Ganesh Consumer Products Ltd. Vs Assistant Registrar of Trademarks

Madras High Court Upholds Registration of ‘GANESHA’ Trademark for Gram Flour on Ground of Honest Concurrent Use and Territorial Limitations

Case Title: Ganesh Consumer Products Ltd. (Previously known as Ganesh Grains Ltd.) v. Assistant Registrar of Trademarks and G.I. & Ors.

Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Date of Judgment: 15.04.2026

Citation: 2026:MHC:1519

In a notable trademark appeal concerning rival claims over marks containing the word “GANESHA” for gram flour (Class 30), the Madras High Court dismissed the challenge filed by Ganesh Consumer Products Ltd. and upheld the registration of the device mark “SPECIAL GANESHA BRAND” (with pictorial elements) granted to the partners of Shankar Industries, Karnataka.

Brief Facts

The appellant, Ganesh Consumer Products Ltd., opposed the registration of Trademark Application No. 1831646 filed by K.R. Nagendra and K.N. Shobha (partners of Shankar Industries) for a label mark featuring “SPECIAL GANESHA BRAND” and device elements in respect of gram flour. The opposition was rejected by the Registrar of Trade Marks, Chennai, vide order dated 11.09.2024, leading to registration of the mark as No. 1831646. The appellant preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking to set aside the Registrar’s order and cancel the registration.

The appellant claimed prior use and registration of several “GANESH”/“GANESHA” marks and argued that the impugned mark was deceptively similar. The respondents relied on their long-standing use, an earlier registration of a similar mark (No. 460314) since the 1980s, and evidence of turnover and advertisement expenses supported by a Chartered Accountant’s certificate.

Key Issues and Court’s Analysis

The Court examined the evidence of use adduced by both sides. It noted that the respondents had an earlier registered mark containing “SPECIAL GANESHA BRAND” with a pictorial device of Lord Ganesha, registered with effect from 1986 on a user claim from 1978. A rectification petition filed by the appellant against that registration was withdrawn without leave to re-file.

The respondents also placed on record a Chartered Accountant’s certificate showing turnover and advertisement expenses for the “GANESHA” mark in respect of gram flour from 1995-96 onwards. Though the appellant raised objections regarding the evidentiary value of the certificate (absence of underlying documents and affidavit), the Court held that the Registrar of Trade Marks does not conduct a full trial and the strict rules of the Evidence Act are not binding. The certificate specifically linked the figures to the mark and goods in question and was thus acceptable as evidence of use. Invoices and other documents further supported the respondents’ claim.

The appellant’s evidence showed use since 1992, which was subsequent to the respondents’ claimed and registered use. Additional documents sought to be filed by the appellant at the appellate stage, including old advertisements from 1936, were not admitted as they fell outside the pleadings.

Crucially, the Court observed that both the impugned registration and the respondents’ earlier registration carried a territorial limitation restricting use to the State of Karnataka only. Many of the appellant’s registrations were similarly limited to West Bengal. This territorial restriction provided an additional ground for invoking Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which permits registration in cases of honest concurrent use or other special circumstances.

The Court held that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of Section 12 on account of their prior registration, established use, and the territorial limitations. In view of this finding, it was unnecessary to examine the issue of deceptive similarity between the rival marks in detail. Even if the additional documents were considered, no case was made out to interfere with the Registrar’s order.

Final Decision

The Madras High Court dismissed the appeal (CMA (TM) No.21 of 2025) and the connected miscellaneous petition without costs. The registration of Trademark No. 1831646 in favour of the respondents was upheld.

This judgment highlights the importance of territorial limitations in trademark registrations, the evidentiary flexibility before the Registrar, and the protective scope of Section 12 for honest concurrent users, particularly where marks incorporate common or religious elements like the name of a deity and operate in geographically limited markets.

Disclaimer: This is a brief write-up based on the judgment for reporting purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It may contain subjective summarization.

Written By:

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor

[Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #TrademarkLaw #HonestConcurrentUse #Section12TradeMarksAct #MadrasHighCourt #GANESHA trademark #IndianIPLaw #IPIndiaupdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Suggested Title for Legal Journal:

“Madras High Court Upholds ‘GANESHA’ Trademark Registration Emphasising Honest Concurrent Use and Territorial Limitations under Section 12 of Trade Marks Act”

Tags: #Trademark #HonestConcurrentUse #Section12 #MadrasHighCourt #DeityName #TerritorialLimitation #GramFlour #IPCaselaw #TradeMarksAct1999 #RegistrarOfTradeMarks

=====

**Madras High Court Upholds Trademark Registration on Grounds of Honest Concurrent Use and Territorial Limitations**

### Introduction

Trademark disputes often arise when two businesses want to use similar names or labels for their products, especially when the name has a common or religious connection. In one such case involving marks with the word “GANESHA” for gram flour, the Madras High Court delivered an important ruling that balances the rights of long-time users while considering practical limitations on where the goods are sold. The judgment shows how courts look at real-world use of trademarks, old registrations, and special situations that allow similar marks to coexist peacefully in different areas. This decision offers valuable guidance to businesses on how prior use, honest adoption, and geographic restrictions can protect a trademark registration even when another party claims earlier rights.

### Factual Background

The dispute centred on a label mark featuring the words “SPECIAL GANESHA BRAND” along with pictorial elements, used for pure gram flour. One side was Ganesh Consumer Products Ltd., a company based in West Bengal that claimed rights over several marks containing the word “GANESH” or “GANESHA” for food products like atta and flour. The other side consisted of partners of Shankar Industries from Arsikere in Karnataka, who had been selling gram flour under their GANESHA brand for many years.

The Karnataka firm had obtained an earlier trademark registration for a similar label that included a picture of Lord Ganesha. They later applied for registration of the impugned mark without the deity image but with the same brand name. The West Bengal company opposed this application, arguing that their own marks were similar and that allowing the new registration would create confusion among customers. They claimed to have been using their GANESH marks for a long time and had several registrations in their favour or in the name of their predecessors.

The Karnataka partners defended their position by pointing to their established business in gram flour, supported by sales records, advertisement expenses certified by chartered accountants, and their existing registration. They maintained that their use was honest and had continued for decades without any major issues.

### Procedural Background

The West Bengal company filed a formal opposition before the Trade Marks Registry in Chennai against the application by the Karnataka firm. After considering evidence and arguments from both sides, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the opposition and allowed the registration of the mark in Class 30 for gram flour. Feeling aggrieved, the West Bengal company approached the Madras High Court through a civil miscellaneous appeal under the relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act. They also filed an application to place additional old documents on record, such as newspaper advertisements and assignment deeds.

Both parties were represented by experienced counsel who presented detailed arguments. The appellant stressed the similarity of the marks and their own prior use, while the respondents highlighted their long-standing registration, continuous business activity, and the limited geographic scope of their operations.

### Reasoning

The Court carefully reviewed the evidence presented by both parties regarding the use of their respective marks. It noted that the respondents had secured an earlier trademark registration for a very similar label mark many years ago, claiming use dating back even further. Although the appellant had challenged that earlier registration through a rectification petition, the challenge was later withdrawn without permission to file it again, which weakened their position.

The respondents produced a certificate from chartered accountants showing their sales turnover and advertisement spending specifically linked to the GANESHA mark for gram flour over many years. The Court accepted this as valid evidence of use, observing that trademark proceedings before the Registrar are not strict court trials and that rigid rules of evidence do not always apply in the same way. The appellant’s own evidence of use began later than the respondents’ claimed and registered use.

A key factor in the Court’s thinking was the territorial limitation attached to both the respondents’ registrations and many of the appellant’s marks. The respondents’ marks were restricted to goods sold only within Karnataka, while the appellant’s registrations were often limited to West Bengal. This geographic separation reduced the chance of actual confusion or conflict in the market.

The Court explained that the law allows registration of similar marks in appropriate cases when there is honest concurrent use or other special circumstances that make it fair to do so. Here, the respondents’ long prior registration, continuous honest business activity in their region, and the territorial limits created such special circumstances. Because of this, the Court found it unnecessary to deeply analyse whether the marks looked deceptively similar. Even if the additional documents the appellant wanted to introduce were considered, they did not change the overall picture, as many related to periods or connections not properly pleaded earlier.

### Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed

The Madras High Court delivered its judgment on 15 April 2026 in the matter of CMA (TM) No.21 of 2025 and connected CMP No.32352 of 2025, cited as **2026:MHC:1519**, authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

In its reasoning, the Court discussed the scope of Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. This provision empowers the Registrar to permit registration of identical or similar marks by more than one proprietor when there is honest concurrent use or other special circumstances that justify it. The judgment placed this section in the context of balancing competing interests in the marketplace, particularly where parties operate in different regions and have built their businesses honestly over time.

