Saturday, February 21, 2026

Gillette Safety Razor Company Vs. Anglo-American Trading Company Ltd.

Introduction:The case of Gillette Safety Razor Company versus Anglo-American Trading Company stands as a classic illustration of how courts interpret patent specifications and distinguish true invention from mere imitation of existing ideas. Decided by the House of Lords in 1913, this dispute revolved around the famous Gillette safety razor and whether a rival product called the “Duplex” razor infringed the patent. The judgment remains relevant today because it explains two fundamental principles of patent law: first, that a patent is only valid if it shows real inventive merit over what was already known; and second, that even a valid patent is not infringed unless the accused product falls squarely within the scope of what the patentee actually claimed and described. The decision shows how the highest court carefully balanced the rights of the inventor with the right of the public to use ideas that were already in the public domain.

Factual Background: King Camp Gillette invented a safety razor that used a very thin, flexible blade instead of the thick, rigid blades common at the time. The blade was held in a special holder with a curved backing and a curved guard. When the parts were screwed together, the thin blade bent into a gentle curve. This bending gave the blade the stiffness needed for shaving and also allowed the user to adjust how close the cutting edge came to the guard. The inventor explained that this curvature was an important feature of his design.

The defendants sold a safety razor under the name “Duplex.” In their razor, the backing and guard were completely flat. There was no curvature, and the thin blade was simply clamped flat between the two flat surfaces. The blade was held firmly enough to shave, but it did not bend or offer the same kind of adjustment as the Gillette razor. The defendants argued that their product was different because it lacked the bending mechanism that Gillette had described as central to his invention.

Procedural Background:The Gillette company had earlier faced challenges to its patent in other cases, leading to an amendment of the specification to limit it strictly to safety razors. In the present action, the company sued the Anglo-American Trading Company and its manufacturer for infringement. At the trial before Mr Justice Parker, the court found the patent valid and held that the Duplex razor infringed it. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which reversed the decision and held that there was no infringement. The Gillette company then brought the matter to the House of Lords, where the final appeal was heard by Lords Kinnear, Atkinson, Shaw, and Moulton.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The House of Lords carefully examined what Gillette had actually invented and what he had told the public in his specification. Lord Moulton delivered the leading speech. He first looked at an earlier American specification by John Butler, published before Gillette’s patent. Butler had shown a safety razor in which a blade was clamped between two flat cheeks at the end of a handle, with one cheek shaped to act as a guard. Lord Moulton explained that this was a simple and well-understood way of fixing a blade transversely to a handle.

The only real difference between Butler’s razor and the defendants’ Duplex razor was that the defendants used a thin blade while Butler had shown a thicker one. But thin blades for razors were already known from other earlier designs. Therefore, the defendants’ razor involved no new inventive step beyond what Butler had already made public.

Turning to Gillette’s patent, the court held that the patent was valid because it required the special curved holder that bent the thin blade. The words “substantially as described” in the main claim tied the invention to this bending feature. The defendants’ flat holder did not bend the blade in the way Gillette had described, so it did not infringe the patent. In short, the patent protected the clever idea of using curvature to give rigidity and adjustability to a thin blade, but it did not prevent anyone from making a safety razor that simply clamped a thin blade flat between two flat surfaces.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This case settled an important principle that continues to guide patent law: if the accused product is, in substance, the same as something already described in a prior publication and differs only in non-inventive ways, then either the patent is invalid for lack of novelty or the product does not infringe. The court also reinforced that when a patentee says his invention is “substantially as described,” the claim must be read in the light of the whole specification, including the drawings and the features the inventor treated as important. Optional features may be ignored, but essential features that the inventor highlighted cannot be stripped away to widen the claim. The judgment reminds inventors that they must describe their invention clearly and cannot later argue for a broader monopoly than what they actually disclosed to the public.

Case Title: Gillette Safety Razor Company v. Anglo-American Trading Company Ltd.
Date of Order: 30 June 1913
Case Number: Letters Patent No. 28,763 of 1902
Neutral Citation: (1913) 30 R.P.C. 465
Name of Court: House of Lords
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Delivered by Lord Moulton (with concurring opinions by Viscount Haldane L.C., Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Lord Kinnear and Lord Atkinson)

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]


Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

  1. The Gillette Razor Case: How the House of Lords Drew the Line Between Invention and Imitation
  2. Classic Patent Judgment on Safety Razors: Gillette v. Anglo-American Trading Explained
  3. When a Thin Blade Is Not Enough: Lessons from the 1913 Gillette Patent Dispute
  4. Landmark House of Lords Ruling on Patent Construction and Prior Art – Gillette Safety Razor

Suggested Tags
GilletteDefense, PatentLaw , HouseOfLords , GilletteRazor, PatentInfringement, PriorArt, PatentConstruction, IntellectualProperty, SafetyRazorCase , IPJudgment, PatentValidity

Headnote of the Article
In Gillette Safety Razor Company v. Anglo-American Trading Company Ltd. (1913), the House of Lords held that a patent for a safety razor using a thin flexible blade bent by curved clamping surfaces was valid but not infringed by a rival razor that clamped the blade flat between plane surfaces. The Court ruled that the defendants’ product was substantially the same as an earlier published design and lacked the inventive curvature described in the patent, thereby clarifying that a valid patent protects only what is distinctly claimed and described, not every possible variation of a known mechanical principle.

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The Gillette Safety Razor Company patented a safety razor that used a thin flexible blade held in a curved holder, which bent the blade to give it the necessary stiffness for shaving and allowed easy adjustment.

The Anglo-American Trading Company sold the Duplex razor, which clamped a similar thin blade between completely flat surfaces without any bending.

The trial court found the patent valid and infringed, but the Court of Appeal reversed the infringement finding.

The House of Lords dismissed the final appeal, holding that the patent was valid because of the special curved bending feature but was not infringed by the defendants’ flat design, which was essentially the same as an earlier known method.

Points of Law Settled:

A patent claim using the words “substantially as described” must be read with the whole specification and is limited to the essential features the patentee treated as central to the invention, such as the curved bending of the blade. (Per Lord Moulton, (1913) 30 R.P.C. 465 at p. 482)

The public is entitled to make any product that follows a prior publication without inventive step; a later patent cannot monopolise such obvious equivalents. (Per Lord Moulton, (1913) 30 R.P.C. 465 at p. 480-481)

Case Title: Gillette Safety Razor Company Vs. Anglo-American Trading Company Ltd.:30 June 1913: Letters Patent No. 28,763 of 1902:(1913) 30 R.P.C. 465:House of Lords:Lord Moulton (leading judgment, with concurrence of Viscount Haldane L.C., Lord Shaw, Lord Kinnear and Lord Atkinson)

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Friday, February 20, 2026

Green Energy Resources Vs Union of India

A company based in Sambalpur held a patent for an innovative method to safely treat hazardous industrial waste from aluminium production. The patent lapsed because renewal fees were not paid on time due to the negligence of the company’s appointed patent agent. The company discovered the lapse only later, during the difficult COVID period when physical verification was hard. It approached the Orissa High Court seeking permission to file a restoration application even after the normal deadline had expired. The court found that the company itself was not at fault, had acted diligently, and never intended to abandon the patent. Relying on similar rulings from the Delhi High Court, it held that an innocent patent holder should not lose valuable rights because of an agent’s mistake, especially during the pandemic. The writ petition was allowed. The company was permitted to file the restoration application within thirty days, and the authorities were directed to consider it on merits within two months.

