Tuesday, May 19, 2026

Best Agrolife Limited v. Deputy Controller of Patents


In Best Agrolife Limited v. Deputy Controller of Patents & Anr., the High Court of Delhi on 7 July 2022 in W.P.(C)-IPD 11/2022, delivered a judgment by Justice Jyoti Singh allowing the writ petition filed by Best Agrolife Limited. The Court set aside the order dated 08.04.2022 passed by the Deputy Controller of Patents granting Patent No. IN 394568 to GSP Crop Science Pvt. Ltd. for a synergistic suspo-emulsion formulation of Pyriproxyfen and Diafenthiuron, after dismissing the pre-grant opposition.

The Petitioner challenged the grant on grounds including lack of novelty, inventive step, and non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(e) of the Patents Act. The Court held that the impugned order was non-speaking and suffered from serious violation of principles of natural justice as the Deputy Controller failed to consider the Petitioner’s substantive objections, particularly under Section 3(d), relevant prior art documents, and allowed claim amendments without notice to the opponent. While noting the availability of post-grant remedies, the Court exercised writ jurisdiction due to manifest procedural irregularities. The matter was remanded to the Controller for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #PatentOpposition, #Section3dPatentsAct, #PreGrantOpposition, #AgrochemicalPatent, #NaturalJustice, #WritPetitionIPD, #JusticeJyotiSingh, #PatentRemand, #IPLitigation, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a notable judgment concerning patent opposition proceedings in the agrochemical sector, the Delhi High Court has underscored the importance of reasoned orders by the Patent Office and strict adherence to principles of natural justice while deciding pre-grant oppositions. The ruling highlights that even at the pre-grant stage, the Controller must address all substantial grounds raised by the opponent, particularly objections under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, which acts as a crucial filter against evergreening of patents.

Factual and Procedural Background

GSP Crop Science Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 2) filed patent application No. 284/MUM/2014 on 27 January 2014 for a synergistic suspo-emulsion formulation of Pyriproxyfen and Diafenthiuron. The application was published on 11 September 2015. After examination and amendments, Best Agrolife Limited (Petitioner) filed a pre-grant opposition on 4 March 2021 under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, raising multiple grounds including lack of novelty, inventive step, and non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(e). Several other parties also filed oppositions.

The Deputy Controller of Patents heard the matter and passed an order on 8 April 2022 granting the patent (IN 394568) while dismissing the oppositions. Aggrieved by this, Best Agrolife filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the order primarily on grounds of non-application of mind, violation of natural justice, and failure to consider key objections.

Dispute

The core dispute centred on whether the Controller’s order granting the patent was sustainable when it allegedly failed to address the Petitioner’s opposition under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, did not properly evaluate prior art documents, and allowed claim amendments without notice to the opponent. The Petitioner also questioned the maintainability of the writ petition, given the availability of post-grant remedies.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Jyoti Singh delivered the judgment on 7 July 2022. The Court first examined the maintainability of the writ petition. While acknowledging alternative remedies like post-grant opposition under Section 25(2) or revocation under Section 64, the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1, and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771. It held that writ jurisdiction can be invoked where there is violation of principles of natural justice or manifest error, and relegating the Petitioner to statutory remedies would cause injustice.

On merits, the Court found the impugned order suffered from serious infirmities. The Petitioner had specifically raised objections under Section 3(d), arguing that the claimed suspo-emulsion was a new form of a known combination that did not demonstrate enhanced efficacy. However, the Controller’s order did not even mention Section 3(d). The Judge referred to the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1, explaining that Section 3(d) sets a higher threshold to prevent evergreening by requiring enhanced efficacy for new forms of known substances. The Court clarified that Section 3(d) (enhanced efficacy) and Section 3(e) (synergistic effect in admixtures) operate in different fields and both needed independent consideration.

The order was described as non-speaking and unreasoned on vital grounds. The Court also noted failure to consider several prior art documents and allowing amendments to claims just two days before the order without giving the Petitioner an opportunity to respond, violating natural justice. Reliance was placed on Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940, and Gilead Pharmasset, LLC v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014, to stress the need for reasoned decisions.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the impugned order dated 8 April 2022 granting the patent, and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Controller for fresh consideration in accordance with law, after giving due opportunity to all parties.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces that pre-grant oppositions must be decided through speaking orders addressing all substantial grounds raised, particularly under Section 3(d). Non-consideration of key statutory objections or violation of natural justice (such as deciding amendments without notice) renders the order unsustainable, justifying interference under Article 226 despite alternative remedies. It reiterates the distinct roles of Sections 3(d) and 3(e) and the binding principles from Novartis on preventing evergreening in chemical/agrochemical patents.

Case Detail Title: Best Agrolife Limited Vs Deputy Controller of Patents & Anr. Date of Order: 7th July, 2022 Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 11/2022 & CM APPL. 32/2022, 54/2022, 55/2022 Neutral Citation: 2022:DHC:XXXX (as per available records) Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court allows writ petition by Best Agrolife Limited, quashes order granting patent IN 394568 to GSP Crop Science, holding that non-consideration of Section 3(d) objection, failure to address prior art, and allowing amendments without notice violated principles of natural justice. Matter remanded for fresh decision. Court clarifies distinct application of Sections 3(d) and 3(e) following Novartis principles.

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Reddy Pharmaceuticals v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.

In Reddy Pharmaceuticals v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., the High Court of Delhi on 18 May 2026 in RFA(OS) 138/2013 and connected W.P.(C) 654/2014, delivered a common judgment by the Division Bench comprising Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla. The Court upheld the learned Single Judge’s decree dated 13.09.2013, which had granted a permanent injunction restraining Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (RPL) from using the mark “REDDY” in relation to pharmaceutical products, finding it amounted to passing off.

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (DRL) claimed that its long and continuous use of the trading style “Dr. Reddy’s” had caused the expression “REDDY” to acquire distinctiveness and secondary meaning exclusively associated with DRL. RPL contended that “REDDY” was a common surname forming part of its bona fide corporate name and house mark, adopted honestly by its Managing Director. The Court held that DRL’s prior adoption and extensive use conferred superior common law rights, and RPL’s use was likely to cause confusion in the pharmaceutical trade. The IPAB’s order for rectification of the Register by removal of RPL’s “REDDY” registration was also sustained. The appeals and writ petition were accordingly dismissed.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #TrademarkPassingOff, #ReddyTrademark, #PharmaTrademarkDispute, #DrReddys, #TradeMarkRectification, #Section35TradeMarksAct, #IPLitigation, #JusticeCHariShankar, #JusticeOmPrakashShukla, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a significant ruling on trademark rights involving common surnames in the pharmaceutical sector, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has clarified the scope of protection available to a trading style that has acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning through long and continuous use. The judgment balances the rights of prior users with the limitations on adopting surnames in a manner that may cause confusion in the market, particularly in the sensitive field of medicines.

Factual and Procedural Background

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. (DRL), a well-known pharmaceutical company founded in 1984 by Dr. K. Anji Reddy, has been using the trading style “Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories” for decades. Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (RPL), incorporated in 1996 with a Managing Director bearing the surname Reddy, initially acted as a supplier and later as a del credere agent for DRL’s products. From around 2003, RPL began marketing finished pharmaceutical formulations using “REDDY” prominently as part of its corporate name and house mark.

