Yokogawa Electric Corporation Vs. Union of India

Introduction: The case of Yokogawa Electric Corporation v. Union of India represents a significant judicial pronouncement on the procedural rigours governing trademark opposition proceedings in India, particularly concerning the nature of time limits prescribed for filing evidence in support of opposition under the Trade Marks Rules. Decided by the High Court of Madras, the judgment underscores the imperative of adhering to strict timelines in trademark disputes to prevent undue delays in the registration process. 

The court was confronted with a challenge to the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks' refusal to accept belated evidence filed by the opponent, raising a pivotal question that has divided judicial opinions across various High Courts: whether the time limits under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 (and by extension, analogous provisions in subsequent rules) are mandatory or directory. By aligning itself with the stricter interpretation adopted by the Delhi High Court and rejecting the more lenient view of the Gujarat High Court, the Madras High Court reinforced the policy objective of expediting trademark registrations while curtailing procedural indulgences that could prolong opposition proceedings indefinitely.

Factual Background: Yokogawa Electric Corporation, a Japanese entity renowned globally for its solutions in industrial automation, control, test, and measurement, has long used the trademark CENTUM/CENTUM. Upon discovering that Centum Industries Pvt. Ltd., the third respondent, had applied for registration of a similar mark in Class 09 under Application No. 1587782, Yokogawa promptly filed a Notice of Opposition on 17 November 2011. The third respondent's counter-statement was served on Yokogawa on 19 March 2012, triggering the period for filing evidence in support of the opposition. Yokogawa sought extensions of time, first until 19 June 2012 and subsequently until 19 September 2012, citing the need to collate documents from its offices spread across multiple countries. Eventually, on 24 August 2012, Yokogawa filed an interlocutory petition along with an affidavit of evidence, which was served on the third respondent. However, the Deputy Registrar rejected this evidence vide order dated 21 October 2014, holding that Rule 50 evidence is mandatory and that the Registrar lacks power to extend time beyond the prescribed limits, relying on decisions of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).

Procedural Background: The opposition proceedings commenced with Yokogawa's timely notice of opposition, followed by the third respondent's counter-statement. Under the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, Rule 50 mandated that evidence in support of opposition be filed within two months of receipt of the counter-statement, extendable by the Registrar for a further period not exceeding one month in aggregate. Yokogawa's requests for extensions and subsequent filing through an interlocutory petition fell outside this window. The Deputy Registrar's impugned order explicitly declined to take the late evidence on record, emphasising the binding nature of IPAB precedents that curtailed the Registrar's discretion. Aggrieved, Yokogawa filed the writ petition under Article 226 in 2015 (after receiving the order copy that year), seeking certiorarified mandamus to quash the Registrar's order and direct acceptance of the evidence. 

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The Madras High Court looked into conflicting judicial precedents on the interpretation of Rule 50 of the 2002 Rules. It noted the Gujarat High Court's view in Wyeth Holdings that the provision was directory, drawing from principles of subordinate legislation and the Supreme Court's observations in Salem Advocate Bar Association regarding the contextual interpretation of the word "shall". In contrast, the court placed greater reliance on Delhi High Court decisions in Sunrider Corporation v. Hindustan Lever Limited and Mahesh Gupta v. Registrar of Trademarks, which highlighted deliberate legislative changes: the inclusion of "not exceeding one month in aggregate" as a cap on extensions and the removal of discretionary phrases like "unless the Registrar otherwise directs" from earlier rules. These amendments, the Delhi High Court reasoned, manifested a clear intent to make the timeline mandatory and to deem opposition abandoned upon non-compliance. The Madras High Court found this reasoning persuasive, observing that even under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 (where the one-month extension phrase was omitted), the absence of discretionary language reinforced the mandatory nature. The court emphasised the Trade Marks Registry's policy of strict timelines to prevent opponents from indefinitely stalling registrations. Consequently, it held that the Registrar lacked power to condone delays beyond the prescribed period, dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit, and upheld the impugned order without costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles, within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, that the time limit for filing evidence in support of trademark opposition under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 (and corresponding provisions in the 2017 Rules) is mandatory rather than directory. The Registrar possesses no discretion to extend time beyond the statutory maximum of one month aggregate extension under the 2002 Rules, and failure to file evidence within the overall three-month window results in deemed abandonment of the opposition. By expressly preferring the Delhi High Court's interpretation over that of the Gujarat High Court and the IPAB's earlier view in Sahil Kohli (which treated similar provisions under the 2017 Rules as directory by invoking Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999), the court has aligned itself with a stricter construction that prioritises expeditious disposal of trademark applications. This ruling reinforces the legislative intent evident from deliberate drafting changes aimed at curtailing delays and establishes that procedural lapses in opposition evidence cannot be condoned indefinitely, thereby promoting certainty and efficiency in trademark adjudication.

Case Title: Yokogawa Electric Corporation Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 10.10.2025

Case Number: W.P. No. 5703 of 2016

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice M. Dhandapani

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

Mandatory Timelines in Trademark Opposition: Madras High Court Upholds Strict Compliance in Yokogawa Electric Corporation v. Union of India

Deemed Abandonment of Opposition: Analysing the Mandatory Nature of Evidence Filing under Trade Marks Rules

Yokogawa Electric Corporation v. Union of India: Reinforcing Procedural Rigour in Trademark Opposition Proceedings

Suggested Tags

Trademark Law, Opposition Proceedings, Rule 50 Trade Marks Rules 2002, Mandatory vs Directory Provisions, Deemed Abandonment, Madras High Court, Delhi High Court Precedents, Trade Marks Registry, Evidence Filing Timeline, Intellectual Property Law

Headnote

Madras High Court holds that time limit for filing evidence in support of trademark opposition under Rule 50 of Trade Marks Rules, 2002 is mandatory; Registrar lacks discretion to condone delay beyond one month aggregate extension; opposition deemed abandoned upon non-compliance; court prefers Delhi High Court's strict interpretation over Gujarat High Court's directory view; writ petition challenging refusal to accept belated evidence dismissed.

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Yokogawa Electric Corporation, a Japanese entity using the trademark CENTUM worldwide, opposed the registration of a similar mark applied for by Centum Industries Pvt. Ltd. in Class 09 under Application No.1587782, filing a Notice of Opposition on 17.11.2011. The counter-statement was served on Yokogawa on 19.03.2012, triggering the period to file evidence in support of opposition under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002. Yokogawa sought extensions and eventually filed evidence via interlocutory petition on 24.08.2012, which the Deputy Registrar rejected on 21.10.2014, holding Rule 50 evidence mandatory with no power to extend time beyond the prescribed limits.

Yokogawa challenged this order via writ petition in 2015, relying on Gujarat High Court's directory interpretation in Wyeth Holdings, while respondents cited Delhi High Court's mandatory view in Aman Engineering Works and others. The Madras High Court agreed with the Delhi High Court's reasoning on deliberate legislative changes capping extensions at one month aggregate and removing Registrar's discretion, held the timeline mandatory even under analogous 2017 Rules, upheld the rejection, and dismissed the writ as devoid of merit.

• The time limit for filing evidence in support of trademark opposition under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 is mandatory, with the Registrar having no discretion to extend beyond one month aggregate (total three months from service of counter-statement), leading to deemed abandonment upon non-compliance [Paras 11, 12].
• The removal of discretionary phrases and inclusion of "not exceeding one month in aggregate" in Rule 50(1) of 2002 Rules manifests legislative intent for strict timelines; similar mandatory nature applies even under Rule 45 of Trade Marks Rules, 2017 despite omission of extension phrase [Paras 10,(46)].

