Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armasuisse

# When Can You Appeal Twice? The Delhi High Court Clarifies the Scope of Section 100-A CPC in Trademark Appeals

## Introduction

Can a party dissatisfied with a Single Judge's ruling in a trademark appeal go a step further and appeal to a Division Bench of the same High Court? This apparently technical, procedural question carried significant practical stakes in *Promoshirt SM SA v. Armasuisse*, decided by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The controversy centred on whether Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — a provision designed to curb multiplicity of appeals — extinguishes the right to file a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against a Single Judge's decision rendered in an appeal from an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The judgment is a rich, closely reasoned exposition on statutory interpretation, the doctrine of precedent, and the continuing vitality of the Letters Patent as a source of intra-court appellate jurisdiction. It untangles decades of conflicting case law from across India by identifying the precise thread that distinguishes cases where Section 100-A applies from those where it does not.

## Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose out of trademark registration proceedings between Promoshirt SM SA (the appellant, a Swiss entity) and Armasuisse (the principal respondent). The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, by an order dated 25 July 2022, rejected the notice of opposition filed by Armasuisse and directed that Promoshirt's applications for registration of its trademarks be accepted and processed further under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Armasuisse challenged this order by way of a statutory appeal to the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court decided that appeal by a judgment dated 4 January 2023. Aggrieved by this outcome, Promoshirt preferred two connected intra-court appeals — LPA 136/2023 and LPA 137/2023, along with several connected applications (for stay, for summoning the complete record, and for placing additional documents on record) — before a Division Bench, invoking Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court.

At the threshold, Armasuisse raised a preliminary objection to the very maintainability of these Letters Patent Appeals. It contended that Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — which contains a non-obstante clause overriding "any Letters Patent for any High Court" — bars any further appeal once an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order has been heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court. Since the Single Judge here was admittedly exercising appellate jurisdiction (hearing an appeal against the Registrar's order under Section 91), Armasuisse argued that no further appeal to a Division Bench could lie.

Given the divergence of judicial opinion on this issue across various High Courts and even within the Delhi High Court's own precedents, the Division Bench proceeded to examine the question in considerable depth, tracing the legislative history of Section 100-A, the appellate provisions of successive trade mark statutes (the Trade Marks Act, 1940, the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and the Trade Marks Act, 1999), and a long line of Supreme Court and High Court precedents. The order was reserved on 21 August 2023 and pronounced on 6 September 2023, with the Bench confining itself, at this stage, only to the preliminary objection regarding maintainability.

## Dispute Before the Court

At its core, the case required the Court to answer one central legal question: **Does Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure bar a Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment of a Single Judge rendered in exercise of appellate powers under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, given that Section 91 does not expressly subject such appeals to the Code?**

For a lay reader, the dispute can be understood this way: ordinarily, if you lose before a Single Judge of the High Court after a first round of appeal, the law says "no more appeals within the High Court" — the matter is over unless you go to the Supreme Court. This rule exists to stop litigation from dragging on endlessly. But the Letters Patent — an old colonial-era charter that established the High Court and granted it certain powers — separately allows a further "appeal within the High Court" (an LPA) against a Single Judge's decision in specified situations. The question was whether the newer rule (Section 100-A) had silently swallowed up this older right (the LPA) in the specific context of trademark appeals.

**Armasuisse's position:** Section 100-A uses sweeping language ("notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent... or any other law for the time being in force") and was intended to eliminate a further tier of intra-court appeal wherever a Single Judge decides an appeal. It relied on the fact that the 1999 Trade Marks Act, unlike its 1958 predecessor, contains no provision expressly allowing a further appeal against a Single Judge's order, suggesting Parliament intended to do away with that extra layer. It also invoked a body of case law (mostly involving Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, the Company Law Board, and proceedings originating in civil courts) holding that Section 100-A bars LPAs in analogous situations.

**Promoshirt's position:** Section 100-A applies only where the Single Judge has decided an appeal against a "decree" or "order" as those terms are specifically defined in the Code of Civil Procedure — and an "order," under Section 2(14) CPC, means the formal expression of a decision of a *civil court*. The Registrar of Trade Marks, they argued, is not a civil court — merely being vested with some of the powers of a civil court (for taking evidence, summoning witnesses, etc.) does not transform an administrative/quasi-judicial authority into a court. Since the order under appeal before the Single Judge did not emanate from a civil court, Section 100-A's bar simply never came into play, leaving the Letters Patent remedy intact.

## Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

### The statutory framework

The Court began by setting out Section 100-A of the Code in its various historical avatars — as introduced in 1976, and as substituted in 1999 and 2002 — noting that the provision has progressively widened, but has always retained its core non-obstante character overriding Letters Patent provisions. It also reproduced Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the (then) Lahore High Court, applicable to the Delhi High Court, explaining that it permits an intra-court appeal against a Single Judge's judgment, subject to specified exceptions.

Crucially, the Bench undertook a comparative reading of the appellate provisions across the three successive trade mark statutes:

- **Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940** provided an appeal to the High Court, and Section 76(3) expressly applied the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to such appeals.

- **Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958** went further: Section 109(5) expressly provided for "a further appeal... to a Bench of the High Court" where the first appeal was heard by a Single Judge, and Section 109(8) also applied the Code to such appeals.

- **Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999**, the provision actually in force, contains neither an express right of further appeal (as under the 1958 Act) nor any provision subjecting the appeal to the Code (as under both the 1940 and 1958 Acts).

This comparison became pivotal to the Court's reasoning: the 1999 Act's silence cuts both ways, and the Bench had to determine which way it actually cut.

### Precedents on the applicability of Section 100-A

The Court undertook an exhaustive survey of precedent, which it eventually organised into three analytically distinct categories:

1. **Cases arising directly under the Code of Civil Procedure** — for instance, appeals from orders passed under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC (as in the Supreme Court's decision in the *Mohd. Saud* line of cases, and Delhi High Court decisions such as *Vasanthi* and *N.G. Nanda*). In these cases, Section 100-A applied without controversy since the underlying decree or order was, by definition, one passed by a civil court.

2. **Cases arising from special enactments where the underlying dispute had, from its inception, been before a civil court** — such as *Avtar Narain Behal v. Subhash Chander Behal* (a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court concerning Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925), *Satish Chander Sabharwal v. State* (also under the Succession Act), and the Kerala Full Bench decision in *Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai v. State of Kerala* [2003 SCC OnLine Ker 293] (concerning Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894). The Court noted that both Section 299 of the Succession Act and Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act expressly subjected appeals to the Code of Civil Procedure, making Section 100-A's application unavoidable.

3. **Cases involving tribunals deemed by statutory fiction to be civil courts** — most notably *Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd.* [(2006) 7 SCC 613], where the Supreme Court held that Section 100-A barred a further appeal against a Single Judge's order in an appeal from the Company Law Board, because the Board possessed "all the trappings of a court" and Section 10E(4D) of the Companies Act, 1956 deemed its proceedings to be judicial proceedings. Similarly, the Full Bench decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in *Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi v. Managing Director, A.P. SRTC* [2003 SCC OnLine AP 525] and its later reaffirmation in *United India Insurance* dealt with Motor Accident Claims Tribunals, which Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deems to be civil courts for specified purposes.

The Bench distinguished all of the above from the case at hand by holding that the Registrar of Trade Marks does not fall into any of these three categories. There is no deeming provision in the 1999 Act clothing the Registrar with the status of a civil court, and Section 91 does not subject the appeal to the Code.

### The "civil court" versus "court" distinction

A significant portion of the judgment is devoted to unpacking the difference between a "court," a "civil court," and a body with mere "trappings of a court" — a distinction with a long pedigree in Indian jurisprudence. The Court extensively relied on:

- ***The Anglo French Drug Co. (Eastern) Pvt. Ltd. v. R.D. Tinaikar*** [1957 SCC OnLine Bom 165], where the Bombay High Court held that the Registrar of Trade Marks, despite possessing some evidentiary powers of a civil court, is not himself a "Court," drawing on the Privy Council's classic exposition in *Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation* [1931 AC 275] on the indicia that separate courts from administrative tribunals.

- ***Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association*** [(2008) 10 SCC 723], where the Supreme Court reaffirmed, citing its earlier decision in *Sakura v. Tanaji* [(1985) 3 SCC 590], that the Registrar of Trade Marks is not a court.

- ***Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation*** [(2009) 8 SCC 646], a comprehensive Supreme Court decision explaining that although all civil courts are courts, not all courts (or tribunals with trappings of a court) are civil courts — a distinction the Delhi High Court found determinative, since Section 2(14) CPC defines "order" specifically by reference to a decision of a "civil court," not merely a "court."