DRL filed a suit (CS(OS) 2194/2003) seeking permanent injunction for passing off and related reliefs, claiming that RPL’s use of “REDDY” was likely to cause confusion and amounted to passing off. Parallelly, DRL initiated rectification proceedings before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) seeking removal of RPL’s “REDDY” trademark registration. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 13 September 2013, decreed the suit substantially in favour of DRL, granting a permanent injunction against RPL’s use of “REDDY” for pharmaceutical products and directing rendition of accounts. The IPAB also ordered rectification by removing RPL’s registration.

RPL challenged the Single Judge’s decree in RFA(OS) 138/2013 and the IPAB order in W.P.(C) 654/2014. Both matters were heard together.

Dispute

The central dispute was whether DRL could claim exclusive rights over the expression “REDDY” in the pharmaceutical trade through prior use and acquired distinctiveness, or whether RPL could legitimately use it as part of its corporate name derived from its Managing Director’s surname. Key issues included likelihood of confusion, bona fide adoption, passing off, acquiescence, and validity of RPL’s trademark registration.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla, with Justice Om Prakash Shukla authoring the judgment delivered on 18 May 2026, undertook a detailed examination of the pleadings, evidence, and legal principles. The Court noted that DRL had been using “Dr. Reddy’s” since 1984 and had built substantial goodwill. It held that the word “REDDY” had become the dominant and essential feature of DRL’s trading style and had acquired secondary meaning exclusively associated with DRL’s products.

The Bench rejected RPL’s defence of bona fide adoption of a common surname, observing that while surnames can be used, such use becomes objectionable when it is likely to cause confusion in the market, especially in pharmaceuticals where public interest demands higher scrutiny (referring to principles from Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73). The Court found evidence of mala fide intent, including RPL’s use of DRL’s address (Ameerpet, Hyderabad) on packaging and its prior relationship as DRL’s agent.

On acquiescence and delay, the Bench held that no real conflict existed while RPL was only supplying bulk drugs. The dispute arose when RPL entered formulations business in 2003, and DRL acted promptly. Thus, the defence of laches was not available. The Court affirmed that prior adoption and use confer superior common law rights over subsequent registration.

The Bench upheld the Single Judge’s findings on passing off and sustained the injunction. It also upheld the IPAB’s rectification order removing RPL’s “REDDY” registration, as the registration was obtained without sufficient cause and remained wrongly on the register.

Final Decision of the Court

On 18 May 2026, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal (RFA(OS) 138/2013) and the writ petition (W.P.(C) 654/2014), substantially upholding the learned Single Judge’s decree and the IPAB’s rectification order. The permanent injunction against RPL using “REDDY” in relation to pharmaceutical products was affirmed.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles that in the pharmaceutical sector, a trading style or mark containing a common surname can acquire distinctiveness and secondary meaning through long, continuous and extensive use, conferring superior common law rights that prevail over subsequent registration by another party. It reiterates that bona fide use of a personal name is not an absolute defence if the adoption creates likelihood of confusion or exploits another’s goodwill. Priority of adoption and use takes precedence, and actions for passing off can succeed even without registration where secondary meaning is established.

Case Detail Title: Reddy Pharmaceuticals vs Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr. Date of Order: 18 May 2026 Case Number: RFA(OS) 138/2013 & W.P.(C) 654/2014 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4402-DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journal: Delhi High Court Upholds Dr Reddy’s Rights Over REDDY Mark in Passing Off Dispute, Reddy Pharmaceuticals vs Dr Reddy’s Laboratories Division Bench Judgment on Surname Trademark, Justice Om Prakash Shukla Ruling on Secondary Meaning in Pharma Trademarks, Delhi High Court Affirms Injunction and Rectification in REDDY Trademark Battle

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court Division Bench dismisses appeal by Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and upholds decree in favour of Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, holding that “REDDY” acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning through DRL’s prior continuous use. RPL’s adoption held likely to cause confusion and passing off; permanent injunction and rectification of register sustained.

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K K Bansal & Anr. Vs. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV

In K K Bansal & Anr. Vs. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV, the High Court of Delhi on 18 May 2026 in RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & 18/2018 delivered a detailed judgment by a Division Bench comprising Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla, partly allowing the appeals filed by K.K. Bansal and Rajesh Bansal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 12 July 2018.

The dispute centered on Indian Patent IN 184753 held by Philips, claimed to be a Standard Essential Patent (SEP) for decoding technology used in DVD players. Philips alleged that the Bansals infringed the patent by manufacturing and selling DVD players without obtaining a licence. The Single Judge had held the patent to be an SEP, found infringement, and awarded royalty at FRAND rates along with punitive damages.

The Division Bench undertook an extensive analysis of SEP jurisprudence, essentiality, infringement (both direct and indirect tests), patent exhaustion under Section 107A(b), and FRAND obligations. While acknowledging the complexities involved in SEP litigation, the Court held that the Single Judge’s quantification of damages and royalty rates suffered from several infirmities, including insufficient evidence on FRAND compliance and mapping. The appeals were partly allowed and the damages awarded were set aside.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #SEPInfringement, #StandardEssentialPatent, #DVDPatent, #FRAND, #PatentExhaustion, #PhilipsvBansal, #IPLitigation, #RFAOSCOMM, #JusticeCHariShankar, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) occupy a unique position in patent law because they cover technologies that have become industry standards, ensuring compatibility across devices from different manufacturers. In a comprehensive judgment, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court examined critical issues relating to SEPs, including their essentiality, proof of infringement, the doctrine of patent exhaustion, and the requirement of offering licences on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The ruling provides important guidance on balancing the rights of patent holders with the need to prevent abuse of dominant market positions through patent pools.

Factual and Procedural Background

Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV (Philips) filed two commercial suits against K K Bansal (proprietor of Bhagirathi Electronics) and Rajesh Bansal (proprietor of Mangalam Technology). Philips alleged that the defendants were manufacturing and selling DVD video players that infringed its Indian Patent No. IN 184753 titled “Decoding device for converting a modulated signal to a series of m-bit information words.” This patent, granted on 13 February 1995, corresponded to US Patent 5696505 and European Patent EP 745254B1, which Philips claimed were recognised as SEPs for DVD technology.

Philips asserted that its patent was essential to the DVD standard set by the DVD Forum. It claimed willingness to license the patent on FRAND terms, but the defendants were unwilling licensees who continued to sell infringing DVD players without taking a licence. The suits sought injunctions and damages. During the pendency of the suits, the patent expired on 12 February 2015, rendering the injunction claims infructuous. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, by a common judgment dated 12 July 2018, held the patent to be an SEP, found infringement, and decreed the suits in favour of Philips, awarding royalty at specified FRAND rates along with punitive damages of Rs. 5 lakhs against Rajesh Bansal and directing an inquiry into the number of infringing players sold.

Aggrieved by the judgment, K K Bansal and Rajesh Bansal filed appeals before the Division Bench, which were reserved on 17 December 2025 and pronounced on 18 May 2026.

Dispute

The core dispute revolved around whether Philips’ patent was a valid SEP for DVD technology, whether the defendants’ DVD players infringed it, whether the doctrine of patent exhaustion applied because the defendants sourced components such as printed circuit boards (PCBs) containing the technology from authorised suppliers, and whether Philips had offered a FRAND licence. The defendants also challenged the quantification of damages and the award of punitive damages.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla, with Justice Hari Shankar authoring the judgment, provided an extensive prefatory note on SEPs, drawing heavily from the Division Bench decision in Intex Technologies (India) Ltd v. Telefonaktiebolaget L.M. Ericsson (2015 SCC OnLine Del 1845 (DB)). The Court explained that SEPs require proof of a standard set by a recognised Standard Setting Organisation (SSO), essentiality of the patent to that standard through proper mapping, and a commitment by the patentee to license on FRAND terms.