Case Title: Yokogawa Electric Corporation Vs. Union of India:10.10.2025:W.P. No. 5703 of 2016:MadHC:The Honourable Mr. Justice M. Dhandapani

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Thukral Mechanical Works Vs. PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction: The batch of appeals decided by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court , represents a watershed moment in Indian trademark jurisprudence. For the first time, an Indian court has directly confronted and resolved the theoretical “impasse” identified by Kerly’s authoritative treatise on trademarks, where a validly registered proprietor who commences use belatedly faces a prior continuous user who has built substantial goodwill before such commencement. The Court recognised that in such circumstances the registered proprietor can restrain the prior user on infringement while the prior user can simultaneously restrain the registered proprietor on passing off, resulting in mutual restraint. This nuanced, equitable outcome preserves the sanctity of registration under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 while protecting common law rights in goodwill, without allowing one to wholly trump the other absent the specific conditions of Section 33.

Factual Background:  The dispute centres on the word mark FIELDMARSHAL/FIELD MARSHAL in Class 7. Jain Industries secured registration of FIELD MARSHAL with effect from 13 May 1965 for goods including centrifugal pumps, though it never commercially used the mark on centrifugal pumps. On 30 May 1986 Jain assigned the mark along with goodwill to Thukral Mechanical Works, which commenced use on centrifugal pumps only in 1988. PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd., registered proprietor of FIELDMARSHAL since 1964 for diesel oil engines, commenced use of the identical mark on centrifugal pumps from 1975. By 1988 PMD had amassed enormous reputation and goodwill in FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps, evidenced by crores in sales, extensive advertising, nationwide dealer networks and banking approvals.

Procedural Background:  Litigation commenced in 1985 when PMD instituted suit against Thukral alleging passing off and infringement, obtaining an ex-parte injunction that was later modified  permitting Thukral to use the mark with disclaimers. PMD also sought rectification of Jain/Thukral’s registration  under Section 46 for non-use. Thukral countered with suit  seeking injunction against PMD for infringement. Prolonged proceedings included a  Supreme Court judgment clarifying that non-use by the assignor Jain could not invalidate Thukral’s registration absent challenge to the assignment and impleadment of Jain. After the Single Judge largely favoured PMD by cancelling Thukral’s registration, decreeing PMD’s passing-off suit and allowing PMD’s writ petitions for further registrations, multiple appeals and LPAs were preferred, culminating in the present Division Bench decision.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:  The Division Bench  analysed the Kerly impasse, holding that the Supreme Court’s  finding of infringement by PMD was binding and the Single Judge erred in cancelling Thukral’s registration contrary to that mandate. Non-use by Jain could not be attributed to bona fide assignee Thukral without impleading Jain and proving speculative assignment, neither of which occurred. Thukral’s registration thus remained valid, entitling it to restrain PMD under Section 28(1) read with Section 29 for infringement . Simultaneously, PMD’s continuous unchallenged use from 1975 to 1988 generated substantial trans-border reputation and goodwill protectable under common law passing off. Applying principles from Neon Laboratories, S. Syed Mohideen, N.R. Dongre and Whirlpool, PMD was entitled to restrain Thukral . The Court held that goodwill, while foundational to passing off, is no defence to statutory infringement absent Section 33 protection, which did not apply as PMD’s use post-dated Jain’s 1965 registration. Section 27(2) preserves passing-off rights but does not erode infringement remedies under Section 28(1). Resultantly, both suits were decreed to the extent of permanent injunctions against the opposite party using the mark for centrifugal pumps, rectification was dismissed, and PMD’s applications for registration in regional languages were rejected under Section 12(1). No accounts or damages were awarded, and parties bore their own costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment authoritatively settles the application of the Kerly Impasse in Indian law. Where a valid registration predates the defendant’s use but the plaintiff’s own use commences after the defendant has built substantial goodwill through continuous prior use, both parties possess concurrent enforceable rights. The registered proprietor is entitled to injunction for infringement as goodwill is not a defence thereto except under Section 33. Conversely, the prior user with goodwill is entitled to injunction for passing off as registration is no defence thereto by virtue of Section 27(2). The equitable consequence is mutual permanent restraint from using the mark for the disputed goods, preventing either party from exploiting the mark while preserving the integrity of both statutory and common law protections. This balanced approach ensures neither registration nor goodwill achieves absolute supremacy absent statutory priority of use, providing definitive guidance for future concurrent rights conflicts.

Case Title: Thukral Mechanical Works v. PM Diesels Private Limited & Anr.

Date of Order: 6 February 2026

Case Numbers: LPA 320/2024

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:966-DB

Court: High Court of Delhi (Division Bench)

Hon’ble Judges: Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Title Suggestions:Resolving the Kerly Impasse: Delhi High Court Grants Mutual Permanent Injunctions in the Historic FIELDMARSHAL Trademark War

Mutual Restraint in Trademark Law: Delhi High Court’s Landmark Decision Balancing Registration Rights and Prior User Goodwill in Thukral v. PM Diesels

From Impasse to Equitable Resolution: The Delhi High Court’s Mutual Injunction Ruling in the Four-Decade FIELDMARSHAL Dispute

Tags: KerlyImpasse, MutualInjunction, TrademarkInfringement, PassingOff, PriorUserGoodwill,  FieldMarshalTrademark, DelhiHighCourt,  ThukralMechanicalWorks, PMDiesels,  IndianTrademarkLaw, Section28TMAct, Section27(2)TMAct, 

Headnote: In a groundbreaking judgment dated 6 February 2026, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court  resolved the classic “Kerly Impasse” in trademark law by granting mutual permanent injunctions restraining both the registered proprietor (Thukral Mechanical Works) and the prior continuous user (PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd.) from using the marks FIELD MARSHAL/FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps, thereby balancing statutory registration rights with common law goodwill acquired through prior use.

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The dispute involves the marks FIELD MARSHAL (registered by Jain Industries in 1965 for centrifugal pumps, assigned to Thukral Mechanical Works in 1986 with use starting 1988) and FIELDMARSHAL (used by PM Diesels Pvt. Ltd. since 1975 on centrifugal pumps, building substantial goodwill, though registered only for diesel engines).

PMD sued in 1985 for passing off and sought rectification for non-use; Thukral countersued in 1992 for infringement. The Supreme Court in 2008 held PMD's use infringed the registration. The Single Judge cancelled Thukral's registration and decreed PMD's passing off claim. On appeals, the Division Bench restored Thukral's valid registration (non-use by assignor not attributable to bona fide assignee absent proper challenge), decreed Thukral's infringement suit while upholding PMD's passing off suit on goodwill grounds, and resolved the Kerly impasse by granting mutual permanent injunctions restraining both parties from using the marks for centrifugal pumps, with no damages or costs.

Points of Law Settled:

Valid registration confers exclusive rights under Section 28(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, entitling the proprietor to injunction for infringement even against a prior user whose use post-dates registration; goodwill is no defence absent Section 33 protection (Paras 101-126, 146-176).

Continuous prior use generating substantial goodwill supports passing off action under Section 27(2), and registration is no defence thereto (Paras 1-14, 79-100).

In a Kerly impasse scenario (valid registration with delayed use vs. post-registration prior continuous use with goodwill), both parties hold concurrent rights leading to mutual permanent injunctions restraining use by either (Paras 1-14, 221-223).

Non-use by assignor cannot lead to rectification against bona fide assignee without impleading assignor and proving speculative assignment (Paras 131-145, 146-176).

Diesel engines and centrifugal pumps are allied/cognate goods (Paras 38-41).

Case Title: Thukral Mechanical Works v. PM Diesels Private Limited :06.02.2026: LPA 320/2024: 2026:DHC:966-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Neelam Gupta Vs Esme Consumer Pvt Ltd.

Neelam Gupta, claiming to be the registered proprietor of the trademark "GRACE HEAVEN" since 2019 and using it continuously for cosmetics and allied goods with distinctive trade dress and logo, filed a suit in the Calcutta High Court for groundless threats under Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957, based on a cease-and-desist notice dated 4 September 2025 issued by Esme Consumer Private Limited (registered proprietor of "HEAVEN" for similar goods) and another. 

Without replying to the notice initially, the petitioner sought interlocutory reliefs; she replied only on 26 September 2025 after filing the suit. Subsequently, the respondent filed an infringement suit CS-(COM)/476/2025 before the Commercial Court at Saket, New Delhi. 

