IndiaMart Inter Mesh Limited Vs. Open AI Inc.

In Indiamart Inter Mesh Limited Vs Open AI Inc. and Ors., decided on 20 May 2026 in IA No. GA-COM/1/2025 in IP-COM/57/2025, the Calcutta High Court, Intellectual Property Rights Division, presided over by Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur, dismissed an interim injunction application filed by IndiaMart against OpenAI concerning alleged discriminatory treatment by ChatGPT Search. The Court examined whether ChatGPT’s refusal to provide active IndiaMart links in response to user queries amounted to trademark dilution, disparagement, unfair trade practice, copyright infringement and violation of the Information Technology Act, 2000. IndiaMart contended that ChatGPT deliberately bypassed its platform and directly displayed sellers’ websites, thereby causing diversion of traffic and economic loss, allegedly relying upon the USTR Notorious Markets List 2024 to exclude IndiaMart. OpenAI argued that there exists no enforceable “right to visibility” on a private AI platform and that ChatGPT’s internal policies and output generation mechanisms could not be judicially controlled at the interim stage. The Court held that no statutory, contractual or constitutional obligation existed requiring ChatGPT to display IndiaMart links in a particular manner and observed that pure economic loss without infringement of a vested legal right is not actionable. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur further made significant observations on generative AI jurisprudence, prima facie holding that ChatGPT appears to function more as an “originator” than a mere “intermediary” under the IT Act because of its generative and synthesized outputs, while clarifying that the issue requires final adjudication after expert evidence. The Court found no prima facie case of trademark infringement, disparagement, trade libel or copyright infringement and held that compelling ChatGPT to display IndiaMart links would amount to forcing a private entity to conduct business in a particular manner. Accordingly, the interim application was dismissed while directing expeditious hearing of the suit.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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IndiaMart Inter Mesh Limited v. Open AI Inc. and Ors.: A Landmark Judicial Examination of Generative AI, ChatGPT and Intermediary Liability in India

Introduction

The decision delivered by the Calcutta High Court in Indiamart Inter Mesh Limited Vs Open AI Inc. and Ors. marks one of the earliest detailed judicial discussions in India concerning the legal character of generative artificial intelligence platforms such as ChatGPT. The judgment, rendered by Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur on 20 May 2026, goes beyond a traditional intellectual property dispute and enters the evolving area of AI governance, intermediary liability, platform autonomy, economic rights on digital platforms, and the applicability of the Information Technology Act, 2000 to modern generative AI systems.

The case arose from allegations by IndiaMart that ChatGPT Search deliberately avoided displaying IndiaMart links while showing direct seller websites or competing platforms in response to user prompts. The dispute therefore raised larger questions concerning whether a private AI platform can be compelled to display or promote another business platform in a particular manner and whether generative AI systems should legally be treated as “intermediaries” or “originators” under Indian law.

The judgment is significant because the Court extensively discussed the architecture and functioning of Large Language Models (LLMs), the distinction between traditional search engines and generative AI systems, and the inadequacy of existing Indian technology law frameworks to deal with modern AI tools. Though the dispute was decided at an interim stage, the observations made by the Court are likely to influence future litigation involving artificial intelligence, digital platforms, algorithmic visibility, and AI-generated outputs in India.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, IndiaMart Inter Mesh Limited, operates one of India’s largest B2B online marketplace platforms. Since 1996, the platform has provided online business listings connecting suppliers and buyers across diverse product categories. The petitioner owns several registered trademarks associated with “IndiaMart” and claimed that a substantial part of its business depends on online visibility through internet searches and digital referrals.

The respondents included OpenAI Inc. and related entities associated with the operation of ChatGPT. The Court recorded that ChatGPT is a conversational AI platform powered through Large Language Models and capable of generating synthesized responses by processing enormous volumes of internet data.

The dispute specifically concerned “ChatGPT Search,” introduced broadly around October 2024. According to the petitioner, when users searched for products or suppliers on ChatGPT, the AI system allegedly bypassed IndiaMart links and directly displayed seller websites, whereas competing platforms allegedly received visible platform links. IndiaMart argued that this amounted to selective exclusion and discrimination against its platform.

The petitioner further alleged that OpenAI was relying upon the United States Trade Representative Review of Notorious Markets List 2024 (USTR List), where IndiaMart’s name appeared, to justify restricting visibility of IndiaMart links. IndiaMart contended that the USTR List had no binding legal force in India and that reliance upon such a foreign document was arbitrary and discriminatory.

An interim application seeking relief was filed before the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the Calcutta High Court. IndiaMart sought directions requiring ChatGPT to display accessible IndiaMart links in its responses and alleged infringement of intellectual property rights, dilution of trademark, disparagement, unfair trade practices, violation of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The Dispute Before the Court

The primary issue before the Court was whether IndiaMart possessed any enforceable legal right requiring ChatGPT to display its platform links in a specific manner.

IndiaMart argued that ChatGPT was intentionally excluding the IndiaMart platform despite displaying links of competing platforms. According to the petitioner, such omission interfered with prospective business opportunities, diverted user traffic, and diluted the commercial value of its trademarks.

The petitioner relied upon Section 2(1)(w) and Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 along with Rule 3(1)(n) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. IndiaMart contended that ChatGPT functions as an intermediary and therefore cannot discriminate between platforms while disseminating search-related information.

The petitioner further argued that internet users possess a right to access information concerning IndiaMart and that deliberate exclusion of IndiaMart links violated constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

To support its arguments, the petitioner relied upon judgments including Neptune Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 310, Press Trust of India vs. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1044, and Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2637.

OpenAI, on the other hand, argued that IndiaMart had no “right to visibility” on a private platform. It was contended that no contract, statute, or constitutional provision obligated ChatGPT to display IndiaMart links. OpenAI argued that forcing such visibility would interfere with private business autonomy and disrupt the functioning of generative AI systems.

The respondents also denied that ChatGPT was a conventional search engine or intermediary. They argued that ChatGPT functions more like an “originator” under Section 2(1)(za) of the IT Act because it generates independent synthesized responses rather than merely hosting or transmitting third-party content.

The respondents relied upon several precedents including Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4809, Myspace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., 236 (2017) DLT 478, Tech Plus Media Private Limited v. Jyoti Janda, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1819, Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671, and Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1990) 3 SCC 447.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur delivered an elaborate discussion balancing technological innovation, private commercial freedom, intermediary law, and evolving AI regulation.

The Court first observed that no law compels a private business to operate according to terms dictated by another business entity. The Court emphasized principles of free market autonomy and noted that compelling a platform to display another business in a particular manner would seriously interfere with commercial freedom.

The Court referred to the common law principle discussed by Lord Diplock in Home Office vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [1970] 2 All ER 294, observing that common law generally does not impose liability for “pure omissions” unless there exists a statutory, contractual, or constitutional duty.

According to the Court, the injury complained of by IndiaMart was essentially “pure economic loss,” namely loss of user traffic and potential profit. The Court held that such economic loss alone does not create a legal cause of action unless some enforceable legal right has been infringed.

A major part of the judgment focused upon whether ChatGPT can legally be considered an “intermediary” under Section 2(1)(w) of the IT Act or an “originator” under Section 2(1)(za).

The Court analyzed the functioning of traditional search engines and contrasted them with generative AI systems. Justice Kapur explained that traditional search engines merely crawl and rank existing internet data. In contrast, Large Language Models synthesize information, generate new responses, and create content dynamically. ChatGPT was described as a system capable of independently generating poems, research material, code, drawings and textual outputs.

The Court observed that such functions go far beyond passive hosting or transmission of third-party content. Therefore, prima facie, ChatGPT possesses characteristics of an “originator” because it creates and generates electronic records rather than merely transmitting them.

The Court observed:

“ChatGPT has an element of newness, uniqueness and originality in its results which ought to bring it within the definition of an ‘originator’ rather than an ‘intermediary’.”

However, the Court clarified that this issue is legally complex and would ultimately require final adjudication based upon technical and expert evidence during trial.

