Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks

### Legal News Write-Up

## High Court of Gujarat Dismisses Intra-Court Appeal Under Trade Marks Act, 1999 as Non-Maintainable

 * [Case Title] : Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

 * Date of Judgment : 23/07/2026

 * Case No. : Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023 with Civil Application No. 1 of 2026

 * Neutral Citation : 2026:GUJHC:619-LPA

 * [Court Name] : High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

 * Name of Hon'ble Judge : Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

### Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging a single-judge order dated July 11, 2025. That order had been passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which itself arose from a decision of the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, dated February 27, 2023. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, arguing that the single judge exercised statutory appellate jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction.

### Dispute before Court

The primary legal issue before the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a judgment rendered by a single judge of the High Court while exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically in light of the statutory bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

### Reasoning of Judge

The Court examined the statutory evolution of trademark legislation, comparing Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 with Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Under the 1958 Act, a second appeal to a Division Bench was explicitly provided for, whereas the 1999 Act intentionally omitted this provision. The Court noted that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial functions and possesses the trappings of a court, exercising adjudicatory powers over civil rights. Consequently, the single judge exercised appellate jurisdiction over an adjudicatory order. The Court held that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which contains a non-obstante clause overriding the Letters Patent, bars any further appeal from a decree or order decided by a single judge in appellate jurisdiction.

### Decision

The Division Bench upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal as non-maintainable.

### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case

An intra-court Letters Patent Appeal does not lie against a decision of a single judge passed in exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as the Registrar functions as a tribunal with the trappings of a court, and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 operates as an absolute bar to further appeals.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

### Analytical Article on the Judgment

### Introduction

The maintainability of intra-court appeals against orders passed by a single judge in statutory appellate proceedings has long been a subject of judicial scrutiny. In a significant judgment, the High Court of Gujarat addressed whether a Letters Patent Appeal can be entertained against a judgment delivered by a single judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The decision provides clarity on the intersection between special intellectual property statutes, the Letters Patent charter, and the overriding effect of procedural codes governing civil appeals in India.

### Factual and Procedural Background

The controversy originated from an order passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, on February 27, 2023. Aggrieved by the statutory authority's determination, an appeal was preferred before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The learned single judge, exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction, disposed of the matter through a judgment dated July 11, 2025.

Seeking to challenge the decision of the single judge, the aggrieved party filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, registered as Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026. Upon the listing of the intra-court appeal, the opposing party raised a preliminary objection regarding its maintainability, asserting that the single judge had exercised appellate powers over a quasi-judicial body and that further appeals were implicitly and explicitly barred by law.

The legislative history of trademark law in India formed a central element of the procedural analysis. Under the former Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, Section 109 specifically provided a two-tier appeal system within the High Court, explicitly allowing a second appeal to a Division Bench against an order passed by a single judge. However, when Parliament repealed the 1958 Act and enacted the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 91 was framed without incorporating any provision for a second-tier intra-court appeal. Following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board through the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, statutory appeals from the Registrar were directed straight to the High Court.

### Dispute Before the Court

The core legal question presented to the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against an order of a single judge passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The appellant contended that the High Court’s jurisdiction under the Letters Patent is an independent charter-based power that remains intact unless expressly barred by a statute. It was argued that the Registrar of Trade Marks is merely an administrative authority rather than a civil court, and therefore, proceedings before the Registrar do not attract the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, the appellant asserted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which prohibits further appeals from single-judge decisions, should not apply to trademark appellate proceedings.

Conversely, the respondents submitted that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial functions, evaluates evidence, decides civil rights between competing parties, and possesses all the trappings of a civil court. Therefore, an appeal under Section 91 of the 1999 Act is a regular appellate proceeding. The respondents highlighted that Parliament consciously omitted the provision for a second appeal when replacing the 1958 Act with the 1999 Act. Furthermore, they relied on Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arguing that its non-obstante clause completely overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, thereby prohibiting any second appeal from an appellate judgment rendered by a single judge.

### Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Division Bench undertook a detailed statutory analysis of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. To determine whether Section 100A applied, the Court evaluated the exact nature and status of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

Examining Sections 19 through 22, 127, 128, and 129 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alongside the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the Court observed that the Registrar is vested with powers to receive evidence on affidavit or oral testimony, administer oaths, enforce witness attendance, compel document production, issue commissions, review decisions, and award costs executable as civil court decrees. Applying constitutional precedents regarding statutory authorities, the Court concluded that the Registrar exercises the State's inherent judicial powers to adjudicate disputes over private commercial rights. Thus, the Registrar acts as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.

Because the proceedings before the Registrar involve binding civil adjudications, the Court held that the appeal before the single judge under Section 91 was a statutory appellate proceeding continuing the original dispute, rather than an exercise of original jurisdiction by the High Court.

The Court then examined Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which permits intra-court appeals from single-judge judgments but explicitly excludes judgments passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over orders made by subordinate courts or tribunals.

To reinforce this conclusion, the Court examined Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2002. Section 100A states that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent or other law, where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is decided by a single judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. The Court emphasized that the non-obstante clause gives Section 100A absolute overriding effect over Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

The Court also gave weight to the deliberate legislative shift between the 1958 Act and the 1999 Act. By deliberately excluding the second-appeal mechanism previously present under Section 109(5) of the 1958 Act, Parliament demonstrated a clear intent to restrict litigants to a single round of appeal before the High Court. Allowing a Letters Patent Appeal would circumvent the statutory scheme and defeat the legislative objective of finality and expeditious disposal in commercial intellectual property disputes.

### Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench of the High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, upholding the preliminary objection. The Court held that the intra-court appeal was barred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026, along with connected civil applications for stay, was dismissed as non-maintainable.

### Point of Law Settled

This judgment settles an important procedural principle concerning intellectual property litigation:

 1. The Registrar of Trade Marks acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal equipped with the essential trappings of a civil court when adjudicating trademark registration and opposition disputes.

 2. A judgment delivered by a single judge of a High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is rendered in statutory appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction.

 3. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, establishing an absolute bar against filing an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench against a single-judge decision arising from Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

### Case Details

Title of the Case: M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 23/07/2026

Case Number: R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in R/Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:619-LPA

Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, High Court of Gujarat, LPA No. 619 of 2026, Decided on 23/07/2026. The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against a single-judge order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Division Bench held that the Registrar of Trade Marks functions as a tribunal with trappings of a civil court. The single judge exercised statutory appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains an overriding non-obstante clause that bars further intra-court appeals against appellate decisions of a single judge. The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed as non-maintainable.

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TV Today Network Vs Saurashtra Aaj Tak

## News Write-Up: High Court Restrains Regional Publisher from Using 'Aaj Tak' Mark

**Case Title**: TV Today Network Vs Saurashtra Aaj Tak and Anr.

**Date of Judgment**: 30.07.2026

**Case No.**: RFA 320/2012 & CM APPL. 80300/2025

**Neutral Citation**: 2026:DHC:6103

**Court Name**: High Court of Delhi

**Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

### Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, TV Today Network, runs the nationally prominent 24-hour Hindi news channel 'Aaj Tak', which initially launched as a program in 1995 and became a dedicated channel in 2000. In December 2002, the appellant discovered that the respondents had launched a Gujarati regional daily newspaper titled 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' from Rajkot, Gujarat. After a legal notice yielded no response, the appellant filed a suit in 2003 seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions against the use of 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak'. The trial court, vide judgment dated February 29, 2012, recorded ex-parte proceedings against the defendants and recognized that 'Aaj Tak' had achieved secondary meaning and goodwill. However, instead of issuing a complete restraint order, the trial court permitted the respondents to continue using 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' subject to publishing a prominent disclaimer denying any association with the appellant. Aggrieved by the refusal to grant a full permanent injunction, the appellant preferred the present appeal before the High Court of Delhi.

### Dispute before Court

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the respondent to continue using the deceptively similar mark 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' with a disclaimer, despite concluding that the appellant held established goodwill in 'Aaj Tak' and that the respondent's mark was likely to cause consumer confusion.