The respondent argued that the groundless threats suit must be dismissed due to the subsequent infringement action filed with due diligence. The petitioner contended that the suit could not be dismissed without a formal Order VII Rule 11 application, that damages survive independently, and that partial rejection of the plaint is impermissible. 

The Court held that once an infringement suit is instituted with due diligence, the groundless threats action becomes infructuous as the threats cease to be groundless, the cause of action extinguishes, and consequential damages claims linked solely to such threats also fail, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and fulfill the legislative intent of the provisions; no separate independent cause of action was pleaded, the Court can dismiss suo moto without formal application, and cited precedents supported this view while distinguishing the petitioner's authorities on facts.

Key legal principles settled:

Once the person making threats commences and prosecutes with due diligence an infringement action against the threatened party, the suit for groundless threats under Section 142(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957 becomes infructuous and ceases to apply, as the threats are no longer groundless (Para 11).

No formal application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is mandatorily required for dismissal; the Court has a duty to reject the plaint suo moto if barred by law (Para 14).

Case Title:Neelam Gupta Vs Esme Consumer Pvt Ltd.:30.01.2026:IP-COM/47/2025:2026:CHC-OS:39:CalHC: HOn'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Parul Ruparella Vs. Camme Wang

Parul Ruparella and another (appellants/plaintiffs) filed a suit for trademark infringement and passing off against Camme Wang and another (respondents, Chinese entities) in respect of their registered Indian trademark “PL SUPREME” for torch lights and components. The appellants alleged that the respondents, who previously manufactured and supplied goods to them under purchase orders, started infringing the mark by using it independently. An ex parte interim injunction was initially granted, but vacated after contested hearing by the Single Judge on 5 December 2025, who dismissed the interim applications (GA-COM/1/2025 and GA-COM/3/2025 for injunction and receiver). 

The Division Bench upheld the vacation, finding that the respondents prima facie established continuous uninterrupted prior use in India through a properly verified supplementary affidavit dated 10 November 2025 containing supporting documents (which the appellants did not substantively deny), despite defects in the principal affidavit-in-opposition. The court held that allegations of fabrication/interpolation were not apparent at the prima facie stage and could be tested at trial, that sales to the appellants did not negate independent prior use, and that the appellants failed to make out a strong prima facie case, with balance of convenience and irreparable injury not favouring injunction. Directions regarding alleged under-invoicing/tax evasion were kept in abeyance till final hearing. The appeal was dismissed with observations being prima facie only.

Points of Law Settled

In a suit for infringement based on a registered trademark, the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to interim injunction unless the defendant prima facie establishes continuous uninterrupted prior use in India; however, where the defendant discloses sufficient materials (especially through a properly verified supplementary affidavit incorporating prior annexures) to show such prior use, and allegations of fabrication are not glaringly apparent, injunction can be refused at the interim stage (Para 17–20).  

Defective verification of the principal affidavit-in-opposition (lacking proper segregation of statements true to knowledge) renders it unreliable, but a subsequent supplementary affidavit that is properly affirmed and jurat-containing, and which independently supports prior use, can be relied upon at the prima facie stage (Para 16–18).  

At the interim injunction stage in trademark matters, the court need not conclusively determine issues of fabrication, interpolation or volume/extent of prior use, which are better left for trial; the focus remains on whether a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury favour the plaintiff (Para 19, 22).  

Prior use claimed through sales exclusively to the plaintiff (without agency documents) does not necessarily negate independent continuous prior use if other materials prima facie support it (Para 8, 20).  

Observations and findings at the interim stage (including on prior use) are prima facie only and do not bind the parties at final trial (Para 27).

Case Title: Parul Ruparella Vs. Camme Wang :04.02.2026:APO-IPD/1/2026 : 2026:CHC:37-DB  Hon’ble Justice Debangsu Basak & Hon’ble Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

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Yangtze Memory Technologies Co Ltd Vs Union of India

Yangtze Memory Technologies Co Ltd filed Indian Patent Application No. 202127020980 (parent application) on 9 May 2021 claiming priority from PCT/CN2018/119908 dated 7 December 2018 for a novel 3D NAND memory device and method. The First Examination Report issued on 23 May 2022 objected under Section 10(5) for plurality of inventions not linked by a single inventive concept. After response, hearing on 8 July 2024, and written submissions on 22 July 2024 (wherein petitioner expressly recorded intent to file divisional application if objections persisted and noted Controller's assurance of extended hearing), the Controller unexpectedly granted the patent on 26 July 2024 without further notice or hearing, thereby closing the window for filing a divisional application. The petitioner immediately attempted to file the divisional application and related petitions under Rules 137/138 but was prevented by the e-filing system; despite repeated communications, the grant stood. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking setting aside of the grant order and direction to permit filing of divisional application. The court dismissed the writ after observing that post grant of Parent Patent, no application for divisional application can be filed.

Points of Law Settled:

  

Where an applicant expressly records intent to file a divisional application in written submissions post-hearing and the Controller acknowledges the same while assuring further/extended hearing, sudden grant of the parent application without prior notice or promised hearing deprives the applicant of the statutory right to file a divisional application under Section 16 and violates principles of natural justice (Para 8.5–8.8).  

The Controller is obliged to afford reasonable opportunity (including promised extended hearing) before finally deciding grant especially when applicant has flagged plurality of inventions and conditional intent for divisional filing; failure to do so renders the grant order procedurally infirm and liable to be set aside (Para 8.3–8.5, 10–12). 

 

Post-grant attempts to file divisional application are statutorily barred under Section 16(1) as the window closes upon grant of the parent; however, where grant occurs due to procedural irregularity and denial of natural justice, the Court may quash the grant and restore the application to enable divisional filing (Para 8.6–8.7, 13–15).  

Bona fide diligence by applicant (prompt communication, repeated attempts to file divisional despite system disablement) supports exercise of writ jurisdiction to correct patent office error and prevent miscarriage of justice (Para 8.6–8.7).

Case Title: Yangtze Memory Technologies Co Ltd Vs Union of India:03.02.2026:W.P.(C)-IPD 10/2025: 2026:DHC:981: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

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UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufactures Association

Introduction: In this significant decision, the High Court at Calcutta, Intellectual Property Rights Division, has underscored the imperative of maintaining distinct procedural pathways for the examination of patent applications under Sections 14 and 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, and the adjudication of pre-grant oppositions under Section 25(1) of the same Act. The case of UPL Limited versus Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association & Anr. highlights the consequences of procedural consolidation where separate hearings and reasoned orders are mandated by the statutory framework. The judgment remands a rejected patent application for fresh consideration, emphasizing adherence to principles of natural justice and the independent character of examination and opposition proceedings. This ruling aligns with recent judicial trends that seek to prevent the conflation of these distinct stages while ensuring that the Controller of Patents exercises independent scrutiny untainted by mechanical adoption of third-party submissions.

Factual Background:  The dispute centers on a patent application filed by UPL Limited on 26 March 2018, bearing number 201831011137, titled “Herbicidal Combinations.” The claimed invention pertains to synergistic herbicidal compositions combining active ingredients from three distinct classes: a triazolone herbicide, a Photosystem II inhibitor herbicide, and either an ALS inhibitor herbicide from the imidazolinone family or a bleacher herbicide. The applicant asserted that these combinations exhibited unexpected synergistic efficacy in controlling undesirable weeds, an advantage not achievable when the individual components were applied alone. The application was published on 27 September 2019. Following examination, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) on 24 January 2020, raising objections primarily on grounds of lack of novelty and inventive step. In response, the applicant amended the claims by deleting the compound amicarbazone and submitted data purporting to demonstrate synergistic effects. Subsequently, the Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association filed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) on 30 September 2020, contesting the application on multiple grounds including lack of novelty, obviousness, and the invention constituting a mere admixture falling within the prohibition under Section 3(e) of the Act. After a combined hearing on 7 April 2022 and written submissions, the Controller passed an order dated 27 April 2023 rejecting the application, relying inter alia on prior art documents introduced during the opposition.