The Court also referred to the limited nature of proceedings before the Trade Marks Registry, noting that it does not function like a full civil trial and that the Evidence Act is not strictly binding. This context helped justify reliance on the chartered accountants’ certificate as proof of use, even without supporting affidavits or all underlying invoices for every year.

Additionally, the judgment touched upon the effect of an earlier registration and the withdrawal of a rectification petition without leave, explaining how these procedural steps impact later challenges. The territorial limitations on registrations were highlighted as creating “special circumstances” under Section 12, allowing similar marks to coexist without causing widespread confusion.

### Final Decision of Court

After weighing all aspects, the Madras High Court found no reason to interfere with the Registrar’s order that had allowed the registration. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety, and the connected miscellaneous petition for additional documents was closed. No order was passed as to costs. The registration of the impugned “SPECIAL GANESHA BRAND” mark in favour of the partners of Shankar Industries was thus upheld.

### Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment settles an important practical point in trademark law: When two parties use similar marks containing common elements like the name of a deity, and their registrations or business activities are confined to different geographic areas, the law can permit both to coexist under the principle of honest concurrent use or special circumstances. A prior registration, even if challenged and later withdrawn from contest, combined with evidence of continuous honest use and territorial restrictions, can provide strong protection against later opposition. The decision also clarifies that trademark registries have flexibility in accepting evidence of use and that courts will not readily disturb such decisions when special circumstances exist.

### Case Details

**Title:** Ganesh Consumer Products Ltd. Vs Assistant Registrar of Trademarks and G.I. & Ors.  

**Date of Order:** 15.04.2026  

**Case Number:** CMA (TM) No.21 of 2025 and CMP No.32352 of 2025  

**Neutral Citation:** 2026:MHC:1519  

**Name of Court:** High Court of Judicature at Madras  

**Name of Hon'ble Judge:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

**Disclaimer:** Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

**Written By:** Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

### Suggested Titles for the Article

1. Madras High Court Upholds ‘GANESHA’ Trademark Registration Based on Honest Concurrent Use and Territorial Limits  

2. Territorial Restrictions and Prior Registration Save Similar Trademark in Gram Flour Dispute: Madras HC Ruling  

3. Section 12 of Trade Marks Act Comes to Rescue in Honest Concurrent Use Case: Madras High Court Decision  

4. Madras HC Emphasises Special Circumstances Allowing Coexistence of Similar Trademarks in Different Regions

### Suggested Tags

#TrademarkLaw #HonestConcurrentUse #Section12TradeMarksAct #MadrasHighCourt #GANESHA trademark #TerritorialLimitation #IPCaselaw #TradeMarksAct1999 #IndianIPLaw #TrademarkRegistration #IPUpdate #DeityNameTrademark #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman

### Headnote of Article

**Headnote:** In a trademark appeal concerning rival “GANESHA” marks for gram flour, the Madras High Court upheld the registration granted to the Karnataka-based respondents by invoking Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Court held that honest concurrent use, an earlier similar registration, continuous business activity, and territorial limitations restricting sales to Karnataka constituted special circumstances justifying the coexistence of similar marks. The appeal by the West Bengal company was dismissed, reinforcing that geographic separation and prior honest use can protect registrations even when marks share common elements.

R. Kishore Kumar Vs. R.R. Cine Productions

Madras High Court Decrees Copyright Suit in Favour of Producer in Film Title Dispute

Case Title: R. Kishore Kumar v. M/s R.R. Cine Productions & Ors. (C.S. No. 362 of 2016) & Connected Cross Suit C.S. (Comm Div) No. 237 of 2022

Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Date of Judgment: 08.04.2026

In a significant copyright dispute concerning ownership of the Tamil feature film originally titled “MANI” (later censored as “MONEY” and subsequently as “DHADHA”), the Madras High Court has upheld the claim of R. Kishore Kumar, proprietor of Annai Therasa International Films, as the producer and first owner of copyright in the cinematograph film.

Brief Facts

Kishore Kumar claimed to have conceived, produced, and directed the film starring Nithin Sathiya, Gayathri, Yogi Babu, and Mono Bala. He alleged that he had approached editor Durairajan @ R.D. Rajan for post-production work. According to him, Durairajan and M/s R.R. Cine Productions (represented by Meeran Malu Mohamed Rafiq) induced him to transfer only the title rights, but later fraudulently claimed production credits and obtained a CBFC censor certificate in the name of R.R. Cine Productions for the film titled “MONEY”.

Kishore Kumar complained to the Tamil Film Producers Council, which reportedly reversed the title transfer. He filed the suit in 2016 seeking declaration of copyright ownership and permanent injunction against infringement.

In a counter-suit filed in 2022, Durairajan and R.R. Cine Productions claimed that they had actually produced the film, with Durairajan acting as director and music director. They alleged Kishore Kumar was merely an assistant and had misappropriated documents. They sought declaration that their film “DHADHA” was not infringing and injunction against Kishore Kumar.

Key Evidence & Court’s Analysis

The Court meticulously examined the evidence led by both sides:

Kishore Kumar’s evidence: Included agreements with key crew members (hero, heroine, comedian, music director, dance director, art director, cinematographer) executed in May 2015 onwards (Exs.P3–P9), shooting ledger with contemporaneous entries bearing his production company’s stamp (Ex.P10), original bound script (Ex.P34), lyrics draft by Na. Muthukumar (Ex.P2), confirmation letter from actor Nasser (Ex.P37), and testimony of five supporting witnesses (PW1–PW5) who confirmed working under Kishore Kumar and receiving payments from him.

Durairajan/R.R. Cine Productions’ evidence: Relied on professional services agreements purportedly executed in March–April 2015 by the partnership firm (Exs.D2–D9), CBFC certificate in the name of Rafiq (Ex.P24), bank statements, pooja/shooting photographs, and testimony of DW1 (Durairajan), DW2, and DW3.

The Court found serious infirmities in the defence evidence:

The partnership deed (Ex.D16) was executed only on 18.07.2015, yet the agreements (Exs.D2–D9) were shown as executed earlier by the non-existent partnership firm.

A subsequent registered partnership deed dated 04.03.2016 further undermined the earlier documents.

Durairajan failed to produce the bound script despite claiming possession.

He could not recall camera details despite claiming to be the director and had no prior film production/directing experience.

Key defence witnesses included interested parties (e.g., editor Vinoth was Durairajan’s sister’s son).

The Court held that Kishore Kumar’s contemporaneous documents, especially the shooting ledger and crew agreements, carried greater credibility. It concluded that Kishore Kumar took the initiative and bore the responsibility for making the film, thereby qualifying as the “producer” under Section 2(uu) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and the first owner of copyright under Section 17.

Judgment

The Madras High Court decreed C.S. No. 362 of 2016 in favour of Kishore Kumar, granting:

Declaration that he is the author, creator, and sole copyright owner of the film “MANI”/“MONEY”.

Permanent injunction restraining Durairajan, R.R. Cine Productions, and others from infringing the copyright by releasing or exploiting the film.

The connected cross-suit C.S. (Comm Div) No. 237 of 2022 was dismissed. Costs of ₹4,00,000/- were awarded to Kishore Kumar.

Neutral Citation: To be assigned.

This judgment underscores the importance of contemporaneous documentary evidence and credible witness testimony in film copyright disputes, particularly where rival claims of production ownership arise. It reaffirms that the producer — the person who takes the initiative and responsibility for the film — is the first owner of copyright in a cinematograph work.

Disclaimer: This is a brief write-up based on the judgment for reporting purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It may contain subjective summarization.

Written By:

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor

[Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #CopyrightLaw #FilmCopyright #MadrasHighCourt #IndianIPLaw #IPIndia

=====

Madras High Court Clarifies Copyright Ownership in Film Production Dispute: Producer Who Takes Initiative and Responsibility Holds the Rights

Introduction

In the world of Indian cinema, disputes over who actually produced a film often lead to heated legal battles, especially when money, credits, and future releases are at stake. A recent judgment from the Madras High Court brings welcome clarity to such conflicts. The Court resolved a long-running clash between two parties claiming ownership of the same Tamil film, originally known as “MANI” and later censored under the title “MONEY”. The ruling emphasizes that the true producer is the person who steps forward to organize and take responsibility for creating the movie, and that person automatically becomes the first owner of its copyright. This decision serves as an important reminder for filmmakers, producers, and industry professionals about the value of proper documentation and honest claims in copyright matters.