Law settled in the case

  • Negligence or error by a patent agent, without any fault on the part of the patentee, can be condoned and restoration of a lapsed patent may be permitted.
Case Title:Green Energy Resources Vs Union of India:11.02.2026: W.P.(C) No.19128 of 2024: High Court of Orissa at Cuttack  : Hon'ble Justice B.P. Routray

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Mehul Jain Vs The Registrar of Trademark

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a direction to the Registrar of Trade Marks to expeditiously decide his pending trademark application for the word mark 'AMAM' in Class 25 and the associated opposition filed by the respondent, after the hearing had concluded and written submissions were filed but no decision was pronounced despite significant delay. The court issued notice only to the Registrar, dispensed with notice to the opposing party given the limited nature of relief sought, and without examining the merits of the trademark claim or opposition, disposed of the petition by directing the Registrar to decide the application and opposition as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months.

- **Law settled:** In writ petitions seeking mandamus for expeditious disposal of pending trademark opposition proceedings where hearing is complete and submissions filed but decision is unduly delayed, courts may direct the Registrar to decide the matter within a reasonable fixed timeframe without delving into merits, to ensure timely adjudication. (Para 3, 8-9)

**Case Title:** Mehul Jain Vs The Registrar of Trademark.  
**Order date:** 18.02.2026  
**Case Number:** W.P.(C)-IPD 7/2026  
**Neutral Citation:** Not provided in the document  
**Name of court:** High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  
**Name of Judge:** Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Victoria Cross India Pvt Ltd Vs Victrorinox Ag

The appellant company, Victoria Cross India Pvt Ltd, filed an appeal against a commercial court judgment in a trademark dispute with Victorinox AG, but with a delay of 195 days. The appellant explained the delay through an affidavit citing the death of the key decision-maker  during the suit, prolonged injunction preventing business operations for years, the widow  suddenly having to handle affairs without experience, her mental health issues, dissolution of a related partnership firm, assignment of trademarks and copyrights to the appellant company, and subsequent changes in directorship and shareholding requiring administrative time at the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The court considered these explanations but found them insufficient to condone the substantial delay, as the appellant failed to show sufficient cause or diligence, leading to rejection of the condonation application and consequent dismissal of the appeal.

Law settled:

Condonation of delay in filing an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 requires sufficient cause to be shown convincingly; personal difficulties, family changes, administrative processes, or lack of prior involvement in decision-making do not automatically constitute sufficient cause for a long delay, especially when no satisfactory explanation for inaction or lack of diligence is provided throughout the period. 

Case Title:Victoria Cross India Pvt Ltd Vs Victrorinox Ag:17.02.2026:RFA(COMM) 532/2024:2026:DHC:1458:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

Pawan Kumar Goel Vs Dhan Singh

Introduction: The Delhi High Court has sent a clear message to litigants in intellectual property matters: you cannot withdraw a patent infringement suit in a way that keeps the door open for filing the same case again just in case the defendant changes its process in the future. In this ruling, the court refused the plaintiff’s request for conditional withdrawal and instead imposed costs on him for dragging the defendant into avoidable litigation. The judgment carefully balances the plaintiff’s right to withdraw his own suit with the need to prevent abuse of court process and harassment of the opposite party.

Factual Background: Pawan Kumar Goel owns an Indian patent for a process to extract Alpha Yohimbine of high purity from a particular species of the Rauwolfia plant. He believed that Dr. Dhan Singh and his company were using the same plant and the same process, and therefore filed a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction, damages, accounts and delivery up of infringing material. Later, after seeing the defendant’s export documents and manufacturing records, the plaintiff formed the view that the defendant was actually using a different species of Rauwolfia. On that basis he concluded there was no infringement and decided to withdraw the suit.

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that the defendant’s product came from a different plant species and therefore did not infringe his patent. He requested the court to allow withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit in future if the defendant ever started using the specific plant covered by his patent. The defendant strongly opposed this conditional withdrawal. They placed on record their batch manufacturing records and licence documents to show they had been using the plant species mentioned in the patent for many years. They also pointed out that the plaintiff’s own expert had clearly stated that the defendant’s process was completely different from the patented process. The defendant argued that the entire suit was without any real cause of action and asked for exemplary costs.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela carefully examined the patent claims and found that the patent protects a process of extraction, not the plant species itself. The court observed that the plaintiff could not claim infringement only when one plant is used and say there is no infringement when another plant is used, because the patent is on the process, not on the raw material. The judge noted that the defendant had produced clear evidence showing use of the relevant plant species for years, yet the plaintiff’s own expert had already confirmed that the processes were dissimilar.

The court held that the plaintiff was trying to approbate and reprobate at the same time. He could not say there is no cause of action today and at the same time keep the right to file the same case tomorrow if the defendant does something different. Such a conditional withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action was not justified under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court found no sufficient grounds for granting such liberty.

As a result, permission to withdraw with liberty was refused. The court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the plaintiff for putting the defendant through unnecessary litigation when his own expert report had already shown the processes were different. The suit was directed to be listed again for further proceedings.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles that a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit cannot seek withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit merely to keep a hypothetical future cause of action alive when the present suit itself lacks merit or when the plaintiff’s own evidence contradicts the infringement claim. The provision for withdrawal with liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC is not meant to allow a party to reserve the right to re-litigate the same dispute on a “wait and watch” basis. A party who files a suit must stand by its pleadings and cannot blow hot and cold. Courts will impose costs where a litigant drags the other side into court on a weak or inconsistent case.

Case Title: Pawan Kumar Goel Vs. Dr. Dhan Singh & Anr. Date of Order: 17 February 2026 Case Number: CS(COMM) 672/2022 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1333 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

  1. Delhi High Court Refuses “Wait and Watch” Withdrawal in Patent Suit, Awards Costs
  2. No Future Reservation of Cause of Action: Key Patent Ruling by Delhi HC
  3. Plaintiff Cannot Blow Hot and Cold in Patent Litigation: Delhi High Court
  4. Costs Imposed on Patent Owner for Frivolous Conditional Withdrawal Attempt

Suitable Tags Patent Infringement, Delhi High Court, Order XXIII CPC, Withdrawal of Suit, Costs in IP Cases, Patent Process, Intellectual Property Litigation, Frivolous Suit, IP Adjutor, Indian Patent Law,

Headnote of Article In a significant ruling, the Delhi High Court refused to allow conditional withdrawal of a patent infringement suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action in future. The court held that such liberty cannot be granted where the plaintiff’s own evidence shows no infringement and where the plaintiff is attempting to keep the dispute alive on a hypothetical future change in the defendant’s process. Costs were imposed on the plaintiff for unnecessary litigation.

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Pawan Kumar Goel filed a commercial suit claiming that Dr. Dhan Singh was infringing his patent for a process to extract a high-purity chemical from a specific plant species. After reviewing the defendant’s manufacturing records, the plaintiff concluded there was no infringement because the defendant was using a different plant species, and filed an affidavit seeking to withdraw the suit. He requested withdrawal with liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC to file a fresh suit in future if the defendant ever used the patented plant. The defendant opposed the conditional withdrawal, producing records showing they had been using the relevant plant for years and pointing out that the plaintiff’s own expert had already confirmed the processes were completely different. The court refused the conditional withdrawal, holding that the plaintiff cannot keep a future right to sue on the same cause of action while admitting the present suit has no merit, and that such liberty requires sufficient grounds which were absent. The court imposed costs on the plaintiff for dragging the defendant into unnecessary litigation and directed the suit to proceed.

Law settled in the case:

A plaintiff cannot seek withdrawal of a patent suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action merely to preserve a hypothetical future infringement when the present suit lacks any real cause of action. Paras 14-19

Liberty to file a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC is not available unless sufficient grounds are shown; Paras 18-19.

Case Title: Pawan Kumar Goel Vs. Dr. Dhan Singh: 17.02.2026:CS(COMM) 672/2022:2026:DHC:1333:Hon'ble Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Tuesday, February 17, 2026

Coldsmiths Retail Services Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

**Introduction**  
Trademark registration in India provides protection for a fixed period, but owners must renew it on time to keep the mark alive on the official register. The law requires the Trade Marks Registry to send advance notices before expiry so that proprietors can apply for renewal. When these notices are not properly served due to errors in the registry records—such as outdated agent details—the proprietor may miss the renewal window entirely. The Delhi High Court’s decision in this writ petition highlights the Registry’s responsibility to maintain accurate records of proprietors and authorized agents after changes like assignment or agent revocation. It shows that procedural lapses by the Registry can prevent fair opportunity for renewal, and courts will step in under writ jurisdiction to correct such injustices and direct renewal where the proprietor acted diligently.