### Reasoning of Judge

The High Court observed that the trial court's finding regarding the respondent having developed independent goodwill or acting without dishonesty was legally unsustainable, as the respondent had been proceeded ex-parte and failed to adduce any evidence to support such claims. Merely adding a geographical prefix like 'Saurashtra' to a distinctive mark does not dispel the likelihood of deception or association, especially when both parties operate in the allied field of news dissemination. The Court reaffirmed that in passing off actions, proving actual damage is not required; demonstrating a distinct likelihood of confusion and consequential damage to goodwill is sufficient. Furthermore, approval from the Registrar of Newspapers for India (RNI) under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 does not grant immunity against trade mark passing off claims, given the distinct objectives of the two statutes. Consequently, a mere disclaimer is an inadequate remedy when the adoption of a dominant mark creates clear source confusion.

### Decision

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's direction permitting the use of the mark with a disclaimer. The Court issued an absolute permanent injunction restraining the respondents from publishing, printing, or circulating any newspaper, magazine, or promotional material under the name 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' or any mark confusingly similar to 'Aaj Tak'.

### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case

A mere disclaimer or addition of a geographical prefix cannot cure passing off when an essential and dominant mark of a prior user is adopted for cognate services, and administrative registration under publication laws offers no defense against trademark rights.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

## Safeguarding Trademark Identity in Media: High Court Rules Against Misleading Name Adaptations

### Introduction

Maintaining brand identity and distinctiveness is vital for media organizations, where public trust and reputation directly influence readership and viewership. When rival entities adopt similar titles, it often leads to confusion among the public regarding the origin of the news services. The High Court of Delhi recently addressed this critical aspect of intellectual property law in an appeal challenging a trial court decision that allowed a regional entity to use a prominent media brand's name accompanied by a disclaimer. The judgment reinforces the legal protections available to prior users of distinctive trade names and clarifies the limits of using disclaimers as a remedy in passing off disputes.

### Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant company forms part of a major media group established in 1975. It commenced using a specific mark in 1995 for a news segment broadcast on the national network Doordarshan. In December 2000, it expanded operations by launching a dedicated 24-hour Hindi news channel under the same mark, gaining massive national reach and public recognition.

In December 2002, the appellant discovered that a regional Gujarati newspaper was being published and circulated in the Saurashtra region of Gujarat under a title that incorporated the appellant's news channel mark prefixed with the regional name. The appellant issued a formal legal notice in January 2003 requesting the cessation of the name. Receiving no response, the appellant instituted a civil suit in April 2003 seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions to restrain the publication under the contested title.

During the suit's pendency, the proceedings were transferred to a district court due to jurisdictional adjustments. The defendants eventually stopped participating in the proceedings and were proceeded ex-parte in August 2008. Meanwhile, trademark registration certificates were issued in 2005 for the relevant mark under classes covering telecommunications and entertainment/education services, with retrospective effect from October 2003.

In February 2012, the trial court delivered its judgment. It held that the appellant's mark had acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness through continuous use. It also noted that the defendant's publication was likely to cause confusion among readers and advertisers. However, the trial court refrained from granting an absolute permanent injunction, reasoning that the defendant might have established local goodwill and that its adoption was not per-se dishonest. Instead, it granted a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to publish a prominent disclaimer alongside its title, explicitly stating the lack of association with the appellant. Dissatisfied with the refusal to issue a full prohibition, the appellant approached the High Court in appeal.

### Dispute Before the Court

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial court erred in permitting the continuous use of a deceptively similar mark coupled with a disclaimer, despite rendering factual findings that the appellant possessed established goodwill and that the respondent's mark was likely to cause confusion.

The appellant argued that having satisfied all three requirements of passing off—goodwill, misrepresentation, and likelihood of damage—it was entitled to an absolute injunction restraining the use of its mark. It contended that adding a geographic prefix like "Saurashtra" did not alter the dominant identity of the mark and that a disclaimer was ineffective in preventing consumer deception.

On the other hand, the respondent argued that the suit was unmaintainable due to issues of locus standi and non-joinder of the parent entity holding the registration. Substantively, the respondent claimed protection under prior local user concepts, arguing that its title had received regulatory approval from the Press Registrar under publication laws, operated in a regional language, was confined strictly to print in a specific geography, and was adopted in good faith to denote daily local reporting.

### Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The High Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the common law remedy of passing off and its interaction with statutory trademark protections.

Addressing preliminary technical objections, the Court confirmed that an action for passing off is rooted in common law rights arising from prior adoption and goodwill generation, distinct from statutory infringement claims. Prior use grants rights superior to subsequent adoption, and a prior user can maintain a passing off action irrespective of whether it holds formal registration in its own name or through an associate entity. Moreover, procedural objections regarding maintainability or locus standi must be raised in initial trial pleadings, and an ex-parte party that failed to file cross-appeals cannot challenge favorable trial findings for the first time at the appellate stage.

On the merits of passing off, the Court assessed the classical parameters: goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The Court reaffirmed that while individual ordinary words in a mark may be descriptive, their combination used continuously in a specific domain can acquire secondary meaning and exclusive distinctiveness. The unrebutted evidence established that the news channel mark had become a household brand nationally prior to the respondent's local adoption.

Regarding misrepresentation and confusion, the Court observed that both parties operate in the news dissemination sector. Television broadcasting and print publishing represent allied and cognate activities within media. Merely prefixing a geographical identifier to a well-known mark does not eliminate confusion; rather, it often leads the public to infer that the regional publication is an official local arm or affiliate of the national broadcasting network. The language difference or regional restriction does not insulate against deception when the underlying brand carries national reach.

The Court further held that the trial court's assumption regarding the respondent's good faith or independent goodwill lacked evidentiary basis. Because the respondent failed to present evidence during trial, an adverse inference applied, rendering any speculative finding of honest concurrent use legally improper.

Addressing the defense based on title registration under publication laws, the Court clarified the statutory distinction. Approval granted by administrative authorities under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 serves regulatory filing purposes and does not override trademark rights or provide a valid defense against passing off actions.

Finally, evaluating the adequacy of relief, the Court held that a disclaimer is an inappropriate and insufficient remedy when the primary mark has been appropriated for similar services. Allowing an entity to trade on another's goodwill while relying on fine-print disclaimers fails to protect the public from initial interest confusion and undermines the protection guaranteed to prior brand owners.

### Final Decision of the Court

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's decision to the extent that it permitted the respondent to use the disputed mark with a disclaimer. The Court issued a decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondents, their agents, and representatives from printing, publishing, circulating, or advertising any newspaper, magazine, or periodical under the contested title or any other mark confusingly or deceptively similar to the appellant's registered mark.

### Point of Law Settled

The judgment reinforces the legal rule that where a party establishes prior continuous use, brand reputation, and likelihood of confusion in an action for passing off involving allied fields, the Court must issue a complete injunctive relief. Imposing disclaimers or relying on minor structural additions like geographical prefixes is insufficient to mitigate source confusion or safeguard established goodwill. Additionally, the ruling reiterates that administrative approvals under print media regulations do not defeat common law or statutory trademark rights.

Title of the Case: TV Today Network vs Saurashtra Aaj Tak and Anr.

Date of Judgment: 30.07.2026

Case Number: RFA 320/2012 & CM APPL. 80300/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:6103

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

### Headnote of the Judgment

TV Today Network v. Saurashtra Aaj Tak and Anr., High Court of Delhi, RFA 320/2012. The appellant, operator of the nationwide news channel 'Aaj Tak', appealed against a trial court decree which allowed the respondents to publish a daily Gujarati newspaper titled 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' subject to a mandatory disclaimer. The High Court held that 'Aaj Tak' had achieved secondary meaning and prior goodwill in news dissemination. Incorporating the dominant mark with a geographical prefix for cognate news services creates a strong likelihood of public confusion. Relying on unevidenced claims of bona fide use or administrative approval under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 offers no defense in passing off actions. The Court set aside the disclaimer direction and granted an absolute permanent injunction restraining the respondents from using the contested mark.