- ***Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd.*** [(2006) 13 SCC 322] (cited via the discussion on arbitral awards), reinforcing that only a "court," in the strict sense engaged in adjudication of a "suit," can render a "decree" or "order" as defined by the Code.

Applying these principles, the Bench held that even applying the "trappings of a court" test urged by the respondents, the Registrar of Trade Marks does not meet the threshold, since Section 91 makes no provision subjecting appeals to the CPC and there is no statutory fiction deeming the Registrar (or its orders) to have the status of a civil court.

### Distinguishing and reading down Avtar Narain Behal

Since the Full Bench decision in *Avtar Narain Behal* had made broad observations suggesting that Section 100-A is not confined to matters arising under the Code alone, the Division Bench had to carefully reconcile this precedent rather than simply disregard it. Applying settled principles on ascertaining the *ratio decidendi* of a judgment — drawing support from the Constitution Bench's guidance in ***In Re: Natural Resources Allocation, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012*** [(2012) 10 SCC 1] on distinguishing binding principle from broader observations — the Bench held that *Avtar Narain Behal* must be read in light of its own facts: it arose under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which (like Section 76(3) of the 1940 TM Act and Section 109(8) of the 1958 TM Act) expressly imported the CPC into the appellate process. The ratio of *Avtar Narain Behal*, properly understood, was therefore that the LPA remedy is excluded when the special statute itself subjects the appeal to the Code — not that Section 100-A applies universally regardless of the source of the order under appeal.

The Bench also drew support from an earlier Full Bench decision in *Mahli Devi*, concerning Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which had held that unless a statute itself bars a second appeal or makes a Single Judge's decision final, the Letters Patent remedy survives. This, in turn, traced back to the seminal Supreme Court ruling in ***National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros.*** [AIR 1953 SC 357], decided under Section 76 of the 1940 Trade Marks Act itself, which held that once a statutory appeal reaches the High Court, it must be conducted "according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court" — including its Letters Patent — unless the statute expressly excludes such further recourse.

### The Constitution Bench in P.S. Sathappan and other authorities

The Court also examined ***P.S. Sathappan (Dead) by LRs v. Andhra Bank Ltd.*** [(2004) 11 SCC 672], a Constitution Bench decision heavily relied upon by the respondents. It clarified that while *Sathappan* had recognised that Section 100-A, once validly invoked, bars an LPA, the case itself turned on the saving provisions of Section 104 CPC as they stood at the relevant time (before the 2002 amendment), and did not concern appeals arising outside the framework of the Code. Similarly, ***Subal Paul v. Malina Paul*** [(2003) 10 SCC 361] was found to be a case concerning proceedings squarely governed by the Code.

The Bench additionally engaged with two recent, more directly relevant Delhi High Court decisions specifically on the maintainability of LPAs against Single Judge orders under the 1999 Trade Marks Act: ***Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. Phonepe Pvt. Ltd.*** [2023 SCC OnLine Del 2972] and ***V.R. Holdings v. Hero Investocorp Ltd.*** [2023 SCC OnLine 4673]. Both decisions had held that, absent a provision analogous to Section 76(3) of the 1940 Act or Section 109(8) of the 1958 Act applying the Code to appeals under Section 91, the Letters Patent remedy remains available, and that Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not curtail this remedy where the Single Judge was not exercising original civil jurisdiction. The Division Bench found itself in agreement with this line of reasoning.

### The Court's ultimate synthesis

Bringing these threads together, the Bench held that Section 100-A operates to bar a Letters Patent Appeal only in two situations: (i) where the order appealed from before the Single Judge is, in substance, a decree or order of a civil court as understood under the Code; or (ii) where the special enactment under which the original proceeding arose expressly subjects appeals to the High Court to the provisions of the Code relating to appeals. Since neither condition was satisfied — the Registrar of Trade Marks is not a civil court, and Section 91 of the 1999 Act contains no provision applying the CPC to such appeals — the bar under Section 100-A did not extend to the LPAs filed by Promoshirt.

## Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench rejected the preliminary objection raised by Armasuisse regarding the maintainability of the two Letters Patent Appeals. It held that Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure does not bar an LPA against a judgment of a Single Judge rendered in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, because the Registrar of Trade Marks is not a civil court and Section 91 does not subject such appeals to the provisions of the Code. Consequently, LPA 136/2023 and LPA 137/2023 were held to be maintainable, the preliminary objection was overruled, and the appeals were directed to be listed for further consideration (on their merits) on 19 September 2023.

## Point of Law Settled

This judgment settles, at least for the Delhi High Court, the important question of when Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure operates to bar a Letters Patent Appeal against a Single Judge's order passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under a special statute. The principle it establishes may be summarised as follows:

- The bar under Section 100-A CPC is confined to appeals from a "decree" or "order" as those expressions are defined in the Code — meaning, in the case of an "order," a formal expression of a decision of a *civil court*.

- Where the authority whose decision was under challenge before the Single Judge (such as the Registrar of Trade Marks) is not a civil court, and possesses at most some incidental "trappings" of a court without a statutory fiction deeming it to be one, Section 100-A does not apply merely because the Single Judge exercised "appellate" jurisdiction in a loose sense.

- The Letters Patent remedy stands excluded only where (a) the special statute itself expressly bars a further appeal, or (b) the special statute subjects appeals before the High Court to the provisions of the Code relating to appeals (as the 1940 and 1958 Trade Marks Acts, the Indian Succession Act, and the Land Acquisition Act did, but the 1999 Trade Marks Act does not).

- Judicial precedents dealing with tribunals statutorily deemed to be civil courts (such as the Company Law Board or Motor Accident Claims Tribunals) are not straightforwardly applicable to authorities, like the Registrar of Trade Marks, that enjoy no such deeming fiction.

The ruling has significant practical implications for intellectual property litigation and beyond: it preserves a valuable additional layer of intra-court scrutiny for parties aggrieved by Single Judge decisions in trademark appeals, and more broadly, it offers a structured, replicable framework for resolving similar maintainability disputes arising under other special statutes that are silent on the applicability of the Code to appeals before the High Court.

---

**Case Details:** *Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armasuisse & Anr.*, Order pronounced on 6 September 2023, LPA 136/2023 and LPA 137/2023 (with connected CM Appl. Nos. 8810/2023, 8811/2023, 8813/2023 and 14104/2023), High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, coram of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yashwant Varma and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharmesh Sharma.

Magnesium Aluminium Silicate

Magnesium Aluminium Silicate (MAS) is one of those ingredients that seems mysterious until you understand its structure. Once you do, its ability to stabilize suspension concentrates (SC), suspo-emulsions (SE), and emulsion concentrates becomes very logical.

---

Step 1. What is Magnesium Aluminium Silicate?

Imagine a pile of extremely tiny sheets of paper.

Each sheet is not paper, but an ultra-thin mineral crystal made of:

• Magnesium
• Aluminium
• Silicon
• Oxygen

Each crystal is only about 1 nanometer thick (100,000 times thinner than a human hair).

These tiny sheets belong to a family of minerals called smectite clays.

Common examples are:

• Bentonite
• Montmorillonite
• Hectorite

Magnesium Aluminium Silicate is a purified form of these smectite minerals.

---

Step 2. What does "Smectite Structure" mean?

The word smectite refers to a special layered crystal arrangement.

Each particle looks like a sandwich.

Top layer
Silica (Si-O)

-------------------

Middle layer
Magnesium + Aluminium + Oxygen

-------------------

Bottom layer
Silica (Si-O)

Scientists call this a 2:1 layer because

Silica

Metal oxide

Silica

So every sheet is

Silica → Magnesium/Aluminium → Silica

This arrangement repeats millions of times.

Imagine a book.

Every page is one crystal sheet.

The whole particle is a stack of thousands of pages.

---

Step 3. Why are these sheets special?

These sheets do not fit together perfectly.

Some atoms are replaced.

For example

Instead of

Al³⁺

another atom like Mg²⁺ may occupy the position.

Because of this replacement,

the sheet develops a negative electrical charge.

Think of every sheet becoming a tiny magnet carrying a negative charge.

---

Step 4. What happens when you add water?

Water molecules enter between the sheets.

Now the layers begin to separate.

Imagine a dry book.

Water enters between pages.

The pages slowly open.

Exactly the same thing happens.

The sheets swell.

This is called

Swelling Clay

Smectites are among the few minerals that swell tremendously.

---

Step 5. Then what happens?

After swelling,

the sheets start floating individually in water.

Instead of one thick particle,

you now have millions of ultra-thin plates.

Each plate has

• enormous surface area
• negative charge
• extremely thin shape

Now something amazing begins.

---

Step 6. Why don't these sheets just settle?

Because of their electrical charge.

Negative charges repel one another.

