Marico Limited Vs. Minolta Natural Care

In the matter of Marico Limited vs. Minolta Natural Care & Ors. decided on 9 December 2025, the Bombay High Court in Interim Application (L) No. 28667 of 2025, arising out of Commercial IP Suit, dealt with a trademark and copyright infringement dispute concerning Marico’s well-known “Parachute Advansed Jasmine” and “Hair & Care” products. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were marketing deceptively similar hair oil products under the marks “Sangini Jasmine” and “Hair Protection” using similar trade dress, colour combinations, stylized fonts, bottle shapes and artistic features intended to ride upon Marico’s goodwill and reputation. The defendants argued that the words “Jasmine” and “Hair & Care” were generic, common to trade, covered by disclaimers and incapable of exclusive protection, besides raising objections relating to delay and jurisdiction. Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh held that trademark comparison must be based on overall impression and anti-dissection principles and observed that an average consumer with imperfect recollection was likely to be deceived by the defendants’ packaging and presentation. The Court further held that disclaimers do not eliminate deceptive similarity analysis and that delay alone is not a defence in infringement actions. Finding a prima facie case of infringement, copyright violation and passing off, the Court granted interim injunction in favour of Marico and restrained the defendants from using the impugned marks, labels and trade dress. Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:______.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Marico Limited vs Minolta Natural Care: Bombay High Court Grants Injunction in Trademark and Trade Dress Infringement Dispute

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the Bombay High Court in Marico Limited vs. Minolta Natural Care & Ors. on 9 December 2025 is an important ruling in the field of trademark infringement, copyright protection, trade dress imitation and passing off under Indian intellectual property law. The dispute arose when Marico Limited, one of India’s leading FMCG companies, alleged that the defendants were selling hair oil products under the marks “Sangini Jasmine” and “Hair Protection” using packaging, labels, bottle designs, artistic features and colour combinations deceptively similar to Marico’s well-known “Parachute Advansed Jasmine” and “Hair & Care” products.

The judgment extensively discusses the principles governing deceptive similarity, anti-dissection rule, passing off, effect of trademark disclaimers, composite trademarks, and consumer confusion. The Court examined several important precedents of the Supreme Court and various High Courts while granting interim injunction in favour of Marico Limited. The ruling is significant because it reinforces the principle that trademark disputes must be judged from the perspective of an ordinary consumer having imperfect recollection and that dishonest imitation of overall trade dress cannot be permitted even where certain individual words may be descriptive or generic in nature.

Factual and Procedural Background

Marico Limited instituted a commercial intellectual property suit before the Bombay High Court alleging infringement of its registered trademarks, copyright in artistic works, and passing off against the defendants who were manufacturing and marketing hair oil products under the marks “Sangini Jasmine” and “Hair Protection”. The plaintiff asserted that its products “Parachute Advansed Jasmine” and “Hair & Care” had acquired enormous goodwill and market recognition over several decades.

The plaintiff contended that the defendants copied the essential features of its products including the stylized use of the word “Jasmine”, distinctive bottle shapes, blue and white colour combinations, green cap design, placement of models’ photographs, depiction of jasmine flowers and coconuts, and the overall artistic layout of the packaging. According to Marico, the defendants deliberately designed their products in a manner calculated to deceive consumers and ride upon the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation. 

The plaintiff relied upon its trademark registrations under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and asserted copyright ownership in the artistic labels and packaging under the Copyright Act, 1957. The suit also sought leave under Clause XIV of the Letters Patent to combine causes of action relating to trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off. 

The defendants opposed the interim injunction application primarily on the grounds that the words “Jasmine” and “Hair & Care” were descriptive and common to trade. They also argued that several of the plaintiff’s trademark registrations contained disclaimers restricting exclusive rights over these expressions. Another defence raised by the defendants was that the plaintiff had delayed filing the suit despite allegedly knowing about the defendants’ products since 2016. The defendants further contended that the products were sufficiently distinguishable because the house mark “Sangini” appeared on the packaging. 

Dispute Before the Court

The central dispute before the Court was whether the defendants’ products were deceptively similar to Marico’s products so as to constitute trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off. The Court was also required to determine the legal effect of disclaimers attached to some trademark registrations and whether the use of descriptive or generic words could still amount to infringement when considered in the context of the entire packaging and trade dress.

The plaintiff argued that infringement must be judged on the basis of the overall commercial impression created by the competing products rather than isolated comparison of words. Marico asserted that the defendants had copied almost every significant visual element of the plaintiff’s products, including colour schemes, bottle shapes, stylized lettering, placement of graphical features and artistic layout. The plaintiff further argued that delay cannot defeat a trademark infringement claim because infringement gives rise to a recurring cause of action. 

The defendants, however, contended that the words “Jasmine” and “Hair & Care” were incapable of exclusive appropriation due to disclaimers and common trade usage. They argued that the use of the word “Sangini” sufficiently differentiated their products from those of Marico. Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in Pernod Ricard India Private Limited vs. Karanveer Singh Chhabra to argue that mere presence of common descriptive words cannot by itself establish deceptive similarity. 

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh delivered a detailed and analytical order discussing the core principles of trademark law. The Court first examined the issue of territorial jurisdiction and permitted joinder of causes of action under Clause XIV of the Letters Patent. The Court observed that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 conferred jurisdiction upon the Bombay High Court because the plaintiff carried on business in Mumbai. The Court held that artificial splitting of trademark infringement and passing off claims would be undesirable since all disputes arose from the same transaction. 

The Court rejected the defendants’ argument regarding delay and limitation. Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in Bengal Waterproof Limited vs. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Co., the Court observed that trademark infringement and passing off constitute recurring causes of action and delay alone cannot defeat a claim for injunction. 

While discussing trademark infringement principles, the Court emphasized that marks must be compared as a whole and not dissected into isolated components. The Court referred to the anti-dissection rule and the concept of overall commercial impression. The Court carefully compared the rival products and observed that the defendants had copied the plaintiff’s unique bottle shape, blue-white colour combination, stylized representation of “Jasmine”, depiction of jasmine flowers and coconuts, and overall visual arrangement. 

The Court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court judgment in Parle Products Private Limited vs. J.P. & Co., where it was held that trademarks are remembered by general impression rather than photographic recollection. The Bombay High Court reiterated that an average consumer with imperfect memory is likely to be deceived when two products convey substantially similar visual impressions. 

The Court also referred to Cadila Health Care Ltd. vs. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. principles regarding deceptive similarity and consumer confusion. The Court noted that minor differences between rival marks become irrelevant when the overall impression creates likelihood of confusion among ordinary consumers purchasing everyday products. 

An important part of the judgment concerned the effect of trademark disclaimers. The defendants argued that disclaimers attached to some registrations prevented Marico from claiming exclusivity over the words “Jasmine” and “Hair & Care”. The Court rejected this argument by relying upon the Bombay High Court decisions in Pidilite Industries Limited vs. S.M. Associates and Pidilite Industries Limited vs. Riya Chemy. The Court observed that disclaimers do not enter the marketplace and ordinary consumers are unaware of them. Therefore, while deciding deceptive similarity, the entire mark including disclaimed matter must still be considered. 

The Court also discussed Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 concerning composite marks. Reference was made to Ultratech Cement Ltd. vs. Alaknanda Cement Pvt. Ltd. and Three-N-Products Pvt. Ltd. vs. Emami Ltd., where courts recognized that even if a word is part of a composite mark, exclusivity may still arise where the feature has acquired distinctiveness and goodwill. 

