Operation Mercy India Foundation Vs. Meta Platforms Inc

### Introduction

In the evolving landscape of digital defamation, where anonymous online actors can disseminate harmful content across borders with ease, the question of territorial jurisdiction becomes paramount. The case of Operation Mercy India Foundation and Others versus Meta Platforms Inc. and Others, decided by the Delhi High Court, delves into this complex interplay between traditional civil procedure principles and modern cyber wrongs. At its core, the judgment addresses whether a defamation suit initially filed against unknown "John Doe" defendants can be returned to another court once the identities of the alleged wrongdoers are revealed, particularly when the revealed residence coincides with a place where the alleged wrong also occurred. This ruling not only reinforces the foundational tenets of Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which governs suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables, but also highlights the protections afforded to plaintiffs facing anonymous harassment. By emphasizing that jurisdiction must be assessed based on circumstances at the time of filing, the court safeguards bona fide litigants from procedural manipulations that could arise from defendants' deliberate anonymity. The decision draws on precedents like Tejpal Singh Sisodia and Sameer Wankhede, refining the "Merger Rule" in the context of online defamation, and underscores the need to prevent forum shopping while ensuring access to justice. This analytical article explores the intricacies of the case, offering insights into how Indian courts are adapting procedural laws to the digital age, where reputational harm transcends physical boundaries and can cause global repercussions.

### Factual Background

The plaintiffs in this case consist of Operation Mercy India Foundation and O.M. Books Foundation, both non-profit companies registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956, with their registered offices in Telangana, along with their director, Joseph Gregory Dsouza, who resides in Secunderabad. These entities form part of the O.M. Group, engaged in charitable activities such as operating over 100 schools across India that provide subsidized education to underprivileged children, employing around 2,000 staff, and running 17 bookstores selling religious and educational books at affordable rates. Defendant No. 1 is Meta Platforms Inc., the owner of the social media platform Facebook, based in the United States. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are individuals, Jeypauljesudasan and Panigrahi, both residents of Telangana, who operated a Facebook page titled "OM Justice Seekers" using the email address omjusticeseekers@gmail.com. The dispute originated from posts on this page alleging serious misconduct by the plaintiffs, including benami transactions, misappropriation of donations, exorbitant fees in their institutions, and poor working conditions. The plaintiffs claimed these allegations were false, malicious, and intended to damage their reputation, goodwill, and charitable operations. They pointed to ongoing disputes with former employees in Telangana courts, including criminal complaints for financial irregularities and FEMA violations, which Defendant No. 3 allegedly exploited to publish misleading content referencing these litigations. The posts were widely viewed, shared, and commented upon in India and abroad, leading to a drastic reduction in donations—from Rs. 40.65 crore in 2018-2019 to Rs. 25.38 crore subsequently—and affecting operations, including a bookstore in Delhi. Specifically, the plaintiffs highlighted their purchase of land in Delhi in 2015 for a vocational training center, for which donations dried up due to the negative publicity, halting construction. They also received communications from foreign donors in June 2020 expressing concerns over the posts, and emails from Delhi residents in July 2020 voicing worries about the defamatory content. Asserting irreparable harm to their global reputation, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to remove the page and its content.

### Procedural Background

The suit was instituted in 2020 before the Delhi High Court as CS(OS) 262/2020, initially against Meta and an unknown "John Doe" defendant representing the anonymous operators of the Facebook page, given that their identities were masked. The plaintiffs invoked Section 19 of the CPC, claiming the wrong (defamatory publication and its consequences) occurred in Delhi, including reduced donations for the proposed vocational center, declining bookstore sales, and local access to the content. On September 15, 2020, the court granted an ex parte interim injunction against the email address associated with the page, restraining further defamatory posts. Subsequently, through discovery, the identities of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were revealed, and they were impleaded. In 2022, these defendants filed I.A. 13894/2022 under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 of the CPC, seeking rejection or return of the plaint on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction, arguing all parties were based in Hyderabad (Telangana) and no genuine cause of action arose in Delhi. They contended the plaintiffs' documents—letters from donors and emails from Delhi residents—were fabricated to manufacture jurisdiction. During hearings, on March 19, 2024, the defendants confined their prayer to return under Rule 10, withdrawing the rejection plea under Rule 11. Arguments were advanced by counsel for both sides: Mr. G. Arudhra Rao for the defendants emphasized forum shopping and hardship, while Mr. Akhil Sibal for the plaintiffs stressed the demurrer principle, requiring the court to accept plaint averments as true, and that jurisdiction is fixed at filing. The matter was reserved on November 18, 2025, and pronounced on February 7, 2026.

### Reasoning and Decision of Court

The court's reasoning commenced with an affirmation that the application was confined to return under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, and proceeded on that basis. It reiterated that defamation suits fall under Section 19 CPC, which allows filing where the wrong is done or where the defendant resides/carries on business, interpreting "wrong done" to include both the act and its consequences, as established in precedents like Frank Finn Management Consultants. The plaintiffs' pleadings detailed wrongs in Delhi: reduced donations halting the vocational center's construction, declining bookstore sales, and publication/access of content locally, supported by annexed letters and emails. The defendants challenged these documents as fabricated, but the court held that such veracity determinations require evidence and cannot be made at the demurrer stage under Rule 10, where plaint averments are deemed true, citing Exphar v. Eupharma Laboratories and RSPL Ltd. v. Mukesh Sharma. Thus, the plaintiffs established "wrong done" in Delhi for jurisdictional purposes. The court then examined the "Merger Rule" from Tejpal Singh Sisodia, which mandates suing at the defendant's residence if it coincides with a place of wrong, to avoid options under Section 19. Acknowledging the plaintiffs' averments of global harm, including in Telangana (where plaintiffs are based and operate schools/bookstores), the court found a merger there. However, it distinguished the case due to the initial John Doe proceedings: jurisdiction is assessed at filing, when defendants' identities and residences were unknown, making Delhi a valid forum based on local wrongs. Returning the plaint post-revelation would penalize plaintiffs for defendants' anonymity, undermine bona fide suits against unknown infringers, and lead to de novo trials vacating prior orders, as per Exl Careers. The court rejected applying the Merger Rule retrospectively, noting defendants could raise jurisdiction during trial via evidence. It also affirmed Tejpal's consistency with prior cases like Frank Finn and Indian Potash, and its statutory basis in Section 19, not forum non conveniens (rendering Horlicks inapplicable). Ultimately, the court dismissed I.A. 13894/2022, allowing the suit to proceed in Delhi, with observations not prejudicing merits.

### Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles a nuanced point in procedural law concerning territorial jurisdiction in defamation suits against anonymous online defendants under Section 19 CPC. It clarifies that when a suit is validly instituted against "John Doe" entities due to unknown identities, the assessment of jurisdiction—particularly the application of the "Merger Rule" (requiring suit at the defendant's residence if it merges with a place of wrong)—must be based solely on circumstances at the time of filing, not subsequent revelations. This prevents defendants from exploiting their initial anonymity to force plaint return, ensuring plaintiffs are not disadvantaged and interim protections remain intact. The ruling reinforces the demurrer principle for Order VII Rule 10 applications, prohibiting threshold inquiries into document veracity that necessitate evidence, and distinguishes cyber defamation's global reach from traditional wrongs, while affirming that jurisdiction can still be contested at trial. By integrating precedents like Tejpal and Sameer Wankhede, it establishes that procedural fairness in digital disputes prioritizes the filing-date snapshot, balancing access to justice against forum shopping risks.

## Case Detail

- **Title**: Operation Mercy India Foundation & Ors. Vs. Meta Platforms Inc. & Ors.