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 7. Common Law Remedies in Media Trademarks: Analysis of Delhi High Court Ruling

 8. TV Today Network Secures Full Injunction Against Gujarati Newspaper Title

 9. Understanding Secondary Meaning and Prior User Protections in Indian Media Law

 10. Delhi HC Overturns Trial Court Ruling on Disclaimers in Trademark Passing Off Cases

V-Guard Industries Limited Vs Kangaro Industries

Mandatory Two Months Time Limit for Filing Evidence in Support of Opposition Under Rule 45 of Trade Marks Rules 2017 is Mandatory and Default Leads to Deemed Abandonment: Madras High Court

[Case Title] : V-Guard Industries Limited Vs  Kangaro Industries and another

Date of Judgment: 30-07-2026

Case No.: LPA No. 18 of 2026

Neutral Citation : 2026:MHC:LPA18

[Court Name] : High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

Factual and Procedural Background

V-Guard Industries applied for registration of a label mark containing KANGARO in Class 16 on 09.05.2016. M/s. Kangaro Industries opposed the application on 06.01.2017. V-Guard filed its counter statement on 19.05.2017, which was received by Kangaro Industries on 05.08.2017. Under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, Kangaro Industries was required to file evidence in support of opposition or intimate reliance on the notice of opposition within two months. Instead, Kangaro filed Form TM-M on 23.09.2017 seeking a one-month extension and submitted evidence on 18.10.2017. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the extension request on 08.08.2018 and held the opposition abandoned under Rule 45(2). On appeal under Section 91 before a single Judge, the rejection order was set aside and the matter was remanded. V-Guard filed the present Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the single Judge.

Dispute before Court

Whether Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 is mandatory or directory, and whether the Registrar of Trade Marks has discretionary power under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 109 to grant an extension of time for filing evidence in support of opposition when Rule 45(2) expressly prescribes deemed abandonment for default.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court observed that Rule 45(1) uses the word shall thrice and Rule 45(2) prescribes that the opponent shall be deemed to have abandoned the opposition upon failure to act. Unlike Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, the 2017 Rules consciously omitted the discretion to grant an extension of time. The statutory provisions of Section 131 and Rule 109 cannot be invoked where a specific time limit and default consequence are expressly provided in Rule 45. Therefore, compliance with Rule 45 is mandatory, and failure to file evidence or intimate reliance on opposition facts within two months results automatically in statutory abandonment.

Decision

The Division Bench set aside the judgment of the single Judge and upheld the Assistant Registrar's order treating the opposition as deemed to have been abandoned under Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. The Letters Patent Appeal was allowed without costs.

One Important legal principle held in the case

The period of two months prescribed under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 for filing evidence in support of opposition is mandatory, and failure to comply leads to mandatory statutory abandonment of opposition under Rule 45(2), with no scope for extension under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

=====

Strict Timelines in Trademark Opposition: Madras High Court Reaffirms Mandatory Nature of Rule 45 under Trade Marks Rules 2017

Introduction:

Trademark registration procedures in India are governed by structured timelines designed to bring commercial certainty and protect brand rights. A crucial stage in this process occurs when a published trademark application faces opposition from a third party. Under the statutory framework, both the applicant and the opponent are required to submit their respective pleadings and supporting evidence within designated time limits. The interpretation of these time limits, specifically whether they are strictly mandatory or merely flexible administrative directions, has frequently been a subject of judicial debate. The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras recently delivered a significant ruling analyzing whether the Registrar of Trade Marks possesses the power to extend the time period for filing evidence in support of an opposition under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The history of the case traces back to 09.05.2016, when an application was submitted for the registration of a label mark featuring KANGARO in Class 16. Following the publication of the mark in the Trade Marks Journal, a notice of opposition was filed on 06.01.2017 by an opposing entity. In response, the trademark applicant filed its counter statement on 19.05.2017, which was officially served on the opposing party on 05.08.2017.

During the pendency of these proceedings, the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 came into force, replacing the earlier 2002 regulatory framework. Under Rule 45(1) of the 2017 Rules, an opponent is mandated to either file evidence by way of affidavit in support of the opposition or formally intimate that it intends to rely solely on the facts stated in its notice of opposition, within two months from the receipt of the counter statement.

In this case, the two-month period from the date of receipt of the counter statement expired without the opponent filing its evidence or issuing the required statutory intimation. Instead, on 23.09.2017, the opponent submitted Form TM-M seeking a one-month extension of time to file evidence, subsequently submitting its evidence on 18.10.2017. The applicant thereafter filed its evidence on 21.12.2017.

The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks examined the matter and issued a notice regarding the procedural delay. By an order dated 08.05.2018, the Assistant Registrar rejected the extension application and declared that the opposition stood deemed to have been abandoned under Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

Aggrieved by this decision, the opponent filed an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board on 27.07.2018. Upon the abolition of the appellate tribunal, the proceeding was transferred to the Intellectual Property Division of the High Court. A single Judge of the High Court set aside the Assistant Registrar's order and remanded the opposition for fresh consideration on merits, while directing that the registration granted to the applicant in the interim would abide by the outcome of the remanded opposition. The applicant then instituted a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench challenging the single Judge's judgment.

Dispute Before the Court

The primary legal issue presented before the Division Bench was whether the two-month timeline specified under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 is mandatory or directory in nature.

The applicant argued that unlike Rule 50 of the repealed 2002 Rules, which expressly granted discretion to the Registrar to extend the period for filing evidence by one additional month, Rule 45 of the 2017 Rules deliberately removed all discretionary extensions. It was contended that Rule 45(2) establishes an automatic legal fiction of deemed abandonment if an opponent fails to file evidence or intimate reliance on its notice of opposition within the two-month window. The applicant further submitted that general provisions empowering the Registrar to extend timelines, such as Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 109 of the 2017 Rules, cannot be invoked where a specific rule contains an express statutory deadline accompanied by an explicit consequence of default.

On the other hand, the opponent contended that procedural rules should not be interpreted so rigidly as to destroy substantive rights vested in trademark litigants. It was argued that the right to oppose a trademark application is vital to maintaining the purity of the register and serving public interest. The opponent maintained that the filing of Form TM-M within the two-month window demonstrated active steps, and the Registrar retained discretionary power under Section 131 and Rule 109 to condone procedural delays in the interest of justice.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Division Bench undertook a detailed statutory analysis of Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 in contrast with the statutory provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and predecessor rules. The Bench highlighted the precise legislative drafting of Rule 45(1), noting that the word shall is employed three distinct times to mandate the procedural duties of an opponent. Furthermore, Rule 45(2) explicitly states that if an opponent takes no action under sub-rule (1) within the prescribed time, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his opposition.

The Court emphasized the crucial shift introduced by the executive while framing the 2017 Rules. Under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, the Registrar had express authority to grant a further extension of one month beyond the initial two-month period. The complete exclusion of this discretionary extension in Rule 45 of the 2017 Rules reflects a clear legislative intention to enforce strict, unyielding deadlines for evidence submission during opposition proceedings.

In analyzing the applicability of Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Rule 109 of the 2017 Rules, the Court clarified that general discretionary powers to extend time apply only to matters where a specific time limit is not expressly provided with an absolute statutory consequence. Rule 109 itself excludes matters where time limits are expressly governed by specific rules. Because Rule 45 provides both a strict time limit and an explicit penalty of deemed abandonment, recourse to general extension provisions under Section 131 or Rule 109 is impermissible.

The Court examined various judicial authorities cited by the parties, including decisions emphasizing that procedural law must serve substantive justice as well as decisions confirming that statutory rules framed under an Act carry mandatory force when framed to streamline time-bound commercial adjudication. The Court concurred with the principle that where the law imposes an automatic consequence of default through a legal fiction of deemed abandonment, courts and administrative authorities cannot create exceptions that defeat the text and objective of the law. Consequently, the Assistant Registrar's decision to reject the extension application and treat the opposition as abandoned was fully justified and legally sound.

Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench allowed the Letters Patent Appeal and set aside the judgment of the single Judge. The Court restored the order dated 08.05.2018 passed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, which had declared the opposition as deemed to have been abandoned under Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. Consequently, the trademark application was freed from the revived opposition proceedings, protecting the statutory rights accrued to the registered proprietor. All connected miscellaneous applications were closed without any order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled

This decision clarifies and settles a critical point of intellectual property law regarding trademark opposition procedure in India. The High Court established that the two-month period prescribed under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 for filing evidence in support of an opposition is absolute and mandatory. Failure to file affidavit evidence or formally intimate reliance on the notice of opposition within this two-month period results in automatic deemed abandonment of the opposition under Rule 45(2). The Registrar of Trade Marks lacks statutory authority or inherent discretion under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or Rule 109 of the 2017 Rules to grant extensions of time for evidence submission under Rule 45. This ruling reinforces procedural discipline and commercial efficiency in trademark prosecution across India.