The Court distinguished the Supreme Court ruling in Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701, by observing that Marico’s case was not based merely on use of common words but on the totality of deceptive visual features and overall trade dress copied by the defendants. 

The Court also rejected the defence under Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act which protects bona fide descriptive use. The Court held that the defendants were not using “Jasmine” descriptively but prominently as a trademark and source identifier. The placement and stylization of the word demonstrated trademark use rather than descriptive reference to ingredients. 

After examining the sales figures, advertising expenses and market reputation of Marico’s products, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had established strong goodwill and reputation. The Court found that the defendants had failed to provide any honest explanation for adoption of deceptively similar trade dress and labels. 

Final Decision of the Court

The Bombay High Court held that Marico Limited had successfully established a prima facie case of trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off. The Court observed that the defendants’ products were deceptively similar and likely to mislead consumers. It further held that the defendants had dishonestly attempted to imitate the plaintiff’s packaging and trade dress in order to capitalize upon Marico’s goodwill and reputation.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the interim application and granted injunction restraining the defendants from using the impugned marks, labels, packaging, bottles, logos and trade dress deceptively similar to Marico’s products. 

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reinforces several important principles of trademark law. It reiterates that deceptive similarity must be judged on the basis of overall commercial impression and not by dissecting marks into isolated parts. The ruling confirms that disclaimers attached to trademark registrations do not automatically eliminate the possibility of consumer confusion because ordinary consumers are unaware of such disclaimers. The decision also clarifies that even descriptive or common words may receive protection when used in a distinctive stylized trade dress that has acquired goodwill and reputation.

The judgment further strengthens the principle that delay alone is not a defence in trademark infringement actions because infringement constitutes a recurring cause of action. Most importantly, the ruling emphasizes that dishonest imitation of packaging, labels and trade dress intended to capitalize upon another trader’s reputation will not be tolerated by courts.

Case Detail

Case Title: Marico Limited Vs. Minolta Natural Care & Ors.

Date of Order: 9 December 2025

Case Number: Interim Application (L) No. 28667 of 2025 in Commercial IP Suit

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-AS:______

Name of Court: Bombay High Court

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

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Bombay High Court on Deceptive Similarity and Trade Dress Protection

Marico vs Minolta Natural Care: Important Ruling on Trademark Disclaimers

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Headnote

The Bombay High Court in Marico Limited vs. Minolta Natural Care & Ors., decided on 9 December 2025, granted interim injunction against the defendants for infringement of Marico’s trademarks “Parachute Advansed Jasmine” and “Hair & Care”, copyright in artistic labels and passing off. The Court held that deceptive similarity must be judged on the basis of overall commercial impression and anti-dissection principles from the perspective of an average consumer with imperfect recollection. The Court further ruled that trademark disclaimers do not negate deceptive similarity analysis and that delay is not a defence in infringement actions. The defendants were restrained from using deceptively similar packaging, labels, bottle designs and trade dress likely to cause consumer confusion and unfairly exploit Marico’s goodwill.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Bennett Coleman and Company Limited Vs. Arjun Kumar

In the matter of Bennett Coleman and Company Limited vs. Arjun Kumar & Ors., decided on 22 May 2026 by the Delhi High Court in CS(COMM) 560/2026, before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela, the Court dealt with a commercial intellectual property and confidentiality dispute concerning the programme “News Ki Pathshala”. The plaintiff alleged breach of confidentiality, misuse of proprietary information, and infringement of trademark and copyright by former employees and associated parties. The defendants challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court on the basis of an exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring Mumbai courts and argued that no confidential material remained in their possession. The Court noted rival submissions on maintainability and jurisdiction, particularly the plaintiff’s reliance on Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act for invoking Delhi jurisdiction. Considering the objections raised, the Court directed defendant no.6 to preserve and deposit cloned programme-related data in a sealed cover and permitted filing of replies on jurisdictional objections, which would be considered as a preliminary issue. The matter has been listed for further proceedings. Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:______.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Bennett Coleman vs Arjun Kumar: Delhi High Court Examines Copyright, Confidentiality and Territorial Jurisdiction in Media Industry Dispute

Introduction

The decision delivered by the Delhi High Court in Bennett Coleman and Company Limited vs. Arjun Kumar & Ors. on 22 May 2026 is an important development in the field of intellectual property law, employment-related confidentiality obligations, and jurisdictional disputes in commercial litigation. The matter arose from allegations made by Bennett Coleman and Company Limited, one of India’s leading media companies, against certain former employees and associated parties in relation to the programme “News Ki Pathshala”. The plaintiff alleged misuse of confidential information, copyright infringement, trademark-related violations, and unauthorized use of proprietary media content after the defendants ceased association with the organization.

The case is significant because it reflects the growing legal conflicts emerging in the digital media and broadcasting industry where editorial formats, research material, creative structures, and confidential production processes are increasingly being treated as valuable intellectual property assets. The Court was also required to examine whether the Delhi High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction despite the existence of a contractual clause allegedly conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon Mumbai courts.

The order was passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela while dealing primarily with an application seeking interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, along with various procedural applications filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the CPC. 

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Bennett Coleman and Company Limited, instituted a commercial intellectual property suit before the Delhi High Court alleging that the defendants were involved in activities detrimental to the plaintiff’s proprietary rights connected with the programme “News Ki Pathshala”. According to the plaintiff, the programme involved journalistic research, editorial scripting, visual presentation, and graphic integration which constituted original artistic and literary work protected under the Copyright Act, 1957. The plaintiff further asserted that the defendants, who were either employees or consultants associated with the plaintiff, had access to confidential and proprietary information during the course of their engagement.

The suit was filed as CS(COMM) 560/2026 before the Delhi High Court. Along with the suit, several interlocutory applications were moved seeking permission to place additional documents on record, exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, exemption from filing typed copies of certain documents, permission to file video materials in electronic form, and interim injunction relief against the defendants. 

The Court granted exemption from pre-institution mediation by relying upon the Supreme Court judgment in Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815, observing that the matter involved urgent interim relief. The Court also allowed procedural exemptions and permitted filing of electronic evidence and redacted consultancy agreements. 

The principal controversy emerged during hearing of the injunction application when defendant no.6 challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. Senior counsel appearing for defendant no.6 argued that Clause 17 of the Consultancy Agreement specifically vested exclusive jurisdiction in the courts at Mumbai and therefore the Delhi High Court could not entertain the proceedings against that defendant. The defendants further contended that the consultancy relationship was on a principal-to-principal basis and not an employment relationship. 

Dispute Before the Court

The dispute before the Court essentially revolved around three major issues. The first issue related to territorial jurisdiction and maintainability of the suit. The second concerned allegations relating to misuse of confidential information and intellectual property. The third involved preservation and control over electronic data and access credentials connected with the programme.

Defendant no.6 argued that the suit was barred because the Consultancy Agreement contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause favouring Mumbai courts. Reliance was placed upon several Supreme Court decisions including Dabur India Limited vs. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595, Paragon Rubber Industries vs. Pragathi Rubber Mills, (2014) 14 SCC 762, and Asma Lateef vs. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 42. According to the defendants, once parties had contractually chosen a forum, the Delhi High Court could not assume jurisdiction merely because trademark or copyright claims had also been added. 

