Friday, June 5, 2026

Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd. Vs. Piccadily Agro Industries Ltd.

Case Title: Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd. Vs. Piccadily Agro Industries Ltd. 

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1164/2025 

Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4852

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Jyoti Singh

In a trademark dispute concerning the mark “WHISTLER” for whisky products, the Delhi High Court decided rival interim injunction applications filed by Irish whisky manufacturer Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd. and Indian liquor company Piccadily Agro Industries Ltd. The foreign company alleged passing off by Piccadily’s use of the mark “WHISTLER”, while Piccadily sought to restrain the foreign company from selling whisky in India under the marks “WHISTLER” and “THE WHISTLER”.

The court  held that although the foreign company had international registrations and reputation, it failed to establish sufficient spillover of transborder goodwill and reputation in India prior to Piccadily’s adoption and use of the mark. The Court applied the territoriality principle laid down in Toyota Prius and found that global reputation alone was insufficient for a passing-off claim in India. The Court also noted that Piccadily was the registered proprietor of the mark “WHISTLER” in India and had been commercially selling whisky under the mark since 2018.

The Court dismissed the foreign company’s application for interim injunction and allowed Piccadily’s application, restraining Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd. and its associates from selling whisky in India under the marks “WHISTLER”, “THE WHISTLER” or any deceptively similar mark during the pendency of the suit.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception,interpretation and presentation of facts and law.]

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The Whistler Whiskey War: When Global Fame Meets Indian Trademark Law

Trans-Boarder Reputation and Principle of Territoriality

Introduction

In a world increasingly connected by trade, travel, and digital media, a foreign brand may become well known in a country even before it physically arrives there. But does that familiarity alone give the foreign brand legal protection against a domestic rival who has been selling under the same name for years? This is precisely the question that came before the High Court of Delhi in a landmark trademark dispute between an Irish whiskey maker and an Indian distillery, both claiming rights over the name "WHISTLER" for their respective whiskey products. The judgment, delivered on 29th May 2026, offers a rigorous and illuminating analysis of the law of passing off, trademark infringement, and the doctrine of trans border reputation and Territoriality of Goodwill as it applies in India. It is a judgment that every brand owner, domestic or foreign, seeking to enter or protect a position in the Indian market must carefully study.

Factual and Procedural Background

Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd. is a Private Limited Company incorporated under Irish Company Law. It has been engaged in the manufacture, production, and trading of Irish whiskey, gin, and other alcohol-based drinks for more than two decades and describes itself as an industry leader. The company claims that the trademark WHISTLER was first registered on 12th May 2005 in the United Kingdom and was later assigned to its sister concern, Boann Distillery Limited, in 2015, before being transferred to the company itself in 2017. The mark THE WHISTLER was adopted in 2016 and the company obtained registrations for one or both marks in several countries including the Russian Federation, Chile, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Brazil, and Nigeria. However, and this is a fact of central importance in the entire dispute, the company does not hold any trademark registration in India for either of the two marks WHISTLER or THE WHISTLER.

The company claims an impressive global market presence spanning Asian countries including China, India, and Japan, European countries, North and South America, the United Kingdom, and parts of Africa. It registered several domain names incorporating the words WHISTLER and THE WHISTLER. It also claims substantial global revenues from as early as 2011-12 reaching over Rs. 224 crore in 2023-24. The company won several awards including the World's Best Honey at the World Liqueur Awards in 2020 and the World's Best Grain at a prestigious whiskey event in 2022. A number of established Indian liquor distributors including Radico Khaitan, Oberoi Spirits, and Globus Spirits reportedly approached the company between 2014 and 2025 to market and sell its products in India.

Piccadily Agro Industries Ltd. is a listed Public Limited Company incorporated in 1994 and is described as India's premier independent producer and distributor of malt spirits. Its portfolio includes single malt whiskey, blended malt whiskies, rum, vodka, and other products. The company is also the maker of the celebrated Indian single malt brand INDRI, which became the first single malt brand in the world to cross sales of one lakh cases in 2023-24 and commands 35 percent of export market share from India in its category with presence in 27 countries. In 2007, Piccadily conceived the trademark WHISTLER and in April 2008 filed an application for registration. The company says the brand draws inspiration from the Whistler Warbler, a vibrant song bird indigenous to the Indian sub-continent known for its rich and melodic whistling songs. The mark was registered and the company spent nearly a decade developing the product before commercially launching the whiskey under the WHISTLER brand in 2018. The whiskey became a success upon launch and was relaunched in 2025 with a varied blend and new packaging. The product received excise approvals in more than 15 states including Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Goa, and Rajasthan and is priced in the range of Rs. 980 to Rs. 1500 for a 750 ml pack.

In August 2025, Piccadily learned that the Irish company was attempting to market and sell its whiskey under the WHISTLER mark in India through M/s HS Oberoi Spirits. It issued objection letters to various state excise departments in September 2025 and sent a legal notice. The Irish company replied asserting its ownership of the mark globally and on the very same day, 27th October 2025, filed CS (COMM) 1164/2025 before the High Court of Delhi seeking a permanent injunction restraining Piccadily from selling its IMFL whiskey under the mark WHISTLER, alleging passing off. Piccadily in turn filed CS (COMM) 9/2026 seeking a permanent injunction against the Irish company for infringement of its registered trademark WHISTLER in India. Both parties also filed applications for ad interim injunctions. The court took up both applications together and disposed them by a single judgment.

The Dispute

The dispute in its simplest form is this. Two companies are using or seeking to use the trademark WHISTLER for whiskey in India. The Irish company registered the mark internationally first, in 2005, but has no Indian registration and has only recently attempted physical entry into the Indian market. The Indian company registered the mark in India in 2008, launched the product commercially in 2018, has been selling it successfully ever since, and possesses extensive documentary evidence of Indian sales, promotions, and recognition.

The Irish company sued for passing off, arguing that its global reputation and goodwill in the WHISTLER brand had spilled over into India, and that the Indian company was misrepresenting its product as originating from or being associated with the Irish company, thereby causing damage to its reputation and goodwill. The Irish company also resisted the infringement claim made by the Indian company, arguing that the products cater to entirely different consumer segments, that the Irish whiskey retails at Rs. 2800 to Rs. 11,000 per bottle while the Indian product retails at an average of Rs. 780 per bottle, that discerning whiskey consumers would never confuse the two, and that the Irish whiskey is an EU Geographical Indication protected product clearly labelled as Irish whiskey.

The Indian company on its part claimed infringement of its registered trademark WHISTLER by the Irish company and also claimed passing off. It argued that it has an unchallenged Indian registration from 2008, that it was first in the Indian market in 2018, that the Irish company had no presence or reputation in India when the Indian product was launched, and that the near-identical marks used for the same product category namely whiskey would inevitably cause confusion among consumers.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The court began by addressing the legal framework applicable to both sets of claims, providing a thorough and scholarly analysis of the governing principles.

On the question of passing off, the court noted that in the absence of any trademark registration in India, the Irish company could only assert common law rights by establishing the three classic ingredients of a passing off action as described by Lord Oliver in Reckitt and Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc and Ors, MANU/UKHL/0012/1990, namely goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage to goodwill. The Supreme Court of India had endorsed this classical trinity in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah and Another, (2002) 3 SCC 65. Registration merely recognises rights pre-existing in common law and does not create new rights.

The critical question, however, was whether the Irish company could establish goodwill in India sufficient to sustain a passing off claim. This brought the court to the most important legal issue in the case, namely the territoriality principle versus the universality doctrine in trademark law.

The court reviewed the evolution of this legal position through a series of landmark Supreme Court decisions. In N.R. Dongre and Others v. Whirlpool Corporation and Another, (1996) 5 SCC 714, the Supreme Court had upheld an injunction against an Indian company using the mark WHIRLPOOL, holding that the American corporation had the necessary transborder reputation which had spilled into India through its advertising and worldwide reputation. In 2004, in Milmet Oftho Industries and Others v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624, the Supreme Court applied the first-in-the-world-market test, holding that a mark first used in the world market is entitled to protection in India against a subsequent adopter, though this reasoning was applied specifically in the context of pharmaceutical products given their inherently international character where doctors and medical professionals regularly access global literature.

The decisive shift came with the Supreme Court's judgment in Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Limited and Others, (2018) 2 SCC 1. In this case, the Supreme Court authoritatively moved away from the universality doctrine and firmly endorsed the territoriality principle. It held that the existence of goodwill and reputation must be shown to exist in India specifically, and that global goodwill and reputation without evidence of territorial goodwill and reputation in India will not be sufficient to succeed in a claim of passing off. The court in Toyota Jidosha reviewed the view of the UK Supreme Court in Starbucks (HK) Ltd. v. British Sky Broadcasting Group, (2015) 1 WLR 2628, which had held that mere reputation is not enough and that a claimant must show significant goodwill in the form of customers within the jurisdiction, as opposed to people in the jurisdiction who happen to be customers elsewhere. The yardstick under Toyota Jidosha for passing off became prior use in India. The Supreme Court further held that once goodwill is established in the jurisdiction, the claimant is not required to prove actual confusion and that likelihood of confusion would be a sufficient test.