Factual Background

The story revolves around a Tamil feature film featuring actors like Nithin Sathiya, Gayathri, Yogi Babu, and Mono Bala. R. Kishore Kumar, who runs Annai Therasa International Films, claimed that he conceived the project, wrote the story, screenplay, and dialogues, and directed the film. He said he had approached Durairajan, a professional editor, for post-production help. According to Kishore Kumar, Durairajan introduced him to Meeran Malu Mohamed Rafiq of R.R. Cine Productions, who expressed interest in buying or promoting the film. Kishore Kumar agreed only to transfer the title rights, but things went wrong when the other side allegedly started claiming full production credits. They even published advertisements showing themselves as producers and Durairajan as director, leaving out Kishore Kumar’s name entirely.

Kishore Kumar complained to film industry bodies like the Tamil Film Producers Council, which reportedly helped restore the title in his name. He also obtained clearances and registrations supporting his claim. However, the rival group managed to secure a censor certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) for the film under the name “MONEY”, listing Rafiq as the producer. Kishore Kumar believed this was done by misusing earlier documents and that it amounted to copyright infringement.

On the other side, Durairajan and R.R. Cine Productions told a different story. They asserted that Durairajan had written the script, served as director and music director, and that the production was funded and managed through their company, with Rafiq providing the financial support. They viewed Kishore Kumar as someone who assisted in production but later tried to take undue credit. They also claimed that Kishore Kumar had taken away important materials, including footage, and later renamed the film “DHADHA” to obtain his own censor certificate. This mutual finger-pointing led to cross suits being filed in court.

Procedural Background

Kishore Kumar filed his suit in 2016 seeking a declaration that he was the rightful author, creator, and sole copyright owner of the film, along with a permanent order stopping the others from releasing or exploiting it under any name. The rival side responded with their own suit in 2022, asking the court to declare that their version of the film (called “DHADHA”) was not an infringement and to restrain Kishore Kumar from interfering. Because the cases were connected and involved the same film, the Madras High Court heard them together as cross suits.

Both parties presented extensive evidence during the trial. Kishore Kumar brought forward agreements with key crew members such as the lead actors, music composer, dance director, art director, and cinematographer. He also submitted payment records, a detailed shooting ledger, the original bound script of the film, and supporting statements from several witnesses who had worked on the project. Durairajan and his team produced their own set of agreements, photographs from the shoot, bank records, and witness statements. They heavily relied on the CBFC censor certificate issued in Rafiq’s name. The court carefully examined all this material, including cross-examination of the main witnesses, before reaching its conclusions.

Reasoning

The judge analyzed the evidence with a focus on who truly took the lead in making the film. He looked at the timing and authenticity of the documents presented by each side. Kishore Kumar’s records, including crew agreements and a handwritten ledger showing day-to-day payments during shooting, appeared consistent and made at the time the work was happening. Several independent crew members, such as the camera person, art director, music director, and dance director, confirmed through their testimony that they had worked with Kishore Kumar and received payments from him.

In contrast, the court found weaknesses in the defence documents. Some key agreements were shown as signed by a partnership firm before that firm had even been legally formed according to the partnership deed. The rival side also struggled to produce the original bound script despite claiming to have it, and Durairajan could not provide clear details about basic aspects of the production, such as the type of camera used, even though he claimed to be the director. He had no prior experience directing or producing films, which raised further doubts.

The court noted that the CBFC censor certificate, while important as proof that the film was completed and viewed by officials, is only initial or prima facie evidence of who the producer is. It cannot override stronger, more detailed records of actual production activities. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the person who initiates the project and bears the main responsibility for organizing and completing the film qualifies as the producer. On the facts, Kishore Kumar had demonstrated that role through consistent evidence, while the other side’s involvement seemed more limited or secondary.

Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed

The Madras High Court delivered a detailed common judgment on 8 April 2026 in the case bearing numbers C.S. No. 362 of 2016 and the connected C.S. (Comm Div) No. 237 of 2022. The citation is 2026:MHC:1440. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy authored the judgment.

In reaching the decision, the Court discussed key provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957. It referred to the definition of “producer” under Section 2(uu), which describes the producer as the person who takes the initiative and responsibility for making the cinematograph film. The judgment also explained Section 17, which states that the producer is the first owner of copyright in a film, unless there is a specific agreement to the contrary. These sections were applied in the context of weighing rival claims where both parties had some involvement but only one could be identified as the primary driving force behind the project.

The Court further clarified the limited evidentiary value of a CBFC certificate. While it serves as strong proof that the film exists and was certified for public exhibition after examination, it does not conclusively settle private disputes over ownership or copyright between parties. This point was discussed against the backdrop of the detailed production records, witness testimonies, and contemporaneous documents placed on record by Kishore Kumar.

By carefully comparing the quality and reliability of evidence from both sides, the Court rejected the defence claims and upheld Kishore Kumar’s position. It also addressed the cross suit, noting that it appeared to be a later response to Kishore Kumar’s earlier action.

Final Decision of Court

The Madras High Court decreed Kishore Kumar’s suit in his favour. It declared him as the author, creator, and sole copyright owner of the film “MANI” (censored as “MONEY”). A permanent injunction was granted, restraining Durairajan, R.R. Cine Productions, and others from infringing the copyright by releasing, distributing, or exploiting the film in any manner. The connected cross suit filed by the rival side was dismissed entirely. The Court also directed the losing parties to pay costs to Kishore Kumar.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment settles an important practical point in Indian copyright law for the film industry: In disputes over ownership of a cinematograph film, the court will primarily look at who actually took the initiative and assumed responsibility for producing the movie. A CBFC censor certificate provides only prima facie (initial) evidence of producer status and can be outweighed by better documentary and oral evidence showing the real course of production. The decision reinforces that the first owner of copyright in a film is the producer as defined under the Copyright Act, and proper, contemporaneous records play a crucial role in proving that status. It offers clear guidance that mere claims or isolated official documents are not enough when stronger proof of actual involvement exists.

Case Details

Title: R. Kishore Kumar Vs. R.R. Cine Productions & Ors.

Date of Order: 08.04.2026

Case Number: C.S. No. 362 of 2016 & C.S. (Comm Div) No. 237 of 2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:MHC:1440

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

Madras High Court Holds Producer Who Takes Initiative Owns Copyright in Film Dispute

CBFC Certificate Not Conclusive: Madras HC Declares True Producer as Copyright Owner

Initiative and Responsibility Define Film Producer under Copyright Law: Madras High Court Ruling

Landmark Film Copyright Judgment: Madras HC Prefers Production Records Over Official Certificates

Suggested Tags

#CopyrightLaw #FilmCopyright #MadrasHighCourt #ProducerRights #IPCaselaw #IndianCopyrightAct #CinematographFilm #IPUpdate #FilmIndustryDispute #CopyrightOwnership #LegalUpdate #IPIndia

Headnote of Article

Headnote: In a dispute over ownership of a Tamil film, the Madras High Court held that the person who takes the initiative and responsibility for making the cinematograph film is its producer and first owner of copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957. A CBFC censor certificate serves only as prima facie evidence and cannot override stronger contemporaneous production records and witness testimony. The Court granted declaration and permanent injunction in favour of the claimant who proved his role as producer, while dismissing the rival cross suit.

=====

Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Calcutta High Court Division Bench Holds No Further Appeal Lies Against Single Judge Order in Trademark Rectification Matters Under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999

Case Title: Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury v. The Registrar of Trade Marks and Another

Decided on: 24 April 2026

Coram: Hon’ble Justice Debangsu Basak and Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi

Citation: TEMPAPO-IPD/2/2025

In a significant ruling on appellate remedies under trademark law, the Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division of the Calcutta High Court dismissed an intra-court appeal as not maintainable. The Division Bench held that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bars any further appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, arising from a rectification order of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

Background

The appellant, Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury, had obtained registration of a label mark containing the words “Ganraj Chhappan Bhog”. Respondent No. 2 filed a rectification application seeking cancellation of the registration, which the Registrar allowed by order dated 6 August 2024. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the High Court. A learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal by order dated 3 March 2025. The appellant then filed the present appeal before the Division Bench challenging the Single Judge’s order.

Issue and Contentions

The core issue before the Division Bench was the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal. Respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection, contending that no further appeal lies in view of Section 100A CPC, which prohibits intra-court appeals from a judgment or decree passed by a Single Judge in an appeal from an original or appellate order. The respondent relied on various Supreme Court and High Court decisions, including Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613 and a coordinate bench decision in Glorious Investment Ltd. v. Dunlop International Ltd. (2025 SCC Online Cal 8647), to argue that the Registrar exercises quasi-judicial powers with trappings of a court, making the Single Judge’s order in the Section 91 appeal final.