The judgment also contains important policy observations concerning AI regulation in India. Justice Kapur recognized that the Information Technology Act, 2000 was enacted long before the emergence of generative AI technologies and therefore does not adequately address modern AI systems. The Court noted that legislative intervention would eventually become necessary to define liabilities and responsibilities relating to AI platforms.

The Court further referred to Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4809, where the Delhi High Court observed that no third party can compel a service provider to use its services in a manner benefiting another entity. This precedent significantly influenced the Court’s conclusion.

Regarding trademark dilution and disparagement, the Court held that no actionable case had been made out because there was no deceptive publication, false representation, confusion, or trade use of IndiaMart’s mark. Mere non-display or silence could not constitute disparagement or trademark dilution.

The Court also relied upon Berger Paints India Ltd. v. JSW Paints Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 4949, observing that trademark dilution under Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 requires use “in the course of trade,” which was absent in the present case.

On copyright claims, the Court found that IndiaMart failed to identify any specific copyrighted work allegedly infringed by ChatGPT. Reliance was placed upon Tech Plus Media Private Ltd. v. Jyoti Janda, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1819.

The Court also rejected the argument that reliance upon the USTR List itself created a legal wrong. According to the Court, OpenAI’s decision to rely upon such reports formed part of its internal policy and business decision-making process, which was not ordinarily justiciable.

Another important aspect discussed by the Court concerned the risk of opening “floodgates of litigation.” The Court cited the famous observation of Cardozo CJ in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, (1931) 255 NY 170, warning against “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”

The Court ultimately concluded that granting interim relief would effectively amount to compelling specific performance requiring continuous judicial supervision over AI outputs and platform functioning.

Final Decision of the Court

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the interim application filed by IndiaMart and refused to direct ChatGPT to display IndiaMart links in a particular manner. The Court held that IndiaMart failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury necessary for grant of interim injunction.

The Court clarified that no vested legal right had been shown by the petitioner requiring enforcement against OpenAI or ChatGPT. The suit itself, however, remains pending for final adjudication, and the parties were directed to take steps for expeditious hearing.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment lays down several important legal principles relating to generative AI and platform liability in India.

The Court prima facie recognized that generative AI systems like ChatGPT may not neatly fit within the conventional definition of “intermediary” under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and may instead function as “originators” because of their ability to generate synthesized and original outputs.

The judgment also establishes that no private business possesses an automatic legal right to algorithmic visibility or preferential display on another private digital platform unless supported by a specific legal, statutory, or contractual right.

Further, the decision reinforces the principle that pure economic loss and loss of internet traffic, without infringement of a substantive legal right, are insufficient to sustain claims of trademark dilution, disparagement, or unfair trade practices.

The judgment is likely to become an important precedent in future Indian litigation involving artificial intelligence, algorithmic governance, digital platform autonomy, intermediary liability, and AI regulation.

Case Details

Title of the Case: IndiaMart Inter Mesh Limited Vs. Open AI Inc. and Ors.

Date of Judgment: 20 May 2026

Case Number: IA No. GA-COM/1/2025 in IP-COM/57/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026 SCC OnLine Cal ___ (Neutral citation not available in uploaded copy)

Court: Intellectual Property Rights Division, Original Side

Name of High Court: Calcutta High Court

Coram: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Headnote

The Calcutta High Court in IndiaMart Inter Mesh Limited v. Open AI Inc. and Ors. refused interim relief against ChatGPT concerning alleged exclusion of IndiaMart links from AI-generated responses. The Court held that no entity possesses a legal “right to visibility” on a private AI platform and prima facie observed that generative AI systems like ChatGPT may function more as “originators” than “intermediaries” under the Information Technology Act, 2000 due to their ability to synthesize and generate new content. The Court further held that mere economic loss arising from reduced digital visibility, without infringement of a substantive legal right, does not constitute actionable trademark dilution, disparagement, or unfair trade practice.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Best Agrolife Limited v. Deputy Controller of Patents

In Best Agrolife Limited v. Deputy Controller of Patents & Anr., the High Court of Delhi on 7 July 2022 in W.P.(C)-IPD 11/2022, delivered a judgment by Justice Jyoti Singh allowing the writ petition filed by Best Agrolife Limited. The Court set aside the order dated 08.04.2022 passed by the Deputy Controller of Patents granting Patent No. IN 394568 to GSP Crop Science Pvt. Ltd. for a synergistic suspo-emulsion formulation of Pyriproxyfen and Diafenthiuron, after dismissing the pre-grant opposition.

The Petitioner challenged the grant on grounds including lack of novelty, inventive step, and non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(e) of the Patents Act. The Court held that the impugned order was non-speaking and suffered from serious violation of principles of natural justice as the Deputy Controller failed to consider the Petitioner’s substantive objections, particularly under Section 3(d), relevant prior art documents, and allowed claim amendments without notice to the opponent. While noting the availability of post-grant remedies, the Court exercised writ jurisdiction due to manifest procedural irregularities. The matter was remanded to the Controller for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #PatentOpposition, #Section3dPatentsAct, #PreGrantOpposition, #AgrochemicalPatent, #NaturalJustice, #WritPetitionIPD, #JusticeJyotiSingh, #PatentRemand, #IPLitigation, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a notable judgment concerning patent opposition proceedings in the agrochemical sector, the Delhi High Court has underscored the importance of reasoned orders by the Patent Office and strict adherence to principles of natural justice while deciding pre-grant oppositions. The ruling highlights that even at the pre-grant stage, the Controller must address all substantial grounds raised by the opponent, particularly objections under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, which acts as a crucial filter against evergreening of patents.

Factual and Procedural Background

GSP Crop Science Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 2) filed patent application No. 284/MUM/2014 on 27 January 2014 for a synergistic suspo-emulsion formulation of Pyriproxyfen and Diafenthiuron. The application was published on 11 September 2015. After examination and amendments, Best Agrolife Limited (Petitioner) filed a pre-grant opposition on 4 March 2021 under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, raising multiple grounds including lack of novelty, inventive step, and non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(e). Several other parties also filed oppositions.

The Deputy Controller of Patents heard the matter and passed an order on 8 April 2022 granting the patent (IN 394568) while dismissing the oppositions. Aggrieved by this, Best Agrolife filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the order primarily on grounds of non-application of mind, violation of natural justice, and failure to consider key objections.

Dispute

The core dispute centred on whether the Controller’s order granting the patent was sustainable when it allegedly failed to address the Petitioner’s opposition under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, did not properly evaluate prior art documents, and allowed claim amendments without notice to the opponent. The Petitioner also questioned the maintainability of the writ petition, given the availability of post-grant remedies.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Jyoti Singh delivered the judgment on 7 July 2022. The Court first examined the maintainability of the writ petition. While acknowledging alternative remedies like post-grant opposition under Section 25(2) or revocation under Section 64, the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1, and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771. It held that writ jurisdiction can be invoked where there is violation of principles of natural justice or manifest error, and relegating the Petitioner to statutory remedies would cause injustice.

On merits, the Court found the impugned order suffered from serious infirmities. The Petitioner had specifically raised objections under Section 3(d), arguing that the claimed suspo-emulsion was a new form of a known combination that did not demonstrate enhanced efficacy. However, the Controller’s order did not even mention Section 3(d). The Judge referred to the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1, explaining that Section 3(d) sets a higher threshold to prevent evergreening by requiring enhanced efficacy for new forms of known substances. The Court clarified that Section 3(d) (enhanced efficacy) and Section 3(e) (synergistic effect in admixtures) operate in different fields and both needed independent consideration.