- **Date of Order**: 07.02.2026

- **Case Number**: CS(OS) 262/2020, I.A. 13894/2022 (along with I.A. 8109/2020, I.A. 4807/2023, and I.A. 21254/2023)

- **Neutral Citation**: Not available

- **Name of Court**: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

- **Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

### Suggested Titles

1. "Navigating Territorial Jurisdiction in Online Defamation: Insights from the Delhi High Court's Ruling in Operation Mercy India Foundation v. Meta Platforms"

2. "John Doe Defendants and the Merger Rule: A Deep Dive into Section 19 CPC in Digital Defamation Cases"

3. "Preserving Jurisdiction in Anonymous Cyber Wrongs: Analysis of the High Court Judgment on Plaint Return under CPC"

### Suggested Tags

Defamation Law, Territorial Jurisdiction, Section 19 CPC, John Doe Suits, Online Anonymity, Merger Rule, Delhi High Court, Cyber Defamation, Order VII Rule 10 CPC, Forum Shopping, Procedural Fairness

### Headnote of Article

Delhi High Court holds that in defamation suits filed against anonymous "John Doe" defendants under Section 19 CPC, territorial jurisdiction is determined based on circumstances at the time of institution, and subsequent revelation of defendants' identities does not warrant return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10, even if it reveals a merger of wrong and residence; demurrer principle applies, barring evidentiary inquiries into plaint documents at threshold stage.

======

The plaintiffs, Operation Mercy India Foundation and O.M. Books Foundation (non-profit entities based in Telangana engaged in running subsidized schools and bookstores across India) along with their director Joseph Gregory Dsouza, filed a defamation suit against Meta Platforms Inc. (owner of Facebook) and two individuals (Defendants 2 and 3, residents of Telangana) who anonymously operated a Facebook page titled "OM Justice Seekers." The page posted allegedly false and malicious content accusing the plaintiffs of benami transactions, misappropriation of donations, exorbitant fees, and poor conditions in their institutions, exploiting pending disputes with former employees in Telangana. The plaintiffs claimed irreparable harm including drastic reduction in donations (from over Rs. 40 crore to Rs. 25 crore), inability to construct a vocational training center on Delhi-purchased land, declining sales at their Delhi bookstore, and receipt of concerned emails from Delhi residents, asserting the wrong occurred in Delhi under Section 19 CPC. The suit was initially filed in 2020 against Meta and a John Doe defendant due to anonymity, with an ex parte interim injunction granted on September 15, 2020. Defendants 2 and 3 were later impleaded after identity revelation. In 2022, they sought return/rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC, confining to return under Rule 10, arguing no cause of action in Delhi, all parties Hyderabad-based, and documents fabricated for forum shopping. The court, applying demurrer principle, accepted plaint averments as true at threshold, finding "wrong done" (including consequences like donation loss and local access) established in Delhi. While noting the "Merger Rule" from Tejpal (where wrong coincides with defendant's residence in Telangana, limiting suit there), it held jurisdiction fixed at filing when defendants were unknown John Doe, making Delhi valid; returning plaint post-revelation would unfairly penalize plaintiffs for defendants' anonymity, vacate interim orders, and require de novo trial. Jurisdiction could be re-agitated at trial via evidence. Thus, I.A. 13894/2022 was dismissed, allowing the suit to proceed in Delhi.

- **Law settled**: In defamation suits filed against anonymous/John Doe defendants, territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 CPC is determined based on circumstances and plaint averments at the time of institution/filing; subsequent revelation of defendants' identities and residence (even triggering Merger Rule where wrong coincides with residence) does not warrant return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, as it would disadvantage bona fide plaintiffs and undermine interim protections (paras 27-33).

- **Law settled**: Applications under Order VII Rule 10 CPC are decided on demurrer, deeming plaint averments true; veracity of annexed documents (e.g., donor letters, emails proving local harm/publication) cannot be adjudicated at threshold without evidence, precluding return on fabrication grounds (paras 17-19).

- **Law settled**: The "Merger Rule" in Tejpal (para 46) — requiring suit only at place of merger (wrong done + defendant residence) when wrong occurs in multiple jurisdictions including defendant's residence — is good law, statutorily rooted in Section 19 CPC text, not forum non conveniens, and consistent with prior Delhi HC precedents (paras 20-24, relying on Sameer Dnyandev Wankhede v. Red Chillies Entertainments Pvt. Ltd.).

**Case Title**: Operation Mercy India Foundation & Ors. v. Meta Platforms Inc. & Ors. (also cited as Operation Mercy India Foundation And ... vs Facebook Inc, And Ors)  

**Order Date**: 07 February 2026  

**Case Number**: CS(OS) 262/2020 (with connected I.As. including I.A. 13894/2022)  

**Neutral Citation**: 2026:DHC:10222  

**Name of Court**: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

**Name of Judge**: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

====

Satya Paul Vs. Alka Industrial Corporation

The **Delhi High Court** in a significant trademark rectification decision delivered on February 9, 2026, protected the long-standing seniority and acquired distinctiveness of the mark **"ARUN"** used continuously since 1962 for sewing machines and parts (Class 7), while directing substantial variation in the later-registered mark **"AiC ARUN"** (registered in 2010/2011) belonging to a geographically proximate competitor in Punjab.

### Introduction

The judgment in **C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 651/2022** titled **Satya Paul v. Alka Industrial Corporation & Anr.** represents a textbook application of Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in rectification / cancellation proceedings before the High Court sitting in its Intellectual Property Division jurisdiction. The core dispute concerned whether the addition of a corporate prefix ("AiC" standing for Alka Industrial Corporation) was sufficient to avoid deceptive similarity with a prior, highly reputed house mark "ARUN" that had enjoyed statutory registrations since the mid-1970s and factual use since 1962. The Court was called upon to balance the statutory presumption of validity attaching to a registered mark against overwhelming evidence of prior adoption, continuous use, acquired distinctiveness, extensive promotion, successful enforcement actions, and geographical/trade-channel overlap. Ultimately, the Court refused to treat "ARUN" as a generic or publici juris term in the sewing machine trade and held that the dominant and essential feature of the impugned mark remained confusingly similar, warranting partial rectification rather than outright cancellation.

### Factual Background

The petitioner, Satya Paul (trading as Satya Paul & Co., Jalandhar), claimed prior adoption and use of the word mark **"ARUN"** for sewing machines and parts thereof since 1962 through its predecessor-in-interest. Documentary evidence demonstrated:

- SSI registration obtained as early as December 1960.

- First registration in Class 7 vide No.314271 dated April 24, 1976 (limited to Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu).

- Subsequent pan-India registration in Class 7 vide No.431317B dated December 21, 1984.

- Registration in Class 20 vide No.1023094 dated July 4, 2001.

- Copyright registration for the artistic label/wrapper/sticker of "ARUN" dated June 16, 1999.

The petitioner placed on record extensive promotional materials (newspaper advertisements spanning decades), caution notices issued to trade associations and dealers, circulars warning against misuse, numerous successful civil suits and decrees against infringers over the years, and audited sales figures certified by a Chartered Accountant showing exponential growth from ≈ ₹81.43 lakh (FY 2007-08) to ≈ ₹2.09 crore (FY 2024-25).

The respondent no.1 (Alka Industrial Corporation, Ludhiana — geographically close to Jalandhar) applied for registration of **"AiC ARUN"** on January 17, 2007 claiming user from April 1, 2004. The mark was advertised in Trade Marks Journal No.1431 dated January 1, 2010 and registered (No.1524226 in Class 7) effective January 12, 2011. The Search Report dated October 23, 2007 cited the petitioner’s earlier "ARUN" registrations, yet no opposition was filed by the petitioner under Section 21. The respondent’s sales remained modest (≈ ₹10,800 in FY 2007-08 rising only to ≈ ₹4.54 lakh in FY 2024-25).

Both parties manufacture and sell identical goods (sewing machines and parts) through overlapping trade channels and consumer bases in Punjab and beyond.

### Procedural Background

The petitioner instituted rectification proceedings under Sections 47, 57 and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Delhi High Court seeking cancellation / removal / rectification of the entry relating to **"AiC ARUN"** on grounds of deceptive similarity, prior rights, bad faith adoption, and likelihood of confusion/deception. The matter was heard finally; judgment was reserved on January 19, 2026 and pronounced on February 9, 2026 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela.

### Reasoning and Decision of Court

The Court first recorded the petitioner’s unchallenged prior adoption and registrations dating back to the 1970s, together with continuous use since 1962, extensive advertising, trade vigilance (caution notices, circulars), successful enforcement litigation, and dramatic sales growth evidencing goodwill, reputation and secondary meaning acquired by "ARUN" in the sewing machine trade.

