Products And Ideas India Pvt Ltd Vs Nilkamal Limited

Introduction: The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has overturned a single judge’s decision and revived an interim injunction in a hotly contested dispute over the “STELLADEXIN” and “STELLA” marks used on commercial induction cookers. The case highlights how Indian trademark law protects a registered owner in India even when the foreign manufacturer claims rights abroad. For ordinary readers, this simply means that if you register a brand name in India first and build its reputation here, no one can import similar-looking products without your permission – even if the original Chinese maker allows it. The judgment clarifies two important defences often misused in such cases and sends a clear message: foreign rights do not automatically override Indian registrations.

Factual Background: Products and Ideas India Private Limited, the appellant, entered into an Exclusive Agency Agreement with Stella Industrial Co. Ltd. (a Chinese company) in April 2017. Under this agreement the Chinese firm allowed the Indian company to decide designs and logos for selling induction cookers in India. The Indian company started selling these cookers under the mark “STELLADEXIN” (which is the English version of the Chinese “STELLA ”) from 2017 onwards. With explicit permission from the Chinese company, the Indian firm registered the word mark “STELLADEXIN” in India in February 2022 in classes covering induction cookers. It also registered the logo under copyright law in July 2024. Over the years the appellant built substantial goodwill, with sales reaching ₹16.27 crores in 2022-23 alone.

Meanwhile, Cambro-Nilkamal Private Limited (Respondent 2), part of a joint venture with Nilkamal Limited, began selling induction cookers branded simply “STELLA” on its website. These cookers were imported directly from the same Chinese company. The appellant discovered this in June 2024 and filed a suit alleging trademark infringement and passing off, claiming that “STELLA” was confusingly similar to its registered “STELLADEXIN” mark.

Procedural Background: The suit was filed in the Delhi High Court. On 27 August 2024 a single judge granted an ex-parte interim injunction stopping Respondent 2 from using the “STELLA” mark. Later, Respondent 2 applied to vacate that injunction, and the appellant sought its continuation. On 1 July 2025 the single judge dismissed the appellant’s applications and allowed Respondent 2’s application, vacating the injunction entirely. The single judge relied mainly on two provisions of the Trade Marks Act: Section 34 (prior user defence) and Section 30(3) (international exhaustion of rights). Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the Division Bench. 

Reasoning: The Division Bench identified three core questions. First, was the single judge correct in saying the Chinese company had prior rights under Section 34? The court examined the four old invoices the Chinese company had produced to prove sales in India since 2013 through another distributor. Two invoices did not mention the mark at all, and the other two were only proforma (tentative) invoices that do not prove actual sales. The court noted that mere sales without showing continuous use of the exact mark “STELLA” or “STELLADEXIN” in India do not qualify for the prior-user defence. Use in China was irrelevant because Indian trademark law protects reputation built inside India.

Second, even if the Chinese company had some defence, that defence could not automatically protect Respondent 2. Importing goods bearing a mark registered in India by someone else amounts to “use” of the trademark under the law, regardless of who the foreign supplier is.

Third, the single judge had applied the principle of international exhaustion under Section 30(3). The Division Bench explained this principle in simple terms: once a trademark owner puts genuine goods in the market anywhere in the world, the owner cannot stop their resale in India – but only if the Indian registered owner gave consent. Here the Chinese company had no registration in India; only the appellant was the registered owner. The appellant had never consented to Respondent 2 importing and selling the goods. Therefore Section 30(3) simply did not apply. The court politely pointed out that the single judge’s observation – “any person in India can import goods bearing any foreign trademark” – was not correct in law.

Judgements with complete citation and their context discussed: The Division Bench carefully considered several important precedents while explaining why the single judge’s approach was incorrect. It referred to Wander India Ltd v. Antox (India) P. Ltd (1990 Supp (1) SCC 727) and Pernod Ricard v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701) to remind itself that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with interim orders, yet must correct clear legal errors that affect the rights of parties. These cases guided the limited scope of review but ultimately supported reversal because the single judge’s findings lacked factual basis.

On the issue of proforma invoices, the Bench relied on the Kerala High Court’s clear ruling in Karn Vir Mehta v. Collector of Customs (1997 SCC OnLine Ker 238), where it was held that a proforma invoice is merely a tentative price quote and cannot prove an actual sale unless supported by further evidence. This helped the court discard the Chinese company’s invoices as insufficient proof of continuous prior use.

The single judge had heavily relied on the Division Bench’s earlier decision in Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. and its follow-up in Seagate Technology LLC v. Daichi International (2024 SCC OnLine Del 3767) to apply international exhaustion. The present Bench explained the context of those cases: they dealt with genuine products put on the market by the actual Indian registered owner or with its consent. Here the situation was different – the Indian registered owner (the appellant) had never consented. The Bench also drew support from its own recent judgment in Western Digital Technologies Inc. v. Geonix International (P) Ltd. (2026 SCC OnLine Del 901), where it had already clarified that Section 30(3) protects only the rights of the Indian registered proprietor and does not extend to foreign registrations.

Final Decision of Court: The Division Bench quashed the single judge’s order dated 1 July 2025 in its entirety. It remanded the interim injunction applications back to the single judge for fresh decision, directing that the earlier ex-parte injunction granted on 27 August 2024 would immediately revive and remain in force until the single judge passes a fresh reasoned order. The parties were directed to appear before the single judge on 2 April 2026, and the matter was to be decided expeditiously without any adjournments. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles two crucial principles in simple, practical terms. First, the prior-user defence under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act requires clear and continuous proof of actual use of the exact mark in India before the plaintiff’s registration or use – tentative invoices or sales without the mark mentioned will not suffice. Second, the doctrine of international exhaustion under Section 30(3) applies only when the goods have been placed in the market by the Indian registered trademark owner or with its explicit consent; a foreign manufacturer’s permission or foreign registration does not override an Indian registration. In everyday language, if you register a brand in India and the foreign supplier later allows someone else to import similar goods, that importer can still be stopped by an Indian court.

Suitable Titles

Delhi High Court Revives Injunction in STELLADEXIN Trademark Battle: Foreign Rights Do Not Override Indian Registration

Key Trademark Lesson from Delhi High Court: Why Importing “STELLA” Cookers Was Held Infringing

Prior User of Trademark and International Exhaustion Clarified: Delhi HC Sets Aside Single Judge Order in Induction Cooker Case

Suitable Tags

TrademarkInfringement, DelhiHighCourt, STELLADEXIN, TradeMarksAct, InternationalExhaustion, Section34, Section30, IntellectualPropertyIndia, BrandProtection, InductionCookers, IPLaw,

Headnote

Delhi High Court Division Bench sets aside Single Judge’s vacation of interim injunction in “STELLADEXIN” vs “STELLA” induction cooker trademark suit; holds that Section 34 prior user defence requires continuous use of the mark in India (not proved by proforma invoices) and Section 30(3) international exhaustion applies only with consent of Indian registered proprietor; revives injunction and remands applications for fresh decision.

Case Title: Products And Ideas India Pvt Ltd Vs Nilkamal Limited and Ors

Date of Order: 23 March 2026

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2385-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs Union of India

Introduction:A company facing a tough notice under a new banking law passed by Parliament in Delhi, wants to challenge the entire law as unconstitutional, so it rushes to the Delhi High Court simply because Parliament sits there. The High Court says no, you cannot file here. The Supreme Court agrees and explains in crystal-clear terms why. This 2004 judgment is like a rulebook for every citizen or business wanting to question a central law in court. It tells us that just because the law was made in Delhi does not mean Delhi courts get automatic power to hear the case. There must be a real link – something actually happened to you in that court’s area. The decision protects courts from being flooded with cases from across India and ensures fairness by sending disputes to the right place.