The order was described as non-speaking and unreasoned on vital grounds. The Court also noted failure to consider several prior art documents and allowing amendments to claims just two days before the order without giving the Petitioner an opportunity to respond, violating natural justice. Reliance was placed on Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940, and Gilead Pharmasset, LLC v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7014, to stress the need for reasoned decisions.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the impugned order dated 8 April 2022 granting the patent, and remanded the matter back to the Deputy Controller for fresh consideration in accordance with law, after giving due opportunity to all parties.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces that pre-grant oppositions must be decided through speaking orders addressing all substantial grounds raised, particularly under Section 3(d). Non-consideration of key statutory objections or violation of natural justice (such as deciding amendments without notice) renders the order unsustainable, justifying interference under Article 226 despite alternative remedies. It reiterates the distinct roles of Sections 3(d) and 3(e) and the binding principles from Novartis on preventing evergreening in chemical/agrochemical patents.

Case Detail Title: Best Agrolife Limited Vs Deputy Controller of Patents & Anr. Date of Order: 7th July, 2022 Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 11/2022 & CM APPL. 32/2022, 54/2022, 55/2022 Neutral Citation: 2022:DHC:XXXX (as per available records) Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journal: Delhi High Court Sets Aside Patent Grant Order for Non-Consideration of Section 3(d) in Pre-Grant Opposition, Best Agrolife Vs Deputy Controller of Patents Judgment on Natural Justice in Patent Matters, Justice Jyoti Singh Remands Agrochemical Patent Case Emphasising Enhanced Efficacy Test, Delhi High Court Reiterates Novartis Principles in Section 3(d) Agrochemical Dispute

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court allows writ petition by Best Agrolife Limited, quashes order granting patent IN 394568 to GSP Crop Science, holding that non-consideration of Section 3(d) objection, failure to address prior art, and allowing amendments without notice violated principles of natural justice. Matter remanded for fresh decision. Court clarifies distinct application of Sections 3(d) and 3(e) following Novartis principles.

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Reddy Pharmaceuticals v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.

In Reddy Pharmaceuticals v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., the High Court of Delhi on 18 May 2026 in RFA(OS) 138/2013 and connected W.P.(C) 654/2014, delivered a common judgment by the Division Bench comprising Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla. The Court upheld the learned Single Judge’s decree dated 13.09.2013, which had granted a permanent injunction restraining Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (RPL) from using the mark “REDDY” in relation to pharmaceutical products, finding it amounted to passing off.

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (DRL) claimed that its long and continuous use of the trading style “Dr. Reddy’s” had caused the expression “REDDY” to acquire distinctiveness and secondary meaning exclusively associated with DRL. RPL contended that “REDDY” was a common surname forming part of its bona fide corporate name and house mark, adopted honestly by its Managing Director. The Court held that DRL’s prior adoption and extensive use conferred superior common law rights, and RPL’s use was likely to cause confusion in the pharmaceutical trade. The IPAB’s order for rectification of the Register by removal of RPL’s “REDDY” registration was also sustained. The appeals and writ petition were accordingly dismissed.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #TrademarkPassingOff, #ReddyTrademark, #PharmaTrademarkDispute, #DrReddys, #TradeMarkRectification, #Section35TradeMarksAct, #IPLitigation, #JusticeCHariShankar, #JusticeOmPrakashShukla, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a significant ruling on trademark rights involving common surnames in the pharmaceutical sector, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has clarified the scope of protection available to a trading style that has acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning through long and continuous use. The judgment balances the rights of prior users with the limitations on adopting surnames in a manner that may cause confusion in the market, particularly in the sensitive field of medicines.

Factual and Procedural Background

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. (DRL), a well-known pharmaceutical company founded in 1984 by Dr. K. Anji Reddy, has been using the trading style “Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories” for decades. Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (RPL), incorporated in 1996 with a Managing Director bearing the surname Reddy, initially acted as a supplier and later as a del credere agent for DRL’s products. From around 2003, RPL began marketing finished pharmaceutical formulations using “REDDY” prominently as part of its corporate name and house mark.

DRL filed a suit (CS(OS) 2194/2003) seeking permanent injunction for passing off and related reliefs, claiming that RPL’s use of “REDDY” was likely to cause confusion and amounted to passing off. Parallelly, DRL initiated rectification proceedings before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) seeking removal of RPL’s “REDDY” trademark registration. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 13 September 2013, decreed the suit substantially in favour of DRL, granting a permanent injunction against RPL’s use of “REDDY” for pharmaceutical products and directing rendition of accounts. The IPAB also ordered rectification by removing RPL’s registration.

RPL challenged the Single Judge’s decree in RFA(OS) 138/2013 and the IPAB order in W.P.(C) 654/2014. Both matters were heard together.

Dispute

The central dispute was whether DRL could claim exclusive rights over the expression “REDDY” in the pharmaceutical trade through prior use and acquired distinctiveness, or whether RPL could legitimately use it as part of its corporate name derived from its Managing Director’s surname. Key issues included likelihood of confusion, bona fide adoption, passing off, acquiescence, and validity of RPL’s trademark registration.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla, with Justice Om Prakash Shukla authoring the judgment delivered on 18 May 2026, undertook a detailed examination of the pleadings, evidence, and legal principles. The Court noted that DRL had been using “Dr. Reddy’s” since 1984 and had built substantial goodwill. It held that the word “REDDY” had become the dominant and essential feature of DRL’s trading style and had acquired secondary meaning exclusively associated with DRL’s products.

The Bench rejected RPL’s defence of bona fide adoption of a common surname, observing that while surnames can be used, such use becomes objectionable when it is likely to cause confusion in the market, especially in pharmaceuticals where public interest demands higher scrutiny (referring to principles from Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73). The Court found evidence of mala fide intent, including RPL’s use of DRL’s address (Ameerpet, Hyderabad) on packaging and its prior relationship as DRL’s agent.

On acquiescence and delay, the Bench held that no real conflict existed while RPL was only supplying bulk drugs. The dispute arose when RPL entered formulations business in 2003, and DRL acted promptly. Thus, the defence of laches was not available. The Court affirmed that prior adoption and use confer superior common law rights over subsequent registration.

The Bench upheld the Single Judge’s findings on passing off and sustained the injunction. It also upheld the IPAB’s rectification order removing RPL’s “REDDY” registration, as the registration was obtained without sufficient cause and remained wrongly on the register.

Final Decision of the Court

On 18 May 2026, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal (RFA(OS) 138/2013) and the writ petition (W.P.(C) 654/2014), substantially upholding the learned Single Judge’s decree and the IPAB’s rectification order. The permanent injunction against RPL using “REDDY” in relation to pharmaceutical products was affirmed.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles that in the pharmaceutical sector, a trading style or mark containing a common surname can acquire distinctiveness and secondary meaning through long, continuous and extensive use, conferring superior common law rights that prevail over subsequent registration by another party. It reiterates that bona fide use of a personal name is not an absolute defence if the adoption creates likelihood of confusion or exploits another’s goodwill. Priority of adoption and use takes precedence, and actions for passing off can succeed even without registration where secondary meaning is established.

Case Detail Title: Reddy Pharmaceuticals vs Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr. Date of Order: 18 May 2026 Case Number: RFA(OS) 138/2013 & W.P.(C) 654/2014 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4402-DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journal: Delhi High Court Upholds Dr Reddy’s Rights Over REDDY Mark in Passing Off Dispute, Reddy Pharmaceuticals vs Dr Reddy’s Laboratories Division Bench Judgment on Surname Trademark, Justice Om Prakash Shukla Ruling on Secondary Meaning in Pharma Trademarks, Delhi High Court Affirms Injunction and Rectification in REDDY Trademark Battle

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court Division Bench dismisses appeal by Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and upholds decree in favour of Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, holding that “REDDY” acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning through DRL’s prior continuous use. RPL’s adoption held likely to cause confusion and passing off; permanent injunction and rectification of register sustained.

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K K Bansal & Anr. Vs. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV

In K K Bansal & Anr. Vs. Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV, the High Court of Delhi on 18 May 2026 in RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & 18/2018 delivered a detailed judgment by a Division Bench comprising Justices C. Hari Shankar and Om Prakash Shukla, partly allowing the appeals filed by K.K. Bansal and Rajesh Bansal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 12 July 2018.