Procedural Background:  The procedural timeline reveals a sequence that ultimately became the focal point of challenge. After publication, the FER cited six prior art documents that mirrored those identified in the International Search Report. The applicant responded on 22 July 2020, expressly requesting a hearing under Section 14 should the Controller remain dissatisfied. No separate hearing was afforded at the examination stage. The pre-grant opposition introduced additional prior art documents (D3 to D5) beyond those common with the FER (D1 and D2). A single hearing addressed both the outstanding examination objections and the opposition grounds. The Controller thereafter issued a composite order rejecting the application without delineating which portions addressed examination objections under Section 15 and which disposed of the opposition under Section 25(1). Aggrieved, UPL Limited preferred an appeal under Section 117A of the Act, contending that the consolidation violated statutory mandates and principles of natural justice. The private opponent and the Controller defended the procedure, asserting that consolidation was permissible and that the order was adequately reasoned.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:  The court examined the statutory architecture of the Patents Act and Rules, concluding that examination proceedings under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) constitute distinct and independent stages. The court observed that Rule 55(5) permits simultaneous decision of the application and representation but does not authorize merger of hearings or obliteration of procedural separation. Where objections in the FER differ from those in the opposition, and particularly where new prior art emerges only in opposition, separate hearings are obligatory to afford the applicant a meaningful opportunity to address each set of concerns. The court found that the applicant had expressly sought a hearing in response to the FER, a request that went unheeded. Furthermore, the inability to locate one cited prior art document (D4) and the absence of any response from the Controller compounded the prejudice. The composite order was held vitiated by its failure to distinguish between examination and opposition findings, rendering it impossible to discern independent application of mind by the Controller. The court noted with concern the Controller’s near-verbatim reproduction of the opponent’s submissions, concluding that such mechanical adoption evidenced absence of reasoned scrutiny. Drawing upon precedents including Gilead Pharmasset LLC v. Union of India (2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014) and the recent Division Bench ruling in Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Limited (2024 SCC OnLine Del 152), the court reaffirmed that pre-grant opposition serves an assistive rather than adversarial role, and opponents possess no locus to participate in pure examination proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside, and the application remanded to a different Controller for fresh consideration with directions to afford separate hearings and pass a speaking order within twelve weeks.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment crystallizes several critical propositions in Indian patent jurisprudence. First, examination under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) are separate and independent proceedings that must ordinarily be heard and decided distinctly, particularly when objections or prior art differ between stages. Consolidation, while permissible in appropriate cases for simultaneous disposal, cannot extinguish the applicant’s statutory right to separate hearings where prejudice is demonstrated. Second, a composite order addressing both streams must clearly demarcate portions relating to examination and opposition respectively, failing which it stands vitiated. Third, the Controller is obliged to apply independent mind and furnish reasons, and mechanical adoption of an opponent’s submissions constitutes abdication of quasi-judicial function. Fourth, pre-grant opponents enjoy no right of audience or participation in the examination process, their role being confined to aiding the Controller through representation on specified grounds. Fifth, violation of these procedural safeguards amounts to breach of natural justice warranting remand, even mindful of the general reluctance to remit matters to expert tribunals. The decision thus reinforces the structural separation articulated in Novartis and allied rulings, ensuring that the expeditious yet rigorous framework envisaged by the legislature remains intact.

Case Title: UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association & Anr. 

Date of Order: 05.02.2026 

Case Number: IPDPTA No.116 of 2023 

Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta, Intellectual Property Rights Division 

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

Calcutta High Court Emphasizes Procedural Separation in Patent Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition: Analysis of UPL Ltd. v. Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association

Remand for Procedural Infirmity: Calcutta High Court Reinforces Independent Examination and Opposition Stages under the Patents Act

Distinct Hearings and Reasoned Orders Mandatory: Key Takeaways from UPL Limited’s Successful Patent Appeal

Safeguarding Natural Justice in Patent Grants: The UPL Herbicide Combination Case

Suggested Tags

Patent Law, Pre-Grant Opposition, Section 25(1) Patents Act, Examination Proceedings, Section 14-15 Patents Act, Procedural Fairness, Natural Justice, Composite Orders, Synergistic Herbicide Combinations, Indian Patent Office, Calcutta High Court, Remand in Patent Appeals, Inventive Step, Section 3(e) Objection

Headnote

Patents Act, 1970 — Sections 14, 15, 25(1) and Rule 55(5) — Examination and pre-grant opposition — Distinct and independent proceedings — Requirement of separate hearings where objections or prior art differ — Composite order must demarcate examination and opposition findings — Mechanical adoption of opponent’s submissions vitiates order — Violation of natural justice warrants remand to different Controller for fresh consideration — Appeal allowed.

Held: Where FER objections and opposition grounds are not identical and new prior art is introduced in opposition, separate hearings under Sections 14 and 25(1) are mandatory. Controller must independently apply mind and provide reasons. Pre-grant opponent has no locus in examination proceedings. Matter remanded for de novo consideration with liberty to all parties on merits. (Paras 8–14)

Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Limited (2024 SCC OnLine Del 152) and Gilead Pharmasset LLC v. Union of India (2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014) followed.

=====

The Calcutta High Court, in a significant ruling delivered by Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur, has set aside the rejection of a patent application for a herbicidal composition filed by UPL Limited. The court found serious procedural irregularities in the manner in which the Controller of Patents handled the pre-grant opposition and the examination process concurrently, without affording separate hearings as contemplated under the Patents Act, 1970. The matter has been remanded for fresh consideration by a different Controller, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory separation between examination proceedings and pre-grant opposition proceedings, along with strict compliance with principles of natural justice.

**Introduction**

This judgment addresses a critical aspect of Indian patent prosecution involving the interplay between the examination of patent applications under Sections 14 and 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, and pre-grant oppositions filed under Section 25(1). The court examined whether these distinct statutory stages can be merged into a single composite order without separate hearings, particularly when new prior art documents are introduced during opposition that were not part of the First Examination Report (FER). The decision reinforces the independent nature of these proceedings, the mandatory requirement of reasoned orders with independent application of mind, and the limited participatory role of pre-grant opponents in the examination stage. It draws heavily on precedents emphasizing procedural fairness in quasi-judicial patent decisions and highlights that procedural lapses vitiating natural justice warrant remand, even in technical matters.

**Factual Background**

UPL Limited filed Patent Application No. 201831011137 on March 26, 2018, claiming a herbicidal combination for controlling undesirable plants (weeds). The invention involved a synergistic composition comprising a Triazolone herbicide, a Photosystem II inhibitor herbicide, and either an ALS inhibitor (from Imidazolinone class) or a bleacher herbicide. The applicant asserted that the combination exhibited unexpected synergistic weed control, superior to individual components. The application was published on September 27, 2019. A First Examination Report was issued on January 24, 2020, raising objections including lack of novelty, inventive step, and sufficiency. In response, filed on July 22, 2020, the applicant amended Claim 1 by deleting the compound amicarbazone to overcome novelty objections and requested a hearing under Section 14. A pre-grant opposition was filed by Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association (respondent no.1) on September 30, 2020, under Section 25(1), alleging lack of novelty (Section 25(1)(b)), lack of inventive step (Section 25(1)(e)), and the invention being a mere admixture not qualifying as an invention under Section 3(e). The opposition introduced additional prior arts (D3 to D5) not cited in the FER. Hearings and written submissions followed, culminating in a composite impugned order dated April 27, 2023, rejecting the application.

