NEC Corporation Vs The Controller of Patents and Designs and another

Suitable Titles for the Article:

1. Calcutta High Court Landmark Ruling: Graphic User Interfaces Qualify as Registrable Designs under the Designs Act, 2000 – A Purposive Interpretation for the Digital Age
2. GUI Designs No Longer Excluded: In-Depth Analysis of Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur’s Judgment Overturning Controller’s Narrow View on Industrial Design Protection
3. From Software Codes to Protectable Designs – Calcutta HC Clarifies Registrability of GUIs in Consolidated Appeals

Suitable Tags: #CalcuttaHighCourt #DesignsAct2000 #GUIRegistration #GraphicUserInterface #IndustrialDesigns #IntellectualPropertyIndia #LocarnoClassification #CryogasEquipment #UpdatingConstruction #IPLaw #DigitalInnovation #ControllerOfPatents #DualProtection #TRIPSCompliance

Introduction

In a landmark pronouncement that bridges traditional industrial design jurisprudence with contemporary digital innovation, the High Court at Calcutta delivered a comprehensive judgment on 9 March 2026 that decisively settles the question of whether Graphic User Interfaces can be registered as designs under the Designs Act, 2000. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur, presiding over five consolidated statutory appeals, meticulously examined the statutory definitions of “article” and “design”, rejected the Controller’s unduly restrictive interpretation, and held that GUIs are not per se ineligible for protection. The ruling underscores that a GUI, comprising iconography, layout, colour schemes, composition of lines and ornamentation, inherently satisfies the visual features contemplated by Section 2(d) when applied to an article such as a display screen or finished electronic device through an industrial process broadly understood to include digital rendering. By invoking principles of updating construction to accommodate technological evolution and drawing persuasive value from both Indian and foreign precedents, the court has not only set aside multiple rejection orders but has also aligned Indian design law with international practices prevalent in 92 per cent of jurisdictions as per WIPO surveys. This decision heralds greater legal certainty for technology companies, reduces potential litigation, and ensures that India remains competitive in protecting digital assets under the Hague Agreement and the Riyadh Design Law Treaty.

Factual Background

The appeals stemmed from a series of design applications filed by leading global and Indian entities seeking protection for innovative GUIs displayed on electronic screens. NEC Corporation’s application No. 285453 claimed novelty residing in the shape and pattern of a display screen hosting a GUI, which the Controller rejected on the ground that the GUI itself does not constitute an article under Section 2(a) and is merely software codes lacking permanence. ERBE Elektromedizin GMBH’s application No. 277243, initially titled “A Display Unit for a High Frequency Generator” and later amended to “Display Screen for an Electrosurgical High Frequency Generator”, was turned down because the GUI was visible only when the device was switched on and connected to a computing system, rendering it purely functional without consistent eye appeal. Abiomed Inc. faced rejection of applications Nos. 397600-001 and 397600-002 for “Display Panel or Portion thereof with Graphical User Interface” intended for vehicle dashboards, the Controller holding that the pictogram displayed on the screen could not be registered. TVS Motor Company Limited’s application No. 393339-001 for a GUI design was refused on the additional ground that it lacked reasons in the order, amounting to violation of natural justice, and that a GUI cannot be judged solely by the eye or possess a sense of touch. In each instance the Controller proceeded on the premise that the 2021 amendment to the Design Rules incorporating GUI under Locarno Class 14-04 was merely administrative and could not override the unamended definitions in the parent Act, that GUIs are not applied by industrial means, cannot be sold or manufactured separately, and are already protected under copyright as artistic works, precluding dual protection.

Procedural Background

All five matters were clubbed and heard together on 10 December 2025 before Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur in the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the High Court at Calcutta. Senior Advocate Mr. Sayantan Basu led the arguments for NEC Corporation, supported by Mr. Tanmoy Roy and Ms. Aheriya Roy, while Ms. Vindhya S. Mani appeared for ERBE Elektromedizin GMBH. Abiomed Inc. was represented by a team headed by Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta, and TVS Motor Company Limited by Senior Advocate Mr. Ranjan Bachawat along with a battery of counsel. The Controller of Patents and Designs was defended by Ms. Sanjukta Gupta, Mr. Brajesh Jha and others. Recognising the seminal importance of the common question of law, the court appointed Mr. Adarsh Ramanujan as Amicus Curiae, whose submissions on the Locarno Classification, the breadth of “applied” and the absence of any statutory permanence requirement proved invaluable. After detailed hearing spanning the misconceived notions prevalent in the Designs Office, the principles of natural justice in non-speaking orders, and comparative jurisprudence, the court reserved judgment and pronounced its verdict on 9 March 2026, disposing of IPDAID/21/2024, IPDAID/22/2024, IPDAID/1/2025, IPDAID/2/2025 and IPDAID/3/2025 along with all connected applications.

Reasoning

The court commenced its analysis by setting out the positive and negative limbs of Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000, emphasising that the definition is not confined to physical tangibility but extends to any features of shape, configuration, pattern, ornament or composition of lines or colours applied to an article by any industrial process, whether manual, mechanical or chemical, separate or combined, and judged solely by the eye. It clarified that the design and the article are distinct; the relevant article for a GUI may be the display unit itself or the finished consumer product such as a smartphone, tablet or automobile dashboard. The expression “article of manufacture” received a liberal interpretation, drawing upon the United States Supreme Court’s observation in Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. vs. Apple Inc. that it covers “a thing made by hand or machine”, and the subsequent recognition in Microsoft Corp. v. Corel Corp. that even software qualifies. The court rejected the fallacy that every article must possess physical embodiment, noting that such a narrow approach would permanently exclude digital and virtual designs.

Turning to the phrase “applied to an article by any industrial process”, the judgment highlighted that the word “any” preceding “industrial process” is deliberately expansive and not limited to the illustrative manual, mechanical or chemical methods. The process of displaying a GUI involves systematic manipulation of electronic signals and precise rendering by advanced hardware, fitting squarely within modern industrial enterprise. The court applied the doctrine of updating construction, citing Bennion on Statutory Interpretation and State of Punjab vs. Amritsar Beverages Ltd., to interpret the Act in light of technological advancements, and found persuasive analogy in the Federal Court of Australia’s decision in Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Patents.

The impugned orders’ insistence on permanence was found to have no statutory foundation; Section 2(d) nowhere requires the design to be permanently visible or affixed. The court relied on In re: Hruby, where the ornamental display of a fountain was protected despite dependence on external water flow, and K.K. Suwa Seikosha’s Design Application, where a watch display visible only when activated was held registrable. The test of noticeability recognised in the Manual of Designs Practice and Procedure further confirmed that features visible only during normal use satisfy the “judged solely by the eye” criterion. The finished-article requirement was satisfied because the GUI forms part of the complete product received by the consumer.

Locarno Class 14-04 explicitly listing Screen Displays and Icons, including Graphical User Interfaces, was acknowledged as indicative of legislative intent following India’s accession to the Locarno Agreement and the 2021 Rules amendment, though classification remains administrative and registration is ultimately subject to Sections 2(a) and 2(d). Dual protection concerns were dispelled through a harmonious reading with the Copyright Act, 1957; a GUI is a visual configuration distinct from both computer programmes (literary works) and pure artistic works. The Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Cryogas Equipment Private Limited vs Inox India Ltd. provided the definitive two-pronged test: first ascertaining whether the work is purely artistic or a design derived from it through industrial application, and second applying functional utility where copyright does not apply. The UST Global (Singapore) order was held to be based on a misconstruction of the Act and was accordingly distinguished. Foreign decisions were accorded persuasive value, consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence in Forasol v. ONGC and the Cryogas case itself.

