Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia Vs. Subodh Mody

The Effect of not taking objection regarding mode of proof at tendering of document

Introduction

  

This judgment from the Bombay High Court addresses a significant procedural issue in civil litigation concerning the timing for deciding objections to the admissibility and proof of oral and documentary evidence. It arose as a reference to a larger bench due to conflicting views among single judges of the court. The decision aims to balance efficiency in trials with fairness to parties, ensuring that evidence is handled properly without unnecessary delays while protecting the right to a just outcome. It explained Failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document.

Factual and Procedural Background

 

The reference stemmed from multiple matters, including writ petitions challenging trial court orders on marking documents as exhibits subject to proof and objections to statements in affidavits of examination-in-chief filed under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Key statutory provisions discussed include Order XIII Rules 3, 4, and 6 (dealing with endorsement and rejection of documents), Order XVIII Rule 4 (examination-in-chief by affidavit and recording of cross-examination, with provisos on proof and admissibility), and related provisions in the Bombay Civil Manual. The 2002 amendments to the Code were examined in detail, emphasizing the shift toward affidavits for chief examination and commissioner-recorded cross-examination to expedite trials. Conflicting single judge decisions were referred, leading to the framed question on whether objections should be decided immediately or deferred.

Dispute Before the Court

The core issue was whether courts must rule on objections to the admissibility or mode of proof of evidence right when they are raised during trial, or if such decisions can be postponed until final arguments or judgment. Some parties argued for immediate decisions to avoid wasting time on cross-examination of potentially inadmissible material and to allow parties to cure defects promptly. Others favored deferral to prevent interruptions in trials and promote faster disposal, citing Supreme Court observations from criminal cases. In simple terms, the dispute centered on practical trial management: decide evidence questions early to keep things fair and efficient, or allow evidence on record tentatively and sort it out later to avoid slowing down the process. The court had to reconcile these approaches with the Code's provisions and judicial precedents.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The court carefully reviewed the statutory framework, particularly the 2002 amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure designed to cut delays in recording evidence. It emphasized that while the legislature sought expedition through affidavits and commissioners, the court retains discretion and responsibility for admissibility decisions under Order XVIII Rule 4(1) proviso. Order XIII provisions require judicial determination of admissibility before endorsement as exhibits. The Civil Manual reinforces prompt handling of documents.  

Precedents played a central role. The court relied on Privy Council cases like Jadu Rai v. Bhubotaran Nandy (16 Indian Appeals 148= 17 Cal 173/186) and Gopal Das v. Sri Thakurji (AIR 1943 PC 83), which stressed deciding admissibility when evidence is tendered to avoid prejudice. Supreme Court authorities such as R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswamy ((2003) 8 SCC 752), Zaver Chand v. Pukhraj Surana (AIR 1961 SC 1655), Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. K.M. Shaffi (AIR 2004 SC 4082), and others were analyzed for distinguishing between objections on stamp duty, mode of proof, and inherent inadmissibility. These generally favor prompt rulings, with exceptions for truly complex or inherently inadmissible items.  

The court distinguished Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (AIR 2001 SC 1158) and State v. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641), noting their context in prolonged criminal trials and Article 21 rights, making them less directly applicable to civil suits governed by specific CPC rules. It favored consistency with civil-specific precedents and principles like stare decisis. Amendments and Law Commission reports were interpreted using Heydon's rule to advance the remedy of speedy justice without sacrificing fairness. The court stressed that procedure serves justice, allowing limited discretion for deferral in exceptional cases to prevent prejudice, but generally requiring decisions at the appropriate stage to enable parties to remedy defects. For affidavit evidence, objections can often be noted and resolved later, per Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd. v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. ((2004) 1 SCC 702). Overall, the reasoning promotes efficiency, fairness, and prevention of miscarriage of justice. It clarified that Failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document.

Final Decision of the Court

The court answered the reference by holding that objections to admissibility and proof of documents should ordinarily be decided when raised and before exhibition, with specific rules for different categories of objections. For evidence in affidavits under Order XVIII Rule 4, objections can generally be reserved until final judgment. The connected writ petitions and suits were directed to be placed before appropriate benches for disposal in accordance with the clarified law. The reference was thus resolved in favor of a structured, case-sensitive approach favoring prompt decisions in most civil contexts.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment settles that in civil proceedings, objections to the admissibility or mode of proof of documentary evidence must generally be raised and judicially decided at the time of tendering, before marking as exhibits, to allow parties to cure defects and ensure fair trials. Exceptions exist for inherently inadmissible documents or complex issues, where deferral to judgment stage is permissible if it serves justice. For oral evidence in affidavits, objections can more readily be deferred. This clarifies conflicting views, aligns procedure with CPC amendments for expedition, and emphasizes that procedure is a handmaid of justice. It held that failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document. It is likely to reduce delays, minimize prejudice, and provide consistent guidance to trial courts, influencing how evidence is handled across civil litigation in the jurisdiction and promoting efficient yet fair dispute resolution.

Title of the Case:Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia Vs. Subodh Mody   

Date of Judgment:16th October 2008  

Case Number:Writ Petition No. 623 of 2005 

Name of Court:High Court of Judicature at Bombay  

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Swatanter Kumar, C.J., V.C. Daga, J. and V.M. Kanade, J.  

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

**Headnote of the Judgment:**  

In Mr. Hemendra Rasiklal Ghia Vs. Subodh Mody & connected matters before the Bombay High Court, a larger bench resolved conflicting single judge views on the stage for deciding objections to admissibility and proof of evidence in civil suits. The court examined CPC Orders XIII and XVIII, amendments of 2002, and various precedents. It held that such objections should generally be decided when raised before exhibition of documents, with limited discretion for deferral in exceptional cases, while objections to affidavit evidence can often be reserved till judgment. The reference was answered accordingly, directing matters for disposal per the clarified law. (Word count: 98)  

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Bristol Bakery Vs Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. DE C.V.

Bombay High Court Resolves Cross-Suits Over "Bimbo" Trademark in Bakery Sector

Bristol Bakery Vs Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. DE C.V. & Ors.:6 July 2026 : Interim Application (L) No. 13958 of 2023 in Commercial IP Suit No. 117 of 2025 :BombayHC:Hon'ble Judge: Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

Factual and Procedural Background

Bristol Bakery, a Mumbai-based firm, claimed prior use and registration of the "Bimbo" mark for bread and bakery products since 1979. Grupo Bimbo, a Mexican global giant, asserted international reputation since 1943 and Indian registrations from 1993, along with market entry through acquisitions. Both filed suits for infringement and passing off, leading to cross interim applications for injunctions.