The dispute centered on Indian Patent IN 184753 held by Philips, claimed to be a Standard Essential Patent (SEP) for decoding technology used in DVD players. Philips alleged that the Bansals infringed the patent by manufacturing and selling DVD players without obtaining a licence. The Single Judge had held the patent to be an SEP, found infringement, and awarded royalty at FRAND rates along with punitive damages.

The Division Bench undertook an extensive analysis of SEP jurisprudence, essentiality, infringement (both direct and indirect tests), patent exhaustion under Section 107A(b), and FRAND obligations. While acknowledging the complexities involved in SEP litigation, the Court held that the Single Judge’s quantification of damages and royalty rates suffered from several infirmities, including insufficient evidence on FRAND compliance and mapping. The appeals were partly allowed and the damages awarded were set aside.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #SEPInfringement, #StandardEssentialPatent, #DVDPatent, #FRAND, #PatentExhaustion, #PhilipsvBansal, #IPLitigation, #RFAOSCOMM, #JusticeCHariShankar, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) occupy a unique position in patent law because they cover technologies that have become industry standards, ensuring compatibility across devices from different manufacturers. In a comprehensive judgment, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court examined critical issues relating to SEPs, including their essentiality, proof of infringement, the doctrine of patent exhaustion, and the requirement of offering licences on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The ruling provides important guidance on balancing the rights of patent holders with the need to prevent abuse of dominant market positions through patent pools.

Factual and Procedural Background

Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV (Philips) filed two commercial suits against K K Bansal (proprietor of Bhagirathi Electronics) and Rajesh Bansal (proprietor of Mangalam Technology). Philips alleged that the defendants were manufacturing and selling DVD video players that infringed its Indian Patent No. IN 184753 titled “Decoding device for converting a modulated signal to a series of m-bit information words.” This patent, granted on 13 February 1995, corresponded to US Patent 5696505 and European Patent EP 745254B1, which Philips claimed were recognised as SEPs for DVD technology.

Philips asserted that its patent was essential to the DVD standard set by the DVD Forum. It claimed willingness to license the patent on FRAND terms, but the defendants were unwilling licensees who continued to sell infringing DVD players without taking a licence. The suits sought injunctions and damages. During the pendency of the suits, the patent expired on 12 February 2015, rendering the injunction claims infructuous. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, by a common judgment dated 12 July 2018, held the patent to be an SEP, found infringement, and decreed the suits in favour of Philips, awarding royalty at specified FRAND rates along with punitive damages of Rs. 5 lakhs against Rajesh Bansal and directing an inquiry into the number of infringing players sold.

Aggrieved by the judgment, K K Bansal and Rajesh Bansal filed appeals before the Division Bench, which were reserved on 17 December 2025 and pronounced on 18 May 2026.

Dispute

The core dispute revolved around whether Philips’ patent was a valid SEP for DVD technology, whether the defendants’ DVD players infringed it, whether the doctrine of patent exhaustion applied because the defendants sourced components such as printed circuit boards (PCBs) containing the technology from authorised suppliers, and whether Philips had offered a FRAND licence. The defendants also challenged the quantification of damages and the award of punitive damages.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla, with Justice Hari Shankar authoring the judgment, provided an extensive prefatory note on SEPs, drawing heavily from the Division Bench decision in Intex Technologies (India) Ltd v. Telefonaktiebolaget L.M. Ericsson (2015 SCC OnLine Del 1845 (DB)). The Court explained that SEPs require proof of a standard set by a recognised Standard Setting Organisation (SSO), essentiality of the patent to that standard through proper mapping, and a commitment by the patentee to license on FRAND terms.

The Bench analysed the nature of the invention in IN 184753, which relates to a decoding device converting 16-bit code words to 8-bit information words using a “look ahead” mechanism involving specific bit positions. It examined whether this technology was essential to the DVD standard and whether the defendants’ products infringed it, considering both direct and indirect tests of infringement as approved in the Intex case.

On the defence of patent exhaustion under Section 107A(b) of the Patents Act, 1970, the Court considered the defendants’ plea that they purchased chips/PCBs from authorised sources like MediaTek. The judgment discussed international exhaustion principles and their application to components incorporated in finished products.

Regarding FRAND, the Bench stressed that the patentee must demonstrate it is a willing licensor by making a specific, written FRAND offer and providing sufficient information for the prospective licensee to evaluate it. The Court referred to the CJEU decision in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. (Case No. C-170/13) for the step-by-step protocol involving notice, offer, counter-offer, and security. The Bench found that the rates offered and the evidence led by Philips did not sufficiently establish that the terms were FRAND. It also held that royalty could not be calculated on the entire value of the DVD player but only on the smallest salable patent-practising unit.

The judgment cited several authorities including Microsoft Corporation v. Motorola Inc. (US Court of Appeals) on the value of standards and anti-competitive risks, and discussed claim-to-standard and claim-to-product mapping requirements under the Delhi High Court Patent Rules.

Final Decision of the Court

On 18 May 2026, the Division Bench allowed the appeals in substantial measure. While upholding certain findings on the technical aspects, the Court set aside the Single Judge’s quantification of royalty and the award of punitive damages, finding the evidence on FRAND compliance and damages insufficient. The Bench remanded aspects relating to actual damages for fresh consideration where necessary, while clarifying important legal positions on SEP litigation.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces that in SEP cases, the patentee bears a heavy burden to prove essentiality through proper mapping, infringement (directly or indirectly), and willingness to license on genuinely FRAND terms with adequate disclosure. It clarifies the application of patent exhaustion to imported components and emphasises that royalty should be based on the patent-practising unit rather than the entire end product. The ruling underscores the need for fair inquiry and evidence before awarding punitive damages or high royalty rates in SEP disputes.

Case Detail Title: K K Bansal & Anr. vs Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV Date of Order: 18 May 2026 Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018 Neutral Citation: 2026: DHC: 4317-DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journal: Delhi High Court Division Bench Ruling on Philips SEP DVD Patent Infringement and FRAND Obligations, K K Bansal vs Koninklijke Philips Judgment on Standard Essential Patents Exhaustion, Justice C Hari Shankar SEP Royalty Calculation on Smallest Salable Unit, Delhi High Court Clarifies Patent Exhaustion and FRAND in DVD Player SEP Case

SEO Tags: Delhi High Court, Standard Essential Patent, SEP Infringement, FRAND Licensing, Philips DVD Patent, Patent Exhaustion Section 107A, Justice C Hari Shankar, DVD Forum SSO, Royalty Calculation SEP, Punitive Damages Patent

AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court Division Bench in appeals by K K Bansal and Rajesh Bansal partially allows challenges to Single Judge decree in Philips SEP suits concerning IN 184753, clarifies essentiality, infringement mapping, patent exhaustion for components, and strict requirements for proving FRAND offers while setting aside royalty and punitive damages quantification for want of sufficient evidence.

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Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena Vs. Chhattisgarh State Information Commission

In Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena v. Chhattisgarh State Information Commission & Ors, the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur on 13 May 2026 in WPC No. 3944 of 2021 allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 29.05.2021 passed by the Chhattisgarh State Information Commission imposing a penalty of Rs.25,000/- in each of four complaints along with recommendation for disciplinary action against the petitioner, who was then Secretary and Public Information Officer of Gram Panchayat Dongarigardh.

The dispute arose when Respondent No.3 filed four RTI applications seeking information on forest rights leases and related documents. Complaints were filed directly before the State Information Commission under Section 18(1)(c) of the RTI Act, 2005 without preferring a first appeal under Section 19. The Commission imposed the maximum penalty for alleged delay in furnishing information.

Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad held that the complaints under Section 18 were not maintainable as the statutory appellate remedy under Section 19 was not exhausted. The Court further observed that there was no conclusive proof of receipt of the RTI applications by the petitioner, no proper inquiry was conducted, and reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded, especially as the petitioner could not join the video conferencing hearing due to technical failure. The imposition of penalty without establishing mala fide or absence of reasonable cause was unsustainable.