The court also reviewed the Delhi High Court's own judgment in BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati and Another, (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 164, which drew out the following principles from Toyota Jidosha: that the territoriality principle applies and not the universality doctrine; that mere reputation is not enough; that the claimant must have customers within India rather than merely people in India who are customers of the brand abroad; that the claimant must be present through its mark in the territorial jurisdiction even if a real market is not necessary; and that such presence may be shown by extensive advertisements circulated and seen in India.

The Division Bench's decision in VIP Industries Limited v. Carlton Shoes Limited and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4620, was also discussed at length. In that case the Division Bench reaffirmed that global goodwill and reputation alone is insufficient for passing off and that existence of goodwill and reputation must be demonstrated in India. The court in that case had granted injunction to Carlton against VIP after finding that Carlton had priority of user in India supported by sale invoices, revenue certificates, articles in high-profile Indian magazines, VAT registrations, and presence across multiple retail outlets in India, none of which VIP could match for the relevant period.

The Division Bench's very recent decision in Sumit Vijay and Another v. Major League Baseball Properties Inc. and Another, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 2, was also relied upon by the court. In that case the Division Bench reversed an order striking a mark from the Register, holding that acquisition of global goodwill and reputation is entirely irrelevant unless the global goodwill has percolated into India. It was held that the mere accessibility of a mark on websites in India is no evidence of transborder goodwill, that availability of goods bearing the mark online without actual purchases from India is not sufficient, and that publication of marks in magazines globally available on the internet cannot by itself establish transborder reputation without positive evidence of readership or subscription in India.

Applying all these principles to the facts before it, the court conducted a detailed document-by-document analysis of what the Irish company had filed to support its transborder reputation claim.

The trademark registrations in other countries were found to be entirely irrelevant since they did not confer any protection in India. Two of the three domain names of the Irish company were not even accessible in India. Even if they were, the Irish company had failed to show how many times and by whom in India those websites had been accessed. The financial statements filed did not pertain specifically to the WHISTLER product and showed no Indian sales. The sales invoices pertained to other countries except for one invoice showing a sale to M/s HS Oberoi Spirits in India, but this was a pro forma invoice dated 2nd May 2025, years after the Indian company had launched its product in 2018. Social media screenshots showed no engagement counts, viewership statistics, or liked post statistics specific to India. The copies of journals in which the Irish company's products were mentioned were all post-2021, and most pertained to foreign markets. The awards won had no connection to any activity or transaction in India. The emails relied upon mostly did not even mention the WHISTLER mark, and those that did were post-2021 and discussed only the prospect of the Irish company entering India rather than an established presence. The lone email mentioning WHISTLER in 2017 showed at best some confidential correspondence with a third party and could not establish spillover reputation. An article dated 27th October 2025 was created on the very day the Irish company filed its suit and was therefore self-serving. Excise approvals for Delhi and Maharashtra for the Irish company's whiskey were granted only in January 2026 and the Indian Customs Department documents for import of the Irish whiskey pertained to 2025, all of which actually undermined the claim that the Irish company's reputation had reached India before 2018.

The court therefore found that the Irish company had prima facie failed to demonstrate spillover of transborder reputation and goodwill in India prior to the Indian company's commercial launch of Whistler whiskey in 2018. The court noted that it is not enough to show that people in India were customers of the Irish company when they travelled abroad, but what is required is to demonstrate the presence of the mark within Indian boundaries.

The court also rejected the argument that the advertising ban on liquor in India should excuse the Irish company from producing evidence of spillover reputation. While acknowledging that liquor is a regulated industry where direct advertisement is restricted, the court pointed out that several brands have successfully established reputation in India through other means such as events, sponsorships, actual sales, and trade channels. None of the documents established spillover reputation prior to 2018.

The court found further that the Irish company had not applied for trademark registration in India even for its THE WHISTLER mark, and that its actual physical products had not entered the Indian market before 2025. This itself was described as self-destructive of the claim of goodwill and reputation preceding the Indian company's 2018 launch.

Having dismissed the Irish company's passing off claim, the court turned to the Indian company's infringement claim. Here the legal position was clearer. The Indian company held an unchallenged registration in the mark WHISTLER in India in Class 33 from 3rd April 2008. The Irish company had no Indian registration. Under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the registered proprietor has the exclusive right to use the mark in relation to the goods for which it is registered. Under Section 29(2)(b), a registered trademark is infringed when a person, not being a registered proprietor or permitted user, uses in the course of trade a mark which because of its similarity to the registered mark and identity or similarity of goods covered by such trademark is likely to cause confusion. Under Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3), when the marks are identical and the goods are identical, confusion is presumed.

The court found that the marks THE WHISTLER and WHISTLER are structurally, visually, and phonetically nearly identical or deceptively similar. The rival products are both whiskey. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others, (2022) 5 SCC 1, where the addition of the word SAI to RENAISSANCE did not save the mark and the court found the marks RENAISSANCE and SAI RENAISSANCE to be so similar as to attract Section 29(2)(c) read with 29(3). Applying the same principle, adding or removing the word THE did not create any meaningful distinction between WHISTLER and THE WHISTLER.

The court also rejected the Irish company's defence of no confusion owing to price difference and discerning consumers. This defence was found to be self-contradictory because the Irish company itself had built its passing off claim on inevitable confusion arising from the similarity of marks and products. A party cannot approbate and reprobate, that is, a party cannot take inconsistent positions at the same time to suit its own convenience. Furthermore, in the liquor industry where advertising is strictly prohibited, the brand name becomes the singular element of consumer recall and purchase decisions at liquor counters are often made orally. Under these circumstances, even discerning consumers are likely to be confused when the marks are near identical.

The court specifically addressed the argument about the different types of whiskey, noting that the Irish company had itself pleaded that rival marks and products being similar would cause confusion, and could not then turn around in the infringement case and argue that the products are so different that no confusion is possible. On the infringement claim, the only available defences for the Irish company were registration in India, prior use in India under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act 1999, or spillover of transborder reputation. The Irish company had failed on all three counts.

On balance of convenience, the court found that the Indian company had been commercially selling its Whistler whiskey since 2018, had built substantial goodwill and reputation in India, and would suffer irreparable harm if the Irish company were allowed to enter the Indian market under an identical or near-identical mark. The request of the Irish company for interim relief permitting it to sell its existing stock was also refused, because on the date the Irish company filed its suit in December 2025, it did not yet possess the requisite excise approvals to sell the goods in India, which were granted only in January 2026. This was a calculated risk taken by the Irish company and no equity could be claimed on account of it.

Final Decision of the Court

The court allowed IA 414/2026 filed by the Indian company and granted an ad interim injunction restraining the Irish company and all those acting on its behalf from selling Irish whiskey in India under the marks THE WHISTLER and/or WHISTLER and/or any other mark deceptively similar to the Indian company's registered mark WHISTLER during the pendency of the suit.IA 26995/2025 filed by the Irish company was dismissed as it had failed to make out a prima facie case of passing off.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment makes a significant contribution to Indian trademark law by firmly applying and extending the territoriality principle laid down in Toyota Jidosha to the alcohol and liquor industry, rejecting any industry-specific exception. The court settled that in a passing off action by a foreign brand in India, global goodwill and reputation without actual percolation into India is insufficient. The foreign brand must demonstrate that its mark was present within Indian territorial jurisdiction through sales, advertisements, events, trade channels, or other means that would have made the mark known to the relevant consuming public in India before the domestic user began occupying the space. The mere accessibility of websites, availability of goods online without proof of actual Indian purchases, publication in internationally circulated magazines without proof of Indian readership, and foreign trade awards without Indian connection do not amount to spillover of transborder reputation into India. Furthermore, the court settled that in a claim for trademark infringement by a registered proprietor under Section 29(2)(c) read with 29(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where marks are identical and goods are identical, confusion is presumed, and price difference or product quality distinction does not constitute a defence, particularly in the alcohol industry where advertising is prohibited and oral articulation of brand names plays a decisive role in consumer purchases. It was also clarified that a party alleging confusion in its own passing off suit cannot simultaneously deny confusion in defending an infringement claim by the opposite party, as such inconsistency amounts to approbating and reprobating.