**Procedural Background**

The applicant challenged the impugned order before the Calcutta High Court in IPDPTA No.116 of 2023. The primary grievance centered on procedural violations: no separate hearing was granted under Section 14 despite the explicit request in the FER reply; the Controller passed a single composite order disposing of both examination and opposition proceedings without delineating portions attributable to each; new prior arts introduced in opposition were considered without adequate opportunity to respond; the impugned order mechanically reproduced the opponent's submissions without independent reasoning or analysis of the applicant's data and arguments; and one cited prior art (D4) was untraceable and not provided despite requests. The Controller defended the consolidation as permissible, while the opponent supported the rejection on substantive grounds including lack of synergy proof and admixture nature.

**Reasoning and Decision of Court**

The court held that examination under Sections 14-15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) constitute distinct, independent stages under the statutory scheme. The opponent has no right of audience or participation in the examination proceeding, which remains confined between the applicant and the Controller. Reliance was placed on Novartis AG vs Natco Pharma Limited (2024 SCC OnLine Del 152), which clarified that opposition aids but does not supplant or merge with independent examination; the opponent's hearing right under Rule 55(5) is limited to the representation grounds. The court found a serious procedural infirmity in the composite order without separate hearings, especially since objections and prior arts differed between FER and opposition. This denied natural justice, as the applicant could not adequately address new citations. The impugned order lacked reasons, mechanically adopted opponent's views without dealing with applicant's submissions, data, or case laws, violating the principle that reasons form the soul of quasi-judicial orders (S.N. Mukherjee vs Union of India). The court distinguished cases cited by the opponent on sufficiency, noting such grounds were not the basis of rejection and the opponent lacked locus in appeal on waived FER objections. Finding violation of natural justice and procedural impropriety going to the root, the court remanded the matter to a different Controller for fresh consideration after adequate hearings and consideration of all materials, without expressing views on merits. The remand was directed within twelve weeks from communication of the order.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**

The judgment settles that pre-grant opposition and patent application examination are statutorily separate proceedings that cannot be merged into a single composite order without separate hearings under Sections 14 and 25(1) respectively, particularly when new prior arts or distinct objections arise in opposition. The Controller must pass reasoned orders with independent application of mind, and failure to provide requested hearings under Section 14, or to delineate statutory stages in composite orders, constitutes violation of natural justice warranting setting aside and remand. Pre-grant opponents have no participatory right in examination proceedings, and their role is confined to aiding holistic assessment without overriding the Controller's independent duty.

**Case Detail**

- **Title**: UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufactures Association & Anr.

- **Date of Order**: 05.02.2026

- **Case Number**: IPDPTA No.116 of 2023

- **Neutral Citation**: (Not available in public domain records as of current date; may be assigned subsequently by the Calcutta High Court registry)

- **Name of Court**: High Court at Calcutta (Intellectual Property Rights Division, Original Side)

- **Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

**Disclaimer**: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

**Suggested Titles for the Article**

1. Calcutta High Court Remands UPL Herbicidal Patent Rejection: Mandates Separate Hearings for Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition

2. Procedural Fairness in Patent Prosecution: Calcutta HC Sets Aside Composite Rejection Order for Violating Natural Justice

3. Separation of Examination and Pre-Grant Opposition Proceedings: Landmark Clarification by Calcutta High Court in UPL Limited Case

4. Natural Justice Prevails: Calcutta HC Quashes Patent Refusal Due to Merged Proceedings and Lack of Reasons

**Suggested Tags**

Patent Law, Pre-Grant Opposition, Section 25(1) Patents Act, Section 14 & 15 Hearing, Natural Justice in Patent Proceedings, Composite Order Invalidity, Remand by Calcutta High Court, Herbicidal Composition Patent, UPL Limited Judgment, Procedural Irregularity in IPO, Inventive Step Rejection, Synergistic Herbicidal Combinations

**Headnote**

Calcutta High Court allows appeal against rejection of patent application for herbicidal combinations; sets aside impugned order for procedural infirmity in merging examination and pre-grant opposition without separate hearings, lack of reasoned independent application of mind, and violation of natural justice; matter remanded for fresh consideration by different Controller within 12 weeks, leaving merits open; reinforces statutory distinction between Sections 14-15 and 25(1) proceedings.

==========

UPL Limited's patent application for a herbicidal combination comprising Triazolone herbicide, Photosystem II inhibitor, and either ALS inhibitor (Imidazolinone) or bleacher herbicide was rejected by the Controller via a composite order dated 27 April 2023 on grounds of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and being a mere admixture under Section 3(e) following a pre-grant opposition by Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association.

The applicant challenged the order before the Calcutta High Court alleging procedural violations including no separate hearing under Section 14 despite request, merger of examination and opposition proceedings into one order without delineation, consideration of new prior arts (D3–D5) introduced only in opposition without adequate opportunity, mechanical adoption of opponent's submissions without independent reasoning or analysis of applicant's data, and lack of reasons.

The Court found serious procedural infirmity and violation of natural justice, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to a different Controller for fresh consideration after affording proper hearings and full consideration of materials, without expressing any view on merits, directing completion within twelve weeks.

Law Point Settled:

Examination proceedings under Sections 14–15 and pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) are distinct, independent stages that cannot be merged into a single composite order without separate hearings, particularly when new prior arts or different objections arise in opposition (Para 8–10, 14).

The pre-grant opponent has no right of audience or participation in the examination proceeding, which remains confined between the applicant and the Controller; the opponent's hearing right under Rule 55(5) is limited to the opposition representation (Para 8, 12).

- Passing a composite order without delineating portions attributable to Section 14/15 and Section 25(1), and without granting a requested hearing under Section 14, constitutes serious procedural irregularity and violation of natural justice warranting setting aside of the order (Para 10, 14, relying on Gilead Pharmasset LLC v Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014).

Case Title: UPL Limited Vs Haryana Pesticides Manufactures Association:05.02.2026:IPDPTA No. 116 of 2023:CalHC: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited Vs Mr. Nitish Kumar

**Summary**  

In this trademark and copyright infringement suit, Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited (plaintiff no.1) and its trademark-holding partnership firm (plaintiff no.2) alleged that defendants no.1 (Nitish Kumar) and no.2 (sole proprietorship "Hero Electric @Hero Motocrop") dishonestly adopted and used the plaintiffs' registered trademarks "HERO ELECTRIC", "HERO" formative marks (registered since 2008 in Class 12), logos, and copyrighted artistic/literary works to operate a rogue website www.evbikedealership.online and email contact@evbikedealership.online, falsely soliciting dealership enquiries, impersonating the plaintiffs, and fraudulently collecting money (evidenced by bank records showing over Rs.8.84 lakhs withdrawn from victims via forged documents). 

The suit sought permanent injunction, damages, costs, domain/email transfer, and other reliefs. Summons issued on 14.02.2022 with ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the impugned use, website takedown, and domain transfer; defendants never appeared despite service, leading to ex-parte proceedings. The Court, noting defendants' wilful default, uncontroverted pleadings/documents proving long-standing goodwill/reputation of "HERO ELECTRIC" (with revenues in crores, awards, extensive promotion), clear infringement/passing off/copyright violation, cheating of public via scam, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience favouring plaintiffs, decreed the suit ex-parte without formal evidence (as repetitive), granted permanent injunction, Rs.20 lakh aggravated/punitive damages, Rs.3 lakh costs, domain/email transfer to plaintiffs, and restraint on the impugned bank account.

Crisp bullet points of law settled:

In IPD matters, where defendants remain ex-parte despite service and material on record sufficiently establishes plaintiffs' claim (including infringement, goodwill, fraud via rogue website), the Court can pass decree/summary judgment without directing formal ex-parte evidence, .

In ex-parte IP infringement cases involving clear evidence of fraud (bank records, forged documents), irreparable injury to reputation/goodwill and balance of convenience tilt decisively in plaintiffs' favour, justifying decree without trial.