Title of the Case: V-Guard Industries Limited vs. M/s. Kangaro Industries and another

Date of Judgment: 30-07-2026

Case Number: LPA No. 18 of 2026 and CMP No. 12387 of 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:MHC:LPA18

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

V-Guard Industries Limited vs. M/s. Kangaro Industries and another, High Court of Judicature at Madras. Letters Patent Appeal filed against single Judge order remanding trademark opposition. Opponent failed to submit evidence within two months under Rule 45(1) of Trade Marks Rules 2017 and sought extension via Form TM-M. Assistant Registrar rejected extension and treated opposition as abandoned under Rule 45(2). High Court held Rule 45 is mandatory, extension under Section 131 is impermissible, and set aside single Judge order, restoring deemed abandonment. Appeal allowed.

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 4. V-Guard vs Kangaro: Madras HC Reaffirms Strict Timelines in Trademark Opposition

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Godfrey Phillips India Limited Vs I T C Limited

Godfrey Phillips India Limited Vs I T C Limited

[Case Title] : Godfrey Phillips India Limited v. I.T.C. Limited

Date of Judgment: 29.04.2011

Case No.: G.A. No. 247 of 2011, A.P.O. No. 37 of 2011, A.P.O.T. No. 25 of 2011, C.S. No. 10 of 2009

Neutral Citation : Not Available

[Court Name] : High Court at Calcutta (Original Side)

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. and Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

I.T.C. Limited filed C.S. No. 10 of 2009 seeking a permanent injunction against Godfrey Phillips India Limited to prevent infringement and passing off concerning the trademark PILOT or PILOT NUMBER ONE. Prior to this suit, in December 2006, Godfrey Phillips had filed an application before the Registrar of Trade Marks for the removal or cancellation of I.T.C.'s registered trademark No. 117155 on grounds of non-user for over 50 years. Godfrey Phillips then moved an application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, requesting a stay of the suit pending the cancellation proceedings and seeking to strike off the pleadings regarding passing off due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Single Judge dismissed Godfrey Phillips' application, leading to the present appeal.

Dispute before Court

 1. Whether an application filed before the Registrar for removal of a trademark on the ground of non-user under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, constitutes a rectification proceeding under Section 57 so as to mandate a stay of the infringement suit under Section 124 of the Act.

 2. Whether the High Court can entertain or permit the joinder of a cause of action for passing off under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent at any stage before trial, even when no prior leave was taken and the defendant resides outside the court's jurisdiction.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court analyzed the substance of the application filed by Godfrey Phillips and noted that its true nature was for removal of the trademark due to non-user under Section 47, rather than a rectification proceeding under Section 57. The Court clarified that removal of a mark under Section 47 takes effect prospectively from the date of the order, whereas a declaration of invalidity or rectification under Section 57 operates differently. Since Section 124 specifically applies to rectification proceedings challenging the validity of a mark, pendency of a removal application under Section 47 does not attract Section 124. Regarding passing off and territorial jurisdiction, the Court held that under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent, the court possesses wide discretionary powers to allow joinder of causes of action at any stage prior to the commencement of the trial.

Decision

The High Court at Calcutta dismissed the appeal, upholding the order of the Single Judge. The prayer to stay the suit under Section 124 was rejected, and the court held that joinder of the cause of action for passing off under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent could be considered prior to trial. No order as to costs was made.

One Important legal principle held in the case

An application for removal of a registered trademark on the ground of non-user under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, is conceptually distinct from an application for rectification under Section 57; hence, the pendency of a Section 47 removal application does not entitle a party to a mandatory stay of an infringement suit under Section 124 of the Act.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Introduction:

The legal framework surrounding intellectual property rights in India provides specific mechanisms for trademark owners to enforce their rights and for aggrieved parties to challenge registrations. A critical aspect of trademark litigation involves the intersection between court proceedings for trademark infringement and administrative proceedings for the removal or rectification of trademark entries. In the case of Godfrey Phillips India Limited v. I.T.C. Limited, the High Court at Calcutta examined the distinction between removing a trademark for non-use and rectifying the register due to invalidity. The judgment also addressed key procedural matters concerning the joinder of causes of action under the Letters Patent when jurisdictional challenges arise.

Factual and Procedural Background:

I.T.C. Limited instituted C.S. No. 10 of 2009 before the High Court at Calcutta seeking permanent injunctive relief against Godfrey Phillips India Limited. The action sought to restrain the defendant, its servants, agents, and distributors from infringing or otherwise using the trademark PILOT or PILOT NUMBER ONE, or any deceptively similar mark, in connection with cigarettes and tobacco products. Prior to the institution of this civil suit, in December 2006, Godfrey Phillips India Limited had initiated an administrative proceeding before the Registrar of Trade Marks, Kolkata. This application sought the removal or cancellation of I.T.C. Limited's registered trademark bearing registration number 117155 in Class 34.

Following the institution of the suit and the receipt of an ex parte injunction dated January 22, 2009, Godfrey Phillips India Limited filed an application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. In this application, the defendant prayed for two primary remedies: first, a stay of all further suit proceedings pending the final outcome of its cancellation application before the Registrar; and second, the striking off of the pleadings concerning the claim of passing off. The defendant contended that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the passing off claim because the defendant resided and carried on business in Maharashtra, and no cause of action for passing off arose within the local jurisdiction of the High Court at Calcutta.

The single judge heard the matter and passed an order on December 7, 2010, rejecting the defendant's prayers. The single judge concluded that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, was inapplicable to the facts of the case. Regarding the passing off claim, the single judge observed that leave to combine causes of action under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent could be granted at any time prior to the commencement of the trial. Aggrieved by this decision, Godfrey Phillips India Limited preferred an appeal before the appellate bench.

Dispute Before the Court

The primary legal disputes presented for adjudication before the appellate bench centered on two specific issues.

The first core question was whether an application seeking the removal of a registered trademark on the ground of continuous non-user for a period exceeding five years under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, falls within the ambit of a rectification proceeding under Section 57 of the Act. The appellant argued that an application to remove a mark based on non-user substantially operates as a rectification proceeding. Consequently, the appellant asserted that under Section 124 of the Act, when a rectification proceeding is pending prior to or during an infringement suit, the trial court is statutorily mandated to stay the civil suit until the administrative proceeding concludes. On the other hand, the respondent submitted that removal of a mark under Section 47 is legally distinct from rectification under Section 57. The respondent argued that Section 124 only applies to rectification proceedings challenging the validity of the registration, meaning a removal application for non-user does not warrant a stay.

The second dispute pertained to territorial jurisdiction and procedural compliance regarding the claim of passing off. The appellant asserted that because it was located in Maharashtra and no part of the cause of action for passing off occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the pleadings on passing off ought to be struck out. The appellant contended that leave under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent to combine the passing off claim with the infringement claim had to be sought prior to any jurisdictional challenge by the defendant. In response, the respondent maintained that partial rejection or striking out of a plaint is impermissible, and that the court retains the authority under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent to grant leave for joinder of causes of action at any stage before trial begins.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In examining the arguments, the appellate court emphasized that the true nature of an application must be determined by analyzing its contents and substantive prayers rather than relying strictly on labels or statutory sections cited in the headings. The court evaluated the appellant's application filed before the Registrar, which cited Sections 47 and 57 alongside Rule 92. Upon inspecting the grounds, the court identified that the core allegations made by the appellant were twofold: that the trademark was registered without a bona fide intention to use it, and that there had been no bona fide use of the mark for a continuous period of five years and three months prior to the application.

The court observed that these specific grounds are explicitly provided under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which governs the removal of a trademark from the register due to non-use. Analyzing Section 57(2) of the Act, the court explained that rectification applies to situations where an entry was omitted without valid reason, made without sufficient cause, wrongly remaining on the register despite an order of removal, or contains an error or defect. The court highlighted that grounds under Section 47 for non-user do not automatically translate into grounds for invalidity or rectification under Section 57.