The defendants also disputed the allegation of possession of confidential information. Defendant no.6 stated before the Court that no confidential information belonging to the plaintiff was retained and that no device belonging to the plaintiff was in possession of the defendant. However, without prejudice to legal objections, defendant no.6 agreed to clone and preserve all information related to “News Ki Pathshala”, including emails available on the personal laptop, and deposit the same before the Court in a sealed cover. 

Similarly, defendant nos.1 to 5 contended that no direction could legally be issued compelling them to rejoin employment with the plaintiff. They further argued that the plaintiff itself had admitted in the plaint that laptops and devices had been abandoned at workstations and therefore the allegation that defendants retained such devices was factually incorrect. Nevertheless, they undertook before the Court that passwords and access credentials available with them during employment would be shared with the plaintiff. 

On the other hand, the plaintiff argued that the suit was a composite intellectual property action involving trademark infringement, copyright infringement, breach of confidentiality, and unauthorized sharing of proprietary information. The plaintiff specifically invoked Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 to contend that Delhi courts possessed jurisdiction. The plaintiff further emphasized that the programme content constituted “original artistic work” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act and had been created during the course of employment for the benefit of the plaintiff organization. 

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tushar Rao Gedela adopted a cautious and balanced approach while dealing with the competing claims. Instead of immediately deciding the jurisdictional objection, the Court recognized that the issue required detailed consideration because it involved interplay between contractual jurisdiction clauses and special jurisdiction provisions under intellectual property statutes.

The Court took note of the defendants’ reliance upon Dabur India Limited vs. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595. In that case, the Supreme Court had examined whether a composite suit involving trademark and copyright claims could override statutory jurisdictional limitations. The decision emphasized that jurisdiction cannot be artificially created merely by combining multiple causes of action. Similarly, the defendants relied upon Paragon Rubber Industries vs. Pragathi Rubber Mills, (2014) 14 SCC 762, where the Supreme Court discussed principles governing maintainability of composite intellectual property suits. Reliance was also placed upon Asma Lateef vs. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 42, concerning enforcement of jurisdiction clauses and procedural maintainability.

At the same time, the Court also considered the plaintiff’s reliance on Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. These provisions grant plaintiffs in intellectual property matters the right to institute proceedings where they reside or carry on business, thereby enlarging ordinary jurisdictional principles. The plaintiff argued that because copyright and trademark issues formed part of the suit, Delhi courts were competent to hear the matter.

The Court observed that since the jurisdictional objection was based upon the Consultancy Agreement executed between the plaintiff and defendant no.6, the matter required detailed adjudication after proper pleadings. Accordingly, the Court permitted defendant no.6 to file an appropriate application raising objections regarding territorial jurisdiction and directed that the same would be treated and decided as a preliminary issue. 

An important aspect of the order was the Court’s emphasis on preservation of electronic evidence. The Court directed that the relevant programme-related data be cloned and deposited in a sealed cover within two days. This reflects increasing judicial awareness regarding digital evidence preservation in intellectual property and media disputes. The Court balanced interests of both parties by ensuring preservation of data without immediately granting unrestricted access to the plaintiff pending adjudication of jurisdictional objections. 

The Court also recognized the commercial sensitivity of confidential information and passwords connected with media operations. The undertakings recorded from the defendants regarding passwords and absence of confidential information played an important role in shaping interim directions. The order demonstrates how Indian courts increasingly encourage preservation, disclosure, and procedural cooperation in technology-related disputes without immediately prejudging substantive rights.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court did not finally determine the issue of territorial jurisdiction or merits of copyright and confidentiality claims at this stage. However, the Court issued several interim procedural directions. Defendant no.6 was directed to clone and deposit all programme-related information and emails in a sealed pen drive before the Court. Defendant nos.1 to 5 undertook to provide passwords and clarified that no confidential information remained with them. The Court permitted filing of replies and rejoinders and directed that the jurisdictional objection would be considered as a preliminary issue in subsequent proceedings. The matter was thereafter listed before the Joint Registrar and later before the Court for further hearing. 

Point of Law Settled

The order reiterates that in intellectual property and confidentiality disputes involving employment or consultancy arrangements, courts may prioritize preservation of electronic evidence even before finally deciding jurisdictional objections. The decision also highlights that contractual exclusive jurisdiction clauses can come into conflict with special jurisdiction provisions under the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act, requiring detailed judicial examination rather than summary rejection of proceedings.

The case further underlines that creative media formats, editorial scripting, graphic integration, and research material may potentially qualify for copyright protection when sufficient originality is demonstrated. It also reflects judicial sensitivity toward balancing commercial confidentiality with procedural fairness in the digital era.

Case Detail

Case Title: Bennett Coleman and Company Limited Vs. Arjun Kumar & Ors.

Date of Order: 22 May 2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 560/2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:______

Name of Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

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Bennett Coleman vs Arjun Kumar: Delhi High Court on Copyright and Confidentiality in Media Industry

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News Ki Pathshala Case: Delhi HC on Media Copyright and Confidential Information

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Bennett Coleman Intellectual Property Case: Analysis of Delhi High Court Order

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Media Industry Employment and Confidentiality Dispute Before Delhi HC

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Headnote

The Delhi High Court in Bennett Coleman and Company Limited vs. Arjun Kumar & Ors., CS(COMM) 560/2026, considered issues relating to copyright protection, breach of confidentiality, preservation of digital evidence, and territorial jurisdiction arising from disputes connected with the media programme “News Ki Pathshala”. The Court examined the interaction between contractual exclusive jurisdiction clauses and special jurisdiction provisions under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Pending adjudication of jurisdictional objections, the Court directed preservation and sealed deposit of electronic data and recorded undertakings regarding passwords and confidential information. The order highlights judicial emphasis on protection of digital evidence and proprietary media content in commercial intellectual property disputes.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan & Ors. Vs. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur & Ors.

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Analytical Article

Introduction

The decision of the Supreme Court in Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan & Ors. v. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur & Ors. is an important judgment dealing with procedural law, particularly the power of courts regarding conversion of one legal proceeding into another, such as conversion of a revision petition into an appeal or writ petition and vice versa. Although the original dispute arose from interpretation of the famous Nizam Jewellery Trust Deed, the Supreme Court delivered important observations on maintainability of revision petitions, appeals, supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and the inherent power of High Courts to convert proceedings in appropriate cases.

The judgment is significant because litigants often file proceedings under incorrect provisions of law. The Court clarified that procedural technicalities should not defeat substantial justice where the superior court otherwise possesses jurisdiction. At the same time, the Court cautioned that such conversion is not automatic and can only be exercised in appropriate cases.

The Court also discussed the distinction between appeal, revision and writ jurisdiction, and explained when a finding becomes appealable and when it does not. The judgment therefore occupies an important place in Indian procedural jurisprudence.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose out of “H.E.H. The Nizam’s Jewellery Trust” created by the Nizam of Hyderabad through a Trust Deed dated 29 March 1951. The trust dealt with valuable jewellery, ornaments and other properties belonging to the Nizam. The trust deed distributed benefits among different sons, daughters, grandchildren and descendants of the settlor.

The controversy mainly related to interpretation of Clauses 9 and 10 of the Trust Deed dealing with the “Remaining Sons’ Fund” and “Remaining Daughters’ Fund.” A dispute arose regarding who would inherit the shares of beneficiaries who died without leaving children.