So the sheets don't stack tightly.

Instead,

they remain dispersed throughout the liquid.

---

Step 7. How does the famous "House of Cards" structure form?

This is the key concept.

A sheet has

Large flat surfaces

and

Thin edges.

The flat surfaces are strongly negative.

The edges have a different charge depending on pH and can become slightly positive.

Now imagine

□□□□

   |

□□□□

      |

□□□□

Instead of lying flat,

one sheet touches another by its edge.

Millions of sheets connect this way.

The result is

a gigantic three-dimensional network.

Scientists call this the

House-of-Cards Structure

because it resembles cards standing against one another.

It is not a solid gel.

It is not a liquid.

It is a delicate microscopic network spread throughout the liquid.

---

Step 8. How does this network stabilize a Suspension Concentrate (SC)?

Suppose you have pesticide particles.

Normally gravity pulls them downward.

Without MAS

Particles

↓

↓

↓

↓

Bottom

Sedimentation occurs.

Now add Magnesium Aluminium Silicate.

The house-of-cards network fills the entire liquid.

The particles become trapped inside tiny pockets.

Network

#/\/\/\/\#

Particle

#/\/\/\/\#

Particle

#/\/\/\/\#

The particles cannot easily fall because the network supports them.

Like fruits suspended inside jelly.

Not exactly stuck,

but gently held.

---

Step 9. Why doesn't the product become solid?

Because the network is thixotropic.

This means:

At rest

The network exists.

When shaken

The network breaks apart.

The liquid flows easily.

When left standing

The network rebuilds itself.

This rebuilding occurs automatically.

That is why SC formulations

• pour easily
• redisperse quickly
• resist settling during storage

---

Step 10. How does MAS stabilize a Suspo-Emulsion (SE)?

A Suspo-Emulsion contains two different systems together:

• Solid particles (suspension)
• Oil droplets (emulsion)

Both need stabilization.

Without stabilization,

two problems occur simultaneously:

1. Solids settle.

2. Oil droplets merge together.

MAS helps solve both.

---

First job: Hold the solid particles

The clay network traps suspended particles.

So sedimentation is greatly reduced.

---

Second job: Hold the oil droplets

Oil droplets are also surrounded by the network.

Imagine grapes inside a spider web.

The web doesn't stick to the grapes strongly,

but it prevents them from moving freely.

Since droplets cannot move easily,

they collide much less often.

Therefore,

they do not merge (coalesce) into larger droplets.

---

Step 11. Why is droplet movement important?

Oil droplets merge only after they collide.

If movement slows,

collisions decrease.

Fewer collisions mean

less coalescence.

MAS increases the viscosity of the continuous water phase and creates a network that restricts droplet movement, complementing the work of surfactants that keep droplets from sticking together.

---

Step 12. What happens during storage?

Suppose a bottle sits on a shelf for one year.

Gravity acts every second.

Without MAS

Top

Clear liquid

-------------

Heavy sediment

With MAS

Particles

Particles

Oil droplets

Particles

Oil droplets

Particles

Almost everything remains uniformly distributed because the microscopic network continually supports the dispersed materials.

---

Step 13. Why is only a small amount needed?

One gram of MAS contains an enormous number of tiny sheets.

When fully hydrated,

these sheets unfold into an immense three-dimensional network with a very large surface area.

Even at concentrations of about 0.5–3% (depending on the formulation), the network can span the entire liquid, making MAS an efficient rheology modifier and stabilizer.

---

Step 14. A simple real-life analogy

Imagine a bowl filled with marbles.

Without anything else,

the marbles sink to the bottom.

Now imagine filling the bowl with a loose mesh made of millions of fine threads.

The marbles are still free to move a little, but each is supported by the mesh.

Shake the bowl, and the mesh temporarily opens so everything flows.

Set it down, and the mesh reforms, supporting the marbles again.

That is essentially how Magnesium Aluminium Silicate works in an SC or SE formulation.

---

Putting it all together

The remarkable performance of Magnesium Aluminium Silicate comes from its smectite structure:

• Ultra-thin silica–magnesium/aluminium–silica (2:1) layered sheets.
• Negative surface charges that keep the sheets dispersed in water.
• Swelling and separation into individual nanosheets upon hydration.
• Formation of a reversible three-dimensional "house-of-cards" network.
• Increased low-shear viscosity that resists sedimentation and creaming.
• Thixotropic behavior: the network breaks under shaking or pumping and rebuilds when the product is at rest.
• Simultaneous stabilization of both suspended solid particles and emulsified oil droplets, making it especially valuable in suspo-emulsion (SE) formulations.

In simple terms, Magnesium Aluminium Silicate doesn't glue particles or droplets in place—it builds an invisible microscopic scaffold throughout the liquid. This scaffold gently supports solids, slows the movement of oil droplets, and reforms after agitation, keeping the formulation stable, pourable, and easy to redisperse even after long storage.

Bharat Bank Ltd. Vs Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd

# Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. — An Analytical Study of the Foundational Ruling on Article 136 and Industrial Tribunals

## Introduction

*Bharat Bank Ltd.* v. *Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.*, reported at 1950 SCC 470, is one of the earliest and most significant pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India on the scope of its special leave jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Decided within months of the Constitution coming into force, the case squarely raised the question of whether an award of an Industrial Tribunal — a body created by ordinary legislation to resolve disputes between employers and workmen — could at all be brought before the Supreme Court by way of special leave to appeal. The judgment is equally significant for its extended discussion of what distinguishes a "court" or "judicial Tribunal" from a body exercising merely administrative or quasi-judicial functions, a distinction that continues to inform administrative law in India. Delivered by five judges with three separate opinions and a partial dissent, the case set out the framework within which the Supreme Court would, for decades thereafter, approach appeals from Tribunals of every description.

## Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Bharat Bank Ltd., a Delhi-based banking company registered under the Companies Act, faced demands from its employees which were met with an unfavourable response. This led to a strike by the employees on 9-3-1949. The Bank responded by serving notices calling upon the striking employees to resume work, and when they failed to do so, discharged a number of them between 19th and 24th March 1949.

The Central Government, acting under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constituted a Tribunal of three persons — the All-India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) — to adjudicate industrial disputes concerning banking companies. Various disputes were referred to this Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act, including, under Item 18 of Schedule II of the notification, the question of "retrenchment and victimisation" concerning specific cases to be cited by the employees.

The dispute between Bharat Bank and its employees under Item 18 was heard by the Tribunal at Delhi. Although the entire hearing had taken place before all three members of the Tribunal, one member — who had in the meantime been appointed to the Boundary Commission in Bengal — did not sign the award. The award was accordingly signed by only two of the three members and made on 19-1-1950. It was published in the Government of India Gazette on 4-2-1950 and was declared binding for a period of one year under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By this award, the Tribunal directed reinstatement of a number of dismissed employees.

Aggrieved, Bharat Bank sought and obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution — this being the first occasion on which special leave was granted against the determination of an Industrial Tribunal. The Bharat Bank Employees' Union, Delhi, and the Union of India (as the authority responsible for constituting the Tribunal and declaring the award binding) intervened in the appeal. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal was raised on behalf of the respondents and the Union of India.

## Dispute Before the Court

Two distinct sets of questions arose for the Court's determination.

**The preliminary objection (maintainability):** Could an appeal lie at all, under Article 136, against the award of a body such as an Industrial Tribunal? The respondents and the intervening Union of India contended that:

- An Industrial Tribunal does not perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function in the strict sense, since it is not bound by any recognised substantive law and, in adjudicating industrial disputes, it can override existing contracts and create new rights.

- The Tribunal's adjudication lacks the essential attributes of a judicial decision because it does not bind the parties until the appropriate Government declares it binding under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act — making it, in substance, more akin to an advice or report than a determination.

- Article 136, even though couched in the widest language, was never intended to cover a body that does not exercise the judicial power of the State; the Industrial Tribunal, being essentially an administrative body performing quasi-judicial functions, falls outside its purview.

- In any event, the ordinary and adequate remedy against jurisdictional excess by such a Tribunal was a writ of certiorari before the High Court, not a special leave petition to the Supreme Court.

Bharat Bank, in reply, argued that the Industrial Tribunal, when examined by reference to its actual composition, procedure and powers, functions as a court exercising judicial power, and that in any case the language of Article 136 — referring broadly to "any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or Tribunal" — was wide enough to bring within its ambit the award of any Tribunal, judicial or not.