Rejecting the respondent’s principal defences, the Court held:

- **"ARUN" is not generic/publici juris** in this context — the respondent failed to produce any cogent evidence showing widespread third-party use; the petitioner’s long, uninterrupted, exclusive-style use + registrations + enforcement history conferred protectable distinctiveness and exclusivity.

- Mere addition of prefix "AiC" (even if denoting corporate name) does not eliminate deceptive similarity when the essential, dominant and distinctive feature remains **"ARUN"**. Phonetic identity, visual prominence of "ARUN", identical goods, identical trade channels, common consumer base, and geographical proximity create high likelihood of confusion for the average consumer with imperfect recollection.

- The argument that non-filing of opposition under Section 21 read with Section 23 forever bars rectification under Sections 47/57 was emphatically rejected. The Court reasoned that such an interpretation would create anomalous classes of registrants (those who opposed vs. those who did not), defeat the legislative intent behind rectification provisions, and leave genuine prior right holders without remedy in cases of honest oversight or lack of knowledge of advertisement.

- Reliance on **Surya Agro-Oils** (sun/solar system analogy) was misplaced as "ARUN" was not shown to be commonly used by multiple traders in sewing machines.

- The Division Bench ruling in **Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Limited** (2012) and Single Judge decision in **Greaves Cotton Ltd.** (2011) were followed to hold that appropriation of the essential feature of a senior mark by mere prefix/suffix does not avoid infringement or sustain a junior registration.

Instead of outright cancellation, the Court exercised discretion under Section 57 to direct **variation/rectification** by deletion of the word "ARUN" from "AiC ARUN", allowing the respondent to retain "AiC" and add other distinctive elements (if so advised) so as to maintain safe distance from the petitioner’s mark. The Registrar was directed to effect the rectification within six weeks.

### Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reaffirms and applies several important propositions:

- Long prior use + multiple registrations + extensive promotion + successful enforcement + geographical proximity + identical goods + common trade channels can clothe even a seemingly ordinary word ("ARUN") with strong secondary meaning and exclusivity in a given trade.

- Addition of a corporate prefix/abbreviation does not automatically immunize a mark from a charge of deceptive similarity when the senior mark’s essential feature remains the visually, phonetically and conceptually dominant component.

- Failure to oppose advertisement under Section 21 does not create an absolute bar to subsequent rectification/cancellation proceedings under Sections 47/57; the two remedies serve distinct purposes and co-exist to prevent anomalous outcomes.

- Rectification power under Section 57 is flexible — courts may direct partial variation/deletion instead of wholesale cancellation where the junior registrant has some user and the equities so permit.

### Case Detail

**Title:** Satya Paul Vs. Alka Industrial Corporation & Anr.  

**Date of Order:** 09.02.2026  

**Case Number:** C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 651/2022  

**Neutral Citation:** 2026:DHC:1038  

**Name of Court:** High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

**Name of Hon'ble Judge:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

**Disclaimer:** Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

**Written By:** Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

### Suggested Titles

1. Delhi High Court Directs Deletion of “ARUN” from “AiC ARUN” – Protects 60-Year-Old Sewing Machine Trademark Against Deceptively Similar Junior Mark  

2. Prior Use Since 1962 Trumps Later Registration: Delhi HC Orders Rectification of “AiC ARUN” in Favour of Senior “ARUN” Mark  

3. Mere Corporate Prefix Insufficient to Avoid Deceptive Similarity – Delhi High Court Mandates Variation of Registered Mark “AiC ARUN”  

4. Non-Opposition Does Not Bar Rectification: Delhi HC Clarifies Co-existence of Sections 21 & 57 in Trademark Law  

### Suggested Tags

trademark rectification, deceptive similarity, prior use, Section 57 Trade Marks Act, Section 47 cancellation, dominant feature, acquired distinctiveness, sewing machines trademark, Delhi High Court IPD, bad faith adoption, geographical proximity, honest concurrent use, publici juris defence, prefix addition, partial rectification

### Headnote

**Trade Marks Act, 1999 — Ss. 47, 57 — Rectification — Deceptive similarity — Prior registered mark “ARUN” used since 1962 for sewing machines — Later registered mark “AiC ARUN” — Dominant feature “ARUN” phonetically and visually identical — Addition of corporate prefix “AiC” insufficient to avoid confusion — Long uninterrupted use, multiple registrations, extensive promotion, successful enforcement and exponential sales growth confer distinctiveness and exclusivity — “ARUN” not generic/publici juris on facts — Non-opposition under S.21 no bar to rectification under Ss.47/57 — Directed deletion of “ARUN” from impugned mark with liberty to retain “AiC” + distinctive additions — Petition allowed with variation.**

=====

The petitioner, prior adopter and registered proprietor of the trademark **ARUN** since 1962 for sewing machines and parts in Class-7 (with registrations from 1976, 1984, and 2001, plus artistic label copyright in 1999), sought rectification/cancellation of the respondent's later-registered mark **AiC ARUN** (No.1524226, applied 2007 claiming user from 2004, registered 2010/2011) under Sections 47, 57 and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alleging deceptive similarity, prior rights, confusion in identical goods/trade channels, geographical proximity (Jalandhar vs Ludhiana), and mala fide adoption despite the respondent's knowledge of the petitioner's reputation. The respondent defended claiming no deceptive similarity due to the distinguishing prefix "AiC" (its corporate name), distinct get-up/packaging, "ARUN" being common/generic/publici juris in the sewing machine trade, lack of opposition to its advertisement under Section 21 barring later challenge, and modest sales causing no injury. The Delhi High Court, after examining evidence of the petitioner's long uninterrupted use, extensive promotion, caution notices, successful enforcement suits, and exponential sales growth establishing acquired distinctiveness and goodwill, held that "ARUN" was not generic on facts, the dominant essential feature "ARUN" remained phonetically/visually confusingly similar despite the prefix, and non-opposition under Section 21 did not bar rectification under Sections 47/57 as the remedies serve distinct purposes to avoid anomalous outcomes. Instead of full cancellation, the Court directed partial rectification by deletion of "ARUN" from "AiC ARUN", permitting retention of "AiC" with liberty to add other distinctive elements for safe distance, with compliance by the Registrar within six weeks.

**Points of law settled:**

- Long prior continuous use since 1962, multiple registrations (1976 onwards), extensive promotion, trade vigilance via caution notices/circulars, successful enforcement decrees, and substantial sales growth can confer strong secondary meaning, goodwill, reputation, and exclusivity even on an ordinary word like "ARUN" in a specific trade, rejecting generic/publici juris defence absent cogent evidence of widespread third-party use (paras 26, 31, 33).

- Mere addition of a corporate prefix ("AiC") does not eliminate deceptive similarity where the senior mark’s essential/dominant feature ("ARUN") remains the visually, phonetically and conceptually predominant component, likely to confuse average consumers with imperfect recollection in identical goods, trade channels and geographical proximity (paras 33, 35–36).

- Failure to file opposition under Section 21 against advertisement does not create an absolute/forever bar to subsequent rectification/cancellation proceedings under Sections 47/57; the provisions co-exist to prevent anomalous classification of right-holders and preserve remedies for genuinely aggrieved prior registrants (paras 37).

- Rectification power under Section 57 is flexible, permitting partial variation/deletion of confusing elements rather than wholesale cancellation where equities (modest junior user/sales) permit, ensuring safe distance while protecting senior rights (para 41).

**Case Title:** Satya Paul v. Alka Industrial Corporation & Anr.  

**Order date:** 09.02.2026  

**Case Number:** C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 651/2022  

**Neutral Citation:** 2026:DHC:1038  

**Name of court:** High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

**Name of Judge:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

=====

Yokogawa Electric Corporation Vs. Union of India

Introduction: The case of Yokogawa Electric Corporation v. Union of India represents a significant judicial pronouncement on the procedural rigours governing trademark opposition proceedings in India, particularly concerning the nature of time limits prescribed for filing evidence in support of opposition under the Trade Marks Rules. Decided by the High Court of Madras, the judgment underscores the imperative of adhering to strict timelines in trademark disputes to prevent undue delays in the registration process. 