The court further noted the inconsistent practice within the Designs Office, where several GUIs had already been registered (e.g., Siemens Nos. 274917, 2749178; Kneevoice No. 284680; LG No. 276736), underscoring the absence of any per se exclusion. It emphasised that registration would bring legal certainty, reduce litigation, and encourage innovation without encroaching upon copyright or patent domains.

Judgements with complete citation discussed and decision of court, point of law settled in the case

The judgment extensively discussed and applied several authorities. The Supreme Court in Cryogas Equipment Private Limited vs Inox India Ltd 2025 SCC Online SC 780 exhaustively analysed the overlap between the Copyright Act, 1957 and the Designs Act, 2000, formulating a two-pronged test under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act to distinguish pure artistic works from industrially applied designs and mandating a functional utility inquiry where necessary; the Calcutta High Court adopted this framework to clarify that once GUI features are industrially applied they cease to remain mere artistic works. In Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. vs. Apple Inc 137 S.Ct.429 the United States Supreme Court broadly construed “article” to include any thing made by hand or machine, which the court found directly applicable to display screens hosting GUIs. Microsoft Corporation vs. Corel Corporation 5:15-cv-05836-EJD further reinforced that software itself can constitute an article of manufacture. English authorities K.K.Suwa Seikosha's Design Application [1982] R.P.C. 166 and the decision in In re: Hruby 54 C.C.P.A. 1196 were relied upon to establish that designs visible only upon activation or during intended use remain registrable, with permanence being a function of the materials employed rather than a statutory prerequisite. The Federal Court of Australia’s ruling in Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Patents [2025] FCAFC 131 supplied the principle of updating construction for technology-driven legislation. The Controller’s reliance on its own order dated 6 July 2023 in UST Global (Singapore) vs. Controller of Patents and Designs was expressly disapproved as resting on an erroneous limitation of industrial process and an artificial requirement of integrality.

The decision of the court was unanimous in allowing all appeals. The impugned orders dated 1 October 2019 (IPDAID/21/2024), 20 September 2019 (IPDAID/22/2024), 17 February 2025 (IPDAID/1/2025 and IPDAID/2/2025) and 31 May 2024 (IPDAID/3/2025) were set aside in their entirety. All applications were remanded to the Controller for fresh consideration after affording full opportunity of hearing to the respective appellants, directing the authorities to apply the correct legal tests articulated in the judgment.

The point of law settled in the case is that Graphic User Interfaces satisfy the criteria of a “design” under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000 read with Section 2(a) and are eligible for registration on a case-to-case basis when the visual features are applied to an identifiable article by an industrial process (broadly understood to encompass digital rendering) and are judged solely by the eye, with no statutory requirement of permanence, separate saleability, or exclusion on the ground of dual protection with copyright; the inclusion of GUIs in Locarno Class 14-04 further evidences legislative intent to protect digital designs, subject only to the fulfilment of the statutory ingredients.

Case Detail

Title: NEC Corporation Vs The Controller of Patents and Designs and another (IPDAID/21/2024, IPDAID/22/2024, IPDAID/1/2025, IPDAID/2/2025, IPDAID/3/2025)

Date of Order: 09.03.2026

Case Number: IPDAID/21/2024, IPDAID/22/2024, IPDAID/1/2025, IPDAID/2/2025 & IPDAID/3/2025

Neutral Citation: Not Reported

Name of court: High Court at Calcutta, Original Side (Intellectual Property Rights Division)

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Headnote of Article

Calcutta High Court holds that Graphic User Interfaces are registrable as industrial designs under the Designs Act, 2000 when applied to an article by any industrial process and judged solely by the eye; the court sets aside Controller’s rejection orders, applies updating construction to digital technologies, distinguishes copyright overlap via Cryogas test, and remands applications for fresh adjudication, thereby settling that there is no per se exclusion for GUIs and aligning Indian law with global digital design protection norms.

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.

Introduction: The Delhi High Court recently delivered an important decision in a patent dispute that shows how courts can sometimes bend strict rules about timing to ensure a fair outcome when the rights of the public are involved. This case arose when a company wanted exclusive rights to make and sell a new weed-control mixture for farmers, but industry groups challenged it saying the idea was not new enough. While the appeal was going on, one challenger asked to add old public records from American environmental agencies and scientific papers. The company strongly opposed this, calling it too late and against the rules. The court had to decide whether to allow these extra materials even after the original patent office hearing was over. The ruling highlights that patent cases are special because they affect farmers, competitors, and society as a whole, not just the two sides fighting in court. By allowing the extra records, the judge emphasised that getting the right answer on whether an invention truly deserves protection is more important than rigid deadlines.

Factual Background: A company called Crystal Crop Protection Ltd had developed a ready-to-use mixture of two common weed-killing chemicals – halosulfuron-methyl and metribuzin – in specific amounts. They believed this combination worked better together than either chemical alone, helping control unwanted plants in many types of crops without needing extra ingredients. The company applied for a patent so no one else could copy their exact mixture. Two groups opposed the application right from the beginning. One was an association of pesticide makers from Haryana, and the other was an individual expert. They argued that the mixture was not a fresh invention because similar combinations already existed in public knowledge. The patent office examined everything and agreed with the opponents, rejecting the application on the grounds that there was no real new idea and that the mixture was just a simple blend of known things.

Procedural Background:The company filed an appeal in the Delhi High Court against the rejection. While the appeal was pending, the Haryana association filed a special request asking the court to accept several additional records that had not been shown to the patent office earlier. These included official registrations from the United States Environmental Protection Agency for similar weed killers, scientific articles explaining how certain chemicals block plant growth, and details about how these substances behave in crops like sugarcane. The company objected strongly, saying the opponents had many chances during the original opposition process and hearings to submit everything they wanted. They argued that the rules do not allow parties to bring new material years later just because they thought of it now, and that this would unfairly let the opponents strengthen their case at the appeal stage. The association replied that the records were always publicly available and directly helped prove the mixture was not inventive. They also said patent matters involve public interest, so the court should see all useful information to decide correctly rather than stick strictly to old procedures.

Reasoning:The judge looked closely at both arguments and noted that patent decisions are different from ordinary property fights between two people. When a patent is granted, it gives the owner a monopoly that stops everyone else from using the idea for many years, which affects farmers who need affordable products and other companies who want to compete. Because of this public angle, the court felt it was more important to have a complete picture than to reject useful records just for being late. The extra documents were clearly connected to the main question – whether the claimed mixture showed any clever new step beyond what was already known. The judge observed that even though the materials were old and public, the opponents only realised their full importance while preparing the appeal. The court rejected the idea that any delay automatically blocks new evidence, especially when the records could help avoid wrongly giving or refusing monopoly rights. It also noted that the company had not shown any real harm from allowing the records, and that the patent rules themselves encourage full examination of all background knowledge. In the end, the judge decided that refusing the documents would leave an incomplete record, making it harder to give a proper final decision on the appeal.