The court highlighted a fundamental distinction in legal effect between removal and rectification. A declaration of invalidity or rectification affects the initial entry or validity of the mark, whereas an order of removal on the ground of non-user under Section 47 takes effect prospectively from the date the order is passed. Because Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, explicitly governs instances where the validity of the registration is questioned via a rectification proceeding under Section 57, an application for removal based on non-user under Section 47 does not attract the mandatory stay provisions of Section 124. The legislature purposefully created separate provisions for removal and rectification, ensuring they do not overlap in operational scope.

Regarding the procedural challenge under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent, the court rejected the rigid interpretation put forward by the appellant. Clause 14 allows the High Court, when it possesses original jurisdiction over one cause of action (such as statutory trademark infringement), to call upon the defendant to show cause why other causes of action (such as common law passing off) should not be joined in the same suit. The court held that the language of Clause 14 is broad enough to permit the court to exercise this discretionary power at any time before trial commences. To support this procedural flexibility, the court referred to the established principle articulated in Gajanan Jaikhan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166, which affirmed that technical pleading defects or preliminary jurisdictional objections can be addressed through appropriate procedural steps prior to the trial phase. Consequently, the failure to obtain leave under Clause 14 at the initial filing stage did not automatically require the striking out of the passing off claim.

Final Decision of the Court

The High Court at Calcutta dismissed the appeal preferred by Godfrey Phillips India Limited and affirmed the decision of the single judge. The court concluded that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, was not attracted, and therefore the prayer for staying the infringement suit was rightly denied. Additionally, the court held that the passing off claim was not liable to be struck out at that stage, as the court retained full jurisdiction under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent to decide on the joinder of causes of action prior to trial. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment clarifies the statutory distinction between Section 47 and Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It settles the rule that an application for removal of a registered trademark on account of non-user under Section 47 does not amount to a challenge to the validity of the trademark's registration under Section 57. Consequently, the pendency of a Section 47 removal proceeding before the Registrar or the Appellate Board does not trigger the mandatory stay of an infringement suit under Section 124 of the Act. Furthermore, the judgment confirms that High Courts exercising original jurisdiction can entertain prayers for joinder of causes of action under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent at any stage prior to the commencement of trial.

Title of the Case: Godfrey Phillips India Limited v. I.T.C. Limited

Date of Judgment: 29.04.2011

Case Number: G.A. No. 247 of 2011, A.P.O. No. 37 of 2011, A.P.O.T. No. 25 of 2011, C.S. No. 10 of 2009

Neutral Citation: Not Available

Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta (Original Side)

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. and Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

In Godfrey Phillips India Limited v. I.T.C. Limited (C.S. No. 10 of 2009), the High Court at Calcutta considered an appeal against an order refusing to stay an infringement suit under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and refusing to strike off passing off pleadings. The court held that an application for removal of a trademark based on non-user under Section 47 is distinct from a rectification proceeding challenging validity under Section 57. Therefore, the stay provisions under Section 124 are not attracted by a Section 47 application. The court also held that joinder of causes of action under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent can be considered at any stage before trial. The appeal was dismissed.

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 4. When Does Section 124 Mandatory Stay Apply in Trademark Infringement Suits?

 5. Calcutta High Court Analysis on Joinder of Passing Off Actions Under Letters Patent

 6. Distinguishing Removal for Non-Use from Trademark Rectification under Indian Law

 7. Landmark Calcutta High Court Decision on Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act 1999

 8. Can a Section 47 Non-Use Application Stay an Infringement Suit? Court Explains

 9. Understanding Clause 14 Letters Patent in Trademark Infringement and Passing Off

 10. Godfrey Phillips vs ITC Limited: A Comprehensive Legal Analysis on Trademark Practice

Parle Products Pvt Ltd Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Parle Products Pvt Ltd Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

[Case Title] : Parle Products Pvt Ltd v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

Date of Judgment: [28.07.2026]

Case No.: LPA 316/2026 & CM APPL. 27819-20/2026

Neutral Citation : 2026:DHC:6020-DB

[Court Name] : High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent no. 2 filed trademark application no. 1606126 for the mark 20-20 in class 30 on 27.09.2007 on a proposed to be used basis. Appellant Parle Products Pvt Ltd subsequently filed trademark application no. 1608183 for the mark 20-20 in class 30 on 04.10.2007, also on a proposed to be used basis, and commenced commercial use in 2007-2008. After prolonged administrative and judicial proceedings, the mark of respondent no. 2 was advertised in August 2020. Appellant filed an opposition which was dismissed by the Registrar of Trade Marks on 29.04.2025. The appeal filed by the appellant before the learned Single Judge was dismissed on 10.03.2026. Assailing this, the appellant filed the present letters patent appeal before the Division Bench.

Dispute before Court

Whether subsequent commercial use and market presence acquired by a junior applicant during the pendency of trademark registration proceedings can grant superior rights to oust a senior applicant who applied earlier on a proposed to be used basis under Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court held that rights conferred upon registration relate back to the date of application. The senior applicant had actively pursued registration for 17 years and non-use was due to delays of the Registry. Subsequent commercial use by a junior applicant during pendency of registration proceedings is inconsequential under Section 18 and cannot defeat the rights of the prior applicant. Furthermore, the appellant had previously represented to the Registry that its mark was distinct from cited marks, and could not be permitted to approbate and reprobate by later claiming deceptive similarity.

Decision

The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed along with all pending applications, upholding the order of the learned Single Judge and the registration granted to respondent no. 2.

One Important legal principle held in the case

In trademark registration proceedings under Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the priority of application date governs, and subsequent commercial use of a mark by a junior applicant during the pendency of a senior applicant's registration application cannot defeat the superior statutory claim of the senior applicant.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Introduction:

The High Court of Delhi recently delivered a significant ruling on trademark priority, statutory rights under registration proceedings, and the doctrine of prior adoption versus subsequent commercial user. The Division Bench addressed whether an earlier trademark application filed on a proposed to be used basis can be defeated by a subsequent applicant who actually launched products in the market while the prior application remained pending before the Trade Marks Registry. The ruling brings notable clarity to commercial entities and intellectual property practitioners regarding the sanctity of filing dates in trademark prosecution.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The dispute traces back to late 2007 when two separate entities sought registration for the trademark 20-20 in Class 30 covering food products, biscuits, and confectionery. Respondent no. 2 filed trademark application number 1606126 on 27.09.2007 on a proposed to be used basis. Just a few days later, Parle Products Pvt Ltd filed trademark application number 1608183 on 04.10.2007 for the same mark 20-20, also on a proposed to be used basis.

During examination of Parle's application, the Registry cited the earlier application of respondent no. 2 as a conflicting mark under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. In response, Parle contended that its mark was visually, phonetically, and conceptually distinct, and offered to restrict its specification of goods to biscuits. Parle subsequently commenced commercial sales of its biscuits under the mark 20-20 around 2007-2008 and obtained registration in November 2017.

Meanwhile, the application of respondent no. 2 faced prolonged administrative delays, refusal, and subsequent appeals. After intervention by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board in August 2019, the application of respondent no. 2 was finally advertised in the Trade Marks Journal on 10.08.2020. Parle filed a notice of opposition on 25.11.2020 claiming extensive user, goodwill, and market reputation. The Registrar of Trade Marks dismissed Parle's opposition on 29.04.2025 and issued a registration certificate to respondent no. 2. Parle challenged this before a Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, who dismissed the appeal on 10.03.2026. Aggrieved by the decision, Parle preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.

Dispute Before the Court

The core legal question before the Court was whether a prior applicant who applied for a mark on a proposed to be used basis can be denied registration merely because a subsequent applicant introduced goods under the identical mark into the market earlier and generated substantial commercial goodwill.

Parle contended that trademark rights stem from actual commercial use in the market rather than mere registration filings. Relying on the first in the market test and common law principles governing passing off, Parle asserted that its continuous market presence since 2007 gave it superior rights under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which should override a dormant trademark application.

On the other hand, respondent no. 2 contended that as the senior adopter and prior applicant, its priority date of 27.09.2007 could not be wiped out by Parle's subsequent market launch. It argued that non-use of its mark during the 17-year interregnum was purely due to administrative and procedural delays in the Trade Marks Registry and pending opposition proceedings, which should not prejudice its statutory rights.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The High Court conducted an extensive analysis of statutory provisions under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically examining Section 18, Section 11, Section 28, and Section 34. The Court observed that when two entities apply for identical or deceptively similar marks on a proposed to be used basis, Section 18 establishes that rights upon registration relate back to the date of application.