Reasoning and discussion of Judge

The Court examined prior use, registrations, trans-border reputation, honest concurrent use, delay, acquiescence, and balance of convenience. It applied principles from Toyota, N.R. Dongre, Milmet Oftho, and other precedents on passing off, well-known marks, and honest adoption. The Court assessed evidence of use, goodwill in India, and found Bristol Bakery as senior user in the local market while recognizing Grupo Bimbo's global standing.

Decision

 

The Court disposed of the interim applications with directions balancing the interests of both parties pending trial,  while allowing both the parties  continued operations, there by mutual co existence at interim stage till the out come of suit proceeding.

[Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.]

Global Brand Reputation Vs Local Prior Trademark Use

Introduction: 

A notable trademark battle in the bakery industry reached the Bombay High Court when two parties claimed rights over the mark "Bimbo." One side was a long-established local Mumbai bakery, and the other a major international food conglomerate. The dispute highlighted issues of prior use in India versus global reputation and raised questions about honest adoption, passing off, and injunctions in cross suits.

Factual and Procedural Background:

Bristol Bakery, operating since the 1960s, claimed to have adopted and used the "Bimbo" mark for bread and bakery products since 1979, securing a device mark registration in Class 30 in March 1979. It traced its partnership history and produced sales figures and promotional materials spanning decades. Grupo Bimbo, incorporated in Mexico, adopted the mark in 1943, built a vast global portfolio with over a thousand registrations, and entered India through joint ventures and acquisitions starting around 2017, with products bearing the mark appearing from 2019.  

Both parties filed commercial IP suits alleging infringement and passing off. Bristol Bakery sued upon discovering Grupo Bimbo's products in the market in 2023. Grupo Bimbo filed its suit and contested Bristol Bakery's rights, alleging fraudulent registration and delay. Cross interim applications sought injunctions against each other's use of the mark. The Court heard detailed arguments on evidence of use, reputation, and statutory defenses under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Dispute Before the Court

  

The main questions were which party had superior rights to the "Bimbo" mark in India for bakery goods, whether one party's use amounted to infringement or passing off, and whether injunctions should be granted at the interim stage. Bristol Bakery argued it was the prior adopter and registered proprietor in India with continuous local goodwill, and that Grupo Bimbo's global reputation did not automatically extend to India without actual use. Grupo Bimbo contended it had honest global adoption, trans-border reputation, and that Bristol Bakery's registration was vulnerable, with its own later entry supported by substantial investments and publicity. Both sides raised issues of delay, acquiescence, and balance of convenience.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court carefully reviewed the evidence of adoption and use by both parties. It noted that Bristol Bakery had a registered device mark since 1979 and produced documents showing long-term business activity in Mumbai. Grupo Bimbo demonstrated strong international presence and Indian registrations from 1993, along with market activities through acquisitions.  

Applying principles from key precedents such as Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha Vs Prius Auto Industries Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 1 on trans-border reputation and passing off, N.R. Dongre vs Whirlpool Corp. 1995 SCC OnLine Del 310 on honest concurrent use, and Milmet Oftho Industries vs Allergan Inc. (2004) 12 SCC 624 on global marks, the Court emphasized territorial aspects of goodwill in India. It considered Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 regarding concurrent registration and honest adoption.  

The Court found that while Grupo Bimbo had a coined mark with strong global goodwill, Bristol Bakery established senior user status in the Indian context with evidence of sales and promotion. However, it also acknowledged Grupo Bimbo's legitimate business expansion. On delay and acquiescence, the Court examined when each party became aware of the other's activities. Balance of convenience was assessed to avoid irreparable harm pending full trial, with the Court noting that complete restraint on either long-operating business could cause significant disruption.  

The analysis highlighted that similarity in the essential feature "Bimbo" created potential for confusion, but distinctions in get-up and local market realities were relevant. The Court referred to various decisions on passing off actions, rectification proceedings under Section 124, and the need for clear evidence of goodwill and misrepresentation.

Final Decision of the Court 

The Court disposed of the cross interim applications by a common order. It allowed  co-existence till the out come of suit proceeding. The suits were directed to proceed to full adjudication on the merits.

Point of Law Settled

 

This judgment reinforces that in trademark disputes involving global brands and local users, Indian courts give significant weight to actual prior use and goodwill within India alongside international reputation. It clarifies the application of passing off principles in cross suits and the discretionary approach to interim injunctions to balance equities. Future cases involving similar conflicts will likely see greater emphasis on territorial evidence and practical measures to allow co-existence where possible, promoting fair competition in the market.

Title of the Case:Bristol Bakery versus Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. DE C.V. & Ors. (cross suits)  

Date of Judgment:6 July 2026  

Case Number:Interim Application (L) No. 13958 of 2023 in Commercial IP Suit No. 117 of 2025 with connected matters  

Name of Court:Bombay High Court  

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh  

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

**Headnote of the Judgment:**  

In cross commercial IP suits between Bristol Bakery and Grupo Bimbo over the "Bimbo" trademark for bakery products, the Bombay High Court dealt with interim injunction applications. Bristol Bakery claimed prior Indian use since 1979 with registration, while Grupo Bimbo asserted global adoption since 1943 and Indian market entry. The Court analyzed prior use, reputation, passing off, and balance of convenience, disposing of the applications with partial restraints and directions for co-existence pending trial. (98 words)

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Industria De Diseno Textil SA Vs Registrar of Trademark

Delhi High Court Allows ZARA's Appeal, Rejects Registration of Similar Mark ZORA in Textiles

Industria De Diseno Textil SA Vs Registrar of Trademark :6 July 2026 :C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 52/2024:2026:DHC:5373:Hon'ble Judge: Justice Jyoti Singh

Factual and Procedural Background:  

Appellant Industria De Diseno Textil, S.A., owner of the well-known ZARA trademark, opposed the registration of ZORA in Class 24 for fabrics by Respondent No.2. The Registrar dismissed the opposition and allowed registration. ZARA challenged this order before the High Court.

Reasoning and discussion of Judge

 

The Court held that ZARA qualifies for protection as a well-known mark under Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 even without formal declaration, based on its extensive reputation, sales, and prior judicial recognition. It found ZARA and ZORA deceptively similar when compared as a whole, both phonetically and visually, rejecting the Registrar's dissection approach. The goods were also held to have trade connection. Precedents on anti-dissection, phonetic similarity, and well-known marks were applied to conclude likelihood of confusion and dilution.

Decision

The appeal was allowed. The impugned order of the Registrar was set aside and the opposition was upheld, preventing registration of ZORA.

[Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.]