Case Details

Title: Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd. v. Piccadily Agro Industries Ltd. and connected matter

Date of Order: 29th May 2026

Case Numbers: CS(COMM) 1164/2025 and CS(COMM) 9/2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4852

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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  2. Global Brand vs Indian Registered Trademark: Lessons from the WHISTLER Whiskey Case 2026
  3. Transborder Reputation in India: Why Foreign Brands Cannot Rely on Global Fame Alone
  4. Delhi High Court 2026: Territoriality Principle Prevails Over Global Reputation in Whiskey Trademark War
  5. Trademark Infringement vs Passing Off in Liquor Industry: The WHISTLER Case Explained
  6. When Does a Foreign Trademark Get Protection in India Without Registration? The WHISTLER Judgment
  7. WHISTLER Whiskey Case 2026: Key Lessons on Trademark Rights for Foreign Brands Entering India
  8. Irish Whiskey Meets Indian Whiskey in Delhi Court: Who Owns the Name WHISTLER in India?

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Brief Headnote:

The Irish whiskey manufacturer Robert A. Merry and Co. Ltd., owner of the WHISTLER and THE WHISTLER marks internationally since 2005 and 2016 respectively but without any Indian trademark registration, filed suit for passing off against Indian company Piccadily Agro Industries Ltd., which held a registered trademark in WHISTLER in India from 2008 and had commercially launched the whiskey product in 2018. Piccadily in turn sued for infringement of its registered Indian trademark. The High Court of Delhi, on competing applications for ad interim injunction, dismissed the Irish company's passing off application holding that it had failed to establish prima facie spillover of transborder reputation and goodwill in India prior to the Indian company's 2018 launch, applying the territoriality principle authoritatively laid down in Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Limited, (2018) 2 SCC 1. The court allowed the Indian company's infringement application restraining the Irish company from selling its whiskey under THE WHISTLER and WHISTLER marks in India, holding that the marks were nearly identical and the goods identical, attracting presumption of confusion under Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and that the Irish company's price-difference and discerning consumer defence was inconsistent with its own passing off claim and therefore untenable.

Renee Cosmetics Private Limited Vs. Ms. Rupali Sharma

Case Title: Renee Cosmetics Private Limited Vs. Ms. Rupali Sharma & Anr.

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 107/2025 

Date of Judgment: 05 June 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5075

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Tushar Rao Gedela, H.J.

In a significant trademark rectification matter, the Delhi High Court allowed a petition filed by Renee Cosmetics Private Limited seeking cancellation of the trademark registration for “GLASS SKIN” held by Ms. Rupali Sharma in Class 3 for cosmetic products. The dispute arose after the respondent asserted exclusive rights over the mark and objected to the petitioner’s use of the expression “GLASS SKIN” in relation to its skincare products.

Court held that the term “GLASS SKIN” is descriptive of a well-known beauty trend originating from the Korean skincare industry and directly conveys the intended purpose and end result of cosmetic products, namely achieving clear, luminous, glass-like skin. The Court noted that the expression was widely used across the cosmetics industry by several manufacturers and was also employed descriptively by the respondent herself. The Court further observed that the respondent failed to establish that the mark had acquired any secondary meaning or distinctiveness capable of warranting trademark protection.

Holding that the registration was wrongly remaining on the Trade Marks Register and attracted the bar under Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to cancel and remove the registration of the mark “GLASS SKIN” from the Register within four weeks. The petition was accordingly allowed without any order as to costs.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception,interpretation and presentation of facts and law.]

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GLASS SKIN Cannot Be Anyone's Exclusive Property: Delhi High Court Cancels Trademark Registration of a Global Beauty Trend Term


Introduction

In the rapidly expanding world of beauty and cosmetics, trends travel fast — from Korean skincare studios to Instagram feeds in India, and from fashion articles in 2017 to product labels in every pharmacy and e-commerce platform by 2020. When a term that describes a worldwide beauty phenomenon is registered as a trademark by a single individual, and that registration is then used to force a major cosmetics company off an e-commerce platform, a fundamental question of trademark law arises: can anyone claim exclusive ownership of a word that belongs to the entire industry?

This is precisely the question that arose in the case decided by the High Court of Delhi on 5 June 2026, in which Renee Cosmetics Private Limited — a well-known Indian cosmetics brand — challenged the trademark registration of the phrase GLASS SKIN in Class-03, which covers non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations. The respondent, an individual who had registered the mark in May 2019 on a "proposed to be used" basis, had used that registration to get the petitioner's products delisted from Amazon and to assert monopoly over a term that was already a globally recognised beauty trend well before the registration was even filed. The case goes to the heart of what makes a mark registrable — and why descriptive words that everyone in an industry uses to describe the nature and purpose of their goods cannot be privatised.


Factual and Procedural Background

Renee Cosmetics Private Limited was incorporated on 18 October 2019 and launched its brand RENEE Cosmetics. At some point, the company began selling cosmetic products including a sunscreen product marketed under the name RENEE GLASS SKIN SPF 50. The company applied for registration of this composite mark on 28 January 2025 in Class-03.

Before examining the petitioner's story further, it is necessary to understand what had happened in 2019. An individual, Ms. Rupali Sharma, the respondent no. 1 in this case, had filed a trademark application bearing number 4164051 seeking registration of the mark GLASS SKIN in Class-03 on 2 May 2019 on a "proposed to be used" basis — meaning she had not actually been using the mark in commerce when she applied for it. Remarkably, the Trade Marks Registry granted her a registration certificate bearing number 2825917 in respect of the mark GLASS SKIN in Class-03 on the very same date, 2 May 2019. The registration covered a wide range of goods including non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations, non-medicated dentifrices, perfumery, essential oils, bleaching preparations and substances for laundry use, and cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations.

On 20 March 2025, the respondent issued a legal notice to the petitioner alleging that the petitioner was infringing her registered trademark GLASS SKIN. The petitioner replied on 7 April 2025, denying all allegations of infringement and simultaneously contesting the registration by asserting that the term GLASS SKIN is descriptive of the goods and therefore incapable of registration. The dispute then escalated in a practical and commercially damaging way: on 3 October 2025, the petitioner received a communication from Amazon — the e-commerce platform — informing it that its product listing had been removed from the platform on account of the respondent's trademark registration in the mark GLASS SKIN.

This commercial harm — being delisted from Amazon on the basis of a registration that the petitioner considered legally invalid — prompted the filing of two proceedings simultaneously: a trademark rectification petition C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 107/2025 under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the GLASS SKIN registration, and a civil suit CS(COMM) 888/2025 for other reliefs. The judgment was reserved on 20 May 2026 and delivered on 5 June 2026.


The Dispute

The legal and commercial dispute in this case revolves entirely around one question: is GLASS SKIN a descriptive term that describes the kind and intended purpose of cosmetic goods, or is it a suggestive term that requires some degree of consumer imagination to connect with the product's purpose, thereby making it distinctive and registrable?

The petitioner's position was categorical: GLASS SKIN is a globally recognised Korean beauty trend term that originated around 2017, has been in widespread use by manufacturers and the trade across the world since that time, and directly and immediately conveys to any consumer of cosmetic products the intended purpose and end result of using such a product — namely, skin that looks luminous, clear, and transparent like glass. Industry giants including Lakme, Nivea, Garnier, Vaseline, L'Oreal, Body Shop, Nykaa, Mamaearth, and others all use the term descriptively in their marketing, product descriptions, and articles. Given this universal descriptive usage, the term cannot be monopolised by any one party and its registration is contrary to Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibit registration of marks that are devoid of distinctive character or that describe the kind or intended purpose of the goods.

The respondent's position was equally firm in the opposite direction: the mark GLASS SKIN is not descriptive but suggestive, because a consumer confronted with this phrase on a cosmetic product would need to exercise imagination to understand what the product does — it does not state any ingredient, formulation, method, or essential characteristic of the product. The respondent also argued that the petitioner could not challenge the mark as descriptive since the petitioner itself had applied for registration of RENEE GLASS SKIN SPF 50, which incorporates the very phrase. Additionally, the respondent had built its own business under the mark since 2019, with invoices from that year onwards, and had achieved a degree of market recognition, which the petitioner had ignored for six years before filing the petition.


Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The court began its analysis by setting out the hierarchy of trademark protection. At the top are arbitrary or invented marks — words with no connection to the goods they represent — which receive the strongest protection. Next come suggestive marks — words that hint at the qualities of the goods but require some imagination to make the connection. Below these are descriptive marks — words that directly describe the characteristics, purpose, or end result of the goods — which receive very limited protection and cannot be registered unless they have acquired a "secondary meaning" through long and intensive use. At the very bottom are generic marks, which receive no trademark protection at all.

