1. Case at a glance
Case: Hindustan Unilever Limited Vs. Kwick Living (I) Private Limited
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Case No.: CS(COMM) 904/2026 & I.A. 22515/2026
Date of judgment: 25 August 2026
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice A. J. Bhambhani
Plaintiff: Hindustan Unilever Limited (HUL)
Defendant: Kwick Living (I) Private Limited
The judgment primarily concerns a preliminary objection regarding territorial jurisdiction. The Court expressly states that although the parties had also argued the merits of HUL's request for an interim injunction, the judgment was confined to the question of whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
2. Background of the dispute
Hindustan Unilever instituted the commercial suit against Kwick Living concerning an advertising campaign styled “War on What’s Hidden.”
According to HUL, the campaign was presented as a public-awareness initiative but in substance targeted and disparaged HUL's products sold under the well-known trademarks “VIM” and “SURF EXCEL.”
HUL alleged that the campaign contained unsubstantiated and misleading claims concerning its products.
The allegedly offending campaign was disseminated through several channels:
- billboards/hoardings;
- social-media platforms;
- YouTube;
- Instagram;
- Kwick Living's website/webpage; and
- the defendant's commercial online platform.
The defendant's webpage allegedly did not merely display the campaign but also offered its competing products for purchase.
Thus, the case involved an intersection of:
- trademark law;
- copyright law;
- comparative advertising/disparagement;
- online dissemination;
- e-commerce; and
- territorial jurisdiction.
3. Relief sought by HUL
HUL sought, inter alia, a permanent injunction restraining Kwick Living from:
- broadcasting;
- publishing;
- hosting;
- communicating to the public; and
- otherwise disseminating
the impugned advertising campaign.
The basic grievance was that the advertising campaign allegedly denigrated HUL's products and made misleading/unsubstantiated comparisons.
The campaign was said to be continuing across physical and digital platforms, giving rise, according to HUL, to a continuing and recurring cause of action.
4. Procedural history
The chronology is important.
14 August 2026
According to the plaint, the cause of action first arose on 14 August 2026, when Kwick Living commenced telecasting and disseminating the impugned comparative advertisements.
The advertisements appeared on:
- YouTube;
- Instagram;
- the defendant's webpage; and
- other media.
HUL also alleged that the campaign appeared on physical hoardings and banners.
15 August 2026
HUL caused a letter to be issued through its media agency to media platforms and others involved in dissemination of the campaign.
The letter placed the concerned parties on notice of HUL's objections based upon:
- trademark infringement; and
- disparagement,
and requested voluntary suspension/review of further dissemination.
19 August 2026
The Court issued summons in the suit.
At that stage, counsel for Kwick Living immediately raised a preliminary objection that the Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, summons were issued. Because of the jurisdiction objection, the Court granted the defendant one day's time to respond to HUL's interim-injunction application.
20 August 2026
Kwick Living filed its reply to the interim injunction application.
24 August 2026
HUL filed its rejoinder.
The Court heard extensive arguments on territorial jurisdiction and reserved judgment on 24 August 2026.
25 August 2026
The present judgment was pronounced.
5. The central question before the Court
The Court deliberately limited itself to the question:
Does the Delhi High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain this suit?
The Court identified three statutory provisions as central to the issue:
Section 20 CPC
Particularly Section 20(c), which permits a suit to be instituted where the cause of action wholly or partly arises.
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
Particularly Section 134(2), which gives a plaintiff in certain trademark proceedings an additional jurisdictional basis where the plaintiff resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain.
Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957
Particularly Section 62(2), containing a similar jurisdictional provision for copyright proceedings.
The Court therefore had to examine the relationship between these three provisions.
6. HUL's pleaded basis for Delhi jurisdiction
HUL's plaint relied upon two principal jurisdictional theories.
A. Cause of action arose in Delhi — Section 20(c) CPC
HUL pleaded that the impugned campaign was accessible in Delhi through:
- YouTube;
- Instagram;
- the defendant's commercial webpage.
HUL further pleaded that the defendant's webpage offered its competing products for sale in Delhi.
Therefore, HUL argued that the campaign was:
- directed at Delhi;
- commercially effective in Delhi; and
- capable of causing injury to HUL in Delhi.
HUL consequently relied on Section 20(c) CPC.