Factual Background:Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. was a company with its registered office in Mumbai. It had taken a loan from the Bhopal branch of the State Bank of India. When the company faced repayment issues, the bank issued a notice from Bhopal under the new Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). This law was passed by Parliament and applied all over India. The company did not like the law itself and wanted to argue that the whole Act was unconstitutional. Instead of filing in Mumbai or Bhopal where the loan and notice were handled, it chose the Delhi High Court. The only reason given was that the law was made by Parliament sitting in Delhi and the Union of India has its office there.

Procedural Background:The company filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court questioning the constitutional validity of the SARFAESI Act. The High Court dismissed the petition straight away, saying it had no territorial jurisdiction because no part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi. The company appealed to the Supreme Court of India. Before the Supreme Court, the company repeated the same argument: since the constitutionality of a parliamentary law was in question and Parliament sits in Delhi, the Delhi High Court must have power to hear it. The Union of India opposed the appeal and said the petition was rightly thrown out because the loan, the bank branch, and the notice were all in Bhopal and Mumbai, not Delhi. 

Reasoning:The Supreme Court began by explaining what “cause of action” really means in simple words. Cause of action is the complete set of facts that give you the right to sue. It is not every tiny detail mentioned in the petition, but only those important facts that prove your legal right and connect directly to the relief you want. Even if a small part of those facts happens inside a High Court’s area, that court can hear the case. But the court warned that this small part cannot be used as a trick to drag every case to Delhi.

The judges drew a sharp line between “legislation” and “executive action”. Legislation means the Act passed by Parliament or a State Assembly, or even rules made under it. Simply passing a law in Delhi does not create any cause of action anywhere. The law applies to the whole country once the President signs it and it is published in the Gazette. A person can challenge it only when that law actually affects him or her – when some official applies it and causes real harm or civil consequences. Until then, there is no dispute to decide, and no court can jump in. A writ court cannot decide big constitutional questions in a vacuum with no real victim in its territory.

The Supreme Court said the mere fact that the Union of India’s office or Parliament is in Delhi does not give the Delhi High Court power over every challenge to central laws. If that were true, every citizen from Kashmir to Kanyakumari could file in Delhi and overload the court. The judges looked at the exact words of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, which allows a High Court to act only where the cause of action arises wholly or in part. They compared it with Section 20(c) of the Civil Procedure Code and said the same principles apply to writ petitions too.

The Court also explained that when an order is passed by any authority – even under a new law – the place where that order is issued becomes part of the cause of action. If there is an appeal or revision, the place where that higher order is passed also counts. But the place where the law itself was debated or signed does not count. The Supreme Court rejected the company’s argument completely and said the Delhi High Court was right to dismiss the petition.

Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed: The Supreme Court discussed several earlier cases to build its reasoning step by step. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu ((1994) 4 SCC 711), the Court had already held that territorial jurisdiction depends only on the facts pleaded in the petition, not on whether those facts are true or false. It also made clear that sending a fax or receiving a reply in Calcutta does not create jurisdiction there if the main dispute is elsewhere. The same principle was used here to show that the company’s petition had no real Delhi connection.

In State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties ((1985) 3 SCC 217), the Court ruled that merely serving a notice does not create cause of action unless the notice itself is the core of the dispute. This helped explain why the mere existence of the SARFAESI Act in the statute book was not enough.

Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engg. Enterprises (P) Ltd. ((1994) 4 SCC 710) was cited to criticise parties who deliberately choose a wrong court. The judges said the company’s move to Delhi looked like forum shopping.

Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. ((2002) 1 SCC 567) and National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram ((2004) 9 SCC 786) reinforced that only facts having a direct nexus with the prayer matter. Facts with no link to the relief cannot create jurisdiction.

The company had relied on Nasiruddin v. STAT ((1975) 2 SCC 671) and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P. ((1995) 4 SCC 738). The Supreme Court clarified Nasiruddin and actually overruled the Chini Mill case on this point. It explained that these older rulings were about appellate orders passed in a particular place, not about the seat of the legislature itself.

Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 532) was distinguished because it was decided before Article 226(2) was added to the Constitution. The old rule no longer applies. Finally, the Court referred to Abdul Kafi Khan v. Union of India (AIR 1979 Cal 354) to support its view that Delhi cannot become the default forum for every central law challenge.

The Final Decision of Court:The Supreme Court dismissed the company’s appeal in full. It confirmed that the Delhi High Court had correctly refused to entertain the writ petition. The company was told it should have approached the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over Mumbai or Bhopal where the loan and the bank notice originated. The Court made it clear that no costs were awarded.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment settled a very important rule that still guides every High Court in India today. The seat of Parliament or the Union Government in Delhi does not by itself create territorial jurisdiction for the Delhi High Court to hear challenges to the constitutional validity of central laws. A writ petition can be filed only where the cause of action arises – that is, where the law has actually been applied to the petitioner and caused real civil consequences. Mere framing or passing of legislation anywhere in India does not give rise to a cause of action. Even a small part of the cause of action can give jurisdiction, but courts can still refuse the case under the doctrine of forum conveniens if it is not the most convenient place. This principle applies equally to challenges against parliamentary Acts, delegated legislation, rules, or executive orders. The decision prevents misuse of Delhi courts and ensures that disputes are heard where they actually belong, making justice faster and fairer for ordinary citizens and businesses.

Case Title: Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs Union of India and Another

Date of Order: 28 April 2004

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 9159 of 2003

Neutral Citation: (2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 254

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha (for the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.N. Khare, C.J., Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia)

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable Titles for this Article:

Supreme Court Says No to Filing Every Central Law Challenge in Delhi High Court

Kusum Ingots Case: Why Seat of Parliament Is Not Enough for Delhi Jurisdiction

Landmark Ruling on Territorial Jurisdiction Under Article 226 – Full Analysis

Suitable Tags for this Article:

Cause of Action and Territorial Jurisdiction Article 226 of Constitution of India , Cause of Action Writ Petition India, Kusum Ingots Supreme Court Judgment, Delhi High Court Jurisdiction Central Laws, SARFAESI Act Challenge, Forum Conveniens Doctrine, Supreme Court 2004 Judgments, Article 226(2) Constitution

Headnote of Article

In a landmark 2004 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the mere seat of Parliament or the Union of India in Delhi does not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court to entertain a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of a parliamentary Act. Cause of action arises only when the law is implemented and causes civil consequences to the petitioner; passing of legislation alone creates no cause of action anywhere. The appeal was dismissed, settling that writ petitions must be filed where the real dispute originates, not at the legislative capital.

Embassy of Peru Vs. Union of India

Introduction: Two neighbouring countries in South America both producing a popular grape-based brandy called "Pisco" for hundreds of years. One country wants exclusive rights to call its version simply "Pisco" in India, while the other says both have been using the name for ages and consumers would get confused. This real-life story reached the Delhi High Court in a battle between the Embassy of Peru and a Chilean producers' association. The court delivered a clear, practical verdict that protects consumers while allowing both sides to keep using their traditional names with a small but important change. The decision explains in simple terms how India's Geographical Indications law works when the same product name comes from two different places.

Factual Background:Pisco is a traditional alcoholic drink made by distilling fermented grapes. Peru has long claimed it as its own, linking the name and the drink to specific valleys in its territory like Ica and Tacna. Peru argued that Pisco originated there centuries ago, tied to its soil, climate, grape varieties, and traditional distillation methods passed down through generations. Chile, on the other hand, has been making its own version of Pisco since at least the 19th century, with laws, exports, and free trade agreements recognising it worldwide. Chilean producers stored the spirit in special clay pots called "piscos," and over time the name stuck to their drink too. Both countries make slightly different versions – Peruvian Pisco is often stronger and more aromatic, while Chilean Pisco tends to be softer – but both have used the exact same word "Pisco" for their products for a very long time. Neither side denied the other's production; the fight was only about who gets to own the name in India.