To determine which category GLASS SKIN falls into, the court drew extensively from McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, the leading treatise on the subject internationally. From paragraph 11.16 of McCarthy, the court extracted the definition of a descriptive mark as one that directly and immediately conveys knowledge of the characteristics of a product or service. Crucially, a mark is descriptive if it describes the intended purpose, function or use of the goods, or the end effect upon the user. It is also relevant that a term need only describe a single significant quality or feature of the goods to be classified as descriptive. From paragraph 11.69 of McCarthy, the court drew the principle that one of the most useful tests for distinguishing descriptive from suggestive marks is to look at whether other sellers in the same industry are in fact using the term to describe their goods or services. If they are, an inference of descriptiveness can be drawn. The proliferation of a term's use across an industry tends to diminish its ability to identify any single source, confirming its descriptive character.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found the evidence against registrability to be overwhelming. Articles published as far back as 24 September 2017 in the Hindustan Times described glass skin as the idea of transparent and translucent skin — a Korean beauty goal centred on a radiant, flawless complexion. Articles in Allure magazine from October 2017 described it as the "fancy name for clear, luminous, seemingly transparent skin." Major global brands — Nykaa, Garnier, Nivea, Lakme, L'Oreal, and Mamaearth — all used the term in marketing materials and product descriptions in a purely descriptive manner, conveying to consumers that use of the product would result in skin like glass. The court placed specific emphasis on the fact that the respondent no. 1's own website from 2019 described Glass Skin as "the most popular Korean beauty technique to get illuminating, flawless and transparent skin like glass" — a description that uses the term in precisely the descriptive sense that McCarthy identifies as the hallmark of a non-distinctive mark.

This was the conclusive point. The respondent herself, in her own promotional content, used GLASS SKIN not as a badge of origin — not as a signal telling consumers that this product comes from Ms. Rupali Sharma's business — but as a description of what the product would do and what result it would achieve. This is exactly the kind of self-defeating use that demonstrates a mark is not functioning as a trademark at all, but merely as a description. The court concluded that GLASS SKIN, assessed through both paragraphs 11.16 and 11.69 of McCarthy, is unambiguously a descriptive mark.

The court then addressed and rejected the respondent's "imagination test" argument. The respondent had argued that a consumer reading GLASS SKIN on a cosmetic product would need to use imagination to understand its purpose — since the mark does not name any ingredient, formulation, or method — and therefore the mark is suggestive rather than descriptive. The court found this argument attractive in the abstract but wholly unpersuasive in context. The products of both parties are cosmetics in Class-03, intended for skin care. In that context, when a consumer sees the words GLASS SKIN on a skin care product, there is absolutely no imagination required to understand the intended purpose and end result. The term immediately and directly conveys the outcome the product promises: skin that looks like glass. Given the worldwide popularity of the Korean beauty glass skin trend — which had been widely reported in Indian media from September 2017 — the imagination test has no room to operate. The question is not whether the mark is suggestive in the abstract, but whether it is descriptive in relation to the specific goods for which it is registered. Here, the connection is immediate and obvious.

On the approbate-reprobate argument — that the petitioner could not call GLASS SKIN descriptive while having itself applied for RENEE GLASS SKIN SPF 50 — the court disposed of this contention neatly. The petitioner was using GLASS SKIN not as a standalone distinctive mark but as part of a composite expression together with the distinctively registered brand name RENEE and the technical specification SPF 50. The court clarified that using a descriptive term as part of a composite mark does not amount to claiming exclusive rights in the descriptive component, nor does it prevent a party from contesting the registrability of that descriptive component when claimed as a standalone mark by someone else.

On the secondary meaning argument — the principle that even a descriptive mark can become registrable if it has been used so extensively and exclusively that consumers have come to associate it with a single source — the court found a complete absence of evidence on the part of the respondent. No sales figures of any significance, no advertising expenditure data, no consumer surveys, no evidence of the kind that would demonstrate that the public has come to associate GLASS SKIN specifically and exclusively with the respondent's products — nothing. The respondent had some invoices from 2019 onwards but nothing that came remotely close to establishing secondary meaning. Since a descriptive term can only survive as a trademark if secondary meaning is proved, and since no such proof existed, the registration could not be sustained.

On the applicable provision of law, the court found that Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 was not the right vehicle because the respondent had placed some invoices on record showing commercial use, which took care of the bona fide use and bona fide intention elements that Section 47 looks at. However, Section 57(2) of the Act — which allows the court to direct removal of a mark that was entered in the Register without sufficient cause or that wrongly remains on the Register — was found to be directly applicable. Since GLASS SKIN ought never to have been registered given its descriptive character and its prohibition under Section 9(1)(b) of the Act, its continued presence in the Register was without sufficient cause and constituted a wrongful entry. The court also applied Section 9(1)(b), which prohibits registration of marks that serve in trade to designate the kind, quality, intended purpose, or other characteristics of the goods, and found this prohibition to be clearly attracted by the term GLASS SKIN in the context of Class-03 cosmetic goods.

The judgments cited by the parties included the Supreme Court judgment in Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Anr. v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1701, and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Marico Limited v. Agro Tech Foods Limited, (2010) SCC OnLine Del 3806 — both cited by the petitioner on the point of descriptiveness and secondary meaning. The respondent relied on the Supreme Court in T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 6314-15 of 2001, decided on 3 March 2011, as well as coordinate bench decisions in Descriptive Health Solutions Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 133/2022 dated 8 July 2022, and Shivani Vig Kapoor and Rushi Tiwari Makker v. Registrar of Trademarks, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 88/2022 dated 12 December 2023, and US Court of Appeals decisions in Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc (No. 08-20578) and OBX-Stock, Inc v. Bicast, Inc (Nos. 06-1769 and 06-1887). The court, however, found that since the outcome was determinable on the facts and the material on record by applying McCarthy's well-established principles, it was not necessary to go into the specific ratios of these case laws.


Final Decision of the Court

The rectification petition was allowed. The Registrar of Trade Marks was directed to cancel the registration of the mark GLASS SKIN granted in favour of the respondent vide certificate number 2825917 dated 2 May 2019 under Class-03. The Registrar was further directed to remove and rectify the registration from the Register of Trade Marks within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. No order as to costs was made. The civil suit CS(COMM) 888/2025 was directed to be listed before the Joint Registrar on the date already fixed, i.e. 13 October 2026, in view of the judgment passed in the cancellation petition.


Points of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment makes several significant contributions to Indian trademark law, particularly in the context of the beauty and cosmetics industry and in the broader realm of descriptive mark jurisprudence. It firmly holds that a globally recognised beauty trend term that directly describes the end result or intended purpose of cosmetic products is a descriptive mark incapable of registration under Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, regardless of when it was applied for or by whom.

The judgment confirms that the correct test for distinguishing descriptive from suggestive marks is not merely the imagination test — whether the consumer needs some imagination to connect the mark with the product — but also, critically, how the term is actually used by other stakeholders in the same industry. If major players in an industry universally use a term to describe their goods, that widespread descriptive use is powerful evidence that the term is not a source identifier but a description. McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, paragraphs 11.16 and 11.69, are adopted by the Delhi High Court as authoritative guidance on this point.

The judgment also establishes that where a mark owner uses its own registered mark in a descriptive manner on its own website and in its own product descriptions — explaining what the mark means and what it achieves — this constitutes strong evidence that the mark is not functioning as a trademark at all. A mark cannot simultaneously be used to describe a product's purpose and claim exclusivity as a source identifier.

On secondary meaning, the judgment reaffirms that a descriptive mark can only survive if the registrant proves that through extensive and continuous use over time, consumers have come to associate the mark specifically with a single commercial source. Mere possession of invoices and some commercial activity is not enough. In the absence of substantial evidence of secondary meaning — sales figures, advertising data, consumer recognition — a descriptive mark cannot be defended.

The judgment further clarifies the distinction between Section 47 and Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in the context of cancellation petitions, holding that where a mark has been registered in violation of the absolute grounds for refusal under Section 9, Section 57(2) provides the appropriate remedy to remove such an entry as one made without sufficient cause.


Case Details

Title: Renee Cosmetics Private Limited v. Ms. Rupali Sharma & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 5 June 2026

Case Numbers: C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 107/2025 & I.A. 11431/2025 and CS(COMM) 888/2025, I.A. 20783/2025 & I.A. 7448/2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5075

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela


Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


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  3. Trademark Squatting in the Cosmetics Industry: Delhi High Court Cancels GLASS SKIN Registration in Renee Cosmetics Case
  4. Section 9(1)(b) Trade Marks Act: Delhi High Court on Descriptive Marks in the Beauty Industry — The GLASS SKIN Judgment
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Head Note

Facts: The respondent registered the mark GLASS SKIN in Class-03 for cosmetic goods in May 2019 on a "proposed to be used" basis. The petitioner, a cosmetics company using the term as part of its composite mark RENEE GLASS SKIN SPF 50, was delisted from Amazon on account of the respondent's registration, prompting it to file a rectification petition under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petitioner contended that GLASS SKIN is a globally recognised Korean beauty trend term used descriptively by all major cosmetics manufacturers including Lakme, Nivea, Garnier, L'Oreal, and Mamaearth, and is incapable of registration under Section 9(1)(b) of the Act. The respondent argued the mark is suggestive, not descriptive, requiring consumer imagination to connect it with the product.

Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the petition under Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that GLASS SKIN is a descriptive mark that directly describes the kind and intended purpose of cosmetic goods, that the respondent herself used it descriptively on her own website, that major industry players universally use it descriptively, that no secondary meaning was established, and that the registration was entered without sufficient cause in violation of Section 9(1)(b). The Registrar of Trade Marks was directed to cancel and remove the registration within four weeks.

Panasonic Holdings Corporation Vs Siddharth Vij

Case Title: Panasonic Holdings Corporation Vs Siddharth Vij

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 171/2025 

Date of Judgment: 05 June 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5074

High Court: Delhi High Court

Hon'ble Judge: Tushar Rao Gedela

In a trademark rectification dispute, the Delhi High Court allowed petitions filed by Panasonic Holdings Corporation and its affiliate seeking cancellation of the registered word mark “PONTA” and device mark registered in Class 9 for electrical goods. The petitioners contended that “PONTA” was deceptively similar to their long-standing and registered trademark “PENTA”, which has been in use since 1989 and enjoys substantial goodwill in the market for electrical switches, sockets and related products.

Justice Tushar Rao Gedela observed that the marks “PENTA” and “PONTA” were visually, structurally and phonetically similar, with the mere substitution of the letter “E” by “O” being insufficient to distinguish the two marks. The Court noted that both parties dealt in identical goods through common trade channels and that the respondent had failed to provide any satisfactory explanation before the Trade Marks Registry for adopting the impugned mark despite objections based on the petitioner’s prior trademark. The Court also rejected the respondent’s subsequent explanation linking the mark to “Paonta Sahib”, holding it to be an afterthought.

Holding that the registration of “PONTA” was made without sufficient cause and was wrongly remaining on the Register, the Court exercised powers under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to remove and rectify both the word mark “PONTA” and the associated device mark from the Register within four weeks.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception,interpretation and presentation of facts and law.]

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PENTA vs PONTA: When Faith Meets Fraud — Delhi High Court Cancels Trademark Registration of Deceptively Similar Mark in Electrical Products Dispute


Introduction

In the world of intellectual property law, few questions are as practically significant as this: can a trademark that differs from an established brand by just one vowel survive legal scrutiny? This case, decided by the High Court of Delhi on 5 June 2026, answers that question with a resounding no. The dispute pits one of the world's most recognised electronics corporations, Panasonic Holdings Corporation of Japan, against an individual entrepreneur who had registered the marks PONTA and its stylised device version in India for electrical goods — products that are strikingly similar to those sold under Panasonic's long-established PENTA brand.

What makes this case particularly interesting — and instructive — is not just the similarity of the marks themselves but the manner in which the defence was constructed. The respondent, when confronted with the cancellation petition, offered a story rooted in religious faith and linguistic diversity that he had never thought to mention before the Trade Marks Registry at the time of registration. The court's treatment of this afterthought defence raises important questions about the integrity of explanations offered belatedly in legal proceedings, the evidentiary value of research generated by Artificial Intelligence tools, and the standards that must be met for a mark to survive a cancellation petition under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. This is also a case that settles, with clarity, how the court applies Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 when a mark has been registered despite a clear objection raised by the Trade Marks Registry's own Examination Report.


Factual and Procedural Background

Panasonic Holdings Corporation is a Japanese company incorporated in the year 1918, engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of electrical products across multiple business segments. It entered India in the year 1972 and subsequently expanded its operations in India through subsidiaries and associated companies, aided by liberalisation of Foreign Direct Investment policies. The second petitioner is its associated Indian entity through which the PENTA brand is operated in India.

A significant chapter in the petitioner's Indian business history occurred in 2007 when it acquired the business of the "Shah Family Group" — a well-known Indian group — along with its goodwill and trademarks, including the brand PENTA, for a consideration of Rs. 110 crores. The trademark PENTA in Class-9 (which covers electrical and electronic goods) had originally been applied for registration on 18 September 1989 by the predecessor-in-title. Since then, the petitioner has used the mark PENTA continuously and uninterruptedly for a wide range of electrical products including switches, sockets, regulators, plugs, conduit pipes, and allied goods.

The petitioner holds multiple registrations for the mark PENTA and its variants in Class-9. The original registration bearing number 516905, applied for on 18 September 1989, has been renewed and remains valid until 18 September 2026. A second registration bearing number 1054399 was applied for on 25 October 2001 and is valid until 25 October 2031. Several other registrations for variants such as PENTA PC, PENTA Urea, PENTA MODULAR, and PENTA MODULAR EXIMA were obtained in subsequent years. The products bearing the PENTA trademark are sold through a countrywide network of authorised distributors, stockists, dealers and retailers extending across states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan, and are also available on major e-commerce platforms including Flipkart and Amazon. Promotional activities cover print media — both national and regional — television, websites, and social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and X (formerly Twitter). The sales turnover of the petitioner under the marks PENTA and PENTA MODULAR grew from approximately Rs. 3,26,02,33,791 in the financial year 2013-14 to Rs. 6,31,60,38,458 in the financial year 2024-25 up to November 2024.

Against this backdrop, the respondent no.1, Mr. Siddharth Vij, applied on 30 March 2019 for registration of the word mark PONTA bearing application number 4134589 in Class-9, in respect of electric sockets, electric plugs, electric switches, and multi-plugs. On the same date, he also applied for registration of a stylised device mark — the word PONTA rendered with a distinctive design element in the letter "O" — bearing application number 4885149, also in Class-9. Crucially, both applications were filed on a "proposed to be used" basis, meaning the respondent had not used either mark in commerce at the time of filing.

The Trade Marks Registry issued an Examination Report dated 21 May 2019 raising an objection under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically citing the petitioner's registered marks PENTA bearing registration numbers 516905 and 1054399 as conflicting marks. The Report clearly flagged that the proposed mark PONTA was identical with or similar to the existing marks on the register in respect of identical or similar goods, thereby creating a likelihood of confusion among the public. In response to this Examination Report, the respondent filed a reply on 25 May 2019 — a reply that consisted of merely two short paragraphs — baldly asserting that the marks PENTA and PONTA are different and requesting that the objection under Section 11 be waived. No reason, explanation, or justification for the adoption of the mark was offered; no linguistic analysis, no explanation of inspiration, no story about religious faith — nothing. Despite this wholly inadequate reply, the Trade Marks Registry proceeded to register the word mark PONTA on 22 February 2021 and the device mark on 9 August 2021. The respondent also executed Memoranda of Understanding dated 10 August 2020 and 3 March 2021 licensing both marks in favour of his mother, Ms. Karishma Vig, proprietor of M/s India Electrical Industries, for manufacturing, marketing and selling electrical goods under the PONTA mark.

Aggrieved by these registrations, the petitioner filed two cancellation petitions before the High Court of Delhi — C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 171/2025 challenging the device mark registration no. 4885149, and C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 172/2025 challenging the word mark registration no. 4134589 — under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. With the consent of the parties, both petitions were heard and decided together by a common judgment. The judgment was reserved on 10 April 2026 and delivered on 5 June 2026.


The Dispute

The core of the petitioner's case was straightforward: the mark PONTA is deceptively similar to the well-established registered mark PENTA, the goods are identical, the trade channels are common, and the adoption was dishonest. The petitioner emphasised that by the time the respondent entered the market in 2019-20, the PENTA brand had already clocked an annual turnover of approximately Rs. 7,88,18,59,411, making it a dominant force in the electrical products market. The petitioner also pointed to the fact that the respondent's own reply to the Examination Report was conspicuously silent on any explanation for the adoption of PONTA, yet the Trade Marks Registry still granted registration — an act the petitioner characterised as a clear procedural deficiency and error under Section 9 and Section 18 read with Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petitioner sought cancellation under Sections 47 and 57 of the Act, arguing that the registration was granted without sufficient cause.