**The merits (assuming the appeal was maintainable):** If the appeal did lie, four grounds were urged for interference with the Tribunal's award: (i) that the Tribunal had misconstrued the word "victimisation" so as to assume jurisdiction over matters not properly referred to it; (ii) that the Tribunal erred in ordering reinstatement of employees involved in what was said to be an illegal strike; (iii) that the award was based on no evidence, the allegations of victimisation being unsupported by affidavit or evidence, in violation of natural justice; and (iv) that the award, having been signed by only two of the three members of the Tribunal though the entire hearing took place before all three, was invalid for non-compliance with Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

## Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

### The nature and scope of Article 136

The Court unanimously recognised that the language of Article 136 is exceptionally wide. The Article opens with a non-obstante clause ("Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter") and empowers the Supreme Court, in its discretion, to grant special leave to appeal from "any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or Tribunal in the territory of India" — subject only to the express exclusion, in clause (2), of orders of courts or Tribunals constituted under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

It was noted that Article 136 departs materially from the appellate provisions that precede it. Articles 132, 133 and 134, dealing respectively with constitutional, civil and criminal appeals, are confined to appeals from a "judgment, decree or final order" (or "sentence") of a "High Court." Article 136, by contrast, uses the word "order" without the qualifying word "final," and refers to "any court" rather than the High Court alone; it further introduces two new expressions absent from the earlier Articles and from the corresponding provision of the Judicial Committee Act, 1844 — "determination" and "Tribunal." These additions were held to widen substantially the class of orders and bodies from which an appeal could be brought, extending even to interlocutory orders and to Tribunals that are not courts in the strict, traditional sense.

### Whether an Industrial Tribunal is a "Tribunal" within Article 136

The leading opinion, with which the majority concurred on this point, held that before an appeal can lie to the Supreme Court from a Tribunal, that Tribunal must perform some kind of judicial function and possess, to some extent, the trappings of a court. Examining the constitution and procedure of the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Rules framed thereunder, the Court found the following features significant:

- Proceedings before the Tribunal commence on an application in the nature of a plaint (Rule 3).

- The Tribunal possesses the same powers as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of discovery, inspection, adjournment, reception of evidence on affidavit, enforcement of attendance of witnesses, and production of documents (Section 11(3); Rule 21).

- Every enquiry or investigation by the Tribunal is deemed a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Penal Code, 1860, and the Tribunal is deemed a civil court for the purposes of Sections 480 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.

- Parties have the right of examination, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses, and of addressing the Tribunal after all evidence has been called (Rule 21), and may be represented by legal practitioners with permission (Rule 30).

- The Tribunal's function is essentially adjudicatory: there must be two or more parties before it with conflicting cases, and it must reach a conclusion as to how the dispute is to be ended.

On the objection that the Tribunal is not bound by any recognised substantive law and can override contractual rights, the Court held this to be no different in principle from other special courts (such as those under moneylending or encumbered-estates legislation) which are also empowered to override contracts while administering a special statute; what matters is that the Tribunal must observe the law it is required to administer, and an appellate court can always verify that this special law and procedure have not been departed from arbitrarily.

On the more serious objection — that the Tribunal's award has no binding force until declared so by the appropriate Government under Section 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — the Court held that Section 15(2) leaves no discretion with the Government: it is bound to declare the award binding once made (save in the special case, under the proviso, where the Government is itself a party). The Government's declaration was accordingly held to be automatic and ministerial rather than an independent exercise of will; the substantive determination of rights is made by the Tribunal itself, and the Government's order merely operationalises it. Reliance was placed on the English decision in *R.* v. *Electricity Commissioners, ex p London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.*, (1924) 1 KB 171 (CA), where a similar objection — that the Commissioners "came to no decision at all" because their scheme required confirmation by the Minister of Transport and approval of both Houses of Parliament — was rejected; the Court held that a proceeding does not cease to be judicial merely because it is subject to subsequent confirmation or approval. The further fact that the Industrial Tribunal's decisions are always liable to correction by the High Court through a writ of certiorari (a point conceded by counsel for the intervening Union of India) was treated as itself an indication that the Tribunal exercises functions of a judicial character amenable to appellate/supervisory control, and hence falls within the ambit of "Tribunal" in Article 136. Reliance was also placed on *R.* v. *Minister of Health, ex p Yaffe*, 1931 AC 494 (HL), and *R.* v. *Minister of Health*, (1939) 1 KB 232 (CA), to the same effect — that the need for ministerial confirmation of an order does not deprive it of its character as a decision open to judicial review.

A concurring opinion elaborated further on the constitutional purpose of Article 136, holding that its language is of a comprehensive and overriding character, that the omission of the word "final" before "order" shows that even interlocutory orders may attract special leave, and that the introduction of the word "Tribunal" (absent from the Judicial Committee Act, 1844) was deliberate — intended to bring within the Supreme Court's reach Tribunals which, while not courts in the strict, technical sense, are nevertheless "adorned with similar trappings as court." Reliance was placed on *Shell Co. of Australia Ltd.* v. *Federal Taxation Commr.*, 1931 AC 275 (PC), for the proposition (per Lord Sankey) that there exist Tribunals possessing many of the trappings of a court which are, nonetheless, not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power — and on the celebrated definition of "judicial power" given by Griffith, C.J. in *Huddart, Parker & Co.* v. *Moorehead*, (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Aust.), namely, the power which every sovereign authority must possess to decide controversies between its subjects, exercised whenever some Tribunal with power to give a binding and authoritative decision is called upon to take action. It was further held, drawing on *R.* v. *London County Council, ex p Entertainments Protection Assn. Ltd.*, (1931) 2 KB 215 (CA), that it is not necessary for a body to be a court in the strict sense so long as it exercises, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense of deciding on evidence between a proposal and an opposition. A detailed examination of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules made thereunder (particularly Sections 7, 8, 11, 15 and 38, and Rules 3, 13, 14, 17, 19 and 21) led to the conclusion that the Industrial Tribunal has all the necessary attributes of a court of justice and no function other than adjudication, notwithstanding that the scope of the powers conferred on it (for instance, to override or modify existing contracts) is wider than that ordinarily possessed by a civil court. The decisions in *Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia* v. *J.W. Alexander Ltd.*, (1918) 25 CLR 434 (Aust.); *Rola Co. (Australia) (Pty.) Ltd.* v. *Commonwealth*, (1944) 69 CLR 185 (Aust.); and the Privy Council decisions in *Shell Co. of Australia* and *Moses* v. *Parker, ex p Moses*, 1896 AC 245 (PC), were examined and largely distinguished on the ground that the phraseology of the Australian "judicial power of the Commonwealth" provisions, and the reasoning turning on the ability to create binding and enforceable liability, did not translate directly to the differently-worded Indian statute, under which an Industrial Tribunal's award is itself enforceable by the coercive machinery of the Act once declared binding — a "spark of life" imparted automatically, not discretionarily, by the Government.

### The partly dissenting opinion

A third opinion, with which one other judge agreed entirely, took a materially different view on the first point while ultimately concurring in dismissing the appeal. This opinion held that an Industrial Tribunal is, properly speaking, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions rather than a judicial Tribunal. Drawing on the distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial power articulated by Sir Maurice Gwyer before the Committee on Ministers' Powers (1929) and adopted in *Cooper* v. *Wilson*, (1937) 2 KB 309, 340-41 (CA) — namely, that a true judicial decision involves presentation of a case by the parties, ascertainment of disputed facts through evidence, submission of legal argument, and a decision applying the fixed law of the land to the facts found, whereas a quasi-judicial decision need not involve either legal argument or application of fixed law, the outcome instead resting on administrative policy or discretion — this opinion held that the Industrial Tribunal's award becomes complete and binding only upon a subsequent, and in some cases discretionary (where the Government is itself a party), governmental act, and that the Tribunal is not confined to applying fixed law but may create new rights and obligations according to notions of fairness and expediency, akin to an extended form of collective bargaining rather than adjudication according to law. On this reasoning, and relying on the Federal Court's own earlier characterisation of Industrial Tribunals in *Western India Automobile Assn.* v. *Industrial Tribunal*, (1949-50) 11 FCR 321 : 1949 SCC OnLine FC 12, this opinion concluded that the Industrial Tribunal is not a judicial Tribunal and its determination is not a judicial determination in the proper sense, so that Article 136 did not, properly construed, contemplate an appeal from it at all.

However, even on this view, it was held that the word "Tribunal" in Article 136 must be construed liberally and not narrowly, and that even a Tribunal discharging functions of a judicial nature "in accordance with law" — which an Industrial Tribunal does, to a degree — falls within the ambit of the Article, so that an application for special leave was, in a broad sense, competent, though the Court should be extremely reluctant to actually admit and entertain such appeals given the numerous practical difficulties involved (for instance, the fact that the Tribunal's determination is not complete or binding without governmental declaration, that the Court's own decision on appeal would similarly require governmental confirmation to have effect, and that the Tribunal is not bound to decide according to fixed rules of law, making appellate review of the "correctness" of its decision largely inapposite). It was accordingly held that ordinarily the Supreme Court would not admit an appeal from an Industrial Tribunal's award save in the rarest of cases involving jurisdictional excess or a denial of natural justice, in which event the more appropriate remedy would, in any event, be a writ of certiorari or prohibition before the High Court.