**Factual Background**  
A company originally called Nirula’s Corner House Private Limited registered eight trademarks many years ago. Later, it assigned all these marks to Coldsmiths Retail Services Private Limited through a proper assignment deed. At the same time, the original owner revoked the authority of its previous agent and appointed a new authorized agent, informing the Trade Marks Registry through the required forms. The Registry updated the name of the new owner (the petitioner) in its records for all the marks. However, it failed to update the name of the authorized agent and continued to show the old agent’s name. When the registration period was nearing its end, the Registry sent renewal reminder notices—but it sent them only to the old (revoked) agent and not to the current agent or the petitioner. As a result, neither the petitioner nor its authorized agent received any notice about the impending expiry. The registrations lapsed, and when the petitioner later tried to renew the marks, the online system refused, stating the delay was too long. The petitioner then approached the High Court, arguing that the Registry’s mistake in not updating the agent details and not serving notices correctly deprived it of the chance to renew on time.

**Procedural Background**  
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, asking the court to stop the Registry from removing the marks from the register due to non-renewal and to direct the Registry to renew them. The Registry appeared through government counsel but did not strongly contest the factual sequence of events. The matter was heard, judgment was reserved, and the decision was delivered shortly thereafter. The court examined the forms filed by the petitioner and the assignment documents, along with screenshots from the Registry’s own portal showing the errors in agent details.

**Reasoning and Decision of Court**  
Justice Tushar Rao Gedela accepted the petitioner’s case that the Registry was fully aware of the change in ownership and the appointment of the new agent because the necessary forms had been submitted well in time. Despite this knowledge, the Registry did not correct the agent’s name in its records and wrongly continued to treat the old agent as authorized. Because of this error, the mandatory advance notices for renewal were never received by the petitioner or its current agent. The court held that the Registry has a statutory duty to maintain accurate records and to ensure proper communication of important notices, especially when it has been informed of changes through official forms. Failing to do so amounts to a violation of natural justice, as the petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to renew the marks. The court emphasized that the petitioner had acted diligently by filing the required documents and attempting renewal as soon as it became aware of the lapse. In these circumstances, the lapse could not be held against the petitioner. The court therefore directed the Registry to renew all the eight trademarks with effect from their original expiry date and to restore them on the register without treating the delay as fatal.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**  
This judgment settles that when the Trade Marks Registry is duly informed through prescribed forms about a change in ownership or authorized agent, it is legally bound to update its records accurately and to send all future statutory communications—including renewal notices—only to the current proprietor or the newly authorized agent. Failure to make such corrections and serving notices on outdated or revoked agents deprives the proprietor of natural justice and a reasonable opportunity to comply with renewal requirements. In such cases of Registry error, courts exercising writ jurisdiction will intervene to direct renewal of the marks retrospectively, treating the delay as not attributable to any fault of the proprietor, so long as the proprietor has acted diligently and in good faith.

**Case Detail**  
**Title:** Coldsmiths Retail Services Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks  
**Date of Order:** 17 February 2026  
**Case Number:** W.P.(C)-IPD 37/2025, CM 162/2025 & CM 164/2025  
**Neutral Citation:** 2026:DHC:1332  
**Name of Court:** High Court of Delhi  
**Name of Hon'ble Judge:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

**Disclaimer:** Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

**Written By:** Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles:**  
- Delhi High Court Directs Retrospective Renewal of Trademarks Due to Registry’s Failure to Update Agent Details  
- Trade Marks Registry’s Error in Not Updating Authorized Agent Leads to Court-Ordered Renewal  
- Writ Relief Granted: High Court Restores Lapsed Trademarks After Registry’s Communication Lapse  
- Natural Justice in Trademark Renewal – Delhi HC Protects Proprietor from Registry’s Procedural Mistake  

**Suggested Tags:** #TrademarkRenewal #TradeMarksAct #DelhiHighCourt #WritPetition #RegistrarOfTradeMarks #NonRenewal #AuthorizedAgent #RegistryError #IPLitigation #TrademarkRestoration #NaturalJustice #TrademarkLawIndia  

**Headnote**  
Writ petition under Article 226 allowed — Direction to Registrar of Trade Marks to renew eight registered trademarks retrospectively from date of expiry — Registry failed to update records of authorized agent despite filing of prescribed Forms TM-P and TM-M reflecting change of ownership and revocation of previous agent — Renewal notices under Section 25(3) wrongly sent to revoked old agent instead of current agent — Petitioner deprived of opportunity to renew due to Registry’s error — Petitioner acted diligently and in good faith — Lapse not attributable to petitioner — Marks directed to be restored on Register without treating delay as fatal.
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A company assigned its eight registered trademarks to the petitioner and properly informed the Trade Marks Registry by filing the required forms to update the owner’s name and change the authorized agent, revoking the previous agent. The Registry updated the owner’s name but failed to correct the agent’s name in its records. Renewal notices were sent only to the old revoked agent, so neither the petitioner nor its current agent received them. The registrations expired, and when the petitioner tried to renew, the system blocked it due to excessive delay. The petitioner filed a writ petition claiming the Registry’s error prevented it from renewing in time. The Court agreed that the Registry had been duly informed of the agent change yet wrongly continued using the old agent for communications, breaching its duty to maintain accurate records and ensure proper service of notices. This lapse denied the petitioner a fair chance to renew. Since the petitioner acted diligently, the Court directed the Registry to renew all eight trademarks retrospectively from their expiry date and restore them on the register.

Points of Law Settled:   
Once the Trade Marks Registry receives prescribed forms notifying a change in authorized agent and revocation of the previous agent, it is statutorily obliged to update its records accordingly and direct all future communications—including Section 25(3) renewal notices—only to the current agent or proprietor.

Failure by the Registry to correct agent details despite being informed through official Forms TM-P and TM-M, resulting in renewal notices being sent to a revoked agent, constitutes a serious procedural error and violation of natural justice, depriving the proprietor of reasonable opportunity to renew.

Case Title:Coldsmiths Retail Services Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:17.02.2026:W.P.(C)-IPD 37/2025,2026:DHC:1332:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor
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Pawan Kumar Goel Vs. Dr. Dhan Singh