The writ petition was allowed and the impugned order was quashed with a direction to refund any amount deposited by the petitioner.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#ChhattisgarhHighCourt, #RTIAct2005, #PIOPenalty, #Section18RTI, #Section20RTI, #NaturalJustice, #RTILitigation, #InformationCommission, #WritPetition, #JusticeAmitendraKishorePrasad, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

The Right to Information Act, 2005 aims to promote transparency while balancing the duties of public servants. In a significant ruling, the High Court of Chhattisgarh has clarified important safeguards available to Public Information Officers (PIOs) when facing penalties for alleged delays or non-supply of information. The Court emphasized the need to follow proper procedures, including giving fair opportunity of hearing and exhausting statutory remedies before imposing penalties.

Factual and Procedural Background

Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena, the petitioner, was serving as Secretary of Gram Panchayat Dongarigardh in District Mungeli, Chhattisgarh and was also the Public Information Officer for that office. Respondent No.3, Shri Nitin Singhvi, filed four separate RTI applications on 21 August 2018 seeking details related to forest rights leases, constitution of Forest Rights Committee, objections sent to higher committees, and related official letters under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.

The petitioner claimed that he never received these four RTI applications and there was no record of them in the panchayat office. After about six months, on 22 February 2019, Respondent No.3 filed four separate complaints directly before the Chhattisgarh State Information Commission under Section 18(1)(c) of the RTI Act without approaching the First Appellate Authority. The Commission entertained the complaints and, after issuing notice, passed an order on 29 May 2021 imposing a penalty of Rs.25,000 on the petitioner in each of the four complaints (total Rs.1,00,000) and recommended disciplinary action against him for delay in furnishing information.

Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court of Chhattisgarh.

Dispute

The main dispute was whether the State Information Commission was justified in imposing the maximum penalty on the PIO without proper proof that the RTI applications were received by him, without following the first appeal route, and without granting a meaningful opportunity of hearing. The petitioner argued that he appeared for the video conferencing hearing but could not connect due to internet failure at the NIC centre, yet the Commission passed an ex-parte order. He also contended that filing four separate applications on the same subject amounted to harassment.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad carefully examined the provisions of the RTI Act, particularly Sections 18, 19, and 20. The Court referred to the Bombay High Court judgment in Goa Cricket Association vs. State of Goa (Writ Petition No.739 of 2010, decided on 22 March 2013, 2013 (4) MhLJ 453). In that case, the Bombay High Court held that Section 18 of the RTI Act is meant for specific complaints and does not normally allow bypassing the first appeal under Section 19 when the grievance relates to non-supply or delay in information.

The Judge also relied on Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai vs. Rui Ferreira and Ors (W.P. Nos.132 and 307 of 2011, decided on 28 July 2011, 2011 (5) MhLJ 765), where it was observed that parties cannot bypass the statutory appeal mechanism under Section 19 and directly approach the Commission under Section 18 for grievances arising from non-furnishing of information.

On the question of penalty under Section 20(1), the Court discussed the Delhi High Court ruling in Shamik Nag vs. The Public Information Officer, Oriental Bank of Commerce (WPC No.8913 of 2016, decided on 4 August 2017). This judgment clarified that penalty can be imposed only after a proper inquiry and after giving the PIO a reasonable opportunity of being heard, as mandated by the proviso to Section 20(1). The burden to prove reasonable and diligent action lies on the PIO, but this burden can only be discharged if a genuine hearing is provided.

In the present case, the Judge found that the petitioner had raised a credible defence that the RTI applications were never received. There was no conclusive evidence of delivery or acknowledgment. The Commission did not conduct a proper inquiry into this aspect. Additionally, the technical failure during the video conferencing hearing was not adequately considered, and no further opportunity was given, violating principles of natural justice. The Court also noted that the information was eventually supplied after the notice from the Commission.

Final Decision of the Court

On 13 May 2026, the High Court of Chhattisgarh allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned order dated 29 May 2021 passed by the State Information Commission in all four complaint cases. The Court directed refund of any amount deposited by the petitioner within eight weeks.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles that complaints under Section 18(1)(c) of the RTI Act should not ordinarily be entertained when the grievance is of delay or non-supply of information, without first exhausting the appeal remedy under Section 19. It further reinforces that imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) requires clear evidence of receipt of application, deliberate default or mala fide action, and a meaningful opportunity of hearing to the PIO. Technical difficulties in virtual hearings must be considered fairly before passing ex-parte penal orders.

Case Detail Title: Shri Shatruhan Lal Dadsena vs Chhattisgarh State Information Commission & Ors. Date of Order: 13 May 2026 Case Number: WPC No. 3944 of 2021 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of Court: High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journal: Chhattisgarh High Court Quashes Rs 1 Lakh Penalty on PIO for RTI Delay Citing Lack of Hearing and Proof of Receipt, Section 18 vs Section 19 RTI Act Maintainability Judgment by Chhattisgarh High Court, Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Ruling on Natural Justice in RTI Penalty Cases, RTI Penalty Quashed Due to Non Exhaustion of First Appeal and Technical Hearing Failure

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Chhattisgarh High Court allows writ petition and quashes penalty of Rs.25,000 imposed in each of four complaints on PIO holding that direct complaint under Section 18 bypassing first appeal under Section 19 was not proper, no conclusive proof of receipt of RTI applications existed, and reasonable opportunity of hearing was not granted especially due to technical failure in video conferencing. Penalty order set aside with direction for refund.

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Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited v. Anila Kedia

In Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited v. Anila Kedia, the Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division of the High Court at Calcutta on 15 May 2026 in FMAT-IPD/2/2026 dismissed the appeal filed by Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited against the order of the Commercial Court at Rajarhat dated 23 December 2025 refusing interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

The appellant, holder of registered word and label mark ‘ONN’ for hosiery products, alleged infringement and passing off by the respondent’s use of ‘ON & ON’. The respondent contended that the appellant was estopped from claiming similarity, as in its 2011 reply to the Trademark Registry’s objection, the appellant had described ‘ONN’ as a coined, meaningless expression visually, structurally, and conceptually different from similar marks like ‘ON-N-ON’.

The Division Bench comprising Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi held that the appellant failed to make out a prima facie case for injunction. On the parity of its own stand before the Registrar, ‘ONN’ could not be treated as deceptively similar to ‘ON & ON’ at the interim stage. The Court declined to interfere with the impugned order refusing injunction.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#CalcuttaHighCourt, #TrademarkInfringement, #InterimInjunction, #HosieryTrademark, #ONNTrademark, #PassingOff, #IPLitigation, #EstoppelInTrademark, #Order39CPC, #JusticeDebangsuBasak, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a notable decision on trademark disputes involving prior statements made before the Registrar, the Calcutta High Court has highlighted the principle of estoppel in interim injunction matters. The Court refused to restrain the use of a similar mark when the plaintiff had previously taken a contradictory stand before the Trademark Registry that its own mark was distinct from cited marks.

Factual and Procedural Background

Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited, a manufacturer and seller of hosiery products, holds registrations for the word and label mark "ONN". The company filed a commercial suit seeking injunction against Anila Kedia for using the mark "ON & ON" on similar goods, alleging infringement and passing off. The plaintiff claimed exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 due to its registration.

The Commercial Court at Rajarhat, by order dated 23 December 2025, dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Aggrieved by this, Biswanath Hosiery Mills filed an appeal before the Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division of the Calcutta High Court.

Dispute

The central dispute was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using "ON & ON". The plaintiff argued that its registered mark "ONN" gave it exclusive rights and the defendant’s mark was deceptively similar. The defendant contended that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts and was estopped from claiming similarity because, in 2011, while responding to objections from the Trademark Registrar, the plaintiff had described "ONN" as a coined, meaningless expression visually and structurally different from marks like "ON-N-ON".