Procedural Background:Peru, through its Embassy in New Delhi, applied to register "PISCO" as a Geographical Indication under India's GI Act of 1999 for its alcoholic beverage. The Chilean association opposed the application, saying the name belongs to both countries and granting it only to Peru would confuse buyers. In 2009, the Assistant Registrar approved registration but only as "PERUVIAN PISCO" to avoid mix-ups. Peru appealed to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, which in 2018 removed the "Peruvian" prefix and allowed plain "PISCO" for Peru. Chile challenged this in the Delhi High Court through a writ petition. In July 2025, a single judge set aside the Appellate Board's order and restored the "PERUVIAN PISCO" registration while allowing Chile's separate application to move forward. Peru then filed this Letters Patent Appeal before a division bench, arguing it deserved the plain name without any extra word.

Reasoning:The court looked at the heart of India's Geographical Indications law, especially Section 9, which acts like a strict safety valve. Even if a product perfectly meets the basic definition of a GI – meaning it has a special link to its place of origin – it cannot be registered if using that name would deceive or confuse ordinary people. The judges found clear evidence that Chile has been making and selling Pisco for nearly a century, backed by old laws, huge export records, and international trade deals. Granting Peru the exclusive right to call its drink simply "Pisco" would make buyers think every bottle labelled Pisco comes from Peru, even when it actually comes from Chile. This confusion is exactly what Section 9(a) forbids. The court rejected Peru's claim that Chile "stole" the name in 1936 by renaming a town – calling such old disputes irrelevant when both countries have long, honest use. Historical stories, old maps, and grape-growing details were interesting but did not change the fact that two different Piscos exist side by side in the market. The judges also explained that free trade agreements are strong proof that the world already knows Chilean Pisco as a real product, not something fake. On the other hand, the court said Section 9(g), which stops false claims about origin, does not apply here because Peru was not lying about its own product coming from Peru.

Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed: The division bench carefully studied earlier rulings and legal principles but found no direct Indian judgment on this exact point, which is why it gave a detailed walkthrough of the GI Act itself. It referred to the definition of Geographical Indication in Section 2(1)(e), explaining that a GI must point clearly to one place and cannot be a generic word anyone can use anywhere. The court discussed Section 10 on homonymous (same-sounding) GIs, noting it only kicks in when one GI is already registered and someone applies for an identical name for a different product – not the situation here, as no prior Pisco GI existed on India's register. It also examined Section 11(6), which gives the Registrar wide power to add conditions or changes when approving an application, including prefixes like "Peruvian" to prevent confusion. The single judge's July 2025 decision (in WP(C)-IPD 17/2021) was partly upheld for correctly using this power, but criticised for treating the registration as a "homonymous GI" when that legal route was not available. The Appellate Board's 2018 order was overturned because it ignored the confusion risk. International references like WIPO guidelines on homonymous indications were considered helpful but not binding, as Indian law has its own clear rules. The judges also cited general principles from cases like Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074  to confirm that the word "shall" in Section 9 makes the ban on confusing names mandatory, not optional.

The Final Decision of Court:After weighing everything, the Delhi High Court dismissed Peru's appeal completely. Peru cannot register the plain word "PISCO" as a Geographical Indication in India because it would confuse consumers who already know Chilean Pisco exists. However, the court upheld the original decision to register "PERUVIAN PISCO," meaning Peru keeps protection for its version with the clarifying prefix. Chile's separate application for "CHILEAN PISCO" can now proceed normally. The court made it clear that Peru can even surrender the "Peruvian Pisco" registration if it wants, but it has no right to the standalone name. No costs were awarded to either side.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:This judgment settles several important rules for anyone dealing with Geographical Indications in India. First, Section 9(a) is an absolute bar – if two countries have been using the same name for similar goods for a long time, neither gets the plain name if buyers could mix them up; priority of use or old history does not matter. Second, homonymous GIs can only be registered through a proper application when an identical name is already on the register, not automatically by a court adding prefixes. Third, the Registrar has broad power under Section 11(6) to modify a GI name by adding words like country names to avoid confusion, and courts can uphold such changes in review. Fourth, international trade agreements and long-term foreign laws can prove a product's real-world use and origin, even if they are not Indian statutes. Finally, the GI Act focuses on protecting consumers and genuine links to place, not on rewarding the first user or punishing old border changes between countries. These clear guidelines will help future GI applications involving shared names across borders.

Case Title: Embassy of Peru Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 18 March 2026

Case Number: LPA 577/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2259-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable Titles for this Article:

Peru Loses Standalone Pisco GI Claim in India – Delhi High Court Orders 'Peruvian Pisco' Only

Pisco Brandy Battle: Why Delhi High Court Said No to Plain 'Pisco' for Peru

Chile Vs Peru Pisco Dispute:  Peru Loses Standalone Pisco GI Claim in India

Suitable Tags for this Article:

Geographical Indication Law India, Pisco GI Case, Peru Embassy Delhi High Court, Peruvian Pisco Judgment, Section 9 GI Act Confusion, Homonymous Geographical Indications, Chile Pisco Export, Delhi High Court IP Judgment 2026, GI Registration Rules India, Alcoholic Beverage GI Dispute

Headnote of Article

In this ruling on shared geographical names, the Delhi High Court held that Peru cannot register the standalone GI "PISCO" for its brandy because Chile's long-standing production would confuse consumers under Section 9(a) of the GI Act. The court upheld registration of "PERUVIAN PISCO" as a valid modification under Section 11(6), dismissed claims of dishonest adoption by Chile, clarified that homonymous GIs require prior registration, and ruled that international trade agreements prove real-world use. The appeal was dismissed, settling that GI protection prioritises consumer clarity over historical priority.

Smt.Maya Gupta and Ors Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and ors

Introduction:The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur has delivered a clear ruling that protects consumers and genuine brands from those who try to sell fake or substandard goods by copying famous names. Court  refused to stop criminal proceedings against a group of people running a factory called Polyset Pipe Industries. The company was accused of making low-quality PVC pipes and then sticking famous brand names like “Jain Pipes”, “Super Jain” or “Jindal Gold” on them to fool buyers into thinking they were buying genuine products from the well-known Jain Irrigation Systems Limited. The court said this is not just a simple business quarrel over trademarks or copyright – it involves cheating ordinary people and selling unsafe goods, so the police case must go to full trial. 

Factual Background:Jain Irrigation Systems Limited is a reputed company that makes high-quality PVC pipes used in farming, water supply and construction. On 19 December 2021, the company complained to the police station in Chargawan, Jabalpur, that some people running Polyset Pipe Industries were manufacturing cheap, sub-standard plastic pipes in their factory. According to the complaint, these people were deliberately putting Jain’s brand name or similar-sounding names on their own inferior pipes and selling them in the market. Customers who asked for “Jain Pipes” or other popular brands were given these fake versions instead. The police investigated and found that the pipes did not meet the quality standards of real branded products. They also discovered that the accused would change the brand name on the pipes depending on what the customer wanted that day – sometimes calling them Jain, sometimes Super Jain or Jindal Gold. This was not a small mistake; it was a planned way to cheat buyers and make quick money by riding on the reputation of a trusted company.

Procedural Background:After the complaint, the police registered an FIR (Crime No. 443/2021) against Maya Gupta, Sandeep Gupta, Gulab Chand Gupta and others for serious offences – cheating (Section 420 IPC), forgery (Sections 468 and 471 IPC) and violations under the Copyright Act (Sections 51, 63 and 68). The police carried out a proper investigation, collected documents, tested the quality of the pipes and recorded statements. They then filed a charge-sheet in court, saying there was enough evidence to put the accused on trial. The accused persons, instead of waiting for trial, rushed to the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC. They filed three connected petitions asking the court to quash the entire FIR and the criminal case, arguing that it was only a civil dispute about trademarks and copyright and that the police had wrongly started a criminal matter just because of business rivalry.