Introduction
In patent infringement litigation, a plaintiff who initiates a suit alleging unauthorized use of a patented process often faces the challenge of proving infringement based on the defendant's actual manufacturing methods. When new evidence emerges during proceedings that undermines the foundational claim of infringement, the plaintiff may seek to withdraw the suit. However, Indian courts scrutinize such requests carefully, particularly when the plaintiff attempts to withdraw conditionally to preserve the right to file a fresh suit later on the same grounds. The Delhi High Court's decision in this case illustrates the strict application of withdrawal provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that a plaintiff cannot use withdrawal as a tool to revive a meritless claim or hedge against future contingencies while avoiding consequences for pursuing weak or baseless litigation.
Factual Background
The plaintiff, Pawan Kumar Goel, owns Indian Patent No. 369150, which covers a novel process for extracting Alpha Yohimbine (also known as Rauwolscine) with purity greater than 90% from Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla. He filed the suit claiming that the defendants, Dr. Dhan Singh and another, were infringing this patent by using the same or similar process involving Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla to produce the compound commercially. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction, delivery up of infringing stocks, accounts of profits, damages, and costs. During the proceedings, the defendants filed documents, including Batch Manufacturing Records (BMRs) and export records, showing their process for producing Alpha Yohimbine with over 90% purity. The plaintiff initially believed these documents indicated use of Rauwolfia vomitoria (a different species), which he claimed would not infringe his patent focused on Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla. The plaintiff's own expert report, filed earlier, analyzed the defendants' process and concluded it was "absolutely dissimilar" to the patented process. The defendants maintained they used Rauwolfia tetraphylla (covered under the plaintiff's patent claims) alongside Rauwolfia vomitoria, had regulatory licenses since 2014, and had been exporting the product commercially for years without infringement.
Procedural Background
The suit was instituted as CS(COMM) 672/2022, with a counter-claim and various interim applications. After the defendants filed their written statement and documents, the plaintiff filed an affidavit dated 21.07.2025 stating that the defendants' documents confirmed use of Rauwolfia vomitoria, removing the cause of action for infringement. The plaintiff sought to withdraw the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) of the CPC, requesting liberty to file a fresh suit if the defendants later used Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla. The defendants opposed conditional withdrawal, arguing no fresh cause of action could arise since the patent protects a process, not a specific raw material species, and the plaintiff's expert had already cleared their process of similarity. They sought dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action and imposition of exemplary costs for frivolous litigation. Arguments were heard, judgment reserved on 11.02.2026, and delivered on 17.02.2026.
Reasoning and Decision of Court
Justice Tushar Rao Gedela rejected the plaintiff's request for conditional withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC. The Court observed that the patent protects a specific process for extracting Alpha Yohimbine with high purity from Rauwolfia species, not the raw material itself. Distinguishing infringement based solely on the species of Rauwolfia used was illogical, as the cause of action for infringement arises from using a similar process, regardless of minor variations in raw material. The defendants' documents, including BMRs, showed use of Rauwolfia tetraphylla, yet the plaintiff's own expert report confirmed the processes were dissimilar, negating infringement. The Court held that the plaintiff could not approbate and reprobate—first alleging infringement from use of Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla, then claiming no cause of action upon discovering Rauwolfia vomitoria, while seeking to reserve rights for future claims on the same species. Such a conditional withdrawal was impermissible, as what cannot be achieved directly cannot be done indirectly. No formal defect or sufficient grounds existed for liberty to file afresh. Since the suit lacked merit from the outset, particularly after the expert report in 2023, the Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the plaintiff, payable within four weeks, for dragging the defendants into unnecessary litigation. The suit was not dismissed outright but listed for further proceedings on 08.07.2026.
Point of Law Settled in the Case
This judgment clarifies that in patent infringement suits, withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC requires demonstration of formal defect or sufficient grounds, and courts will deny such permission where the plaintiff seeks to preserve a future claim on the same cause of action after realizing the original claim lacks merit. A plaintiff cannot create artificial distinctions (such as raw material species) to justify conditional withdrawal when the patent covers a process applicable across species variations. When a plaintiff's own expert evidence negates infringement and the suit appears frivolous or unsustainable, courts may impose exemplary costs on the plaintiff under Order XXIII Rule 4(b) CPC to deter abuse of process and compensate the defendant for unwarranted litigation.
Case Detail
Title: Pawan Kumar Goel v. Dr. Dhan Singh & Anr.
Date of Order: 17 February 2026
Case Number: CS(COMM) 672/2022, CC(COMM) 16/2023 & I.A. 13948/2023
Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1333 (based on standard Delhi High Court neutral citation format for 2026 judgments)
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela
Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
Suggested Titles:
Delhi High Court Rejects Conditional Withdrawal in Patent Infringement Suit, Imposes Costs for Frivolous Litigation
No Liberty to File Fresh Suit: Delhi HC Denies Plaintiff’s Attempt to Withdraw Patent Case Conditionally
Patent Process Infringement Claim Fails – Delhi High Court Awards Exemplary Costs to Defendant
When Plaintiff’s Own Expert Clears Defendant: Delhi HC Imposes Costs in Patent Suit Withdrawal Bid
Suggested Tags: #PatentInfringement #DelhiHighCourt #OrderXXIIICPC #WithdrawalOfSuit #ExemplaryCosts #AlphaYohimbine #Rauwolfia #IPLitigation #PatentLawIndia #FrivolousLitigation
Headnote
Suit for permanent injunction alleging infringement of process patent IN 369150 for extraction of Alpha Yohimbine >90% purity from Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla — Plaintiff seeks withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC with liberty to file fresh suit, claiming defendants use Rauwolfia vomitoria removing cause of action — Court holds patent protects process, not raw material species; distinction untenable — Plaintiff's expert report confirms defendant's process dissimilar, negating infringement — Conditional withdrawal denied as no sufficient grounds; what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly — Exemplary costs of Rs.50,000 imposed on plaintiff for unnecessary litigation — Suit listed for further hearing.
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**Brief Summary**  
Pawan Kumar Goel, owner of Indian Patent No. 369150 for a process to extract Alpha Yohimbine with over 90% purity from Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla, filed a suit claiming Dr. Dhan Singh and another were infringing it by using the same or similar process to make and export the compound. During the case, the defendants filed documents like manufacturing records showing their process and raw materials. The plaintiff then filed an affidavit stating these documents showed use of Rauwolfia vomitoria (a different plant), meaning no infringement occurred, and asked to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh one later if the defendants used Rauwolfia canescens/tetraphylla. The defendants opposed this conditional withdrawal, arguing their process was different as confirmed by the plaintiff's own expert report, they had used Rauwolfia tetraphylla for years with valid licenses, and the suit lacked any real basis for infringement. The Court rejected the conditional withdrawal, holding that the patent protects the extraction process itself, not a specific plant species, so distinguishing infringement based only on the plant used made no sense. Since the plaintiff's expert had already found the processes dissimilar and the suit appeared baseless, permission to file afresh was denied. Instead, the Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the plaintiff for forcing unnecessary litigation on the defendants, and listed the matter for further hearing.

**Points of Law Settled**  
- A plaintiff cannot obtain conditional withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC merely to preserve a future claim when the original suit lacks merit or when the plaintiff seeks to create artificial distinctions (such as raw material species) that do not align with the scope of the patent, which protects a process and not a particular raw material (Paras 14–19).  
- In patent infringement suits, the cause of action arises from use of a similar or identical process, and minor variations in raw material do not negate infringement or create a separate future cause of action justifying conditional withdrawal (Paras 15–16).  
- When a plaintiff's own expert report concludes the defendant's process is dissimilar and negates infringement, and the plaintiff persists with the suit before seeking withdrawal, the Court may refuse permission under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC and impose exemplary costs on the plaintiff under Order XXIII Rule 4(b) CPC to compensate the defendant for being dragged into frivolous or avoidable litigation (Paras 17, 20).  
- A plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate by first alleging infringement based on use of a particular raw material and later claiming no cause of action upon discovering a different raw material, while seeking to reserve rights for the same material in future (Para 16).  

**Case Title:** Pawan Kumar Goel Vs. Dr. Dhan Singh & Anr.  
**Order Date:** 17 February 2026  
**Case Number:** CS(COMM) 672/2022, CC(COMM) 16/2023 & I.A. 13948/2023  
**Neutral Citation:** 2026:DHC:1333  
**Name of Court:** High Court of Delhi  
**Name of Judge:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

**Disclaimer:** Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

**Written By:** Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor
======

Yashasvi Havelia Vs. Prabhtej Bhatia

Introduction: In a clear and practical ruling, the Delhi High Court has once again reinforced that trademarks which are registered but never used in the market cannot be allowed to block genuine businesses. The Court removed the mark ‘BANDOOK’ from the Register in Class 33 because the registered owner had not used it for more than five years. This judgment protects honest traders who want to use a mark and sends a strong signal that the trademark register must remain clean and reflect actual commercial use.