B. HUL carries on business in Delhi — Section 134(2) and Section 62(2)
HUL also pleaded that it carries on business in Delhi.
Therefore, according to HUL, Delhi had jurisdiction independently under:
- Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act; and
- Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.
7. Defendant's territorial-jurisdiction objection
Kwick Living took a strong position that Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction.
Its submissions can be divided into several components.
A. No specific Delhi cause of action pleaded
The defendant argued that HUL had not specifically pleaded an actual instance of an impugned hoarding in Delhi.
The plaint specifically referred to an impugned hoarding in Mumbai.
HUL's pleading stated that it had, as of that point, confirmed an impugned hoarding in Mumbai and reserved the right to provide particulars of additional hoardings later.
The defendant relied heavily upon this omission.
Its argument was essentially:
If the plaint itself identifies Mumbai but does not identify a Delhi hoarding, there is no concrete pleaded physical cause of action in Delhi.
8. Both parties were based in Mumbai
Another important factual circumstance relied upon by the defendant was that:
- HUL's registered office was in Mumbai; and
- Kwick Living's registered office was also in Mumbai.
The defendant therefore argued that the natural and proper forum was Mumbai.
The defendant contended that HUL was attempting to establish Delhi jurisdiction primarily through the accessibility of online material.
9. Defendant's challenge to the digital-jurisdiction argument
This was one of the most important aspects of the case.
The defendant argued that merely because:
- YouTube is accessible in Delhi;
- Instagram is accessible in Delhi; or
- the defendant's website can be accessed in Delhi,
that fact does not automatically create a cause of action in Delhi.
The defendant relied upon the Delhi High Court Division Bench judgment in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy.
The principle relied upon was that mere accessibility of a website is insufficient.
The plaintiff must show something more, such as:
- purposeful availment;
- specific targeting of the forum;
- commercial activity directed toward the forum; and/or
- injury/effect within the forum.
10. Defendant's reliance on Sanjay Dalia
The defendant placed substantial reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in:
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia
This was one of the most significant authorities considered in the judgment.
The defendant's interpretation of Sanjay Dalia was that where:
- a plaintiff has its principal/registered office at a particular place; and
- the cause of action also arises wholly or partly at that place,
the plaintiff cannot simply choose another distant forum merely because it has a subordinate/branch office there.
The Supreme Court's approach was described as a restrictive and purposive interpretation of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act.
The objective was to prevent forum shopping and inconvenience to defendants.
The Court reproduced the Supreme Court's reasoning that where the plaintiff's principal office and part of the cause of action coincide, the plaintiff should sue at that location rather than selecting another distant location merely because it also carries on business elsewhere.
11. The significance of Sanjay Dalia
The judgment explains that Sanjay Dalia essentially seeks to prevent a corporation with multiple offices from selecting an unrelated or inconvenient forum.
The Supreme Court recognised that Sections 134 and 62 were enacted to make it easier for IP owners to litigate at their own place of business.
But that statutory convenience cannot, according to Sanjay Dalia, be interpreted so broadly that a corporation can ignore the place where:
- its principal office is located; and
- the cause of action has also arisen.
This became a major source of tension in the present case because HUL argued that Section 20(c) independently gave Delhi jurisdiction.
12. Defendant's reliance on Ultra Home Construction
Kwick Living also relied upon the Delhi High Court Division Bench decision in:
Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey
That decision had systematised the effect of Sanjay Dalia into different corporate-office scenarios.
The judgment explains that the four broad situations are:
- plaintiff has only one office;
- plaintiff has principal office at A, branch office at B, and cause of action at A;
- plaintiff has principal office at A, branch office at B, and cause of action at B; and
- plaintiff has offices at A and B, but cause of action at a third place C.
The significance is that the availability of jurisdiction can change depending on where the cause of action arises relative to the plaintiff's principal and subordinate offices.
The defendant argued that the restrictive Sanjay Dalia/Ultra Home approach should control.
13. Defendant's reliance on Banyan Tree
The Court discussed Banyan Tree Holding extensively because the dispute involved internet dissemination.
The principle identified by the Court was:
Mere website accessibility is insufficient.
A website being accessible in Delhi does not automatically confer Delhi jurisdiction.
The plaintiff must demonstrate something more, particularly:
- purposeful availment;
- specific targeting of Delhi;
- commercial activity; and, where appropriate,
- an injurious effect in Delhi.