Reasoning:The High Court carefully read the FIR, the charge-sheet and all the arguments from both sides. It found that the accusations were not vague or imaginary. The complainants had shown specific acts – making sub-standard pipes and then labelling them with famous brand names to trick customers. This is classic cheating because buyers were induced to pay for something they thought was genuine and high-quality. The court noted that during investigation the pipes were tested and found to be of poor quality, which could harm users. The accused claimed they had proper factory registrations like GST and MSME, but the court said that having legal papers for the factory does not give anyone the right to cheat the public by misusing someone else’s brand.

The court explained that when brand misuse is coupled with dishonest intention and actual deception of customers, it crosses the line from a civil trademark dispute into a criminal offence. It is not enough for the accused to say “this is only about copyright” – the police have already found evidence of forgery and cheating. The court also observed that the complaint was not filed out of personal grudge; it came after Jain Irrigation discovered fake products in the market. Therefore, letting the case continue will not be an abuse of law; instead, stopping it now would harm genuine businesses and consumers.

Judgements with complete citation and their context discussed:The court relied heavily on landmark Supreme Court decisions that guide when a High Court can or cannot quash a criminal case. The most important was State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Suppl. 1 SCC 335). In that case the Supreme Court gave a list of rare situations where criminal proceedings can be stopped at the very beginning . The Madhya Pradesh High Court used this to say that the present FIR clearly mentions cheating and forgery, so it does not fall in any of those rare categories.

Next, the court discussed Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander & Anr. (2012) 9 SCC 460. Here the Supreme Court warned that High Courts should not act like mini-trial courts and start weighing evidence while deciding a quashing petition. The judge quoted this to explain that he could only check whether a basic offence is shown on paper; he cannot decide who is telling the truth – that job belongs to the trial court.

The court also referred to Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2020) 10 SCC 180, where the Supreme Court said criminal investigations must normally be allowed to run their course unless there is a very strong reason to stop them. This helped the court reject the petitioners’ request to kill the case before trial.

The final decision of court:After examining everything, the High Court dismissed all three connected petitions. It held that the FIR and the charge-sheet disclose a clear prima facie case of cheating, forgery and copyright violations. The criminal proceedings will continue before the trial court, which will now hear the full evidence and decide whether the accused are guilty or not. The court made it clear that its order should not influence the trial judge.

Point of law settled in the case:This judgment settles an important practical rule: when someone is accused of using a famous brand name on sub-standard goods and actually cheating customers, the matter cannot be dismissed as a mere civil trademark or copyright dispute. Such cases involve public interest and criminal cheating, so the High Court will not quash the FIR under Section 482 CrPC. The accused must face trial where all facts can be properly examined. This protects honest businesses and ordinary buyers from fake products sold under trusted names.

Case Title: Smt.Maya Gupta and Ors Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and ors  

Date of Order: 17 March 2026

Case Number: Misc Crl. Case No. 42300 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:MPHC:JBP:22421

Name of court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Shri Justice B. P. Sharma

Disclaimer:Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

Madhya Pradesh High Court Says Fake Jain Pipes Case is Criminal – Refuses to Quash FIR Against Polyset Industries

Brand Cheating Not Just Civil Dispute: High Court Allows Trial Against Manufacturers Selling Sub-Standard Pipes as Jain Brand

Consumer Protection Wins: Jabalpur High Court Rejects Quashing Plea in Trademark Forgery and Cheating Case

Suggested Tags

Madhya Pradesh High Court, Section 482 CrPC, Trademark Infringement, Copyright Act 1957, Cheating IPC 420, PVC Pipes Forgery, Jain Irrigation Systems, Fake Branded Goods, Polyset Pipe Industries

Headnote of Article

High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismisses petitions under Section 482 CrPC filed by manufacturers of Polyset Pipe Industries accused of passing off sub-standard PVC pipes as products of Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd. by misusing brand names; court holds that allegations disclose prima facie offences of cheating, forgery and copyright violation requiring full trial and cannot be quashed as mere civil dispute.

Sujoy Ghosh Vs The State of Jharkhand

Introduction:The Supreme Court of India has delivered a strong message to filmmakers and copyright claimants: criminal proceedings cannot be started lightly just because someone feels their story idea was copied. In a clear and well-reasoned judgment, the Court completely quashed a criminal case filed against renowned director and screenwriter Sujoy Ghosh, the creator of the blockbuster film “Kahaani” and its sequel “Kahaani-2: Durga Rani Singh”. The complainant had accused Ghosh of stealing his script “Sabak” and making the film without permission. The Supreme Court found that the entire case was baseless, frivolous, and an abuse of the legal process. This ruling protects creative artists from harassment through false criminal complaints and reminds magistrates that they must carefully apply their mind before summoning anyone in a copyright case. It is especially important for the film industry, where ideas and scripts are often similar but independent creation is common.

Factual Background:Sujoy Ghosh is a well-known film director and screenwriter. He made the hit film “Kahaani” which released in March 2012 and won him a National Award for Best Screenplay in 2013. Later, he developed the sequel “Kahaani-2: Durga Rani Singh”. He had already registered the first half of its script with the Screen Writers Association (SWA) on 10 October 2013. The full script was also registered by December 2013 under different working titles. The film was released in December 2016.

A complainant from Hazaribagh claimed that he met Ghosh in Mumbai on 29 June 2015, gave him a copy of his own script titled “Sabak”, and later registered it with SWA on 31 July 2015. After watching “Kahaani-2”, he felt the film copied his script. He first complained to SWA, which set up an expert committee. In February 2018, the SWA experts compared both works and clearly said there was no similarity at all; they rejected the complaint. Despite this expert finding, the complainant filed a criminal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate in Hazaribagh, accusing Ghosh and another person of copyright theft under Sections 63, 65 and 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957, and extortion under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code. He alleged that most scenes in the film were taken from his script.

Procedural Background:The SWA expert committee had already dismissed the claim before the magistrate took up the case. The magistrate recorded statements of the complainant’s brother and cousin and, in June 2018, issued summons against Ghosh without giving any detailed reasons or mentioning the SWA report. Ghosh then approached the Jharkhand High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to get the criminal case quashed, arguing that the complaint was false and the magistrate had not applied his mind. The High Court refused and said the truth should be tested only at trial. Ghosh finally approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition, which was converted into a Criminal Appeal. The Supreme Court heard the matter and delivered its judgment on 20 March 2026.

Reasoning:The Supreme Court carefully examined the complaint, the statements of witnesses, the summoning order, and all surrounding facts. It found that the complaint only made vague and general statements like “most scenes were based on complainant’s script” without pointing out even a single specific scene, dialogue, or plot point that was copied. There was no material to show any similarity. The Court noted that the complainant had deliberately hidden the SWA expert committee’s order which had already ruled there was no similarity. This concealment itself showed the complaint was not honest.

Even more importantly, Ghosh had registered his script years before the complainant ever wrote or registered “Sabak”. The Court observed that Ghosh’s work existed in 2012-2013 while the complainant’s script came only in 2015, so copying was impossible. The magistrate’s summoning order was described as mechanical and passed without any real application of mind. The High Court had also failed to notice these glaring defects. The Supreme Court held that criminal law cannot be set in motion casually; summoning an accused is a serious step and the magistrate must satisfy himself that a real offence is prima facie made out. When proceedings are clearly frivolous and vexatious, courts must step in under Section 482 CrPC to stop the harassment.

The Supreme Court  observed that a magistrate cannot issue summons mechanically; he must carefully look at the material and even question the complainant if needed to check if the allegations are true.

The final decision of court:The Supreme Court allowed Sujoy Ghosh’s appeal. It quashed the summoning order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 07 June 2018, the High Court order dated 22 April 2025, and the entire criminal proceedings in Complaint Case No.1267 of 2017 pending before the CJM, Hazaribagh. Ghosh and the co-accused were discharged completely. No costs were awarded.