The appellant countered that the right of appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act is a statutory right independent of the CPC. He argued that the Registrar is neither a court nor a tribunal with full trappings of a civil court, as the powers under Section 127 are limited and orders are not fully executable. He relied on older precedents under earlier trademark laws and contended that the Letters Patent, 1865 powers of the chartered High Court cannot be curtailed by implication through Section 100A CPC. The appellant also pointed to the Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2023 of the Calcutta High Court as supporting further appeals.

Decision

The Division Bench, speaking through Justice Debangsu Basak (with Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi concurring), upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. The Court held that once a Single Judge exercises appellate powers under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 against the Registrar’s order, the prohibition under Section 100A CPC squarely applies, irrespective of whether the Registrar qualifies strictly as a “court” or whether the original order meets the technical definition of a “decree” under the CPC. The “notwithstanding” clause in Section 100A overrides the Letters Patent, 1865 and any other law.

The Bench noted that when the legislature substituted the Appellate Board with the High Court in Section 91 (with retrospective effect from 4 April 2021), Section 100A CPC (in its present form since 2002) was already in force. The legislature must be presumed to have been aware that no further appeal would lie from the Single Judge’s order. The Court distinguished or reconciled earlier precedents relied upon by the appellant, observing that many related to pre-amendment regimes or different statutes.

The appeal (TEMPAPO-IPD/2/2025) was accordingly dismissed without costs. The underlying rectification and cancellation of the appellant’s trademark registration thus stands upheld.

This judgment aligns with the Calcutta High Court’s earlier view in Glorious Investment and highlights a potential divergence with certain other High Courts on the availability of intra-court appeals in IP matters. It underscores the finality of Single Judge orders in trademark appeals to the High Court and reinforces the statutory bar under Section 100A CPC in such proceedings.

Case Details: Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury versus The Registrar of Trade Marks and Another, Order dated 24.04.2026, TEMPAPO-IPD/2/2025, Calcutta High Court (Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division), Honourable Justice Debangsu Basak and Honourable Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #TrademarkRectification #TrademarkAppeal #Section91TMAct #Section100ACPC #CalcuttaHighCourt #IndianIPLaw #LegalUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Headnote: Calcutta High Court Division Bench rules that no intra-court (Letters Patent) appeal lies against a Single Judge’s order dismissing an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 from a Registrar’s rectification order, in view of the bar under Section 100A CPC.

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**Introduction**  

The Calcutta High Court has delivered an important ruling that clarifies the limits on appeals in trademark disputes. In a case involving the cancellation of a registered trademark, the Division Bench decided whether a party could file yet another appeal after losing before a Single Judge of the High Court. The decision touches on how special laws like the Trade Marks Act interact with general rules about appeals in civil cases. It provides clarity for businesses and lawyers dealing with trademark registrations and challenges, showing that once a Single Judge has heard an appeal from the Registrar of Trade Marks, the matter usually ends there without any further appeal to a larger bench.

**Factual Background**  

A businessman named Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury had successfully registered a label mark that included the words “Ganraj Chhappan Bhog” along with other design elements. Another party felt this registration should not have been granted and applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks for rectification, asking the Registrar to cancel the registration. After hearing both sides, the Registrar agreed with the challenger and cancelled the trademark registration belonging to Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury. Feeling wronged, the trademark owner challenged this cancellation before the High Court.

**Procedural Background**  

The owner first filed an appeal under the special provision in the Trade Marks Act that allows any person unhappy with the Registrar’s decision to approach the High Court. A Single Judge of the Intellectual Property Rights Division carefully examined the matter and dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Registrar’s decision to cancel the registration. Not satisfied even after this, the owner filed a further appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, hoping for another chance to argue his case. The other party immediately raised an objection, saying this second appeal inside the same High Court was not allowed by law. The Division Bench heard detailed arguments only on this question of whether the further appeal could even be considered.

**Reasoning**  

The Division Bench, led by Justice Debangsu Basak with Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi agreeing, focused on a key rule in the general law of civil procedure. This rule states that when a Single Judge of a High Court hears and decides an appeal from any original or earlier order, no further appeal can be filed against that decision, no matter what other laws or old charters of the High Court might say. The judges explained that this bar applies whenever a Single Judge is exercising powers as an appeal court, regardless of whether the first decision came from a regular civil court or from a special authority like the Registrar of Trade Marks.

The Court noted that the Trade Marks Act allows an appeal from the Registrar’s order straight to the High Court. When the legislature changed the law to send such appeals to the High Court instead of a separate board, the general rule preventing further appeals was already part of the law. The judges felt the lawmakers must have known that Single Judge decisions in these matters would become final. They carefully reviewed arguments that the Registrar does not act like a full court and that special rules of the High Court might allow more appeals, but concluded that the broad wording of the general rule covers these situations. The focus remains on the fact that the Single Judge was hearing an appeal, which triggers the prohibition on any additional appeal.

**Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed**  

The Division Bench placed strong reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Kamal Kumar Dutta and Another vs. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. and Others* (2006) 7 SCC 613. In that case, the Supreme Court examined a similar situation under company law where appeals went to a Single Judge and held that no further appeal was possible because the law created a complete system with finality at that stage. The Calcutta High Court applied the same logic here, noting that the Registrar, while deciding rectification matters, performs quasi-judicial functions with many features similar to a court, such as hearing evidence and deciding rights between parties.

The Bench also referred to its own earlier coordinate bench ruling in *Glorious Investment Ltd vs. Dunlop International Ltd* (2025 SCC Online Cal 8647), which had already taken the view that further appeals are barred in trademark matters. Other Supreme Court cases like *Mohd. Saud and Another vs. Dr. (Maj.) Shaikh Mahfooz* (2010) 13 SCC 517 and *Geeta Devi and Others vs. Puran Ram Raigar and Another* (2010) 9 SCC 84 were cited to reinforce that appeals are creatures of statute and can be limited by clear legal provisions. The Court distinguished older cases from the time when trademark appeals went to different bodies or under previous laws, explaining that the current framework, read with the general civil procedure rule, leads to finality after the Single Judge’s order. A Delhi High Court view allowing further appeals in a similar context was noted but not followed, highlighting a possible difference of opinion between High Courts that may need higher clarification in future.

**Final Decision of Court**  

The Division Bench held that the further appeal before it was not maintainable in law. It dismissed the appeal without going into the merits of the trademark cancellation. As a result, the Single Judge’s order upholding the Registrar’s decision to cancel the registration stands, and the matter reaches its final conclusion at that stage.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**  

This judgment settles that when a person challenges the Registrar of Trade Marks’ decision by filing an appeal before the High Court under the Trade Marks Act, the order passed by the Single Judge hearing that appeal is final. No additional appeal can be filed to a Division Bench of the same High Court because of the clear bar in the general civil procedure law. This brings certainty and speed to trademark disputes by limiting layers of appeals, while still allowing one full hearing before the High Court after the Registrar’s decision. It also shows that special intellectual property laws do not automatically override general rules designed to prevent endless litigation unless the statute expressly says so.

**Case Detail:** Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks and Another, Order dated 24.04.2026, TEMPAPO-IPD/2/2025, Calcutta High Court (Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division), Honourable Justice Debangsu Basak and Honourable Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

**Suggested Titles for the Article:**  

1. No Second Appeal in Trademark Rectification Cases: Calcutta High Court Applies Bar Under Section 100A CPC  

2. Finality in Trademark Appeals: Calcutta High Court Rules Single Judge Orders Under Trade Marks Act Are Conclusive  

3. Calcutta High Court Limits Intra-Court Appeals in IP Matters, Reinforcing Statutory Finality  

**Suitable Tags:**  

#TrademarkAppeal #Section91TMAct #Section100ACPC #CalcuttaHighCourt #IPCaseLaw #TrademarkRectification #LettersPatentAppeal #IndianIPLaw #IPRUpdate #TrademarkLaw #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor #LegalUpdate #IPIndiaupdate

**Headnote of Article:**  

Calcutta High Court Division Bench holds that no further intra-court appeal lies against a Single Judge’s order passed in an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 from the Registrar’s rectification decision, due to the bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure; the ruling emphasizes finality after one High Court appeal and aligns with the principle that appeals are statutory creations subject to legislative limits.