### The merits of the appeal

On the assumption that the appeal was competent, the majority proceeded to examine the four grounds urged by the appellant Bank.

The first ground — that the word "victimisation" had been given an unduly wide interpretation by the Tribunal, resulting in it assuming jurisdiction over matters not referred to it — was rejected as not amounting to a matter of the "vital character" that would justify exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 136, "victimisation" being an ordinary English word (not a defined term of law) meaning that a person has been unjustly dealt with, and the Tribunal's interpretation not having materially affected its determination.

The second ground — that the Tribunal had erred in ordering reinstatement of employees who had participated in what was said to be an illegal strike under Section 23(b) of the Act — was similarly rejected. It was noted that a strike during the pendency of an earlier reference before a Tribunal may, per certain Calcutta High Court authority, be illegal even if arising from fresh demands, but that the members of the Tribunal in the present case, though divided on the correctness of this proposition, agreed that it did not affect their determination on Item 18; the statute, moreover, does not bar reinstatement of persons found to have engaged in an illegal strike, and the point did not warrant interference under Article 136.

The third ground — that the award was based on no evidence whatsoever — was treated as requiring serious consideration. Examination of the Tribunal's proceedings under Rule 17 disclosed that the Tribunal had simply called upon the parties to state their respective cases, after which each side's representative addressed arguments and the Tribunal proceeded straight to its award, without any examination or cross-examination on oath, without any affidavit filed in support of the allegations of victimisation, and without any consideration of the detailed affidavit filed by the Bank disputing those allegations. On this view, the procedure adopted by the Tribunal was found to be against all principles of natural justice, the award being founded on no material capable of sustaining it — the members appearing to have proceeded to judgment on their own view of the merits, unaided by any evidentiary material, a mode of proceeding described as unwarranted by the statute and foreign to a democratic Constitution. On this basis it was held (in a view expressed by way of dissent on the ultimate disposal, but concurred in as to reasoning by another member on the wider legal question) that this ground alone would justify quashing the award.

The fourth ground — that the award, though heard by all three members, had been signed by only two, contrary to Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (which mandates that an award be in writing and signed by all members, though permitting a dissenting minute) — was also examined in depth. It was found that although one member had ceased to be available (having been appointed to the Boundary Commission), the Government had at no stage formally reconstituted the Tribunal under Section 8 of the Act, despite having the power to do so; a mere exchange of telegrams between the remaining members and the Labour Ministry, advising them to "proceed as they were," was held insufficient to cure the defect. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council's decision in *Fakira* v. *King Emperor*, (1936-37) 64 IA 148 : 1937 SCC OnLine PC 25, where non-compliance with a similarly peremptory requirement (confirmation of a sentence by at least two of a two-Judge Court) was held fatal, and on *Varadaraja Mudaliar, An Advocate, Madras, In re*, AIR 1942 Mad 267 : 1941 SCC OnLine Mad 390, where a report of a Bar Council Tribunal was similarly invalidated because one member had died without signing. On this reasoning it was held that the provisions of Section 16 are mandatory, that the award given by only two of the three members who had heard the entire case was not the award of the Tribunal as constituted, and that it was accordingly vitiated and had to be quashed, with a direction that the reconstituted or continuing Tribunal readjudicate Item 18 of the reference and resubmit its award to the Government.

However, this view on the merits (that the award should be quashed) was a minority position among the five judges. The majority — comprising those who had held that this was, in any event, not a proper case for interference within the narrow and exceptional scope of Article 136 — took the position that the aggrieved parties should seek redress, if at all, through other appropriate proceedings (i.e., before the High Court by way of writ), and declined to interfere with the Tribunal's award on the facts of the case.

## Final Decision of the Court

By majority, the Supreme Court held that the preliminary objection as to maintainability should be overruled — the Industrial Tribunal was held to fall within the meaning of "Tribunal" in Article 136 (with differing degrees of emphasis on whether it was truly a "judicial" Tribunal or one exercising quasi-judicial functions), and an appeal by special leave was accordingly held to be competent, though only to be exercised with great caution and reluctance having regard to the special nature of industrial adjudication.

On the merits, however, the majority held that this was not a case calling for interference with the Tribunal's award under the extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction conferred by Article 136, and that the aggrieved parties, if so advised, could pursue other appropriate remedies. One judge, dissenting on the facts (though broadly agreeing on the law), would have allowed the appeal to the extent of quashing the award and remitting Item 18 of the reference for fresh adjudication by a properly constituted Tribunal.

**The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.**

## Point of Law Settled

*Bharat Bank* is a foundational authority on the reach of Article 136 of the Constitution and continues to be cited for the following propositions:

1. **Breadth of Article 136:** The power conferred by Article 136 is deliberately couched in the widest possible language, overriding by its non-obstante clause the more restrictive appellate provisions of Articles 132–134. It is not confined to final orders of the High Court but extends to any judgment, decree, determination, sentence, or order — including interlocutory orders — of any court or Tribunal in India (subject only to the express exclusion for military courts/Tribunals under clause (2)).

2. **"Tribunal" includes bodies that are not courts in the strict sense:** The word "Tribunal" in Article 136 was deliberately introduced to extend the Supreme Court's special leave jurisdiction beyond courts of justice properly so called, to bodies which, while not courts in the traditional sense, are invested with a part of the judicial power of the State and possess the "trappings of a court" — i.e., they adjudicate disputes between parties, hear evidence, and render binding determinations, even if those determinations require external confirmation to take legal effect.

3. **An Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 falls within Article 136:** Whether characterised as a judicial Tribunal (majority view) or as an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions (the partly dissenting view), an Industrial Tribunal's award was held to be a "determination" of a "Tribunal" amenable, in principle, to the Supreme Court's special leave jurisdiction. The requirement of a subsequent governmental declaration under Section 15 of the Act to make the award binding does not, by itself, deprive the Tribunal's determination of its adjudicatory character, since the Government (outside the special case where it is itself a party) possesses no discretion to withhold, alter or add to the award.

4. **The jurisdiction, though wide, is to be exercised sparingly:** Article 136 confers an extraordinary, residuary and discretionary power, to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances — where there has been a grave miscarriage of justice or a departure from the fundamental principles of natural justice or procedure — and not as a matter of course or as a substitute for the ordinary appellate process. In relation to determinations of Industrial Tribunals in particular, the Supreme Court signalled that it would be markedly reluctant to interfere, given the special, non-adjudicatory character of much industrial dispute resolution and the practical difficulties of superintending awards that are not based on fixed rules of law.

5. **Mandatory procedural requirements bind Tribunals strictly:** Statutory requirements — such as the requirement under Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that an award be signed by all members of the Tribunal who heard the matter — are to be treated as mandatory, and non-compliance (absent formal reconstitution of the Tribunal under Section 8) may vitiate the award, underscoring the broader administrative-law principle that a statutory Tribunal must function strictly in accordance with the manner prescribed by the statute constituting it.

This decision laid the doctrinal foundation for the subsequent, extensive body of Indian jurisprudence on Article 136, and for the classification and treatment of quasi-judicial Tribunals more generally in Indian administrative law.

---

**Case Details:** *Bharat Bank Ltd. Vs  Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.*, decided on 26 May 1950, Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1950, reported at 1950 SCC 470, Supreme Court of India, before Harilal Kania, C.J., and Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan and B.K. Mukherjea, JJ.

Opella Healthcare Group Vs. Pureca Laboratories Pvt Ltd

Here is an analytical legal article based on the provided judgment.

Introduction:

Intellectual property rights serve as a vital shield for brand identity, commercial goodwill, and public health, particularly within the pharmaceutical industry. The legal framework governing trademarks and copyrights in India ensures that established brands are protected from deceptive imitation that could confuse consumers. When a rival entity attempts to adopt a deceptively similar mark or packaging for identical products, statutory remedies under trademark and copyright laws come into play. Furthermore, modern commercial litigation in India increasingly leverages streamlined legal processes to resolve clear-cut disputes efficiently without undergoing full-scale trials. The judgment in this case highlights the crucial interplay between trademark protection in the pharmaceutical sector and the application of summary judgment procedures under commercial law.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The litigation involves a suit instituted under Sections 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alongside Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The proceedings were initiated by a international healthcare corporation, part of a global group, seeking permanent injunctions against a domestic pharmaceutical company. The dispute centered around the plaintiff's registered mark PHENSEDYL, which was first adopted internationally in the 1950s and introduced in India in 1995 for pharmaceutical preparations treating respiratory and allergic symptoms. The trademark PHENSEDYL was registered in India on July 21, 1954, under Class 05 for pharmaceutical preparations for human and veterinary use, with validity extended up to July 31, 2030. The plaintiff also secured registered trademark protections for word and label marks in Hindi and English, alongside establishing rights over a distinctive trade dress featuring a blue and pink color combination.