Case Title:Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited Vs  Mr. Nitish Kumar:04.02.2026:CS(COMM) 104/2022:2026:DHC:903:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs Batra Breweries and Distilleries

In this trademark infringement suit, Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited (plaintiff) claimed exclusive rights over the well-known mark "Officer's Choice" (adopted since 1988, declared well-known in 2017, with massive sales and numerous prior successful litigations), alleging that defendants (including its own bottler Batra Breweries) were using the deceptively similar mark "Principal Choice" / "Principal Choice Premium Whisky" for whisky, with strikingly similar trade dress and label, leading to infringement and passing off. The suit was filed in Delhi High Court; interim injunction was granted in August 2023 restraining fresh production (allowing limited sale of existing stock), later confirmed till disposal; defendants appeared initially, obtained condonation of delay for written statement but never actually filed it, leading to ex-parte proceedings against them in October 2024. The plaintiff then sought summary judgment under Order XIIIA of the Commercial Courts Act. The Court, noting defendants' non-prosecution of their own TM application (abandoned), non-filing of defence despite opportunity, plaintiff's strong documentary evidence of long user, distinctiveness, secondary meaning, reputation, goodwill and prior injunctions in ~40 cases protecting the mark, held that no formal evidence was required in ex-parte scenario, balance of convenience and irreparable injury favoured plaintiff, and granted permanent injunction. Plaintiff voluntarily gave up claims for damages and costs.

Law settled in the case:

In intellectual property disputes before the IPD of Delhi High Court, summary judgment can be passed without a specific application on principles akin to Order XIIIA CPC as applicable to commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Rule 27, Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 (Para 18).

Where defendant is ex-parte and material on record is sufficient to allow plaintiff's claim, the Court need not direct recording of ex-parte evidence as it would be repetitive of plaint contents and waste of judicial time  (Paras 19 & 20).

Case Title:Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs  Batra Breweries and Distilleries Private Limited:04.02.2026: CS(COMM) 551/2023:2026:DHC:904: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Provivi, Inc. Vs The Controller of Patents and Designs

Provivi, Inc. filed Indian National Phase patent application no. 201817018490 (derived from PCT/US2016/062852) for a micro-organism producing insect pheromones and related compounds. After FER issuance on 20.05.2022 and reply filed on 19.07.2022, a hearing notice dated 03.05.2023 was allegedly issued but not received by the petitioner or its agent; no one appeared at the scheduled hearing on 19.05.2023. 

The Assistant Controller passed a non-speaking refusal order on 30.05.2023 under Section 15 mainly on lack of inventive step citing D3–D5, without discussing petitioner’s reply or analyzing how prior art renders the invention obvious. Petitioner became aware of refusal only later in July 2023, repeatedly followed up, and was informed in October 2024 that e-mails were delivered per office records. 

The High Court set aside the impugned order finding violation of natural justice (non-receipt of hearing notice and no fresh opportunity given) and lack of reasoned/speaking order (failure to consider reply to FER, absence of proper inventive step analysis per three-element test), and remanded the matter for de novo consideration by the Controller after issuing fresh hearing notice to a confirmed e-mail/address.

Crisp bullet points of law:

- Passing a reasoned and speaking order is an integral part of the principle of audi alteram partem; the Controller must grant an opportunity of being heard and record reasons after considering the applicant’s reply/submissions on merits before refusing a patent application.  

  

While rejecting a patent application for lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), the Controller must mandatorily consider and discuss three elements: (i) the invention disclosed in the prior art, (ii) the invention disclosed in the application under consideration, and (iii) the manner in which the subject invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the art; a bare conclusion without such analysis is impermissible.  

  

- Even if office records show successful delivery of hearing notice, principles of natural justice require that the applicant be afforded at least one effective opportunity of hearing before refusal, particularly when non-appearance is disputed and no reasoned consideration of reply to FER is given.  

  

Case Title: Provivi, Inc. Vs The Controller of Patents and Designs:30.01.2026:W.P.(C)-IPD 43/2025:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Coral Drugs Private Limited Vs The Assistant Controller of Patents

Coral Drugs Private Limited filed patent application no. 201717022856 for a process of preparing 16,17-acetals of pregnane derivatives. After pre-grant opposition by respondent no.2 and examination, the Assistant Controller rejected the application on 23.03.2023 solely on the ground of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) read with Section 25(1)(b) of the Patents Act, 1970. 

Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal. During hearing, the appellant agreed to amend claims by deleting claims 2 and 3 (which had broadened the scope of independent claim 1). The amended claims (Annexure-A) were placed on record, and both respondents (Patent Office and opponent) had no objection to their acceptance. 

The Court held that deletion of claims 2 & 3 merely narrows the scope without introducing new matter or contravening Section 59, relying on the principle laid down in Fresenius Medical Care case, and remanded the matter for de novo consideration by a different Controller on the amended claims.

Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case:

Deletion of dependent claims that broaden the scope of the independent claim, resulting in narrowing of the overall claim scope, does not contravene Section 59 of the Patents Act, 1970 and is permissible.  

  (Ref: Paras 8, 11, 12, 14)

Proposed auxiliary/amended claims that are in the nature of narrowing/disclaimer, do not broaden the scope of earlier filed claims, and whose subject matter is disclosed in the specification, comply with Sections 58(1) and 59 of the Patents Act, 1970.  (Ref: Paras 13–14; )

Case Details:Coral Drugs Private Limited Vs The Assistant Controller of Patents:29.01.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 20/2023: : Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

**Disclaimer**: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Neway Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mold-Tek Packaging Limited

Introduction: The Delhi High Court in a detailed Division Bench judgment delivered on 28 January 2026, addressed cross-appeals arising from an interim injunction order in a patent infringement suit concerning tamper-evident and leak-proof packaging systems for containers, particularly pails and lids. The Court upheld the injunction against Neway Industries Pvt. Ltd. for alleged infringement of Mold-Tek Packaging Limited's patent IN 401417 while setting aside the vacation of injunction for patent IN 298724, thereby restoring interim protection for both patents pending trial. This ruling emphasizes the high threshold for defendants to credibly challenge patent validity at the interim stage and reinforces the application of infringement tests like pith-and-marrow and doctrine of equivalents in prima facie assessments.

Factual Background: This decision from the Delhi High Court in cross-appeals under FAO(COMM) 235/2025 and 241/2025 clarifies the evidentiary burden on defendants seeking to defend patent infringement suits by raising invalidity grounds under Sections 64 and 107 of the Patents Act, 1970, at the interim injunction stage under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Mold-Tek Packaging Ltd., holder of two granted Indian patents for innovative tamper-evident closure systems used in plastic pails and containers for food and industrial storage, alleged infringement by Neway Industries Pvt. Ltd.'s competing products. 

The Commercial Court had partially confirmed and partially vacated the initial ad-interim injunction, prompting appeals from both sides. The Division Bench examined infringement mappings, prior art challenges, and equitable considerations, ultimately tilting the balance in favor of preserving status quo through injunctions for both patents while remanding certain validity aspects for deeper trial scrutiny. The judgment underscores that registered patents enjoy a presumption of validity, and defendants must discharge a substantial prima facie burden to rebut infringement or establish invalidity to defeat interim relief, particularly when claim charts and technical comparisons reveal substantial embodiment of essential inventive features.

The Suit Patent:  Mold-Tek Packaging Limited holds Indian Patent No. IN 401417 titled “Tamper-Evident Leak Proof Pail Closure System” and Indian Patent No. IN 298724 titled “A Tamper Proof Lid Having Spout for Containers and Process for Its Manufacture”, both granted and subsisting. These patents cover specialized plastic closure systems featuring tamper-evident bands, peel-off rings, gaskets, and integrated spouts designed to ensure leak-proof sealing, tamper detection, and ease of use in pails and containers for food, chemicals, and other goods. Mold-Tek alleged that Neway Industries Pvt. Ltd. was manufacturing, selling, and offering products that directly embodied the essential features of these patented inventions without license, thereby infringing Mold-Tek's exclusive rights under Section 48 of the Patents Act, 1970. Neway denied infringement, asserting that its products differed in construction and functionality, and further contended that both patents were invalid on grounds of lack of novelty, obviousness, and anticipation by prior art (including foreign patents and an Indian application IN 288127), availing defenses under Section 107.