The Bench analysed the nature of the invention in IN 184753, which relates to a decoding device converting 16-bit code words to 8-bit information words using a “look ahead” mechanism involving specific bit positions. It examined whether this technology was essential to the DVD standard and whether the defendants’ products infringed it, considering both direct and indirect tests of infringement as approved in the Intex case.

On the defence of patent exhaustion under Section 107A(b) of the Patents Act, 1970, the Court considered the defendants’ plea that they purchased chips/PCBs from authorised sources like MediaTek. The judgment discussed international exhaustion principles and their application to components incorporated in finished products.

Regarding FRAND, the Bench stressed that the patentee must demonstrate it is a willing licensor by making a specific, written FRAND offer and providing sufficient information for the prospective licensee to evaluate it. The Court referred to the CJEU decision in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. (Case No. C-170/13) for the step-by-step protocol involving notice, offer, counter-offer, and security. The Bench found that the rates offered and the evidence led by Philips did not sufficiently establish that the terms were FRAND. It also held that royalty could not be calculated on the entire value of the DVD player but only on the smallest salable patent-practising unit.

The judgment cited several authorities including Microsoft Corporation v. Motorola Inc. (US Court of Appeals) on the value of standards and anti-competitive risks, and discussed claim-to-standard and claim-to-product mapping requirements under the Delhi High Court Patent Rules.

Final Decision of the Court

On 18 May 2026, the Division Bench allowed the appeals in substantial measure. While upholding certain findings on the technical aspects, the Court set aside the Single Judge’s quantification of royalty and the award of punitive damages, finding the evidence on FRAND compliance and damages insufficient. The Bench remanded aspects relating to actual damages for fresh consideration where necessary, while clarifying important legal positions on SEP litigation.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces that in SEP cases, the patentee bears a heavy burden to prove essentiality through proper mapping, infringement (directly or indirectly), and willingness to license on genuinely FRAND terms with adequate disclosure. It clarifies the application of patent exhaustion to imported components and emphasises that royalty should be based on the patent-practising unit rather than the entire end product. The ruling underscores the need for fair inquiry and evidence before awarding punitive damages or high royalty rates in SEP disputes.

Case Detail Title: K K Bansal & Anr. vs Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV Date of Order: 18 May 2026 Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018 Neutral Citation: 2026: DHC: 4317-DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journal: Delhi High Court Division Bench Ruling on Philips SEP DVD Patent Infringement and FRAND Obligations, K K Bansal vs Koninklijke Philips Judgment on Standard Essential Patents Exhaustion, Justice C Hari Shankar SEP Royalty Calculation on Smallest Salable Unit, Delhi High Court Clarifies Patent Exhaustion and FRAND in DVD Player SEP Case

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court Division Bench in appeals by K K Bansal and Rajesh Bansal partially allows challenges to Single Judge decree in Philips SEP suits concerning IN 184753, clarifies essentiality, infringement mapping, patent exhaustion for components, and strict requirements for proving FRAND offers while setting aside royalty and punitive damages quantification for want of sufficient evidence.

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Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena Vs. Chhattisgarh State Information Commission

In Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena v. Chhattisgarh State Information Commission & Ors, the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur on 13 May 2026 in WPC No. 3944 of 2021 allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 29.05.2021 passed by the Chhattisgarh State Information Commission imposing a penalty of Rs.25,000/- in each of four complaints along with recommendation for disciplinary action against the petitioner, who was then Secretary and Public Information Officer of Gram Panchayat Dongarigardh.

The dispute arose when Respondent No.3 filed four RTI applications seeking information on forest rights leases and related documents. Complaints were filed directly before the State Information Commission under Section 18(1)(c) of the RTI Act, 2005 without preferring a first appeal under Section 19. The Commission imposed the maximum penalty for alleged delay in furnishing information.

Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad held that the complaints under Section 18 were not maintainable as the statutory appellate remedy under Section 19 was not exhausted. The Court further observed that there was no conclusive proof of receipt of the RTI applications by the petitioner, no proper inquiry was conducted, and reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded, especially as the petitioner could not join the video conferencing hearing due to technical failure. The imposition of penalty without establishing mala fide or absence of reasonable cause was unsustainable.

The writ petition was allowed and the impugned order was quashed with a direction to refund any amount deposited by the petitioner.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#ChhattisgarhHighCourt, #RTIAct2005, #PIOPenalty, #Section18RTI, #Section20RTI, #NaturalJustice, #RTILitigation, #InformationCommission, #WritPetition, #JusticeAmitendraKishorePrasad, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

The Right to Information Act, 2005 aims to promote transparency while balancing the duties of public servants. In a significant ruling, the High Court of Chhattisgarh has clarified important safeguards available to Public Information Officers (PIOs) when facing penalties for alleged delays or non-supply of information. The Court emphasized the need to follow proper procedures, including giving fair opportunity of hearing and exhausting statutory remedies before imposing penalties.

Factual and Procedural Background

Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena, the petitioner, was serving as Secretary of Gram Panchayat Dongarigardh in District Mungeli, Chhattisgarh and was also the Public Information Officer for that office. Respondent No.3, Shri Nitin Singhvi, filed four separate RTI applications on 21 August 2018 seeking details related to forest rights leases, constitution of Forest Rights Committee, objections sent to higher committees, and related official letters under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.

The petitioner claimed that he never received these four RTI applications and there was no record of them in the panchayat office. After about six months, on 22 February 2019, Respondent No.3 filed four separate complaints directly before the Chhattisgarh State Information Commission under Section 18(1)(c) of the RTI Act without approaching the First Appellate Authority. The Commission entertained the complaints and, after issuing notice, passed an order on 29 May 2021 imposing a penalty of Rs.25,000 on the petitioner in each of the four complaints (total Rs.1,00,000) and recommended disciplinary action against him for delay in furnishing information.

Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court of Chhattisgarh.

Dispute

The main dispute was whether the State Information Commission was justified in imposing the maximum penalty on the PIO without proper proof that the RTI applications were received by him, without following the first appeal route, and without granting a meaningful opportunity of hearing. The petitioner argued that he appeared for the video conferencing hearing but could not connect due to internet failure at the NIC centre, yet the Commission passed an ex-parte order. He also contended that filing four separate applications on the same subject amounted to harassment.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad carefully examined the provisions of the RTI Act, particularly Sections 18, 19, and 20. The Court referred to the Bombay High Court judgment in Goa Cricket Association vs. State of Goa (Writ Petition No.739 of 2010, decided on 22 March 2013, 2013 (4) MhLJ 453). In that case, the Bombay High Court held that Section 18 of the RTI Act is meant for specific complaints and does not normally allow bypassing the first appeal under Section 19 when the grievance relates to non-supply or delay in information.

The Judge also relied on Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai vs. Rui Ferreira and Ors (W.P. Nos.132 and 307 of 2011, decided on 28 July 2011, 2011 (5) MhLJ 765), where it was observed that parties cannot bypass the statutory appeal mechanism under Section 19 and directly approach the Commission under Section 18 for grievances arising from non-furnishing of information.

On the question of penalty under Section 20(1), the Court discussed the Delhi High Court ruling in Shamik Nag vs. The Public Information Officer, Oriental Bank of Commerce (WPC No.8913 of 2016, decided on 4 August 2017). This judgment clarified that penalty can be imposed only after a proper inquiry and after giving the PIO a reasonable opportunity of being heard, as mandated by the proviso to Section 20(1). The burden to prove reasonable and diligent action lies on the PIO, but this burden can only be discharged if a genuine hearing is provided.