The defendant therefore argued that HUL had failed to plead sufficient facts establishing that Kwick Living purposefully targeted Delhi.
14. Plaintiff's response
HUL's counsel, Mr. Amit Sibal, accepted that HUL's registered office was in Mumbai but emphasised that HUL also had a corporate office in Delhi.
More importantly, HUL argued that Delhi jurisdiction was not dependent solely upon its corporate office.
Its argument was that part of the cause of action itself arose in Delhi.
15. HUL's emphasis on the online campaign
HUL argued that the campaign was not a passive piece of content.
It was systematically disseminated through:
- YouTube;
- Instagram;
- the defendant's webpage;
- hoardings; and
- banners.
The defendant's webpage allegedly also provided consumers with an opportunity to purchase the defendant's competing products.
Therefore, according to HUL, the online activity had a real commercial dimension in Delhi.
16. HUL's reliance on Burger King
HUL placed substantial reliance upon:
Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani
The proposition relied upon was particularly important in trademark litigation.
The decision treated “use” of a trademark in the course of trade as giving rise to a cause of action.
Importantly, “use in relation to goods” was said to include:
- advertising;
- promotion;
- publicity.
Therefore, according to HUL, if the impugned advertising campaign is used in Delhi, that use itself can constitute a cause of action in Delhi.
17. The important conflict between Burger King and Sanjay Dalia
The Court identified a significant jurisprudential tension.
Burger King approach
Under Burger King:
Every place where infringing trademark use occurs can potentially constitute a place where a cause of action arises.
Advertising, promotion and publicity can constitute “use.”
Sanjay Dalia approach
Under Sanjay Dalia:
Where the plaintiff's principal office is also a place where part of the cause of action arises, the plaintiff cannot necessarily choose another forum merely because it has another office elsewhere.
The Court described this as a practical conflict.
This conflict is central to the judgment.
18. World Wrestling Entertainment
The Court also discussed:
World Wrestling Entertainment
This decision adopted a broader approach to the concept of “carrying on business” in the context of e-commerce.
Where a website allows commercial transactions, the entity can potentially be considered to carry on business at places where such transactions can be concluded.
However, the present Court made an important distinction:
World Wrestling Entertainment dealt with “carrying on business”; it did not necessarily resolve when a “cause of action” arises under Section 20(c).
That distinction becomes crucial in online jurisdiction cases.
19. Kohinoor Seed Fields
Another important authority was:
Kohinoor Seed Fields India (P) Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences (P) Ltd.
This judgment took a relatively expansive approach to e-commerce.
It recognised that an interactive website through which commercial transactions can be concluded may constitute carrying on business wherever such transactions can occur.
Importantly, actual completion of a transaction was treated as not necessarily indispensable.
This created another tension with the more restrictive Banyan Tree approach.
20. Banyan Tree versus Kohinoor Seed Fields
The Court identified the conflict as follows.
Banyan Tree
Requires:
- purposeful availment;
- specific targeting;
- appropriate commercial activity;
- and, where applicable, forum-specific injury.
Kohinoor Seed Fields
Adopts a broader e-commerce understanding under which the capability to conduct commercial transactions can establish business presence.
The Court therefore observed that the two approaches create materially different thresholds for online jurisdiction.
21. Nilesh Girkar
The Court also considered:
Nilesh Girkar v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.
There, the relevant content was available throughout India on an OTT platform, including Delhi.
The approach in that case appeared to treat nationwide communication and availability of content as sufficient to establish at least part of the cause of action in Delhi under Section 20(c).
The present Court observed that this creates another tension with Banyan Tree.
Nilesh Girkar
Nationwide availability can result in part of the cause of action arising wherever the content is available.
Banyan Tree
Mere online accessibility is insufficient without more specific targeting and forum-related effects.
22. Astral Limited
The Court also discussed:
Astral Ltd. v. Ajay Enterprises
This decision appeared to allow concurrent jurisdiction where parts of the cause of action arise at both:
- the principal-office location; and
- the subordinate-office location.
The Court noted that this approach potentially conflicts with Sanjay Dalia, because Sanjay Dalia adopts a more restrictive position where the principal office is itself connected with the cause of action.
23. Rukhmani Keshwani and ITC
The Court also considered more recent decisions, including:
- Rukhmani Keshwani v. Raju Agarbatti Works
- ITC Ltd. v. Adyar Gate Hotels Ltd.