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench comprising Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi examined the matter on 15 May 2026. Justice Basak, writing for the Bench, noted that for granting an interim injunction, the Court must assess prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The Court found that when the plaintiff applied for registration of "ONN" in 2011, the Registrar raised objections under Section 11 citing similar marks including "ON-N-ON". In reply dated 30 September 2011, the plaintiff’s advocates asserted that "ONN" is a coined and meaningless expression, visually, structurally, and conceptually different from the cited marks. They provided a comparative table and relied on case law to argue dissimilarity.

The Bench observed that the defendant is using "ON & ON". Applying the same logic the plaintiff had used before the Registrar, there appeared to be no similarity sufficient for granting injunction at the prima facie stage. The Court held that the plaintiff’s earlier stand created estoppel, preventing it from now claiming deceptive similarity.

The judges emphasized that while considering an interim injunction application, the Court looks at the overall equities. Given the plaintiff’s previous representation that its mark is distinct, it could not demonstrate a strong prima facie case of infringement or passing off at this stage.

Final Decision of the Court

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal (FMAT-IPD/2/2026) along with connected applications on 15 May 2026. The order of the Commercial Court refusing interim injunction was upheld. No order as to costs was passed.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment reinforces that a party seeking injunction in a trademark matter cannot take contradictory stands at different forums. Statements made before the Trademark Registry regarding distinctiveness of one’s mark can operate as estoppel in subsequent civil proceedings when claiming similarity against another mark. It also reiterates the standard principles for granting interim injunctions – prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm – must be satisfied convincingly, especially when prior conduct of the plaintiff weakens its case.

Case Details Title: Biswanath Hosiery Mills Limited vs Anila Kedia Date of Order: 15 May 2026 Case Number: FMAT-IPD/2/2026 Neutral Citation: 2026:CHC-AS:749-DB (as per document) Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Intellectual Property Rights Appellate Division) Name of Hon’ble Judges: Justice Debangsu Basak and Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journals: Calcutta High Court Refuses Injunction in ONN vs ON & ON Trademark Case Citing Estoppel, Biswanath Hosiery Mills vs Anila Kedia Judgment on Prior Trademark Registry Reply, Division Bench Calcutta High Court Applies Estoppel in Hosiery Trademark Dispute, Justice Debangsu Basak Ruling on Prima Facie Case and Contradictory Stand in IP Matter

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AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Calcutta High Court dismisses appeal against refusal of interim injunction in trademark suit holding that plaintiff’s earlier stand before Registrar describing its mark ‘ONN’ as coined and dissimilar creates estoppel against claiming similarity with defendant’s mark ‘ON & ON’. No prima facie case made out for injunction.

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Ravinder Singh Vs. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd

In Ravinder Singh Vs. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd & Ors, the Delhi High Court on 15 May 2026 in CS(COMM) 383/2025 dismissed the application filed by Defendants under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Plaintiff, trading as M/s. Royal International from Amritsar, Punjab, filed the suit seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violation against the use of deceptively similar marks “Royal”/“Regoshin” and labels in respect of dietary supplements and pharmaceutical products. Defendants contended that the Plaintiff carried on business in Amritsar, no cause of action arose in Delhi, and they had no drug licence to sell in Delhi.

Justice Jyoti Singh held that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Court must proceed on a mere demurrer accepting all averments in the plaint as true. The Court found that the plaint contained sufficient pleadings regarding the registered office of Defendant No.1 in Delhi and the accessibility of Defendants’ website (with ‘Contact Us’ page) and third-party listings on IndiaMart and Justdial in Delhi, which prima facie showed part cause of action arising in Delhi under Section 20 CPC. The Judge observed that issues regarding the interactivity of websites and actual sales being mixed questions of fact and law, they could be adjudicated as a preliminary issue after evidence. The application was dismissed while granting liberty to Defendants to raise the jurisdiction issue at a later stage.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #TrademarkInfringement, #TerritorialJurisdiction, #Order7Rule10CPC, #PharmaceuticalTrademark, #IPLitigation, #ContactUsWebsite, #PassingOff, #JusticeJyotiSingh, #TradeMarksAct, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a clear and practical ruling on territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes, the Delhi High Court has reiterated that courts must examine the plaintiff’s pleadings at face value when defendants challenge jurisdiction at an early stage. The judgment highlights how a company’s registered office in Delhi and an accessible “Contact Us” webpage can establish sufficient connection for a Delhi court to hear a trademark and passing off case, even if the plaintiff operates from another state.

Factual and Procedural Background

Ravinder Singh, trading as Royal International from Amritsar, Punjab, filed a suit in the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction against Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd and others. He alleged that the defendants were infringing his “Royal” trademarks and trade dress by selling similar marks on dietary supplements and pharmaceutical products.

Defendants No. 1 and 3 moved an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting the plaint be returned for lack of territorial jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiff neither resides nor carries on business in Delhi, has no drug licence for sales in Delhi, and their websites are merely passive. The matter was heard by Justice Jyoti Singh.

Dispute

The main dispute was whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defendants claimed no cause of action arose in Delhi because the plaintiff’s business is in Punjab and they themselves do not sell products in Delhi due to absence of necessary licences. The plaintiff countered that the defendants’ registered office is in Delhi, their website has a functional “Contact Us” page accessible in Delhi, and their products are listed on popular platforms like IndiaMart and Justdial, which are accessible across India including Delhi.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Jyoti Singh explained that when deciding an application for return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the court must follow the principle of “demurrer”. This means the court accepts all averments in the plaint as true and does not look into the defendant’s defence at this preliminary stage. The judge referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 688, which laid down that jurisdiction objections at this stage must be tested only on the basis of facts pleaded in the plaint.

The Court noted that while Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act gives an additional forum where the plaintiff resides or works, ordinary rules under Section 20 of the CPC also apply. Here, the plaintiff had specifically pleaded that Defendant No.1 has its registered office in Delhi, maintains a website with a “Contact Us” page showing Delhi address and contact details, and lists products on third-party websites accessible in Delhi. These averments, taken as true, were held sufficient to establish that part of the cause of action arose in Delhi.

Justice Singh discussed several important judgments. She relied on World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. v. M/s Reshma Collection and Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd (2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727) to explain the difference between passive and interactive websites. She also referred to Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd v. Artura Pharmaceuticals and Cadila Healthcare Ltd v. Uniza Healthcare LLP, where similar “Contact Us” pages and online listings were considered enough for jurisdiction at the prima facie stage. The judge clarified that questions like whether actual sales occurred or whether the website is truly passive require full evidence at trial and cannot be decided while considering return of plaint.

The Court rejected the argument that absence of a drug licence in Delhi automatically removes jurisdiction, noting this is a defence to be examined later.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. The suit will proceed in Delhi. However, the defendants were given liberty to raise the territorial jurisdiction issue again at later stages, including during the hearing of the interim injunction application. Pleadings were directed to be completed and the matter listed for further proceedings.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment reinforces that in trademark and passing off suits involving online presence, a defendant’s registered office in the city combined with an accessible website having a “Contact Us” feature and product listings on third-party platforms can validly confer territorial jurisdiction on the court. Such jurisdictional challenges at the initial stage are decided only on the plaintiff’s pleadings, and disputed factual issues regarding actual sales or website interactivity are left for trial. This provides clarity and practical guidance for businesses involved in e-commerce and IP disputes.

Case Details Title: Ravinder Singh v. Regoshin Healthcare Pvt Ltd & Ors. Date of Order: 15 May 2026 Case Number: CS(COMM) 383/2025 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon’ble Judge: Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable SEO Titles for Legal Journals: Delhi High Court Upholds Jurisdiction on Basis of Registered Office and Website Contact Page in Trademark Suit, Ravinder Singh vs Regoshin Healthcare Territorial Jurisdiction Judgment, High Court Dismisses Application for Return of Plaint in Pharma Trademark Case, Justice Jyoti Singh Ruling on Online Presence and Court Jurisdiction in IP Disputes

SEO Tags: Delhi High Court, Territorial Jurisdiction, Trademark Infringement, Order 7 Rule 10 CPC, Website Jurisdiction, Contact Us Page, Pharma Trademark Dispute, Passing Off Action, Registered Office Jurisdiction, IndiaMart Justdial Listings

AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

Headnote: Delhi High Court holds that in trademark infringement and passing off suits, pleadings regarding defendant’s Delhi registered office and accessible website with “Contact Us” feature are sufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction at the prima facie stage under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. Application for return of plaint dismissed with liberty to raise issue at trial.