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S.S. White Burs Inc. versus The Registrar of Trade Marks

Delhi High Court Rectifies ‘S.S. WHITE’ Trademark Registration in Favour of U.S. Company, Holding Indian Company’s Adoption Dishonest

Case Title: S.S. White Burs Inc. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. (and connected matter)

Decided on: 25 April 2026

Coram: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Citation: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) No. 448/2022 (lead petition)

In a detailed judgment concerning cross-rectification petitions over the trademark ‘S.S. WHITE’ used for dental care products, the Delhi High Court allowed the petition filed by S.S. White Burs Inc., a U.S.-based company, and directed cancellation of the Indian company’s registration while dismissing the counter-rectification petition.

Background

S.S. White Burs Inc. (Petitioner), a pioneer in dental products since 1844, claimed global rights in the coined mark ‘S.S. WHITE’ through a chain of title originating from its founder Dr. Samuel Stockton White. It held a prior Indian registration (No. 609897 in Class 10, applied in 1993) and asserted trans-border reputation and use in India since 1991 through distributors. The Petitioner sought rectification of Trade Mark Registration No. 2147676 in Classes 5 and 10 granted to S.S. White Dental Private Limited (Respondent), an Indian company incorporated in 1992, which had applied for the mark in 2011 and obtained registration in 2013.

The Respondent claimed honest adoption of ‘S.S. WHITE’ in 1991–92 at the instance of S.S. White, U.K., along with prior use in India. The parties were also litigating parallel commercial suits.

Key Findings

Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora held that the Petitioner established prior, bona fide, and continuous global proprietary rights in the inherently distinctive coined mark ‘S.S. WHITE’, including territorial assignment under 1986 agreements (and amendments) granting it worldwide rights except in the UK, France, and Brazil. The Court found substantial evidence of the Petitioner’s use and reputation in India since at least 1991, supported by sales data, affidavits, and worldwide registrations in over 90 countries.

On the Respondent’s adoption, the Court ruled it was unauthorized and dishonest. The Respondent failed to produce any written authorization from S.S. White, U.K., whose own written statement in connected proceedings denied granting any such permission. Contemporary 1993 cease-and-desist notices from UK solicitors (asserting the Petitioner’s rights) put the Respondent on notice, yet it persisted with use. The Court highlighted inconsistencies in the Respondent’s stand — claiming derivation from S.S. White, U.K. in suits, but describing the name as an acronym (“Surgical Scientific White”) before the Registrar of Companies — rendering its adoption lacking in bona fides.

The Court further noted the Respondent’s slavish imitation of the Petitioner’s stylized device mark, evidencing bad faith under Section 11(10) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Procedural lapses in the original registration (improper classification and examination) were also considered, though the dishonesty finding was decisive.

The Respondent’s defences — including delay, lack of opposition, honest concurrent use, and absence of trans-border reputation — were rejected. The Court clarified that the Petitioner qualified as a “person aggrieved” and that prior knowledge did not bar rectification in cases of dishonest adoption.

Outcome

The Court allowed C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) No. 448/2022, directing rectification of the Register by cancelling the Respondent’s impugned registration No. 2147676. Consequently, the Respondent’s counter-petition (C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) No. 299/2023) was dismissed as it did not survive.

This judgment reinforces principles of prior rights in coined marks, strict scrutiny of claims of honest adoption (especially when derivative), and the relevance of bad faith and stylistic imitation in rectification proceedings under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It underscores that territorial assignments and global reputation can prevail over local claims of concurrent use when adoption lacks bona fides.

Case Details: S.S. White Burs Inc. versus The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. and connected matter, Order dated 25.04.2026, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 448/2022 (lead) & 299/2023, Delhi High Court, Honourable Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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**Delhi High Court Cancels Indian Company’s ‘S.S. WHITE’ Trademark Registration, Upholding Global Rights of U.S. Pioneer in Dental Products**

**Introduction**  

In a significant ruling on trademark rights in the dental industry, the Delhi High Court resolved a long-standing dispute between an American company with roots dating back to the 19th century and an Indian firm over the use of the mark ‘S.S. WHITE’. The Court examined claims of prior global ownership, honest adoption, and bad faith registration, ultimately protecting the established international brand while highlighting the importance of genuine and lawful adoption of trademarks in India.

**Factual Background**  

The American company, S.S. White Burs Inc., traces its origins to a dentist named Dr. Samuel Stockton White who started making dental products in the United States in 1844 under the name ‘S.S. WHITE’. Over the decades, this coined mark became well-known worldwide for dental tools and supplies. Through business transfers and agreements in the 1980s, the U.S. company gained exclusive rights to the mark across most of the world, including India, while certain countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Brazil were treated separately. The American firm had been selling its products in India through distributors since the early 1990s and held an Indian trademark registration from the 1990s.

The Indian company, S.S. White Dental Private Limited, was incorporated in the early 1990s. It claimed it adopted the name ‘S.S. WHITE’ after discussions with a director from the UK branch of the brand for selling and making dental goods in India. The Indian firm registered the mark ‘S.S. WHITE’ in 2013 for dental and related products after applying in 2011. Both sides accused each other of copying and infringing rights, leading to parallel court cases.

**Procedural Background**  

The U.S. company filed a petition before the Delhi High Court seeking to cancel the Indian company’s trademark registration, arguing it was wrongly granted and obtained through improper means. In response, the Indian company filed its own petition to cancel the U.S. company’s earlier registration. These cross-petitions were heard together, with the U.S. company’s petition treated as the main one. The Court also considered pleadings and documents from related commercial suits between the parties. The Indian company did not file a formal reply in the main petition, though it submitted written arguments drawing from the connected cases. After hearing detailed submissions from both sides, the Court reserved judgment and delivered its decision on 25 April 2026.

**Reasoning**  

The Court first looked at the history of the mark and found that ‘S.S. WHITE’ was a specially created, distinctive name with a clear chain of ownership leading to the U.S. company for most parts of the world, including India. Evidence showed the American firm had built a strong global reputation over many years, with products reaching India through regular channels well before the Indian company’s adoption. The U.S. company had actively protected its rights worldwide and acted promptly once it learned of the Indian firm’s use.

Turning to the Indian company’s claim, the Court found its adoption was not independent or honest. The Indian firm said it received permission from the UK branch, but no written proof was provided, and the UK entity itself denied giving any such authorization in related proceedings. Old letters from the early 1990s showed the Indian company was warned about unauthorized use of the name, yet it continued. The Court noted inconsistencies in the Indian company’s explanations — one version linked the name to a foreign collaborator, while another described it as a simple abbreviation for its business activities. This shifting stand suggested the adoption was not straightforward.

The Court also observed that the Indian company had copied not just the words but the special stylized way the U.S. company presented its mark, which pointed to an attempt to ride on the established reputation. Even though the Indian firm had been using the name locally for some time, the Court held that such use did not create superior rights when the original adoption lacked genuine permission from the true owner for the Indian territory.

**Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed**  

The Court referred to principles from earlier cases to support its view on bad faith adoption. It discussed the ruling in *Kia Wang v. The Registrar of Trademarks & Anr.* (2023: DHC: 6684), where a coordinate bench cancelled a registration because the respondent had copied the stylized device mark of the petitioner for similar goods. In that context, the Court explained that imitating the distinctive presentation of a mark, combined with identical goods, shows bad faith and makes the registration vulnerable to cancellation under relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act. This helped illustrate why slavish copying of style strengthens a case for rectification.

The judgment also touched upon the need for honest concurrent use and proper examination at the trademark registry, referencing the broader framework under the Act that protects prior rights and prevents misleading registrations. While discussing trans-border reputation, the Court kept in mind settled ideas from Supreme Court precedents like *Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd.* (AIR 2018 SC 167), emphasizing that reputation can spill over into India through specialized fields even without massive local advertising.

**Final Decision of Court**  

The Delhi High Court allowed the main petition filed by the U.S. company and directed the cancellation of the Indian company’s trademark registration for ‘S.S. WHITE’. As a result, the counter-petition by the Indian company did not survive and was dismissed. The Court made it clear that the U.S. company’s prior and legitimate rights prevailed, and the Indian registration could not stand due to the circumstances of its adoption and registration.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**  

This judgment settles that when a trademark has a clear international owner with prior rights in a territory, a local party cannot claim honest adoption merely by asserting oral permission from a related but unauthorized entity, especially when contemporaneous records show awareness of the true owner’s rights. Copying the stylized form of an established mark further indicates bad faith, making the registration liable to be removed. The decision reinforces that genuine permission or assignment from the rightful proprietor is essential for building independent rights, and shifting explanations about adoption can undermine a party’s claim before the court.

**Case Detail:** S.S. White Burs Inc. versus The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. and connected matter, Order dated 25.04.2026, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 448/2022 (lead petition) & 299/2023, Delhi High Court, Honourable Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora.