Factual Background: Yashasvi Havelia is actively engaged in the beverage business. The petitioner had already secured registration of the trademark ‘BANDOOK’ in Class 32 for beer and non-alcoholic drinks. When the petitioner decided to expand into alcoholic beverages (excluding beer) and applied for registration in Class 33, a search revealed an existing registration of the identical mark ‘BANDOOK’ in Class 33 in the name of Prabhtej Bhatia, trading as Raipur Bottling Company. The petitioner claimed that the respondent had never used the mark for any alcoholic beverages since its registration in 2018 and had no genuine intention to use it.

Procedural Background: The petitioner filed a rectification petition under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking removal of the impugned registration on the ground of non-use. The petition was duly served on the respondent. Despite service, the respondent neither appeared nor filed any reply. The Registrar of Trade Marks was impleaded as Respondent No.2 and appeared through counsel but raised no opposition. The matter proceeded ex parte against Respondent No.1. After hearing the petitioner, the Court delivered its judgment on 22 January 2026, which contained a typographical error in the operative paragraph. This error was corrected by a subsequent order dated 10 February 2026 under Section 152 CPC, with the consent of the Registrar.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: Justice Jyoti Singh observed that the respondent’s complete silence and failure to file any reply meant that all allegations made in the petition stood admitted. The petitioner had clearly pleaded that the mark had not been used for over five years, supported by investigations showing no excise licences, no manufacturing approvals, no brand registrations, and no commercial activity under the mark. The Court held that the petitioner is a “person aggrieved” because it already holds registration of the identical mark in Class 32 and has a pending application in Class 33. The continued presence of the unused registration was blocking the petitioner’s legitimate business expansion.

Placing reliance on consistent precedents of the Delhi High Court, the judge ruled that once non-use is pleaded and not specifically denied, the allegation is deemed admitted and the mark becomes liable for removal under Section 47(1)(b) of the Act. The Court found that the respondent had no bona fide intention to use the mark and had merely squatted on the registration. Accordingly, the petition was allowed and the Trade Marks Registry was directed to remove the mark ‘BANDOOK’ under Registration No.3762319 in Class 33 from the Register and rectify the records to maintain its purity.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles that when a rectification petition pleads non-use of a registered trademark for the statutory period and the registered proprietor does not appear or specifically deny the allegation, the plea of non-use is deemed admitted and the mark is liable to be removed under Section 47(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It also reaffirms that a person who has registered or applied for the same or similar mark in a related class and whose business interests are affected is a “person aggrieved” entitled to maintain such a petition. The ruling further clarifies that mere registration without genuine commercial use does not entitle the proprietor to block others, and the Register must be kept free of dead or unused marks.

Case Title: Yashasvi Havelia Vs. Prabhtej Bhatia and Anr.
Date of Order: 22 January 2026
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 166/2025
Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:884
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

  1. Delhi High Court Removes Unused ‘BANDOOK’ Trademark for Non-Use
  2. Squatting on Trademark Register No Longer Works: Delhi HC Ruling
  3. Non-Use for Five Years Leads to Removal of ‘BANDOOK’ Mark
  4. Genuine Business Interest Prevails: Rectification Petition Allowed

Suitable Tags
Trademark Rectification, Section 47 Trade Marks Act, Non-Use of Trademark, Delhi High Court Judgment, Person Aggrieved, Trademark Squatting, Bandook Trademark, IP Law India, Trademark Removal, Clean Register

Headnote of Article
The Delhi High Court allowed a rectification petition and directed removal of the trademark ‘BANDOOK’ in Class 33 on the ground of non-use for more than five years. The Court held that the petitioner, being the registered proprietor of the identical mark in Class 32 and having a pending application in Class 33, is a person aggrieved. Since the respondent failed to contest the petition or deny the allegations of non-use, the averments were deemed admitted, leading to removal of the mark to maintain purity of the Register.

=====

Yashasvi Havelia, who is already the registered owner of the trademark BANDOOK for beer and non-alcoholic beverages, applied for the same mark for alcoholic beverages excluding beer and found an identical registration standing in the name of Prabhtej Bhatia. Claiming the respondent had never used the mark since registration and had no intention to use it, the petitioner filed a rectification petition for its removal. The respondent was duly served but neither appeared nor filed any reply, so the matter proceeded ex parte. The court held that the clear allegations of non-use stood fully admitted due to absence of any denial and that the petitioner was a person aggrieved because the unused mark was blocking its legitimate business expansion. Finding no genuine commercial use, the court allowed the petition and directed the Trade Marks Registry to remove the mark from the Register.

Law settled in the case

When a rectification petition pleads non-use of a registered trademark and the registered proprietor fails to appear or specifically deny the allegation, the plea of non-use is deemed admitted and the mark is liable to be removed.

Case Title: Yashasvi Havelia Vs. Prabhtej Bhatia:22.01.2026:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 166/2025:2026:DHC:884: Hon'ble Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Monday, February 16, 2026

Oswaal Books and Learnings Pvt.Ltd. Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Introduction: Delhi High Court has allowed the registration of the mark “ONE FOR ALL” for educational books and related publications. The decision highlights how courts should evaluate everyday suggestive marks when they are used as trademarks. Rather than treating common words as automatically unprotectable, the court examined whether the suggestive marks truly describes the product or merely suggests an idea in the minds of buyers. This judgment is particularly important for businesses in the education sector, where creative slogans help publishers stand out in a crowded market. It reassures companies that a well-chosen tagline can function as a source identifier even if the words themselves are simple and familiar.

Factual Background: Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited, a well-known publisher of educational materials, started using the expression “ONE FOR ALL” for its books and academic resources from August 2020. The company chose the phrase to convey that its publications serve as a complete solution for students preparing for various school boards and competitive examinations. In October 2020, Oswaal filed an application to register “ONE FOR ALL” as a trademark in Class 16, which covers printed books and paper goods. The company believed the mark would help customers instantly recognise its products and distinguish them from those of other publishers.

Procedural Background: The Trade Marks Registry examined the application and refused registration, stating that the mark lacked distinctiveness and was a common phrase that anyone should be free to use. Oswaal challenged this refusal before the Delhi High Court through a statutory appeal. A single judge heard the matter and upheld the refusal, observing that “ONE FOR ALL” was a laudatory expression suggesting the books were a universal solution and that the company had not proved the mark had acquired a special meaning among buyers. Feeling aggrieved, Oswaal filed an intra-court appeal before a division bench of the High Court. After hearing detailed arguments from senior counsel, the division bench delivered its judgment on 10 February 2026.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The division bench carefully studied the mark in the specific context of educational books. The judges noted that “ONE FOR ALL” does not immediately tell a buyer anything about the physical nature, quality, or content of a book. A book is a tangible printed item, and the phrase simply suggests broad coverage or completeness rather than describing any particular feature of the book itself. The court observed that the connection between the mark and the goods is not direct; it requires a moment of thought. Therefore, the mark is suggestive rather than descriptive.

The bench respectfully differed from the single judge’s view that the phrase was laudatory and descriptive in the education field. It emphasised that the test is not whether the words are common in English but whether they describe the goods in question. Since no similar mark existed on the register in the relevant class and the Registry itself had raised no objection about other traders using the same expression, the court found no reason to deny protection. The judges also clarified that the mark need not be proved to have acquired secondary meaning because it already possessed enough distinctiveness on its own in the context of books.

Ultimately, the division bench set aside both the Registrar’s order and the single judge’s judgment. It restored the trademark application to its original position and directed the Registry to proceed with that stage . The appeal was allowed without any order on costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles an important principle: when deciding whether a common phrase or slogan can be registered as a trademark, courts must assess it in relation to the specific goods or services and not in isolation. A phrase that appears ordinary may still be protectable if it does not directly describe the character or quality of the product and only suggests an idea. The ruling reinforces that the imagination test remains key — if linking the mark to the goods requires even a slight mental effort, the mark is suggestive and eligible for registration. It also confirms that slogans and taglines can function as independent source identifiers in today’s market, especially in creative industries like publishing. Businesses can now take greater comfort that thoughtful, non-descriptive slogans will receive trademark protection without needing to prove long years of exclusive use.