Point of law settled in the case:This judgment settles that in criminal complaints for copyright infringement, the magistrate must find prima facie evidence of actual copying or similarity before issuing summons; a mere general allegation is not enough. An independent expert body’s finding of no similarity (even if not binding) is a strong circumstance that the court must consider. When the accused’s work was created and registered much earlier than the complainant’s, the charge of theft becomes impossible. Concealment of material facts like an expert rejection order makes the complaint malicious and liable to be quashed. Most importantly, criminal law cannot be used as a tool to harass creative persons through vexatious proceedings; courts have a duty to quash such cases at the earliest stage under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process.

Case Title: Sujoy Ghosh Vs The State of Jharkhand & anr 

Date of Order: 20 March 2026

Case No. SLP (Crl.) No. 9452 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 267

Name of court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Alok Aradhe (author) with Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

Disclaimer:Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

Supreme Court Quashes Criminal Case Against “Kahaani” Director Sujoy Ghosh – Copyright Complaint Called Frivolous

No Similarity, No Case: Supreme Court Protects Filmmaker from False Copyright Theft Allegations in Kahaani-2 Dispute

Creative Freedom Wins: SC Says Vague Script Theft Claims and Copyright Criminal Complaints

Suggested Tags

Supreme Court of India, Sujoy Ghosh, Kahaani-2, Copyright Infringement, Frivolous Complaint, Section 482 CrPC, Film Script Theft, SWA Expert Committee, Quashing of Proceedings, Abuse of Process

Headnote of Article

Supreme Court quashes entire criminal proceedings against director Sujoy Ghosh in Kahaani-2 copyright case, holding that vague allegations without proof of similarity, concealment of SWA expert rejection, and prior registration by the filmmaker make the complaint manifestly frivolous and an abuse of law.

TV Today Network Limited Vs News Laundry Media Pvt.Ltd

Introduction:This ruling balances the rights of media houses against free speech and fair criticism, the High Court of Delhi has partly allowed an appeal by TV Today Network Limited (the company behind Aaj Tak and India Today) against News Laundry Media Private Limited. The court ordered the removal of certain highly derogatory remarks from News Laundry’s videos while refusing a blanket ban on their content. This decision highlights how courts handle disputes between rival media platforms where one accuses the other of defamation, commercial disparagement, and copyright infringement through online reviews and critiques. The judgment is easy to understand: it protects reputation from clear insults but does not silence legitimate media criticism.

Factual Background:TV Today Network Limited runs popular television channels such as Aaj Tak and India Today. It claimed that News Laundry, an independent digital media company known for satirical reviews of news channels, had repeatedly used clips from its broadcasts without proper permission and made extremely insulting comments. Examples included calling the channel’s work “shit standards,” its reporters “shit reporters,” anchors “high on weed or opium,” and referring to punctuation as “as bad as your journalism.” News Laundry argued that its videos were fair reviews meant to critique media bias and hold powerful channels accountable. It said it gave credit to the original clips, used only short excerpts, and transformed them with its own commentary, satire, and public-interest journalism. TV Today filed a commercial suit seeking to stop these videos and remove the content, claiming huge damage to its reputation and copyright.

Procedural Background:TV Today moved an application for an immediate temporary injunction to stop News Laundry from using its clips and to remove the offending videos. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court found that some statements were clearly defamatory and disparaging on the face of it and that a prima facie case existed. However, the Single Judge refused the injunction, holding that the balance of convenience favoured News Laundry and that TV Today would not suffer irreparable injury because any loss could be compensated by money damages later. Both sides appealed. TV Today challenged the refusal of the injunction, while News Laundry challenged the finding that a prima facie case of defamation existed. The Division Bench heard both cross-appeals together.

Reasoning:The Division Bench first confirmed that the Commercial Court had jurisdiction to hear the entire suit because the copyright claim brought the matter within the Commercial Courts Act, and the connected claims of defamation and disparagement could also be tried there. On copyright, the court agreed with the Single Judge that whether News Laundry’s use of clips qualified as “fair dealing” for criticism and review was a complex factual question that could only be decided after a full trial. It refused any interim order stopping the use of clips.

On defamation and commercial disparagement, the court agreed that statements like “shit reporters,” “shit show,” “high on weed or opium,” and “Your punctuation is as bad as your journalism” were clearly insulting and went beyond fair criticism. It rejected News Laundry’s argument that the two companies were not competitors simply because one earned from advertisements and the other from subscriptions. In today’s digital world, both reach the same audience, so the remarks amounted to commercial disparagement aimed at harming TV Today’s reputation.

The court then examined the “triple test” for injunctions – prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. While the Single Judge had correctly found a prima facie case, the Division Bench held that the Single Judge had wrongly applied the other two tests. It explained that the mere fact that a defence of justification or fair dealing is pleaded cannot automatically tilt the balance against granting relief. The plaintiff’s reputation is at risk right now, while removing a few specific remarks would cause no real hardship to News Laundry. The court also clarified that the ability to claim damages later does not mean the injury is not “irreparable” – some harm to reputation cannot be fully fixed by money. Therefore, limited interim relief was necessary to protect TV Today until the trial.

Judgements with complete citation and their context discussed:The court relied on several important precedents to explain its reasoning. In Wander Ltd v Antox India (P) Ltd (1990 Supp SCC 727), it reminded itself that an appellate court should interfere with an interim order only if the Single Judge acted arbitrarily or ignored settled law – a principle that guided how strictly it reviewed the earlier order. 

For fair dealing in copyright, it discussed Super Cassettes Industries Limited v Mr Chintamani Rao & Ors (2012 (49) PTC 1 (Del)), explaining that only the minimum portion necessary for genuine criticism is allowed and one cannot “piggyback” on another’s work to gain popularity.

On disparagement, the court cited Dabur India Limited v Patanjali Ayurved Limited and Anr (2025 DHC 5232), which defines disparagement as any false or misleading statement that harms a rival’s product or reputation to gain commercial advantage. It also referred to Zydus Wellness Products Ltd v Mr Prashant Desai (2024 DHC 7432) and the Division Bench decision in Reckitt Benckiser (India) Pvt Ltd v Gillette India Ltd (2016 SCC OnLine Del 4737), which laid down clear tests: the statement must specifically target the rival, must be taken seriously, and must go beyond mere puffery or self-praise. For defamation and interim injunctions, the court borrowed the famous “Bonnard standard” from English law (Bonnard v Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269) as applied in Indian cases, stressing that courts must be extremely cautious before stopping publication because free speech is precious. Finally, on irreparable injury, it quoted the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar v Prahlad Singh (1992 1 SCC 719) to show that injury which cannot be fully compensated by damages justifies immediate protection.

The final decision of court:The Division Bench partly allowed TV Today’s appeal and dismissed News Laundry’s cross-appeal. It upheld the Single Judge’s finding of a prima facie case but set aside the refusal of injunction for the disparaging parts. It directed News Laundry to immediately remove the specific remarks – “shit reporters,” “shit show,” “high on weed or opium,” and “Your punctuation is as bad as your journalism” – from the videos and all its social media platforms and websites until the suit is finally decided. No injunction was granted on the copyright claims or other general content. The rest of the suit will continue to trial. There was no order as to costs.

Point of law settled in the case:This judgment settles that in media disparagement cases, once a court finds certain statements are clearly defamatory on the face of it, the mere pleading of a defence of justification or fair dealing cannot automatically deny interim relief. The balance of convenience and irreparable injury must be weighed independently, and protection of reputation can outweigh free-speech concerns when the remarks are malicious and not genuine criticism. It also clarifies that differing business models (advertisement vs subscription) do not prevent two media houses from being treated as competitors in the digital age. Finally, it reinforces that commercial courts can hear composite suits involving copyright along with defamation when the claims arise from the same facts.