These decisions further demonstrated that the law was not entirely settled.
Of particular significance was the view that Sanjay Dalia should not necessarily be understood as eliminating jurisdiction wherever a real and substantive cause of action independently arises in another forum.
24. The Court's major concern: unlimited internet jurisdiction
One of the strongest observations in the judgment concerns the practical consequences of unrestricted online jurisdiction.
The Court recognised that because of the internet:
- goods can be accessed anywhere;
- advertisements can be viewed anywhere;
- websites can be accessed throughout the country;
- e-commerce transactions can potentially be conducted from numerous locations.
If mere accessibility were enough, a corporation could potentially sue almost anywhere in India.
The Court expressly cautioned that territorial-jurisdiction principles cannot be diluted to such an extent that corporations can select practically any forum without reference to where the cause of action actually arose.
This is arguably one of the most important policy observations in the judgment.
25. The Court did NOT finally decide the competing jurisdictional theories
This is crucial.
The Court did not definitively hold:
- that Delhi had jurisdiction; or
- that Delhi did not have jurisdiction.
Instead, the Court concluded that the underlying legal issue itself required authoritative consideration by a Larger Bench.
The Court found several conflicting lines of authority and considered that resolving them was necessary for certainty and consistency.
26. Three questions referred to the Larger Bench
The Court formulated three principal questions.
Question 1 — Relationship between the statutory provisions
Whether intellectual-property suits are governed:
- solely by Section 20 CPC;
- by Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act;
- by Section 62 of the Copyright Act; or
- by an interplay of all three provisions, and, if so, how.
Question 2 — Principal/registered office versus another forum
Whether a corporate plaintiff must sue only at the place of its principal or registered office when part of the cause of action has arisen there.
This directly concerns the Sanjay Dalia principle.
Question 3 — Online transactions and IP jurisdiction
What jurisdictional rule should govern online transactions in intellectual-property disputes, particularly in view of the conflicting approaches in:
- Banyan Tree;
- World Wrestling Entertainment; and
- Kohinoor Seed Fields.
27. What happened to the interim injunction?
This judgment does not decide the merits of HUL's interim injunction application.
The Court specifically stated at the beginning that although counsel had argued the merits, the Court would first deal only with territorial jurisdiction.
Therefore, this judgment should not be read as a finding that:
- Kwick Living's advertisements were legally disparaging;
- the advertisements were misleading;
- HUL established trademark infringement;
- HUL established copyright infringement;
- HUL was entitled to a permanent injunction; or
- HUL was entitled to an interim injunction on merits.
Those questions remained outside the scope of this judgment.
28. Final procedural direction
Rather than finally resolving territorial jurisdiction, Justice Bhambhani directed the Registry to place the judgment before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for consideration of placing the issue before a Bench of appropriate strength.
The Registry was directed to take the necessary steps within one week.
29. Core legal controversy in simple terms
The judgment essentially revolves around this problem:
Scenario
A company has:
- its registered/principal office in Mumbai;
- another office in Delhi;
- an opponent based elsewhere;
- an online advertisement accessible throughout India;
- products capable of being purchased online.
Question
Can the company sue in Delhi merely because:
- the advertisement is accessible in Delhi;
- its products are sold in Delhi;
- its own office/business exists in Delhi; or
- the defendant's website permits transactions from Delhi?
Restrictive answer suggested by Sanjay Dalia
Not necessarily.
If the principal office is also connected with the cause of action, Sanjay Dalia suggests that the plaintiff may have to sue there.
Broader answer suggested by other authorities
Potentially yes, if there is a genuine territorial nexus through:
- use of the trademark;
- advertising;
- commercial transactions;
- business activity;
- targeted online activity; or
- actual injury.
The Delhi High Court found that these competing approaches had not been satisfactorily reconciled.