Procedural Background: Mold-Tek instituted Commercial Suit CS(Comm) 01/2024 before the District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, Patiala House Courts, Delhi, seeking permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs for patent infringement. Accompanying the suit was an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. On 8 January 2024, an ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted restraining Neway from infringing both patents.

Neway applied under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC for vacation of the injunction. After hearing both sides, the learned Commercial Court, by impugned order dated 20 August 2025, confirmed the injunction qua IN 401417 (finding prima facie infringement and insufficient credible invalidity challenge) but vacated it qua IN 298724 (on grounds of arguable invalidity or non-infringement). Aggrieved, Neway appealed against the confirmation for IN 401417 (FAO(COMM) 235/2025), while Mold-Tek appealed against the vacation for IN 298724 (FAO(COMM) 241/2025), along with connected miscellaneous applications.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: For IN 401417, the Court upheld the Commercial Court's finding of prima facie infringement, noting that Neway's product embodied every essential integer of the claimed dual-lock tamper-evident closure system, including the anti-clockwise peel-off ring and gasket arrangement, satisfying the pith-and-marrow doctrine and doctrine of equivalents. On invalidity, the Bench held that Neway failed to discharge its burden under Sections 64/107 by not providing any claim-to-claim comparative analysis or mapping with cited prior art.

Mere general references to foreign patents without technical dissection were insufficient to create a credible challenge at the interim stage. The presumption of validity attached to granted patents prevailed, and the defendant's unsubstantiated assertions did not tilt the balance against injunction. For IN 298724, the Court found the Commercial Court's vacation erroneous, as Mold-Tek had made out a prima facie case of infringement through detailed claim charts showing substantial embodiment of the tamper-proof lid with integrated spout features. The Bench criticized the lower court's reliance on arguable prior art without requiring the defendant to prima facie substantiate invalidity through cogent evidence. Overall, setting aside the impugned order to the extent it vacated relief for IN 298724, the High Court restored interim injunctions for both patents pending suit disposal, remanded the invalidity issues for fresh detailed consideration at trial, and directed expeditious trial. The appeals were disposed accordingly, with costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: In patent infringement suits, while defendants may raise invalidity grounds under Section 64 as a defense per Section 107 at any stage including interim injunction proceedings, the burden lies heavily on the defendant to prima facie demonstrate credible invalidity through detailed comparative claim analysis, mapping, and technical evidence vis-à-vis cited prior art; mere general allegations, references to foreign patents without dissection, or lack of claim-to-claim charting are insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of granted patents or defeat interim injunction where prima facie infringement is otherwise established under Section 48. At the interim stage, courts must apply infringement tests such as pith-and-marrow and doctrine of equivalents by comparing essential claim features with the defendant's product, and equitable relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC favors preserving status quo through injunction when balance of convenience and irreparable injury (dilution of patent monopoly, market share loss) tilt towards the patentee.

CaseTitle: Neway Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mold-Tek Packaging Limited 

Date of Order: 28 January 2026  

Case Number: FAO(COMM) 235/2025 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:702-DB   

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Justice Shri C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Justice Shri Om Prakash Shukla  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles for this Article**  

- Delhi High Court Restores Interim Injunctions in Mold-Tek v. Neway Patent Dispute: Burden on Defendant to Prove Invalidity at Prima Facie Stage  

- Tamper-Evident Packaging Patents: Delhi HC Upholds Injunction for IN 401417, Revives for IN 298724 in Neway Industries Appeal  

- Patent Interim Relief: Delhi High Court Clarifies High Threshold for Invalidity Challenge in Infringement Suits  

- Mold-Tek Prevails in Cross-Appeals – Delhi HC Reinforces Presumption of Patent Validity at Interim Stage  

**Suggested Tags**  

PatentInfringement, Interim Injunction, DelhiHighCourt , TamperEvidentClosure, MoldTek,  NewayIndustries, PatentsAct1970, Section48, Section107, Section64, PithAndMarrow,  DoctrineOfEquivalents, IPR , IntellectualProperty, CommercialCourt , IPLitigation,   

**Headnote**  

Delhi High Court Division Bench upholds interim injunction against Neway Industries for infringement of Mold-Tek's patent IN 401417 (Tamper-Evident Leak Proof Pail Closure System) and sets aside vacation of injunction for IN 298724 (Tamper Proof Lid with Spout), holding prima facie infringement established under Section 48 Patents Act via pith-and-marrow/equivalents tests; defendant failed to discharge burden under Sections 64/107 to credibly challenge validity through detailed prior art mapping at interim stage, preserving patentee's monopoly pending trial with invalidity issues remanded for fresh consideration.

====

Mold-Tek Packaging Ltd holds Indian patents IN 401417 (tamper-evident leak-proof pail closure system) and IN 298724 (tamper-proof lid with spout for containers). It filed a commercial suit (CS Comm 01/2024) alleging that Neway Industries Pvt Ltd was infringing both patents by manufacturing and selling similar products. An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 08.01.2024. Neway applied under Order XXXIX Rule 4 for vacation. The Commercial Court, vide impugned order dated 20.08.2025, confirmed the injunction qua IN 401417 finding prima facie infringement and no credible invalidity challenge, but vacated the injunction qua IN 298724 holding the patent prima facie generic, lacking novelty and inventive step due to prior patent IN 207276 and market products. 

Both parties filed FAO appeals. The Division Bench upheld the injunction in respect of IN 401417 (dismissing Neway’s appeal FAO 235/2025) as Neway failed to provide product-to-claim mapping or credible prior art comparison (especially vis-à-vis IN 288127) and failed to discharge onus on invalidity. For IN 298724, the Bench upheld the finding of prima facie infringement but set aside the invalidity findings for lack of proper claim comparison with cited prior art, remanded the validity issue afresh to the Commercial Court, revived the original ex-parte injunction of 08.01.2024 till fresh decision, and directed both parties to appear on 17.02.2026 for expeditious hearing.

Crisp bullet points of law settled:

In patent infringement proceedings, when invalidity is raised as a defence under Section 107 read with Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970, the onus to make out a credible prima facie challenge to validity lies on the defendant once the plaintiff establishes prima facie infringement. (Para 19)

Product-to-claim mapping is an indispensable element in a patent infringement suit (except where impossible); absence of such mapping seriously undermines the case that the defendant’s product is “that product” covered by the granted claim. (Para 13.9–13.10, relying on Zydus Lifesciences Ltd v E.R. Squibb & Sons LLC, MANU/DE/0186/2026)

Arguments not pressed or not captured in written submissions before the trial court (even if pleaded) are ordinarily not permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal. (Para 13.5)

Finding of lack of novelty / obviousness / generic nature cannot negate the existence of infringement; infringement and validity are separate inquiries and must not be conflated. (Para 18.2–18.3)

When an appellate court sets aside an order that had vacated an earlier ex-parte ad-interim injunction, the earlier ad-interim injunction revives ipso facto; the principle of merger does not prevent such revival. (Para 21–24)

Case Title:Neway Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mold-Tek Packaging Limited :28.01.2026:FAO (COMM) 235/2025: 2026:DHC:702-DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Trackon Couriers Private Limited Vs B. N. Srinivas

Introduction:**  

This case exemplifies the robust protection afforded to registered composite/label trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly when a dominant word element forms the essential and leading feature of the mark. The Bombay High Court, through Justice Arif S. Doctor, addressed a classic scenario of alleged infringement and passing off arising from a former business associate's attempt to independently adopt and register a nearly identical mark for identical services. The decision underscores that registration of a composite mark confers statutory exclusivity over its prominent verbal components, especially when such components have acquired distinctiveness and goodwill through long-standing use. It also highlights how courts scrutinize claims of prior or independent use, particularly when contradicted by documentary evidence of permissive use and subsequent undertakings to cease. The ruling reinforces principles of honest adoption, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury in interim relief applications in commercial IP disputes.