Case Title: TV Today Network Limited Vs News Laundry Media Pvt.Ltd. & Ors 

Date of Order: 20.03.2026

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 268/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2339-DB

Name of court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla with Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

Disclaimer:Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

Delhi High Court Orders News Laundry to Remove “Shit Reporters” Remarks from Videos in Aaj Tak Copyright-Disparagement Battle

Reputation Wins Over Satire: High Court Directs Partial Takedown of News Laundry Content Targeting TV Today

Disparagement, Fair Criticism or Malicious Attack? Delhi HC Grants Limited Injunction Against News Laundry in Media Rivalry Case

Suggested Tags

Delhi High Court, TV Today vs News Laundry, Media Disparagement, Copyright Fair Dealing, Interim Injunction, Commercial Courts Act, Defamation in Journalism, Free Speech vs Reputation, Aaj Tak, Satirical News Review

Headnote of Article

Delhi High Court partly allows TV Today’s appeal and directs News Laundry to remove specific derogatory remarks such as “shit reporters” and “shit show” from its videos while refusing blanket injunction on copyright claims, settling key principles on balance of convenience in media disparagement cases.

Novo Nordisk Vs Dr.Reddy Laboratories Limited -DB

The Test of "Person in the Know" in case of Patent Infringement 

Introduction: In this case Imagine a drug company holding a patent on a blockbuster diabetes medicine that is due to expire in just two months. It rushes to court asking for an order to stop a generic competitor from selling the same drug. The lower court says no because the patent looks weak. The company appeals. The High Court listens, but then asks a blunt question: why should we spend court time on a case that will become pointless the moment the patent dies?  This is exactly what happened in the fight between Novo Nordisk and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories over the patent for Semaglutide. 

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal on 9 March 2026, agreeing that the patent was open to a strong challenge because the invention was obvious from an earlier patent. The story is not just about one drug; it tells how Indian courts balance patent protection, public interest and the limited life of every patent.

Factual Background:Novo Nordisk owns Indian Patent No. 262697 (IN’697), granted for “Acylated GLP-1 Analogs Comprising Non-Proteogenic Amino Acid Residue”. The patent claims Semaglutide as one of its specific compounds (Claim 23). The priority date is 18 March 2005. Semaglutide is a once-weekly injection or tablet used to treat type-2 diabetes and obesity. Novo sells it in India under the brand names Wegovy and Rybelsus. In December 2024 Novo learned that Dr. Reddy’s was importing and exporting Semaglutide. Novo believed this infringed its patent. It sent a cease-and-desist notice in May 2025. When Dr. Reddy’s did not stop, Novo filed a commercial suit in May 2025 asking the court to stop Dr. Reddy’s from making or selling the drug and also sought an immediate temporary order (interlocutory injunction) to protect its rights until the full trial.

Procedural Background:The single judge of the Intellectual Property Division heard the injunction application and rejected it on 2 December 2025 after a detailed order. She found that Dr. Reddy’s had raised a credible challenge to the validity of Novo’s patent. Novo filed an appeal before the Division Bench (FAO(OS)(COMM) 204/2025). By the time the appeal was argued and judgment reserved, only about two months remained before the patent would expire on 20 March 2026. The Division Bench reserved judgment on 19 January 2026 and delivered it on 9 March 2026.

Reasoning:The Division Bench began with some strong prefatory thoughts. The judges openly wondered whether they should even spend precious court time on a patent that was about to die. They noted that after 20 March 2026 anyone could make Semaglutide. There was no allegation that Dr. Reddy’s was selling sub-standard medicine. They asked what real harm Novo would suffer in the last two months. Still, because the matter had already been argued, the judges decided they must give a judgment. They made clear they would not re-try the entire case from scratch; they would only check whether the single judge had made any basic legal error (following the famous Wander Ltd principle).

The judges then explained the law in simple terms. 

A patent can be challenged on several grounds listed in Section 64 of the Patents Act. The most important for this case were prior claiming (Section 64(1)(a)), lack of novelty (Section 64(1)(e)) and obviousness (Section 64(1)(f)). At the stage of a temporary injunction the defendant does not have to prove the patent is definitely invalid; it only has to show a “credible challenge”. If such a challenge exists, the court usually refuses to stop the defendant until the full trial.

The court carefully compared Novo’s patent (IN’697) with an earlier patent owned by Novo itself – Indian Patent IN’964 (the “Genus Patent”). IN’964 covered a broad family of GLP-1 compounds and specifically described a compound called Example 61 (Ala Semaglutide). The only difference between that compound and the Semaglutide claimed in IN’697 was the replacement of one amino acid (Ala) with another (Aib) at position 8. 

The single judge had treated this as prior claiming under Section 64(1)(a). The Division Bench disagreed on that exact legal label. Section 64(1)(a) needs the claims to be identical; it is a strict claim-to-claim match. Here the claims were not exactly the same. However, the judges said the single judge’s detailed analysis actually proved something even stronger – that Semaglutide was obvious to a skilled person from the teachings of IN’964. That made the patent vulnerable under Section 64(1)(f).

The court added an important new point. Five inventors were common to both patents. In such cases earlier Division Bench decisions (AstraZeneca AB v Intas and F Hoffmann-La Roche v Natco) say the court should use the stricter “person in the know” test instead of the ordinary “person skilled in the art”. Because the inventors themselves knew the earlier patent inside out, it was even easier for them (or someone like them) to see that changing Ala to Aib would give Semaglutide. The Supreme Court had refused to interfere with those earlier rulings, so the test is now settled law. The judges found that even under this tougher test a credible challenge of obviousness existed.

The Division Bench also looked at the urgency issue again. It said that directing Dr. Reddy’s to keep accounts of sales for the last two months would have been enough protection. There was no need to stop sales completely when the patent was dying anyway.

Judgements with complete citation and their context discussed:The court relied on several key decisions and explained them in easy language. First came Wander Ltd v Antox (India) Pvt Ltd (1990 Supp SCC 727). This Supreme Court case says that in appeals against temporary injunction orders the higher court should not replace the lower court’s view with its own unless the lower court made a clear legal mistake. The Division Bench said it was bound by this rule and would only check for error of principle.

Next the court discussed the two Roche cases – F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Cipla Ltd (Roche-I) (2009) 159 DLT 243 (DB) and the later Roche-II (2016) 65 PTC 1 (DB). These explain what a “credible challenge” means and lay down the five-step test for deciding obviousness. The Division Bench praised the single judge for following those steps but gently noted that at the injunction stage a full five-step mini-trial is not needed; the judge can simply put himself in the shoes of the skilled person and see whether the invention looks obvious.

The court also referred to Novartis AG v Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1 (the famous Glivec case) while discussing genus versus species patents. It explained that when a broad patent already teaches a specific compound, a later narrow patent cannot claim the same thing again.

Importantly the judges cited their own earlier Division Bench rulings – AstraZeneca AB v Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd (2021 SCC OnLine Del 3746) and F Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Natco Pharma Limited (2025 SCC OnLine Del 6390). These introduced the “person in the know” test when inventors overlap. Both judgments have been upheld by the Supreme Court (SLPs dismissed). The court said this test applies here because the same inventors filed both patents.

Finally the court mentioned Pernod Ricard v Karanveer Singh Chhabra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701) to repeat that appellate courts must be slow to interfere with discretionary injunction orders.

The Final Decision of Court: The Division Bench dismissed the appeal in its entirety. It held that the single judge’s order refusing the injunction was correct. The patent was prima facie vulnerable to revocation on the ground of obviousness under Section 64(1)(f) because of the earlier genus patent IN’964. The court made clear that everything said in the judgment was only a prima facie view and would not bind the single judge when the full trial takes place later.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:This judgment settles three important practical points for patent lawyers. First, it draws a clear line between prior claiming under Section 64(1)(a) (which needs identical claims) and obviousness under Section 64(1)(f) (which looks at what a skilled person would find obvious). Second, when the same inventors file a genus patent and a later species patent, courts must apply the stricter “person in the know” test rather than the ordinary skilled-person test. Third, even when a patent is about to expire, courts can still refuse an injunction if a credible challenge to validity is shown; keeping accounts may be enough protection in such short-life cases.