**Disclaimer:** Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

**Suggested Titles for the Article:**  

1. Delhi High Court Protects Century-Old U.S. Dental Brand, Cancels Indian Firm’s ‘S.S. WHITE’ Trademark  

2. Honest Adoption Under Scanner: Delhi High Court Cancels ‘S.S. WHITE’ Registration in Dental Products Dispute  

3. Prior Global Rights Prevail: Key Trademark Rectification Ruling by Delhi High Court in ‘S.S. WHITE’ Case  

**Suitable Tags:**  

#TrademarkRectification #DelhiHighCourt #IPCaseLaw #TrademarkLaw #HonestAdoption #BadFaith #DentalProducts #IPRUpdate #IndianIPLaw #TrademarkDispute #S.S.White #IPAdjutor #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #TrademarkCancellation

**Headnote of Article:**  

Delhi High Court cancels Indian company’s ‘S.S. WHITE’ trademark registration holding its adoption unauthorized and lacking bona fides despite local use; upholds prior global rights of U.S. pioneer in dental products and emphasizes that imitation of stylized mark and inconsistent explanations indicate bad faith under trademark law.

Sanjeev Gaur Vs The State of Assam

Gauhati High Court Upholds Cognizance in Intellectual Property Theft Dispute Involving Surgical Glove Manufacturing Machines

Case Title: Sanjeev Gaur & Anr. v. State of Assam & Anr.

Case No.: Crl.Pet./1526/2024

Decided on: 23.04.2026

Coram: Honourable Mr. Justice Pranjal Das

In a significant ruling concerning territorial jurisdiction and prima facie case in intellectual property-related offences, the Gauhati High Court dismissed a petition under Section 528/529 BNSS, 2023, seeking quashing of criminal proceedings in CR Case No. 40 of 2024.

Background

The informant, M/s Anondita Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., alleged that the petitioners — Sanjeev Gaur (petitioner No. 1) and Ranjit Kumar Yadav (petitioner No. 2, a former employee) — conspired to steal the design of an indigenously developed machine used for manufacturing surgical gloves. The machine was conceptualized in 2013, became operational in October 2013, and its design was registered under the Designs Act, 2002 on 18.04.2016. The company claimed the machine was assembled in Noida and later shifted to its factory in Village Kurshala, Paneri, Kamrup (under Boko Police Station jurisdiction) in 2015.

It was alleged that petitioner No. 2, while working as Assistant Production Manager till July 2019 at the Assam factory, had access to the confidential design and shared it with petitioner No. 1 after being induced with better pay and bribes. Petitioner No. 2 later joined petitioner No. 1’s company, M/s Swear Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., at Dholpur, Rajasthan, where an allegedly identical machine was manufactured, causing wrongful loss to the informant and gain to the petitioners.

An initial FIR (Boko P.S. Case No. 826/2021) under Sections 120(B), 408, 420 IPC read with Section 63 of the Copyright Act and Sections 103/104 of the Trade Marks Act was registered. However, the police filed a final report (FR No. 168/2023) citing insufficient evidence. The informant then filed a protest petition and a private complaint dated 28.06.2024, registered as CR Case No. 40/2024.

Proceedings Before the Magistrate

The learned JMFC, Boko, examined the complainant under Section 200 CrPC and three witnesses (CW1–CW3) under Section 202 CrPC. The witnesses consistently deposed about petitioner No. 2’s involvement in the design process, his communications with petitioner No. 1 regarding the machine, and the identical nature of the machine observed at the Rajasthan factory. On 21.08.2024, the Magistrate took cognizance under Sections 408, 420, 120(B) IPC read with Section 63 of the Copyright Act and Sections 103/104 of the Trade Marks Act, and issued summons.

High Court’s Decision

The petitioners contended that:

The complaint was malicious and stemmed from business rivalry.

The Boko court lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the alleged copied machine was operating in Rajasthan.

No prima facie case existed, especially after the police final report.

Justice Pranjal Das rejected both grounds. On territorial jurisdiction, the Court held that part of the offence (design theft and access to the machine) occurred within the jurisdiction of Boko Police Station in Assam, where the informant’s machine operated and the former employee had worked. Relying on Sections 177 and 178 CrPC (corresponding to Sections 197 and 198 BNSS), the Court ruled that even if the offence had multiple limbs across jurisdictions, the Boko court had jurisdiction since a part of the cause of action arose there. The decisions in Y. Abraham Ajith (2004) 8 SCC 100 and Bhura Ram (2008) 11 SCC 103 were distinguished, as those cases involved no part of the offence in the concerned jurisdiction.

On merits, the Court found that the complainant and witnesses’ statements disclosed a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy, breach of trust, cheating, and IP violations. The Magistrate had applied his mind and properly scrutinized the evidence before taking cognizance, in line with the principles laid down in Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand (SLP (Crl) No. 9452 of 2025). The police final report did not bar the private complaint.

Outcome

The High Court upheld the cognizance order dated 21.08.2024 and dismissed the petition. The stay on proceedings was vacated.

This judgment reaffirms that in cases involving multi-jurisdictional economic and IP offences, courts can exercise jurisdiction where any part of the offence occurs, and private complaints can proceed even after a police closure report if sufficient material discloses a prima facie case.

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Factual and Procedural Background

A company called M/s Anondita Healthcare Pvt Ltd was making surgical gloves using a special machine they had designed themselves in their factory near Boko in Assam. They alleged that one of their former employees, Ranjit Kumar Yadav, who had worked closely with the machine and knew all its details, secretly shared the design with another businessman named Sanjeev Gaur. Gaur then started producing very similar machines in his factory in Dholpur, Rajasthan, through his company Swear Healthcare. The company claimed this caused them heavy losses. They first filed a police complaint in Assam in 2021, but after investigation the police submitted a final report saying there was not enough evidence. Not satisfied, the company filed a private complaint before the local magistrate in Boko in 2024. The magistrate heard the company owner and three witnesses who described how the employee had access to the design, spoke about making similar machines for Gaur, and how an identical machine was later seen in Rajasthan. Based on these statements, the magistrate took cognizance of offences like cheating, criminal conspiracy, breach of trust, and violations related to copyright and trademarks, and issued summons to both men.

Dispute in Question

The petitioners Sanjeev Gaur and Ranjit Kumar Yadav approached the Gauhati High Court to get the entire criminal case quashed. They argued that the case was nothing but a business rivalry turned into a criminal matter, that the police had already found no evidence, and most importantly that the court in Assam had no jurisdiction because the accused were operating their machines in Rajasthan, far away from Assam. They also said there was no strong enough case to even summon them.

Judgement with Complete Citation their Context Referred, Reasoning and Decision of Court

Justice Pranjal Das of the Gauhati High Court carefully examined the matter and delivered the judgment on 23 April 2026 in the case of Sanjeev Gaur and Anr. versus The State of Assam and Anr. The court referred to the landmark Supreme Court decisions on territorial jurisdiction such as Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai (2004) 8 SCC 100 and Bhura Ram & Ors Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr (2008) 11 SCC 103, which explain that a court has jurisdiction only if part of the offence has occurred within its area. The court also relied on the recent Supreme Court ruling in Sujoy Ghosh Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr (SLP (Crl) No. 9452 of 2025), which lays down clear principles that summoning an accused is a serious step and the magistrate must apply his mind to see if a prima facie offence is made out from the complaint and witness statements.

The High Court reasoned that even though the copied machines were being used in Rajasthan, a significant part of the alleged offence – including the development and operation of the original machine, the employee’s access to its confidential design while working in the Assam factory, and the alleged stealing of that design – had taken place within the jurisdiction of the Boko court in Assam. Therefore, under the rules of territorial jurisdiction, the local magistrate had the power to hear the case. The court further observed that the statements given by the complainant and the three witnesses were consistent and detailed enough to show a basic case of wrongdoing against the petitioners. The magistrate had properly examined the material before taking cognizance and issuing summons, and the earlier police closure report did not prevent the private complaint from proceeding when fresh evidence was placed before the court. Finding no merit in the petition, the High Court upheld the magistrate’s order dated 21 August 2024, dismissed the quashing petition, and vacated the stay on the proceedings.

One Important Legal Point Settled in this Case

Even when the main manufacturing activity or the accused persons are located in another state, a criminal court can still exercise jurisdiction if any important part of the alleged offence, such as the place where the original machine operated or where the design was allegedly stolen, occurred within its local area. This allows cases involving intellectual property theft and business disputes spanning multiple states to be tried where a substantial connection exists.

Case Details: Sanjeev Gaur and Anr. versus The State of Assam and Anr., Order dated 23.04.2026, Case No. Crl.Pet./1526/2024, Gauhati High Court, Honourable Mr. Justice Pranjal Das.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Crystal Crop Protection Limited Vs. Sudpita Dey, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.