In the present case, the Judge found that the petitioner had raised a credible defence that the RTI applications were never received. There was no conclusive evidence of delivery or acknowledgment. The Commission did not conduct a proper inquiry into this aspect. Additionally, the technical failure during the video conferencing hearing was not adequately considered, and no further opportunity was given, violating principles of natural justice. The Court also noted that the information was eventually supplied after the notice from the Commission.

Final Decision of the Court

On 13 May 2026, the High Court of Chhattisgarh allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned order dated 29 May 2021 passed by the State Information Commission in all four complaint cases. The Court directed refund of any amount deposited by the petitioner within eight weeks.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles that complaints under Section 18(1)(c) of the RTI Act should not ordinarily be entertained when the grievance is of delay or non-supply of information, without first exhausting the appeal remedy under Section 19. It further reinforces that imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) requires clear evidence of receipt of application, deliberate default or mala fide action, and a meaningful opportunity of hearing to the PIO. Technical difficulties in virtual hearings must be considered fairly before passing ex-parte penal orders.

Case Detail Title: Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena vs Chhattisgarh State Information Commission & Ors. Date of Order: 13 May 2026 Case Number: WPC No. 3944 of 2021 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of Court: High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Chhattisgarh High Court allows writ petition and quashes penalty of Rs.25,000 imposed in each of four complaints on PIO holding that direct complaint under Section 18 bypassing first appeal under Section 19 was not proper, no conclusive proof of receipt of RTI applications existed, and reasonable opportunity of hearing was not granted especially due to technical failure in video conferencing. Penalty order set aside with direction for refund.

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Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited v. Anila Kedia

In Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited v. Anila Kedia, the Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division of the High Court at Calcutta on 15 May 2026 in FMAT-IPD/2/2026 dismissed the appeal filed by Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited against the order of the Commercial Court at Rajarhat dated 23 December 2025 refusing interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

The appellant, holder of registered word and label mark ‘ONN’ for hosiery products, alleged infringement and passing off by the respondent’s use of ‘ON & ON’. The respondent contended that the appellant was estopped from claiming similarity, as in its 2011 reply to the Trademark Registry’s objection, the appellant had described ‘ONN’ as a coined, meaningless expression visually, structurally, and conceptually different from similar marks like ‘ON-N-ON’.

The Division Bench comprising Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi held that the appellant failed to make out a prima facie case for injunction. On the parity of its own stand before the Registrar, ‘ONN’ could not be treated as deceptively similar to ‘ON & ON’ at the interim stage. The Court declined to interfere with the impugned order refusing injunction.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Introduction

In a notable decision on trademark disputes involving prior statements made before the Registrar, the Calcutta High Court has highlighted the principle of estoppel in interim injunction matters. The Court refused to restrain the use of a similar mark when the plaintiff had previously taken a contradictory stand before the Trademark Registry that its own mark was distinct from cited marks.

Factual and Procedural Background

Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited, a manufacturer and seller of hosiery products, holds registrations for the word and label mark "ONN". The company filed a commercial suit seeking injunction against Anila Kedia for using the mark "ON & ON" on similar goods, alleging infringement and passing off. The plaintiff claimed exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 due to its registration.

The Commercial Court at Rajarhat, by order dated 23 December 2025, dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Aggrieved by this, Biswanath Hosiery Mills filed an appeal before the Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division of the Calcutta High Court.

Dispute

The central dispute was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using "ON & ON". The plaintiff argued that its registered mark "ONN" gave it exclusive rights and the defendant’s mark was deceptively similar. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts and was estopped from claiming similarity because, in 2011, while responding to objections from the Trademark Registrar, the plaintiff had described "ONN" as a coined, meaningless expression visually and structurally different from marks like "ON-N-ON".

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench comprising Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi examined the matter on 15 May 2026. Justice Basak, writing for the Bench, noted that for granting an interim injunction, the Court must assess prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The Court found that when the plaintiff applied for registration of "ONN" in 2011, the Registrar raised objections under Section 11 citing similar marks including "ON-N-ON". In reply dated 30 September 2011, the plaintiff’s advocates asserted that "ONN" is a coined and meaningless expression, visually, structurally, and conceptually different from the cited marks. They provided a comparative table and relied on case law to argue dissimilarity.

The Bench observed that the defendant is using "ON & ON". Applying the same logic the plaintiff had used before the Registrar, there appeared to be no similarity sufficient for granting injunction at the prima facie stage. The Court held that the plaintiff’s earlier stand created estoppel, preventing it from now claiming deceptive similarity.

The judges emphasized that while considering an interim injunction application, the Court looks at the overall equities. Given the plaintiff’s previous representation that its mark is distinct, it could not demonstrate a strong prima facie case of infringement or passing off at this stage.

Final Decision of the Court

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal (FMAT-IPD/2/2026) along with connected applications on 15 May 2026. The order of the Commercial Court refusing interim injunction was upheld. No order as to costs was passed.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces that a party seeking injunction in a trademark matter cannot take contradictory stands at different forums. Statements made before the Trademark Registry regarding distinctiveness of one’s mark can operate as estoppel in subsequent civil proceedings when claiming similarity against another mark. It also reiterates the standard principles for granting interim injunctions – prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm – must be satisfied convincingly, especially when prior conduct of the plaintiff weakens its case.

Case Details Title: Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited vs Anila Kedia Date of Order: 15 May 2026 Case Number: FMAT-IPD/2/2026 Neutral Citation: 2026:CHC-AS:749-DB (as per document) Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division) Name of Hon’ble Judges: Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Calcutta High Court dismisses appeal against refusal of interim injunction in trademark suit holding that plaintiff’s earlier stand before Registrar describing its mark ‘ONN’ as coined and dissimilar creates estoppel against claiming similarity with defendant’s mark ‘ON & ON’. No prima facie case made out for injunction.

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Ravinder Singh Vs. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd

In Ravinder Singh Vs. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd & Ors, the Delhi High Court on 15 May 2026 in CS(COMM) 383/2025 dismissed the application filed by Defendants under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff, trading as M/s. Royal International from Amritsar, Punjab, filed the suit seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violation against the use of deceptively similar marks “Royal”/“Regoshin” and labels in respect of dietary supplements and pharmaceutical products. Defendants contended that the Plaintiff carried on business in Amritsar, no cause of action arose in Delhi, and they had no drug licence to sell in Delhi.

Justice Jyoti Singh held that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Court must proceed on a mere demurrer accepting all averments in the plaint as true. The Court found that the plaint contained sufficient pleadings regarding the registered office of Defendant No.1 in Delhi and the accessibility of Defendants’ website (with ‘Contact Us’ page) and third-party listings on IndiaMart and Justdial in Delhi, which prima facie showed part cause of action arising in Delhi under Section 20 CPC. The Judge observed that issues regarding the interactivity of websites and actual sales being mixed questions of fact and law, they could be adjudicated as a preliminary issue after evidence. The application was dismissed while granting liberty to Defendants to raise the jurisdiction issue at a later stage.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Introduction

In a clear and practical ruling on territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes, the Delhi High Court has reiterated that courts must examine the plaintiff’s pleadings at face value when defendants challenge jurisdiction at an early stage. The judgment highlights how a company’s registered office in Delhi and an accessible “Contact Us” webpage can establish sufficient connection for a Delhi court to hear a trademark and passing off case, even if the plaintiff operates from another state.