Case Title: Novo Nordisk Vs Dr.Reddy Laboratories Limited and another

Date of Order: 9 March 2026

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 204/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1911-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Headnote of article:

Delhi High Court dismisses Novo Nordisk’s appeal against refusal of interim injunction in Semaglutide patent suit; holds that the patent (IN’697) is prima facie obvious under Section 64(1)(f) from earlier genus patent IN’964; clarifies distinction between prior claiming and obviousness; applies “person in the know” test due to common inventors; reiterates Wander standard and notes limited utility of injunction when patent expires in two months.

SemaglutidePatentLitigation, Section64PatentsAct , ObviousnessChallenge, PriorClaimingDistinction,PersonInTheKnowTest , WanderStandard, InterlocutoryInjunctionAppeal, GLP1Analogue, GenusSpeciesPatent, NovoNordiskDrReddys, DelhiHighCourtIPD, AstraZenecaIntasRatio, RocheCiplaTest, PatentExpiryUrgency,

Geron Corporation Vs. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Introduction: The case addresses a recurring tension in patent jurisprudence: the boundary between patentable technical innovations and non-patentable methods of medical treatment. In an era where personalized medicine and biomarker-driven therapies are gaining prominence, the Court’s ruling assumes critical importance in clarifying whether screening and selection methods for treatment fall within the statutory exclusion of “diagnostic” processes. The judgment provides a deeply reasoned analysis of statutory interpretation, international obligations under TRIPS, and evolving judicial precedents in India.

Factual Background: The appellant, Geron Corporation, a biopharmaceutical entity engaged in developing telomerase inhibitors, filed an Indian national phase patent application titled “Diagnostic Markers for Treating Cell Proliferative Disorders with Telomerase Inhibitors.” The invention related to an in vitro method for identifying cancer patients who would benefit from treatment with telomerase inhibitors based on the relative length of telomeres in cancer cells.

The patent application claimed a method involving the analysis of telomeric nucleic acids from biological samples of individuals diagnosed with or suspected of having cancer. Based on whether the telomere length fell within a specified percentile threshold, the method enabled selection of patients likely to benefit from specific therapeutic intervention. The invention thus operated at the intersection of biomarker detection and therapeutic decision-making.

The Patent Office, however, objected to the application on multiple grounds, including lack of novelty, inventive step, and most significantly, non-patentability under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act. The core objection was that the claimed invention constituted a diagnostic method and was therefore excluded from patentability.

Procedural Background: Following the filing of the application and issuance of the First Examination Report, the appellant submitted responses and amended claims to address objections raised by the Controller. A hearing was conducted, and further written submissions along with amended claims were filed by the appellant.

Despite these efforts, the Controller refused the application by order dated 31.12.2021, holding that the claims fell squarely within the ambit of Section 3(i) as a diagnostic method related to treatment of cancer. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act before the High Court of Delhi.

Reasoning: The Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the statutory framework, particularly Section 3(i), which excludes from patentability any process for medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic, diagnostic, therapeutic, or other treatment of human beings. The central question before the Court was whether the claimed “in vitro screening method” constituted a diagnostic method for treatment.

The Court rejected the appellant’s attempt to distinguish “screening” from “diagnosis” by holding that nomenclature is not determinative. What is crucial is the functional role of the claimed process. If a method contributes to or forms the basis of a treatment decision, it may fall within the scope of “diagnostic” under Section 3(i).

In interpreting the scope of “diagnostic,” the Court relied heavily on prior judicial precedents and Patent Office Guidelines. It emphasized that diagnosis need not be definitive; even a process that aids or influences treatment decisions qualifies as diagnostic. The Court also clarified that the statutory exclusion does not distinguish between in vivo and in vitro methods, thereby rejecting the appellant’s contention that laboratory-based techniques should be patentable.

A key aspect of the reasoning was the application of the “treatment nexus” test. The Court examined whether the claimed method inherently enabled a medical practitioner to make a treatment decision. It found that the method, by determining telomere length and applying a threshold, directly guided the selection of patients for telomerase inhibitor therapy. This, in substance, constituted a diagnostic process integral to treatment.

The Court further observed that granting patent protection to such methods would result in monopolisation of clinical decision-making processes, which is precisely what Section 3(i) seeks to prevent. The legislative intent behind the provision, reinforced by TRIPS, is to ensure that medical practitioners are not constrained by patent rights in performing diagnostic and therapeutic functions.

Judgments with Complete Citations Discussed: The Court engaged in a detailed analysis of prior judicial decisions to articulate the scope of Section 3(i). It relied extensively on Chinese University of Hong Kong v. Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 6372, wherein the Madras High Court held that diagnostic processes must be understood in the context of treatment and include processes capable of identifying pathology for therapeutic purposes.

Further reliance was placed on Chinese University of Hong Kong v. Controller of Patents & Designs, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 8616, which clarified that diagnostic methods are not confined to in vivo procedures and must be interpreted in light of their role in treatment.

The Court also referred to Natera Inc. & Anr. v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2025:DHC:8937, where it was held that processes employed by medical practitioners for diagnosis are excluded from patentability, irrespective of whether they are performed in vivo or in vitro.

Additionally, Sequenom Inc. & Anr. v. The Controller of Patents, 2025:DHC:8926, was cited to reinforce the principle that even non-definitive diagnostic processes, which influence treatment decisions, fall within the exclusion under Section 3(i).

Collectively, these precedents were harmonised to establish that any process contributing to diagnosis for treatment—whether labelled as screening, monitoring, or otherwise—is not patentable.

Decision of the Court: The Court upheld the order of the Controller and dismissed the appeal. It held that the claimed invention, though framed as an in vitro screening method, was in substance a diagnostic method forming the basis of treatment decisions for cancer patients. Consequently, it fell squarely within the exclusion under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act.

The Court further rejected the argument that grant of patents in foreign jurisdictions such as the United States or Europe should influence the Indian position, reiterating that patentability must be assessed strictly in accordance with Indian law.

Point of Law Settled: The judgment conclusively establishes that any method—whether termed as screening, monitoring, or selection—that contributes to or enables a medical practitioner to make a treatment decision qualifies as a “diagnostic method” under Section 3(i) and is therefore not patentable. It further settles that the exclusion applies equally to in vitro processes and that the determinative test is the functional role of the claimed invention in the treatment pathway, not its form or drafting.

Case Title: Geron Corporation Vs. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Date of Order: 17 March 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 244/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2206

Court: High Court of Delhi

Judge: Hon'ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

“Screening or Diagnosis? Delhi High Court Clarifies the Scope of Section 3(i) in Biotechnology Patents”

“Patentability of Diagnostic Methods in India: A Critical Analysis of Geron Corporation Case”

“Biomarkers and the Law: Limits of Patent Protection under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act”

Suggested Tags

Patent Law India, Section 3(i) Patents Act, Diagnostic Methods, Biotechnology Patents, Delhi High Court, Geron Corporation Case, Patent Eligibility, Medical Treatment Exclusion, TRIPS Compliance, Intellectual Property Law

Headnote

The Delhi High Court in Geron Corporation v. Assistant Controller of Patents held that an in vitro screening method for selecting cancer patients based on telomere length for administering telomerase inhibitor therapy constitutes a diagnostic method under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970. The Court ruled that the functional role of the process in influencing treatment decisions is determinative, and not the manner of drafting or labeling of claims. It further clarified that diagnostic methods include both in vivo and in vitro processes and extend to non-definitive tests that guide therapeutic intervention. Consequently, such methods are excluded from patentability

Coromandel Indag Products India Limited Vs Suimoto Chemical Co Ltd

Introduction: The Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling delivered on 18 March 2026, has reaffirmed the narrow and limited scope of Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the context of intellectual property disputes involving trademarks, copyright, and passing off. The Division Bench  allowed the appeal filed by Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd. against the order of a learned Single Judge who had rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action and that the alleged cause of action was purely illusory. The judgment meticulously dissects the distinction between a plaint that fails to disclose any cause of action and one that merely raises triable issues or may ultimately fail on merits. By restoring the suit and directing its trial on merits, the Court has sent a strong message that threshold rejection of plaints in complex IP matters must not become a substitute for a mini-trial or an evaluation of evidence that is the exclusive domain of a full-fledged hearing. The decision underscores the principle that at the stage of Order VII Rule 11(a), the Court is bound to proceed on a demurrer, presuming every averment in the plaint to be true, and cannot import documents filed by the defendant or adjudicate disputed questions of fact or law.