Certain beneficiaries approached the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad by filing Original Petition No. 173 of 1998 and Original Petition No. 253 of 1998 under Sections 56 and 61 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 seeking directions to trustees regarding proper interpretation of the trust deed. Simultaneously, civil suits being O.S. No. 383 of 1998 and O.S. No. 540 of 1998 were also filed by other beneficiaries seeking declaration and injunctions.

The Trial Court decided preliminary issues through a common judgment dated 21 July 1999. The Trial Court substantially accepted the interpretation advanced by children of deceased beneficiaries and held that even children of pre-deceased sons and daughters were entitled to benefits under the trust.

Aggrieved parties filed Civil Revision Petitions before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, notably, no direct appeal or revision was filed against the findings rendered in the suits themselves.

The High Court held that the original petitions under Sections 56 and 61 of the Indian Trusts Act were not maintainable. Yet, despite holding so, the High Court proceeded to decide the merits of the interpretation dispute and reversed the Trial Court’s reasoning.

The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court through multiple civil appeals and special leave petitions.

Dispute Before the Supreme Court

Although the substantive trust dispute was important, the major procedural controversy before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court could decide the merits after holding that the revision petitions themselves were not maintainable.

The appellants argued that once the High Court held the revision petitions to be non-maintainable, it ought not to have entered into merits. They further argued that interpretation of a trust deed did not involve jurisdictional error warranting revisional interference under Section 115 CPC.

Another important issue was whether the High Court could exercise powers under Article 227 of the Constitution even where revision under Section 115 CPC was unavailable.

Most importantly for procedural law, the Supreme Court examined whether a superior court could convert one proceeding into another, such as revision into appeal or writ into appeal, where justice demanded such exercise.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice S.B. Sinha, made several important observations regarding procedural jurisdiction.

The Court first observed that the Trial Court’s findings on preliminary issues did not amount to a decree because the suit itself had not been finally disposed of. Therefore, no appeal lay immediately against those findings alone. The Court clarified that a mere finding without a formal decree is generally not appealable.

The Court then held that ordinarily once the High Court found the civil revision petitions not maintainable, it should not have proceeded into merits of the case. This observation reinforced the principle that jurisdiction must first exist before substantive adjudication can take place.

However, the Court did not completely reject the possibility of procedural flexibility. It recognised that superior courts possess inherent procedural powers in appropriate cases.

The Supreme Court specifically observed:

“...If the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain either an appeal or a revision application or a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in a given case it, subject to fulfillment of other conditions, could even convert a revision application or a writ petition into an appeal or vice-versa in exercise of its inherent power.”

This observation became one of the most important procedural principles emerging from the judgment.

The Court clarified that such conversion is not automatic. The Court used the words “appropriate case” and stressed that sufficient grounds must exist for exercise of such inherent power.

The Supreme Court also discussed the nature of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. It referred to the landmark decision in M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P.) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, where it had been held that revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised merely because another view on facts or law is possible. Revisional jurisdiction is confined to jurisdictional errors or material procedural irregularities.

The Court further discussed Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir where the Supreme Court explained the limited nature of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and held that supervisory powers are meant to keep subordinate courts within bounds of their authority.

The Court also relied upon Ajantha Transports (P) Ltd. v. T.V.K. Transports and explained that jurisdictional error may arise not only from absence of jurisdiction but also from consideration of irrelevant material or non-consideration of relevant material.

Importantly, the Court clarified that even if revision jurisdiction is unavailable, constitutional remedies under Articles 226 and 227 may still remain available. In this context, the Court discussed Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and recognised the broad supervisory and judicial review powers of High Courts.

The Court also referred to C.V. Rajendran v. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi regarding applicability of res judicata between different stages of the same proceedings. However, the Court distinguished that case and held that since appeal against final decree was still maintainable, the principle of res judicata would not bar challenge to earlier findings.

Another important procedural aspect discussed was whether direct special leave petitions against orders of the City Civil Court were maintainable. The Court referred to Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar and observed that ordinarily the High Court should not be bypassed.

Ultimately, instead of finally deciding the trust interpretation dispute, the Supreme Court preferred to remand the matter to the High Court so that all pending appeals, revisions and miscellaneous proceedings could be heard together.

Final Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the High Court should ordinarily not have entered into merits after holding the revision petitions to be non-maintainable. However, instead of conclusively deciding the substantive dispute, the Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and directed that all pending proceedings be reconsidered together by the High Court.

The Court directed return of the special leave petitions so that parties could pursue appropriate remedies before the High Court itself. The High Court was requested to dispose of the matter expeditiously.

Thus, the Supreme Court effectively restored procedural balance and ensured that all disputes would be adjudicated in proper appellate proceedings.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settled several important principles of procedural law.

The Supreme Court recognised that High Courts possess inherent power, in appropriate cases, to convert revision petitions into appeals or writ petitions and vice versa, provided jurisdiction otherwise exists and interests of justice so require.

The Court further clarified that once a court concludes that a proceeding is not maintainable, it should ordinarily avoid adjudicating merits unless jurisdiction can otherwise be sustained.

The judgment also reaffirmed that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited to jurisdictional errors and material procedural irregularities and cannot function as a substitute for appeal.

Another important principle laid down was that findings on preliminary issues do not automatically amount to decrees unless the suit itself is finally disposed of.

The decision also strengthened the understanding that supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 remains available even where revisional jurisdiction may not exist.

Case Details

Title: Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan & Ors. Vs. Nawab Imdad Jah Bahadur & Ors.

Date of Order: 05 March 2009

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 846–851 of 2001

Neutral Citation: (2009) 5 SCC 162

Equivalent Citations: 2009 AIR SCW 2289; (2009) 3 SCALE 934

Court: Supreme Court of India

Hon’ble Judges: Justice S.B. Sinha and Justice Cyriac Joseph

Headnote

The Supreme Court held that although ordinarily a High Court should not decide merits after holding a revision petition to be non-maintainable, the High Court may in appropriate cases convert a revision petition into an appeal or writ petition and vice versa in exercise of inherent powers, provided jurisdiction otherwise exists. The Court further clarified the distinction between appeal, revision and supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and held that findings on preliminary issues do not amount to decrees unless the suit is finally disposed of.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Zydus Wellness Products Limited Vs. Karnal Pack

In Zydus Wellness Products Limited Vs. Karnal Pack and Others, CS (COMM) No. ___ of 2025, Neutral Citation No. 2025:HHC:29474, decided on 29 August 2025 by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Justice Ajay Mohan Goel rejected the commercial suit filed by Zydus alleging trademark infringement and passing off concerning its registered marks “Glucon-D” and “Glucon-C”. The plaintiff had sought urgent interim injunction against the defendants for using marks such as “Glucose-D”, “Glucose-C” and “Glucospoon-D”. The Court observed that although the plaintiff claimed urgent relief, the alleged infringement had been within its knowledge since April 2023 and there was no substantial change in circumstances justifying bypass of mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Relying upon the Supreme Court decisions in Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815, and M/s Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1129, the Court held that the plea of urgent interim relief cannot be used as a camouflage to avoid mandatory mediation. Holding that the suit was filed in violation of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, the Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Zydus Wellness v Karnal Pack: Himachal Pradesh High Court Rejects Trademark Suit for Non-Compliance of Section 12A

Mandatory Pre-Institution Mediation Under Commercial Courts Act: Analysis of Zydus v Karnal Pack Judgment

Can Trademark Suits Bypass Mediation? Himachal Pradesh High Court Explains in Zydus Case

Section 12A Commercial Courts Act Explained Through Zydus Wellness v Karnal Pack

Urgent Interim Relief Cannot Be a Camouflage: Important Trademark Judgment by Himachal Pradesh High Court

Trademark Infringement Suit Rejected for Avoiding Mandatory Mediation: Zydus v Karnal Pack Analysis

Himachal Pradesh High Court on Pre-Litigation Mediation in Trademark Disputes

Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 12A Commercial Courts Act: Detailed Analysis of Zydus Judgment

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Zydus Wellness Products Limited v. Karnal Pack and Others is an important decision concerning the mandatory nature of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The case arose from a trademark infringement and passing off dispute relating to the well-known marks “Glucon-D” and “Glucon-C”. While the plaintiff sought urgent interim injunction against the defendants for allegedly using deceptively similar marks such as “Glucose-D”, “Glucose-C” and “Glucospoon-D”, the Court ultimately rejected the plaint itself on the ground that the plaintiff had bypassed mandatory pre-institution mediation without establishing any genuine urgency.