The Bench carefully analyzed previous judicial precedents, including the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Mohan Goldwater Breweries Pvt. Ltd. v. Khoday Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. (1977) and decisions of the High Court of Delhi in Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. (2019) and Drums Food International Pvt. Ltd. v. Euro Ice Cream (2011). These rulings consistently establish that for registration entitlement under Section 18, priority is determined as on the date of application. Subsequent commercial use by a junior applicant during the pendency of a senior application does not grant any special statutory privilege or override the prior applicant's claim.

The Court distinguished the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. (2016). The Bench observed that Neon Laboratories was rendered in the context of an interim injunction in an action for passing off, where established market goodwill carries pre-eminence. In contrast, the present dispute pertained strictly to statutory registration and opposition proceedings under Section 18, where the relevant date of assessment is the date of filing.

Additionally, the Court held that respondent no. 2 could not be accused of abandoning its mark or hoarding it without intent, as it had diligently litigated and pursued its registration across various forums for 17 years. Delay caused by procedural bottlenecks of the Registry cannot operate to the detriment of a diligent applicant.

Finally, the Court pointed out that Parle had engaged in approbation and reprobation. In 2008, when replying to the Registry's examination report, Parle had taken a firm stand that the rival marks were visually, phonetically, and conceptually distinct in order to secure its own registration. Having obtained registration on that representation, Parle could not be permitted to take a contradictory stance in opposition proceedings by claiming that the mark of respondent no. 2 was deceptively similar.

Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench found no merit in the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Single Judge. The Court held that respondent no. 2 was the senior applicant whose priority related back to 27.09.2007, making Parle's subsequent use in 2007-2008 inconsequential for determining registration rights. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal and all connected pending applications were dismissed.

Point of Law Settled

The Court reaffirmed the crucial principle of trademark law that in statutory registration proceedings under Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, priority between competing applicants filing on a proposed to be used basis is determined strictly by the date of application. Subsequent commercial entry into the market by a junior applicant while a senior application is pending before the Registry does not divest the senior applicant of their statutory rights. Furthermore, the ruling enforces the principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by making inconsistent representations regarding mark similarity before the Trade Marks Registry to suit different stages of litigation.

Title of the Case: Parle Products Pvt Ltd v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 28.07.2026

Case Number: LPA 316/2026 & CM APPL. 27819-20/2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:6020-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

In Parle Products Pvt Ltd v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. (2026:DHC:6020-DB), the High Court of Delhi dismissed an appeal against a Single Judge order upholding the registration of the trademark 20-20 in favor of respondent no. 2. Both parties had applied for registration in Class 30 on a proposed to be used basis, with respondent no. 2 applying on 27.09.2007 and Parle on 04.10.2007. Parle commenced commercial sales during the pendency of proceedings and opposed respondent's registration. The Division Bench held that priority under Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is governed by the application date, and subsequent market use by a junior applicant during procedural delays cannot oust the senior applicant. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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 5. Section 18 Trade Marks Act: Delhi HC Clarifies Scope of Proposed To Be Used Applications

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 9. Delhi High Court Distinguishes Passing Off Principles from Trademark Registration Rights

 10. Legal Analysis: Parle Products Pvt Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks on Trademark Priority

JK Engineering Private Limited Vs ANE Industries Private Limited

JK Engineering Private Limited Vs ANE Industries Private Limited

Date of Judgment: 28.07.2026

Case No.: IA NO. GA-COM/3/2025 In CS-COM/834/2024

Neutral Citation : Not Available

In The High Court at Calcutta (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction - Commercial Division)

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Justice Aniruddha Roy

### Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff originally instituted a non-commercial suit in 2016, followed by a second suit on the same cause of action, which was later permitted to be withdrawn by the Division Bench on 03.12.2024 with liberty to file a fresh commercial suit within four weeks. The plaintiff then filed the present commercial suit on 24.12.2024, seeking dispensation of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, both of which were granted ex-parte by a Coordinate Bench on 06.01.2025. The defendant filed an application seeking revocation of both the Section 12A dispensation and the Clause 12 Letters Patent leave, contending that no urgent interim relief was contemplated and that Calcutta was an inconvenient forum given that the contract was executed in Punjab, work was executed in Assam, and the parties were registered in Sikkim and Punjab.

### Dispute before Court

Whether the court should revoke the dispensation granted to the plaintiff from exhausting mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and whether the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 ought to be revoked on the ground of forum conveniens.

### Reasoning of Judge

The Court held that dispensation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was validly granted because the plaintiff genuinely contemplated urgent interim relief from its own standpoint, supported by pleadings and oral submissions regarding the apprehension that the defendant might alienate assets. However, regarding Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the Court held that even if a minuscule part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction, the balance of convenience heavily favored the defendant, as no operations or registered offices were in West Bengal, and a related suit was already pending in Punjab.

### Decision

The application was allowed in part. The prayer to recall the Section 12A dispensation was rejected, but the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 was revoked on the principle of forum conveniens, and the plaint was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff to be presented before the competent jurisdictional commercial court in Punjab.

### One Important legal principle held in the case

Even if a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a Chartered High Court, the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 can be revoked if the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favors the defendant under the doctrine of forum conveniens.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

# Analytical Legal Article

## Introduction:

Commercial litigation in India demands a delicate balance between procedural efficiency, statutory compliance, and equitable access to an appropriate legal forum. The interplay between mandatory pre-institution mediation under commercial law and the discretionary territorial jurisdiction exercised by Chartered High Courts often gives rise to complex procedural battles. A prominent instance of such litigation involves the challenge raised by a defendant seeking the dismissal or return of a commercial suit on two distinct procedural grounds: the failure to undergo mandatory pre-litigation mediation and the improper invocation of territorial jurisdiction under historic letters patent provisions. The judgment in question offers a comprehensive analysis of how courts evaluate the stand-point of a plaintiff seeking urgent interim relief against the hardships faced by a defendant forced to litigate in a forum that lacks substantial connection with the underlying dispute.

## Factual and Procedural Background:

The history of the dispute traces back to 18.08.2016, when the plaintiff initially instituted a civil suit before the regular non-commercial division of the High Court. On the very next day, 19.08.2016, the plaintiff withdrew the initial suit and filed a second suit on the self-same cause of action between identical parties seeking identical reliefs. In this second action, the plaintiff secured a judgment upon admission on 07.02.2019. However, the defendant filed a demurrer application which eventually escalated to the appellate stage. On 03.12.2024, the Division Bench disposed of the appeal by setting aside the judgment upon admission, observing that the dispute was commercial in nature and ought not to have proceeded before the regular non-commercial division. The Division Bench permitted the plaintiff to withdraw the second suit with liberty to institute a fresh commercial suit within four weeks, specifying that failure to do so within the stipulated timeframe would deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Pursuant to the directions of the Division Bench, the plaintiff presented a fresh commercial suit on 24.12.2024. Along with the suit, the plaintiff sought leave under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 for invoking territorial jurisdiction, and dispensation with the requirement of mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. On 06.01.2025, a Coordinate Bench granted ex-parte leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and dispensed with the pre-institution mediation requirement, thereby admitting the suit. Subsequently, on 11.08.2025, the defendant filed an interlocutory application seeking revocation of the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, revocation of the dispensation granted under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and dismissal of the suit.

The commercial contract in dispute was a memorandum of understanding dated 26.03.2013. The registered office of the plaintiff was located in Gangtok, Sikkim, while the registered office of the defendant was situated in Chandigarh Road, Punjab. The execution of the contracted works was to take place entirely in Assam, and the financial banking transfers associated with the contract were routed through a bank in Nawanshahr, Punjab. The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction in Calcutta on the premise that negotiations occurred at its corporate office situated within local limits and that one witness to the agreement had an address in Kolkata. Meanwhile, the defendant had already instituted a civil suit arising out of the same contractual transaction against the plaintiff, which remained pending before the jurisdictional court in Punjab.