Judgements with complete citation discussed and Decision of Court: The court discussed several earlier cases to explain its thinking. It started with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1, which made it clear that Indian patent law demands a real technical advance with economic value, not just any small change or mixture. This helped the judge remember that the burden is always on the person seeking the patent to prove something genuinely new. On the rules about adding evidence in appeals, the court referred to K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 216, Wadi v. Amilal and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 677, N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy, (2001) 7 SCC 503, and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148. These cases generally say new material should not be allowed unless there is a strong reason or the court genuinely needs it to decide fairly, and they warn against using appeals to fix weaknesses in the original case. The company had relied on Akebia Therapeutics INC. v. Controller General of Patents, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4841, to argue strict timing rules must be followed. However, the judge distinguished all these because patent cases involve public rights, not private land disputes. The court also looked at F. Hoffmann-La Roche Limited v. Cipla Ltd., 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del) and Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Controller of Patents, Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:158, which stress that courts must check every piece of existing knowledge to prevent wrong monopolies. It further considered decisions like Eastern Equipment & Sales Limited v. Ing. Yash Kumar Khanna, 2008 (12) SCC 739 and others cited by the opponents showing that evidence can be admitted if it helps the court reach the right answer. After weighing everything, the court allowed the request. In its decision dated 28 February 2026, it held that the additional documents would be taken on record and considered when the main appeal is finally heard.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles that in appeals concerning patents, courts can accept additional old public records even at a late stage if those records are directly helpful for deciding whether the invention truly deserves protection. The key reason is the public nature of patent rights – a wrong decision affects society, so the court’s duty to find the correct answer can outweigh normal strict rules about timing and diligence. This makes patent appeals more flexible than ordinary civil cases, ensuring that monopoly rights are granted or refused only after looking at every relevant piece of background knowledge.

Title: Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors..

Date of Order: 28/02/2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 19/2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1828

Name of court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable Titles:

1. Delhi High Court Opens Door for Late Evidence in Patent Appeals to Protect Public Interest
2. Landmark Ruling on Admitting Fresh Records in Intellectual Property Challenges
3. How Public Interest Trumps Strict Timelines in Patent Validity Disputes

Suitable Tags: #PatentLaw #DelhiHighCourt #AdditionalEvidence #IntellectualProperty #PatentOpposition #PublicInterest #IPAppeals #CPCOrder41

Headnote: Delhi High Court permits additional prior art documents in a pending patent appeal, holding that public interest in correct patent decisions outweighs procedural delays when the materials are relevant to assessing inventiveness.

Abbott Products Operations AG Vs Ms. Aprajita Sushma

Factual and Procedural Background:

Abbott, a long-standing healthcare company founded in the late 1800s and active in India since 1910, created and registered the brand name Pankreoflat in 1964 for a medicine that helps with stomach problems like bloating, and has sold it continuously since the 1970s with growing sales and heavy advertising. 

In 2021, a smaller firm named Alrom Pharmaceuticals registered a similar-sounding name Kreoflat for the exact same type of stomach medicine. Abbott discovered this in October 2024, sent a warning letter asking the firm to stop, but got no cooperation, so Abbott filed a court request in 2025 to cancel the newer registration due to likely customer mix-ups.

Core Dispute:

The main fight is whether Kreoflat copies Pankreoflat too closely in sound, look, and structure, risking confusion among buyers for identical gut health products, with Abbott arguing their older use and fame give them stronger rights, while the other side claims the names are totally different and their adoption was honest with its own growing popularity.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:

The court reviewed Abbott's strong proof like old sales receipts, accountant reports on sales jumping from about 21 million rupees in 2017 to 35 million in 2024, and ad spending over 14 million rupees, plus the lack of any real defense or evidence from the other side, who didn't even file a proper response. It agreed the names are confusingly alike, especially for medicines where mistakes could harm health, and sided with Abbott's prior rights over the newer registration. The court ordered the removal of Kreoflat from the official list, allowing both names to coexist would weaken Abbott's trusted brand.

Law Point Settled in the Case:

For drug brands, courts apply a tough standard—even small similarities can lead to cancellation to protect public safety and reward the first honest user over later copies.

Abbott Products Operations AG Vs Ms. Aprajita Sushma :26.02.2026, C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 163/2025:2026:DHC:1721: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Cyber law  #LegalNews  #IndianIPUpdate  #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Daikin Industries Ltd. Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents

Factual and Procedural Background:

Daikin, a Japanese company, applied for an Indian patent in June 2022 for a better version of a device that transfers heat efficiently, like in air conditioners, claiming priority from a January 2020 Japanese filing and an international application. The patent office reviewed it, pointed out similarities to an old 1972 US patent, and rejected it in April 2024 for not being original enough. Daikin appealed to the Delhi High Court, offering to revise their description to match a version already approved by the US patent office, which had also looked at the same old US document.

Core Dispute:

The key issue was whether Daikin's heat transfer device added anything truly new compared to the decades-old US invention, and if they should be allowed to refine their application details right there in the appeal court to address the rejection.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:

The court explained that appeal judges can approve tweaks to patent applications if they just clarify or narrow the original idea without adding fresh concepts, based on recent similar cases. Here, the proposed changes mirrored the US-approved wording, stayed within the original filing's boundaries, and didn't expand the scope, so they were greenlit. The rejection order was overturned, and the case was sent back to the patent office for a new review after Daikin submits the updated version, with a two-month deadline to decide, but no final call on originality.

Law Point Settled in the Case:

Appeals courts have the power to let inventors adjust patent claims mid-appeal, as long as adjustments are limited to disclaimers, fixes, or explanations that fit the original submission without broadening it, ensuring fair chances for valid innovations.

Daikin Industries Ltd. Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs:26.02.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 56/2024: Justice Jyoti Singh.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Cyber law  #LegalNews  #IndianIPUpdate  #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Britannia Industries Ltd Vs Desi Bites Snacks P Ltd

Britannia Industries Ltd filed a lawsuit against Desi Bites Snacks Pvt Ltd and others seeking a permanent injunction to stop them from using the 'GOOD DAY' trademark on confectionery like soan papdi, claiming they only became aware of this use in October 2024, and initially obtained a temporary court order halting the defendants' sales without notice, but this was later lifted by mutual agreement in February 2025 and the case was sent for mediation.

Later, Britannia applied to amend their complaint to include details of a prior 2018 rectification petition against a related 'GOOD DAY' registration for papad and to add Jai Food Products and its proprietor Roop Chand Agarwal as new defendants, arguing they were necessary for resolving the full dispute since Roop Chand held a 2005 trademark registration for 'GOOD DAY' on papad and was a director of Desi Bites.

In response, Desi Bites and another defendant filed an application accusing Britannia and its representative Omar Waziri of perjury for deliberately hiding prior knowledge of Roop Chand's mark and misrepresenting Desi Bites as a new entrant to create false urgency, pointing to errors in company details and addresses in the original filing.

The core dispute centered on whether Britannia's omissions were intentional lies warranting criminal perjury proceedings and if the court should allow the amendments and additions of parties.

The court reasoned that perjury requires clear evidence of deliberate falsehood for personal gain, but here the mistakes stemmed from genuine confusion over similar company names on product packaging versus official records, with no proof of intent to deceive, especially since Britannia's signer joined in 2021 unaware of the 2018 proceedings, and suppressing facts inadvertently did not justify perjury as it must be exceptional and based on unimpeachable evidence rather than suspicion.

On amendments, the court noted they should be liberally granted to address the real issues without procedural barriers unless mala fide, and here they clarified the dispute without prejudice.

Similarly, adding the new parties was essential as Roop Chand's registration and role made them key to fair adjudication. The court dismissed the perjury application, approved the plaint amendment and impleadment of the new defendants, directed filing of updated documents and responses, and set timelines for further steps.