The decision is significant because it reiterates that commercial litigants cannot avoid the statutory requirement of mediation merely by making a formal prayer for urgent interim relief. The Court carefully examined whether the urgency pleaded by the plaintiff was real or merely a device to bypass Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. The judgment also consolidates and applies several important Supreme Court rulings on mandatory mediation in commercial disputes.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Zydus Wellness Products Limited, claimed to be the proprietor of the registered trademarks “Glucon-D” and “Glucon-C”, which are widely known glucose powder-based drink mixes sold across India. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were manufacturing and selling products under the marks “Glucose-D”, “Glucose-C” and “Glucospoon-D”, which according to the plaintiff were deceptively similar to its registered trademarks and trade dress. The plaintiff also alleged infringement of copyright in packaging and labels. 

The plaint disclosed that the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged infringement activities since 28 April 2023 when a cease and desist notice was first issued to Defendant No. 2 in relation to the mark “Glucospoon-D”. Thereafter, further notices and reminders were exchanged between the parties throughout 2023 and 2024. The plaintiff alleged that despite repeated legal notices and undertakings given by the defendants, the defendants continued to sell the impugned products through websites such as IndiaMart and Trade India. 

The plaintiff filed a commercial suit seeking injunctions for trademark infringement, passing off, copyright infringement and removal of online listings. The suit also sought urgent interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, before examining the merits of trademark infringement, the Court was required to determine whether the suit itself was maintainable without compliance of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 

Dispute Before the Court

The principal dispute before the Court was whether the plaintiff was justified in bypassing the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act on the ground that the suit contemplated urgent interim relief.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged infringement since April 2023 and had continued exchanging notices and correspondence for almost two years before filing the suit. Therefore, according to the defendants, there was no genuine urgency requiring immediate judicial intervention. The defendants contended that the plaintiff was attempting to avoid the mandatory mediation mechanism prescribed under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the defendants were continuously infringing its registered trademarks and that the continuing nature of infringement itself justified urgent interim relief. The plaintiff also relied upon online advertisements and continued sale of products as constituting continuing cause of action. 

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

Justice Ajay Mohan Goel extensively examined Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 along with the law laid down by the Supreme Court regarding mandatory pre-institution mediation. The Court first reproduced the statutory language of Section 12A, which mandates that a commercial suit “which does not contemplate any urgent interim relief” cannot be instituted unless the plaintiff exhausts the remedy of pre-institution mediation. 

The Court also referred to Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which empowers courts to reject a plaint where the suit appears from the plaint itself to be barred by law. The Court reiterated that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11, only the plaint and accompanying documents are to be examined. 

A major part of the judgment discusses the landmark Supreme Court decision in Patil Automation Private Limited v. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited. The High Court reproduced important portions of the judgment where the Supreme Court held that Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is mandatory in nature and that commercial suits filed without compliance are liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Supreme Court in Patil Automation emphasized that mediation was introduced to reduce docket explosion in Indian courts and to encourage settlement of commercial disputes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 

The Court particularly relied upon the Supreme Court’s observation that although urgent interim relief suits may bypass mediation, the requirement cannot be avoided through artificial drafting or camouflage. The High Court observed that the Supreme Court had clearly recognized the possibility of litigants attempting to misuse the urgent relief exception to avoid mediation. 

The Court further relied upon Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, where the Supreme Court clarified that commercial courts must examine the nature of the suit, cause of action and urgency pleaded by the plaintiff to determine whether the urgent interim relief exception is genuinely attracted. The Supreme Court had held that urgent interim relief should not become a “guise or mask” to bypass Section 12A. 

The High Court also discussed M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 12A is mandatory and reiterated the tests for determining genuine urgency. The Supreme Court clarified that courts must assess whether the plaintiff’s request for urgent interim relief is bona fide from the standpoint of the plaintiff, while simultaneously ensuring that the urgent relief plea is not merely an excuse to avoid mediation. 

After discussing these precedents, the High Court examined the factual chronology in the present case. The Court noted that the plaintiff admittedly became aware of the alleged infringement on 28 April 2023 and thereafter continuously exchanged notices with the defendants over an extended period. The Court observed that from April 2023 till the filing of the suit, there was no “qualitative change” in the cause of action. The alleged infringement continued in the same manner throughout this period. 

The Court found it significant that the plaintiff’s application for urgent interim relief merely narrated the history of infringement and notices but did not specifically explain why immediate judicial intervention suddenly became necessary without resorting to mediation. According to the Court, the plaintiff failed to explain any exceptional circumstances, immediate threat or sudden development justifying bypass of the statutory mediation process. 

Justice Ajay Mohan Goel observed that since the plaintiff had tolerated the alleged infringement for a substantial period and had continued corresponding with the defendants, the mediation process contemplated under Section 12A would not have caused any grave prejudice to the plaintiff. The Court therefore concluded that the plea of urgent interim relief was not genuine and that the application had effectively been filed merely to circumvent mandatory mediation. 

The Court clarified that rejection of the plaint was not based upon refusal of interim relief on merits. Rather, the rejection was based upon the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the Court regarding the existence of genuine urgency necessary to bypass Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. 

Final Decision of the Court

The High Court allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC and rejected the plaint. The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and had not established any genuine urgency justifying exemption from mediation. The Court therefore concluded that the suit was barred by law and liable to rejection.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces the mandatory nature of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and clarifies that merely adding a prayer for urgent interim relief in a commercial suit is not sufficient to bypass pre-institution mediation.

The decision establishes that courts must independently examine whether genuine urgency exists by considering the factual background, chronology of events and conduct of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff has long-standing knowledge of the dispute and fails to demonstrate any sudden or exceptional circumstance requiring immediate intervention, the suit may be rejected for non-compliance with Section 12A.

The judgment also reiterates that courts must prevent misuse of the urgent interim relief exception and ensure that mediation remains an effective mechanism for resolution of commercial disputes.