Well-Known Trademark Protection in a Trademark Rectification Proceeding

Introduction:

In a significant ruling on trademark protection, the Delhi High Court addressed the conflict between the globally reputed ZARA brand and a similar mark ZORA sought to be registered for textile fabrics. The case examined key issues of deceptive similarity, well-known marks, and the scope of protection available even for dissimilar goods under Indian trademark law. The judgment provides important guidance on how marks should be compared and the rights of established brands against potential infringers.

Factual and Procedural Background:

Industria De Diseno Textil, S.A., a Spanish company, owns the ZARA trademark, used extensively for fashion clothing and home products including textiles since the 1970s. It has registrations in multiple classes in India, including Class 24, and has built substantial reputation with stores and sales in the country. Respondent No.2 applied for ZORA in Class 24 for various fabrics, claiming use since 2016. The mark was advertised, opposed by ZARA, but the Registrar rejected the opposition in February 2024 and granted registration. ZARA filed an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Delhi High Court challenging the Registrar's decision.

Dispute Before the Court

The core questions were whether ZARA and ZORA are deceptively similar and whether ZARA's well-known status entitles it to block ZORA's registration even if the goods are argued to be dissimilar. ZARA contended that the marks are phonetically and visually close, likely to confuse consumers, and that its brand deserves broad protection due to reputation. Respondent No.2 argued the marks differ in prefixes, goods and trade channels are distinct, and ZARA lacks formal well-known declaration, so no violation occurs. The parties differed on the proper test for mark comparison and the applicability of dilution principles.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court  

The Court carefully examined Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which deals with relative grounds for refusal of registration. It clarified that Section 11(2) protects well-known marks against similar marks for dissimilar goods if registration would take unfair advantage or harm the earlier mark's distinctive character or repute. The Court held that no formal declaration is required for such protection; entitlement based on reputation evidenced under Section 11(6) and the definition in Section 2(1)(zg) suffices.  

On similarity, the Court applied the anti-dissection principle, emphasizing that marks must be compared as a whole rather than broken into parts. It relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 11, where overall impression matters more than minor differences. Other important precedents included Encore Electronics Ltd. v. Anchor Electronics & Electricals Pvt. Ltd., 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 147, on phonetic similarity; South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing & Anr., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953, reinforcing holistic comparison; and cases like Essco Sanitations v. Mascot Industries, Ajanta Pharma, and Sulphur Mills where small vowel changes did not prevent a finding of deceptive similarity.  

The Court found ZARA and ZORA share structural, visual, and phonetic similarities, with common "RA" ending and only a minor vowel difference that average consumers with imperfect recollection might overlook. It also noted trade connections in the textile and bag manufacturing sector. ZARA's extensive global and Indian presence, sales figures, and prior recognition as well-known in earlier litigation strengthened its case. The Registrar's approach of dissecting marks and ignoring well-known status was held erroneous.

Final Decision of the Court 

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Registrar's order dated 08.02.2024, and upheld ZARA's opposition. Registration of the ZORA mark was rejected.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reaffirms that well-known marks under Section 11(2) do not require prior formal declaration for opposition purposes if reputation is established. It strengthens the holistic comparison test for deceptive similarity and extends robust protection to reputed brands against marks that could dilute their value, even in related trade channels. This is likely to guide future oppositions, discourage opportunistic registrations, and encourage stricter scrutiny by the Trade Marks Registry in similar cases involving famous brands.

Title of the Case:Industria De Diseno Textil SA Vs Registrar of Trademark    

Date of Judgment:6 July 2026  

Case Number:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 52/2024  

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5373 

Name of Court:High Court of Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Justice Jyoti Singh  

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

**Headnote of the Judgment:**  

In Industria De Diseno Textil, S.A. v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., the Delhi High Court allowed an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The appellant challenged the Registrar's dismissal of opposition to the mark ZORA in Class 24. The Court held ZARA as entitled to well-known mark protection without formal declaration and found ZORA deceptively similar to ZARA on holistic comparison. It set aside the Registrar's order and upheld the opposition, preventing registration of ZORA. (128 words)

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SC-Rasiklal Manickchand Dhariwal and Anr. Vs. M.S.S. Food Products

Rasiklal Manickchand Dhariwal. Vs. M.S.S. Food Products case:A party that has forfeited its right to cross-examine witnesses or advance oral arguments through non-appearance cannot demand a fresh hearing from a successor judge

Introduction:

The administration of civil justice requires a delicate balance between giving parties an adequate opportunity to present their case and preventing the abuse of judicial processes through deliberate delays. Legal strategies often involve a series of procedural applications that can inadvertently or intentionally stall the final resolution of a dispute. The Supreme Court of India handled these competing themes in a significant decision involving two prominent business entities locked in a trademark dispute. The case provides critical clarity on the boundaries of procedural rights under civil law, particularly when a party defaults in appearance or seeks to prolong litigation despite clear judicial directions for time-bound disposal.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The dispute originated when M.S.S. Food Products filed a lawsuit against Dhariwal Industries Limited and Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal in the court of the First Additional District Judge at Mandaleshwar, Madhya Pradesh. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendants had no right to use the trademark Manikchand for selling pan masala, gutka, supari, or similar products, claiming it was deceptively similar to their own mark, Malikchand. The plaintiff also sought a perpetual injunction and an accounting of profits.

According to the plaintiff, the business under the brand name Malikchand was initially started in 1959-1960 by Prabhudayal Choubey, who later assigned the trademark to his son in April 1986. The mark was subsequently assigned to another proprietor in April 1992, who eventually transferred it to the plaintiff on April 1, 1996. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants later began selling similar products under the phonetically identical name Manikchand, thereby passing off their goods as those of the plaintiff.

The defendants contested the claim, denying that any business was run under the name Malikchand since 1959. They argued that they had applied for the registration of Manikchand in 1966, named after the father of the second defendant, and had been using it continuously. They asserted that the plaintiff had forged documents to ride on their established goodwill and had filed a separate lawsuit in the Bombay High Court in 2004 against the plaintiff.

The trial court framed multiple factual and legal issues, including additional issues under Section 10 and jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In March 2004, an ad-interim ex-parte injunction was granted to the plaintiff, which was made absolute in April 2004. The High Court dismissed the defendants' appeal against this injunction in May 2004 but explicitly directed the trial court to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within six months. The defendants challenged this before the Supreme Court, which dismissed their petition in February 2005, reiterating that the trial must be completed within six months from that date.

Despite these clear mandates, the defendants filed numerous interlocutory applications, including requests for rejection of the plaint, discovery, and production of documents, which were progressively dismissed by the trial court. On February 28, 2005, when the defendants' counsel refused to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses, the trial court closed the right to cross-examine and scheduled the matter for March 17, 2005. On that date, no one appeared for the defendants. 