Britannia Industries Ltd Vs Desi Bites Snacks P Ltd:28/02/2026:CS(COMM) 983/2024:2026:DHC:1826:Tejas Karia.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Vardhman Trusteeship Pvt Ltd Vs Smt Jyotsana Dubey

Vardhman Trusteeship Pvt Ltd, a company providing trusteeship services, acted as debenture trustee for loans totaling Rs.77 crores taken by Defendant No.2, a tech solutions firm, with Defendant No.1's New Delhi property mortgaged as security through deposit of title deeds after its purchase in 2006 following inheritance and conversion to freehold, and various agreements like debenture trust deeds, hypothecation, share pledges and personal guarantees were executed in 2023 and 2024, but breaches occurred leading to default notices in October 2025 demanding over Rs.40 crores with Defendant No.2 admitting liability via email in January 2026 without payment, prompting the Plaintiff to file a commercial suit in February 2026 seeking a mortgage decree for Rs.3.91 crores based on property valuation, sale of the property, permanent bar on redemption and costs, along with an application for exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act claiming urgency to prevent third-party interests, and another for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC to restrain alienation of the property.

The core dispute was whether the suit contemplated urgent interim relief to exempt it from mandatory pre-institution mediation. The court reasoned by referring to Supreme Court precedents like Patil Automation emphasizing the mandatory nature of Section 12A unless genuine urgency exists, Yamini Manohar requiring courts to scrutinize if urgency is not a disguise based on plaint averments, Novenco finding urgency in continuing IP infringements as each act is a fresh wrong, and Chandra Kishore stating urgency is determined by the plaintiff's pleadings, but found in this case the claims of urgency were vague and bald since the property was already mortgaged with no evidence of imminent third-party creation, distinguishing it from ongoing wrongs, thus no real urgency warranted exemption. The court dismissed the exemption application, returned the plaint with liberty to refile after mediation, and disposed of all pending applications.

Vardhman Trusteeship Pvt Ltd Vs Smt Jyotsana Dubey:24.02.2026: CS(COMM) 177/2026: Subramonium Prasad.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

International Business Machines Corp Vs Tivoli Gardens

International Business Machines Corporation, known as IBM, a global tech company, acquired the 'TIVOLI' trademark in 1996 from Tivoli Systems Inc. and has used it for decades in IT management software, applying for its registration in India in 2003 under Class 42 for computer services. Tivoli Gardens, a hospitality business using 'TIVOLI' and 'TIVOLI GARDENS' marks since 1994, opposed this application in 2006, claiming prior use. IBM filed a counter-statement in 2011, which the Trade Marks Registry served on Tivoli Gardens in 2019, requiring them to submit evidence within two months or face abandonment of their opposition. Tivoli Gardens failed to do so until 2022, when they filed evidence late along with a petition to excuse the delay, blaming their former lawyer and COVID-19 disruptions. The Registrar allowed this petition in April 2025, reviving the opposition. IBM appealed to the Delhi High Court, arguing the rules set strict, non-extendable deadlines and the Registrar had no power to condone such a long delay. The core dispute was whether the Registrar could overlook the two-month evidence filing deadline under the Trade Marks Rules (either 2002 or 2017 versions, as both are mandatory). The court examined records showing proper service in 2019, ruled that the deadlines are absolute with no discretion for extension, noted Tivoli Gardens' pattern of delays in this and other cases, and held that blaming a lawyer isn't enough excuse without the party's own diligence. The court decided in IBM's favor, setting aside the Registrar's order, deeming the opposition abandoned, and allowing IBM's trademark application to proceed after over 22 years of wait.

International Business Machines Corp Vs Tivoli Gardens:28/02/2026, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 45/2025 : 2026:DHC:1831: Tejas Karia.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

FinTree Education Pvt. Ltd. Vs Fintree Finance Pvt. Ltd.,

FinTree Education Pvt Ltd, which runs finance education courses and registered the trademark “FINTREE” in 2012 for its services, sued Fintree Finance Pvt Ltd in 2019 for copying the same name on its finance business and asked for an immediate stop order.

The defendant opposed the injunction. In 2021 the plaintiffs added a passing-off claim by amending the plaint (allowed in 2023), but later realised some supporting documents and a clear prayer for passing off in the injunction motion were missing. In 2025 they filed this second amendment application to add fresh documents (updated registration, new invoices, client reviews, website screenshots, branch proofs) and clarify pleadings.

The defendant strongly opposed, arguing six years had passed, most documents were available earlier, the plaintiffs were careless, and the strict disclosure rules of the Commercial Courts Act do not allow late additions without strong reasons.

The judge examined the Commercial Courts Act rules on document disclosure, noted that some documents genuinely came into existence only after the suit or were needed to answer the defendant’s defence, while others were available earlier and could not be added now.

He held that at the pre-trial stage amendments to pleadings should be allowed liberally if they help decide the real dispute without changing its basic nature, and intellectual property cases deserve protection against ongoing infringement. On 20 February 2026 the Bombay High Court partly allowed the application: it permitted the new documents that came into existence later and the clarificatory pleadings/amendments in the plaint and injunction motion for passing off, but rejected the older documents that should have been filed earlier; no costs were awarded.

Title: FinTree Education Pvt. Ltd. Vs Fintree Finance Pvt. Ltd.: 20.02.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 234 of 2021:2026:BHC:OS:5031:BombHC: Arif S. Doctor, H.J..

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs Zee Laboratories Ltd

GlaxoSmithKline, a big global healthcare company with over 100 years in India, sells antibiotic capsules called PHEXIN since 1985 under a registered trademark and distinctive green-and-white packaging to treat infections.

In 2025 it found Zee Laboratories selling skin ointments under very similar sounding names FEXIT, FEXIT-B and FEXIT-M with almost identical green-and-white boxes. GSK sent legal notices asking Zee to stop, but Zee ignored them, so GSK filed a suit in Delhi High Court and asked for an immediate order to stop the use.

Zee agreed in court to drop one name FEXIN straight away but fought the others, claiming the names are different, the products are totally different (capsules versus ointments), they have been selling since 2007 without any complaints, the prefix FEXI is common in the market, and there is no real confusion because doctors prescribe both.

GSK replied that in medicines even small sound-alike names are dangerous, the first part of the name matters most, doctors’ handwriting is often bad, pharmacists can mix them up, and delay does not matter when copying is dishonest.

The judge compared the names and packaging, noted they sound almost the same and look alike, said medicines need extra strict protection because mistakes can harm health, found GSK has strong reputation from long use and advertising, ruled the prefix is not proven common in actual trade, and held Zee gave no good reason for choosing such similar names. On 28 February 2026 the court granted the interim injunction, stopping Zee, its directors, dealers and everyone connected from using FEXIT, FEXIT-B, FEXIT-M or any similar mark or green-white packaging for ointments until the full trial, because GSK made a strong case, balance of convenience favoured GSK, and delay would harm its goodwill.

Title: Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs Zee Laboratories Ltd.:28.02.2026:CS(COMM) 896/2025: 2026:DHC:1832:Tejas Karia, H.J..

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Terix Computer Service India Pvt. Ltd. Vs TPM Guru Pvt. Ltd.