Case Details

Case Title: Zydus Wellness Products Limited v. Karnal Pack and Others

Date of Judgment: 29 August 2025

Case Number: CS (COMM) No. ___ of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:HHC:29474

Court: High Court of Himachal Pradesh

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel

Headnote

The Himachal Pradesh High Court rejected a trademark infringement and passing off suit filed by Zydus Wellness Products Limited on the ground of non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court held that the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged infringement since April 2023 and failed to establish any genuine urgency justifying bypass of mandatory pre-institution mediation. The judgment reiterates that the plea of urgent interim relief cannot be used as a camouflage to circumvent the statutory mandate of mediation in commercial disputes.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Zydus Wellness v Karnal Pack, Section 12A Commercial Courts Act, Mandatory Pre Institution Mediation, Trademark Infringement Case, Passing Off Law India, Himachal Pradesh High Court Judgment, Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Urgent Interim Relief, Patil Automation Case, Yamini Manohar Case, Commercial Suit Rejection, Trademark Litigation India, Commercial Courts Act 2015, Mediation in Commercial Disputes, Glucon D Trademark Dispute, Intellectual Property Litigation, Civil Procedure Code, Trademark Passing Off, Indian Trademark Law, Commercial Litigation India, AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

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Dabur India Limited Vs. Emami Limited

Dabur India Limited Vs. Emami Limited:22.05.2026: FAO(OS)(COMM) 23/2026: 2026:DHC:4576-DB, Hon'ble  Justices V. Kameswar Rao and  Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Division Bench upheld the interim injunction granted against Dabur in a trade dress passing off dispute concerning “Cool King Thanda Tael” and Emami’s “Navratna Oil”. 

The Court held that although no monopoly could be claimed over individual common elements such as red colour, herbs, hibiscus flowers, ice cubes or descriptive words like “cool” and “thanda”, the overall combination, arrangement and get-up of Dabur’s packaging was deceptively similar to Emami’s established trade dress. 

The Bench observed that Emami had established substantial goodwill and reputation through long and continuous use since 1989, extensive sales, advertisements and dominant market share in the cooling oil segment. 

Rejecting Dabur’s defence that its well-known house mark “DABUR” was sufficient to dispel confusion, the Court held that the overall impression created on an average consumer with imperfect recollection was likely to result in passing off and consumer confusion. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the interim injunction restraining Dabur from using the impugned trade dress was sustained.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DaburVsEmami, #DelhiHighCourt, #TradeDress, #PassingOff, #TrademarkLaw, #IPR, #IntellectualProperty, #BrandProtection, #TradeDressInfringement, #CoolingOilDispute, #NavratnaOil, #CoolKingThandaTael, #CommercialCourts, #TrademarkDispute, #IndianIPLaw, #IPLitigation, #ConsumerConfusion, #PassingOffAction, #DelhiHCJudgment, #LegalNews, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Dabur vs Emami Trade Dress Dispute: Delhi High Court Upholds Injunction in Navratna Oil Passing Off Case

Delhi High Court on Trade Dress Protection: Dabur Cool King Thanda Tael vs Emami Navratna Oil

Passing Off and Trade Dress Law in India: Analysis of Dabur India Ltd v Emami Ltd 2026

Can Common Packaging Elements Amount to Passing Off? Delhi High Court Explains in Dabur v Emami

Delhi HC Clarifies Principles of Passing Off and Trade Dress Similarity in Cooling Oil Market

Navratna Oil Trade Dress Protected: Detailed Analysis of Delhi High Court Judgment Against Dabur

House Mark Not Enough to Avoid Passing Off: Important Delhi High Court Ruling in Dabur v Emami

Trade Dress, Consumer Confusion and Passing Off: Delhi HC Judgment in Emami v Dabur Explained

House Mark Not Enough to Avoid Passing Off

Introduction:

The decision of the High Court of Delhi in Dabur India Limited v. Emami Limited is an important development in Indian trademark and trade dress jurisprudence, particularly in relation to passing off actions involving consumer products sold in mass retail markets. The dispute revolved around the alleged imitation of the trade dress and overall packaging of Emami’s well-known “Navratna Oil” product by Dabur’s “Cool King Thanda Tael”. The Division Bench was required to examine whether the overall appearance, packaging style, colour combination and arrangement of features used by Dabur created a deceptive similarity capable of confusing ordinary consumers.

The judgment is significant because the Court clarified that even where individual packaging elements are common to trade and incapable of exclusive monopoly, the overall combination and arrangement of those elements may still acquire distinctiveness and protection under the law of passing off. The Court also didnot give any benefit to the  House Mark and it held Not Enough to Avoid Passing Off.

Factual and Procedural Background

Emami Limited claimed that it had launched “Navratna Oil” in January 1989 and had continuously used the product’s distinctive red trade dress for several decades. Emami asserted that the product had become one of the most recognized cooling oils in India and that it possessed a market share of approximately 66% in the cooling oil segment as of 2022. The company relied upon several trademark registrations, copyright registrations and registered bottle designs under the Designs Act, 2000. Emami also relied upon extensive sales figures, advertising expenditure and long-standing goodwill associated with the product. 

According to Emami, Dabur launched its product “Cool King Thanda Tael” in 2023 using a deceptively similar trade dress containing similar red packaging, ice cubes, hibiscus flowers, ayurvedic herbs, similar colour combinations and Hindi expressions such as “Raahat”, “Aaram” and “Tarotaazgi” appearing in the same sequence. Emami alleged that Dabur had deliberately copied the essential features of the Navratna Oil packaging to ride upon the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff’s product. 

The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court granted interim injunction against Dabur under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 restraining the sale of the impugned product in the contested trade dress. The Single Judge held that the overall get-up and visual impression created by Dabur’s packaging amounted to passing off. Dabur challenged the injunction before the Division Bench through FAO(OS)(COMM) 23/2026. 

Dispute Before the Court

The central dispute before the Division Bench was whether Dabur’s packaging and trade dress for “Cool King Thanda Tael” was deceptively similar to Emami’s “Navratna Oil” so as to constitute passing off.

Dabur argued that no monopoly could be granted over common elements such as red colour packaging, herbs, hibiscus flowers, ice cubes and descriptive words like “cool”, “thanda” or “cool oil”. Dabur further argued that many third-party cooling oils in the market used similar packaging elements. It was also argued that Dabur prominently displayed its famous house mark “DABUR”, which was sufficient to distinguish the products and avoid consumer confusion. Dabur additionally contended that Emami had failed to establish distinctiveness and secondary meaning in the present packaging style, especially since the packaging had evolved over the years. 

Emami, on the other hand, argued that the issue was not about monopoly over individual elements but about the deceptive imitation of the overall arrangement and visual appearance of the product. Emami contended that Dabur’s adoption of multiple similar features in combination clearly demonstrated dishonest intention to imitate the established trade dress of Navratna Oil. Emami also emphasized its enormous sales turnover, extensive advertisements and long-standing market leadership in the cooling oil segment. 

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Division Bench clarified that Emami had confined its case only to passing off and was not pressing claims relating to trademark infringement, copyright infringement, bottle design infringement or monopoly over the red colour itself. 

The Court observed that in passing off actions, the focus is on similarities in overall get-up and packaging which create deception and confusion in the minds of consumers. The Bench emphasized that the plaintiff must establish that its trade dress has acquired distinctiveness and that the defendant’s product is similar enough to deceive consumers despite differences in individual details. 

The Court accepted Emami’s evidence regarding substantial goodwill and reputation acquired through long use since 1989, extensive advertising and massive sales turnover. The Bench observed that Emami’s sales figures and market share were sufficient at the prima facie stage to establish goodwill in the cooling oil market. The Court also noted that Dabur had launched the impugned trade dress only in 2023 and had not explained the reason behind adopting such similar packaging features. 

The Court discussed several important judgments during the analysis. Reliance was placed on Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. for the principle that deceptive similarity must be judged from the perspective of a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. The Court reiterated that side-by-side comparison is not necessary and that overall impression is the governing test. 