Consequently, the trial court ordered the suit to proceed ex-parte, heard the plaintiff's arguments, and closed the case for judgment.

Although the matter was reserved, a change in the presiding officer occurred when a new judge assumed charge in August 2006. The defendants filed further applications to set aside the ex-parte order, which were dismissed. Ultimately, the trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff on March 7, 2007, restraining the defendants from using the mark and directing them to submit accounts of profits. The High Court affirmed this decree in August 2008 but modified the relief concerning accounts by awarding a token monetary relief of eleven lakh rupees.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal legal and factual controversies before the Supreme Court focused on procedural propriety and the validity of an ex-parte decree delivered by a successor judge. The core question was whether the trial court committed a fatal error by ordering the suit to proceed ex-parte and whether a successor judge could validly deliver a judgment based on arguments heard by a predecessor judge without offering a fresh oral hearing to the parties.

The defendants contended that a judgment delivered by a judge who did not personally hear the final arguments violates the foundational principle of natural justice that the person who hears a matter must decide it. They argued that because they had appeared on subsequent dates before the judgment was formally pronounced, their right to participate and argue the merits of the case could not be completely extinguished. Furthermore, they asserted that the examination-in-chief submitted by the plaintiff via affidavits could not be considered valid evidence under the law because the witnesses did not physically enter the witness box to formally confirm those affidavits in an appealable case.

Conversely, the plaintiff argued that the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly empowers a successor judge to take up a case from the stage left by their predecessor. They maintained that the defendants had repeatedly disrupted and delayed the trial despite explicit instructions from the High Court and the Supreme Court for a speedy disposal. The plaintiff stated that the defendants deliberately forfeited their rights to cross-examination and oral arguments through their own non-cooperative conduct, meaning they could not later complain about a lack of opportunity.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous examination of the procedural provisions governing the trial of civil suits, specifically focusing on Order XVIII Rule 2, Order XVIII Rule 15, and Order XX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The court clarified that the hearing of a suit is a comprehensive process that begins with the production of evidence and concludes with the pronouncement of judgment, rather than being limited merely to oral arguments.

Addressing the contention that one who hears must decide, the court noted that while this principle is strictly applicable to quasi-judicial administrative forums, its application within civil suits is moderated by express statutory provisions. The court highlighted Order XVIII Rule 15, which acts as a special provision designed to handle situations where a judge is prevented by death, transfer, or other causes from concluding a trial. This rule explicitly allows a successor judge to deal with any evidence recorded by their predecessor and to proceed with the suit from the precise stage at which it was left. The court observed that the phrase from the stage at which his predecessor left it is wide enough to encompass a stage where evidence has been closed and arguments have been heard, thereby preventing the entire process from being undone.

The court distinguished the precedent from the Madras High Court in the case of American Baptist Foreign Mission Society versus Jaladi Ayyappaseti, reported at 48 Indian Cases 859, noting that it involved the death of a party prior to the conclusion of arguments where legal representatives were not brought on record, which did not touch upon Order XVIII Rule 15. Instead, the court expressed its agreement with the principle articulated by the Lahore High Court in Harji Mal versus Devi Ditta Mal, reported at Air 1924 Lahore 107. The Lahore High Court had established that Order XVIII Rule 2 gives an option to parties to argue their case when evidence is conducted, and if they deliberately choose not to avail themselves of this privilege, they do so at their own peril.

Regarding the validity of evidence by way of affidavit, the court analyzed the interaction between Order XVIII Rule 4 and Order XVIII Rule 5. The court referred to its earlier ruling in Ameer Trading Corporation Limited versus Shapoorji Data Processing Limited, reported at 2004 1 SCC 702, which affirmed the Bombay High Court's position in F.D.C. Limited versus Federation of Medical Representatives Association India, reported at Air 2003 Bombay 371. The court clarified that the expression in every case in Order XVIII Rule 4 means that the examination-in-chief must be submitted via affidavit in both appealable and non-appealable cases. The court explicitly rejected the notion that a witness must enter the box merely to formally confirm an affidavit that has already been sworn before a competent officer. Since the plaintiff's witnesses were present and the defendants voluntarily refused to cross-examine them on the appointed date, the evidence was legally complete and admissible.

The court also dismissed the defendants' reliance on Order IX Rule 7, explaining that once a suit is fully heard and closed for judgment, an application to set aside an ex-parte order has no application because an adjournment for pronouncing judgment is not an adjournment for the hearing of the suit. This position was backed by the landmark three-judge bench decision in Arjun Singh versus Mohindra Kumar, reported at 1964 5 SCR 946, which ruled that there is no legal gap between the reservation of judgment and its pronouncement that would allow a defaulting party to reset the clock.

Final Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court found no merit in the challenges raised by the appellants and determined that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or illegally. The conduct of the defendants demonstrated a clear pattern of filing endless interlocutory applications to obstruct the time-bound mandate given by the judiciary. The court ruled that the procedure adopted by the trial court was entirely consistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the Civil Appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the concurrent findings and the modified decree passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which protected the plaintiff's trademark rights. The appellants were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings, which were quantified at fifty thousand rupees.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reaffirms and clarifies two critical procedural principles under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. First, it establishes that under Order XVIII Rule 15, a successor judge is fully empowered to deliver a judgment based on the record left by a predecessor judge, including situations where the case has been closed for judgment after ex-parte arguments. A party that has forfeited its right to cross-examine witnesses or advance oral arguments through non-appearance cannot demand a fresh hearing from a successor judge. Second, the ruling settles that in appealable cases under Order XVIII Rule 4, an examination-in-chief submitted via affidavit constitutes valid legal evidence once the witness is made available for cross-examination, and there is no separate requirement for the witness to enter the box solely to formally confirm the affidavit text. This minimizes procedural redundancies and reinforces judicial efficiency against dilatory litigation tactics.

Title of the Case: Rasiklal Manickchand Dhariwal and Anr. Vs. M.S.S. Food Products

Date of Judgment: 25.11.2011

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 10112 of 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 27180 of 2008)

Citation: 2011 (13) SCALE 183

Name of Court: The Supreme Court of India

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Aftab Alam and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

Rasiklal Manickchand Dhariwal and Anr. Vs. M.S.S. Food Products, Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 10112 of 2011. The appeal arose from an ex-parte trademark decree affirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court restraining the defendants from using the mark Manikchand due to deceptive similarity with Malikchand. The defendants contended that the decree delivered by a successor judge without a fresh oral hearing was a nullity and challenged the validity of evidence filed by affidavit. The Supreme Court held that under Order XVIII Rule 15 of the CPC, a successor judge can validly proceed from the stage left by their predecessor, and a party defaulting in appearance forfeits its right to oral arguments. The court also affirmed that examination-in-chief on affidavit is valid evidence. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

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Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. Vs Registrar of Trade Marks

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. Vs Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. :06.07.2026 : (COMM.IPD-TM) 44/2025 : 2026:DHC:5378: Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

The court considered a dispute concerning trademark opposition involving the well-known mark GHOSTBUSTERS and a similar mark GHOST BUSTER. The case arose from Columbia Pictures' opposition to the registration of GHOST BUSTER in Class 05 for pharmaceutical goods, which the Registrar rejected. The principal question before the Court was whether the Registrar erred in not examining the well-known status of GHOSTBUSTERS under Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, despite dissimilar goods.