Terix Computer Service India Pvt Ltd runs an IT maintenance business across the world using its own special software and tools that it developed since 2002. In 2021 it noticed many clients suddenly stopping renewals and discovered that two of its own directors had secretly started a new company called TPM Guru Pvt Ltd, diverted over 115 client contracts worth more than ₹3.70 crore, used Terix staff and parts to serve those clients, copied Terix software, and even froze Terix bank accounts to force an “exit” deal. Terix filed a civil suit in Delhi High Court asking for an order to stop the copying and for damages. The new company and the directors filed an application saying two earlier written agreements (one from 2020 called Collaboration Agreement and one from 2021 called Exit Agreement) contained clear arbitration clauses that required all disputes to be decided by a private arbitrator in Noida instead of court. Terix objected, arguing the case was about copyright theft (which courts alone should decide), the agreements were invalid or already finished, and not every defendant had signed them. The judge carefully read the agreements, the plaint, and Supreme Court rulings like Vidya Drolia and Cox & Kings. He found that the heart of the fight arose directly from the business relationship created by those agreements, the copyright claims were tied to what happened under the contract and not purely a public right, and even non-signatories could be included because the whole matter formed one connected transaction. On 28 February 2026 the court allowed the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, referred the entire dispute to arbitration, and the civil suit was sent to the arbitrator for final decision.

Title: Terix Computer Service India Pvt. Ltd. Vs TPM Guru Pvt. Ltd. , Order date: 28 February 2026, Case Number: CS(COMM) 783/2025, Neutral Citation: None assigned, Name of court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs Rakesh Goyal

Hindustan Lever (now Unilever) and Procter & Gamble are giant companies that make everyday products like Fair & Lovely cream, Sunsilk shampoo, Lux soap, Ponds, Ariel detergent, Head & Shoulders and many more, all sold with special packaging and famous brand names.

In 2002 and 2003 police raids at the shops of Rakesh Goyal and his family in Delhi caught them selling cheap fake copies of these exact products, packed in almost identical bottles and boxes.

Even after the raids the defendants kept making and selling the counterfeits, so the companies filed this lawsuit in 2018 asking the court to stop them forever, punish them and make them pay for the losses. The court quickly gave a stop order in 2005 that stayed till the end, framed issues, and later the defendants stopped coming to court and gave no evidence or reply.

The judge studied the trademark registrations, copyright in the packaging designs, raid seizure memos and the companies’ huge sales records, and found that the fakes were clearly copied to trick customers and ride on the real brands’ reputation.

On 28 February 2026 the court passed a final decree permanently stopping Rakesh Goyal, his family and anyone connected with them from making, selling or advertising any fake versions of these products, ordered them to jointly pay Rs 2,50,000 as damages within four weeks (with 9% interest if late) and also made them pay the companies’ full actual legal costs.

Title: Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs Rakesh Goyal: 28.02.2026:CS(COMM) 256/2018: 2026:DHC:1821:Tejas Karia.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Novartis AG Vs Noviets Pharma

Novartis AG, a global pharmaceutical giant, has been using its famous trademark “NOVARTIS” in India since 1996 and built huge reputation through massive sales and advertising. In 2024 it discovered a Bihar-based group called Noviets Pharma selling medicines and veterinary products under the very similar name “NOVIETS” on websites like IndiaMart.

Novartis sent legal notices and opposed their trademark but received no proper reply, so it filed a suit in the Delhi High Court asking for an immediate order to stop the use. The defendants argued the court had no jurisdiction because their business is in Bihar, the marks look and sound different, and they only use “NOVIETS” as a company name, not a brand.

The judge first ruled that Delhi has jurisdiction because the defendants’ IndiaMart page lists a Delhi address and their online presence reaches customers here.

He then compared the two marks and found “NOVIETS” is so close to “NOVARTIS” in spelling, sound and look that ordinary buyers, especially with doctors’ handwriting, could easily mix them up — especially dangerous for medicines.

Novartis proved its strong goodwill with huge sales figures, while the defendants could not explain why they chose such a similar name and had even tried to register it themselves. The court said this was a clear case of trademark infringement and passing off, the balance of convenience favoured Novartis, and any delay would harm its reputation.

On 28 February 2026 the court granted the interim injunction, stopping the defendants and everyone connected with them from using “NOVIETS” or any similar mark for pharmaceutical or veterinary products until the full trial is over.

Title: Novartis AG Vs Noviets Pharma: 28.02.2026:CS(COMM) 218/2024:2026:DHC:1827:Tejas Karia, H.J..

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Associated Broadcasting Company Limited Vs Google LLC

Associated Broadcasting Company Limited, which runs TV9 news channels, uploaded videos on YouTube about real events like hurricanes, heavy snow, floods, the Israel-Hamas war and a Chinese spy balloon, using very short clips of raw footage to explain the news to the public. Some American and Turkish media companies claimed copyright in those tiny clips and sent repeated strike notices to YouTube, threatening to shut down TV9 channels if the videos stayed up. TV9 said the clips were too small to matter, showed only plain facts of nature and current affairs that no one can own, and were used fairly just for honest news reporting. When TV9 tried to talk, the companies demanded secret business records and later filed a case in America but quietly dropped it against TV9’s channels. Google, as the platform owner, stayed neutral and only followed its rules. The companies never filed any reply or appeared in the Delhi High Court despite being served many times, so the court treated their claims as untrue. The judge looked at the videos and saw the clips lasted only seconds inside much longer news stories full of TV9’s own commentary, making the use fair and too tiny to harm anyone under Indian law. On 28 February 2026 the court gave summary judgment without needing a full trial, declared that TV9’s videos do not infringe any copyright, and permanently stopped the companies from sending any more groundless threats or strike notices against these videos.

Title: Associated Broadcasting Co Ltd. Vs Google LLC: 28.02.2026:CS(COMM) 9/2024:2026:DHC:1833:Tejas Karia, H.J.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Innovative Derma Care Vs Vardhman Sakincare Pvt. Ltd.

Innovative Derma Care sells skin care products under the trademark Clariwash and sued Vardhaman Skincare Private Limited and another company in 2018 after discovering they were selling face wash under the same name.

The commercial suit in the trial court at Tis Hazari dragged on for nearly six years with mediation attempts, framing of issues in February 2025, and the plaintiff first listing only its owner as a witness before successfully adding three more witnesses in March 2025. In April 2025 the plaintiff filed another application to add two extra witnesses — Mr Amit Chopra who had been unwell and Mr Gulshan Kumar who travels frequently for work — but the trial court rejected it, noting the case was already the oldest pending matter, the plaintiff had already increased its witnesses from one to four, and there was no strong reason why these two names could not have been included earlier.

The plaintiff then approached the High Court under Article 227 claiming the law allows parties to bring their own witnesses without prior permission if evidence is still open and citing a Supreme Court ruling that technical delays should not block important witnesses.

The High Court examined the records, found no medical proof or other documents to support the excuses of illness and travel, observed that the names could have been listed much earlier anyway, and agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff itself was causing the delay in a six-year-old case by repeatedly expanding its witness list.

Therefore on 28 February 2026 the High Court dismissed the petition, refused to interfere with the trial court’s order, and held that the two additional witnesses cannot be examined so the suit can proceed without further postponement.

Title: Innovative Derma Care Vs Vardhman Sakincare Pvt. Ltd.:28.02.2026:CM(M)-IPD 47/2025, 2026:DHC:1829: Tejas Karia, H.J..

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. Vs Assistant Controller of Patent and Design

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd wanted a patent for a ready-to-use weed killer made by mixing two chemicals called halosulfuron-methyl and metribuzin in specific amounts to control weeds in crops like sugarcane. The patent office examined the application and rejected it after two opponents argued that the mixture was not a new invention, did not show any special extra power beyond what the two chemicals already do on their own, and was just an ordinary blend without real improvement.