The Court also referred to Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. regarding appellate interference in interim injunction matters and held that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with discretionary orders unless the findings are perverse or contrary to law. The Court found no such perversity in the order of the learned Single Judge. 

Another important precedent discussed was Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc. relating to the classical trinity test for passing off, namely goodwill, misrepresentation and likelihood of damage. The Court held that Emami had prima facie satisfied all three requirements. 

The Court further discussed Pernod Ricard India Private Limited v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra concerning acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning. Dabur had relied upon this judgment to argue that Emami failed to produce consumer surveys and recognition studies. However, the Court distinguished the facts and held that at the interim stage, Emami had produced sufficient material demonstrating substantial goodwill and distinctiveness. 

A major aspect of the reasoning was the Court’s finding that although individual elements such as red colour, herbs or hibiscus flowers may be common to trade, the combination and arrangement of these features in Dabur’s packaging created an overall impression deceptively similar to Navratna Oil. The Court specifically noted similarities in colour scheme, bottle appearance, placement of flowers and herbs, yellow triangular “New” label, use of Hindi words and the overall visual presentation. 

The Court rejected Dabur’s argument that the presence of the house mark “DABUR” was enough to eliminate confusion. The Bench observed that low-cost consumer products are often purchased casually by ordinary consumers with imperfect recollection and limited attention to detail. Therefore, the overall packaging and visual impression become more important than the house mark itself. 

The Court also emphasized that passing off law protects the overall commercial impression of a product rather than isolated individual elements. It observed that the defendant appeared to have copied the essential features of Emami’s trade dress in a manner likely to confuse consumers and damage Emami’s goodwill. 

Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench dismissed Dabur’s appeal and upheld the interim injunction granted by the learned Single Judge. The Court held that Emami had successfully established a prima facie case of passing off and deceptive similarity.and that House Mark Not Enough to Avoid Passing Off. The Bench concluded that Dabur’s trade dress was likely to cause confusion among ordinary consumers and appeared to be a deliberate attempt to imitate the essential features of Navratna Oil packaging. Accordingly, the restraint against Dabur from selling “Cool King Thanda Tael” in the impugned trade dress continued to remain operative.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces the principle that in passing off actions, courts must evaluate the overall commercial impression and visual appearance of competing products rather than dissecting individual packaging elements separately. Even where individual elements are common to trade, their unique combination and arrangement may acquire distinctiveness and legal protection.

The decision further clarifies that a well-known house mark alone may not always be sufficient to dispel confusion when the overall trade dress and packaging are deceptively similar. The Court also reaffirmed that consumer perception must be judged from the standpoint of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, particularly in relation to low-cost retail products purchased in ordinary market conditions.

Case Title: Dabur India Limited v. Emami Limited

Date of Judgment: 22 May 2026

Case Number: FAO(OS)(COMM) 23/2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4576-DB

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judges: Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Headnote

The Delhi High Court upheld an interim injunction against Dabur in a passing off dispute concerning “Cool King Thanda Tael” and Emami’s “Navratna Oil”, holding that although no monopoly exists over individual common packaging elements, the deceptive imitation of the overall trade dress, visual arrangement and commercial impression of a well-known product is actionable under passing off law. The Court further held that the use of a well-known house mark is not always sufficient to avoid consumer confusion where the overall packaging creates deceptive similarity.

Trade Dress Law, Passing Off, Dabur vs Emami, Navratna Oil Case, Delhi High Court Judgment, Trademark Dispute, Cooling Oil Trade Dress, Consumer Confusion, Intellectual Property Law, Brand Protection, Trade Dress Infringement, Passing Off Action, Commercial IP Litigation, Indian Trademark Law, Deceptive Similarity, House Mark Defence, Interim Injunction, Cadila Healthcare Principle, Trade Dress Protection India, Packaging Similarity Dispute, AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

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Lachman Dass Bhatia Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax

In Delhi High Court, the Full Bench in Lachman Dass Bhatia Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, ITA Nos. 724/2010 to 729/2010 and connected matters, decided on 06 August 2010, clarified the maintainability of appeals against orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The dispute arose over whether every rectification or recall order passed by the Tribunal could be challenged before the High Court under Section 260A. The Revenue argued that only appellate orders deciding substantial questions of law were appealable, while the assessee contended that parties should not be left without remedy against rectification orders. 

The Full Bench examined decisions of various High Courts including Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Rajasthan and Karnataka High Courts and interpreted Sections 254(1), 254(2) and 260A of the Income Tax Act. The Court held that where the Tribunal merely amends or rectifies an appellate order, such amended order remains appealable under Section 260A. However, an order rejecting a rectification application or recalling the entire appellate order does not amount to a final adjudication and therefore is not appealable under Section 260A. The Court further observed that in such cases aggrieved parties may invoke writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 

The Court accordingly answered the legal reference by holding that recall orders under Section 254(2) are not appealable under Section 260A, whereas amended rectification orders can be challenged before the High Court on substantial questions of law. The judgment has become an important precedent on the distinction between rectification, amendment and recall powers of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. 

Case Title: Lachman Dass Bhatia v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax

Date of Judgment: 06 August 2010

Case Number: ITA Nos. 724/2010 to 729/2010 and connected matters

Neutral Citation: [2010] 328 ITR 243 (Delhi)

Court: Delhi High Court

High Court: Delhi High Court

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #IncomeTaxAct, #Section254, #Section260A, #ITAT, #TaxAppeal, #RectificationOrder, #TaxLitigation, #IncomeTaxCase, #WritJurisdiction, #TaxLawIndia, #AppealMaintainability, #IncomeTaxAppellateTribunal, #LegalNewsIndia, #DirectTaxLaw, #Articles226227, #TaxJudgment, #IndianTaxLaw, #LitigationUpdate, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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1. Delhi High Court Clarifies Appealability of ITAT Rectification Orders Under Section 260A
2. Lachman Dass Bhatia v ACIT: Delhi High Court on Section 254(2) and Section 260A of Income Tax Act
3. Can ITAT Recall Orders Be Appealed? Important Delhi High Court Judgment Explained
4. Delhi High Court Explains Scope of Rectification Powers of ITAT Under Income Tax Act
5. Maintainability of Appeals Against ITAT Rectification Orders: Detailed Legal Analysis
6. Section 254(2) vs Section 260A: Delhi High Court Resolves Tax Appeal Controversy
7. Important Tax Litigation Judgment on ITAT Recall and Rectification Jurisdiction
8. Delhi High Court on Appeal Rights Against ITAT Orders Under Income Tax Act, 1961
9. Lachman Dass Bhatia Case: Difference Between Recall and Amendment of ITAT Orders
10. Delhi High Court Judgment on Tax Appeals, Rectification and Writ Jurisdiction

Detailed Analytical Article

Introduction

The judgment delivered by Delhi High Court in Lachman Dass Bhatia v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, decided on 06 August 2010, is an important decision concerning the scope of appellate remedies available against orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The judgment resolved an important legal controversy regarding whether an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act could be maintained against orders passed by the Tribunal while exercising rectification powers under Section 254(2). The Full Bench judgment authored by Chief Justice Dipak Misra examined conflicting views taken by different High Courts across India and clarified the distinction between an order amending an appellate order and an order recalling the entire appellate order.