The court was confronted with a challenge to the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks' refusal to accept belated evidence filed by the opponent, raising a pivotal question that has divided judicial opinions across various High Courts: whether the time limits under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 (and by extension, analogous provisions in subsequent rules) are mandatory or directory. By aligning itself with the stricter interpretation adopted by the Delhi High Court and rejecting the more lenient view of the Gujarat High Court, the Madras High Court reinforced the policy objective of expediting trademark registrations while curtailing procedural indulgences that could prolong opposition proceedings indefinitely.

Factual Background: Yokogawa Electric Corporation, a Japanese entity renowned globally for its solutions in industrial automation, control, test, and measurement, has long used the trademark CENTUM/CENTUM. Upon discovering that Centum Industries Pvt. Ltd., the third respondent, had applied for registration of a similar mark in Class 09 under Application No. 1587782, Yokogawa promptly filed a Notice of Opposition on 17 November 2011. The third respondent's counter-statement was served on Yokogawa on 19 March 2012, triggering the period for filing evidence in support of the opposition. Yokogawa sought extensions of time, first until 19 June 2012 and subsequently until 19 September 2012, citing the need to collate documents from its offices spread across multiple countries. Eventually, on 24 August 2012, Yokogawa filed an interlocutory petition along with an affidavit of evidence, which was served on the third respondent. However, the Deputy Registrar rejected this evidence vide order dated 21 October 2014, holding that Rule 50 evidence is mandatory and that the Registrar lacks power to extend time beyond the prescribed limits, relying on decisions of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).

Procedural Background: The opposition proceedings commenced with Yokogawa's timely notice of opposition, followed by the third respondent's counter-statement. Under the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, Rule 50 mandated that evidence in support of opposition be filed within two months of receipt of the counter-statement, extendable by the Registrar for a further period not exceeding one month in aggregate. Yokogawa's requests for extensions and subsequent filing through an interlocutory petition fell outside this window. The Deputy Registrar's impugned order explicitly declined to take the late evidence on record, emphasising the binding nature of IPAB precedents that curtailed the Registrar's discretion. Aggrieved, Yokogawa filed the writ petition under Article 226 in 2015 (after receiving the order copy that year), seeking certiorarified mandamus to quash the Registrar's order and direct acceptance of the evidence. 

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The Madras High Court looked into conflicting judicial precedents on the interpretation of Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules. It noted the Gujarat High Court's view in Wyeth Holdings that the provision was directory, drawing from principles of subordinate legislation and the Supreme Court's observations in Salem Advocate Bar Association regarding the contextual interpretation of the word "shall". In contrast, the court placed greater reliance on Delhi High Court decisions in Sunrider Corporation v. Hindustan Lever Limited and Mahesh Gupta v. Registrar of Trademarks, which highlighted deliberate legislative changes: the inclusion of "not exceeding one month in aggregate" as a cap on extensions and the removal of discretionary phrases like "unless the Registrar otherwise directs" from earlier rules. These amendments, the Delhi High Court reasoned, manifested a clear intent to make the timeline mandatory and to deem opposition abandoned upon non-compliance. The Madras High Court found this reasoning persuasive, observing that even under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 (where the one-month extension phrase was omitted), the absence of discretionary language reinforced the mandatory nature. The court emphasised the Trade Marks Registry's policy of strict timelines to prevent opponents from indefinitely stalling registrations. Consequently, it held that the Registrar lacked power to condone delays beyond the prescribed period, dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit, and upheld the impugned order without costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles, within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, that the time limit for filing evidence in support of trademark opposition under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 (and corresponding provisions in the 2017 Rules) is mandatory rather than directory. The Registrar possesses no discretion to extend time beyond the statutory maximum of one month aggregate extension under the 2002 Rules, and failure to file evidence within the overall three-month window results in deemed abandonment of the opposition. By expressly preferring the Delhi High Court's interpretation over that of the Gujarat High Court and the IPAB's earlier view in Sahil Kohli (which treated similar provisions under the 2017 Rules as directory by invoking Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999), the court has aligned itself with a stricter construction that prioritises expeditious disposal of trademark applications. This ruling reinforces the legislative intent evident from deliberate drafting changes aimed at curtailing delays and establishes that procedural lapses in opposition evidence cannot be condoned indefinitely, thereby promoting certainty and efficiency in trademark adjudication.

Case Title: Yokogawa Electric Corporation Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 10.10.2025

Case Number: W.P. No. 5703 of 2016

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice M. Dhandapani

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

Mandatory Timelines in Trademark Opposition: Madras High Court Upholds Strict Compliance in Yokogawa Electric Corporation v. Union of India

Deemed Abandonment of Opposition: Analysing the Mandatory Nature of Evidence Filing under Trade Marks Rules

Yokogawa Electric Corporation v. Union of India: Reinforcing Procedural Rigour in Trademark Opposition Proceedings

Suggested Tags

Trademark Law, Opposition Proceedings, Rule 50 Trade Marks Rules 2002, Mandatory vs Directory Provisions, Deemed Abandonment, Madras High Court, Delhi High Court Precedents, Trade Marks Registry, Evidence Filing Timeline, Intellectual Property Law

Headnote

Madras High Court holds that time limit for filing evidence in support of trademark opposition under Rule 50 of Trade Marks Rules, 2002 is mandatory; Registrar lacks discretion to condone delay beyond one month aggregate extension; opposition deemed abandoned upon non-compliance; court prefers Delhi High Court's strict interpretation over Gujarat High Court's directory view; writ petition challenging refusal to accept belated evidence dismissed.

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Yokogawa Electric Corporation, a Japanese entity using the trademark CENTUM worldwide, opposed the registration of a similar mark applied for by Centum Industries Pvt. Ltd. in Class 09 under Application No.1587782, filing a Notice of Opposition on 17.11.2011. The counter-statement was served on Yokogawa on 19.03.2012, triggering the period to file evidence in support of opposition under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002. Yokogawa sought extensions and eventually filed evidence via interlocutory petition on 24.08.2012, which the Deputy Registrar rejected on 21.10.2014, holding Rule 50 evidence mandatory with no power to extend time beyond the prescribed limits.

Yokogawa challenged this order via writ petition in 2015, relying on Gujarat High Court's directory interpretation in Wyeth Holdings, while respondents cited Delhi High Court's mandatory view in Aman Engineering Works and others. The Madras High Court agreed with the Delhi High Court's reasoning on deliberate legislative changes capping extensions at one month aggregate and removing Registrar's discretion, held the timeline mandatory even under analogous 2017 Rules, upheld the rejection, and dismissed the writ as devoid of merit.

• The time limit for filing evidence in support of trademark opposition under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 is mandatory, with the Registrar having no discretion to extend beyond one month aggregate (total three months from service of counter-statement), leading to deemed abandonment upon non-compliance [Paras 11, 12].
• The removal of discretionary phrases and inclusion of "not exceeding one month in aggregate" in Rule 50(1) of 2002 Rules manifests legislative intent for strict timelines; similar mandatory nature applies even under Rule 45 of Trade Marks Rules, 2017 despite omission of extension phrase [Paras 10,(46)].

Case Title: Yokogawa Electric Corporation Vs. Union of India:10.10.2025:W.P. No. 5703 of 2016:MadHC:The Honourable Mr. Justice M. Dhandapani

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Thukral Mechanical Works Vs. PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction: The batch of appeals decided by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court , represents a watershed moment in Indian trademark jurisprudence. For the first time, an Indian court has directly confronted and resolved the theoretical “impasse” identified by Kerly’s authoritative treatise on trademarks, where a validly registered proprietor who commences use belatedly faces a prior continuous user who has built substantial goodwill before such commencement. The Court recognised that in such circumstances the registered proprietor can restrain the prior user on infringement while the prior user can simultaneously restrain the registered proprietor on passing off, resulting in mutual restraint. This nuanced, equitable outcome preserves the sanctity of registration under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 while protecting common law rights in goodwill, without allowing one to wholly trump the other absent the specific conditions of Section 33.