The company appealed to the High Court of Delhi. During the appeal one opponent asked to add old public records from America and research papers showing very similar weed-killer mixes already existed years before. The court first allowed those extra papers because they were important for deciding the case fairly. After hearing everyone and studying the old records, the judge found that the company’s own test results only proved better weed control when more chemicals were used, not because the two worked together in a surprising new way. Experts in farming chemicals would have easily thought of this mix from what was already known, so there was no inventive step.

The mixture also fell under the rule that stops patents for simple combinations that just add up properties without synergy. The patent office order was clear, complete and correct, so the court saw no reason to change it.

Title: Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. Vs Assistant Controller of Patent and Design :28.02.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 19/2023:2026:DHC:1828, Tejas Karia, H.J..

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Godrej Consumer Vs Reckitt Benckiser:DB

Godrej Consumer Products Limited launched a toilet cleaner called "Spic" in October 2025 in a black bottle with a dispenser cap meant to reach under the toilet rim. Reckitt Benckiser India Private Limited, which sells the well-known blue "Harpic" toilet cleaner, felt that Godrej's bottle shape (especially the spout/dispenser part) was too similar to its own and would confuse customers. Reckitt had earlier design protection for its bottle shape, but that had expired, so the shape became open for anyone to use. However, Reckitt later got trademark registration for the overall "Harpic Bottle and Cap" as a device (picture mark).  

Reckitt filed a court case in February 2026 mainly complaining about Godrej's ads that compared and criticised Harpic (called disparaging ads), but also added a smaller claim about trademark infringement and product confusion due to the similar bottle shape. A single judge quickly gave a temporary order on February 25, 2026 stopping Godrej from selling its Spic product. Godrej appealed this order to a higher bench (Division Bench) of the Calcutta High Court.  

The Division Bench looked at everything and felt the single judge's quick ban was not correct. The main fight in the case was about the insulting ads, which Godrej had already promised to stop. The bottle shape complaint came later and seemed added as an afterthought. The two bottles look clearly different overall — Harpic is blue with its name in big letters, while Spic is black with a different label and cap. The only common thing is the basic spout shape needed for the job (to clean under the rim), which is now common/generic after the old design expired. The court also doubted whether Reckitt could use trademark law to bring back protection for a shape whose design right had ended. The judges said there was no strong first-case proof of trademark copying or real confusion, so no temporary ban was needed. They cancelled the February 25 order, told Godrej to file its full reply soon, and asked the lower court to decide the next steps properly after hearing both sides fully. Godrej remains bound by its promise not to run those comparison ads anymore.

Case Details :Godrej Consumer Vs Reckitt Benckiser:27.02.2026, TEMPAPO-IPD/2/2026 in IP.COM/3/2026:CALHC, Hon’ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha and Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi

Disclaimer:It is not substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective human errors.  

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited Vs Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited

Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited, operating under the brand Forest Essentials, has been selling Ayurvedic products since 2000 with significant sales and registrations for the mark Forest Essentials across various classes, including baby care products under sub-marks like Forest Essentials Baby since 2006. 

In June 2023, they discovered Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited using the marks Baby Forest and Baby Forest-Soham of Ayurveda for similar baby Ayurvedic products, alleging deceptive similarity, customer confusion evidenced by social media queries and Google suggestions, and malicious copying including rebranding and store location choices. 

The respondents, formerly Landsmill Healthcare, registered Baby Forest in 2020 on a proposed use basis, started sales in 2022 with notable revenue, and argued no similarity, that Forest is a generic dictionary word with no monopoly, their focus is exclusively on baby products unlike the appellant's adult-targeted range, and trade dress plus logos differ. 

Forest Essentials filed a commercial suit CS(COMM) 523/2023 for trademark infringement and passing off, seeking interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. 

The single judge dismissed the applications on May 15, 2024, reasoning that the appellant failed to prove proprietorship over baby-specific sub-marks which were marketed under the main house mark, Forest is generic and not registered separately under Section 17(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1999, the composite mark Forest Essentials cannot be dissected for monopoly over Forest, no visual phonetic or structural similarity exists between the marks, trade dress packaging and tree logos are dissimilar, the respondents' concession to stop using Saundarya and Baby Essentials was a goodwill gesture not an admission, and evidence like isolated social media posts or Google predictions does not show widespread confusion. 

The appellant appealed this denial in FAO(OS)(COMM) 111/2024. The division bench, after considering arguments, upheld the single judge's findings, emphasizing that without secondary meaning the common word Forest cannot be monopolized, the marks are distinct when viewed as wholes under the anti-dissection rule, no prima facie case for infringement or passing off, balance of convenience favors the registered user respondents, and no irreparable harm, thus refusing interim relief. The court dismissed the appeal, allowing the respondents to continue using the challenged marks pending trial.

Mountain Valley Springs India Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Baby Forest Ayurveda Pvt.Ltd. 27.02.2026, FAO(OS)(COMM) 111/2024, 2026:DHC:1756-DB: DHC, Navin Chawla , Madhu Jain .

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Reckitt Benckiser Vs Godrej Consumer Products Limited

**Summary**  

Reckitt Benckiser, owner of the famous HARPIC toilet cleaner, sued Godrej Consumer Products for trademark infringement after Godrej launched its “Spic” toilet cleaner in a bottle that looks almost identical in shape and cap to the HARPIC bottle. Reckitt holds trademark registrations covering the distinctive bottle shape. At the urgent hearing before the Calcutta High Court, Reckitt pressed only the infringement claim. The court compared the two bottles side by side and found them strikingly similar, creating a clear risk of confusion among buyers. It held that trademark protection for the bottle shape remains valid even after the earlier design registration expired. Reckitt made out a strong prima facie case, the balance of convenience favoured protection of the registered mark, and deliberate copying left no room for Godrej. The court granted an ad-interim injunction stopping Godrej from selling “Spic” in the similar bottle shape till 23 March 2026 and rejected Godrej’s request to stay the order.

**Points of Law Settled in the Case**  

• Expiry of design registration for a product shape does not cancel trademark protection if the same shape is registered under the Trade Marks Act. (Paras 9 & 11)  

• Trademark registration for the shape of a bottle or cap is permissible and provides prima facie validity and protection against infringement. (Paras 8, 10 & 11, relying on Section 2(1)(m) read with 2(z)(b) of the Trade Marks Act)  

• When two product shapes are virtually identical and likely to confuse the average consumer, an ad-interim injunction must follow as a normal consequence regardless of balance of convenience arguments. (Paras 13 & 14, relying on Gorbadschow Wodka KG vs. John Distilleries 2011(4) M.H.L.J. 842)  

• Deliberate and slavish copying of a registered trademark shape disentitles the defendant from claiming balance of convenience or irreparable injury in its favour. (Para 14, relying on Allergan Inc. vs. Milment Oftho Industries AIR 1998 Cal 261)  

**Case Title:** RECKITT BENCKISER (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED VS GODREJ CONSUMER PRODUCTS LIMITED  

**Order Date:** 25 February 2026  

**Case Number:** IP-COM/3/2026 with IA NO. GA-COM/1/2026  

**Neutral Citation:** Not assigned  

**Name of Court:** High Court at Calcutta (Intellectual Property Rights Division), Original Side  

**Name of Judge:** Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Mangrol Oil Mill Vs Vikas Oil Industries

**Suitable Titles for the Article:**  

1. Gujarat High Court Dismisses Appeal in 'GULAB' vs 'ROSE' Edible Oil Trademark Battle: Delay and Lack of Distinctiveness Seal the Fate  