The defendant adopted the mark PHENSERYL along with a similar label and packaging for its cough syrup products. The plaintiff filed the commercial suit CS(COMM) 552/2024, obtaining an ex parte ad interim injunction on July 9, 2024, restraining the defendant from using the impugned marks and packaging. In its written statement filed in November 2024, the defendant defended its actions primarily on the ground that its own mark and artistic label work were registered. In response, the plaintiff initiated rectification proceedings C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 92/2024 under Sections 47(1)(A) and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 9/2024 under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 read with Rule 71(1) of the Copyright Rules, 2013. The High Court allowed these petitions via a detailed judgment dated November 12, 2024, cancelling the defendant's trademark and copyright registrations. Subsequently, the defendant failed to continue representation, leading to being set ex parte on July 20, 2026. The plaintiff then moved application I.A. 4622/2025 under Order XIII-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Rule 27 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022, praying for summary judgment.

Dispute Before the Court

The legal and factual questions before the High Court revolved around whether the defendant’s adoption of the mark PHENSERYL and its accompanying packaging constituted trademark infringement and passing off, and whether the matter was fit for summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 without proceeding to trial. The plaintiff contended that as a prior adopter, continuous user, and registered proprietor, it held exclusive rights over the PHENSEDYL mark. It argued that the defendant's mark was visually and phonetically deceptively similar, intended to trade upon the massive goodwill built over decades, creating a strong likelihood of consumer confusion in the market for cough syrups. The plaintiff further maintained that since the defendant's sole defense—its own registration—had been invalidated in prior rectification proceedings, no real defense remained.

Conversely, the initial position taken by the defendant in its written statement relied upon its own registration of the trademark and copyright, alongside a general denial of resemblance between the rival marks. However, the defendant produced no evidence to substantiate its claimed user date of December 1, 2016, and failed to appear to challenge the cancellation of its registrations or defend the summary judgment application.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In analyzing the dispute, the Court evaluated the substantive principles of trademark law in tandem with the procedural mechanism of summary judgment. Substantively, the Court noted that the plaintiff had established long-standing prior use, continuous market presence since 1995 in India, and substantial financial turnover associated with the PHENSEDYL marks. In examining deceptive similarity, the Court held that the phonetic and visual elements of the defendant's mark PHENSERYL and its dark blue and pink packaging were virtually identical to the plaintiff's established brand dress, designed deliberately to mimic the plaintiff's products.

The Court placed strong reliance on the binding Supreme Court decision in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73. In that landmark case, the Supreme Court established that public interest demands a lower threshold of proof to demonstrate confusing similarity in medicinal products compared to non-medicinal goods. The Court emphasized the principle that confusion in pharmaceutical products can lead to severe, life-threatening consequences, given human fallibility and the operational conditions of medical prescribing and dispensing. Consequently, stricter standards are required to prevent confusion between medicinal items sharing common trade channels and target consumers.

The Court also took judicial notice of the findings rendered in the prior rectification judgment dated November 12, 2024, which had already settled the factual and legal determination regarding the deceptive similarity of the marks and canceled the defendant's registrations. Because that decision had attained finality, the defendant was left without any viable defense under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Procedurally, the Court examined the standard for issuing a summary judgment under Order XIII-A Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015). It relied upon the procedural precedent laid down in Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev and Another, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764. That judgment clarified that the intent behind Order XIII-A is to ensure time-bound resolution of commercial disputes, eliminating full trials as a default requirement when a party has no "real prospect" of successfully defending a claim. The term "real" requires assessing whether a defense is realistic rather than fanciful. Applying these principles, the Court held that requiring the plaintiff to lead formal ex parte evidence would be a futile exercise, as no genuine issue requiring trial existed.

Final Decision of the Court

The High Court allowed application I.A. 4622/2025 for summary judgment. Consequently, CS(COMM) 552/2024 was decreed in favor of the plaintiff in terms of the injunctive reliefs sought under paragraph 38 (a) to (e) of the plaint, as the plaintiff chose to give up the monetary reliefs claimed in paragraph 38 (f) to (h). The Court directed the Registry to draw up the decree sheet accordingly, and the suit along with all pending applications was formally disposed of.

Point of Law Settled

This decision reinforces two key legal standards in commercial IP litigation. First, it reaffirms the heightened standard of protection applied to pharmaceutical trademarks under the Cadila doctrine, reaffirming that visual, phonetic, or trade dress similarities in medicinal products present an unacceptable risk to public health. Second, it clarifies the application of Order XIII-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, establishing that where a defendant's sole legal defense (such as a counter-registration) has been struck down in parallel rectification proceedings, and no genuine factual dispute remains, the court should grant summary judgment without forcing the plaintiff to undergo unnecessary ex parte trial proceedings.

Case Details

Title of the Case: Opella Healthcare Group Vs Pureca Laboratories Pvt Ltd.

Date of Judgment: July 22, 2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 552/2024 & I.A. 32616/2024

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5957

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

Opella Healthcare Group Vs. Pureca Laboratories Pvt Ltd., High Court of Delhi, CS(COMM) 552/2024, Judgment dated July 22, 2026. The plaintiff, proprietor of registered trademark PHENSEDYL, filed a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendant’s deceptively similar mark PHENSERYL and trade dress. The defendant's trademark and copyright registrations were previously cancelled in rectification proceedings. Following defendant's ex parte status, plaintiff applied for summary judgment under Order XIII-A, Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The High Court held that the defendant had no real prospect of defending the claim and that trial was unnecessary, reinforcing strict confusion standards for pharmaceutical products under the Cadila principle. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff granting injunctive relief.

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Case Summary Statement:

The Title of the Case is Opella Healthcare Group Vs Pureca Laboratories Pvt Ltd., the Date of Judgment is July 22, 2026, the Case Number is CS(COMM) 552/2024 & I.A. 32616/2024, the Neutral Citation is 2026:DHC:5957, the Name of Court is High Court of Delhi, and the Name of Hon'ble Judge is Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh.

Mangal Marketing Vs Mangal and Mangal

Introduction:

The requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, stands as a pivotal procedural mechanism designed to encourage out-of-court settlements and reduce judicial backlog. However, statutory law explicitly provides an exception to this mandatory process where a suit contemplates urgent interim relief. The intersection of this procedural mandate with intellectual property litigation, where rights are continuously infringed, gives rise to complex legal questions regarding what constitutes genuine urgency. This decision addresses an application seeking the rejection of a commercial suit for alleged non-compliance with pre-institution mediation requirements in the context of an ongoing trademark infringement dispute.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The applicant in the present proceeding is M/s Mangal Marketing, a partnership firm through its partner, while the respondent is M/s Mangal and Mangal, a registered partnership firm through its managing partner. The respondent instituted a commercial suit, numbered C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 52 of 2026, before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, alleging continuous infringement of its registered trademark and copyright by the applicant.

Prior to filing the suit, formal legal notices were exchanged between the parties. The respondent issued a cease and desist notice on October 17, 2025, to which the applicant sent a reply on October 31, 2025. The respondent followed up with a rejoinder on November 27, 2025, and an interim response was issued by the applicant on December 8, 2025. Subsequently, the respondent e-filed the commercial suit on January 12, 2026, and completed physical filing on February 9, 2026, seeking protective reliefs for its trademark alongside applications for interim injunctions.

In response to the suit, the applicant filed Application No. 1826 of 2026 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint. The applicant contended that the suit was barred under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as the respondent had failed to exhaust the mandatory pre-institution mediation process prior to approaching the court.

Dispute Before the Court:

The fundamental legal dispute before the Court centered on whether the commercial suit was liable to be rejected in limine under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failing to undergo pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The applicant submitted that it had been carrying on business under the subject trade name since the year 1991. The applicant highlighted that the respondent was aware of its activities at least as early as October 2025 when the cease and desist notice was issued, yet waited until February 2026 to physically institute the suit. The applicant argued that this unexplained delay demonstrated a lack of genuine urgency. Furthermore, the applicant asserted that because no ex-parte interim injunction had been granted by the court, the prayer for interim relief was merely a camouflage or a ruse to bypass the mandatory mediation mechanism mandated by statute.