Factual Background:  The dispute centres on the word mark FIELDMARSHAL/FIELD MARSHAL in Class 7. Jain Industries secured registration of FIELD MARSHAL with effect from 13 May 1965 for goods including centrifugal pumps, though it never commercially used the mark on centrifugal pumps. On 30 May 1986 Jain assigned the mark along with goodwill to Thukral Mechanical Works, which commenced use on centrifugal pumps only in 1988. PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd., registered proprietor of FIELDMARSHAL since 1964 for diesel oil engines, commenced use of the identical mark on centrifugal pumps from 1975. By 1988 PMD had amassed enormous reputation and goodwill in FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps, evidenced by crores in sales, extensive advertising, nationwide dealer networks and banking approvals.

Procedural Background:  Litigation commenced in 1985 when PMD instituted suit against Thukral alleging passing off and infringement, obtaining an ex-parte injunction that was later modified  permitting Thukral to use the mark with disclaimers. PMD also sought rectification of Jain/Thukral’s registration  under Section 46 for non-use. Thukral countered with suit  seeking injunction against PMD for infringement. Prolonged proceedings included a  Supreme Court judgment clarifying that non-use by the assignor Jain could not invalidate Thukral’s registration absent challenge to the assignment and impleadment of Jain. After the Single Judge largely favoured PMD by cancelling Thukral’s registration, decreeing PMD’s passing-off suit and allowing PMD’s writ petitions for further registrations, multiple appeals and LPAs were preferred, culminating in the present Division Bench decision.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:  The Division Bench  analysed the Kerly impasse, holding that the Supreme Court’s  finding of infringement by PMD was binding and the Single Judge erred in cancelling Thukral’s registration contrary to that mandate. Non-use by Jain could not be attributed to bona fide assignee Thukral without impleading Jain and proving speculative assignment, neither of which occurred. Thukral’s registration thus remained valid, entitling it to restrain PMD under Section 28(1) read with Section 29 for infringement . Simultaneously, PMD’s continuous unchallenged use from 1975 to 1988 generated substantial trans-border reputation and goodwill protectable under common law passing off. Applying principles from Neon Laboratories, S. Syed Mohideen, N.R. Dongre and Whirlpool, PMD was entitled to restrain Thukral . The Court held that goodwill, while foundational to passing off, is no defence to statutory infringement absent Section 33 protection, which did not apply as PMD’s use post-dated Jain’s 1965 registration. Section 27(2) preserves passing-off rights but does not erode infringement remedies under Section 28(1). Resultantly, both suits were decreed to the extent of permanent injunctions against the opposite party using the mark for centrifugal pumps, rectification was dismissed, and PMD’s applications for registration in regional languages were rejected under Section 12(1). No accounts or damages were awarded, and parties bore their own costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment authoritatively settles the application of the Kerly Impasse in Indian law. Where a valid registration predates the defendant’s use but the plaintiff’s own use commences after the defendant has built substantial goodwill through continuous prior use, both parties possess concurrent enforceable rights. The registered proprietor is entitled to injunction for infringement as goodwill is not a defence thereto except under Section 33. Conversely, the prior user with goodwill is entitled to injunction for passing off as registration is no defence thereto by virtue of Section 27(2). The equitable consequence is mutual permanent restraint from using the mark for the disputed goods, preventing either party from exploiting the mark while preserving the integrity of both statutory and common law protections. This balanced approach ensures neither registration nor goodwill achieves absolute supremacy absent statutory priority of use, providing definitive guidance for future concurrent rights conflicts.

Case Title: Thukral Mechanical Works v. PM Diesels Private Limited & Anr.

Date of Order: 6 February 2026

Case Numbers: LPA 320/2024

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:966-DB

Court: High Court of Delhi (Division Bench)

Hon’ble Judges: Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Title Suggestions:Resolving the Kerly Impasse: Delhi High Court Grants Mutual Permanent Injunctions in the Historic FIELDMARSHAL Trademark War

Mutual Restraint in Trademark Law: Delhi High Court’s Landmark Decision Balancing Registration Rights and Prior User Goodwill in Thukral v. PM Diesels

From Impasse to Equitable Resolution: The Delhi High Court’s Mutual Injunction Ruling in the Four-Decade FIELDMARSHAL Dispute

Tags: KerlyImpasse, MutualInjunction, TrademarkInfringement, PassingOff, PriorUserGoodwill,  FieldMarshalTrademark, DelhiHighCourt,  ThukralMechanicalWorks, PMDiesels,  IndianTrademarkLaw, Section28TMAct, Section27(2)TMAct, 

Headnote: In a groundbreaking judgment dated 6 February 2026, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court  resolved the classic “Kerly Impasse” in trademark law by granting mutual permanent injunctions restraining both the registered proprietor (Thukral Mechanical Works) and the prior continuous user (PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd.) from using the marks FIELD MARSHAL/FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps, thereby balancing statutory registration rights with common law goodwill acquired through prior use.

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The dispute involves the marks FIELD MARSHAL (registered by Jain Industries in 1965 for centrifugal pumps, assigned to Thukral Mechanical Works in 1986 with use starting 1988) and FIELDMARSHAL (used by PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd. since 1975 on centrifugal pumps, building substantial goodwill, though registered only for diesel engines).

PMD sued in 1985 for passing off and sought rectification for non-use; Thukral countersued in 1992 for infringement. The Supreme Court in 2008 held PMD's use infringed the registration. The Single Judge cancelled Thukral's registration and decreed PMD's passing off claim. On appeals, the Division Bench restored Thukral's valid registration (non-use by assignor not attributable to bona fide assignee absent proper challenge), decreed Thukral's infringement suit while upholding PMD's passing off suit on goodwill grounds, and resolved the Kerly impasse by granting mutual permanent injunctions restraining both parties from using the marks for centrifugal pumps, with no damages or costs.

Points of Law Settled:

Valid registration confers exclusive rights under Section 28(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, entitling the proprietor to injunction for infringement even against a prior user whose use post-dates registration; goodwill is no defence absent Section 33 protection (Paras 101-126, 146-176).

Continuous prior use generating substantial goodwill supports passing off action under Section 27(2), and registration is no defence thereto (Paras 1-14, 79-100).

In a Kerly impasse scenario (valid registration with delayed use vs. post-registration prior continuous use with goodwill), both parties hold concurrent rights leading to mutual permanent injunctions restraining use by either (Paras 1-14, 221-223).

Non-use by assignor cannot lead to rectification against bona fide assignee without impleading assignor and proving speculative assignment (Paras 131-145, 146-176).

Diesel engines and centrifugal pumps are allied/cognate goods (Paras 38-41).

Case Title: Thukral Mechanical Works v. PM Diesels Private Limited :06.02.2026: LPA 320/2024: 2026:DHC:966-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Neelam Gupta Vs Esme Consumer Pvt Ltd.

Neelam Gupta, claiming to be the registered proprietor of the trademark "GRACE HEAVEN" since 2019 and using it continuously for cosmetics and allied goods with distinctive trade dress and logo, filed a suit in the Calcutta High Court for groundless threats under Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957, based on a cease-and-desist notice dated 4 September 2025 issued by Esme Consumer Private Limited (registered proprietor of "HEAVEN" for similar goods) and another. 

Without replying to the notice initially, the petitioner sought interlocutory reliefs; she replied only on 26 September 2025 after filing the suit. Subsequently, the respondent filed an infringement suit CS-(COM)/476/2025 before the Commercial Court at Saket, New Delhi. 

The respondent argued that the groundless threats suit must be dismissed due to the subsequent infringement action filed with due diligence. The petitioner contended that the suit could not be dismissed without a formal Order VII Rule 11 application, that damages survive independently, and that partial rejection of the plaint is impermissible. 

The Court held that once an infringement suit is instituted with due diligence, the groundless threats action becomes infructuous as the threats cease to be groundless, the cause of action extinguishes, and consequential damages claims linked solely to such threats also fail, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and fulfill the legislative intent of the provisions; no separate independent cause of action was pleaded, the Court can dismiss suo moto without formal application, and cited precedents supported this view while distinguishing the petitioner's authorities on facts.

Key legal principles settled:

Once the person making threats commences and prosecutes with due diligence an infringement action against the threatened party, the suit for groundless threats under Section 142(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957 becomes infructuous and ceases to apply, as the threats are no longer groundless (Para 11).