Factual Background: Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd., an Indian agro-chemical company incorporated in 1983 and the parent entity of the Coromandel Group, instituted a suit seeking permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs against Sumitomo Chemical Company Ltd. and its Indian subsidiary on the grounds of copyright infringement, passing off, and dilution of goodwill in respect of the trademark “PADAN” and its packaging. The plaintiff asserted that it had been using the mark “PADAN” continuously since 1988 in relation to insecticides containing Cartap Hydrochloride. It pleaded that under an Agreement dated 06.12.2004, its subsidiary Coromandel Agrico Pvt. Ltd. (CAPL) was granted a royalty-based license to use the plaintiff’s marks including “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50SP”. The plaintiff further claimed that it had independently designed the artistic packaging in 2006, which was protected under the Copyright Act, 1957, and that through extensive sales and promotion it had acquired secondary meaning and exclusive goodwill in the mark. The suit was triggered when, in May-June 2023, the plaintiff discovered that the second defendant had launched an identical product under the same compound with deceptively similar packaging. The plaintiff also pleaded non-use of the mark by the defendants despite their registrations and sought cancellation of those registrations under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The defendants, on the other hand, relied upon their registered proprietorship, a Distribution Agreement dated 26.12.2005 executed with CAPL, and alleged that the plaintiff had no independent rights and had suppressed material documents.

Procedural Background: The defendants moved an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC praying for rejection of the plaint on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action. The learned Single Judge allowed the application vide judgment dated 03.07.2025, holding that the plaintiff could not maintain the suit on behalf of CAPL (a distinct legal entity under liquidation), that the Distribution Agreement had been deliberately withheld and when examined showed that CAPL was merely a non-exclusive licensee of the first defendant, that use by the licensee would inure to the registered proprietor, that the copyright assignment had expired after five years under Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act, and that the plaintiff had failed to establish its own goodwill or sales figures. The Single Judge further opined that the Agreement dated 06.12.2004 appeared fabricated and that the entire suit was vexatious and malicious, rendering the cause of action purely illusory. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 along with an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence. After hearing Senior Counsel Mr. J. Sai Deepak for the appellant and Mr. Rajshekhar Rao for the respondents, the Division Bench reserved judgment on 22.01.2026 and pronounced it on 18.03.2026.

Reasoning:The Division Bench commenced its analysis by reiterating the well-settled jurisprudence on the meaning and scope of “cause of action” as expounded in ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India, and T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal. The Court emphasised that cause of action is a bundle of material facts which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove to obtain relief, and that at the Order VII Rule 11(a) stage the plaint must be read holistically, every averment presumed true, and no inquiry into the merits or defence is permissible. The Bench categorically held that the learned Single Judge had transgressed these parameters by (i) examining the Distribution Agreement filed by the defendants although it was neither sued upon nor formed the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim, (ii) conducting a mini-trial on the validity of the 06.12.2004 Agreement and the copyright assignment, (iii) adjudicating whether sales and promotional expenses of sister concerns inured to the plaintiff, and (iv) prematurely concluding that the cause of action was illusory. The Court clarified that the principle of incorporation by reference laid down in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Education Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust applies only to documents relied upon by the plaintiff as the basis of its claim and cannot be stretched to permit the defendant to defeat the plaint at the threshold by producing contrary documents. The Bench further observed that questions such as whether the plaintiff as parent company could claim benefit of use by its licensee CAPL, whether the license had become naked, whether the packaging constituted original artistic work, and whether the defendants’ registration could be challenged for non-use, were all triable issues requiring evidence and cross-examination. The Court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff lacked locus standi merely because CAPL was under liquidation, holding that the royalty-based license agreement pleaded in the plaint, if taken as true, conferred independent rights on the plaintiff. Similarly, the finding that the copyright had expired was held premature because the scope of the assignment deed, its annexures, and the precise works involved were disputed and required trial. On passing off, the Bench held that the plaint sufficiently pleaded goodwill, misrepresentation through deceptively similar packaging, and likelihood of confusion, which was all that was required at the pleading stage. The Division Bench categorically ruled that the standard for “illusory” cause of action cannot be equated with the summary judgment standard under Order XIII-A Rule 3 CPC, as the former is limited to the face of the plaint while the latter involves deeper scrutiny after pleadings are complete.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: The judgment settles several important points of law. First, at the stage of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, the Court cannot look into documents filed by the defendant unless they are expressly sued upon and form the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim; the principle of incorporation by reference cannot be invoked to defeat the plaint by extraneous material. Second, the enquiry is strictly limited to whether the plaint, read as a whole and presuming its averments true, discloses material facts that, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff to relief; the Court cannot evaluate the probability of success, the veracity of documents, or adjudicate triable issues of fact or law. Third, in IP suits involving trademarks, copyright, and passing off, pleadings of license agreements, continuous use, goodwill, independent creation of artistic works, and deceptive similarity are sufficient to disclose a cause of action; questions of naked licensing, inurement of use by licensees or group companies, expiry of assignments, and prior use by registered proprietors are matters for evidence and cannot justify threshold rejection. Fourth, the concept of an “illusory” cause of action cannot be used as a surrogate for summary judgment; it applies only when the plaint is cleverly drafted to create a mere semblance of a right without pleading the necessary material facts. Fifth, corporate distinction between parent and subsidiary or the insolvency of a licensee does not automatically bar the parent company from suing in its own right when it pleads independent license and goodwill. The ruling thus strengthens the protection of IP rights holders by ensuring that meritorious suits are not prematurely throttled at the pleading stage.

Case Title: Coromandel Indag Products India Limited Vs Suimoto Chemical Co Ltd.and another

Date of Order: 18.03.2026

Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2260-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla 

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable Titles for this Article:

1. Delhi High Court Restores IP Suit: Landmark Ruling on Limits of Plaint Rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC in Trademark & Copyright Disputes
2. “No Mini-Trial at Threshold”: Delhi HC Sets Aside Plaint Rejection in Coromandel v. Sumitomo PADAN Trademark Battle
3. Cause of Action Not Illusory: Division Bench Reinstates Agro-Chemical Passing Off & Copyright Suit

Suitable Tags: #DelhiHighCourt #Order7Rule11CPC #TrademarkInfringement #CopyrightInfringement #PassingOff #PlaintRejection #IntellectualPropertyLaw #CauseOfAction #IPLitigation #CoromandelVsSumitomo #AgroChemicalTrademark #NakedLicense #LicenseeRights #DivisionBenchRuling

Headnote of Article

In a detailed and erudite judgment, the Delhi High Court Division Bench has set aside the rejection of a plaint in a composite suit for trademark passing off, copyright infringement, and dilution, holding that the learned Single Judge impermissibly conducted a mini-trial and relied upon defendant-filed documents at the Order VII Rule 11(a) stage. The Court restored the suit, reiterating that plaints in IP matters must be read holistically with every averment presumed true, and triable issues of license, goodwill, and deceptive similarity cannot justify threshold rejection. The ruling settles that “illusory cause of action” cannot substitute for summary judgment and firmly protects the right of IP owners to a full trial on merits.