Conversely, the respondent contended that as a registered trademark holder, it was seeking to protect its statutory intellectual property rights against continuous infringement. The respondent emphasized that intellectual property infringement creates an ongoing, daily injury that confuses the public and dilutes goodwill. Therefore, mere passage of time during notice exchanges does not negate the inherent urgency of seeking interim protection against a continuing wrong. The respondent maintained that the suit contained explicit pleadings justifying the need for urgent interim relief, thereby validly exempting it from Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Court undertook a careful evaluation of the statutory framework under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, alongside Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It examined the chronology of pre-suit communications, noting the exchange of notices between October 2025 and December 2025, followed swiftly by e-filing in January 2026 and physical filing in February 2026.

Regarding the applicant's defense of long-standing business usage since 1991, the Court observed that such factual assertions could only be tested and substantiated during a full trial. For the purpose of assessing compliance with Section 12A, the court must primarily look at the nature of the right asserted and the relief claimed in the suit.

In analyzing judicial precedents, the Court considered the decision relied upon by the applicant, Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, reported in (2024) 5 SCC 815. That precedent established that where interim reliefs are artificially created or camouflaged merely to bypass pre-institution mediation, the court lacks discretion to grant an exemption, and the plaint may be rejected. However, the Court distinguished the general application of this rule in matters involving ongoing intellectual property violations.

The Court relied upon the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2753 of 2025, decided on October 27, 2025. The Supreme Court held that infringement of an intellectual property right constitutes a continuing wrong that generates an ongoing injury. In such cases, the assessment of injury and urgency must be viewed through the lens of continuous harm and potential public deception. The Court affirmed that where a suit is filed to restrain continuous trademark infringement, the ongoing nature of the injury satisfies the statutory requirement of contemplating urgent interim relief, thereby legitimately exempting the plaintiff from mandatory pre-institution mediation. The Court concluded that the respondent's suit was not a camouflage to avoid mediation, as the need to protect registered trademarks from ongoing harm inherent in commercial distribution forms a valid ground for urgent judicial intervention.

Final Decision of the Court:

The Court found no merit in the application filed by the applicant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, Application No. 1826 of 2026 in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 52 of 2026 was formally dismissed. The Court directed that there shall be no order as to costs, leaving the commercial suit to proceed in accordance with law.

Point of Law Settled:

This decision reaffirms that in commercial suits involving intellectual property rights, ongoing infringement constitutes a continuing cause of action and a continuous injury. Where a plaintiff seeks interim relief to stop continuous trademark or copyright infringement, the suit validly falls within the statutory exception under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The mere exchange of pre-suit notices or a brief passage of time prior to filing does not negate the urgency of interim relief, nor does it convert an urgent intellectual property action into a procedural attempt to bypass pre-institution mediation.

Case Details

Title of the Case:  Mangal Marketing Vs Mangal and Mangal

Date of Judgment: July 31, 2026

Case Number: Application No. 1826 of 2026 in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 52 of 2026

Neutral Citation: Not Provided in Judgment Copy

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

In M/s Mangal Marketing v. M/s Mangal and Mangal, Application No. 1826 of 2026 in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 52 of 2026, the High Court of Judicature at Madras considered an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reject a commercial suit for non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The applicant argued that delay after issuing a cease and desist notice negated urgency. The Court held that continuous trademark infringement creates an ongoing injury, justifying urgent interim relief and exempting the suit from pre-institution mediation. The application was dismissed with no order as to costs.

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1. Madras High Court Clarifies Section 12A Exemption in Continuous Trademark Infringement Suits
2. Pre-Institution Mediation and Intellectual Property: Insights from M/s Mangal Marketing v. M/s Mangal and Mangal
3. Rejection of Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC in Commercial Suits: Madras High Court Decision
4. Does Delay in Filing Suit Negate Urgency Under Section 12A Commercial Courts Act?
5. Continuous Injury in Trademark Suits Exempts Pre-Institution Mediation, Rules Madras High Court
6. M/s Mangal Marketing v. M/s Mangal and Mangal: Legal Analysis of Section 12A Compliance
7. Intellectual Property Rights and Mandatory Mediation: The Scope of Urgent Interim Relief
8. Madras High Court Dismisses Order VII Rule 11 Application in Trademark Infringement Case
9. Understanding Section 12A Exceptions in Ongoing Commercial Patent and Trademark Disputes
10. Mandatory Pre-Institution Mediation vs Urgent Interim Injunctions in Intellectual Property Law

Title of the Case is M/s Mangal Marketing v. M/s Mangal and Mangal, Date of Judgment is July 31, 2026, Case Number is Application No. 1826 of 2026 in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 52 of 2026, Neutral Citation is Not Provided in Judgment Copy, Name of Court is High Court of Judicature at Madras, and Name of Hon'ble Judge is Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu.

Sangeetha Caterers And Consultants Vs Grand Sangeetham

Introduction:

Intellectual property rights serve as a shield against the unauthorized appropriation of commercial goodwill and brand identity. In trademark law, attempts to bypass judicial orders by setting up new business entities under close family members remain a persistent challenge. The present decision deals with such an attempt, where a party sought to circumvent prior court orders by fronting a new proprietorship in the name of a family member to run a business under a confusingly similar mark.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The applicant originally established a vegetarian restaurant under the name Hotel Sangeetha Veg. Restaurant in 1985. The business was later converted into a partnership firm in 2001, and subsequently transformed into a limited liability partnership. The partners assigned their registered trademarks in favor of the partnership firm, and the applicant owns various trademark certificates in Class 42 and Class 43 along with copyright in the marks. The applicant operates restaurant and lodging establishments in locations such as Egmore, Santhome, and Guindy under the names SVR Sangeetha and Sangeetha.

Prior litigation commenced when a family member, specifically the son of the proprietor of the respondent, established a restaurant under the name Sangeetham House of Veg. The applicant issued a cease and desist notice and filed a commercial suit in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 35 of 2023. That suit was disposed of after the defendant agreed to alter the name to Ragam House of Veg. Following continued unauthorized use, the applicant filed Contempt Petition No. 3721 of 2024, which was closed when the contemnor adopted the name Skantha Iyer Restaurant. Additionally, a trademark registration obtained by the son was expunged by the High Court via an order dated November 6, 2025, in OP(TM) No. 23 of 2025.

Thereafter, the mother of the previous defendant established a business under the name Grand Sangeetham Inn at the exact same physical premises. The respondent started this lodging business in April 2025. The applicant issued a cease and desist notice, and upon receiving a contesting reply, instituted C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 44 of 2026 along with Original Application No. 111 of 2026 seeking an interim injunction. An ad-interim injunction was granted on February 11, 2026.

Dispute Before the Court:

The core question before the Court was whether the adoption of the trade name Grand Sangeetham Inn by the respondent constituted an infringement of the applicant's registered trademarks and copyright, or whether it represented a genuine, independent business operating in a distinct sphere that was not bound by prior orders.

The applicant contended that the respondent was a front created to circumvent earlier judicial decrees and trademark expungement orders. The applicant pointed out that the new business operated from the exact same premises, using a mark phonetically and visually similar to Sangeetha, thereby misleading the public and causing trademark infringement.

The respondent argued that as an independent sole proprietorship, it was a separate legal entity not bound by orders passed against the proprietor's son. The respondent further asserted that running a lodging house differed from running a restaurant, placing the businesses in distinct spheres with no likelihood of consumer confusion or passing off. Additionally, the respondent highlighted that the proprietor was a 71-year-old senior citizen undergoing medical treatment, and argued that the trade name Grand Sangeetham Inn was not deceptively similar.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Court undertook a close examination of the factual matrix and the prior litigation history between the parties. A pivotal factual aspect acknowledged in the pleadings was that the proprietor of the respondent was the mother of the defendant in the earlier suit, and that the business of Grand Sangeetham Inn was being conducted from the exact same physical premises as the previous infringing restaurant.

The Court further scrutinised the respondent's counter affidavit, where the proprietor admitted to being 71 years old, suffering from serious health conditions, undergoing treatment in Chennai since 2018, and residing in her native village. From these undisputed admissions, the Court observed that the named proprietor was not effectively running the business, indicating that the proprietorship was a mere proxy to continue the infringing activities previously restrained by judicial decree.

On the defense of operating in distinct commercial spheres, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that lodging and restaurant services operate in completely separate fields. The Court observed that the applicant also provides boarding and lodging services under its registered marks, rendering the services directly overlapping and competing.

The Court analyzed the statutory provisions governing trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, focusing on protection against deceptive similarity and unauthorized adoption intended to capitalize on established goodwill. It arrived at a prima facie conclusion that the adoption of Grand Sangeetham Inn was a deliberate and calculated maneuver to circumvent the decree in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 35 of 2023 and the expungement order in OP(TM) No. 23 of 2025.