Combinations of known ingredients is non patentable, in absence of unexpected enhancement

Introduction

Patents protect new inventions that are useful, novel, and involve an inventive step. In the field of agrochemicals, companies often try to patent combinations of existing active ingredients, claiming they work better together than separately. This case highlights the challenges in obtaining patent protection for such combinations when prior publications already describe similar mixtures. The court examined whether a specific insecticidal formulation using Fipronil and Emamectin Benzoate in a suspension concentrate (SC) form deserved a patent, or whether it was anticipated by existing knowledge in the public domain.

The judgment provides a clear example of how Indian courts apply the tests of novelty (newness) and inventive step (non-obviousness) under the Patents Act, 1970. It is particularly useful for understanding how prior art documents from other countries (here, Chinese patents) can block a patent grant in India if they disclose the same or very similar invention.

Factual Background

Crystal Crop Protection Limited filed Patent Application No. 1607/DEL/2010 on July 8, 2010, titled “Insecticidal Composition.” The invention claimed a broad-spectrum insecticide made by combining two active ingredients: Fipronil (a phenyl-pyrazole insecticide that disrupts the insect nervous system) at exactly 3.5% w/w and Emamectin Benzoate (an avermectin-class insecticide) at exactly 1.5% w/w, formulated as a suspension concentrate (SC).

The company argued that this specific combination and formulation offered a synergistic effect — meaning the two chemicals together killed insects more effectively than the sum of their individual effects. It claimed the product controlled both biting/chewing insects (like Spodoptera, fruit borers, Helicoverpa) and sucking insects (mites, leaf miners, thrips) in a single, cost-effective, and environment-friendly product. The appellant emphasized that no single prior product effectively handled such a wide range of pests without higher costs or environmental harm.

The complete specification highlighted lower dosage requirements, reduced residues, rain-fastness (not washing off easily), and better safety for non-target organisms. The independent Claim 1 specifically defined the composition with the exact percentages and SC form, while dependent claims covered adjuvants and their concentrations.

Procedural Background

After filing, the application underwent examination. The First Examination Report (FER) was issued in 2017, and the applicant responded and amended claims in 2019. Between 2017 and 2021, four pre-grant oppositions were filed by different parties, including Respondent No. 3 (represented by Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman). The applicant replied to these oppositions.

A hearing was held before the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs on November 23, 2021. On January 11, 2022, the Assistant Controller refused the application on three main grounds:

• Lack of novelty (the invention was not new);
• Lack of inventive step (it was obvious to a skilled person);
• Non-patentability under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act (mere new form of a known substance without enhanced efficacy).

The appellant filed an appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act before the Delhi High Court, arguing that the Controller’s order lacked proper reasoning, failed to consider the synergistic effect, and misapplied the law on novelty and obviousness. The appellant relied on the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Biomoneta Research Pvt. Ltd. vs. Controller General of Patents (2023 SCC OnLine Del 1482) to support patentability of synergistic combinations.

Respondent No. 3 strongly defended the refusal, pointing out that multiple Chinese prior art documents already disclosed the same combination of Fipronil and Emamectin Benzoate in similar concentrations and formulations.

Reasoning

The court, through Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, carefully analyzed the invention and the cited prior arts. It first summarized the problem the invention sought to solve and the claimed solution, including the alleged synergy.

Lack of Novelty

The court found that the invention lacked novelty primarily because of two Chinese documents:

• CN1969627 (CN'627): Embodiment 5 explicitly disclosed a composition with exactly 3.5% Fipronil and 1.5% Emamectin Benzoate. Claim 8 described formulations as “suspending agent” (which corresponds to suspension concentrate/SC). The abstract and claims covered the same range of pests. The court noted that the specific percentages fell within the broad ranges disclosed, and the SC form was expressly taught.
• CN101019546 (CN'546): Example 5 again disclosed the identical 3.5% Fipronil + 1.5% Emamectin Benzoate combination, with co-toxicity coefficient showing synergy, and mentioned possible formulations including aqueous emulsions.

The court held that a single prior art document anticipating all essential features of the claim destroys novelty. Here, the exact active ingredients, their precise concentrations in one case, and the formulation type were already public knowledge. Minor differences in other components (like presence of synergists in some examples) did not save the claim, as the core combination was disclosed.

Lack of Inventive Step (Obviousness)

Even if not entirely anticipated, the court found the invention obvious to a person skilled in the art (PSA). It examined several additional documents:

• CN101066055A (CN'055) and CN101151970A (CN'970): These taught combinations of Fipronil and Emamectin Benzoate (or its derivatives) in overlapping ratios, with adjuvants, and various formulations including suspensions. They encouraged mixtures to reduce resistance and improve efficacy.
• CN1911037 (CN'037): Disclosed SC formulations of the same pair with ratios covering the claimed amounts, field trials showing good control, and synergy data.
• CN1579160 (CN'160): Explicitly taught synergistic pesticidal compositions of Fipronil and Emamectin Benzoate in suspension form, with examples and preparation methods.

The court explained that combining teachings from these documents (all in the same technical field of crop protection) would obviously lead a skilled formulator to the claimed specific percentages and SC form. SC formulations were a standard, well-known type in the industry for water-based, environment-friendly delivery. The alleged synergy was also demonstrated or suggested in prior arts.

The court rejected the argument of “teaching away” or improper mosaicing, noting that when documents disclose similar products in the same field, it reflects the state of the art rather than impermissible combining of unrelated teachings (Sterlite Technologies Ltd. v. HFCL Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2895).

It also clarified the correct approach to inventive step, drawing from Agriboard International LLC vs. Deputy Controller of Patents (2022 SCC OnLine Del 940): the Controller must compare (i) the prior art, (ii) the claimed invention, and (iii) how a PSA would obviously bridge them. The impugned order satisfied this test.

Other Grounds

The court found it unnecessary to examine Section 3(d) (new form without enhanced efficacy) or sufficiency of disclosure once novelty and inventive step objections were upheld.

On the appellant’s procedural challenge (alleged non-application of mind or copy-pasting), the court held that mere similarity in reasoning with opposition submissions does not invalidate the order if independent analysis is evident. Here, the Controller had examined each prior art in detail.

Judgements with Complete Citation and Their Context Discussed

The court referred to and applied several key precedents to guide its analysis:

• Biomoneta Research Pvt. Ltd. vs. Controller General of Patents, Designs and Anr. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 1482): Cited by the appellant to argue that synergistic combinations of known ingredients can be patentable if they show unexpected enhancement. The court distinguished it on facts, as the prior arts here already suggested or demonstrated synergy for the same pair.
• Sterlite Technologies Ltd. v. HFCL Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine Del 2895): Used to explain that using multiple documents disclosing similar products in the same field does not amount to impermissible “mosaicing.” It reflects the cumulative state of the art.
• Agriboard International LLC vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 940): Provided the three-step framework for assessing inventive step — prior art disclosure, claimed invention, and obviousness to PSA. The court confirmed the Controller followed this structured approach.

These citations were discussed in the context of ensuring that patent refusals are reasoned, that obvious combinations in a crowded field like pesticides do not qualify for protection, and that synergy claims must be evaluated against existing disclosures.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court upheld the Assistant Controller’s refusal order in its entirety. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs. The court concluded that the claimed composition lacked both novelty and inventive step, making it unpatentable under the Patents Act. It did not find any infirmity in the Controller’s reasoning warranting interference or remand for fresh consideration.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

A specific selection of known active ingredients in precise percentages and a standard formulation type (like SC) does not automatically qualify for a patent if prior publications already disclose the same combination, similar ratios, and the formulation option. Synergy, while potentially patentable in principle, must be genuinely unexpected and not suggested or shown in existing literature.

Controllers and courts must apply a structured analysis for inventive step, but when the field is well-developed and multiple documents point in the same direction, the invention is likely obvious. Mere procedural arguments about “copy-pasting” will not succeed if the final decision shows application of mind to the key issues.

The case underscores that patents are not granted for incremental or routine improvements in agrochemical formulations when the core idea is already in the public domain through foreign prior art.

Case Title: Crystal Crop Protection Limited Vs. Sudpita Dey, Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.