Factual and Procedural Background

Ravinder Singh, trading as Royal International from Amritsar, Punjab, filed a suit in the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction against Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd and others. He alleged that the defendants were infringing his “Royal” trademarks and trade dress by selling similar marks on dietary supplements and pharmaceutical products.

Defendants No. 1 and 3 moved an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting the plaint be returned for lack of territorial jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiff neither resides nor carries on business in Delhi, has no drug licence for sales in Delhi, and their websites are merely passive. The matter was heard by Justice Jyoti Singh.

Dispute

The main dispute was whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defendants claimed no cause of action arose in Delhi because the plaintiff’s business is in Punjab and they themselves do not sell products in Delhi due to absence of necessary licences. The plaintiff countered that the defendants’ registered office is in Delhi, their website has a functional “Contact Us” page accessible in Delhi, and their products are listed on popular platforms like IndiaMart and Justdial, which are accessible across India including Delhi.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Jyoti Singh explained that when deciding an application for return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the court must follow the principle of “demurrer”. This means the court accepts all averments in the plaint as true and does not look into the defendant’s defence at this preliminary stage. The judge referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 688, which laid down that jurisdiction objections at this stage must be tested only on the basis of facts pleaded in the plaint.

The Court noted that while Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act gives an additional forum where the plaintiff resides or works, ordinary rules under Section 20 of the CPC also apply. Here, the plaintiff had specifically pleaded that Defendant No.1 has its registered office in Delhi, maintains a website with a “Contact Us” page showing Delhi address and contact details, and lists products on third-party websites accessible in Delhi. These averments, taken as true, were held sufficient to establish that part of the cause of action arose in Delhi.

Justice Singh discussed several important judgments. She relied on World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. v. M/s Reshma Collection and Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd (2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727) to explain the difference between passive and interactive websites. She also referred to Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v. Artura Pharmaceuticals and Cadila Healthcare Ltd v. Uniza Healthcare LLP, where similar “Contact Us” pages and online listings were considered enough for jurisdiction at the prima facie stage. The judge clarified that questions like whether actual sales occurred or whether the website is truly passive require full evidence at trial and cannot be decided while considering return of plaint.

The Court rejected the argument that absence of a drug licence in Delhi automatically removes jurisdiction, noting this is a defence to be examined later.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. The suit will proceed in Delhi. However, the defendants were given liberty to raise the territorial jurisdiction issue again at later stages, including during the hearing of the interim injunction application. Pleadings were directed to be completed and the matter listed for further proceedings.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment reinforces that in trademark and passing off suits involving online presence, a defendant’s registered office in the city combined with an accessible website having a “Contact Us” feature and product listings on third-party platforms can validly confer territorial jurisdiction on the court. Such jurisdictional challenges at the initial stage are decided only on the plaintiff’s pleadings, and disputed factual issues regarding actual sales or website interactivity are left for trial. This provides clarity and practical guidance for businesses involved in e-commerce and IP disputes.

Case Details Title: Ravinder Singh v. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd & Ors. Date of Order: 15 May 2026 Case Number: CS(COMM) 383/2025 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon’ble Judge: Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court holds that in trademark infringement and passing off suits, pleadings regarding defendant’s Delhi registered office and accessible website with “Contact Us” feature are sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction at the prima facie stage under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. Application for return of plaint dismissed with liberty to raise issue at trial.

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Panchhi Petha Store Vs Union of India

In Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India & Ors, the Delhi High Court on 11 November 2024 in W.P.(C) 773/2019 set aside the order dated 27.08.2018 passed by Respondent No.2 (Regional Director) rejecting the petitioner’s application for rectification of the company name of Respondent No.4, M/s. Pancchi Petha Private Limited.

The dispute arose from a family-run sweets business where the petitioner, claiming prior use and registration of the trademark “PANCHHI”, sought removal/rectification of the respondent company’s name under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013, alleging it was identical and deceptively similar. The Regional Director had rejected the application while making observations on trademark ownership, holding that the petitioner was not the owner of the mark.

Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju observed that the Regional Director exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Companies Act by adjudicating upon trademark ownership, which is a matter for the Intellectual Property Division or appropriate trademark forums. The Court clarified that the RD’s role is limited to examining whether a company name is identical or too nearly resembles an existing company name or registered trademark, without delving into contested trademark ownership disputes.

The petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and parties were granted liberty to approach the Regional Director afresh in accordance with law, with all rights and contentions kept open.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #CompaniesAct2013, #TrademarkDispute, #CompanyNameRectification, #Section16CompaniesAct, #PanchhiPetha, #IPLitigation, #RegionalDirectorMCA, #TrademarkRectification, #JusticeTaraVitastaGanju, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a significant ruling concerning the interplay between company name registration and trademark rights, the Delhi High Court has clarified the scope of authority of the Regional Director under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013. The judgment underscores that while the Regional Director can direct changes in company names that are identical or deceptively similar to existing trademarks, the authority cannot adjudicate upon complex questions of trademark ownership or infringement, which fall within the domain of specialized intellectual property proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

Panchhi Petha Store, a well-known entity dealing in traditional sweets, filed a petition challenging an order dated 27 August 2018 passed by the Regional Director (Northern Region). The petitioner had approached the Regional Director seeking rectification and removal of the name of a company called “Panchhi Petha Private Limited” from the Register of Companies. The petitioner claimed prior rights and ownership over the trademark “PANCHHI”, which had been registered and used for a long time in relation to its business.

The Regional Director rejected the application, observing that the petitioner was not the owner of the trademark, as the registrations stood in the name of one Subhash Chander. The order also noted the existence of ongoing disputes between the parties before trademark authorities and courts. Aggrieved by this decision and particularly the finding on trademark ownership, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Dispute

The core dispute revolved around whether the Regional Director, while exercising powers under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013, could examine and give a conclusive finding on the ownership of a trademark. The petitioner argued that the Regional Director overstepped its jurisdiction by delving into trademark ownership issues instead of limiting itself to examining similarity of names for the purpose of preventing public confusion. The respondents defended the order, contending that the Regional Director had correctly exercised jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(b).

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju carefully examined the scope of Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013. The provision empowers the Central Government (through the Regional Director) to direct a company to change its name if it is identical with or too nearly resembles the name of an existing company or a registered trademark.

The Court referred to the judgment of a Coordinate Bench in CGMP Pharmaplan (P) Ltd. v. Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (2010 SCC OnLine Del 2387), which in turn relied upon the Division Bench decision in Montari Overseas Ltd. v. Montari Industries Ltd. (1995 SCC OnLine Del 864). These judgments clarify that the Regional Director’s inquiry is limited to determining whether the name “too nearly resembles” another name or trademark so as to cause confusion in the minds of the public. The powers are not as wide as those exercised by a civil court in a passing-off action or by the Intellectual Property Division in trademark disputes.

Justice Ganju observed that the Regional Director had gone beyond this limited mandate by recording a finding that the petitioner was not the owner of the trademark “PANCHHI”. Such a determination on ownership involves intricate questions of prior use, registration, and validity of trademarks, which require detailed evidence and are best left to specialized forums like the Trade Marks Registry or the High Court in IP matters.