Final Decision of the Court:

The Court held that the applicant established a strong prima facie case for the grant of interim relief. Consequently, the Court made the interim injunction order dated February 11, 2026, absolute. Original Application No. 111 of 2026 was allowed as prayed for, restraining the respondent from infringing the registered trademark of the applicant or operating under the name Grand Sangeetham Inn or any other similar name. The Court directed that there shall be no order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reaffirms the equitable principle that parties cannot evade judicial decrees or trademark injunctions by setting up nominal business entities through immediate family members at the same location. Courts will look behind technical legal structures, such as separate proprietorships, to identify the true substance of an infringing enterprise. Where the physical location, underlying operations, and commercial identity remain unchanged, creating a new firm under a family member's name will be treated as an impermissible attempt to circumvent judicial orders.

Case Details

Title of the Case:  Sangeetha Caterers And Consultants Vs Grand Sangeetham Inn

Date of Judgment: July 31, 2026

Case Number: O.A. No. 111 of 2026 and A. No. in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 44 of 2026

Neutral Citation: Not Provided in Judgment Copy

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

In M/s Sangeetha Caterers And Consultants LLP v. M/s Grand Sangeetham Inn, O.A. No. 111 of 2026 in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 44 of 2026, the High Court of Judicature at Madras considered an application for interim injunction against trademark infringement. The applicant, owner of registered marks Sangeetha in restaurant and lodging services, alleged that the respondent adopted Grand Sangeetham Inn at the same premises where a family member previously suffered an adverse decree and trademark expungement. The Court noted that the respondent proprietor was an ailing senior citizen not actively running the business, revealing an attempt to circumvent earlier orders. Finding deceptive similarity and overlapping services, the Court made the interim injunction absolute, allowing the application.

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Title of the Case is M/s Sangeetha Caterers And Consultants LLP v. M/s Grand Sangeetham Inn, Date of Judgment is July 31, 2026, Case Number is O.A. No. 111 of 2026 in C.S.(COMM.DIV.) No. 44 of 2026, Neutral Citation is Not Provided in Judgment Copy, Name of Court is High Court of Judicature at Madras, and Name of Hon'ble Judge is Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu.

HMS Medical Systems Vs. B. Jayamani

Introduction:

The protection of intellectual property rights, particularly trademarks, plays a pivotal role in preserving the commercial identity, goodwill, and reputation of businesses and manufacturing entities. In the realm of specialized healthcare and medical devices, brand confusion can impact both commercial interests and public reliance on medical technology. The judgment under consideration arises from a trademark dispute in the medical equipment sector, addressing key principles governing interim injunctions, alleged descriptive trademarks, and the legal implications of pending rectification proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The applicant, a registered partnership firm, is an established manufacturer of specialized medical equipment, particularly in the fields of physiotherapy and electrotherapy. The applicant manufactures and markets its products under the trademark DIGILASER, which is a registered trademark under the relevant intellectual property laws.

The conflict emerged when the applicant discovered that another entity was manufacturing and selling medical devices under the trade name BMS DIGILASER PRO. The applicant noticed these products being offered for sale on online platforms. Upon bringing the matter to the attention of the relevant e-commerce intermediary, the infringing listings were removed from the online platform.

Subsequently, the respondents initiated a rectification application seeking the cancellation or removal of the applicant's registered trademark from the trade marks register. Additionally, the applicant filed a commercial suit seeking interim relief against trademark infringement and passing off. In the interim proceedings, the Court initially granted a interim injunction order on September 22, 2025. The matter was thereafter taken up for final hearing on the interim applications, leading to the decision delivered on July 31, 2026.

Dispute Before the Court

The primary legal and factual questions before the Court revolved around whether the respondent's adoption of the mark BMS DIGILASER PRO constituted an infringement and passing off of the applicant's registered trademark DIGILASER or HMS DIGILASER, and whether an interim injunction should be maintained during the pendency of the suit and the rectification proceedings.

The applicant contended that as the proprietor of a validly registered trademark, it enjoyed exclusive rights over the mark DIGILASER. The applicant argued that the respondent's mark DIGILASER PRO was deceptively similar to its registered mark and calculated to cause confusion among consumers and trade channels. To substantiate its legal rights, the applicant relied on settled judicial precedents protecting registered marks against unauthorized adoption.

In response, the respondents submitted that they had been engaged in the manufacture and supply of physiotherapy equipment since 2001 and had independently adopted the mark BMS DIGILASER-PRO in the year 2014. The respondents argued that the term DIGI refers to digital technology, LASER denotes laser-based treatment, and PRO signifies professional-grade equipment, making the phrase generic and descriptive in nature. The respondents claimed that no single entity could claim a monopoly over descriptive terms. Furthermore, the respondents urged that the addition of the prefix BMS clearly distinguished their product from the applicant's products. They also asserted that because the products are specialized medical devices purchased by trained healthcare professionals, hospitals, and rehabilitation centers rather than ordinary consumers, there was no likelihood of deception or confusion. Lastly, the respondents highlighted that they had applied for registration of their mark and filed a rectification application against the applicant's registration.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In analyzing the rival contentions, the Court examined the statutory rights conferred on the owner of a registered trademark and evaluated the defense raised by the respondents. The Court observed that it was an admitted position that the applicant possessed a validly registered trademark. While the respondents argued that the term was descriptive and ought not to be monopolized, the Court highlighted a logical inconsistency in the respondents' stance: while questioning the registerability of the applicant's mark on descriptive grounds, the respondents had simultaneously applied for registration of their own similar trademark for exclusive rights.

The Court addressed the precedents cited by both parties. The applicant relied upon the Supreme Court ruling in Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 92, to emphasize that an injunction must follow where there is a clear infringement of a registered mark. Reliance was also placed on N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 714, and Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., reported in (1972) 1 SCC 618, regarding the principles of deceptive similarity and protection of brand equity. Conversely, the respondents cited J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India, reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 215, Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., reported in (2001) 5 SCC 73, and Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701, to argue that specialized consumers and distinct prefixes prevent commercial deception.

The Court recognized the principle established by the Supreme Court that when there is no likelihood of confusion among end users, an action for infringement may fail. However, the Court carefully noted that whether the level of sophistication among professional buyers entirely eliminates consumer confusion is a factual matter that can only be conclusively determined after a full trial where evidence is led, rather than at the preliminary stage of an interim application.

Given the undisputed existence of the applicant's trademark registration and the pending rectification proceedings initiated by the respondent, the Court determined that the interim protection granted on September 22, 2025, ought to be affirmed to protect the applicant's prima facie statutory rights.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court made the ad-interim injunction granted on September 22, 2025, absolute pending the final disposal of the commercial suit. However, the Court explicitly clarified that this interim relief remains subject to the final outcome of the rectification petition pending between the parties. The Court disposed of Original Application Nos. 928 and 929 of 2025 without any order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment reaffirms the principle that a registered trademark holder is entitled to interim protection against deceptively similar marks, even when the defendant contends that the mark is descriptive or used for specialized professional markets. The Court clarified that nuanced defenses—such as the target market consisting solely of sophisticated professionals or the mark being descriptive—require comprehensive evaluation during trial rather than serving as absolute bars to interim relief at the preliminary stage. Furthermore, the decision underscores that a party claiming a mark is generic cannot easily reconcile that defense with its own attempt to register the same mark.

Case Details:

Title of the Case: HMS Medical Systems Vs. B. Jayamani and Another

Date of Judgment: July 31, 2026

Case Number: O.A. Nos. 928 & 929 of 2025 in C.S. (COMM. DIV.) No. 238 of 2025

Neutral Citation: Not Available in Original Text

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

In M/s. HMS Medical Systems v. B. Jayamani and Another, before the High Court of Judicature at Madras (O.A. Nos. 928 & 929 of 2025 in C.S. (COMM. DIV.) No. 238 of 2025, decided on July 31, 2026), the registered trademark owner of DIGILASER sought an ad-interim injunction against the respondents for using the mark BMS DIGILASER PRO on medical equipment. The respondents claimed the term was descriptive and targeted specialized healthcare professionals, while also filing a rectification petition against the mark. The High Court held that questions regarding professional market confusion require full trial and made the interim injunction absolute, subject to the result of the rectification proceedings.

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Title of the Case is M/s. HMS Medical Systems v. B. Jayamani and Another, Date of Judgment is July 31, 2026, Case Number is O.A. Nos. 928 & 929 of 2025 in C.S. (COMM. DIV.) No. 238 of 2025, Neutral Citation is Not Available in Original Text, Name of Court is High Court of Judicature at Madras, and Name of Hon'ble Judge is Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Kumaresh Babu.