No formal application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is mandatorily required for dismissal; the Court has a duty to reject the plaint suo moto if barred by law (Para 14).

Case Title:Neelam Gupta Vs Esme Consumer Pvt Ltd.:30.01.2026:IP-COM/47/2025:2026:CHC-OS:39:CalHC: HOn'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Parul Ruparella Vs. Camme Wang

Parul Ruparella and another (appellants/plaintiffs) filed a suit for trademark infringement and passing off against Camme Wang and another (respondents, Chinese entities) in respect of their registered Indian trademark “PL SUPREME” for torch lights and components. The appellants alleged that the respondents, who previously manufactured and supplied goods to them under purchase orders, started infringing the mark by using it independently. An ex parte interim injunction was initially granted, but vacated after contested hearing by the Single Judge on 5 December 2025, who dismissed the interim applications (GA-COM/1/2025 and GA-COM/3/2025 for injunction and receiver). 

The Division Bench upheld the vacation, finding that the respondents prima facie established continuous uninterrupted prior use in India through a properly verified supplementary affidavit dated 10 November 2025 containing supporting documents (which the appellants did not substantively deny), despite defects in the principal affidavit-in-opposition. The court held that allegations of fabrication/interpolation were not apparent at the prima facie stage and could be tested at trial, that sales to the appellants did not negate independent prior use, and that the appellants failed to make out a strong prima facie case, with balance of convenience and irreparable injury not favouring injunction. Directions regarding alleged under-invoicing/tax evasion were kept in abeyance till final hearing. The appeal was dismissed with observations being prima facie only.

Points of Law Settled

In a suit for infringement based on a registered trademark, the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to interim injunction unless the defendant prima facie establishes continuous uninterrupted prior use in India; however, where the defendant discloses sufficient materials (especially through a properly verified supplementary affidavit incorporating prior annexures) to show such prior use, and allegations of fabrication are not glaringly apparent, injunction can be refused at the interim stage (Para 17–20).  

Defective verification of the principal affidavit-in-opposition (lacking proper segregation of statements true to knowledge) renders it unreliable, but a subsequent supplementary affidavit that is properly affirmed and jurat-containing, and which independently supports prior use, can be relied upon at the prima facie stage (Para 16–18).  

At the interim injunction stage in trademark matters, the court need not conclusively determine issues of fabrication, interpolation or volume/extent of prior use, which are better left for trial; the focus remains on whether a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury favour the plaintiff (Para 19, 22).  

Prior use claimed through sales exclusively to the plaintiff (without agency documents) does not necessarily negate independent continuous prior use if other materials prima facie support it (Para 8, 20).  

Observations and findings at the interim stage (including on prior use) are prima facie only and do not bind the parties at final trial (Para 27).

Case Title: Parul Ruparella Vs. Camme Wang :04.02.2026:APO-IPD/1/2026 : 2026:CHC:37-DB  Hon’ble Justice Debangsu Basak & Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

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Yangtze Memory Technologies Co Ltd Vs Union of India

Yangtze Memory Technologies Co Ltd filed Indian Patent Application No. 202127020980 (parent application) on 9 May 2021 claiming priority from PCT/CN2018/119908 dated 7 December 2018 for a novel 3D NAND memory device and method. The First Examination Report issued on 23 May 2022 objected under Section 10(5) for plurality of inventions not linked by a single inventive concept. After response, hearing on 8 July 2024, and written submissions on 22 July 2024 (wherein petitioner expressly recorded intent to file divisional application if objections persisted and noted Controller's assurance of extended hearing), the Controller unexpectedly granted the patent on 26 July 2024 without further notice or hearing, thereby closing the window for filing a divisional application. The petitioner immediately attempted to file the divisional application and related petitions under Rules 137/138 but was prevented by the e-filing system; despite repeated communications, the grant stood. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking setting aside of the grant order and direction to permit filing of divisional application. The court dismissed the writ after observing that post grant of Parent Patent, no application for divisional application can be filed.

Points of Law Settled:

  

Where an applicant expressly records intent to file a divisional application in written submissions post-hearing and the Controller acknowledges the same while assuring further/extended hearing, sudden grant of the parent application without prior notice or promised hearing deprives the applicant of the statutory right to file a divisional application under Section 16 and violates principles of natural justice (Para 8.5–8.8).  

The Controller is obliged to afford reasonable opportunity (including promised extended hearing) before finally deciding grant especially when applicant has flagged plurality of inventions and conditional intent for divisional filing; failure to do so renders the grant order procedurally infirm and liable to be set aside (Para 8.3–8.5, 10–12). 

 

Post-grant attempts to file divisional application are statutorily barred under Section 16(1) as the window closes upon grant of the parent; however, where grant occurs due to procedural irregularity and denial of natural justice, the Court may quash the grant and restore the application to enable divisional filing (Para 8.6–8.7, 13–15).  

Bona fide diligence by applicant (prompt communication, repeated attempts to file divisional despite system disablement) supports exercise of writ jurisdiction to correct patent office error and prevent miscarriage of justice (Para 8.6–8.7).

Case Title: Yangtze Memory Technologies Co Ltd Vs Union of India:03.02.2026:W.P.(C)-IPD 10/2025: 2026:DHC:981: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

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UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufactures Association

Introduction: In this significant decision, the High Court at Calcutta, Intellectual Property Rights Division, has underscored the imperative of maintaining distinct procedural pathways for the examination of patent applications under Sections 14 and 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, and the adjudication of pre-grant oppositions under Section 25(1) of the same Act. The case of UPL Limited versus Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association & Anr. highlights the consequences of procedural consolidation where separate hearings and reasoned orders are mandated by the statutory framework. The judgment remands a rejected patent application for fresh consideration, emphasizing adherence to principles of natural justice and the independent character of examination and opposition proceedings. This ruling aligns with recent judicial trends that seek to prevent the conflation of these distinct stages while ensuring that the Controller of Patents exercises independent scrutiny untainted by mechanical adoption of third-party submissions.

Factual Background:  The dispute centers on a patent application filed by UPL Limited on 26 March 2018, bearing number 201831011137, titled “Herbicidal Combinations.” The claimed invention pertains to synergistic herbicidal compositions combining active ingredients from three distinct classes: a triazolone herbicide, a Photosystem II inhibitor herbicide, and either an ALS inhibitor herbicide from the imidazolinone family or a bleacher herbicide. The applicant asserted that these combinations exhibited unexpected synergistic efficacy in controlling undesirable weeds, an advantage not achievable when the individual components were applied alone. The application was published on 27 September 2019. Following examination, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) on 24 January 2020, raising objections primarily on grounds of lack of novelty and inventive step. In response, the applicant amended the claims by deleting the compound amicarbazone and submitted data purporting to demonstrate synergistic effects. Subsequently, the Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association filed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) on 30 September 2020, contesting the application on multiple grounds including lack of novelty, obviousness, and the invention constituting a mere admixture falling within the prohibition under Section 3(e) of the Act. After a combined hearing on 7 April 2022 and written submissions, the Controller passed an order dated 27 April 2023 rejecting the application, relying inter alia on prior art documents introduced during the opposition.