## Dispute Before the Court

The core legal questions requiring adjudication centered on whether the plaintiff had legitimately bypassed the statutory mandate of pre-institution mediation and whether the High Court ought to retain territorial jurisdiction over the suit.

The defendant argued that Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 creates an absolute statutory bar against instituting a commercial suit without exhausting pre-litigation mediation unless the suit genuinely contemplates urgent interim relief. The defendant contended that the suit was primarily a money claim where no urgent interim relief had been formally applied for or granted since 2016. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff used the plea of urgency as a mere camouflage and guise to bypass the mandatory statutory process. On the issue of jurisdiction, the defendant urged that the contract was executed in Punjab, the works were performed in Assam, payments originated from Punjab, and both parties had registered offices outside West Bengal. Relying on the doctrine of forum conveniens, the defendant maintained that compelling it to defend the action in Calcutta caused severe hardship, especially when a related proceeding was pending in Punjab.

Conversely, the plaintiff contended that the contemplation of urgency must be assessed holistically from the standpoint of the plaintiff at the time of filing. The plaintiff highlighted that having previously obtained a judgment upon admission that was later set aside on technical jurisdictional grounds, it possessed a legitimate apprehension that the defendant would dissipate or alienate assets to defeat the claim if forced into mediation. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the strict four-week timeline imposed by the Division Bench on 03.12.2024 necessitated immediate filing without waiting for mediation. Regarding territorial jurisdiction, the plaintiff maintained that part of the cause of action arose within the local limits where contractual negotiations occurred, and that averments in the plaint must be accepted as true at the initial stage without forcing a revocation of leave.

## Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In analyzing the first issue regarding pre-institution mediation, the Court examined the statutory mandate under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 alongside Rule 8 of the High Court Commercial Court Practice Directions, 2021. The Court observed that Section 12A imposes a mandatory requirement that non-compliance with ordinarily renders a plaint institutionally defective, leading to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, an explicit statutory exception exists where a suit contemplates urgent interim relief.

The Court referred to authoritative precedents of the Supreme Court of India to establish the precise legal standard applicable to Section 12A. In Patil Automation Private Limited and Others vs. Rakheja Engineering Private Limited [(2022) 10 SCC 1], the Supreme Court established the mandatory nature of pre-institution mediation. This standard was further refined in Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D. Keerthi [(2024) 5 SCC 815] and Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited vs. Union of India and Another [(2025) 9 SCC 424], where the Apex Court clarified that the test under Section 12A is not whether an urgent interim relief is ultimately granted on merits, but whether, upon a holistic examination of the plaint, documents, and oral submissions, a prayer for urgent interim relief was genuinely contemplable from the standpoint of the plaintiff.

This principle was reaffirmed in Novenco Building and Industry A/S vs. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Private Limited [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2278], which summarized that courts must examine if there exists a plausible urgency or risk of losing rights or assets, rather than assessing the final merits of the interim relief. Applying these principles, the Court held that the apprehension of asset alienation expressed by the plaintiff—given the prior litigation history where a judgment upon admission had been recorded—constituted a plausible and reasonable basis for contemplating urgent interim relief. Consequently, the ex-parte order dispensing with pre-institution mediation was affirmed as a valid exercise of judicial discretion.

Turning to the second issue regarding Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, the Court undertook a detailed evaluation of discretionary territorial jurisdiction. Under Clause 12, where only a part of the cause of action arises within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, the court possesses discretion to grant, refuse, or subsequently revoke leave to sue. The Court reviewed the landmark decision in Madanlal Jalan vs. Madanlal & Ors. [AIR 1949 Cal 495], which formulated the foundational principles governing revocation of leave under Clause 12. The principles establish that the court must consider the balance of convenience of both parties and may apply the doctrine of forum conveniens to revoke leave if the balance is overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant, even in the absence of bad faith by the plaintiff.

The Court also considered Ultra Engineering vs. Spintex Industry [AIR 1980 Cal 159] and Mighty Metals Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Rajasthan Financial Corporation [2011 SCC OnLine Cal 2113], which emphasized that genuine hardship and lack of territorial nexus justify revoking leave. Upon scrutinizing the material on record, the Court observed that the primary elements of the transaction occurred far outside Calcutta: the registered office of the plaintiff was in Sikkim, the registered office of the defendant was in Punjab, the memorandum of understanding was executed in Punjab, the works were executed in Assam, and payments were processed in Punjab.

Furthermore, the defendant had already instituted a civil suit in Punjab arising from the same transaction. The Court noted that under company law mandates, corporate records are maintained at registered offices. While the plaintiff would have to transport records from Sikkim regardless of whether the trial occurred in Calcutta or Punjab, the defendant—having no place of business in West Bengal—would suffer extreme hardship in transporting witnesses and records from Punjab to Calcutta. Balancing the convenience of both sides, the Court held that Calcutta was not the natural or convenient forum, and that trying the suit in Punjab alongside or before the jurisdictional court would serve the ends of justice.

## Final Decision of the Court

The Court disposed of the interlocutory application by granting partial relief to the applicant defendant. The Court refused to recall or revoke the order granting dispensation from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, holding that the dispensation was lawfully granted based on the plaintiff's contemplable urgency.

However, the Court allowed the application regarding territorial jurisdiction and revoked the leave previously granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 on the ground of forum conveniens. The Court directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff along with the original court fees paid, upon retaining a certified photostat copy of the plaint on record. The plaintiff was granted liberty to present the plaint before the competent jurisdictional commercial court in Punjab where the defendant's suit was pending. The Court noted that because the defendant had forfeited its right to file a written statement by operation of law under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the suit would proceed from its present stage before the transferee commercial court as an undefended suit. Connected interlocutory applications were disposed of, and interim orders were vacated with liberty to re-apply before the appropriate court in Punjab.

## Point of Law Settled

This judgment reaffirms and clarifies two crucial procedural standards in commercial litigation:

First, in evaluating compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the test for dispensing with pre-institution mediation is subjective-objective, measured strictly from the standpoint of the plaintiff at the time of filing. The Court is not required to adjudicate whether interim relief will be granted on merits, but whether the plaintiff had a plausible and non-illusory reason to contemplate urgent intervention to protect its rights or assets.

Second, the judgment reaffirms that ex-parte leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 is subject to judicial review under the doctrine of forum conveniens. Even if a minuscule or formal part of the cause of action is shown to arise within the territorial limits of a Chartered High Court, the court retains inherent discretion to revoke leave if the balance of convenience heavily favors the defendant and litigating in that forum imposes undue hardship without a substantial nexus to the core transaction.

Title of the Case: JK Engineering Private Limited Vs ANE Industries Private Limited

Date of Judgment: 28.07.2026

Case Number: IA NO. GA-COM/3/2025 In CS-COM/834/2024

Neutral Citation: Not Available

Name of Court: In The High Court at Calcutta (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction - Commercial Division)

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Justice Aniruddha Roy

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

### Headnote of the Judgment:

In JK Engineering Private Limited Vs ANE Industries Private Limited (IA NO. GA-COM/3/2025 In CS-COM/834/2024), the High Court at Calcutta considered an application to recall Section 12A Commercial Courts Act, 2015 pre-litigation mediation dispensation and revoke Clause 12 Letters Patent, 1865 leave. The Court affirmed the Section 12A dispensation, holding that urgency must be assessed holistically from the plaintiff's standpoint. However, the Court revoked Clause 12 leave applying the doctrine of forum conveniens, as the contract was executed in Punjab, works were performed in Assam, and both corporate offices were outside West Bengal. The plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation before the jurisdictional Commercial Court in Punjab to proceed as an undefended suit.

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Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai Vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court Rejects Pre-Arrest Bail in Multi-Crore Nal Se Jal Public Welfare Scheme Scam

Case Title : Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai Vs State of Gujarat

Date of Judgment : 27-07-2026

Case No. : R/Criminal Misc. Application (For Anticipatory Bail) No. 17277 of 2026

Neutral Citation : 2026:GUJHC:17277

Court Name : High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, proprietor of M/s Shrinathji Construction Agency, preferred an anticipatory bail application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in connection with FIR C.R. No. 11201005250003 of 2025 registered with CID Crime Police Station, Vadodara Zone. The offences alleged fall under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 114, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, alongside Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b), 13(2), and 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case pertains to multi-crore irregularities in implementing the government's Nal Se Jal scheme designed to deliver potable water to rural households in Mahisagar district. The applicant was awarded pipe-laying and execution work for villages including Bachkariya, Ditvas, Babrol, and Shir. Investigation revealed significant shortfalls in execution, shallower pipeline laying, inflated house connection counts, and the submission of forged invoice records.