Case Title: Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks Date of Order: 10 February 2026 Case Number: LPA 571/2025 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1249-DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

  1. Delhi High Court Opens Door for “One For All” Trademark in Education Sector
  2. Suggestive Slogans Win Protection: Key Takeaways from Oswaal Books Trademark Case
  3. When Common Words Become Trademarks – Delhi High Court Explains the Law
  4. Victory for Publishers: “One For All” Allowed as Registrable Trademark

Suitable Tags Trademark Registration, Delhi High Court Judgment, Suggestive Marks, Distinctiveness in Trademarks, Educational Publishing, Trade Marks Act, Slogan Trademark, One For All Case, IP Law India, Trademark Appeal

Headnote of Article In a landmark ruling, the Delhi High Court allowed registration of the trademark “ONE FOR ALL” for educational books, holding that the phrase is suggestive rather than descriptive when used in Class 16. The division bench clarified that common expressions can be protected if they do not directly describe the goods and possess sufficient distinctiveness in context, thereby providing valuable guidance for businesses seeking trademark protection for creative slogans.

=====

Oswaal Books adopted the mark “ONE FOR ALL” for its educational publications and sought its registration for printed books. The Registrar refused registration calling the phrase common and non-distinctive. The single judge upheld the refusal holding it descriptive and lacking secondary meaning.

In appeal, the division bench ruled that the mark has no direct or immediate connection with books, merely suggests completeness, and is suggestive rather than descriptive. It is therefore inherently distinctive and registrable without proof of acquired distinctiveness. The court set aside both the Registrar’s order and the single judge’s judgment and directed the application to proceed for registration.

Law settled in the case

Common English phrases and slogans can be registered as trademarks if they are suggestive and do not directly describe the character or quality of the goods. Paras 31-36.

Distinctiveness of a mark must be judged in the specific context of the goods or services and not in isolation.

If any mental effort or imagination is required to connect the mark with the goods, the mark is suggestive and eligible for registration.

Case Title: Oswaal Books and Learnings Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks: 10.02.2026:LPA 571/2025:

2026:DHC:1249-DB:Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.Vs Chacha Cloth House

Introduction: In the bustling world of Indian retail, where family-style names often appear in shop signs, a recent ruling from the Delhi High Court brings welcome clarity to how trademarks work for everyday words. The case involved two businesses selling sarees and garments under names that both featured the word "Chacha". While one side had official registration, the other did not. The lower court had refused protection, calling the word too common. The High Court stepped in and reversed that view, explaining why even familiar words can deserve legal shield when used cleverly in a specific business. This decision reminds traders that brand identity matters and courts will step up to prevent customer confusion in competitive markets like clothing.

Factual Background: A Delhi-based company ran a well-known store in Sarojini Nagar Market, offering sarees, lehengas, and similar garments under registered brand names that prominently included "Chacha". These marks had been officially registered years earlier for textiles and clothing. Across the border in Haryana, another trader operated a similar shop in Yamuna Nagar, using the name "Chacha Cloth House" for exactly the same type of goods. The Haryana trader had no registration but had applied for one. The Delhi company noticed the similarity and felt customers might mix up the two shops, especially since both used "Chacha" as the eye-catching part of their branding. They approached the court seeking to stop the Haryana trader from using any version of "Chacha" that could create confusion.

Procedural Background: The Delhi company filed a regular suit for trademark infringement and also asked for an immediate temporary order to halt the rival's use while the case continued. The commercial court first granted a short-term stop order without hearing the other side. Later, after full arguments, the same court changed its mind and removed the stop order. It reasoned that "Chacha" simply means "uncle" in common speech, so no one could claim it as their own, and there was no proof that the word had become specially linked only to the Delhi shop in customers' minds. The court also noted the shops were in different cities and saw no immediate risk of mix-up. Feeling this was unfair, the Delhi company appealed to the High Court, where senior lawyers presented detailed arguments on both sides through oral hearings and written notes.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The High Court carefully reviewed the entire matter and found the lower court's approach mistaken on basic principles. Judges explained that whether a word like "Chacha" can be protected depends on the kind of goods it is used for, not on its meaning in daily life. Here, "Chacha" has nothing to do with sarees or clothes – it is not a description of fabric, style, or quality. When attached to garments, the word stands out and helps customers remember one particular shop. The court noted that people shopping for sarees do not think deeply about every part of a shop name; they remember the striking or main word. In both brands, "Chacha" was that main word, while the rest simply described the business (Saree Bazar or Cloth House).

Even though the full names looked somewhat different and the shops were far apart, the judges said this does not remove the risk of confusion. Customers with ordinary memory might recall only the "Chacha" part and assume the Haryana shop was connected to the famous Delhi one, especially when both sold identical items. The court added that businesses often grow and open new outlets, so distance today does not guarantee safety tomorrow. The Haryana trader's own attempt to register a similar name was seen as an admission that the word had value and could be protected.

On the visual style of the logos, the court held that differences in design or colour do not save the situation if the spoken or remembered part sounds alike and creates the same impression. After weighing everything, the High Court set aside the lower court's order, restored the protection, and directed the Haryana trader to stop using "Chacha" or "Chacha Cloth House" for garments until the main suit is decided. The appeal was allowed in favour of the Delhi company.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles an important everyday question in trademark law: common spoken words are not automatically free for anyone to use in business if they have no natural link to the product and help identify one seller. Courts must look at the word in the actual context of the trade. The ruling also clarifies that when comparing two similar brand names, the most noticeable or "dominant" part can be given special attention without breaking the rule that full names must be seen as a whole. Further, simply showing other shops somewhere use the same word is not enough to call it "common property"; there must be real, widespread use that actually affects customers' understanding. At the early stage of a case, official registration itself gives strong initial support for protection. Overall, the decision strengthens the message that honest traders who build a name deserve court help to prevent copycats, even when the name uses an ordinary word in a fresh way.

Case Title: Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.Vs Chacha Cloth House Date of Order: 12 February 2026 Case Number: FAO (COMM) 217/2025 Neutral Citation: 2026 DHC 1296 DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

  1. Delhi High Court Shields "Chacha" Brand Name for Sarees – Common Word Gets Trademark Protection
  2. Why "Chacha" Cannot Be Freely Copied in Garment Business: Key Takeaways from Delhi High Court Ruling
  3. From Uncle to Brand Icon: How Delhi High Court Gave "Chacha" Distinct Identity in Retail Trade
  4. Trademark Lesson for Retailers: Delhi High Court Says Context Matters More Than Dictionary Meaning

Suitable Tags: TrademarkLaw , BrandProtection, Commonword , DelhiHighCourt, SareeBusiness , IntellectualProperty, TrademarkInfringement, ChachaTrademark, RetailLaw, IndianCourts, DistinctiveMarks. common to trade,

Headnote of Article:

Delhi High Court rules that the word "Chacha", though common in daily speech, becomes distinctive when used for sarees and garments. Reversing the lower court, it grants interim injunction against similar use by another trader, clarifying that dominant features drive customer recall and registration presumes protection even for ordinary words in unrelated trades.

======
The Delhi High Court Division Bench, in its oral judgment dated February 12, 2026, allowed the appeal FAO(COMM) 217/2025 filed by Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., setting aside the order of the learned District Judge (Commercial Court)-01 which had dismissed the appellants' application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC in their pending suit alleging trademark infringement and passing off against the respondent using the unregistered mark “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE” for identical goods like sarees, lehengas, suits, and garments. 

The appellants hold prior registrations since 1988/2010/2013 for marks including “CHACHA SAREE BAZAR PVT LTD” (word) and “CHACHE DI HATTI” (device) in Classes 24 and 25, operating from a single outlet in Sarojini Nagar Market, New Delhi. The respondent operates in Yamuna Nagar, Haryana, using “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE” with labels/logos incorporating “CHACHA”.