2. When Roses and Gulabs Collide: Gujarat High Court Explains Why Old Knowledge Defeats Fresh Injunction Claims in Trademark Cases  

3. Key Takeaways from Gujarat High Court on Interim Relief in Trademark Disputes: A Simple Guide to Prima Facie Case, Delay, and Good Judgment Writing  

**Suitable Tags:**  

Trademark Infringement, Passing Off Action, Interim Injunction, Delay and Acquiescence, Distinctiveness of Marks, Commercial Court Judgment, Gujarat High Court, Edible Oil Brands, Trade Mark Registry Proceedings, Judgment Writing Guidelines  

### Introduction  

In a clear and practical ruling, the Gujarat High Court has once again reminded businesses and lawyers that trademark protection is not automatic. Even a registered mark does not guarantee an immediate stop order against a rival if the owner has waited too long or failed to show that the mark truly stands out in the minds of ordinary buyers. The dispute between two edible oil makers—one using the word “GULAB” and the other “ROSE”—brought these basic principles back into focus. The court refused to grant any temporary ban on the rival’s mark, stressing honesty, prompt action, and real proof of consumer confusion.

### Factual Background  

The plaintiffs belong to the same family group and have been selling groundnut and other edible oils under the mark “GULAB” for many years. They hold registrations for the word and some label versions that include a rose-flower picture. They claim huge sales and heavy advertising have built strong goodwill around “GULAB”.  

The defendants sell similar oils under the mark “ROSE”, also with a flower device. The plaintiffs argued that “Gulab” and “Rose” mean the same thing in Hindi and English, so ordinary shoppers would mix up the two products and think they come from the same source. They said the defendants copied the idea deliberately to ride on their reputation.  

The defendants replied that they had been using “ROSE” openly since the early 1990s (at least since 2008 when they applied for registration). They pointed out that the plaintiffs knew about their mark for more than fourteen years because they had opposed the registration application back in 2008. Yet the plaintiffs stayed silent until 2022. The defendants also said “GULAB” is a common dictionary word for rose flower and cannot be monopolised.

### Procedural Background  

The plaintiffs filed a commercial suit in 2022 seeking permanent injunction, damages, and accounts for both trademark infringement and passing off. They immediately asked for a temporary injunction. The trial court first granted it in 2023, but the High Court sent the matter back for fresh hearing after considering all objections raised by the defendants.  

On fresh consideration in November 2024, the Commercial Court at Morbi rejected the temporary injunction application. It found no strong prima facie case, noted the long delay, and held that the balance of convenience did not favour the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then filed the present appeal before the Gujarat High Court, arguing that the trial court had ignored the similarity of the marks and wrongly relied only on delay.

### Reasoning and Decision of Court  

The High Court carefully examined the pleadings, the labels, and the evidence placed before the trial court. It applied well-settled tests: whether the marks are deceptively similar, whether ordinary buyers with imperfect memory are likely to be confused, and whether the plaintiffs had shown real goodwill attached to their specific device mark.  

The court found that the plaintiffs could not prove on a prima facie basis that “GULAB with rose flower” had become so distinctive that buyers immediately connect it only to their goods. The word “GULAB” itself is descriptive and laudatory. Long use alone does not turn a common word into an exclusive brand unless buyers stop thinking of it as “rose flower” and start thinking only of the plaintiffs’ oil. The plaintiffs had not shown such secondary meaning.  

On delay, the court noted that the plaintiffs had known about the defendants’ mark since at least 2008 when they filed an opposition at the Trade Marks Registry. Waiting fourteen years before rushing to court for an urgent injunction was fatal. Such long silence amounts to acquiescence and disentitles the plaintiffs from equitable relief like temporary injunction.  

The court also clarified an important practical point. Even though the defendants’ registration application is still pending before the Trade Marks Registry, the civil court cannot avoid deciding the temporary injunction question on the ground that “the issue is pending elsewhere”. The trial court must form its own prima facie view on similarity, likelihood of confusion, and the three ingredients for injunction—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Leaving everything to the Registry is not correct.  

After weighing everything, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the trial court’s order. The appeal was dismissed. The suit will now proceed to full trial without any interim restraint on the defendants. The court also gently advised Commercial Courts across the state to write clearer, more structured judgments that focus on issues rather than long unnecessary narration.

### Point of Law Settled in the Case  

This judgment settles three straightforward but vital points for everyday trademark practice.  

First, registration gives a right, but at the interim stage the owner must still show a strong prima facie case that the mark has acquired distinctiveness and that confusion is likely. A common word like “GULAB” (rose) needs extra proof that buyers see it only as the plaintiffs’ brand.  

Second, long delay and silence after knowing about a rival’s use will almost always defeat a claim for urgent temporary injunction. Acquiescence is a complete bar to equitable relief.  

Third, a civil court hearing an injunction application cannot pass the buck to the Trade Marks Registry on core questions of similarity and confusion. It must decide these issues on a prima facie basis, keeping in mind that it is not conducting a full trial.  

The ruling also serves as a gentle reminder to judges about the art of clear judgment writing—structure, brevity, and focus on real issues make justice more accessible.

**Case Detail**  

**Title:** M/S. MANGROL OIL MILL & ORS. Versus VIKAS OIL INDUSTRIES & ANR.  

**Date of Order:** 20 February 2026  

**Case Number:** R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 192 of 2025 with CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025  

**Neutral Citation:** Not assigned  

**Name of Court:** High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad  

**Name of Hon'ble Judges:** Hon’ble Chief Justice Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker  

**Disclaimer:** Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

**Written By:** Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Headnote of the Article**  

Gujarat High Court dismisses appeal against rejection of ad-interim injunction in “GULAB” vs “ROSE” edible oil trademark suit. Court holds that descriptive mark failed to show prima facie distinctiveness, long delay and acquiescence bar equitable relief, and civil courts must independently assess similarity at interim stage rather than deferring to Trade Marks Registry. Clear guidelines issued on structured judgment writing for Commercial Courts. Appeal dismissed; suit to proceed to trial.

====

**Summary**  

Plaintiffs from one family sell edible oils under the registered mark “GULAB” with a rose-flower device and claim long use and goodwill. Defendants sell similar oils under the mark “ROSE” with a flower device. Plaintiffs filed a commercial suit for trademark infringement and passing off and sought an interim injunction. The trial court rejected the injunction after finding that plaintiffs had known about defendants’ mark since 2008 when they opposed its registration, yet waited till 2022 to sue, amounting to delay and acquiescence. After the High Court remanded the matter for fresh hearing, the trial court again refused relief. On appeal, the Gujarat High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that “GULAB” is a common descriptive word, plaintiffs failed to show any strong prima facie case of distinctiveness or confusion, long silence disentitled them from equitable relief, and the Commercial Court must itself decide similarity and confusion on prima facie basis instead of deferring everything to the Trade Marks Registry.