The respondent defended the registrations on multiple grounds. First and most notably, it was claimed for the very first time before the court — not before the Trade Marks Registry — that the respondent is a devout follower of the Sikh faith and was inspired to adopt the name PONTA by the sacred Gurudwara Shri Paonta Sahib. This religious faith, it was claimed, made the adoption genuine and honest, entitling the respondent to protection under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, which provides for registration of a mark notwithstanding a prior conflicting mark where there is honest and concurrent use. Second, the respondent argued that the word PONTA carries diverse meanings in various languages around the world, and therefore its adoption was arbitrary and bore no relation to the products manufactured. Third, the respondent claimed that by the time of the present proceedings, it had built its own goodwill under the PONTA mark, with turnover growing from Rs. 87,08,350 in the financial year 2020-21 to Rs. 3,06,56,040 in the financial year 2024-25, supported by BSI certifications and MSME registration. Finally, the respondent characterised the petitioner's action as an attempt by a large corporate entity to harass and intimidate a small business owner.


Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The court examined the facts with considerable care, beginning by acknowledging the overwhelming documentary evidence of the petitioner's long and extensive use of the PENTA mark. The sales figures extending from FY 2013-14 to FY 2024-25, supported by a Chartered Accountant's certificate, invoices dating from 2005, brochures and price lists from 2008, newspaper advertisements from 2002, and consistent online promotional activity — all of this, considered together, led the court to conclude firmly that the petitioner had garnered substantial goodwill and immense reputation in respect of PENTA for electrical goods in Class-9.

A pivotal analytical moment in the judgment came when the court pointed to the comparative position of the two parties at the time the respondent entered the market. In FY 2019-20, when the respondent's business effectively commenced, the petitioner had already achieved a combined PENTA and PENTA MODULAR turnover of approximately Rs. 7,88,18,59,411. The court observed that this enormous and established commercial presence of the petitioner at that very point of time would, in its view, provide a clear motivation for the respondent to adopt a mark similar to PENTA — an observation that is at once pragmatic and damning.

On the critical question of the similarity between the marks, the court conducted a visual comparison. Looking at PENTA and PONTA as plain word marks, the court found the resemblance to be glaring — almost identical. The mere substitution of the letter "E" with "O" creates no meaningful distinction. Even more remarkably, the court observed that in the stylised device mark of the respondent — where the letter "O" is rendered with a distinctive design element built into it — the visual effect is such that the "O" actually appears to look like an "E" at first glance. This meant that even the artistic design choice made by the respondent, far from differentiating the mark from PENTA, paradoxically made it look even more like PENTA. The court found no dissimilarity whatsoever — the mark PONTA was held to be visually, structurally, and conceptually, if not identical, then clearly deceptively similar to PENTA.

Applying the well-established test of the unwary consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection — a consumer who does not sit down with both marks side by side and examine them minutely — the court held that such a consumer is likely to be confused or deceived into buying the respondent's goods believing them to be those of the petitioner. The court also noted the practical reality of who buys these products: electricians, petty contractors, and ordinary members of the public. These are not sophisticated purchasers who conduct diligent brand verification. They buy by name and by memory. Accordingly, the triple identity test — identical marks (or deceptively similar), identical goods, and identical trade channels — was held to be amply satisfied.

The court then turned to the religious inspiration defence, which it characterised in terms that are unusually candid for judicial writing. The explanation of deriving inspiration from Gurudwara Shri Paonta Sahib was described as a "brilliant and most innovative storyline" and "though seemingly attractive" was found to be "unpersuasive and unmerited." The reason is important: this explanation had never been placed before the Trade Marks Registry at the time of responding to the Examination Report on 25 May 2019. The two-paragraph reply of May 2019 said nothing about religious faith, nothing about Gurudwara Paonta Sahib, and nothing about the linguistic meaning of PONTA in foreign languages. Since the Registry never had the opportunity to consider and evaluate this story, the court held that it could not and would not accept this explanation as a reason to sustain the registration. The court went further, stating plainly that it appeared the respondent had "cooked up a story" to align with a mala fide adoption of the mark — a remarkably direct judicial assessment of the respondent's credibility.

On the linguistic diversity argument — that PONTA means various things in various languages globally — the court noted that the respondent had relied on research generated entirely by Artificial Intelligence tools, without any independent authentication or corroborative evidence of the actual existence of such words or meanings in the claimed foreign languages. The court declined to place any reliance on such unauthenticated and unverified material. This is a significant judicial statement about the limitations of AI-generated content as legal evidence, and one that practitioners and litigants would do well to heed.

The court also addressed the protection claimed under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which permits registration of a mark even where a prior conflicting mark exists, provided the use is honest and concurrent. The court rejected this argument on two independent grounds. First, the adoption cannot be said to be honest given that no genuine reason was ever offered to the Trade Marks Registry despite the Registry's own specific objection. Second, there can be no concurrent use because the respondent had not used the mark at all when it applied for registration — both applications were on a "proposed to be used" basis — and by the time actual use commenced, the petitioner was already an overwhelmingly dominant commercial presence in the same market.

On the question of which provision of law would best govern the cancellation, the court drew a distinction between Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 47(1)(a) requires proof of two conditions: that the mark was registered without bonafide intention to use it, and that there has been no bonafide use for three months before the date of application. The court found Section 47 inapplicable here because the respondent had applied on a "proposed to be used" basis (so the three-month use condition before filing is necessarily absent) and had since placed invoices showing some commercial use (making the bonafide intention issue less clear). However, Section 57(2) of the Act, which empowers the court to expunge or vary a registration where an entry has been made "without sufficient cause" or an entry "wrongly remains" on the register, was found to be squarely applicable. Since the mark PONTA was deceptively similar to the petitioner's mark PENTA, since the Registry had raised a specific objection under Section 11(1) which was not adequately answered, and since no valid justification for adoption existed, the registration was entered without sufficient cause and the respondent's mark had no lawful basis to remain on the Trade Marks Register.

The judgments cited by the petitioner in support of its case included Kamani Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhuwaneshwar Refineries Pvt. Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 595; Aktiebolaget Volvo of Sweden v. Volvo Steels Ltd. of Gujarat (India), 1997 SCC OnLine Bom 578; Federal Express Corporation v. Fedex Securities Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5056; Mallcom (India) Ltd. v. Shanti Udyog Weldsafe Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2751; and Mallcom (India) Ltd. & Anr. v. Rakesh Kumar & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine 7646. These authorities were cited in the context of deceptive similarity and the legal standards for comparing competing marks, reinforcing the proposition that single-vowel differences in five-letter words used for identical goods do not create sufficient distinction to avoid confusion.


Final Decision of the Court

The court allowed both petitions and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks — respondent no. 2 — to remove and rectify the Register of Trade Marks by cancelling the word mark PONTA bearing application number 4134589, registered on 22 February 2021, and the device mark bearing application number 4885149 in Class-9, registered on 9 August 2021, both registered in the name of the respondent no.1. The Registrar was directed to carry out this exercise within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. No costs were awarded to either party.


Points of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment makes several contributions to the development of Indian trademark law. It holds unequivocally that Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is the appropriate provision to seek cancellation of a mark that was registered "without sufficient cause" — particularly where the Trade Marks Registry had raised its own objection in the Examination Report, that objection was never adequately addressed, and yet registration was wrongly granted. The court clarifies the distinction between Section 47 and Section 57, noting that Section 47 presupposes use-related analysis which may not always apply to marks filed on a "proposed to be used" basis.

The judgment settles that explanations for the adoption of a mark, if not placed before the Trade Marks Registry at the earliest opportunity — specifically in response to the Examination Report — cannot be introduced for the first time before the court in cancellation proceedings. A party that chooses to remain silent before the Registry cannot construct a fresh narrative in litigation and expect the court to treat it as credible. This is a procedural discipline of significant importance.

The judgment is also noteworthy for its treatment of AI-generated evidence. It expressly holds that research produced through Artificial Intelligence tools, without independent authentication or corroborating material, is unauthenticated and unverified and cannot be relied upon in court proceedings. This is one of the early and clear judicial statements in Indian intellectual property law on the evidentiary limitations of AI-generated content.

On deceptive similarity, the court confirms that a single-vowel substitution in a five-letter word used for identical goods in the same class does not create any meaningful distinction. The standard of comparison is the ordinary consumer — an electrician, a petty contractor, a householder — who buys by memory, not by careful examination. The visual and phonetic proximity of PENTA and PONTA satisfies the deceptive similarity test comprehensively.

Finally, the court reaffirms that the protection of honest concurrent use under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is not available to a party whose adoption cannot be characterised as honest — particularly where that party had not used the mark at all at the time of registration, and where the mark is deceptively similar to a massively popular prior-registered mark in the same field.