30. Important authorities discussed
The judgment considers a substantial body of case law:
| Authority | Main relevance |
|---|---|
| Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia | Restrictive interpretation of Sections 134/62; principal-office/cause-of-action limitation |
| Banyan Tree Holding v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy | Mere website accessibility insufficient; purposeful availment/targeting required |
| World Wrestling Entertainment | E-commerce website can establish “carrying on business” where transactions can occur |
| Ultra Home Construction v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey | Four corporate-office jurisdiction scenarios |
| Burger King Corp. v. Techchand Shewakramani | Trademark use, including advertising/promotional use, can constitute cause of action |
| Kohinoor Seed Fields v. Veda Seed Sciences | Broader e-commerce concept of carrying on business |
| Nilesh Girkar v. Zee Entertainment | Nationwide digital communication and local availability |
| Astral Ltd. v. Ajay Enterprises | Potential concurrent jurisdiction at principal and subordinate offices |
| Rukhmani Keshwani v. Raju Agarbatti Works | Real nexus/purposeful commercial targeting |
| ITC Ltd. v. Adyar Gate Hotels | Territorial nexus and injury at a location can support jurisdiction |
| Travellers Exchange Corporation | Distinction between Section 20 jurisdiction and additional jurisdiction under Sections 62/134 |
The Court's examination of these authorities demonstrates that the issue is not simply a straightforward application of one precedent.
31. The most important legal propositions emerging from the judgment
Proposition 1
Sections 20 CPC, 134 Trade Marks Act and 62 Copyright Act must be read in relation to one another.
The precise relationship between them is unresolved and was referred to a Larger Bench.
Proposition 2
Section 134(2) is not necessarily an unrestricted forum-shopping provision.
Sanjay Dalia places an important restriction where the plaintiff's principal office and cause of action coincide.
Proposition 3
Mere website accessibility may not be enough.
Banyan Tree requires more than mere accessibility in an internet jurisdiction case.
Proposition 4
Advertising can constitute trademark “use.”
The Burger King line of authority treats advertising, promotion and publicity as forms of use capable of giving rise to a cause of action.
Proposition 5
E-commerce creates a special jurisdictional difficulty.
An interactive website capable of facilitating transactions may effectively create commercial presence across numerous territories.
Proposition 6
Online accessibility cannot automatically mean nationwide jurisdiction.
The Court expressly warned against a situation where corporations could sue in almost any location merely because online material is accessible there.
Proposition 7
The law requires authoritative clarification.
The Court considered the existing authorities sufficiently conflicting to warrant determination by a Larger Bench.
32. What the judgment ultimately decides
The ultimate outcome is procedural and jurisdictional rather than merits-based.
The Single Judge did not conclusively determine the merits of HUL's disparagement/trademark claims.
Instead, the Court:
- examined the defendant's preliminary objection;
- examined HUL's jurisdictional case;
- considered Section 20 CPC;
- considered Section 134 Trade Marks Act;
- considered Section 62 Copyright Act;
- examined conflicting Supreme Court and Delhi High Court precedents;
- identified significant inconsistencies in the existing jurisprudence;
- formulated three questions of law; and
- referred those questions to a Larger Bench.
The Registry was directed to place the matter before the Chief Justice for constitution/reference to a Bench of appropriate strength.
33. One-paragraph executive summary
In Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd., HUL challenged Kwick Living's “War on What's Hidden” advertising campaign, alleging that it disparaged HUL's VIM and SURF EXCEL products through social media, websites, hoardings and banners. Kwick Living raised a preliminary objection that the Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction because both parties' registered offices were in Mumbai and HUL had not specifically pleaded a concrete Delhi occurrence, while mere accessibility of an online campaign in Delhi was insufficient. HUL relied on Section 20(c) CPC, Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, arguing that the campaign was accessible in Delhi, had commercial effect there, and that the defendant's webpage facilitated sale of competing products in Delhi. The Court examined competing authorities including Sanjay Dalia, Banyan Tree, World Wrestling Entertainment, Ultra Home Construction, Burger King, Kohinoor Seed Fields, Nilesh Girkar and Astral, and found substantial conflict concerning the interaction between Sections 20, 134 and 62 and the jurisdictional consequences of online commercial activity. Rather than finally deciding the jurisdiction issue, the Court held that these questions required consideration by a Larger Bench, particularly whether an IP plaintiff must sue at its principal/registered office when part of the cause of action arises there and what test should govern online IP disputes. The matter was therefore directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for consideration of constitution of an appropriate Larger Bench.
Bottom line
This is an important jurisdiction judgment, not a final merits judgment on the alleged disparagement. Its major significance is that the Delhi High Court has formally recognised a conflict between different lines of authority governing territorial jurisdiction in online IP disputes and has referred the issue to a Larger Bench for authoritative resolution.