**Points of Law Settled in the Case**  

• A registered but descriptive mark like “GULAB” (meaning rose) requires clear prima facie proof of acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning to claim interim injunction; mere registration is not enough. (Para 24 of the Judgment)  

• Inordinate delay and acquiescence after actual knowledge of rival use (here since 2008) completely bars grant of ad-interim injunction as it is discretionary equitable relief. (Paras 14, 28, 39 & 54 of the Judgment)  

• At interim injunction stage, the Commercial Court must independently examine deceptive similarity, likelihood of confusion and prima facie case; it cannot defer or leave these core issues to pending proceedings before the Trade Marks Registry. (Paras 18-21 & 37 of the Judgment)  

• Appellate Court interferes with trial court’s discretionary order refusing interim injunction only if it is arbitrary, capricious or perverse; it does not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view. (Para 53 of the Judgment, relying on Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.)  

**Case Title:** M/S. MANGROL OIL MILL & ORS. Versus VIKAS OIL INDUSTRIES & ANR.  

**Order Date:** 20 February 2026  

**Case Number:** R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 192 of 2025 with CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025  

**Neutral Citation:** Not assigned  

**Name of Court:** High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad  

**Name of Judges:** Hon’ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Landmark Crafts Limited Vs. Romil Gupta

Introduction

In a significant ruling that balances procedural fairness with practical realities of trademark registration, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has upheld the validity of a minor stylistic amendment to a device mark. The case involved a dispute over whether changing the placement of two small letters in a four-letter device mark amounted to a "substantial alteration" that would invalidate the registration. The Court not only affirmed the Single Judge’s decision to restore the trademark but also laid down clear guidance on how such amendments should be viewed under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. This judgment is particularly important for businesses and trademark practitioners because it shows that not every visual tweak to a mark requires restarting the entire registration process.

Factual Background

The respondent, Romil Gupta trading as Sohan Lal Gupta, applied for registration of a device mark consisting of the letters S, D, H and P in a specific stylized form for self-tapping metal screws and drilling screws. The application claimed use of the mark since February 2013. During examination, the office raised certain objections. In response, the respondent sought a small correction, asking to adjust the positioning of the letters “S” and “D” from a horizontal to a vertical arrangement while keeping the overall letters, font sizes and general appearance the same. The Registry allowed this correction and the mark was eventually registered.

Later, the appellant, Landmark Crafts Limited, challenged the registration on the ground that the change was substantial and that proper user documents had not been filed for the amended mark. The core dispute was whether this stylistic adjustment was a minor clerical correction or a major change that required fresh examination and fresh proof of use.

Procedural Background

After registration, the appellant filed a complaint before the Trade Marks Registry alleging irregularities in the amendment process. Acting on its own motion under Section 57(4) of the Act, the Deputy Registrar issued a notice and, after hearing the parties, cancelled the registration. The respondent appealed to the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, who set aside the cancellation order on two main grounds: first, that the Deputy Registrar had not followed the mandatory one-month notice period prescribed under the Rules, and second, that on merits the change was not a substantial alteration. Aggrieved by this, the appellant approached the Division Bench through a Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench heard detailed arguments from senior counsel on both sides and delivered its judgment on 25 February 2026.

Reasoning and Decision of Court

The Division Bench carefully examined both procedural and substantive aspects. On the procedural side, the Court held that the one-month notice requirement under Rule 100(1) is mandatory and cannot be waived even if the affected party does not immediately object. The Court emphasized that when the law prescribes a particular manner of doing something, it must be followed strictly. Since the Deputy Registrar had cancelled the registration without giving the full notice period, the order was liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

On the merits, the Bench agreed with the Single Judge that the change in the mark was not substantial. The Court observed that the four letters remained the same, the relative sizes stayed identical, and only the orientation of the two smaller letters was adjusted. Applying the ordinary meaning of “substantial” as something essential or of real importance, the judges found that this was a minor stylistic correction rather than a complete transformation of the mark. Because the alteration was not substantial, there was no need for the applicant to file a fresh user affidavit. The original claim of use continued to apply to the corrected mark.

The Court also noted that the rectification proceedings filed separately by the appellant remain unaffected, so the appellant’s rights to challenge the user claim or other aspects are fully preserved. In the end, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and restored the registration, while reiterating that its observations would not influence the pending rectification petition.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment settles two important principles in trademark law. First, the notice period for suo motu rectification by the Registrar is mandatory and its breach renders the order invalid, irrespective of whether prejudice is specifically pleaded. Second, a stylistic or positional change in a device mark that does not alter the essential identity or overall commercial impression of the mark does not amount to a “substantial alteration” under Rule 37. In such cases, no fresh statement of user is required, and the original user claim carries forward. The ruling provides much-needed clarity to applicants and examiners on what kinds of corrections are permissible without triggering a full re-examination, while still protecting the rights of genuine prior users through separate rectification proceedings.

Case Detail

Title: Landmark Crafts Limited Vs. Romil Gupta Trading as Sohan Lal Gupta & Anr.

Date of Order: 25 February 2026

Case Number: LPA 575/2025 (along with connected CM applications)

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1674-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

1. Delhi High Court Holds Minor Stylistic Change in Device Mark is Not Substantial Alteration
2. Landmark Ruling on Trademark Amendments: Clarity on “Substantial Alteration” under Rule 37
3. No Fresh User Affidavit Needed for Minor Correction in Trademark: Delhi HC
4. Procedural Fairness and Trademark Law: Delhi High Court Restores Registration after Cancellation on Technical Grounds

Suitable Tags

Trademark Amendment, Substantial Alteration, Rule 37 Trade Marks Rules, Section 57 Rectification, Delhi High Court Judgment, Device Mark, User Affidavit, Trade Marks Act 1999, Letters Patent Appeal, Trademark Registration Procedure

Headnote of the Article

In a well-reasoned judgment, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has clarified that a small positional change in the letters of a stylized device mark does not constitute “substantial alteration” under Rule 37 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. The Court also reiterated the mandatory nature of the one-month notice requirement in suo motu rectification proceedings. The ruling restores the trademark registration while preserving the appellant’s rights in parallel rectification proceedings, striking a practical balance between procedural safeguards and commercial realities.

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The respondent applied for registration of a stylized device mark for self-tapping screws claiming use since 2013. During examination, he sought a small correction in the positioning of two letters in the mark, which the Trade Marks Registry allowed and the mark was registered. The appellant challenged the registration alleging the change was substantial. Acting on its own motion, the Deputy Registrar cancelled the registration. The Single Judge set aside the cancellation order holding that mandatory notice period was not followed and that the change was not substantial. In Letters Patent Appeal, the Division Bench upheld the Single Judge’s decision, restored the registration and dismissed the appeal, while clarifying that the appellant’s separate rectification petition remains unaffected.

Points of Law Settled

• The one-month notice requirement prescribed under Rule 100(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 for suo motu rectification under Section 57(4) is mandatory; breach of this requirement renders the cancellation order invalid irrespective of prejudice or waiver. (Landmark Crafts Limited v. Romil Gupta Trading as Sohan Lal Gupta & Anr., LPA 575/2025, Paras 42-44)
• A minor stylistic or positional change in a device mark which does not alter its essential identity or overall commercial impression does not amount to “substantial alteration” under the proviso to Rule 37 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. (Landmark Crafts Limited v. Romil Gupta Trading as Sohan Lal Gupta & Anr., LPA 575/2025, Paras 50, 62)
• When an amendment to a trademark is not substantial, no fresh statement of user or affidavit is required; the original user claim continues to apply to the corrected mark. (Landmark Crafts Limited v. Romil Gupta Trading as Sohan Lal Gupta & Anr., LPA 575/2025, Paras 57-61)

Case Title: Landmark Crafts Limited v. Romil Gupta:25.02.2026:LPA 575/2025:2026:DHC:1674-DB:C. Hari Shankar & Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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