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Panchhi Petha Store Vs Union of India

In Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India & Ors, the Delhi High Court on 11 November 2024 in W.P.(C) 773/2019 set aside the order dated 27.08.2018 passed by Respondent No.2 (Regional Director) rejecting the petitioner’s application for rectification of the company name of Respondent No.4, M/s. Pancchi Petha Private Limited.

The dispute arose from a family-run sweets business where the petitioner, claiming prior use and registration of the trademark “PANCHHI”, sought removal/rectification of the respondent company’s name under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013, alleging it was identical and deceptively similar. The Regional Director had rejected the application while making observations on trademark ownership, holding that the petitioner was not the owner of the mark.

Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju observed that the Regional Director exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Companies Act by adjudicating upon trademark ownership, which is a matter for the Intellectual Property Division or appropriate trademark forums. The Court clarified that the RD’s role is limited to examining whether a company name is identical or too nearly resembles an existing company name or registered trademark, without delving into contested trademark ownership disputes.

The petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and parties were granted liberty to approach the Regional Director afresh in accordance with law, with all rights and contentions kept open.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#DelhiHighCourt, #CompaniesAct2013, #TrademarkDispute, #CompanyNameRectification, #Section16CompaniesAct, #PanchhiPetha, #IPLitigation, #RegionalDirectorMCA, #TrademarkRectification, #JusticeTaraVitastaGanju, #IPUpdate, #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, #IPAdjutor

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Introduction

In a significant ruling concerning the interplay between company name registration and trademark rights, the Delhi High Court has clarified the scope of authority of the Regional Director under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013. The judgment underscores that while the Regional Director can direct changes in company names that are identical or deceptively similar to existing trademarks, the authority cannot adjudicate upon complex questions of trademark ownership or infringement, which fall within the domain of specialized intellectual property proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

Panchhi Petha Store, a well-known entity dealing in traditional sweets, filed a petition challenging an order dated 27 August 2018 passed by the Regional Director (Northern Region). The petitioner had approached the Regional Director seeking rectification and removal of the name of a company called “Panchhi Petha Private Limited” from the Register of Companies. The petitioner claimed prior rights and ownership over the trademark “PANCHHI”, which had been registered and used for a long time in relation to its business.

The Regional Director rejected the application, observing that the petitioner was not the owner of the trademark, as the registrations stood in the name of one Subhash Chander. The order also noted the existence of ongoing disputes between the parties before trademark authorities and courts. Aggrieved by this decision and particularly the finding on trademark ownership, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Dispute

The core dispute revolved around whether the Regional Director, while exercising powers under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013, could examine and give a conclusive finding on the ownership of a trademark. The petitioner argued that the Regional Director overstepped its jurisdiction by delving into trademark ownership issues instead of limiting itself to examining similarity of names for the purpose of preventing public confusion. The respondents defended the order, contending that the Regional Director had correctly exercised jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(b).

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju carefully examined the scope of Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013. The provision empowers the Central Government (through the Regional Director) to direct a company to change its name if it is identical with or too nearly resembles the name of an existing company or a registered trademark.

The Court referred to the judgment of a Coordinate Bench in CGMP Pharmaplan (P) Ltd. v. Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (2010 SCC OnLine Del 2387), which in turn relied upon the Division Bench decision in Montari Overseas Ltd. v. Montari Industries Ltd. (1995 SCC OnLine Del 864). These judgments clarify that the Regional Director’s inquiry is limited to determining whether the name “too nearly resembles” another name or trademark so as to cause confusion in the minds of the public. The powers are not as wide as those exercised by a civil court in a passing-off action or by the Intellectual Property Division in trademark disputes.

Justice Ganju observed that the Regional Director had gone beyond this limited mandate by recording a finding that the petitioner was not the owner of the trademark “PANCHHI”. Such a determination on ownership involves intricate questions of prior use, registration, and validity of trademarks, which require detailed evidence and are best left to specialized forums like the Trade Marks Registry or the High Court in IP matters.

The Court emphasized that both parties belong to the same extended family and are locked in multiple litigations concerning the brand. In such family business disputes involving intellectual property, the Regional Director cannot act as an arbiter of trademark rights. The object of Section 16 is to prevent public confusion regarding the identity of companies, not to resolve substantive trademark ownership disputes.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court set aside the impugned order dated 27 August 2018. However, liberty was granted to both parties to approach the Regional Director afresh, if necessary, in accordance with law. All rights and contentions of the parties were left open. The petition was disposed of accordingly.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles that the jurisdiction of the Regional Director under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013 is confined to examining similarity or identity of names for preventing confusion in the market. The authority cannot adjudicate upon questions of trademark ownership, validity, or infringement, which are beyond the scope of the provision. This maintains a clear demarcation between company law proceedings for name rectification and specialized intellectual property litigation.

Case Details Title: Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India & Ors. Date of Order: 11 November 2024 Case Number: W.P.(C) 773/2019 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon’ble Judge: Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Headnote: Delhi High Court holds that Regional Director under Section 16 of Companies Act cannot decide trademark ownership while directing change of company name; such disputes must be resolved in appropriate IP forums. Impugned order set aside with liberty to parties to approach afresh.

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Firoz A Nadiadwala Vs Seven Arts International Limited

In Firoz A Nadiadwala vs Seven Arts International Limited decided on 24 April 2026, in Application No.1827 of 2026 in C.S. (Comm Div) No.267 of 2025, bearing Neutral Citation 2026:MHC:1658, the High Court of Judicature at Madras through Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy dismissed an application seeking rejection of a copyright infringement plaint relating to remake and derivative rights connected with the Malayalam films “Ramji Rao Speaking” and “Mannar Mathai Speaking.” The dispute arose after Seven Arts International Limited alleged infringement of remake and sequel rights concerning the “Hera Pheri” film franchise. The defendant argued that the suit was barred by limitation, that the assignment agreement dated 12.05.2022 did not validly confer rights upon the plaintiff company, and that the death of one of the principals revoked the power of attorney under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Court held that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is only required to examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on merits. The Court observed that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law and that the plaintiff’s allegation of continuing infringement through the proposed production of “Hera Pheri 3” could not be rejected at the threshold. The Court further held that questions regarding validity of assignment under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, interpretation of the power of attorney, and effect of death of one of the principals required detailed adjudication during trial and could not justify rejection of the plaint at the preliminary stage. Consequently, the application for rejection of plaint was dismissed and the copyright suit was permitted to proceed further.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Madras High Court Refuses to Reject Copyright Suit in Hera Pheri Remake Rights Dispute

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Firoz A Nadiadwala vs Seven Arts International Limited is an important decision concerning copyright assignment, remake rights in cinematographic films, and the scope of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The dispute arose in relation to remake and derivative rights connected with the Malayalam cult films “Ramji Rao Speaking” and “Mannar Mathai Speaking,” which later inspired the highly successful Hindi film franchise “Hera Pheri.”

The judgment delivered on 24 April 2026 by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy clarifies that at the stage of considering an application for rejection of plaint, the Court is only required to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed in proving its claims. The Court also examined issues relating to limitation, assignment of copyright under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957, powers of attorney coupled with interest under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the legal effect of death of one of several principals in an agency arrangement.

The ruling is significant for the entertainment and film industry because disputes over remake rights, sequel rights, adaptations, and derivative works have become increasingly common with the commercial expansion of film franchises and OTT exploitation. The decision also demonstrates judicial caution against dismissing intellectual property disputes at the threshold stage without full trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute relates to the Malayalam films “Ramji Rao Speaking” and “Mannar Mathai Speaking,” which acquired substantial popularity and later inspired the Hindi remake “Hera Pheri” released in 2000 and its sequel “Phir Hera Pheri” released in 2006.