Date of Order: 08 April 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 86/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2926

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Remands Insecticide Patent: Reasoned Order Required for Synergistic Fipronil-Emamectin Composition
2. Synergistic Insecticidal Formulation Gets Second Chance: Key Takeaways from Crystal Crop Protection Patent Appeal
3. Why the Delhi High Court Set Aside Refusal of Broad-Spectrum Pesticide Patent
4. Patent Office Must Apply Mind Independently: Lessons from Crystal Crop’s Successful Appeal

Suitable Tags:

Patent Appeal, Insecticidal Composition, Synergistic Effect, Fipronil, Emamectin Benzoate, Section 3(d), Lack of Novelty, Inventive Step, Pre-Grant Opposition, Delhi High Court, Suspension Concentrate, Reasoned Order, Agrochemical Patent

Headnote of the Article

In Crystal Crop Protection Limited v. Sudpita Dey (2026), the Delhi High Court set aside the refusal of a patent for a synergistic insecticidal composition of 3.5% Fipronil and 1.5% Emamectin Benzoate in suspension concentrate form. The court held that the Assistant Controller’s order lacked independent reasoning, failed to properly address the applicant’s arguments on novelty, inventive step, and synergy, and improperly invoked Section 3(d). Remanding the application for fresh consideration, the judgment reinforces the requirement of reasoned, speaking orders in patent proceedings and proper evaluation of synergistic combinations under Indian patent law.

Kamal Raheja Vs. Hahnemann Pure Drug Co.

Infringement Protection Independent of Commercial Use

Introduction

In a straightforward yet important ruling on trademark protection in the pharmaceutical and skincare sector, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on 8 July 2025 dismissed an appeal by Kamal Raheja challenging an interim injunction restraining him from using the mark “MARKS GO” for skincare cream. The court held that the registered proprietor of a trademark enjoys exclusive rights to prevent infringement regardless of whether the mark is currently in commercial use due to a suspended drug manufacturing licence.

The Court clarified that lack of commercial exploitation does not automatically defeat an infringement action at the interim stage. The remedy for non-use lies in a separate rectification application under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, not as a defence in an infringement suit. This decision reinforces that valid registration provides strong prima facie protection, and infringing parties cannot escape liability by pointing to regulatory issues faced by the brand owner.

Factual Background

Hahnemann Pure Drug Co., the respondent, is the registered proprietor of the trademark “MARKS GO” in Class 5 under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with registration dating back to 14 September 2010. The mark covers skincare cream and related products. The company discovered that Kamal Raheja, the appellant, was manufacturing and selling similar skincare products under the identical mark “MARKS GO”.

Hahnemann filed a commercial suit (CS(COMM) 346/2023) before the District Judge (Commercial Court-02), Rohini, seeking a permanent injunction against the appellant for trademark infringement. Along with the suit, it moved an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC for an interim injunction. On 8 June 2023, the trial court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant and others from using “MARKS GO” or any deceptively similar mark for skincare products.

The appellant filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC seeking vacation of the injunction. Meanwhile, the respondent faced regulatory action: its drug manufacturing licence was suspended following a show cause notice under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The appellant argued that due to this suspension, the respondent could not commercially exploit the mark and thus had no justification to seek an injunction.

On 7 March 2025, the learned Commercial Court allowed the respondent’s injunction application, making the ex parte order absolute, and dismissed the appellant’s vacation application. It found the rival marks identical, used for similar goods, and rejected the appellant’s plea of acquiescence while noting the respondent’s registration and the appellant’s lack of priority.

Procedural Background

The suit was instituted in 2023. The trial court promptly granted an ex parte ad interim injunction on 8 June 2023. After hearing both sides on the interim applications, the Commercial Court passed the detailed impugned order on 7 March 2025, confirming the injunction and rejecting the vacation plea.

Aggrieved, Kamal Raheja filed the present appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC before the Delhi High Court (FAO(COMM) 105/2025), along with applications for stay and other reliefs. The appeal was heard as an oral judgment on 8 July 2025.

Reasoning

The Division Bench noted that the appellant did not contest the core issues of registration, identity of marks, or similarity of goods. The sole argument was that the respondent’s drug licence suspension prevented commercial use of “MARKS GO”, rendering the injunction unjustified.

The court rejected this submission outright. It explained that rights against infringement flow directly from valid registration under Section 28(1) of the Trade Marks Act. Once a mark is registered and the registration is subsisting, the proprietor gains the exclusive right to use it and to obtain relief against infringement. Commercial user is not a prerequisite for maintaining an infringement action.

Section 29 of the Act defines infringement with reference to a “registered trade mark.” The provisions protecting against infringement do not condition relief on actual market use by the registrant. While non-use for five continuous years can be a ground for rectification and removal of the mark under Section 47 (upon application by an aggrieved person), such removal is not automatic and does not retroactively validate infringement.

At the interim injunction stage, the plaintiff needs only to show a prima facie case. Section 31(1) provides that registration itself is prima facie evidence of validity. The appellant could not, at this stage, successfully argue invalidity or disentitlement based on the respondent’s regulatory issues under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Those issues might give the respondent remedies elsewhere, but they do not strip the registered mark of its statutory protection.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The Division Bench primarily relied on the statutory framework of the Trade Marks Act rather than citing specific external precedents in detail. It explained Sections 28(1), 29, 31(1), 47, and 135(1) in clear, accessible language:

• Section 28(1): Registration of a valid trademark gives the proprietor exclusive rights to use the mark for the registered goods/services and to seek relief against infringement. The court stressed that this right arises from registration itself, not from actual commercial exploitation.
• Section 29: Infringement is defined with respect to a registered trademark. Each sub-section begins with “a registered trade mark,” making registration the key trigger rather than user.
• Section 47(1): Non-use for five years (subject to conditions) can lead to removal of the mark from the register, but only upon an application by an aggrieved person. The Registrar cannot act suo motu, and removal is not automatic. The court clarified that an infringer cannot use non-use as a shield in an infringement suit; the proper remedy is a separate rectification proceeding.
• Section 31(1): Registration is prima facie evidence of validity in legal proceedings, strengthening the plaintiff’s case at the interim stage.
• Section 135(1): Relief in infringement suits includes injunction, damages, or account of profits, reinforcing the strong protection for registered marks.

The judgment also referenced the broader definition of “use of a mark” under Section 2(2)(b) and (c), noting that it encompasses visual representation and association with goods, not merely actual sales. Provisions like Sections 30, 33, 34, and 35 that can insulate defendants in specific situations were noted, but none applied here.

The reasoning was kept simple: registration creates strong rights that infringement actions protect, while non-use challenges must follow the specific statutory route under Section 47 rather than serving as a defence.

Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal (FAO(COMM) 105/2025) and the connected applications. It found no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 7 March 2025 of the Commercial Court, which had made the interim injunction absolute. The interim restraint against the appellant using “MARKS GO” or any deceptively similar mark for skincare products remained in force.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

A valid and subsisting registration of a trademark gives the owner the exclusive right to stop others from using an identical or deceptively similar mark for similar goods, even if the owner is temporarily unable to sell the product due to regulatory issues like a suspended drug licence. Lack of current commercial use does not weaken the right to an injunction against infringement at the interim stage.

If someone wants to challenge a registered mark on grounds of non-use, they must file a separate application for rectification and removal under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act after the required five-year period. They cannot use non-use as a defence in the main infringement suit to escape an injunction.

At the interim stage, registration itself provides strong prima facie evidence of validity, and courts will protect registered marks unless specific statutory exceptions apply. This protects brand owners from copycats while directing non-use disputes to the proper rectification process.

The ruling also reminds parties that arguments in appeals should focus on the core issues; raising only peripheral points (like licence suspension) without contesting infringement findings is unlikely to succeed.

Case Title: Kamal Raheja Vs. Hahnemann Pure Drug Co.

Date of Order: 08 July 2025

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 105/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5613-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court: Suspended Drug Licence No Bar to Trademark Injunction for “MARKS GO”
2. Registration Trumps Non-Use: High Court Upholds Injunction in Skincare Trademark Dispute
3. Infringement Protection Independent of Commercial Use: Key Ruling in Kamal Raheja Case
4. Section 28 Rights Prevail: Division Bench Dismisses Appeal Against “MARKS GO” Injunction

Suitable Tags:

Trademark Infringement, Interim Injunction, Section 28 Trade Marks Act, Non-Use Defence, Section 47 Rectification, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Commercial Court, Delhi High Court, MARKS GO Trademark, Order XXXIX CPC

Headnote of the Article

In FAO(COMM) 105/2025, the Delhi High Court Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the interim injunction restraining the appellant from using the mark “MARKS GO” for skincare products. The court held that rights against infringement under Section 28(1) of the Trade Marks Act arise from valid registration and are not dependent on current commercial use by the registrant. Non-use may support a rectification application under Section 47 but does not defeat an infringement action or interim relief at the interlocutory stage. The judgment clarifies that regulatory suspension of a drug licence does not divest the registered proprietor of statutory trademark protection.