The Court emphasized that both parties belong to the same extended family and are locked in multiple litigations concerning the brand. In such family business disputes involving intellectual property, the Regional Director cannot act as an arbiter of trademark rights. The object of Section 16 is to prevent public confusion regarding the identity of companies, not to resolve substantive trademark ownership disputes.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court set aside the impugned order dated 27 August 2018. However, liberty was granted to both parties to approach the Regional Director afresh, if necessary, in accordance with law. All rights and contentions of the parties were left open. The petition was disposed of accordingly.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles that the jurisdiction of the Regional Director under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013 is confined to examining similarity or identity of names for preventing confusion in the market. The authority cannot adjudicate upon questions of trademark ownership, validity, or infringement, which are beyond the scope of the provision. This maintains a clear demarcation between company law proceedings for name rectification and specialized intellectual property litigation.

Case Details Title: Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India & Ors. Date of Order: 11 November 2024 Case Number: W.P.(C) 773/2019 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon’ble Judge: Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journals:

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Headnote: Delhi High Court holds that Regional Director under Section 16 of Companies Act cannot decide trademark ownership while directing change of company name; such disputes must be resolved in appropriate IP forums. Impugned order set aside with liberty to parties to approach afresh.

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Firoz A Nadiadwala Vs Seven Arts International Limited

In Firoz A Nadiadwala vs Seven Arts International Limited decided on 24 April 2026, in Application No.1827 of 2026 in C.S. (Comm Div) No.267 of 2025, bearing Neutral Citation 2026:MHC:1658, the High Court of Judicature at Madras through Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy dismissed an application seeking rejection of a copyright infringement plaint relating to remake and derivative rights connected with the Malayalam films “Ramji Rao Speaking” and “Mannar Mathai Speaking.” The dispute arose after Seven Arts International Limited alleged infringement of remake and sequel rights concerning the “Hera Pheri” film franchise. The defendant argued that the suit was barred by limitation, that the assignment agreement dated 12.05.2022 did not validly confer rights upon the plaintiff company, and that the death of one of the principals revoked the power of attorney under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Court held that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is only required to examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on merits. The Court observed that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law and that the plaintiff’s allegation of continuing infringement through the proposed production of “Hera Pheri 3” could not be rejected at the threshold. The Court further held that questions regarding validity of assignment under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, interpretation of the power of attorney, and effect of death of one of the principals required detailed adjudication during trial and could not justify rejection of the plaint at the preliminary stage. Consequently, the application for rejection of plaint was dismissed and the copyright suit was permitted to proceed further.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Madras High Court Refuses to Reject Copyright Suit in Hera Pheri Remake Rights Dispute

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Firoz A Nadiadwala vs Seven Arts International Limited is an important decision concerning copyright assignment, remake rights in cinematographic films, and the scope of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The dispute arose in relation to remake and derivative rights connected with the Malayalam cult films “Ramji Rao Speaking” and “Mannar Mathai Speaking,” which later inspired the highly successful Hindi film franchise “Hera Pheri.”

The judgment delivered on 24 April 2026 by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy clarifies that at the stage of considering an application for rejection of plaint, the Court is only required to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed in proving its claims. The Court also examined issues relating to limitation, assignment of copyright under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957, powers of attorney coupled with interest under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the legal effect of death of one of several principals in an agency arrangement.

The ruling is significant for the entertainment and film industry because disputes over remake rights, sequel rights, adaptations, and derivative works have become increasingly common with the commercial expansion of film franchises and OTT exploitation. The decision also demonstrates judicial caution against dismissing intellectual property disputes at the threshold stage without full trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute relates to the Malayalam films “Ramji Rao Speaking” and “Mannar Mathai Speaking,” which acquired substantial popularity and later inspired the Hindi remake “Hera Pheri” released in 2000 and its sequel “Phir Hera Pheri” released in 2006.

The plaintiff, Seven Arts International Limited, claimed that by virtue of an Assignment Agreement dated 12 May 2022, it acquired remake rights and derivative rights including rights to create sequels, prequels, spin-offs, and adaptations in Hindi and other North Indian languages in relation to the original Malayalam films.

The assignment agreement was allegedly executed between original screenplay authors K.I. Siddique and M. Paul Michael, together with producer Mani C. Kappan, and G.P. Vijayakumar, Managing Director of Seven Arts International Limited.

Subsequently, disputes arose concerning the proposed production of “Hera Pheri 3.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, film producer Firoz A. Nadiadwala, was infringing the plaintiff’s copyright and derivative rights in relation to the film franchise.

A commercial suit was therefore instituted before the Madras High Court seeking remedies for copyright infringement. In response, the defendant filed Application No.1827 of 2026 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that it disclosed no cause of action and was barred by law.

The application was heard by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal dispute before the Court was whether the plaint deserved to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The defendant argued that the plaint failed to disclose a valid cause of action because the assignment agreement did not actually confer enforceable rights upon Seven Arts International Limited. It was contended that the assignment agreement identified G.P. Vijayakumar personally as the assignee and not the company itself. Therefore, according to the defendant, the plaintiff company lacked locus standi to sue.

The defendant further argued that the suit was barred by limitation because the alleged remake films “Hera Pheri” and “Phir Hera Pheri” had already been released years earlier in 2000 and 2006 respectively. It was submitted that the present proceedings had been instituted after an inordinate delay.

The defendant also challenged the validity of the assignment agreement under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957. It was argued that the agreement imposed conditions and obligations upon the assignors and therefore did not constitute a valid statutory assignment.

An additional issue arose because one of the original assignors, K.I. Siddique, had passed away on 8 August 2023. The defendant contended that the power of attorney executed in favour of G.P. Vijayakumar stood automatically revoked under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 upon the death of one of the principals.

The plaintiff, however, argued that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC required the Court to assume the averments in the plaint to be true. It was submitted that the issue of limitation involved mixed questions of fact and law and could not be conclusively decided at the threshold stage. The plaintiff further argued that the production of “Hera Pheri 3” constituted a continuing cause of action.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy undertook a detailed analysis of the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and repeatedly emphasized that the Court must only determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff is likely to ultimately succeed in the suit.

The Court observed that paragraph 17 of the plaint specifically referred to the execution of the assignment agreement dated 12 May 2022 and also referred to a cease-and-desist notice issued on 27 December 2024 in relation to the announcement of “Hera Pheri 3.” Since the plaint asserted that the cause of action was continuing and recurring, the Court held that limitation could not be conclusively determined at the preliminary stage.

The Court thus accepted the plaintiff’s argument that limitation in the present case was a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence and adjudication during trial.

The Court next considered the argument that Seven Arts International Limited was not a party to the assignment agreement. The defendant relied upon the principle that a company is a separate juristic entity distinct from its directors and officers.

However, the Court carefully examined the plaint and noted that the assignment agreement described G.P. Vijayakumar as Managing Director of Seven Arts International Limited. The plaint specifically asserted that the plaintiff company had acquired remake and derivative rights under the assignment agreement.

Justice Ramamoorthy held that for purposes of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, such assertions must be presumed to be correct. Whether the plaintiff would ultimately succeed in proving the assignment was a matter for trial and not a ground for rejection of plaint.

The Court then examined the defendant’s argument that the assignment agreement was invalid under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Section 19 of the Copyright Act prescribes the mode and requirements for valid assignment of copyright. The defendant argued that Clauses 5 and 6 of the agreement imposed contingent obligations and therefore the agreement did not qualify as a statutory assignment.

Clause 5 allegedly required the assignors to initiate legal proceedings against third parties, while Clause 6 provided that only token consideration had been paid and the remaining consideration was contingent upon fulfilment of certain obligations.

The Court refused to enter into a conclusive determination regarding validity of the assignment at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Justice Ramamoorthy held that such issues involve examination of contractual rights and obligations and require full adjudication either during final disposal of the suit or in appropriate proceedings where evidence can be considered.