Main argument of contesting parties are that the Appellant contended the marks were nearly identical, adoption was in bad faith, and its mark deserved cross-class protection as well-known, while the Respondent defended the Registrar's order citing dissimilarity of goods and lack of formal well-known declaration.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, court observed that the Registrar failed to consider key grounds under Section 11(2) regarding well-known marks. The Court held that formal declaration is not a pre-condition for protection under Section 11(2), emphasizing that the Registrar must evaluate evidence of reputation using factors in Section 11(6) and (7). 

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order, remanding the matter for fresh consideration.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Formal declaration of Well Known Trademark under Rule 124 is not a mandatory precondition for invoking Section 11(2) protection in opposition proceedings

Introduction

This judgment addresses important questions on the protection of well-known trademarks in India, particularly when an established mark faces registration of a similar name for unrelated goods. The case highlights how courts balance exclusive rights of famous brands against new applications in different classes. It holds relevance for businesses building global brands, trademark practitioners handling oppositions, and the Registrar of Trade Marks in evaluating reputation-based claims. The ruling clarifies procedural aspects under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and strengthens safeguards against potential dilution of reputed marks.

Factual and Procedural Background

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., a major American film studio, owns the GHOSTBUSTERS mark associated with its successful movie franchise starting in 1984. The mark has been used extensively through films, sequels, merchandise, and streaming in India since 1985, with registrations in classes such as 9, 41, 25, and 28.

In 2020, another party applied to register GHOST BUSTER in Class 05 for pharmaceutical and related goods on a proposed-to-use basis. The mark was advertised, and Columbia Pictures filed an opposition citing similarity, bad faith adoption, and its own mark's well-known status. After evidence and hearings, the Registrar rejected the opposition in April 2025, primarily on grounds of dissimilar goods and classes, accepting the applicant's explanation for adopting the mark based on product function in chromatography.

Aggrieved, Columbia Pictures filed an appeal before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Dispute Before the Court

The core issues were whether the Registrar properly examined the Appellant's claim that GHOSTBUSTERS qualified for protection as a well-known mark under Section 11(2), allowing opposition even for dissimilar goods, and whether the adoption of GHOST BUSTER was dishonest. The Appellant argued the marks were nearly identical, prior knowledge existed due to the film's fame, and evidence of reputation was ignored. The Respondent defended the order, stressing differences in goods, trade channels, and the need for a formal well-known declaration via Rule 124 before claiming cross-class protection.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court carefully interpreted Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which protects earlier well-known trademarks against similar marks for dissimilar goods if registration would take unfair advantage or harm the earlier mark's distinctive character or repute. It explained that Explanation (b) to Section 11 refers to marks "entitled to protection" as well-known, not requiring prior formal declaration. Factors under Sections 11(6) and 11(7), such as duration of use, promotion, recognition among the public, and enforcement records, guide this determination.

The Court noted the Registrar completely overlooked this ground despite detailed evidence of the film's success, Indian releases, merchandise sales, media coverage, and international enforcement, including a successful US opposition against a related entity. It distinguished cases like Nandhini Deluxe, finding them inapplicable due to the coined and highly distinctive nature of GHOSTBUSTERS.

Several precedents were discussed, including judgments from the Madras High Court in Lego Juris A/S v. Gurumukh Singh and Godfrey Philips India Limited v. Khoday India Limited, which supported evaluating well-known status during opposition without prior declaration. The Court also referenced Delhi High Court decisions on bad faith adoption, underscoring that prior knowledge and failure to explain choice of mark can indicate mala fide intent. Rule 43 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, was read in harmony to reinforce that opposition can allege well-known status.

The analysis emphasized that Section 11(2) serves to prevent dilution and unfair advantage, aligning with India's TRIPS obligations. The Registrar's focus solely on class dissimilarity without addressing reputation evidence amounted to a material error, requiring fresh adjudication.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Registrar's order rejecting the opposition, and remanded the matter for fresh consideration in accordance with the judgment, directing proper evaluation of the well-known status claim and other grounds.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment clarifies that a formal declaration under Rule 124 is not a mandatory precondition for invoking Section 11(2) protection in opposition proceedings. Proprietors of reputed marks can establish well-known status through evidence during opposition, enabling cross-class protection where similarity and risk of unfair advantage exist. This strengthens enforcement for famous brands and guides the Registrar to comprehensively address reputation claims, likely influencing future oppositions involving global entertainment marks and dissimilar goods.

Title of the Case: Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. Vs Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.  

Date of Judgment/Order: 6th July, 2026  

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 44/2025  

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5378

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh  

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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1. Delhi High Court Allows Appeal in Columbia Pictures GHOSTBUSTERS Trademark Opposition Case  

2. Well-Known Trademark Protection Under Section 11(2): Key Takeaways from Columbia Pictures Judgment  

3. No Formal Declaration Needed for Well-Known Mark Status in Oppositions: Delhi HC Ruling  

4. GHOSTBUSTERS Trademark Dispute: Registrar Order Set Aside by High Court  

5. Cross-Class Trademark Protection for Famous Marks Explained in 2026 Delhi HC Judgment  

6. Bad Faith Adoption and Well-Known Marks: Analysis of Columbia Pictures vs Registrar Case  

7. Delhi High Court Clarifies Scope of Section 11(2) Trade Marks Act in Film Franchise Dispute  

8. Importance of Reputation Evidence in Trademark Oppositions: Columbia Pictures Case  

9. Landmark Ruling on Ghostbusters Mark and Pharmaceutical Goods Registration  

10. How Delhi HC Strengthened Protection for Iconic Entertainment Trademarks in India  

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**Headnote of the Judgment:**  

In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. Vs Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., the High Court of Delhi allowed the appeal against the Registrar's rejection of opposition to GHOST BUSTER mark in Class 05. The Appellant challenged the order on grounds of similarity with its well-known GHOSTBUSTERS film franchise mark and bad faith. The Court held that formal declaration is not required under Section 11(2) for well-known mark protection in oppositions and set aside the order for fresh consideration of reputation evidence and other grounds. (128 words)

SC-Parle Products (P) Ltd. Vs. J.P. and Co

Parle Products  Vs. J.P. and Co  case, Trademark Infringement :Overall Impression Vs Side by Side Test

Introduction

The marketplace thrives on brand identity, where consumers often rely on visual impressions rather than meticulous scrutiny to identify their favorite products. When competitive brands use packaging that closely mimics established trademarks, it leads to legal conflicts centered on consumer deception and trademark infringement. 

The judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Parle Products Private Limited versus J.P. and Company, Mysore, is a landmark decision addressing this pivotal issue. 

This case holds immense significance for businesses, legal practitioners, and consumers alike, as it clarifies the benchmark for determining deceptive similarity between competing product packaging. By establishing that overall visual impression outweighs minor individual differences, the ruling safeguards intellectual property rights and protects the ordinary consumer from market confusion.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute originated from the biscuit and confectionery manufacturing industry, where the appellant, Parle Products, held long-standing registered trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. Among these was a distinctive wrapper design registered on December 7, 1942, used for their widely popular Parle Glucose Biscuits. 

The registered wrapper featured a specific buff color scheme and depicted a farmyard scene containing a girl in the center holding a water pail, surrounded by cows, hens, a farmyard house, and trees. In March 1961, the appellant discovered that the respondent was marketing biscuits in a wrapper that appeared deceptively similar to their registered design. Despite receiving a formal legal notice, the respondent continued to manufacture and sell their biscuits using the contested packaging, prompting the appellant to file a lawsuit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain trademark infringement.

The respondent defended their actions by pointing out specific differences in their packaging design, which featured a girl carrying a bundle of hay on her head, a sickle, and a bundle of food, along with different arrangements of buildings, cows, and birds. The trial court meticulously compared the two wrappers side by side, concluded that the dissimilarities outweighed the similarities, and dismissed the suit on the ground that an ordinary purchaser would not be deceived. 

On appeal, the Mysore High Court confirmed this dismissal, observing that biscuits are generally purchased by upper-class consumers who ask for brands by name, and noted specific distinct features like the lady carrying a hay bundle instead of a pot, and a single cow instead of two calves. Aggrieved by these concurrent dismissals, the appellant approached the Supreme Court through special leave.

Dispute Before the Court

The core legal question requiring adjudication by the Supreme Court was whether the respondent's wrapper was deceptively similar to the appellant's registered trademark, thereby constituting an infringement under the law. The competing contentions revolved around the method of assessing similarity. 

The respondent argued that the visible differences in details, such as the specific posture of the girl, the nature of the livestock depicted, and the distinct text, were sufficient to prevent any consumer confusion. 

Conversely, the appellant contended that the overall get-up, color combination, and general arrangement of elements created a striking visual resemblance that would easily mislead an ordinary purchaser who does not have both products side by side for a direct comparison.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In its analysis, the Supreme Court observed that both the lower courts had committed a fundamental legal error by applying the wrong standards for evaluating trademark infringement. The court drew a clear statutory distinction between an action for passing off, which is a common law remedy against deceit, and an action for trademark infringement, which is a statutory remedy to vindicate an exclusive property right. It referenced the precedent of Durga Dutt versus Navaratna Laboratories, where it was established that in an infringement action, if the essential features of a registered trademark are adopted, variations in packaging or get-up become entirely immaterial.

The court further highlighted the legislative framework, noting that under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which repealed and carried forward the protections of the 1940 Act, a mark is deceptively similar if it so nearly resembles another mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion. 

To understand consumer psychology, the court cited legal authority from Karly's Law of Trade Marks, emphasizing that consumers remember brands by general impressions or significant details rather than photographic recollection. Therefore, the court held that the correct approach is to assess the broad and essential features of the marks rather than placing them side by side to look for minute discrepancies.

Applying this rule to the facts, the court found that both packets were of the same size, shared an almost identical color scheme, placed the words Glucose Biscuits prominently at the top in a similar style, and featured a central graphic theme of a girl with livestock against a farm background. 

The court remarked that an ordinary purchaser is not gifted with the powers of observation of a Sherlock Holmes and could easily mistake one packet for the other if encountered at different times. Consequently, the court rejected the argument that it should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts, stating its duty to intervene when such findings are based on an incorrect application of law.

Final Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of both the trial court and the High Court. The court formally decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, granting a permanent injunction that restrained the respondent from selling, offering for sale, or using biscuits in wrappers that are similar in appearance to the registered trademark of the appellant. Additionally, the court ordered that the appellant would be entitled to recover costs throughout all stages of the litigation from the respondent.

Point of Law Settled

This landmark judgment firmly established the test of overall visual impression and general recollection for determining deceptive similarity in trademark infringement cases. It settled the principle that courts must not perform a side-by-side meticulous comparison of two marks to detect minor differences; instead, they must evaluate whether the essential and broad features are likely to mislead an ordinary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. This ruling clarified that substantial visual similarities in color schemes, layout, and thematic design override minor variations in individual graphic elements, providing a robust legal shield for brand owners against sophisticated visual imitations.

Title of the Case: Parle Products (P) Ltd. Vs. J.P. and Co., Mysore

Date of Judgment/Order: 28.01.1972

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 1051 of 1967

Neutral Citation: AIR 1972 SC 1359

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C.A. Vaidialingam, G.K. Mitter and I.D. Dua, JJ.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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 3. Landmark Supreme Court Rulings on Product Wrapper and Packaging Protection

 4. How to Prove Trademark Infringement Overall Impression vs Side by Side Test

 5. The Sherlock Holmes Test in Indian Trademark Law Parle Products Case Explained

 6. Legal Analysis of Parle Products P Ltd v JP and Co 1972 SC

 7. Protection of FMCG Packaging and Trade Dress Under Indian Trademark Law

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 9. Essential Features Test for Deceptive Similarity in Intellectual Property

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Headnote of the Judgment

Parle Products (P) Ltd. Vs. J.P. and Co., Mysore; Supreme Court of India. Appeal by special leave against the Mysore High Court's dismissal of a trademark infringement suit. The appellant alleged that the respondent's biscuit wrapper deceptively resembled its registered wrapper. The trial court and High Court dismissed the suit by applying a side-by-side comparison. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' findings, holding that deceptive similarity must be assessed based on overall visual impression and essential features rather than meticulous differences. Finding the respondent's wrapper likely to confuse an ordinary consumer, the Court allowed the appeal and granted a permanent injunction.

Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Exotic Mile

Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Exotic Mile Date of Judgment: 06.07.2026 : Case No.: CS(COMM) 519/2019 :2026:DHC:5374:Hon'ble Judge Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

The Court considered a dispute concerning the grant of an interim injunction in a trademark and passing off action involving the marks "BOAT" and "BOULT". The case arose from an application filed by Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. seeking to restrain Exotic Mile from using the word mark "BOULT", contending that it was deceptively similar to its well-known trademark "BOAT". The principal question before the Court was whether a second application seeking an interim injunction against the word mark "BOULT" was maintainable after an earlier injunction application had already been decided.

The main arguments of the contesting parties were that the plaintiff contended the omission of the word mark "BOULT" from the earlier injunction order was merely inadvertent and that the defendant continued to exploit a deceptively similar mark despite earlier judicial findings regarding phonetic similarity. The defendant argued that the application was barred by issue estoppel, amounted to an abuse of process, and sought identical relief already declined earlier without any change in circumstances or undue hardship.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, the High Court of Delhi observed that the earlier judgment had consciously restricted the injunction to certain device marks and had not restrained the use of the word mark "BOULT". The Court held that a second interim injunction application on the same facts is maintainable only upon demonstrating changed circumstances or undue hardship, neither of which had been established in the present case. The Court further emphasized that successive applications cannot be used to indirectly rewrite or modify an earlier judicial order which has already attained finality.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application and declined to grant an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the word mark "BOULT".

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Maintainability of Second Injunction Application in Trademark Suit

Introduction

The Delhi High Court's decision in Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Exotic Mile is an important addition to Indian trademark jurisprudence dealing not only with deceptive similarity and passing off but also with the procedural limitations governing successive applications for interim injunctions. The judgment clarifies that even where a party believes an earlier order omitted a particular relief due to oversight, the proper remedy is not to repeatedly seek identical interim relief through fresh applications. 

Factual and Procedural Background

Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd., the proprietor of the well-known trademark "BOAT" for electronic goods and accessories, instituted a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction against Exotic Mile alleging infringement of its trademark, copyright, dilution of its brand and passing off. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had adopted the mark "BOULT" along with several device marks, logos and packaging which were deceptively similar to the plaintiff's well-established "BOAT" brand.

At the inception of the suit, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the word mark "BOULT", its device marks and other deceptively similar marks. Subsequently, the defendant applied for vacation of the interim injunction.

By judgment dated 21 January 2020, the Court disposed of both applications. While holding that the plaintiff was the prior user and observing that "BOAT" and "BOULT" were phonetically similar, the Court granted interim protection only with respect to specified device marks, copyright infringement, passing off and dilution. The operative portion of the order, however, did not expressly restrain the defendant from using the standalone word mark "BOULT".

The defendant challenged the order before the Division Bench. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant informed the Court that it had substantially discontinued the use of the impugned marks and had transitioned to the mark "GOBOULT". The Division Bench ultimately upheld the injunction regarding the device marks but clarified that there had never been any injunction restraining the use of "GOBOULT", leaving it open to the plaintiff to challenge that mark separately if advised.

After disposal of the appeal, the plaintiff filed another application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking an interim injunction specifically against the word mark "BOULT". The plaintiff argued that omission of the word mark from the earlier operative order was merely inadvertent and contrary to the findings recorded in the judgment regarding deceptive similarity. The defendant opposed the application, contending that it sought identical relief that had effectively already been refused, and was therefore barred by settled procedural principles governing successive injunction applications.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff could maintain a second application seeking substantially the same interim injunction that had not been granted in the earlier proceedings.

The plaintiff maintained that the findings recorded in the earlier judgment clearly established deceptive phonetic similarity between "BOAT" and "BOULT". According to the plaintiff, the omission of the word mark from the operative portion of the earlier order was only an accidental oversight which should not deprive it of protection. It further argued that the Division Bench had affirmed the findings relating to deceptive similarity and therefore the defendant ought to be restrained from continuing to use the impugned word mark.

The defendant, on the other hand, argued that the plaintiff never sought review, clarification or modification of the earlier order nor filed any cross appeal. Instead, after allowing the earlier proceedings to attain finality, it attempted to obtain the same relief through a fresh injunction application. According to the defendant, permitting such a course would undermine the doctrine of finality, encourage repetitive litigation and amount to an abuse of judicial process.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The High Court carefully examined the procedural history of the litigation and concluded that the earlier judgment unmistakably restricted interim protection to specified device marks and did not extend the injunction to the standalone word mark "BOULT". The Court observed that if the plaintiff genuinely believed the omission resulted from oversight, the appropriate legal remedies were review, clarification, modification or cross appeal. Having failed to adopt any of those remedies and having allowed several years to pass, the plaintiff could not seek identical relief through a fresh interlocutory application.

The Court relied extensively upon the principles governing successive applications for interim injunctions. It referred to Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Others, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 43, explaining that interlocutory orders may be revisited only in legally recognised circumstances. The Court also discussed Rakesh Madan and Another v. Rajasthan Financial Corporation and Others, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 39, which recognizes that a subsequent injunction application may be entertained only where there exists a genuine change in circumstances or where the earlier order causes undue hardship.

The Court found that neither requirement had been satisfied. According to the Court, the observations made by the Division Bench merely clarified what already existed in the earlier judgment and did not constitute a fresh circumstance giving rise to a new cause for interim relief. Likewise, the plaintiff had failed to specifically plead or establish any undue hardship as required by law.

The Court also referred to Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, (1987) 1 SCC 727 while discussing the applicability of principles analogous to res judicata at successive stages of the same proceedings. It further relied upon S. Malla Reddy v. Future Builders Cooperative Housing Society, (2013) 9 SCC 349, K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573 and Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, (1999) 5 SCC 590 to reiterate that repetitive proceedings seeking substantially identical relief amount to an abuse of the judicial process.

The Court also considered the plaintiff's reliance on Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 14 regarding deceptive similarity between competing marks. While acknowledging the legal principles governing trademark infringement and passing off, the Court held that the present controversy was fundamentally procedural. The issue was not whether "BOAT" and "BOULT" were phonetically similar, but whether the plaintiff could reopen an issue already concluded through another interim application.

The Court further examined the plaintiff's invocation of the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Referring to K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275, it observed that inherent powers cannot be exercised to circumvent or override specific statutory provisions governing interlocutory injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

The Court also noticed that the defendant had consistently stated before the Division Bench as well as before the Single Judge that it had already transitioned from "BOULT" to "GOBOULT" and was prepared to cooperate in removing any residual online listings. This further weakened the plaintiff's plea of continuing hardship.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the plaintiff's application seeking an interim injunction against the use of the word mark "BOULT". The Court held that the application was not maintainable because it sought substantially the same interim relief that had not been granted in the earlier proceedings. It found that the plaintiff had neither established any change in circumstances nor demonstrated undue hardship, which alone could justify entertaining a second application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court further observed that granting the relief sought would effectively amount to rewriting the earlier orders of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench, which had already attained finality. Accordingly, the application was dismissed without granting any further interim protection against the use of the word mark "BOULT".