The Commercial Court dismissed interim relief on the sole ground that “Chacha” (Hindi for uncle) is a generic/commonplace expression over which no monopoly can be claimed. The Division Bench  reversed this, holding that distinctiveness must be assessed vis-à-vis the specific goods/services and not in the abstract or based on etymological meaning; while “Chacha” is an everyday word, it has no natural, descriptive, or etymological link to textiles/clothing/garments, rendering its use arbitrary and inherently distinctive in that trade context, capable of distinguishing the appellants' goods. 

Given prior registrations under Section 23 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, long user, identical goods, market perception overlap, and prima facie confusion likelihood, the Court found balance of convenience and irreparable injury favouring the registered proprietors, granting interim injunction restraining the respondent from using “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE” or any “CHACHA”-incorporating/deceptively similar marks for such goods pending suit, subject to exceptions if honest concurrent use is later proved.

Law Point:

Distinctiveness of a trademark must be evaluated in relation to the specific goods or services for which it is used, not in the abstract or based on general/commonplace/etymological meaning. 

Commonplace words of ordinary language, when arbitrarily adopted as marks in trades lacking etymological nexus, qualify for protection against infringement/passing off, entitling registered proprietors to prima facie interim restraint on identical/similar marks for identical goods where goodwill, prior registration, and confusion elements are established.

Case Title:Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.Vs  Chacha Cloth House:February 12, 2026:FAO(COMM) 217/2025:2026:DHC:1296-DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

====

Lotus Herbals Pvt.Ltd. Vs DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures Pvt.Ltd.

Introduction: The beauty and skincare market is crowded, and brand names often borrow from nature. When a new face cleanser named “Lotus Splash” entered the market, Lotus Herbals saw it as a direct threat to their long-established “Lotus” identity. The single judge allowed the use, calling it descriptive. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court took a closer look and reversed that view. This ruling shows how courts protect famous marks even when rivals claim their name is just describing an ingredient.

Factual Background: Lotus Herbals has built a strong reputation over many years selling herbal skincare and beauty products under the “Lotus” name and its variations. The company holds several registrations for the word “Lotus” and logos in classes covering cosmetics. Their products are widely known, heavily advertised, and associated with natural ingredients.

DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures, linked to actress Deepika Padukone, launched a face cleanser under the main brand “82°E”. The product was prominently named “Lotus Splash” and highlighted lotus flower extracts as a key ingredient. Lotus Herbals objected, arguing that the name would confuse customers into thinking the product came from them or was connected to their range.

Procedural Background: Lotus Herbals filed a commercial suit seeking a permanent ban on the use of “Lotus Splash” or any similar name. They also asked for an immediate temporary order to stop sales while the case continued. The single judge heard both sides and refused the temporary order. He held that “Lotus Splash” was merely descriptive because the product actually contains lotus extract, so it fell under legal exceptions allowing honest descriptive use. Feeling this was wrong, Lotus Herbals appealed to the Division Bench. Senior lawyers argued at length on both sides. After detailed consideration, the Division Bench delivered its judgment on 16 February 2026.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The Division Bench found the single judge’s approach mistaken on key points. They agreed there was clear similarity because “Lotus” is the striking and dominant part of both names. An ordinary shopper seeing “Lotus Splash” could easily link it to the well-known “Lotus” products, especially in the same category of face care items. Initial confusion was likely even if later differences became clear.

The court rejected the claim that “Lotus Splash” was purely descriptive. While lotus extract is an ingredient, the full name was used prominently on bottles, packaging, websites, and advertisements – exactly like a brand name. It was not hidden in small print as a mere description. The respondents were treating “Lotus Splash” as their product identifier, not just explaining contents. The presence of “82°E” at the bottom did not remove the risk of mix-up.

The judges stressed that descriptive use defences apply only when the words are used honestly to describe the product without trying to create a brand impression. Here, the overall commercial impression pointed to trademark use. The court also noted Lotus Herbals’ long prior use and strong reputation, making passing off likely as well.

The Division Bench set aside the single judge’s order. It granted the temporary injunction, stopping the respondents from making, selling, or promoting any product under “Lotus Splash” or any deceptively similar name until the main suit is finally decided. The appeal succeeded in favour of Lotus Herbals.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment clarifies that Prominent display turns a potentially descriptive phrase into infringing trademark use. Courts will examine the full commercial impression created by how the name is actually used on packaging, marketing, and sales – not just the dictionary meaning. Descriptive defences protect genuine explanations of contents but do not allow a rival to build a brand around a word that belongs to someone else. Established brands with proven goodwill receive strong interim protection to prevent customer confusion and dilution of their reputation.

Case Title: Lotus Herbals Pvt.Ltd. Vs DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures Pvt.Ltd.
Date of Order: 16 February 2026
Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 45/2024
Neutral Citation: 2026 DHC 1300 DB
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for this Article:

  1. Delhi High Court Stops Deepika Padukone’s Brand from Using ‘Lotus Splash’ – Victory for Lotus Herbals
  2. ‘Lotus’ Name Protected: Division Bench Overturns Single Judge in Major Cosmetics Trademark Battle
  3. Why Ingredient Names Cannot Become Rival Brands – Lessons from Lotus Herbals Ruling
  4. Delhi High Court Draws Line on Descriptive Use Defence in Beauty Industry Trademark Dispute

Suitable Tags: #TrademarkInfringement #DelhiHighCourt #LotusHerbals #DeepikaPadukone #BrandProtection #CosmeticsLaw #DescriptiveMarks #IndianIPLaw #CelebrityBrands #IPUpdate

Headnote of Article:
Delhi High Court Division Bench grants interim injunction restraining use of “Lotus Splash” by DPKA Ventures (Deepika Padukone’s brand), holding the mark deceptively similar to Lotus Herbals’ registered “Lotus” family and not saved by descriptive use defence, thereby protecting long-established goodwill in the skincare market.

=====

Lotus Herbals, a long-established company known for herbal skincare and beauty products under the mark “Lotus”, sued DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures (linked to Deepika Padukone) for launching a face cleanser prominently named “Lotus Splash” under its main brand “82°E”. Lotus Herbals claimed the name would confuse customers and infringe its registered trademarks. The single judge refused interim injunction, holding that “Lotus Splash” was merely descriptive because the product contains lotus extract. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the order. It found “Lotus” the dominant and memorable part of both names, creating clear likelihood of confusion. The respondents were using the name as a brand identifier on packaging, website and advertisements, not merely describing contents. The descriptive defence did not apply when the term functions as a trademark. The appeal was allowed and interim injunction granted restraining the respondents from using “Lotus Splash” or any deceptively similar name till final decision of the suit.

Law settled in the case

  • When a common word forming the dominant part of a registered trademark is used prominently as a product name, it constitutes trademark use and can cause deceptive similarity even if an ingredient is present. (Paras 34-35)
  • The descriptive use defence under Section 30(2)(a) is available only for honest description and does not protect use of the term as a source identifier or brand name. (Para 13 & 33)

Case Title: Lotus Herbals Pvt.Ltd. Vs DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures Pvt.Ltd.: 16.02.2026:FAO(OS) (COMM) 45/2024:2026 DHC 1300 DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

=====

Fornnax Technology Pvt.Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Copyrights

The Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling delivered on **February 11, 2026**, set aside a common order passed by the Registrar of Copyrights dated January 28, 2026, and remanded multiple connected copyright registration applications back to the Registrar for fresh de novo consideration. The decision addresses critical procedural and substantive issues in the pre-registration scrutiny of artistic works under the Copyright Act, 1957, particularly where opposition arises from competitors in the industrial machinery sector. The appellant, Fornnax Technology Private Limited, sought copyright registration for artistic works consisting of technical drawings or views of components of its secondary shredder machines (notably the "Cutting Chamber Part of Secondary Shredder R-4000 Front View" and related models). The Registrar rejected these applications after entertaining oppositions from respondents (including competitors represented through counsel for R-2 to R-4), primarily on the ground that the works had been industrially applied to more than fifty articles, triggering the bar under Section 15(2) of the Act, and thus could not qualify for copyright protection.