The Court observed that Section 55 of the Copyright Act permits the owner or assignee of copyright to seek remedies for infringement. Since the plaint asserted that the plaintiff was the assignee, the Court held that the plaint disclosed a sufficient cause of action.

The judgment also contains an important discussion on powers of attorney and agency law under Sections 201 and 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

The defendant argued that because one of the principals, K.I. Siddique, had died, the power of attorney automatically stood revoked under Section 201 of the Contract Act.

The Court, however, referred to Section 202 of the Contract Act which deals with “agency coupled with interest.” Section 202 provides that where the agent has an interest in the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot ordinarily be terminated to the prejudice of such interest even by death of the principal.

The Court reproduced Illustration (a) to Section 202, which explains that where an agent has authority to sell property and recover debts from sale proceeds, such authority is not terminated by death of the principal.

Justice Ramamoorthy held that the assignment agreement and power of attorney required joint examination to determine whether the agency was coupled with interest. Such determination could not properly be made at the preliminary stage.

The Court also discussed the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in K.A. Meeran Mohideen vs Sheik Amjad reported in 2024 (5) CTC 613. In that case, the Division Bench held that death of one of several principals does not necessarily terminate a contract of agency.

The Court relied upon this precedent to reject the defendant’s argument that the death of one assignor automatically extinguished all rights flowing from the arrangement.

The defendant relied upon several authorities including T. Arivandandam vs T.V. Satyapal reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs Jagannath reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 to argue that frivolous litigation should be rejected at the threshold.

However, the Court distinguished those authorities and observed that the present case involved substantive disputes regarding assignment, copyright ownership, and contractual interpretation, which required adjudication on merits.

Justice Ramamoorthy ultimately concluded that the defendant had attempted to equate “disclosure of cause of action” with “proof of cause of action.” According to the Court, a plaint cannot be rejected merely because the defendant disputes the strength or validity of the plaintiff’s claims.

Final Decision of the Court

The Madras High Court dismissed the application seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The Court held that none of the objections raised by the defendant justified rejection of the plaint at the threshold stage. The issues relating to validity of assignment, limitation, agency, power of attorney, and enforceability of rights required detailed examination during trial.

The Court therefore permitted the copyright infringement suit relating to remake and sequel rights connected with the “Hera Pheri” franchise to proceed further before the Commercial Division.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles the important principle that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is only concerned with whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff can conclusively establish such cause of action.

The ruling further clarifies that disputes relating to validity of copyright assignments under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, limitation in continuing infringement actions, and powers of attorney coupled with interest under Sections 201 and 202 of the Indian Contract Act ordinarily require detailed adjudication and cannot usually be decided summarily at the stage of rejection of plaint.

The decision also reinforces that in intellectual property disputes involving film rights and derivative rights, courts should ordinarily permit matters to proceed to trial where complex contractual and factual issues are involved.

Case Details

Title: Firoz A Nadiadwala Vs Seven Arts International Limited
Date of Order: 24 April 2026
Case Number: Application No.1827 of 2026 in C.S. (Comm Div) No.267 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026:MHC:1658
Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

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Headnote

The Madras High Court in Firoz A Nadiadwala vs Seven Arts International Limited held that a plaint in a copyright infringement suit concerning remake and derivative rights in the “Hera Pheri” film franchise cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely because the defendant disputes the validity of assignment or enforceability of rights. The Court ruled that issues relating to limitation, validity of assignment under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and the effect of death of a principal on a power of attorney under Sections 201 and 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 involve mixed questions of law and fact requiring detailed adjudication during trial. The Court emphasized that at the stage of rejection of plaint, the Court only examines whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on merits.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Mr. Santosh Kumar R.S Vs Mr. Aditya Dhar

In Mr. Santosh Kumar R.S vs Mr. Aditya Dhar, decided on 22 April 2026 in Writ Petition No.10911/2026 (C), the High Court of Karnataka before Justice K.S. Hemalekha dismissed a writ petition seeking cancellation of CBFC certification granted to the Hindi film “Dhurandhar-2” on allegations of plagiarism of the petitioner’s original script “D-Saheb.” The petitioner claimed that the respondents had gained access to his script through industry intermediaries and unlawfully copied substantial portions of the story, screenplay and characters. The Court held that allegations of copyright infringement and plagiarism involve disputed questions of fact requiring detailed evidence, comparison of scripts and trial, which cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying upon the Supreme Court judgment in R.G. Anand vs Delux Films, the Court reiterated that copyright protects expression and not ideas, and that claims of substantial copying must be proved through cogent evidence before a competent civil forum. The Court further held that the powers of the Central Board of Film Certification under Sections 5A and 5B of the Cinematograph Act are confined to examining issues relating to public order, morality, decency and statutory guidelines, and not to adjudicating private proprietary disputes relating to ownership of scripts or plagiarism. Observing that the petitioner failed to establish any statutory violation in the certification process, the Court dismissed the writ petition while reserving liberty to pursue appropriate remedies before the civil court. Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:XXXXX.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Karnataka High Court Clarifies That Copyright and Plagiarism Disputes in Films Cannot Be Decided in Writ Jurisdiction Against CBFC Certification

Introduction

The decision of the High Court of Karnataka in Mr. Santosh Kumar R.S vs Mr. Aditya Dhar is an important ruling on the intersection of copyright law, film certification, and writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The judgment delivered on 22 April 2026 by Hon’ble Mrs. Justice K.S. Hemalekha examines whether allegations of plagiarism in a cinematographic work can be adjudicated in a writ petition seeking cancellation of certification granted by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The Court ultimately held that disputes involving copyright infringement, script theft, and plagiarism are private proprietary disputes requiring detailed examination of evidence and therefore cannot ordinarily be decided in writ proceedings. The judgment also clarifies the limited scope of powers exercised by the CBFC under Sections 5A and 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952.

The ruling is significant because in recent years several film-related disputes have attempted to invoke writ jurisdiction against CBFC certification on grounds ranging from obscenity to plagiarism. This judgment clearly distinguishes between statutory censorship issues and private copyright disputes. It reiterates that the role of the CBFC is confined to examining whether a film violates standards relating to public order, morality, decency, sovereignty, or other statutory concerns, and not to determine ownership of stories or allegations of copying.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Mr. Santosh Kumar R.S., described himself as a writer, director, and producer associated with Passion Movie Makers. He claimed to have authored an original script titled “D-Saheb,” allegedly based on patriotic and anti-terror themes. According to the petitioner, the script, screenplay, character sketches, and related creative material had been registered with the Screen Writers Association and other authorities.

The petitioner alleged that during 2023 he had shared the script with different individuals and production houses within the film industry, including through an intermediary named Dinesh Kumar, who was functioning as a creative producer. The petitioner claimed that the respondents, including film director Aditya Dhar and associated producers, unlawfully copied substantial parts of his script while producing the Hindi movie “Dhurandhar-2.” The petitioner alleged that the film had subsequently been dubbed into multiple regional languages and released widely across India, including on OTT platforms.

Aggrieved by the alleged plagiarism, the petitioner approached the Karnataka High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. He sought a writ of mandamus directing the CBFC to cancel the certification granted to the film under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. He further sought restraint on the screening and distribution of the movie until disposal of the proceedings.

The matter thus came before the Karnataka High Court as a writ petition challenging CBFC certification indirectly on the basis of alleged copyright infringement.