Case Details

Title: Panasonic Holdings Corporation & Anr. v. Siddharth Vij & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 5 June 2026

Case Numbers: C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 171/2025, I.A. 18595/2025 & I.A. 18596/2025 and C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 172/2025, I.A. 18603/2025 & I.A. 18604/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5074

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela


Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


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  3. Delhi High Court on Section 57(2) Trade Marks Act: Cancellation of Mark Registered Without Sufficient Cause Despite Registry Objection
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Head Note

Facts: Panasonic Holdings Corporation, owner of the well-established trademark PENTA registered in Class-9 since 1989 for electrical goods with annual turnover exceeding Rs. 788 crore by FY 2019-20, filed cancellation petitions against the registered word mark PONTA (registration no. 4134589, registered 22 February 2021) and device mark PONTA (registration no. 4885149, registered 9 August 2021) in Class-9, both registered in favour of the respondent. The respondent had applied on a "proposed to be used" basis on 30 March 2019, and despite the Trade Marks Registry's own Examination Report dated 21 May 2019 specifically citing PENTA as a conflicting mark under Section 11(1), the Registry had granted registration on the basis of an inadequate two-paragraph reply. The respondent, for the first time before the court, claimed inspiration from Gurudwara Shri Paonta Sahib and relied on AI-generated linguistic research to justify adoption of PONTA.

Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the cancellation petitions under Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, held PONTA deceptively similar to PENTA in visual, structural, and conceptual terms, rejected the belated religious inspiration defence as an afterthought not placed before the Registry, declined to rely on unauthenticated AI-generated linguistic evidence, held that Section 12 protection for honest concurrent use was unavailable given the mala fide nature of adoption, and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to remove both the word mark and device mark PONTA from the Register of Trade Marks within four weeks.

Modern Pipe Industries Vs Raj Kumar Maurya

Case Title: Modern Pipe Industries Vs Raj Kumar Maurya

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 283/2025 and CS(COMM) 1402/2025

Date of Judgment: 29 May 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4859

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

High Court: Tushar Rao Gedela

In a trademark and copyright infringement dispute, the Delhi High Court granted interim relief in favour of M/s Modern Pipe Industries, the proprietor of the well-known mark “KOANAFLEX” used for pipes, hoses, water storage tanks and allied products since 1988. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was marketing water storage tanks under the mark “KONAFLEX”, which was deceptively similar to its trademark and logo, thereby causing confusion among consumers.

Court observed that the defendant’s mark “KONAFLEX” was visually, structurally and phonetically almost identical to “KOANAFLEX”. The Court found that the plaintiff had established prior adoption, extensive use, goodwill and reputation in the market, while the defendant had entered the market much later and failed to provide a convincing explanation for adopting a nearly identical mark and artistic style. The Court also rejected the defendant’s objections regarding territorial jurisdiction and the pendency of a separate dispute involving the plaintiff’s mark.

Holding that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and satisfied the requirements for interim injunction, the Court restrained the defendant and all persons acting on its behalf from using the mark “KONAFLEX” or any deceptively similar mark, and from reproducing or using any artistic work substantially similar to the plaintiff’s “KOANAFLEX” logo during the pendency of the suit.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception,interpretation and presentation of facts and law.]

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KOANAFLEX vs KONAFLEX: When a Single Letter Makes All the Difference — Delhi High Court Grants Interim Injunction in Trademark and Copyright Battle Over Water Storage Tanks


Introduction

In the competitive world of industrial and household products, a brand name is often the most valuable asset a business possesses. When a competitor adopts a name, logo, and artistic style that is virtually indistinguishable from an established brand, the law of trademarks and copyright steps in to protect the original creator. This case, decided by the High Court of Delhi on 29 May 2026, presents a fascinating intersection of trademark law, copyright protection, passing off, and the doctrine of prior user all arising from a dispute over two marks that differ by just one letter: KOANAFLEX and KONAFLEX, both used on plastic water storage tanks sold to ordinary consumers across India.

The case raises important questions about what happens when a long-established business discovers that a newer entrant has not merely copied its brand name but has also replicated its logo font, letter styling, colour scheme, and product presentation in a manner so close that even an attentive observer would struggle to tell the two apart. 

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, M/s Modern Pipe Industries, is a partnership firm presently comprising two partners, Mr. Rajiv Kumar Nayar and Mr. Mohit Nayar. The firm traces its origins to 1988, when what was then a partnership firm — also bearing the name M/s Modern Pipe Industries — commenced business in the manufacture and sale of hose pipes and allied products. Over the following decades, the original partnership saw changes: three partners retired in 2003, following which Mr. Rajiv Kumar Nayar continued alone as a sole proprietor, and the current partnership firm was reconstituted in 2013. The plaintiff thus claims to be the successor-in-interest of the original 1988 firm, and asserts continuous operation under that name for over three and a half decades.

The trademark at the heart of the dispute is KOANAFLEX. According to the plaintiff, this mark was coined and adopted in 1988 as a creative combination of the Hindi word "KOANA" (meaning "corner") and the English word "FLEX" (denoting flexibility), originally conceived for use on flexible hose pipes that could bend at corners. The word mark was also rendered in Hindi script on products. The plaintiff states that it initially registered the mark KOANAFLEX in Class 21 (which covers household articles and containers), and that registration remained valid until it lapsed in 2009, attributed to health issues suffered by the proprietor. The mark was subsequently re-registered in Class 21, with fresh registration granted by the Trade Marks Registry on 12 April 2024.

From modest beginnings with four employees and a single machine, the plaintiff grew into one of the leading manufacturers in the PVC pipe industry, now operating over 25 machines in a facility exceeding 60,000 square feet. Its product range expanded significantly under the KOANAFLEX brand to include garden pipes and hoses in more than nine varieties, lay flat tubes, borewell pipes, PVC agricultural pipes, PVC electrical conduit pipes, and UPVC plumbing pipes and fittings. From 2023 onwards, the plaintiff also ventured into the manufacture and sale of plastic water storage tanks under the same mark.

The plaintiff also permitted two other entities  M/s NYR Industries Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Future Plastics Industries  to use the KOANAFLEX mark under its authority. Both entities issued formal certificates and No Objection letters on record, acknowledging that they were not owners of the trademark and that their use was entirely based on permission granted by M/s Modern Pipe Industries. The mark was also created in a stylised artistic form in 2018, displayed prominently in a distinctive yellow-background logo, and social media promotion of the brand began in 2021.

The defendant, Mr. Rajkumar Maurya, operates a proprietorship firm called M/s Satyam Industries from Jaunpur, Uttar Pradesh. The plaintiff claims that back in 2022, the defendant had actually approached the plaintiff seeking a dealership for KOANAFLEX products, which request was refused owing to existing business arrangements. By late August and September 2025, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had begun selling plastic water storage tanks under the mark KONAFLEX  a name that is identical to KOANAFLEX except for the omission of the letter "A". The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had copied its logo and overall artistic style.

The plaintiff filed the present suit  CS(COMM) 1402/2025  before the High Court of Delhi for trademark infringement and copyright infringement, accompanied by an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) seeking an interim injunction. A separate cancellation petition C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 283/2025 was also filed before the same court. The applications were heard together. 

The Dispute

The core dispute is relatively straightforward in its facts though legally nuanced in its resolution. The plaintiff asserts that it has been using the mark KOANAFLEX continuously since 1988, has built up enormous goodwill and reputation over more than three decades, adopted a stylised artistic logo of the mark in 2018, and entered the water storage tank market from March 2023. The defendant, on the other hand, applied for registration of the word mark KONAFLEX on 12 April 2024, and separately for the device mark (logo) KONAFLEX on 9 October 2025, both applications being on a "proposed to be used" basis — meaning the defendant had not even claimed prior use at the time of filing. The first invoice showing the defendant's actual sale of goods under the KONAFLEX mark is dated 27 January 2025.

The plaintiff's grievance is twofold. First, the word KONAFLEX is deceptively similar  differing by only one letter  to the plaintiff's registered word mark KOANAFLEX. Second, and perhaps more strikingly, the artistic style of the defendant's KONAFLEX logo is almost a replica of the plaintiff's KOANAFLEX logo: same thick lettering, same stylised font, same slight gap between particular letters, same black lettering on white background when placed on water tanks.

The defendant contested the suit on multiple grounds. It argued that the plaintiff's original trademark registration had lapsed and was not validly subsisting. It pointed to a suit filed by a third party against the plaintiff, alleging that even the plaintiff was an infringer of the mark KANAFLEX, suggesting the plaintiff's own title to the mark was under a cloud. It challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, arguing both parties are based in Uttar Pradesh and no cause of action had arisen in Delhi. It also challenged the plaintiff's copyright claim, saying there was insufficient documentary proof that the plaintiff had actually created the artistic logo work. The defendant offered its own explanation for adopting KONAFLEX: that water tanks are placed in corners ("KONA" in Hindi) of terraces, and the tanks are made of flexible material, hence "FLEX."