The plaintiff, Seven Arts International Limited, claimed that by virtue of an Assignment Agreement dated 12 May 2022, it acquired remake rights and derivative rights including rights to create sequels, prequels, spin-offs, and adaptations in Hindi and other North Indian languages in relation to the original Malayalam films.

The assignment agreement was allegedly executed between original screenplay authors K.I. Siddique and M. Paul Michael, together with producer Mani C. Kappan, and G.P. Vijayakumar, Managing Director of Seven Arts International Limited.

Subsequently, disputes arose concerning the proposed production of “Hera Pheri 3.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, film producer Firoz A. Nadiadwala, was infringing the plaintiff’s copyright and derivative rights in relation to the film franchise.

A commercial suit was therefore instituted before the Madras High Court seeking remedies for copyright infringement. In response, the defendant filed Application No.1827 of 2026 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that it disclosed no cause of action and was barred by law.

The application was heard by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal dispute before the Court was whether the plaint deserved to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The defendant argued that the plaint failed to disclose a valid cause of action because the assignment agreement did not actually confer enforceable rights upon Seven Arts International Limited. It was contended that the assignment agreement identified G.P. Vijayakumar personally as the assignee and not the company itself. Therefore, according to the defendant, the plaintiff company lacked locus standi to sue.

The defendant further argued that the suit was barred by limitation because the alleged remake films “Hera Pheri” and “Phir Hera Pheri” had already been released years earlier in 2000 and 2006 respectively. It was submitted that the present proceedings had been instituted after an inordinate delay.

The defendant also challenged the validity of the assignment agreement under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957. It was argued that the agreement imposed conditions and obligations upon the assignors and therefore did not constitute a valid statutory assignment.

An additional issue arose because one of the original assignors, K.I. Siddique, had passed away on 8 August 2023. The defendant contended that the power of attorney executed in favour of G.P. Vijayakumar stood automatically revoked under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 upon the death of one of the principals.

The plaintiff, however, argued that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC required the Court to assume the averments in the plaint to be true. It was submitted that the issue of limitation involved mixed questions of fact and law and could not be conclusively decided at the threshold stage. The plaintiff further argued that the production of “Hera Pheri 3” constituted a continuing cause of action.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy undertook a detailed analysis of the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and repeatedly emphasized that the Court must only determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff is likely to ultimately succeed in the suit.

The Court observed that paragraph 17 of the plaint specifically referred to the execution of the assignment agreement dated 12 May 2022 and also referred to a cease-and-desist notice issued on 27 December 2024 in relation to the announcement of “Hera Pheri 3.” Since the plaint asserted that the cause of action was continuing and recurring, the Court held that limitation could not be conclusively determined at the preliminary stage.

The Court thus accepted the plaintiff’s argument that limitation in the present case was a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence and adjudication during trial.

The Court next considered the argument that Seven Arts International Limited was not a party to the assignment agreement. The defendant relied upon the principle that a company is a separate juristic entity distinct from its directors and officers.

However, the Court carefully examined the plaint and noted that the assignment agreement described G.P. Vijayakumar as Managing Director of Seven Arts International Limited. The plaint specifically asserted that the plaintiff company had acquired remake and derivative rights under the assignment agreement.

Justice Ramamoorthy held that for purposes of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, such assertions must be presumed to be correct. Whether the plaintiff would ultimately succeed in proving the assignment was a matter for trial and not a ground for rejection of plaint.

The Court then examined the defendant’s argument that the assignment agreement was invalid under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Section 19 of the Copyright Act prescribes the mode and requirements for valid assignment of copyright. The defendant argued that Clauses 5 and 6 of the agreement imposed contingent obligations and therefore the agreement did not qualify as a statutory assignment.

Clause 5 allegedly required the assignors to initiate legal proceedings against third parties, while Clause 6 provided that only token consideration had been paid and the remaining consideration was contingent upon fulfilment of certain obligations.

The Court refused to enter into a conclusive determination regarding validity of the assignment at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Justice Ramamoorthy held that such issues involve examination of contractual rights and obligations and require full adjudication either during final disposal of the suit or in appropriate proceedings where evidence can be considered.

The Court observed that Section 55 of the Copyright Act permits the owner or assignee of copyright to seek remedies for infringement. Since the plaint asserted that the plaintiff was the assignee, the Court held that the plaint disclosed a sufficient cause of action.

The judgment also contains an important discussion on powers of attorney and agency law under Sections 201 and 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

The defendant argued that because one of the principals, K.I. Siddique, had died, the power of attorney automatically stood revoked under Section 201 of the Contract Act.

The Court, however, referred to Section 202 of the Contract Act which deals with “agency coupled with interest.” Section 202 provides that where the agent has an interest in the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot ordinarily be terminated to the prejudice of such interest even by death of the principal.

The Court reproduced Illustration (a) to Section 202, which explains that where an agent has authority to sell property and recover debts from sale proceeds, such authority is not terminated by death of the principal.

Justice Ramamoorthy held that the assignment agreement and power of attorney required joint examination to determine whether the agency was coupled with interest. Such determination could not properly be made at the preliminary stage.

The Court also discussed the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in K.A. Meeran Mohideen vs Sheik Amjad reported in 2024 (5) CTC 613. In that case, the Division Bench held that death of one of several principals does not necessarily terminate a contract of agency.

The Court relied upon this precedent to reject the defendant’s argument that the death of one assignor automatically extinguished all rights flowing from the arrangement.

The defendant relied upon several authorities including T. Arivandandam vs T.V. Satyapal reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs Jagannath reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 to argue that frivolous litigation should be rejected at the threshold.

However, the Court distinguished those authorities and observed that the present case involved substantive disputes regarding assignment, copyright ownership, and contractual interpretation, which required adjudication on merits.

Justice Ramamoorthy ultimately concluded that the defendant had attempted to equate “disclosure of cause of action” with “proof of cause of action.” According to the Court, a plaint cannot be rejected merely because the defendant disputes the strength or validity of the plaintiff’s claims.

Final Decision of the Court

The Madras High Court dismissed the application seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The Court held that none of the objections raised by the defendant justified rejection of the plaint at the threshold stage. The issues relating to validity of assignment, limitation, agency, power of attorney, and enforceability of rights required detailed examination during trial.

The Court therefore permitted the copyright infringement suit relating to remake and sequel rights connected with the “Hera Pheri” franchise to proceed further before the Commercial Division.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles the important principle that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is only concerned with whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff can conclusively establish such cause of action.

The ruling further clarifies that disputes relating to validity of copyright assignments under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, limitation in continuing infringement actions, and powers of attorney coupled with interest under Sections 201 and 202 of the Indian Contract Act ordinarily require detailed adjudication and cannot usually be decided summarily at the stage of rejection of plaint.

The decision also reinforces that in intellectual property disputes involving film rights and derivative rights, courts should ordinarily permit matters to proceed to trial where complex contractual and factual issues are involved.

Case Details

Title: Firoz A Nadiadwala Vs Seven Arts International Limited
Date of Order: 24 April 2026
Case Number: Application No.1827 of 2026 in C.S. (Comm Div) No.267 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026:MHC:1658
Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

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Headnote

The Madras High Court in Firoz A Nadiadwala vs Seven Arts International Limited held that a plaint in a copyright infringement suit concerning remake and derivative rights in the “Hera Pheri” film franchise cannot be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely because the defendant disputes the validity of assignment or enforceability of rights. The Court ruled that issues relating to limitation, validity of assignment under Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and the effect of death of a principal on a power of attorney under Sections 201 and 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 involve mixed questions of law and fact requiring detailed adjudication during trial. The Court emphasized that at the stage of rejection of plaint, the Court only examines whether the plaint discloses a cause of action and not whether the plaintiff will ultimately succeed on merits.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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