The factual matrix revolves around Fornnax's claim to copyright in original artistic works embodied in engineering drawings or visual representations of shredder components designed for waste processing and recycling machinery. The company asserted that these were pure artistic expressions not intended solely for industrial application beyond limited production. The opposing parties, apparently competitors in the shredder or recycling equipment market, challenged the registrability, producing materials such as PR articles, website "success stories" claiming over 100 installations, and even YouTube/social media videos allegedly showing widespread commercial exploitation of the designs.

Procedurally, the appellant filed applications under Section 45 of the Copyright Act for entry in the Register of Copyrights. The Registrar, invoking powers under Section 45(2) to conduct such inquiry as deemed fit, entertained written oppositions and documents from the respondents, conducted a personal hearing on January 21, 2026, and passed the impugned common rejection order. Aggrieved, Fornnax preferred multiple connected appeals under Section 72 of the Act before the Delhi High Court, which were heard together.

The Court, speaking through Justice Tushar Rao Gedela in an oral judgment, identified two primary infirmities warranting remand. First, the Registrar failed to properly address the appellant's specific objection that the opposing respondents were not "persons interested" as contemplated under Rule 70(9) and (10) of the Copyright Rules, 2013, which govern pre-registration scrutiny and opposition at the application stage. Instead, the Registrar erroneously equated or imported the concept of "person aggrieved" (who can seek rectification or cancellation post-registration under Section 50) into the pre-grant phase, thereby allowing competitors to participate and oppose when their locus standi may be limited to post-grant proceedings. The Court emphasized that these are distinct statutory stages with different standing requirements, and the failure to deal with this objection vitiated the order. Reliance was placed on the appellant's submissions citing the Allahabad High Court in Pramod Sharma vs. State of U.P. (2023 SCC OnLine All 1904) to define "person interested," which remained unaddressed.

Second, the Court found a serious breach of natural justice in the Registrar's reliance on electronic evidence (website claims of over 100 installations, PR materials, YouTube videos, and social media content) to invoke the Section 15(2) bar without furnishing copies to the appellant prior to or during the hearing, and without granting any effective opportunity to rebut the same with counter-evidence. The appellant had specifically asserted production of only 29–34 units for certain models and challenged the admissibility of such electronic material under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act (or equivalent provisions under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), pointing out lack of certification/affidavit. These contentions, raised in detailed post-hearing written submissions (particularly paras 16–17), found no engagement in the impugned order. The Court held that assertions and counter-assertions on the quantum of industrial application required adjudication on tangible, admissible evidence, which was absent here.

While noting the appellant's reliance on the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Cryogas Equipment (P) Ltd. vs. Inox India Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 780, para 66) — which clarified that an original artistic work does not lose copyright protection merely because a design derived from it is industrially applied — the High Court did not decide the merits. It clarified that no opinion was expressed on whether the works qualified as artistic works retaining copyright or whether the Section 15(2) bar applied, leaving these for fresh examination.

The Court accordingly quashed the impugned order, remitted the applications for de novo consideration by a different officer, directed that the appellant be permitted to rebut any documents relied upon by the respondents, allowed the respondents to file further materials in support of opposition, and explicitly required the Registrar to record a specific finding on whether opposition by the respondents could be maintained at the pre-registration stage. No costs were imposed.

This decision settles important points of law in copyright registration practice. It reinforces the strict separation between pre-grant inquiry/opposition under Section 45 read with Rule 70 (limited to "persons interested") and post-grant rectification/expungement under Section 50 (available to "persons aggrieved"). Conflating the two concepts is impermissible. It also establishes that any reliance on electronic or documentary evidence adverse to the applicant during inquiry must comply with natural justice — copies must be supplied and rebuttal opportunity afforded — failing which the order becomes unsustainable. Finally, it underscores that the Section 15(2) industrial application bar (loss of copyright after more than fifty reproductions without design registration) requires concrete, rebuttable evidence rather than untested website claims or media content, aligning with the Supreme Court's emphasis in Cryogas on preserving underlying artistic copyright despite industrial derivation.

**Case Details**  
**Title**: Fornnax Technology Private Limited vs. The Registrar of Copyrights & Ors. (and connected matters)  
**Date of Order**: February 11, 2026  
**Case Number**: CA (COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2026, 6/2026, 7/2026 & 8/2026 (with connected I.As.)  
**Neutral Citation**: Not available in the provided judgment text (awaiting publication)  
**Name of Court**: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  
**Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

**Disclaimer**: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

**Written By**: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles for the Article**  
1. Delhi High Court Remands Copyright Applications: Strict Adherence to Locus Standi and Natural Justice in Pre-Registration Oppositions  
2. Fornnax Technology vs Registrar of Copyrights: High Court Quashes Rejection Order Over Procedural Lapses and Evidence Irregularities  
3. Pre-Grant Opposition in Copyright Registration: Delhi High Court Draws Clear Line Between "Person Interested" and "Person Aggrieved"  
4. Section 15(2) Bar and Electronic Evidence: Delhi High Court Mandates Fair Opportunity in Copyright Registration Proceedings  

**Suggested Tags**  
Copyright Registration, Registrar of Copyrights, Section 45 Copyright Act, Section 50 Copyright Act, Section 15(2) Copyright Act, Rule 70 Copyright Rules 2013, Natural Justice in IP Proceedings, Person Interested vs Person Aggrieved, Industrial Application of Artistic Works, Delhi High Court IP Judgment, Fornnax Technology Copyright Case, Cryogas Equipment Precedent  

**Headnote**  
Delhi High Court sets aside Registrar of Copyrights' rejection of artistic work registration applications on grounds of improper conflation of "person interested" (pre-grant) with "person aggrieved" (post-grant), failure to address locus objections, and violation of natural justice by relying on unshared electronic evidence to invoke Section 15(2) bar; matter remanded for de novo consideration by different officer with directions to permit rebuttal and record finding on maintainability of opposition.
=====
The appellant sought copyright registration under Section 45 of the Copyright Act, 1957 for artistic works comprising technical drawings/views of components (such as the "Cutting Chamber Part of Secondary Shredder R-4000 Front View") of its secondary shredder machines used in waste processing/recycling. The Registrar entertained oppositions from respondents (competitors), considered their documents including website PR articles claiming over 100 installations, YouTube/social media videos, and rejected the applications on February 28, 2026 (impugned common order), primarily invoking the Section 15(2) bar that copyright ceases after industrial application to more than fifty articles without design registration. Aggrieved, the appellant filed connected appeals under Section 72 before the Delhi High Court.

The Court, in its oral judgment dated February 11, 2026, quashed the impugned order and remanded the applications for de novo consideration by a different officer. It held that the Registrar failed to address the appellant's objection that respondents were not "persons interested" under Rule 70(9) & (10) of the Copyright Rules, 2013 (governing pre-registration inquiry/opposition) and wrongly equated them with "persons aggrieved" under Section 50 (post-registration rectification), conflating distinct statutory stages and allowing impermissible pre-grant participation by competitors. 

Law Point:

Pre-registration inquiry under Section 45 read with Rule 70 of Copyright Rules, 2013 permits opposition only by "persons interested"; post-registration rectification/expungement under Section 50 is available to "persons aggrieved" these are distinct stages and concepts that cannot be conflated or substituted (paras 4-7, 15).

Case Title: Fornnax Technology Pvt.Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Copyrights:11.02.2026:CA (COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2026:2026:DHC:1295: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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