Dispute Before the Court

The central dispute before the Court was whether allegations of copyright infringement and plagiarism could form the basis for cancellation of a CBFC certificate through writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The petitioner argued that he was the original author of the script “D-Saheb” and that the respondents had dishonestly copied substantial portions of the story, screenplay, and characters. It was further argued that because the film itself was allegedly based on unlawful copying, the certification granted by the CBFC under Section 5A of the Cinematograph Act was liable to be interfered with. The petitioner contended that unless urgent orders were passed, irreparable injury would be caused because the movie was already being commercially exploited through theatrical release and OTT distribution.

The respondents opposed the maintainability of the writ petition and argued that the dispute essentially related to copyright infringement involving disputed questions of fact requiring trial and evidence. They contended that the CBFC’s role was only to examine films for certification purposes under the Cinematograph Act and not to adjudicate ownership disputes relating to scripts or screenplay.

The Court framed three major points for consideration. First, whether a writ petition alleging copyright infringement is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. Second, whether Sections 5A and 5B of the Cinematograph Act can be invoked for adjudicating private disputes relating to copyright infringement. Third, whether writ jurisdiction can be exercised in absence of any challenge to statutory action under the Cinematograph Act.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice K.S. Hemalekha undertook a detailed examination of copyright principles, the nature of writ jurisdiction, and the statutory scheme of the Cinematograph Act.

The Court first emphasized that the petitioner’s grievance fundamentally concerned copyright infringement and plagiarism. Such allegations, according to the Court, necessarily involve detailed factual inquiry including comparison of scripts, proof of authorship, proof of access, and proof of substantial similarity between the competing works. The Court observed that such adjudication requires appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and may even require expert examination.

In this context, the Court relied heavily upon the landmark Supreme Court judgment in R.G. Anand vs M/s Delux Films and Others reported in (1978) 4 SCC 118. The Supreme Court in R.G. Anand had authoritatively laid down principles governing copyright infringement in dramatic and cinematographic works. The Karnataka High Court reproduced and discussed paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Supreme Court judgment in detail.

The Supreme Court in R.G. Anand held that there can be no copyright in an idea, theme, plot, or historical fact. Copyright protection extends only to the form, manner, arrangement, and expression of the idea. The Supreme Court explained that where two creators work on the same subject matter, similarities may naturally arise. However, infringement occurs only when the defendant’s work is a substantial and material imitation of the plaintiff’s original expression.

The Karnataka High Court highlighted the Supreme Court’s observation that one of the safest tests for determining copyright infringement is whether an ordinary viewer gets an unmistakable impression that the later work appears to be a copy of the original. The High Court stressed that such determination cannot be made merely on allegations or superficial similarities and requires a full evidentiary trial.

The Court further noted that the Supreme Court in R.G. Anand recognized the inherent complexity of film-related copyright disputes because films involve wider treatment, broader narratives, and additional creative elements. Therefore, proving piracy in cinematographic works becomes even more fact-intensive.

After discussing copyright principles, the Court turned to the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Whirlpool Corporation vs Registrar of Trademarks reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1. The Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation held that although High Courts possess broad powers under Article 226, writ jurisdiction is generally not exercised where an effective alternative remedy exists unless exceptional circumstances are shown, such as violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to vires of legislation.

The Karnataka High Court applied these principles and held that no exceptional circumstance existed in the present case. The petitioner’s grievance was essentially a civil dispute relating to alleged infringement of copyright. Such disputes are specifically governed by remedies available under the Copyright Act, 1957 through civil suits for injunction and damages.

The Court then analyzed Sections 3, 5, 5A, and 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952. Section 3 provides for constitution of the Central Board of Film Certification. Section 5 concerns advisory panels assisting the Board. Section 5A deals with grant or refusal of certification. Section 5B lays down principles for guidance in certifying films, including considerations relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, decency, morality, defamation, contempt of court, and incitement to offences.

Justice Hemalekha carefully explained that the CBFC functions as a statutory regulatory body tasked with evaluating whether films comply with censorship and certification standards. The Court observed that the Board’s role is essentially regulatory and not adjudicatory regarding private proprietary disputes.

The Court clarified that challenges to CBFC certification may arise in cases involving violation of statutory guidelines, procedural irregularity, obscenity, defamation, public morality, or infringement of constitutional rights. However, allegations of plagiarism or script theft fall outside the statutory mandate of the Board.

The judgment specifically held that Section 5A of the Cinematograph Act does not confer judicial or quasi-judicial power upon the Board to adjudicate title or ownership of screenplay or script. According to the Court, the certification process acts as a “safety and morality filter” and not as a mechanism for deciding copyright disputes.

The petitioner had relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Bobby Art International vs Om Pal Singh Hoon reported in AIR 1996 SC 1846. However, the Court distinguished that decision by observing that Bobby Art International dealt with obscenity, censorship, and freedom of expression issues under the Cinematograph Act rather than copyright infringement.

The petitioner had also relied upon N.P. Amruthesh vs State of Karnataka reported in ILR 1998 KAR 2885. The Karnataka High Court observed that the dispute in N.P. Amruthesh related to allegations that the content of the film violated constitutional values and public morality under the Cinematograph Act, and therefore that precedent had no application to a copyright dispute between private parties.

The Court repeatedly emphasized that claims involving proof of originality, access, and substantial similarity require appreciation of evidence and therefore squarely fall within the jurisdiction of civil courts. It also observed that the petitioner had failed to show any statutory illegality in the process adopted by the CBFC while granting certification to the film.

Final Decision of the Court

The Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition and declined to interfere with the certification granted to the film “Dhurandhar-2.” The Court held that allegations of plagiarism and copyright infringement cannot ordinarily be adjudicated in writ proceedings under Article 226 because such disputes involve complex factual questions requiring trial and evidence.

The Court further held that the CBFC has no statutory obligation under Sections 5A or 5B of the Cinematograph Act to investigate allegations of script theft before granting certification. The Board’s role is confined to examining whether the film violates statutory standards relating to morality, decency, public order, and similar concerns.

While dismissing the writ petition, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies before a competent civil forum under the Copyright Act, 1957.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles an important legal principle that copyright infringement and plagiarism disputes involving films cannot ordinarily be converted into challenges against CBFC certification through writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The decision clarifies that the CBFC’s statutory role under Sections 5A and 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 is limited to regulation and certification based on public law considerations such as morality, decency, public order, sovereignty, and related concerns.

The judgment further reinforces that disputes involving originality of scripts, access, copying, and substantial similarity are matters requiring detailed factual adjudication and must be resolved through civil proceedings under the Copyright Act, 1957 rather than through constitutional writ remedies.

Case Details

Title: Mr. Santosh Kumar R.S Vs Mr. Aditya Dhar
Date of Order: 22 April 2026
Case Number: Writ Petition No.10911/2026 (C)
Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:XXXXX
Court: High Court of Karnataka
Hon’ble Judge: Justice K.S. Hemalekha

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Headnote

The Karnataka High Court in Mr. Santosh Kumar R.S vs Mr. Aditya Dhar held that allegations of plagiarism and copyright infringement relating to a cinematographic film cannot ordinarily be adjudicated in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that the powers of the Central Board of Film Certification under Sections 5A and 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 are confined to certification based on statutory standards relating to morality, decency, public order, and allied considerations, and do not extend to adjudicating disputes concerning ownership of scripts or screenplay. Relying upon R.G. Anand vs M/s Delux Films, the Court reiterated that copyright infringement claims require detailed examination of evidence regarding originality, access, and substantial similarity and must therefore be pursued before a competent civil court under the Copyright Act, 1957.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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