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The court framed its analysis around the well-established "triple test" applicable to interim injunction applications: whether the applicant has made out a prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience tilts in its favour, and whether irreparable harm would result if no injunction is granted. At this interlocutory stage, the court emphasised that no mini-trial of evidence is conducted  only a general examination of the merits suffices.

On the question of similarity of marks, the court undertook a visual comparison of the plaintiff's mark KOANAFLEX and the defendant's mark KONAFLEX and found the resemblance to be striking. Except for the single letter "A" in KOANAFLEX, the marks are virtually identical in appearance. The court noted that the phonetic similarity between the two marks is also uncanny. Looking at the stylised logos as placed on the actual products  water storage tanks  the court found that even a careful observer would struggle to distinguish one from the other unless examining them very closely. The font, letter thickness, the slight gap between specific letters, the use of dark colour on white background  all are practically identical. The court concluded unambiguously that KONAFLEX is deceptively similar to KOANAFLEX.

The court also addressed the consumer confusion aspect with practical common sense. Water storage tanks are products purchased by ordinary members of the public, including plumbers, who may not scrutinise brand names minutely. Applying the standard of an ordinary consumer of average intelligence with imperfect recollection  a test well-established in Indian trademark law  the court held that such a consumer would inevitably be confused into believing that the defendant's goods emanate from the plaintiff. Since the products themselves are identical and the trade channels and distribution networks would naturally overlap, the risk of confusion is all the more real. This reasoning aligns with the test laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 672, which the court applied to find that the plaintiff was "first in the market" and had priority over the defendant in respect of water storage tanks.

On the copyright dimension, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to produce adequate documentary proof of having created the original artistic work in the KOANAFLEX logo. The court acknowledged this argument but found it unpersuasive at the interim stage. It reasoned that the extensive actual use of the artistic mark  substantiated by years of invoices, social media presence from 2021, and widespread commercial activity  itself corroborates the prima facie claim that the plaintiff created and adopted the artistic work in 2018. The court left a definitive determination of copyright ownership for the trial stage.

On the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's own mark was "under a cloud" because a third party had filed a suit against the plaintiff alleging infringement of the mark KANAFLEX, the court disposed of this contention efficiently. It noted that the plaintiff had itself disclosed this pending suit fairly and voluntarily, which weighed in the plaintiff's favour in terms of candour. The court held that the mere pendency of such a suit could not disentitle the plaintiff from seeking injunctive relief against the defendant in the present proceedings. The effect of any eventual judgment in that suit on these proceedings could be considered at the appropriate time.

The territorial jurisdiction challenge was addressed by relying on a very recent precedent of the Delhi High Court's own Division Bench in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd., decided in FAO(OS)(COMM) 66/2025 on 3 December 2025. That judgment held that where a party maintains an interactive website accessible from a particular location, the courts at that location have territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. The plaintiff had asserted that the defendant's website was interactive and that the defendant had offered to deliver products in Delhi. The court treated this as a mixed question of law and fact incapable of resolution at the interim stage without conducting a mini-trial, and relied on the Kohinoor Seeds principle to decline the defendant's jurisdictional challenge for the present.

A particularly interesting aspect of the court's reasoning concerned the defendant's explanation for adopting the mark KONAFLEX. The defendant's story  that tanks are placed in corners ("KONA") of terraces and made of flexible material ("FLEX")  was found to be almost a verbatim repetition of the plaintiff's own explanation for coining KOANAFLEX. The court found it inexplicable that while the defendant offered a linguistic justification for the word, it offered absolutely no explanation for why the font, stylisation, letter thickness, colour scheme, and placement of the mark on the product are virtually identical to the plaintiff's copyrighted artistic work. This, in the court's assessment, pointed strongly to dishonest adoption by the defendant.

The court also noted another significant evidentiary point: the defendant had applied for trademark registration on a "proposed to be used" basis  meaning, at the time of filing, the mark had not yet been used commercially. The first actual invoice of sale under KONAFLEX dates only to January 2025. This contrasts sharply with the plaintiff's use since 1988 and its water storage tank sales evidenced from March 2023. The court referred to the Supreme Court's guidance in Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, Civil Appeal No. 2768 of 2023, decided on 14 September 2023, which held that at the interim injunction stage, courts need to appreciate the substantial goodwill of the plaintiff based on sales figures and promotional expenditure. The plaintiff's detailed financial data  showing total sales crossing Rs. 13.25 crore in 2024-2025 alone, with consistent sales figures and advertising expenditures over more than a decade  left little doubt about the substantial goodwill vested in the KOANAFLEX brand.

On the balance of convenience, the court was persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that the defendant would suffer no significant hardship from the injunction because the defendant was already selling water storage tanks under the entirely different brand SATYAM and could continue to do so. The balance of convenience therefore tilted clearly in favour of the plaintiff.

Final Decision of the Court

The court granted an interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff, restraining the defendant  along with its proprietor, agents, representatives, employees, associated firms, affiliates, and all persons acting on its behalf  from selling, offering for sale, advertising, or in any other manner using the trademark KONAFLEX or its associated logo, or any other mark identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark KOANAFLEX and its logo, so as to cause confusion or convey a false impression of association amounting to passing off. Separately, the defendant was also restrained from reproducing, communicating, or adapting the artistic work of the KONAFLEX logo or any substantially similar work, so as to infringe the plaintiff's copyright in the KOANAFLEX artistic work.

Points of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment contributes meaningfully to several areas of intellectual property law. It reaffirms that in a passing off and copyright infringement suit, a plaintiff does not need a subsisting trademark registration to seek injunctive relief — prior use and established goodwill are sufficient. Even where a trademark registration has lapsed and been re-obtained, the continuity of use remains a powerful indicator of entitlement.

The judgment settles that the test of deceptive similarity must be applied from the perspective of a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection  not a person who scrutinises marks minutely side by side. A difference of a single letter in an otherwise identical word and logo is insufficient to escape the charge of deceptive similarity, particularly when the visual, structural, and phonetic presentation is near-identical.

It further reinforces that the pendency of a third-party suit against the plaintiff does not automatically bar the plaintiff from maintaining its own suit for injunction, unless the third-party suit results in an adverse finding on the plaintiff's title.

On territorial jurisdiction, the court applied the interactive website principle from the Division Bench ruling in Kohinoor Seeds to hold that Delhi courts could exercise jurisdiction if the defendant's website was accessible and interactive from Delhi, even without proof of an actual completed sale in Delhi.

The court also clarified  citing Brihan Karan Sugar (supra)  that at the interim injunction stage, the standard is whether the plaintiff's goodwill is established through sales figures and promotional expenditure, not whether every aspect of its case has been proved conclusively. This lowers the evidentiary threshold at the interlocutory stage while preserving the right of parties to contest the matter fully at trial.

Case Details

Title: M/S Modern Pipe Industries Vs. Raj Kumar Maurya Proprietor of M/S Satyam Industries & Anr.

Date of Order: 29 May 2026

Case Number: C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 283/2025 & CS(COMM) 1402/2025 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4859

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


Suggested SEO Titles

  1. KOANAFLEX vs KONAFLEX: Delhi High Court Grants Interim Injunction in Trademark and Copyright Battle
  2. One Letter, One Court Order: How Delhi High Court Protected a 37-Year-Old Brand from Copycat Competitor
  3. Deceptive Similarity in Trademarks: Delhi High Court on KOANAFLEX vs KONAFLEX Water Tank Dispute
  4. Prior User Rights in Indian Trademark Law: Lessons from the KOANAFLEX Injunction Case 2026
  5. Delhi High Court on Copyright Infringement of Logo Artistic Work: The KOANAFLEX Judgment Explained
  6. How Indian Courts Decide Interim Injunctions in Trademark Passing Off Cases: A 2026 Delhi High Court Analysis
  7. Interactive Website and Territorial Jurisdiction: Delhi High Court Applies Kohinoor Seeds Principle in IP Dispute

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Head Note

Facts: The plaintiff, a PVC pipe manufacturer using the trademark KOANAFLEX since 1988, filed a suit for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off against the defendant who began selling water storage tanks under the near-identical mark KONAFLEX from January 2025. The plaintiff held a registered trademark in Class 21 (granted 12 April 2024) and claimed copyright in the stylised KOANAFLEX logo created in 2018. The defendant's mark differed from the plaintiff's by only one letter and the artistic logo was visually near-identical in font, style, and colour scheme.

Decision: The Delhi High Court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the mark KONAFLEX or any deceptively similar mark and from reproducing the plaintiff's copyrighted logo, holding that the plaintiff had established prior use, substantial goodwill, deceptive similarity of marks, and prima facie copyright ownership, while the defendant failed to demonstrate prior adoption, market entry, or any credible independent origin for its mark or logo.


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