Dispute before Court

The main issue before the Court was whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail under Section 482 of BNSS in a complex economic fraud case involving public funds. The applicant contended that he was innocent, that the dispute was essentially contractual, that documents were already in police possession, and that no custodial interrogation was required. Conversely, the State argued that the applicant colluded in a systematic white-collar crime siphoning off government exchequer funds, submitted fabricated invoices, and required custodial interrogation to unearth the broader multi-agency scam involving 123 crore rupees.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court observed that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be granted sparingly, especially in serious economic offences that impact the country's financial health and public exchequer. Examining the investigation records, the Court found specific prima facie evidence showing that the applicant installed shorter pipelines than claimed, laid pipelines at unauthorized shallow depths, provided fewer domestic connections while claiming higher funds, and forged invoice records (such as Kamdhenu Pipes invoice No. 2122/903). Relying on Supreme Court precedents including SFIO v. Aditya Sarda, P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, and Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, the Court emphasized that personal liberty under Article 21 must be balanced against societal interest. In sophisticated white-collar crimes undermining public welfare programs, custodial interrogation is vital to conduct a thorough investigation.

Decision

The High Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application and discharged the rule, holding that the applicant failed to make out an exceptional case for pre-arrest protection.

One Important legal principle held in the case

Anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of routine in economic offences involving white-collar fraud and siphoning of public exchequer money, as custodial interrogation is essential to protect larger societal interests and ensure a comprehensive investigation.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Analytical Legal Overview of the Judgment

Introduction:

The discretionary power of courts to grant pre-arrest protection under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires a delicate judicial balancing act. While the statutory remedy exists to protect citizens from arbitrary arrest and malicious prosecution, courts must maintain vigilance when public funds and welfare projects are compromised. In a decision concerning public exchequer fraud, the High Court of Gujarat adjudicated an anticipatory bail application filed by a contractor implicated in the alleged multi-crore Nal Se Jal scheme scam in Mahisagar district. The judgment reinforces the established judicial doctrine that economic offences affecting public interest constitute a class apart, where custodial interrogation is often necessary to unearth complex conspiracies.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The controversy stems from an official investigation into the execution of the Nal Se Jal scheme, a flagship government welfare project designed to deliver potable drinking water to rural households across Mahisagar district. In connection with these works, an FIR bearing C.R. No. 11201005250003 of 2025 was registered at the CID Crime Police Station, Vadodara Zone. The penal provisions invoked included Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 114, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, together with Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b), 13(2), and 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The applicant, carrying on business as the sole proprietor of M/s Shrinathji Construction Agency, was entrusted with execution contracts for several rural habitations, including Babrol, Shir, Bachkariya, and Ditvas. Contracts were executed through local Water Committees starting around November 2021. The broader investigation launched by state authorities uncovered massive systemic irregularities across 620 villages in the district, involving approximately 112 separate contractors, agencies, and firms. The State alleged that approximately 123 crore rupees were siphoned off through falsified test reports, inflated bills, and non-execution of contractual work.

Fearing arrest, the applicant approached the High Court of Gujarat by filing an application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking anticipatory bail.

Dispute Before the Court:

The primary issue before the Court was whether the applicant was entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail in the context of ongoing criminal investigations into serious financial misappropriation.

The applicant submitted that he had been falsely implicated and that no specific overt act was attributed to him in the initial FIR text. It was argued that the work was executed through valid purchases from authorized pipe manufacturers, as corroborated by administrative verification letters. The applicant asserted that the entire matter was essentially a contractual dispute being given an improper criminal character. Furthermore, because all financial and administrative documents were already in the custody of the investigating agency, the applicant argued that custodial interrogation was wholly unnecessary.

On the other hand, the State strongly resisted the application, contending that the case involved a sophisticated white-collar crime impacting a vital public welfare scheme. The State demonstrated through field inspection reports and witness statements under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 that the applicant had engaged in severe physical and financial discrepancies. Specific findings included laying shorter pipelines than billed, digging trenches to depths significantly less than mandated standards, claiming payments for non-existent household connections, and forging manufacturer invoices (such as Kamdhenu Pipes invoice No. 2122/903). The prosecution emphasized that custodial interrogation was indispensable to unravel the deep-rooted conspiracy and recover misappropriated public money.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

In analyzing the rival contentions, the Court underscored that while individual liberty is a cherished fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not absolute and must be balanced against larger public and societal interests. Pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary statutory privilege and not an automatic right, requiring careful consideration of the nature and gravity of the accusations, the role of the accused, and the potential impact on public welfare.

The Court conducted a detailed review of the evidentiary material assembled by the investigating agency regarding the four villages assigned to the applicant's firm. The findings revealed a consistent pattern of physical shortfalls and financial inflated claims:

In Babrol village, pipelines were installed at inadequate depths, overall length was shorter than recorded, and excess payments were drawn against false invoices.

In Shir village, household connections were fewer than approved, yet extra money was claimed, alongside price variation payments obtained through false documentation.

In Bachkariya Part-2 and Ditvas villages, excavation work was incomplete, depth standards were violated, and public beneficiaries were deprived of intended water supply benefits.

A critical piece of evidence noted by the Court involved invoice No. 2122/903 for 26,38,022 rupees issued by Kamdhenu Pipes. While the applicant submitted this invoice to claim payments for Ditvas village, statement recordings from the pipe manufacturer confirmed that the bill actually pertained to Shir village and was never issued for Ditvas, establishing prima facie fabrication of billing records.

To contextualize the legal standard for granting anticipatory bail in economic offences, the Court placed reliance on key landmark precedents from the Supreme Court of India:

In Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 764, the Supreme Court reiterated that anticipatory bail should not be granted routinely in complex financial crimes and serious economic offences involving large-scale public funds.

In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24, the apex court observed that power under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 482 of BNSS) is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly. Refusal of anticipatory bail in grave offences does not violate Article 21, as societal interest in a fair and thorough investigation outweighs individual protection in such contexts.

In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 439, and Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 466, the Supreme Court held that economic offences constitute a class apart because they pose a severe threat to the financial health and developmental structure of the nation. Financial crimes committed with deliberate design for personal profit warrant a strict judicial approach regarding bail.

In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694, the apex court observed that personal liberty must not be protected at the cost of the larger interest of society.

In Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379, the Supreme Court held that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court forms a prima facie view that the applicant was falsely enroped.

In Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, AIR 2023 SC 3307, the Supreme Court emphasized walking a tightrope to strike a balance between safeguarding individual liberty and protecting the integrity of criminal investigations.

Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the present case did not present any exceptional circumstances warranting pre-arrest protection. Given the gravity of the white-collar scam and the need to unearth the full scope of collusion, custodial interrogation was held to be fully justified.

Final Decision of the Court:

The High Court of Gujarat held that the application for anticipatory bail lacked merit. Exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court formally dismissed the application and discharged the rule. The Court clarified that its observations regarding the facts were tentative and meant solely for deciding the pre-arrest bail plea.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reaffirms that economic offences involving white-collar fraud, falsification of records, and misappropriation of public welfare funds constitute a distinct category of crime. In such matters, courts must prioritize societal interest and the necessity of effective custodial interrogation over personal liberty. The decision clarifies that submitting pre-arrest bail applications in contractual or execution fraud cases cannot succeed merely by labeling the dispute as commercial, especially when prima facie evidence demonstrates systemic forgery and intentional financial loss to the public exchequer.

Case Details

Title of the Case: Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai v. State of Gujarat

Date of Judgment: 27/07/2026

Case Number: R/Criminal Misc. Application (For Anticipatory Bail) No. 17277 of 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:17277

Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai v. State of Gujarat, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. Application for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS in connection with FIR for offences under IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act relating to multi-crore irregularities in the Nal Se Jal public water scheme. Allegations involved siphoning government funds through forged invoices, shallow pipe-laying, and incomplete work. The Court held that economic offences affecting public exchequer require thorough custodial interrogation. Application dismissed.

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