The Court dealt with the practical consequences of rectification proceedings before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and examined the nature of “appealable orders” under the Income Tax Act. The judgment is important because it clarifies when parties can approach the High Court through a statutory appeal and when they must instead invoke writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arose from a batch of income tax appeals filed before the Delhi High Court, including ITA Nos. 724/2010 to 729/2010 and connected matters. During hearing before the Division Bench, the Revenue raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. The objection related to whether an order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 254(2) could be challenged through a statutory appeal before the High Court.

Section 254(1) empowers the Tribunal to pass orders in appeals after hearing parties. Section 254(2) allows the Tribunal to rectify mistakes apparent from the record. Section 260A provides a right of appeal to the High Court against orders passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal if the case involves a substantial question of law. The controversy arose because different High Courts had interpreted these provisions differently. Some courts held that all orders under Section 254(2) were appealable, while others held that only certain kinds of rectification orders could be appealed.

The Revenue relied upon decisions such as Visvas Promoters (P) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, (2009) 226 CTR 638 (Madras), Chem Amit v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 272 ITR 397 (Bombay), and Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. ITAT, [1999] 240 ITR 579 (Calcutta), to argue that appeals under Section 260A were not maintainable against orders merely rejecting rectification applications or recalling original orders.

On the other hand, the assessee relied upon judgments including L. Sohanraj v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, [2003] 260 ITR 147 (Karnataka), Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. H.V. Shantharam, [2003] 260 ITR 156 (Karnataka), and Jagdish Chandra and Sons v. ITAT, [2005] 266 ITR 165 (Allahabad), contending that such appeals were maintainable.

Because of conflicting judicial opinions and the recurring nature of the issue, the Division Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench for authoritative determination.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal issue before the Court was whether all orders passed under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act are appealable under Section 260A. The dispute specifically focused upon three different situations. The first situation involved rejection of a rectification application under Section 254(2). The second situation involved amendment or correction of the original appellate order. The third situation involved complete recall of the earlier appellate order passed by the Tribunal.

The Revenue argued that Section 260A permits appeals only against “orders passed in appeal” by the Tribunal. According to the Revenue, an order passed under Section 254(2) merely exercising rectification jurisdiction was not an appellate order and therefore could not automatically become appealable. It was further argued that recall of an order effectively wipes out the original appellate order and therefore there remains no operative appellate order against which an appeal could lie.

The assessee argued that Section 260A should receive liberal interpretation and that parties should not be left without remedy merely because the Tribunal exercised rectification powers. The assessee also argued that the legislative intent behind introduction of Section 260A supported maintainability of appeals against Tribunal orders affecting substantive rights.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Full Bench carefully examined the language of Sections 254 and 260A of the Income Tax Act. The Court observed that Section 260A uses the expression “every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal.” The Court emphasized that the expression must be understood in the context of appellate adjudication and not every procedural or rectification order.

The Bench analyzed several judgments from different High Courts. The Court extensively discussed the Bombay High Court decision in Chem Amit v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 272 ITR 397 (Bom). In that case, the Bombay High Court had distinguished the Supreme Court judgment in CIT v. Durga Engineering and Foundry Works, (2000) 162 CTR (SC) 257. The Bombay High Court had held that the language of Section 260A differed materially from Section 256 because Section 260A permits appeal only against orders passed in appeal, whereas Section 256 used broader language referring to orders passed under Section 254 generally.

The Delhi High Court approved this reasoning and observed that if a rectification order merely rejects an application, it does not independently decide substantive rights because the substantive controversy already stands decided in the original appellate order. Therefore, such rejection orders cannot independently become appealable under Section 260A.

The Court also discussed Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. ITAT, [1999] 240 ITR 579 (Calcutta), where the Calcutta High Court had held that when an order under Section 254(2) modifies or rectifies the main appellate order, both orders together may become appealable. However, a pure recall order which wipes out the original appellate order cannot itself be treated as an appellate adjudication.

The Bench further examined the Rajasthan High Court judgment in Apex Metchem (P) Ltd. v. ITAT, 318 ITR 48 (Raj), which held that amendment orders merge with the original appellate order and therefore remain appealable, whereas recall orders do not finally adjudicate rights and therefore are not appealable.

The Court also relied upon the Delhi High Court judgment in Karan & Co. v. ITAT, [2002] 253 ITR 131 (Delhi), where it was held that Section 254(2) only permits rectification of mistakes apparent from record and does not ordinarily confer broad powers of rehearing or recall. The Court noted that recalling an entire order would effectively amount to fresh adjudication and exceed the limited rectification jurisdiction contemplated by Section 254(2).

The Bench then referred to general principles governing appealability and decrees. It cited Parmeshwar Lal v. Gokhula Nandan Prasad, AIR 1984 Patna 344, and Dinamani Debi v. Paramananda Choudhury, AIR 1980 Orissa 177, to explain that appealability generally depends upon final adjudication of rights. Where no final adjudication exists, no statutory appeal ordinarily lies.

The Court concluded that when the Tribunal completely recalls its earlier order under Section 254(2), there remains no final appellate adjudication because the matter is reopened for fresh hearing. In such circumstances, an appeal under Section 260A is not maintainable.

However, the Court clarified that where the Tribunal merely amends or rectifies the original appellate order without recalling it entirely, the amended order merges with the original appellate order and therefore becomes appealable under Section 260A.

The Bench also addressed the concern that parties would otherwise be left remediless. The Court held that where statutory appeal is unavailable, parties may invoke writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Court relied upon Col. Anil Kak (Retd.) v. Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 2007 SC 1130, and Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan v. Nawab Imad Jah Bahadur, 2009 AIR SCW 2289, to hold that proceedings could even be converted from appeal to writ petition where circumstances justify such conversion.

Final Decision of the Court

The Full Bench answered the reference by laying down three clear legal principles. First, an order passed under Section 254(2) recalling the Tribunal’s earlier order in entirety is not appealable under Section 260A. Second, an order rejecting a rectification application under Section 254(2) is also not appealable. Third, where the Tribunal merely amends or rectifies its appellate order under Section 254(2), the amended order can be challenged through an appeal under Section 260A on substantial questions of law.

The Court further held that where statutory appeal is unavailable, the aggrieved party may seek remedy under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The appeals were directed to be placed before the Division Bench for further proceedings in accordance with law.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settled the legal position that every order passed under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act is not automatically appealable under Section 260A. Only those rectification orders which amend or modify the original appellate order are appealable because they continue to remain part of the appellate adjudication. Orders merely rejecting rectification applications or completely recalling original orders do not amount to final appellate adjudications and therefore are not appealable under Section 260A. In such situations, constitutional remedies under Articles 226 and 227 remain available.

Case Details

Case Title: Lachman Dass Bhatia v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax

Date of Judgment: 06 August 2010

Case Numbers: ITA Nos. 724/2010 to 729/2010 and connected matters

Neutral Citation: [2010] 328 ITR 243 (Delhi)

Court: Delhi High Court

Hon’ble Judges: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Manmohan

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Headnote

The Delhi High Court in Lachman Dass Bhatia v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax clarified the scope of appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act against orders passed under Section 254(2) by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Court held that orders merely rejecting rectification applications or recalling appellate orders entirely are not appealable under Section 260A because they do not constitute final appellate adjudications. However, where the Tribunal amends or rectifies its earlier appellate order, such amended order remains appealable on substantial questions of law. The Court further clarified that writ remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution remain available where statutory appeals are barred.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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