Procedural Background:  The procedural timeline reveals a sequence that ultimately became the focal point of challenge. After publication, the FER cited six prior art documents that mirrored those identified in the International Search Report. The applicant responded on 22 July 2020, expressly requesting a hearing under Section 14 should the Controller remain dissatisfied. No separate hearing was afforded at the examination stage. The pre-grant opposition introduced additional prior art documents (D3 to D5) beyond those common with the FER (D1 and D2). A single hearing addressed both the outstanding examination objections and the opposition grounds. The Controller thereafter issued a composite order rejecting the application without delineating which portions addressed examination objections under Section 15 and which disposed of the opposition under Section 25(1). Aggrieved, UPL Limited preferred an appeal under Section 117A of the Act, contending that the consolidation violated statutory mandates and principles of natural justice. The private opponent and the Controller defended the procedure, asserting that consolidation was permissible and that the order was adequately reasoned.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:  The court examined the statutory architecture of the Patents Act and Rules, concluding that examination proceedings under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) constitute distinct and independent stages. The court observed that Rule 55(5) permits simultaneous decision of the application and representation but does not authorize merger of hearings or obliteration of procedural separation. Where objections in the FER differ from those in the opposition, and particularly where new prior art emerges only in opposition, separate hearings are obligatory to afford the applicant a meaningful opportunity to address each set of concerns. The court found that the applicant had expressly sought a hearing in response to the FER, a request that went unheeded. Furthermore, the inability to locate one cited prior art document (D4) and the absence of any response from the Controller compounded the prejudice. The composite order was held vitiated by its failure to distinguish between examination and opposition findings, rendering it impossible to discern independent application of mind by the Controller. The court noted with concern the Controller’s near-verbatim reproduction of the opponent’s submissions, concluding that such mechanical adoption evidenced absence of reasoned scrutiny. Drawing upon precedents including Gilead Pharmasset LLC v. Union of India (2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014) and the recent Division Bench ruling in Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Limited (2024 SCC OnLine Del 152), the court reaffirmed that pre-grant opposition serves an assistive rather than adversarial role, and opponents possess no locus to participate in pure examination proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the application remanded to a different Controller for fresh consideration with directions to afford separate hearings and pass a speaking order within twelve weeks.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment crystallizes several critical propositions in Indian patent jurisprudence. First, examination under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) are separate and independent proceedings that must ordinarily be heard and decided distinctly, particularly when objections or prior art differ between stages. Consolidation, while permissible in appropriate cases for simultaneous disposal, cannot extinguish the applicant’s statutory right to separate hearings where prejudice is demonstrated. Second, a composite order addressing both streams must clearly demarcate portions relating to examination and opposition respectively, failing which it stands vitiated. Third, the Controller is obliged to apply independent mind and furnish reasons, and mechanical adoption of an opponent’s submissions constitutes abdication of quasi-judicial function. Fourth, pre-grant opponents enjoy no right of audience or participation in the examination process, their role being confined to aiding the Controller through representation on specified grounds. Fifth, violation of these procedural safeguards amounts to breach of natural justice warranting remand, even mindful of the general reluctance to remit matters to expert tribunals. The decision thus reinforces the structural separation articulated in Novartis and allied rulings, ensuring that the expeditious yet rigorous framework envisaged by the legislature remains intact.

Case Title: UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association & Anr. 

Date of Order: 05.02.2026 

Case Number: IPDPTA No.116 of 2023 

Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta, Intellectual Property Rights Division 

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

Calcutta High Court Emphasizes Procedural Separation in Patent Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition: Analysis of UPL Ltd. v. Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association

Remand for Procedural Infirmity: Calcutta High Court Reinforces Independent Examination and Opposition Stages under the Patents Act

Distinct Hearings and Reasoned Orders Mandatory: Key Takeaways from UPL Limited’s Successful Patent Appeal

Safeguarding Natural Justice in Patent Grants: The UPL Herbicide Combination Case

Suggested Tags

Patent Law, Pre-Grant Opposition, Section 25(1) Patents Act, Examination Proceedings, Section 14-15 Patents Act, Procedural Fairness, Natural Justice, Composite Orders, Synergistic Herbicide Combinations, Indian Patent Office, Calcutta High Court, Remand in Patent Appeals, Inventive Step, Section 3(e) Objection

Headnote

Patents Act, 1970 — Sections 14, 15, 25(1) and Rule 55(5) — Examination and pre-grant opposition — Distinct and independent proceedings — Requirement of separate hearings where objections or prior art differ — Composite order must demarcate examination and opposition findings — Mechanical adoption of opponent’s submissions vitiates order — Violation of natural justice warrants remand to different Controller for fresh consideration — Appeal allowed.

Held: Where FER objections and opposition grounds are not identical and new prior art is introduced in opposition, separate hearings under Sections 14 and 25(1) are mandatory. Controller must independently apply mind and provide reasons. Pre-grant opponent has no locus in examination proceedings. Matter remanded for de novo consideration with liberty to all parties on merits. (Paras 8–14)

Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Limited (2024 SCC OnLine Del 152) and Gilead Pharmasset LLC v. Union of India (2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014) followed.

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The Calcutta High Court, in a significant ruling delivered by Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur, has set aside the rejection of a patent application for a herbicidal composition filed by UPL Limited. The court found serious procedural irregularities in the manner in which the Controller of Patents handled the pre-grant opposition and the examination process concurrently, without affording separate hearings as contemplated under the Patents Act, 1970. The matter has been remanded for fresh consideration by a different Controller, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory separation between examination proceedings and pre-grant opposition proceedings, along with strict compliance with principles of natural justice.

**Introduction**

This judgment addresses a critical aspect of Indian patent prosecution involving the interplay between the examination of patent applications under Sections 14 and 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, and pre-grant oppositions filed under Section 25(1). The court examined whether these distinct statutory stages can be merged into a single composite order without separate hearings, particularly when new prior art documents are introduced during opposition that were not part of the First Examination Report (FER). The decision reinforces the independent nature of these proceedings, the mandatory requirement of reasoned orders with independent application of mind, and the limited participatory role of pre-grant opponents in the examination stage. It draws heavily on precedents emphasizing procedural fairness in quasi-judicial patent decisions and highlights that procedural lapses vitiating natural justice warrant remand, even in technical matters.

**Factual Background**

UPL Limited filed Patent Application No. 201831011137 on March 26, 2018, claiming a herbicidal combination for controlling undesirable plants (weeds). The invention involved a synergistic composition comprising a Triazolone herbicide, a Photosystem II inhibitor herbicide, and either an ALS inhibitor (from Imidazolinone class) or a bleacher herbicide. The applicant asserted that the combination exhibited unexpected synergistic weed control, superior to individual components. The application was published on September 27, 2019. A First Examination Report was issued on January 24, 2020, raising objections including lack of novelty, inventive step, and sufficiency. In response, filed on July 22, 2020, the applicant amended Claim 1 by deleting the compound amicarbazone to overcome novelty objections and requested a hearing under Section 14. A pre-grant opposition was filed by Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association (respondent no.1) on September 30, 2020, under Section 25(1), alleging lack of novelty (Section 25(1)(b)), lack of inventive step (Section 25(1)(e)), and the invention being a mere admixture not qualifying as an invention under Section 3(e). The opposition introduced additional prior arts (D3 to D5) not cited in the FER. Hearings and written submissions followed, culminating in a composite impugned order dated April 27, 2023, rejecting the application.

**Procedural Background**

The applicant challenged the impugned order before the Calcutta High Court in IPDPTA No.116 of 2023. The primary grievance centered on procedural violations: no separate hearing was granted under Section 14 despite the explicit request in the FER reply; the Controller passed a single composite order disposing of both examination and opposition proceedings without delineating portions attributable to each; new prior arts introduced in opposition were considered without adequate opportunity to respond; the impugned order mechanically reproduced the opponent's submissions without independent reasoning or analysis of the applicant's data and arguments; and one cited prior art (D4) was untraceable and not provided despite requests. The Controller defended the consolidation as permissible, while the opponent supported the rejection on substantive grounds including lack of synergy proof and admixture nature.

**Reasoning and Decision of Court**

The court held that examination under Sections 14-15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) constitute distinct, independent stages under the statutory scheme. The opponent has no right of audience or participation in the examination proceeding, which remains confined between the applicant and the Controller. Reliance was placed on Novartis AG vs Natco Pharma Limited (2024 SCC OnLine Del 152), which clarified that opposition aids but does not supplant or merge with independent examination; the opponent's hearing right under Rule 55(5) is limited to the representation grounds. The court found a serious procedural infirmity in the composite order without separate hearings, especially since objections and prior arts differed between FER and opposition. This denied natural justice, as the applicant could not adequately address new citations. The impugned order lacked reasons, mechanically adopted opponent's views without dealing with applicant's submissions, data, or case laws, violating the principle that reasons form the soul of quasi-judicial orders (S.N. Mukherjee vs Union of India). The court distinguished cases cited by the opponent on sufficiency, noting such grounds were not the basis of rejection and the opponent lacked locus in appeal on waived FER objections. Finding violation of natural justice and procedural impropriety going to the root, the court remanded the matter to a different Controller for fresh consideration after adequate hearings and consideration of all materials, without expressing views on merits. The remand was directed within twelve weeks from communication of the order.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**

The judgment settles that pre-grant opposition and patent application examination are statutorily separate proceedings that cannot be merged into a single composite order without separate hearings under Sections 14 and 25(1) respectively, particularly when new prior arts or distinct objections arise in opposition. The Controller must pass reasoned orders with independent application of mind, and failure to provide requested hearings under Section 14, or to delineate statutory stages in composite orders, constitutes violation of natural justice warranting setting aside and remand. Pre-grant opponents have no participatory right in examination proceedings, and their role is confined to aiding holistic assessment without overriding the Controller's independent duty.