**Factual Background**  

Trackon Couriers Private Limited, the plaintiff, has been operating in domestic courier services, international shipping, e-commerce logistics, and supply chain management since 2002. It coined and adopted the term "TRACKON" as a key element of its branding. The plaintiff secured valid and subsisting registrations for composite label marks in Class 39, including "Trackon Couriers" (applied 2004, user claim 2002), "Trackon Couriers Pvt Limited" (applied 2018), and "SURE SAFE SWIFT" (applied 2021), all featuring "TRACKON" prominently alongside a stylized "T" in Devanagari script. These marks enjoyed extensive use, substantial advertising investments, high turnover (exceeding INR 404 crores in 2023-2024), and presence across media, websites, and social platforms, establishing significant goodwill and reputation.  

In 2016, the plaintiff appointed the defendant as a business associate to promote its services in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, authorizing use of "M/S. TRACKON COURIERS & CARGO SERVICES" under specific terms via a letter dated May 5, 2016. The defendant and his wife formed a partnership under that name and used "TRACKON" permissively from 2016 to 2023. In October 2023, the plaintiff demanded cessation of "TRACKON" use and name change. Correspondence from October 28 to November 6, 2023, including emails and meeting minutes, showed the defendant's agreement to comply.  

However, in September 2024, the plaintiff discovered the defendant's new partnership "TRACK ON EXPRESS LOGISTICS" and trademark application for "TRACK-ON EXPRESS" on a proposed-to-be-used basis. A cease-and-desist notice followed on September 16, 2024, and termination of association on September 19, 2024. The defendant claimed prior independent use since 1998 via an alleged sole proprietorship later converted to partnership, but provided no supporting evidence.

**Procedural Background**  

The plaintiff instituted a commercial IP suit before the Bombay High Court, seeking permanent injunction against infringement and passing off, along with other reliefs. Simultaneously, it filed the present interim application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for temporary injunction pending suit disposal. The matter was heard by Justice Arif S. Doctor, reserved on December 19, 2025, and pronounced on January 22, 2026. The defendant opposed on grounds including lack of territorial jurisdiction, prior use, and equitable defenses like acquiescence, while alleging suppression of documents by the plaintiff.

**Reasoning and Decision of Court**  

The Court rejected the defendant's jurisdictional objection, finding the suit maintainable under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as cause of action arose partly within its jurisdiction through the plaintiff's widespread operations and the defendant's activities impacting the plaintiff's reputation.  

On merits, the Court held that "TRACKON" constituted the prominent, essential, and leading feature of the plaintiff's registered composite/label marks. Unauthorized use of this word, even in variations like "TRACK-ON EXPRESS", amounted to infringement under Section 29(9) of the Act, as spoken or visual representation of such dominant element infringes the registered mark. The Court relied on precedents affirming protection for essential features of composite marks, even absent separate word mark registration.  

The defendant's claim of prior use since 1998 was disbelieved due to lack of evidence; the 2024 trademark application on proposed-to-be-used basis contradicted prior use assertions. The 2016 letter evidenced only permissive use as an associate "on behalf of" the plaintiff, not independent rights. Email correspondence unequivocally showed the defendant's agreement to cease use and change name, rendering subsequent adoption dishonest and lacking bona fides. No acquiescence or suppression was established, as the plaintiff acted promptly upon discovering resumed use.  

The Court found prima facie infringement and passing off, given identical services, deceptive similarity, likelihood of confusion, and the plaintiff's established goodwill. Balance of convenience favored the plaintiff, with irreparable injury from dilution of reputation if relief denied, while the defendant faced no legitimate prejudice having agreed to discontinue. Interim injunction was granted restraining the defendant from using "TRACK-ON", "TRACKON", or deceptively similar marks/names, with costs awarded. The order was stayed for four weeks to enable appeal.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**  

A word that forms a prominent, essential, and leading feature of a registered composite or label mark attracts statutory protection under Section 29(9) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, such that its unauthorized spoken or visual use constitutes infringement, particularly when the word has acquired goodwill and public association with the registered proprietor, even without separate word mark registration. Permissive or licensed use as a business associate does not confer independent proprietary rights, and subsequent adoption after undertaking to cease use is dishonest, disentitling equitable defenses in interim relief.

**Case Detail**  

- **Title**: Trackon Couriers Private Limited Vs B. N. Srinivas  

- **Date of Order**: 22nd January 2026  

- **Case Number**: Interim Application (L) No. 35022 of 2024 in Commercial IP Suit No. 11 of 2025  

- **Neutral Citation**: 2026:BHC:OS:2082  

- **Name of Court**: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in its Commercial Division)  

- **Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Justice Arif S. Doctor  

**Disclaimer**: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

**Written By**: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles for this Article**  

- Bombay High Court Reinforces Protection for Dominant Word Elements in Composite Trademarks: Trackon Couriers Case Analysis  

- TRACKON Triumph: How Bombay HC Granted Interim Injunction Against Deceptively Similar "TRACK-ON" Mark  

- Dominant Feature Doctrine Upheld: Interim Relief in Trackon Couriers v. B.N. Srinivas Trademark Dispute  

- From Permissive Use to Infringement: Bombay High Court's Key Ruling on TRACKON Trademark  

**Suggested Tags**  

#TrademarkInfringement #CompositeMarks #BombayHighCourt #TRACKON #InterimInjunction #PassingOff #Section29TradeMarksAct #IntellectualProperty #TradeMarkLaw #ArifSDoctor #CourierServices #PriorUse #GoodwillAndReputation #IPLitigation #CommercialDivision  

**Headnote**  

Bombay High Court grants interim injunction restraining defendant from using "TRACK-ON EXPRESS" or similar marks, holding that "TRACKON" as prominent essential feature of plaintiff's registered composite marks is infringed under Section 29(9) of Trade Marks Act, 1999; defendant's claim of prior use disbelieved, adoption found dishonest post-undertaking to cease, establishing prima facie case of infringement and passing off with balance of convenience favoring plaintiff.

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**Very Brief and Compact Summary**  

Trackon Couriers Private Limited, using the coined mark "TRACKON" since 2002 with registered composite label marks in Class 39 and substantial goodwill from extensive use, high turnover, and advertising, appointed defendant B.N. Srinivas as business associate in 2016 for Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, permitting use of "TRACKON COURIERS & CARGO SERVICES". 

The defendant used the name permissively until 2023, when plaintiff demanded cessation and name change; correspondence from October-November 2023 showed defendant's agreement to comply. In 2024, plaintiff discovered defendant's new firm "TRACK ON EXPRESS LOGISTICS" and trademark application for "TRACK-ON EXPRESS" on proposed-to-be-used basis, leading to cease-and-desist and termination notices. 

Plaintiff filed commercial IP suit and interim application for injunction against infringement and passing off. The Bombay High Court rejected defendant's jurisdictional objection and prior-use claim (unsupported and contradicted by proposed-use application and lack of evidence), found "TRACKON" the prominent essential feature of plaintiff's registered composite marks entitled to protection under Section 29(9), held defendant's adoption dishonest post-undertaking to cease, established prima facie infringement and passing off due to identical services and deceptive similarity, and granted interim injunction restraining use of "TRACK-ON", "TRACKON" or confusingly similar marks/names pending suit, with costs, but stayed for four weeks.

Crisp Points of Law Settled:

  

- Registration of a composite/label mark confers statutory exclusivity over its prominent, essential and leading word feature even without separate word-mark registration; unauthorized use of such dominant word (spoken or visual) constitutes infringement under Section 29(9) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, especially when the word has acquired goodwill and public association with the proprietor. (Paras 12–14)  

Permissive/licensed use as business associate does not create independent proprietary rights in the mark; subsequent adoption after express undertaking to cease use and change name is dishonest and lacking bona fides, disentitling equitable defences in interim relief. (Paras 18–25)  

Case Title: Trackon Couriers Private Limited Vs B. N. Srinivas:22.01.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 11 of 2025:2026:BHC:OS:2082: Hon'ble Justice Arif S. Doctor  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

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