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reiterates that a second application for interim injunction seeking substantially identical relief is ordinarily not maintainable merely because a party believes that an earlier order omitted a particular relief or contains an inadvertent error. Such an application can be entertained only where the applicant establishes genuine changed circumstances or undue hardship arising after the earlier order. The decision also reinforces that parties must pursue appropriate remedies such as review, clarification, modification or appeal instead of attempting to indirectly secure the same relief through successive interlocutory applications. The judgment strengthens procedural discipline in commercial and intellectual property litigation while reaffirming the principle that interlocutory proceedings cannot be repeatedly reopened in the absence of legally recognized grounds.

Case Details:

Title of the Case: Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Exotic Mile

Date of Judgment/Order: 06 July 2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 519/2019

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5374

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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1. Delhi High Court Rejects Fresh Injunction Plea Against BOULT Trademark in BOAT Dispute
2. Imagine Marketing v. Exotic Mile: Delhi High Court Clarifies Law on Successive Interim Injunction Applications
3. BOAT vs BOULT Trademark Case: Delhi High Court on Maintainability of Second Injunction Application
4. Delhi High Court Rules Second Interim Injunction Requires Changed Circumstances
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10. Delhi High Court Reaffirms Procedural Finality in Commercial Trademark Disputes

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Headnote of the Judgment:

Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Exotic Mile, CS(COMM) 519/2019, decided by the High Court of Delhi on 06 July 2026, concerned an application seeking a fresh interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the word mark "BOULT" in a pending trademark infringement and passing off suit. The Court held that a second application for the same interim relief is maintainable only upon establishing changed circumstances or undue hardship. Since the plaintiff failed to satisfy either requirement and had not pursued review, clarification or appeal against the earlier order, the Court held that granting the relief would amount to rewriting the previous judicial orders. Consequently, the application was dismissed, reaffirming the principles governing successive interim injunction applications and procedural finality in commercial litigation.

Global Agro Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shri Ajay Sharma

Global Agro Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shri Ajay Sharma : 21/01/2026 : Case No.: CS(OS) 132/2019 : Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:598 : Court: Delhi High Court : Hon'ble Judge: Subramonium Prasad

The court considered a dispute concerning bringing on record legal heirs of a deceased defendant and condonation of delay in a suit for specific performance. 

The case arose from the plaintiff's application to substitute legal heirs of Defendant No.1 who passed away during pendency of the suit with delay in filing the application. 

The principal question before the Court was whether sufficient cause existed for condonation of delay and whether the application for substitution inherently included setting aside abatement.

Court observed that the plaintiff had shown sufficient cause as knowledge of death was confirmed later through official channels, the company plaintiff could not have immediate knowledge, and Defendant No.2 failed to inform the court as required. The Court held that in applications for substitution the prayer for setting aside abatement is inherent relying on Supreme Court precedents. 

Accordingly, the Court allowed the applications, brought the legal heirs on record and directed filing of amended memo of parties. 

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.]

Introduction

Procedural laws governing death of parties during litigation play a crucial role in ensuring justice is not defeated by technicalities. In a recent judgment the Delhi High Court dealt with an application to bring on record legal heirs of a deceased defendant in a specific performance suit while condoning delay. 

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff  Global Agro Corporation Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell dated 23 August 2015 concerning a property in Shivaji Park New Delhi. During pendency of the suit Defendant No.1 Ajay Sharma passed away on 5 September 2021. The plaintiff claimed knowledge of the death could only be confirmed around July 2022 through an investigating officer in a related complaint case. 

Efforts were made to ascertain details of legal heirs. An application under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC was filed in January 2023 to bring the legal heirs on record. A separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was later filed seeking condonation of delay. 

The plaintiff relied on the fact that the original plaintiff was a company and Defendant No.2 (brother of the deceased) did not inform the court and substitution occurred after assignment of interest. The legal heirs opposed the applications contesting bona fides and locus.

Dispute Before the Court

The main questions were whether delay in filing the substitution application should be condoned whether sufficient cause was shown and whether a separate application for setting aside abatement was mandatory. The plaintiff argued lack of prompt knowledge due to the deceased not residing at the property corporate structure of the plaintiff and failure of Defendant No.2 to notify the court. The defendants contended the application lacked bona fides the assignee had no locus and the suit had abated due to expiry of limitation under Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court examined Order XXII Rules 4 and 10A CPC noting the duty of advocates to inform the court of a party's death. It held Defendant No.2 failed in this duty. Relying on the Supreme Court judgment in Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 291 the Court observed that once knowledge of death is gained the application for substitution must be filed within 90 days and for setting aside abatement within the next 60 days. However the prayer for setting aside abatement is inherent in a substitution application and a separate prayer is not always mandatory. 

The Court applied principles from Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma emphasizing a liberal approach where delay is not due to negligence but circumstances like difficulty in confirming death and details of heirs. It clarified that knowledge to an individual assignee could not be attributed to the corporate plaintiff especially as substitution of the assignee occurred later. Sufficient cause was found due to the plaintiff's reasonable efforts and the opposing party's omission.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court allowed both I.A. 620/2023 and I.A. 97/2026. The legal heirs of Defendant No.1 were brought on record. The plaintiff was directed to file an amended memo of parties. The applications stood disposed of.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reaffirms a liberal construction of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in substitution matters particularly where death occurs during long-pending suits without regular hearings. It clarifies that in applications under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC the relief of setting aside abatement is inherent and need not be separately prayed for. It also highlights the mandatory duty under Order XXII Rule 10A CPC on counsel to inform the court of a party's death. This will promote substantive justice over technical abatements in future civil suits and encourage prompt intimation by parties and advocates.

Title of the Case: Global Agro Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shri Ajay Sharma & Ors  

Date of Judgment/Order: 21st January, 2026  

Case Number: CS(OS) 132/2019  

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:590  

Name of Court: Delhi High Court  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Subramonium Prasad

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purpose only. Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

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**Headnote of the Judgment:**  

In  Global Agro Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shri Ajay Sharma & Ors the Delhi High Court allowed applications under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act to bring on record legal heirs of deceased Defendant No.1 in a specific performance suit. The Court condoned delay citing sufficient cause due to delayed confirmation of death and corporate plaintiff's lack of immediate knowledge. Relying on Supreme Court precedents it held that substitution applications inherently include setting aside abatement and noted failure of Defendant No.2 to inform the court. Legal heirs were brought on record. (92 words)