**Case Detail**

- **Title**: UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufactures Association & Anr.

- **Date of Order**: 05.02.2026

- **Case Number**: IPDPTA No.116 of 2023

- **Neutral Citation**: (Not available in public domain records as of current date; may be assigned subsequently by the Calcutta High Court registry)

- **Name of Court**: High Court at Calcutta (Intellectual Property Rights Division, Original Side)

- **Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

**Disclaimer**: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

**Suggested Titles for the Article**

1. Calcutta High Court Remands UPL Herbicidal Patent Rejection: Mandates Separate Hearings for Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition

2. Procedural Fairness in Patent Prosecution: Calcutta HC Sets Aside Composite Rejection Order for Violating Natural Justice

3. Separation of Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition Proceedings: Landmark Clarification by Calcutta High Court in UPL Limited Case

4. Natural Justice Prevails: Calcutta HC Quashes Patent Refusal Due to Merged Proceedings and Lack of Reasons

**Suggested Tags**

Patent Law, Pre-Grant Opposition, Section 25(1) Patents Act, Section 14 & 15 Hearing, Natural Justice in Patent Proceedings, Composite Order Invalidity, Remand by Calcutta High Court, Herbicidal Composition Patent, UPL Limited Judgment, Procedural Irregularity in IPO, Inventive Step Rejection, Synergistic Herbicidal Combinations

**Headnote**

Calcutta High Court allows appeal against rejection of patent application for herbicidal combinations; sets aside impugned order for procedural infirmity in merging examination and pre-grant opposition without separate hearings, lack of reasoned independent application of mind, and violation of natural justice; matter remanded for fresh consideration by different Controller within 12 weeks, leaving merits open; reinforces statutory distinction between Sections 14-15 and 25(1) proceedings.

==========

UPL Limited's patent application for a herbicidal combination comprising Triazolone herbicide, Photosystem II inhibitor, and either ALS inhibitor (Imidazolinone) or bleacher herbicide was rejected by the Controller via a composite order dated 27 April 2023 on grounds of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and being a mere admixture under Section 3(e) following a pre-grant opposition by Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association.

The applicant challenged the order before the Calcutta High Court alleging procedural violations including no separate hearing under Section 14 despite request, merger of examination and opposition proceedings into one order without delineation, consideration of new prior arts (D3–D5) introduced only in opposition without adequate opportunity, mechanical adoption of opponent's submissions without independent reasoning or analysis of applicant's data, and lack of reasons.

The Court found serious procedural infirmity and violation of natural justice, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to a different Controller for fresh consideration after affording proper hearings and full consideration of materials, without expressing any view on merits, directing completion within twelve weeks.

Law Point Settled:

Examination proceedings under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) are distinct, independent stages that cannot be merged into a single composite order without separate hearings, particularly when new prior arts or different objections arise in opposition (Para 8–10, 14).

The pre-grant opponent has no right of audience or participation in the examination proceeding, which remains confined between the applicant and the Controller; the opponent's hearing right under Rule 55(5) is limited to the opposition representation (Para 8, 12).

- Passing a composite order without delineating portions attributable to Section 14/15 and Section 25(1), and without granting a requested hearing under Section 14, constitutes serious procedural irregularity and violation of natural justice warranting setting aside of the order (Para 10, 14, relying on Gilead Pharmasset LLC v Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014).

Case Title: UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufactures Association:05.02.2026:IPDPTA No. 116 of 2023:CalHC: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited Vs Mr. Nitish Kumar

**Summary**  

In this trademark and copyright infringement suit, Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited (plaintiff no.1) and its trademark-holding partnership firm (plaintiff no.2) alleged that defendants no.1 (Nitish Kumar) and no.2 (sole proprietorship "Hero Electric @Hero Motocrop") dishonestly adopted and used the plaintiffs' registered trademarks "HERO ELECTRIC", "HERO" formative marks (registered since 2008 in Class 12), logos, and copyrighted artistic/literary works to operate a rogue website www.evbikedealership.online and email contact@evbikedealership.online, falsely soliciting dealership enquiries, impersonating the plaintiffs, and fraudulently collecting money (evidenced by bank records showing over Rs.8.84 lakhs withdrawn from victims via forged documents). 

The suit sought permanent injunction, damages, costs, domain/email transfer, and other reliefs. Summons issued on 14.02.2022 with ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the impugned use, website takedown, and domain transfer; defendants never appeared despite service, leading to ex-parte proceedings. The Court, noting defendants' wilful default, uncontroverted pleadings/documents proving long-standing goodwill/reputation of "HERO ELECTRIC" (with revenues in crores, awards, extensive promotion), clear infringement/passing off/copyright violation, cheating of public via scam, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience favouring plaintiffs, decreed the suit ex-parte without formal evidence (as repetitive), granted permanent injunction, Rs.20 lakh aggravated/punitive damages, Rs.3 lakh costs, domain/email transfer to plaintiffs, and restraint on the impugned bank account.

Crisp bullet points of law settled:

In IPD matters, where defendants remain ex-parte despite service and material on record sufficiently establishes plaintiffs' claim (including infringement, goodwill, fraud via rogue website), the Court can pass decree/summary judgment without directing formal ex-parte evidence, .

In ex-parte IP infringement cases involving clear evidence of fraud (bank records, forged documents), irreparable injury to reputation/goodwill and balance of convenience tilt decisively in plaintiffs' favour, justifying decree without trial.

Case Title:Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited Vs  Mr. Nitish Kumar:04.02.2026:CS(COMM) 104/2022:2026:DHC:903:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs Batra Breweries and Distilleries

In this trademark infringement suit, Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited (plaintiff) claimed exclusive rights over the well-known mark "Officer's Choice" (adopted since 1988, declared well-known in 2017, with massive sales and numerous prior successful litigations), alleging that defendants (including its own bottler Batra Breweries) were using the deceptively similar mark "Principal Choice" / "Principal Choice Premium Whisky" for whisky, with strikingly similar trade dress and label, leading to infringement and passing off. The suit was filed in Delhi High Court; interim injunction was granted in August 2023 restraining fresh production (allowing limited sale of existing stock), later confirmed till disposal; defendants appeared initially, obtained condonation of delay for written statement but never actually filed it, leading to ex-parte proceedings against them in October 2024. The plaintiff then sought summary judgment under Order XIIIA of the Commercial Courts Act. The Court, noting defendants' non-prosecution of their own TM application (abandoned), non-filing of defence despite opportunity, plaintiff's strong documentary evidence of long user, distinctiveness, secondary meaning, reputation, goodwill and prior injunctions in ~40 cases protecting the mark, held that no formal evidence was required in ex-parte scenario, balance of convenience and irreparable injury favoured plaintiff, and granted permanent injunction. Plaintiff voluntarily gave up claims for damages and costs.

Law settled in the case:

In intellectual property disputes before the IPD of Delhi High Court, summary judgment can be passed without a specific application on principles akin to Order XIIIA CPC as applicable to commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Rule 27, Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 (Para 18).

Where defendant is ex-parte and material on record is sufficient to allow plaintiff's claim, the Court need not direct recording of ex-parte evidence as it would be repetitive of plaint contents and waste of judicial time  (Paras 19 & 20).

Case Title:Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs  Batra Breweries and Distilleries Private Limited:04.02.2026: CS(COMM) 551/2023:2026:DHC:904: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor