Asian Paints Limited Vs Apex Metchem Private Limited

**Head Note of the Case**

Bombay High Court (Commercial Division) vacated the *ex parte* ad-interim injunction granted on 23 September 2025 in favour of Asian Paints Limited, which had restrained Apex Metchem Private Limited from using the mark “APEX” (or any identical or deceptively similar mark) in relation to paints, thinners, lacquers and allied goods and had appointed a Court Receiver. Court held that the plaintiff suppressed material facts regarding the defendant’s long-standing prior use of the mark “APEX” as part of its trade name and business since 1966 (family business of the Bhatia group) and its incorporation as a private limited company in 1995. The plaintiff itself had annexed extracts of the defendant’s website to the plaint showing the 1995 incorporation and use, yet failed to bring this prior user/corporate existence to the notice of the Court while seeking *ex parte* relief. Applying the stringent duty of full and fair disclosure in *ex parte* applications under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC (as explained in *Kewal Ashokbhai Vasoya v. Suarabhakti Goods (P) Ltd.*, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3335), the Court held that the suppression vitiated the injunction. The seized goods were ordered to be released forthwith. A four-week stay was granted to enable the plaintiff to approach a higher forum. The order underscores that prior user is a complete defence to infringement and that suppression of such prior user defeats an *ex parte* injunction.

**Introduction**

This is a landmark order passed by Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh of the Bombay High Court (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, Commercial Division) on 30 March 2026 in Interim Application No. 7417 of 2025 arising out of Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 28791 of 2025 (*Asian Paints Limited v. Apex Metchem Private Limited*). The application was filed by the defendant under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking vacation of an *ex parte* ad-interim injunction and Court Receiver order obtained by Asian Paints Limited on 23 September 2025. The core issue was whether the plaintiff had made full and fair disclosure of all material facts while seeking *ex parte* relief in a trade mark infringement action. The judgment reaffirms the high standard of candour expected from a party seeking *ex parte* relief in intellectual property matters, particularly when the defendant’s prior user and corporate existence are evident from documents already on record. The Court ultimately vacated the injunction, released the seized goods, and granted a short stay, emphasising that suppression of prior user vitiates equitable relief.

**Factual Background**

Asian Paints Limited (plaintiff) is a well-known manufacturer of paints and allied products. It claims to have adopted and used the mark “APEX” since 1995 and holds several registrations, including device marks and word marks in various classes. It alleged that Apex Metchem Private Limited (defendant) was infringing its registered mark by using “APEX” as a trade mark and trade name for industrial paints, thinners, solvents, lacquers and similar goods.

The defendant is part of a large Bhatia family business conglomerate. Its patriarch started M/s Apex Sales Corporation in 1966 as a sole proprietorship dealing in paints and allied products. The business continued as a partnership and was later incorporated as Apex Metchem Private Limited on 2 March 1995. The defendant and its predecessors have used the mark “APEX” continuously since 1966 across cognate industrial segments. The defendant’s website (annexed by the plaintiff itself to the plaint) explicitly states that the company was started in 1995 for manufacturing industrial paints, solvents and thinners. The defendant claimed prior adoption and honest concurrent use, long predating the plaintiff’s commercial launch of “APEX Textured Exterior Emulsion” around 2003-2004.

On 23 September 2025, the plaintiff obtained an *ex parte* ad-interim injunction and appointment of Court Receiver. The Receiver executed the commission and seized infringing goods. The defendant then filed the present application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC alleging material suppression.

**Procedural Background**

The plaintiff filed the suit and moved for *ex parte* ad-interim relief on 23 September 2025. The Court granted the injunction and appointed the Court Receiver without notice to the defendant. The Receiver’s report confirming seizure was placed on record. The defendant filed Interim Application No. 7417 of 2025 on or about October/November 2025 seeking vacation of the order under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC. The matter was heard on 16 February 2026 and reserved. The order was pronounced on 30 March 2026.

**Dispute in Question**

Whether the *ex parte* ad-interim injunction and Court Receiver order dated 23 September 2025 should be vacated under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly suppressed material facts regarding the defendant’s prior adoption, continuous use and corporate existence of the mark “APEX” since 1966/1995, thereby disentitling the plaintiff from equitable relief.

**Arguments of Parties**

**Defendant-Applicant’s Arguments (Apex Metchem):**

- The plaintiff suppressed the defendant’s long prior use since 1966 and incorporation in 1995. The defendant’s website (annexed by the plaintiff at page 262 of the plaint) explicitly mentions the 1995 start and use of “APEX” for industrial paints.

- The plaintiff sought injunction not only against the trade mark but also against use of the mark as part of the corporate/trade name, making the defendant’s corporate history a material fact that ought to have been disclosed.

- Plaintiff’s own documents show user of “APEX” only from 1997/2007 onwards; earlier invoices are illegible or post-2015. The Chartered Accountant’s certificate is the only document claiming 1994-95 user, which is insufficient.

- Prior user is a complete defence to infringement. The plaintiff failed in its duty of full disclosure under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC.

- The defendant is a legitimate, established business with ₹80+ crore turnover, not a fly-by-night operator. The injunction has crippled its business.

- Reliance placed on *Kewal Ashokbhai Vasoya v. Suarabhakti Goods (P) Ltd.* (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3335) and multiple other decisions on duty of disclosure and prior user defence.

**Plaintiff’s Arguments (Asian Paints):**

- Sufficient disclosure was made in paragraph 18 of the plaint. The plaintiff annexed the defendant’s website extract and third-party pages mentioning 1995 incorporation.

- The plaintiff did not press for injunction against the corporate name/domain name.

- The plaintiff never came across the infringing goods until August 2025 despite market inquiries.

- The plaintiff’s mark has been declared well-known by this Court (orders annexed). Sales and advertisement figures from 1995 onwards are on record.

- No suppression; the defendant’s prior user is not pleaded as a defence and is not established by any document showing devolution of rights from predecessors.

**Reasoning of the Judge (including different provisions of law and their context)**

Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh first reproduced Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC verbatim. The provision empowers the Court to discharge, vary or set aside an injunction if the applicant has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular in the application or supporting affidavit. Even where such suppression exists, the Court retains discretion not to vacate the injunction if, for reasons recorded, it is not necessary in the interests of justice.

The Judge held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the heightened duty of full and fair disclosure required when seeking *ex parte* relief. Key reasoning:

- **Material fact suppressed**: The defendant’s website (annexed by the plaintiff) explicitly states incorporation in 1995 and use of “APEX” for industrial paints/thinners. This was a clear indicator of prior user and corporate existence. Yet the plaintiff made only a bald assertion that “despite conducting inquiries” it could not find information about the period of use. No details of inquiries were pleaded.

- **Greater duty in trade mark cases**: In IPR matters, the plaintiff must disclose the date of adoption/use/registration of the rival mark and market information about how long the defendant has been using the mark. The plaintiff’s own documents (invoices) showed user only from 2007/2015 onwards; the CA certificate was the sole document for 1995. The Court was not invited to scrutinise these documents against the defendant’s 1995 incorporation.

- **Consequence of suppression**: The *ex parte* order crippled a legitimate business with decades of use. Prior user is a complete defence to infringement. Had the Court been informed of the defendant’s long user evident from the plaintiff’s own annexures, notice might have been issued instead of granting *ex parte* relief.

- **No distinction between trade mark and trade name**: The plaintiff sought restraint against use of “APEX” both as trade mark and as part of the trade name. Corporate existence since 1995 was therefore material.

The Judge relied heavily on the Division Bench decision in *Kewal Ashokbhai Vasoya v. Suarabhakti Goods (P) Ltd.* (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3335) for the proposition that an applicant seeking *ex parte* injunction must make full and reasonably accurate disclosure of material facts, including matters discoverable by reasonable inquiry. The Court also referred to several other judgments on prior user and suppression (listed in the defendant’s submissions).

**Judgements relied upon by the Judge and their context**

The Judge primarily relied upon and quoted extensively from:

- **Kewal Ashokbhai Vasoya v. Suarabhakti Goods (P) Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3335 (Division Bench)**: The leading authority on the duty of disclosure under Order 39 Rule 4 in trade mark cases. The DB held that the plaintiff must disclose rival adoption, use, registration, market presence and must draw the Court’s attention to all material facts that may show the defendant has a defence. Suppression of prior user vitiates *ex parte* relief.

Other judgments cited by the defendant and considered by the Court (contextual support for prior user defence and suppression):

- *Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd.*, (2016) 2 SCC 672

- *S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai*, (2016) 2 SCC 683

- *Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co.*, 1977 SCC OnLine Del 50

- Various Bombay and Delhi High Court orders on vacation of injunctions due to suppression.

**Final Decision**

The Interim Application was allowed. The *ex parte* ad-interim order dated 23 September 2025 was not continued and stands vacated. The defendant’s products seized and sealed by the Court Receiver were directed to be released forthwith. The order was stayed for four weeks at the plaintiff’s request.

**Concluding Note**

This order is a strong reaffirmation of the principles of equity and fair disclosure in *ex parte* intellectual property proceedings. The Bombay High Court has sent a clear message that a plaintiff seeking drastic relief without notice to the defendant must come with clean hands and full candour. Suppression of the defendant’s long prior user and corporate existence — facts already known to the plaintiff through documents it itself placed on record — was fatal to the injunction. The judgment protects legitimate prior users from being crippled by suppression-based *ex parte* orders and reinforces that prior use remains a complete defence to trade mark infringement claims.

**Legal Point Settled in this Case (with clear explanation of legal concepts)**

1. **Duty of Full and Fair Disclosure under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC in *ex parte* IP Applications**  

   A party seeking an *ex parte* injunction must make a full, accurate and complete disclosure of all material facts, including facts that may show the defendant has a defence (e.g., prior user). The duty includes matters that would have been discovered by reasonable inquiry. Suppression or misleading statement on a material particular mandates vacation of the injunction unless the Court, for recorded reasons, finds it unnecessary in the interests of justice.

2. **Prior User as Complete Defence to Infringement**  

   Long and continuous prior use of a mark/trade name by the defendant (even unregistered) is a valid defence to a suit for infringement of a registered mark. The plaintiff cannot obtain *ex parte* relief by suppressing such prior user.

3. **No Monopoly over Trade Name merely because it contains the Registered Mark**  

   When the plaintiff seeks restraint against use of a mark both as a trade mark and as part of the defendant’s corporate/trade name, the defendant’s long-standing corporate existence becomes a material fact that must be disclosed.

4. **Distinction between Registered Mark and Actual User**  

   Registration does not automatically prove user from the claimed date. The plaintiff must produce clear evidence of user; mere Chartered Accountant certificates or illegible invoices are insufficient when the defendant demonstrates earlier incorporation and use.

These principles provide clear guidance to litigants and courts that *ex parte* relief in trade mark matters is an extraordinary remedy that demands utmost transparency, failing which the injunction is liable to be vacated under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC.

Case Title: Asian Paints Limited Vs Apex Metchem Private Limited  

Date of Order: 30 March 2026  

Case Number: Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 28791 of 2025  

Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC:OS:7627 

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay 

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh  

**Suggested Suitable Titles for YouTube Explainer Video**

1. “Asian Paints vs Apex Metchem – Bombay HC Vacates Ex-Parte Injunction for Suppression of Prior Use!”

2. “Why Bombay High Court Set Aside Asian Paints’ Injunction Against Apex Metchem | Full Order Explained”

3. “Duty of Disclosure in Ex-Parte TM Injunctions – Landmark Bombay HC Ruling in Asian Paints Case”

4. “Apex Metchem Wins Vacation of Injunction – Prior User Defence Triumphs Over Suppression”

5. “Bombay HC Order 39 Rule 4 CPC Explained: Asian Paints Injunction Vacated for Material Suppression”

6. “Family Business Prior Use Beats Registered TM – Detailed Analysis of Asian Paints v. Apex Metchem Judgment”

7. “Ex-Parte Injunction Vacated: Bombay HC on Suppression of 1995 Incorporation & 1966 User”

Varun Chopra & Anr. Vs Shyam Sunder Chopra Sons

Head Note of the Case

Delhi High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC in a family trade mark dispute over the registered composite label mark “NATRAJ GOD” with words “NATRAJ BRAND / SAFFRON & SILVER LEAVES” (registered since 1978 in Class 30 for edible saffron and silver foil used in confectionery). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of infringement or passing off because: (i) the impugned marks (“SV NATRAJ”, “SV RAJ”, “RAJNUT”, “SRI NATRAJ JI”) were not deceptively similar when compared holistically under the anti-dissection rule; (ii) the word “NATRAJ” (name of a deity) is not exclusively protectable and has not acquired secondary meaning identifying only the plaintiff’s goods; and (iii) ownership of the mark itself is seriously disputed in a family context, with defendants claiming ancestral/coparcenary rights flowing from Mohan Lal Chopra’s 1971 Will and a 2019 family settlement (Apsi Samjhautanama). Balance of convenience and irreparable injury were also not established, as the defendants are co-family members with prima facie shared goodwill, and any alleged loss is compensable in damages. The Court clarified that in intra-family trade mark disputes, exclusive proprietary rights cannot be presumed without conclusive proof at trial, and family arrangements/wills must be respected. No injunction was granted; the suit will proceed to trial on ownership and infringement.

Introduction

This is a classic intra-family trade mark and passing-off dispute arising from a multi-generational family business dealing in edible saffron and silver foil (vark) used for decorating sweets and confectionery. The mark in question — a composite label featuring the “NATRAJ” device (depicting Lord Shiva in cosmic dance form) along with the words “NATRAJ BRAND / SAFFRON & SILVER LEAVES” — was originally registered in 1978 in the name of the partnership firm M/s Raja Traders. After the death of the patriarch Mohan Lal Chopra in 1980, the family split into factions, leading to rival claims of ownership: the plaintiff (Varun Chopra, grandson of J.K. Chopra) asserts exclusive rights through assignment and a 2021 Will, while the defendants (other grandsons and the HUF) assert ancestral/coparcenary rights under Mohan Lal Chopra’s 1971 Will and a 2019 family settlement. The plaintiff sought an interim injunction restraining the defendants from using allegedly deceptively similar marks (“SV NATRAJ”, “SV RAJ”, “RAJNUT”, “SRI NATRAJ JI”). Justice Tejas Karia of the Delhi High Court, after a detailed examination of rival marks, family documents, and long user, refused the injunction, holding that no prima facie case existed and that ownership itself requires full trial. The judgment is significant for its application of the holistic comparison test, the anti-dissection rule, and principles governing family trade mark disputes.

Factual Background

The business of manufacturing and selling edible saffron and silver foil under the “NATRAJ” brand was started in 1956 by Mohan Lal Chopra and his son J.K. Chopra as a partnership firm M/s Raja Traders. The composite label mark was registered on 25.12.1978 (No. 344176) in Class 30. Mohan Lal Chopra died on 14.05.1980, leaving a Will dated 11.04.1971 (MLC Will) directing that the business devolve equally upon his grandsons (Chander Sheel, Vinod Kumar, and Shyam Sunder Chopra, with provision for future grandsons). J.K. Chopra continued the business, initially claiming sole proprietorship. In 2015, Shyam Sunder Chopra and Vinod Kumar Chopra executed affidavits (Form TM-24) affirming J.K. Chopra as proprietor for trade mark registry purposes. In 2019, a family settlement (Apsi Samjhautanama) was allegedly executed delineating product-wise use of the “NATRAJ” brand among family members. On 20.06.2022, J.K. Chopra executed an Assignment Deed in favour of his grandson Varun Chopra (plaintiff), transferring all rights in the mark. J.K. Chopra died on 11.01.2025; his 25.11.2021 Will (JKC Will) also bequeathed the mark and business to Varun Chopra. The defendants (Shyam Sunder Chopra’s HUF, his sons Sampan and Vaibhav Chopra, and related entities) began using variants such as “SV NATRAJ”, “SV RAJ”, “RAJNUT”, and “SRI NATRAJ JI” from around 2019–2022, claiming ancestral rights. Sales occur through online portals and B2B channels, with the defendants asserting bona fide use based on shared family goodwill.

Procedural Background

The dispute first surfaced in October 2022 when the plaintiff and J.K. Chopra filed O.S. No. 6788/2022 before the Additional City Civil Court, Bengaluru, alleging infringement based on sales in Karnataka. The Bengaluru Court repeatedly returned the plaint for lack of territorial/pecuniary jurisdiction (orders dated 11.04.2023, 28.08.2023, 02.07.2024). Interim injunctions were granted and later vacated or not continued by the Karnataka High Court. The plaintiff then filed the present commercial suit (CS(COMM) 291/2024) before the Delhi High Court on 05.04.2024. The instant application (I.A. 7808/2024 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC) seeks interim restraint against use of the impugned marks. Defendants opposed the application, arguing lack of prima facie case, balance of convenience in their favour, and no irreparable injury. Earlier related I.As. (5182/2025 & 7932/2025) are procedural but do not alter the core relief sought.

Dispute in Question

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the impugned marks “SV NATRAJ / SV RAJ / RAJNUT / SRI NATRAJ JI” (or any deceptively similar mark) in relation to saffron and silver foil, on the grounds of trade mark infringement under Section 29 and/or passing off, pending final adjudication of ownership of the registered mark “NATRAJ GOD / NATRAJ BRAND / SAFFRON & SILVER LEAVES”.

Arguments of Parties

Plaintiff’s Arguments:

J.K. Chopra became sole proprietor after 1980; defendants (including Shyam Sunder and Vinod Kumar) were only salaried employees.

2015 Affidavits (Form TM-24) and Assignment Deed (2022) + JKC Will conclusively vest exclusive ownership in the plaintiff.

Defendants are estopped/acquiesced by their own affidavits and long user by J.K. Chopra as proprietor.

Impugned marks are deceptively similar; “NATRAJ” is the prominent/essential feature; defendants’ use amounts to infringement and passing off.

Plaintiff has long user since 1956, secondary meaning, substantial goodwill, and sales turnover; defendants’ recent adoption (post-2019) is mala fide.

Balance of convenience and irreparable injury favour the plaintiff; family settlement (if any) does not transfer ownership of the mark.

Defendants’ Arguments :

The mark is ancestral/joint family property under Mohan Lal Chopra’s 1971 Will; all grandsons are coparceners with equal rights.

Business continued as joint family concern; 2015 Affidavits were fiduciary/family documents, not a relinquishment of rights.

2019 Apsi Samjhautanama is a valid family arrangement dividing product lines while preserving shared rights in “NATRAJ”.

Impugned marks are visually, phonetically, and structurally distinct; no deceptive similarity when marks are compared as a whole.

No secondary meaning or exclusivity over the deity name “NATRAJ”; plaintiff cannot monopolise a religious term.

Plaintiff has not proved irreparable injury (stable turnover); balance of convenience lies with defendants who are co-family members exercising legitimate inherited rights.

Suit is barred by Order II Rule 2/XXIII Rule 1 CPC due to earlier Bengaluru proceedings; ownership dispute requires full trial.

Reasoning of the Judge (including different provisions of law and their context)

Justice Tejas Karia applied the classic three-fold test for interim injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury) and refused relief.

Key Legal Provisions and Concepts Explained:

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Interim injunction is a discretionary, equitable relief granted only when the plaintiff demonstrates a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience in his favour, and likelihood of irreparable injury not compensable in damages. The Court acts on the basis of affidavits and documents at an interim stage without finally deciding disputed facts.

Trade Marks Act, 1999 – Section 29 (Infringement)

Infringement occurs when an unregistered person uses a mark identical or deceptively similar to a registered mark in relation to similar goods in a manner likely to cause confusion. The Court must compare the marks as a whole, not dissect them (anti-dissection rule).

Section 17 – Effect of registration of parts of a mark

Registration of a composite mark confers rights in the mark as a whole. No monopoly can be claimed over a part (e.g., the word “NATRAJ”) unless that part is separately registered or has acquired distinctiveness. “NATRAJ” being a deity name is common to the trade and non-exclusively protectable without secondary meaning.

Passing Off (Common Law Tort)

Requires proof of (i) goodwill, (ii) misrepresentation, and (iii) damage. In family disputes, goodwill is often shared; mere use by another family member does not automatically constitute misrepresentation.

Family Trade Mark Disputes – Ancestral Property & Estoppel

Trade marks can be ancestral property. A 1971 Will and 2019 family settlement create prima facie shared rights. Affidavits executed in a fiduciary family context do not operate as absolute relinquishment without clear evidence. Doctrine of estoppel/acquiescence requires proof of unequivocal representation and detrimental reliance.

Judgements relied upon by the Judge and their context

Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701

Supreme Court laid down the holistic comparison test: visual, phonetic, structural, and conceptual similarity must be assessed in entirety. Mere shared generic/descriptive word does not prove deception.

Schweppes Ltd. v. Gibbens (1905) 22 RPC 601

Classic authority for comparing marks “in their entirety” from the viewpoint of an average consumer with imperfect recollection.

Bhole Baba Milk Food Industries Ltd. v. Parul Food Specialities (P) Ltd., Neutral Citation: 2011:DHC:304

Delhi High Court held that a deity name (“KRISHNA”) cannot be monopolised without clear secondary meaning; mere sales turnover does not automatically confer exclusivity.

Vardhman Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Vardhman Properties Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4738

Division Bench clarified that common/descriptive words in a composite mark cannot be dissected for exclusivity; protection is for the mark as a whole.

Rajni Dua & Ors. v. Bhushan Kumar & Ors., (1999) DLT 392

Family trade mark disputes require respect for family arrangements/wills; one member cannot claim exclusive rights over ancestral marks without clear evidence extinguishing others’ rights.

Sri Krishna Sweets Private Ltd. v. M. Murali, CMA No. 2266 of 2017 (Madras High Court)

In family mark disputes, courts must consider the familial context rather than treat it as a pure commercial infringement; longstanding shared use weighs against injunction.

The Judge distinguished plaintiff-cited cases (Empire Spices, Daiwa Pharmaceuticals, etc.) as involving unrelated third-party infringers with clear copying of distinctive elements, unlike the present intra-family dispute with shared historical user.

Final Decision

I.A. 7808/2024 (and connected applications) dismissed. No interim injunction granted. The defendants are not restrained from using the impugned marks pending trial. The suit will proceed to full trial on the issues of ownership, validity of assignment/will, family settlement, and infringement/passing off. All contentions kept open.

Concluding Note

The judgment is a textbook illustration of judicial restraint in intra-family intellectual property disputes. By refusing to grant an interim injunction on disputed ownership documents and applying the holistic comparison test strictly, the Court has prevented one branch of the family from obtaining a tactical advantage through litigation before the core issue of ancestral rights is adjudicated. It reinforces that trade marks originating in family businesses carry a presumption of shared goodwill unless conclusively disproved, and that deity names cannot be monopolised lightly. The decision balances commercial rights with equitable family principles and serves as a reminder that interim relief is not a substitute for trial on seriously contested facts.

Legal Point Settled in this Case (with clear explanation of legal concepts)

Holistic Comparison & Anti-Dissection Rule in Composite Marks

When comparing a registered composite label mark with an impugned mark, courts must examine the marks in their entirety (visual, phonetic, structural, conceptual) rather than dissecting and comparing isolated elements (Section 29 read with Section 17). A common word (especially a deity name) does not automatically create deception if the overall impression differs. This prevents monopolisation of generic/descriptive elements.

Family Trade Marks as Ancestral Property

In Indian law, a trade mark used in a joint family business can constitute ancestral property devolving by intestate succession or will. A patriarch’s will directing equal rights among grandsons creates prima facie coparcenary rights. Unilateral assignment by one member without consent of other coparceners is prima facie ineffective. Family settlements (Apsi Samjhautanama) delineating product-wise use are relevant and must be respected at the interim stage.

Estoppel/Acquiescence in Family Context

Affidavits executed inter se family members for trade mark registry purposes (Form TM-24) are presumed fiduciary unless proved otherwise. Mere attestation or signing does not operate as absolute relinquishment of ancestral rights (Ramesh Chander v. Budha Singh applied). Long shared use negates claims of exclusive proprietorship.

No Secondary Meaning for Deity Names without Clear Evidence

A word denoting a deity (e.g., “NATRAJ”) is common to the trade. Long user and sales figures alone do not confer secondary meaning sufficient to exclude family members from bona fide use unless the mark has lost its original religious significance and exclusively identifies the plaintiff’s goods (Bhole Baba and Vardhman Buildtech applied).

Burden and Standard at Interim Stage in Ownership Disputes

When ownership itself is seriously disputed on the basis of competing wills, settlements, and family documents, the plaintiff cannot claim a strong prima facie case for injunction. Balance of convenience lies in allowing status quo (shared family use) rather than disrupting one party’s business pending trial. Irreparable injury is not presumed if turnover remains stable and loss is monetary.

These principles provide clear guidance to practitioners and courts handling family IP disputes: treat them as equitable family matters first, apply strict trademark tests second, and defer final ownership determination to trial.

Case Title: Varun Chopra & Anr. Vs Shyam Sunder Chopra Sons HUF & Ors.

Date of Order: 28 March 2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 291/2024

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2602

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Suggested Suitable Titles for YouTube Explainer Video

“Delhi HC Refuses Injunction in Family ‘NATRAJ’ Brand War – Ancestral Trademark Rights Explained!”

“NATRAJ Saffron Dispute: Why Delhi High Court Said No to Interim Injunction | Full Case Breakdown”

“Family Trade Mark Battle Over Deity Name ‘NATRAJ’ – Key Legal Lessons from Varun Chopra Case”

“Delhi HC on Family Settlement & Trademark Ownership | SV NATRAJ vs NATRAJ BRAND Judgment 2026”

“Can One Family Member Monopolise ‘NATRAJ’ Brand? Delhi HC Judgment on Ancestral IP Rights”

“Holistic Comparison Test Applied: Why ‘SV NATRAJ’ Not Infringing ‘NATRAJ’ | Detailed Analysis”

“Landmark Family Trademark Case: Delhi HC Dismisses Interim Injunction in Chopra Family Dispute”

President and Fellows of Harvard College Vs Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks

Head Note of the Case:

Delhi High Court, in an appeal under Section 117 of the Patents Act, 1970, set aside the Controller’s order dated 25.08.2022 refusing Patent Application No. 201617000758 titled “SC-β CELLS AND COMPOSITIONS AND METHODS FOR GENERATING THE SAME”. The Court held that the impugned order was vitiated because the Controller failed to consider the amended claims filed by the appellant along with post-hearing written submissions. These amendments materially altered the nature of the claims — from a “composition” claim (non-native pancreatic β cell + pharmaceutically acceptable carriers) to a claim on the “non-native pancreatic β cell” per se. The Court clarified that when post-hearing amendments change the scope or character of the claims, the Controller is duty-bound to examine them afresh on all grounds (including Sections 3(j), 3(e), 10(4) and 10(5)) before refusing the application. The matter was remanded for fresh adjudication within six months after granting a hearing, without prejudice to the merits of patentability of stem-cell-derived non-native pancreatic β cells.

Introduction

This is a significant patent appeal concerning the patentability of human stem-cell-derived pancreatic beta (SC-β) cells developed for potential cell-replacement therapy in diabetes. The appellant, President and Fellows of Harvard College, sought protection for a novel in-vitro generated “non-native” pancreatic β cell population that functionally mimics mature human beta cells but exhibits distinct gene-expression profiles, improved glucose-stimulated insulin secretion (GSIS), and mono-hormonal characteristics not found in nature. The Controller refused the application primarily on the grounds that the claimed subject-matter fell within the non-patentable exclusions under Section 3(j) (plants and animals in whole or any part thereof) and Section 3(e) (mere admixture), coupled with objections on clarity and sufficiency of disclosure under Sections 10(4) and 10(5). Instead of deciding the substantive patentability issues, the Delhi High Court focused on a procedural imperative: the mandatory duty of the Controller to consider post-hearing amendments that materially alter the claim set. The judgment, delivered on 28 March 2026 by Justice Tejas Karia, reinforces procedural fairness in patent examination and remands the application for fresh consideration.

Factual Background

The invention relates to methods, compositions, kits and agents for generating stem-cell-derived beta (SC-β) cells from human pluripotent stem cells. These SC-β cells are “non-native” — i.e., they share many features of endogenous mature pancreatic β cells (insulin production, glucose responsiveness) but differ in gene-expression profiles and certain functional aspects, making them structurally and functionally distinct from naturally occurring β cells. The technology solves a long-standing problem in regenerative medicine: earlier protocols produced only immature or abnormally functioning insulin-expressing cells that failed to secrete insulin appropriately in response to glucose levels.

Key priority dates:

First US provisional: 11.06.2013 (US 61/833,898)

Second US provisional: 28.03.2014 (US 61/972,272)

PCT application: 11.06.2014 (PCT/US2014/041992)

National phase Indian application: 08.01.2016 (No. 201617000758) filed with 29 claims.

On 08.01.2016, the appellant also filed Form-13 amending the claims. Request for examination was filed on 01.06.2017 with voluntary amendments. First Examination Report (FER) was issued on 28.02.2020. The appellant replied on 28.08.2020 with further amendments. Multiple hearing notices were issued; the final hearing occurred on 06.08.2021. Post-hearing written submissions dated 21.08.2021 included yet another set of amended claims. The Controller passed the impugned refusal order on 25.08.2022 under Section 15 of the Patents Act, holding the claims non-compliant with Sections 3(j), 3(e), 10(4) and 10(5).

Procedural Background

The appeal was filed under Section 117 of the Patents Act, 1970 read with Section 151 CPC before the Intellectual Property Division of the Delhi High Court as C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 493/2022. The matter was heard by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia. The Controller appeared through the Central Government Standing Counsel and the Assistant Controller (through VC). The appellant was represented by a team led by Dr. Satyapal Arora.

Dispute in Question

The core dispute before the High Court was whether the Controller’s refusal order was sustainable when it had (i) considered only the pre-hearing (original) set of claims, and (ii) failed to examine the materially amended claims filed along with post-hearing written submissions. Substantive questions — whether SC-β cells are excluded under Section 3(j) as “animals in whole or any part thereof”, whether the claims lack clarity/sufficiency, and whether they constitute a mere admixture under Section 3(e) — were not decided on merits. The procedural question was: does a Controller have a mandatory duty to consider post-hearing amendments that change the nature/scope of claims before finally refusing an application?

Arguments of Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Harvard College):

The amended claims filed post-hearing shifted the primary claim from a “composition” (cell + carriers) to the “non-native pancreatic β cell” per se. The Controller ignored this change and decided the matter on the original claims alone.

The SC-β cells are man-made, non-naturally occurring constructs produced through a multi-step laboratory differentiation protocol involving technical human intervention. They do not occur in nature, are structurally and functionally distinct (different gene-expression profile, enhanced GSIS, mono-hormonal), and therefore fall outside Section 3(j).

Detailed definitions of “non-native” and supporting data on gene expression, crystalline insulin granules, and functional superiority are provided in the specification.

Precedents such as Imclone LLC (2024 SCC OnLine Mad 8397), BTS Research International (2025 SCC OnLine Cal 2943), and US Supreme Court decisions (Chakrabarty, Myriad) were cited to argue that genetically engineered or laboratory-created cellular products are patentable.

Corresponding patents have been granted in USA, UK, Australia, Germany, Japan, etc.

In any event, the Controller’s failure to consider the amended claims is a glaring procedural error warranting remand.

Respondent’s (Controller’s) Arguments:

SC-β cells, even if generated in vitro, are biological derivatives of human/animal material and fall squarely within the Section 3(j) exclusion (“animals in whole or any part thereof”).

The terms “non-native”, “native”, and “gene expression profile” are vague and lack a clear standard, rendering the claims indefinite under Sections 10(4) and 10(5).

No synergy data or specific component ratios were disclosed for the claimed composition.

Foreign grants are not binding; Indian law applies a stricter construction of Section 3(j), especially for human/animal-derived material.

The amended claims were mentioned as “alternative set” but did not require fresh adjudication because the core objections (Section 3(j) and sufficiency) persisted.

Reasoning of the Judge (including different provisions of law and their context)

Justice Tejas Karia began by reproducing the complete set of original and amended claims side-by-side (para 14). He observed that the amendment fundamentally altered the claim structure: the principal claim no longer required “pharmaceutically acceptable carriers” but claimed the isolated non-native pancreatic β cell itself (with functional and structural limitations).

Key Legal Provisions and Concepts Explained:

Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970

Empowers the Controller to refuse or require amendment of an application after examination and hearing. The provision must be read with the principles of natural justice and the duty to consider all material placed on record.

Sections 10(4) and 10(5)

10(4): Requires the specification to fully and particularly describe the invention, enable a person skilled in the art to perform it, and disclose the best method.

10(5): Claims must be clear, succinct, and fairly based on the matter disclosed.

The Court noted that the Controller’s objections on clarity and sufficiency were framed entirely on the original “composition” claims.

Section 3(j)

Excludes “plants and animals in whole or any part thereof other than micro-organisms but including seeds, varieties and species and essentially biological processes for production and propagation of plants and animals.”

The Court did not decide whether SC-β cells fall within this exclusion but held that any such determination must be made only after examining the final set of claims.

Post-hearing amendments

The Patents Act and Rules permit voluntary amendments at any stage before grant (Section 57 read with Rule 81). When amendments are filed with written submissions after hearing and materially alter the claim scope/nature, the Controller cannot ignore them and decide on the pre-amendment claims.

Judgements relied upon by the Judge and their context

Jitendra Kohli v. The Controller of Patents, 2022:DHC:1904

The Delhi High Court held that failure to consider amended claims filed during proceedings is a “glaring error”. The order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication after considering the amended claims on all grounds (novelty, inventive step, patentability).

Akebia Therapeutics INC v. The Controller of Patents and Designs, CMA(PT)/64/2024 dated 20.03.2025

When amendments change the nature of claims (e.g., from method to composition), the Controller must address the new set of claims. Rejection solely or substantially on the ground that claims were amended is not tenable. The matter was remanded with directions for a fresh hearing by a different officer.

The Judge applied these precedents verbatim, holding that the present case involved an identical procedural lapse: the impugned order was passed without considering the post-hearing amended claims that changed the claim from “composition” to the “cell” per se.

Final Decision

The appeal was allowed. The impugned order dated 25.08.2022 was set aside. The matter was remanded to the Controller (preferably a different officer) for fresh consideration of the Subject Application in light of the amended claims filed with post-hearing written submissions. The Controller was directed to pass a reasoned order within six months after affording a hearing to the appellant. No observations were made on the merits of patentability (Sections 3(j), 3(e), sufficiency, etc.). A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Controller General at llc-ipo@gov.in.

Concluding Note

The judgment is a procedural landmark in Indian patent law. It underscores that the Controller’s quasi-judicial function cannot be exercised mechanically or on an incomplete record. When an applicant files amended claims that materially alter the invention’s scope after the hearing, those amendments must be examined on their own merits. The decision protects applicants from arbitrary refusal while reiterating that substantive questions of patentability of advanced biotechnological inventions (such as stem-cell-derived β cells) require careful, claim-specific analysis under Section 3(j) and other provisions. It also signals to the Patent Office that post-hearing amendments are not cosmetic but can fundamentally reshape the examination.

Legal Point Settled in this Case (with clear explanation of legal concepts)

The judgment settles the following important propositions:

Mandatory duty to consider post-hearing amendments

When an applicant files amended claims along with written submissions after the hearing under Section 15, and those amendments change the nature or scope of the claims (e.g., from composition to product per se), the Controller is legally bound to examine the amended claims afresh on all statutory grounds before refusing the application. Ignoring them constitutes a “glaring error” and vitiates the order.

Nature of amendment vs. scope

Even if the overall inventive concept remains the same, a change in claim category (method → composition → product per se) is material and triggers fresh adjudication. This prevents the Controller from deciding on an obsolete claim set.

Remand as the appropriate remedy

When the order is vitiated by non-consideration of material amendments, the correct course is remand for de novo consideration rather than deciding the merits in appeal. No observations on patentability (especially complex Section 3(j) issues) should be made so that the Controller exercises independent discretion.

Interplay between Section 57 (amendment) and Section 15 (refusal)

Amendments are a statutory right. The Controller’s power to refuse cannot be exercised without first addressing the final set of claims placed on record.

These principles provide clear guidance to patent examiners, applicants, and the bar that procedural fairness in the grant/refusal process is non-negotiable, especially in cutting-edge fields like regenerative medicine and stem-cell technology.

Case Title: President and Fellows of Harvard College Vs Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks

Date of Order: 28 March 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 493/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2597

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Suggested Suitable Titles for YouTube Explainer Video

“Delhi HC Remands Harvard’s SC-β Cell Patent – Why Controller’s Refusal Was Set Aside | Section 3(j) Explained”

“Harvard Stem Cell Patent Rejected? Delhi High Court Says Controller MUST Consider Amended Claims | Full Case Breakdown”

“SC-β Cells & Section 3(j) Patent Battle – Harvard College vs Indian Patent Office | Procedural Victory Explained”

“Landmark Patent Remand: When Post-Hearing Amendments Change Everything | Harvard SC-β Cell Case 2026”

“Why Ignoring Amended Claims = Fatal Error for Patent Controller | Delhi HC Judgment on Stem Cell Patent”

“Harvard’s Non-Native Beta Cells Patent: Delhi HC Orders Fresh Examination After Controller’s Mistake”

“Section 15 Patents Act Explained – Harvard College Appeal | Complete Analysis of SC-β Cell Patent Rejection”

Bombay Metals (P) Limited Vs. Tara Singh

Head Note of the Case

Delhi High Court, in a rectification petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, expunged two copyright registrations (A-85865/2009 and A-85866/2009) granted to the respondent for artistic works on packaging/labels of “Ball Head Racers” bicycle parts. The Court held that the impugned artistic works were not “original” within the meaning of Section 13(1)(a) read with Section 2(c) of the Act because they were colourable imitations and substantial reproductions of the petitioner’s earlier registered artistic works in packaging. The judgment reiterates that copyright protection for labels/packaging as artistic works requires originality; mere trade-dress elements or colour schemes cannot be monopolised if generic, but when the overall get-up, layout, colour scheme, placement of logo, typography and arrangement create a deceptive similarity, the later work lacks originality and infringes the prior copyright. The Court applied the “broad and essential features” test (not microscopic side-by-side comparison) and relied on prior permanent injunction granted in a civil suit between the same parties to hold the respondent’s adoption dishonest. The petitioner, being a registered copyright owner and a trade rival, was held to be a “person aggrieved” competent to maintain the rectification petition. The ruling underscores that copyright search certificates under Section 45 are not conclusive and that a registration obtained in violation of the Act or by suppressing pending litigation is liable to be expunged.

Introduction

This is a landmark rectification proceeding under the Copyright Act, 1957 concerning artistic copyright in commercial packaging/labels used for bicycle components (specifically “Ball Head Racer” parts). The petitioner, a long-standing manufacturer, sought removal of two copyright entries granted to a trade rival on the ground that the rival’s packaging was a slavish imitation of the petitioner’s earlier copyrighted designs. The judgment is significant because it clarifies the interplay between copyright originality, substantial similarity in labels, and the High Court’s rectification jurisdiction under Section 50. It also demonstrates how a prior civil suit decree of permanent injunction can influence copyright rectification.

Factual Background

The petitioner, Bombay Metals (P) Limited, manufactures and markets bicycle parts under distinctive trade dress/packaging featuring specific colour combinations, layout, arrangement of features and get-up. One of its products is “Ball Head Racer”. The petitioner is the registered owner of four copyrights in its packaging designs:

A-11138/74 – BM Screw Racer Packaging (red variant shown in judgment);

A-55236/98 – BM Ball Head Racer Packaging (red);

A-55238/98 – BM Ball Head Racer Packaging (black);

A-55214/98 – BM Screw Racer Packaging (green/teal).

The respondent No. 1 (Tara Singh, proprietor of R.S. Industries) was engaged in the same business. In January 2002 the petitioner discovered that the respondent was using packaging that was a colourable imitation of the petitioner’s designs. This led to Civil Suit No. 127/2002 filed before the Delhi High Court seeking injunction. An interim injunction was granted on 12.02.2002 restraining the respondent from using deceptively similar packaging. The respondent was found to have violated the injunction, leading to four contempt petitions (CCP 169/2002, CCP 13/2004, CCP 122/2005 and I.A. 12504/2006).

In 2002-03 the respondent obtained copyright search certificates (CC 2470/2002-03 etc.) under Section 45(1) of the Act claiming no similar artistic work existed. The petitioner challenged those certificates in WP(C) No. 1604/2004; the High Court quashed them on 02.12.2008 and directed the respondent to disclose the pendency of the civil suit while applying for any copyright registration. The respondent allegedly did not comply. Later, the respondent obtained the impugned registrations A-85865/2009 and A-85866/2009 for its orange/red and blue packaging variants of “Ball Head Racers”. These registrations are the subject matter of the present rectification petition.

Procedural Background

The rectification petition was originally filed before the Copyright Board, Delhi. Pursuant to legislative changes and jurisdictional shifts, it was transferred to the Calcutta High Court and finally to the Delhi High Court by an order dated 18.07.2024 passed by the Supreme Court in Transfer Petition (C) No. 465/2024. The matter was heard as C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 17/2024 in the Intellectual Property Division of the Delhi High Court.

Dispute in Question

Whether the two impugned copyright registrations (A-85865/2009 and A-85866/2009) were wrongly made and liable to be rectified/expunged from the Register of Copyright under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 on the grounds that (i) the artistic works lack originality, (ii) they are substantial reproductions of the petitioner’s earlier copyrighted packaging, and (iii) the registrations were obtained in violation of statutory provisions and court orders.

Arguments of Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments:

The impugned registrations violate Section 45 because a proper search would have revealed the petitioner’s earlier copyrights.

Artistic works must be “original” under Section 13(1)(a); the respondent’s packaging is a colourable and slavish imitation and therefore not original.

The respondent’s adoption is dishonest and mala fide, intended to misappropriate the petitioner’s goodwill.

The prior civil suit and permanent injunction decree dated 27.09.2016 conclusively establish infringement.

The petitioner is a “person aggrieved” entitled to seek rectification.

Respondents’ Arguments (Nos. 1A & 1B):

The titles are completely different (“BM LIMITED” vs “RAJIS QUALITY AND QUANTITY”) and there is no visual, structural or phonetic similarity.

The get-up and trade dress are not slavish imitations; the petitioner is merely picking isolated generic features (colour).

Colours are common to the trade and cannot be monopolised.

The petitioner cannot dissect the label to create a claim of infringement.

The petition deserves to be dismissed.

Reasoning of the Judge (including different provisions of law and their context)

JSection 50 of the Copyright Act empowers the High Court to rectify the Register if an entry is made “wrongly” or “wrongly remains” on the Register. The provision is in the nature of a summary rectification power analogous to trade-mark rectification under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act. Any “person aggrieved” can invoke it. The Court held the petitioner is a person aggrieved because (i) it holds prior registered copyrights in identical subject-matter, and (ii) both parties are competitors in the bicycle-parts market; continued existence of the impugned registrations would dilute the petitioner’s statutory copyright and goodwill.

The core legal concept clarified is originality of artistic works. Under Section 13(1)(a), copyright subsists in “original artistic works”. Section 2(c) defines “artistic work” to include any “drawing, painting, … or any other work of artistic craftsmanship” and, importantly for commercial labels, the arrangement of letters, colours, layout and get-up can qualify if the overall expression is original. Originality in Indian copyright law does not require novelty or invention; it requires that the work should not be a mere copy and should involve the exercise of skill, labour and judgment (though the threshold is low). However, when a work is a colourable imitation or substantial reproduction of an earlier work, it fails the originality test and also infringes the prior copyright under Section 51.

The Judge applied the test of substantial similarity laid down by the Supreme Court in Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co. (1972) 1 SCC 618 (originally for passing-off but held equally applicable to copyright in labels). The test is: compare the broad and essential features of the two works, not by placing them side-by-side for microscopic differences, but from the viewpoint of an average purchaser with imperfect recollection. If the overall impression is such that one is likely to be mistaken for the other, there is substantial reproduction.

The Court then conducted a detailed visual comparison (paras 19-21 of the judgment) and found:

Identical colour schemes (red/blue variants);

Circular logo placed centrally in white-and-blue or white-and-red;

Trade name in white letters on coloured background;

Product name “BALL HEAD RACERS” in identical position and font style;

Side panels with identical wording and placement (“BALL HEAD RACER” and “10 SET OF THREE”).

These elements created an overall deceptive similarity. The respondent’s argument of “different titles” was rejected because title is only one element; the get-up as a whole was copied.

The Judge also noted the respondent’s past conduct (violation of injunction, suppression of litigation) rendered the adoption mala fide, reinforcing lack of originality.

Judgements relied upon by the Judge and their context

Marico Ltd. v. Jagit Kaur, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8488 (Delhi High Court) – Directly applied. The Court quoted para 6 of Marico at length. In Marico, two coconut-oil labels were compared; the Court held that colour scheme, arrangement of coconut tree and broken coconuts were substantially similar even though brand names differed. The judgment clarified that the Parle Products test applies equally to copyright infringement actions involving artistic works/labels.

Parle Products P. Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618 (Supreme Court) – The foundational authority quoted verbatim in Marico and adopted in the present case. It laid down the “not side-by-side” rule and the “average purchaser with imperfect recollection” standard. Though originally a passing-off case, the Delhi High Court held the similarity test identical for copyright because both turn on deceptive similarity of artistic expression.

No other judgments were cited; the Court relied heavily on these two precedents to crystallise the legal position on label copyright.

Final Decision

The petition was allowed. Copyright Registrations Nos. A-85865/2009 and A-85866/2009 were cancelled and expunged from the Register of Copyright. The Registry was directed to communicate the order to the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks within four weeks for necessary updation on the official website.

Concluding Note

The judgment is a textbook illustration of how Indian courts protect copyright in commercial packaging while preventing monopolisation of generic trade-dress elements. By emphasising the “broad features” test and linking copyright originality with the absence of copying, the Court has sent a strong message that dishonest copying of a competitor’s label design will not be rewarded with statutory copyright protection. The decision also reinforces the High Court’s supervisory role over the copyright register under Section 50, making it an effective remedy against wrongly granted registrations.

Legal Point Settled in this Case (with clear explanation of legal concepts)

The judgment settles the following propositions:

Originality in label/packaging copyright: A later artistic work (label) is not “original” under Section 13(1)(a) if it is a colourable imitation or substantial reproduction of an earlier copyrighted label, even if minor changes (different brand name) are made. The test is not identity but overall deceptive similarity judged by broad essential features.

Application of Parle Products test to copyright: The Supreme Court’s passing-off similarity test in Parle Products is equally applicable to determine substantial reproduction in copyright suits involving artistic works. Courts must adopt the viewpoint of the average consumer, not an expert comparing labels side-by-side.

Person aggrieved under Section 50: A prior copyright owner who is also a trade rival is a person aggrieved if the continued registration of an infringing work would dilute its statutory rights and goodwill.

Section 45 search certificates are not conclusive: Obtaining a “no similar work” certificate does not validate a subsequent registration if the work is in fact copied; the certificate can be challenged and the registration expunged.

Prior civil decree as evidence: A permanent injunction decree in a civil suit between the same parties conclusively establishes infringement and can be relied upon in the rectification proceeding to show lack of originality and mala fides.

These principles provide clear guidance to manufacturers, copyright registries and practitioners on the protectability of packaging designs and the scope of rectification proceedings.

Case Title: Bombay Metals (P) Limited Vs. Tara Singh Prop. R.S. Industries (Regd) and Anr

Date of Order: 28 March 2026

Case Number: C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 17/2024

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2596

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Suggested Suitable Titles for YouTube Explainer Video

“Delhi HC Cancels Copyright of Bicycle Parts Packaging – Bombay Metals vs Tara Singh | Full Case Explained”

“When Copying a Label = No Copyright Protection | Landmark Delhi High Court Judgment on Artistic Works”

“Section 50 Copyright Rectification Explained – How Delhi HC Expunged Two Registrations for Copying Packaging Design”

“Parle Products Test Applied to Copyright Labels | Detailed Analysis of Bombay Metals Case 2026”

“No Originality = No Copyright: Delhi HC Strikes Down Imitated Bicycle Part Packaging Registrations”

“Trade Dress vs Copyright – Why Your Competitor’s Label Can Be Cancelled | Latest Delhi HC Ruling”

“Full Breakdown: Bombay Metals (P) Ltd. v. Tara Singh – Copyright Battle Over Ball Head Racer Packaging”

Saga Lifesciences Limited Vs M/s Anaadi Global Co

Export constitutes use in India for infringement and passing-off

Head Note of the Case

In this trademark infringement and passing-off suit, the High Court of Delhi granted an ad-interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC restraining the defendants from using the mark “HALESAGA / HALE’SAGA” (or any deceptively similar mark) in relation to pharmaceutical, medicinal and nutraceutical preparations in Class 05. The Court held that the Impugned Mark is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s long-established and registered mark “SAGA”, with “SAGA” forming the dominant and essential feature. Triple identity (identical/similar marks, identical goods, identical trade channels via e-commerce) was established. Export sales were held to constitute “use” in India under Section 56 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Defences of honest adoption, distinct consumer base, non-use in domestic market, estoppel from Reply to Examination Report, and lack of territorial jurisdiction were rejected. Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury were found in favour of the Plaintiff.

Introduction

This is a classic trademark infringement and passing-off dispute in the pharmaceutical and nutraceutical sector. Saga Lifesciences Limited (Plaintiff), a company established in 1981, sought an interim injunction against M/s Anaadi Global Co. & Anr. (Defendants) for using the mark “HALESAGA / HALE’SAGA” (Impugned Mark) in respect of goods identical or similar to those sold under the Plaintiff’s well-known mark “SAGA”. The judgment, delivered on 28 March 2026 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia in CS(COMM) 574/2023 (along with I.A. 15667/2023 & I.A. 19731/2023), is a detailed 22-page reasoned order granting ad-interim injunction after hearing both sides. The case highlights principles of deceptive similarity, triple identity, territorial jurisdiction in e-commerce cases, and the effect of export sales under Section 56 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Factual Background

The Plaintiff is an Indian pharmaceutical company established in 1981. On 01.05.1981, through its predecessor, it adopted the mark “SAGA” (“Subject Mark”) as part of its trade name and has continuously used it for pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations, nutraceutical products, dietetic substances adapted for medical use, and cosmetics. The Plaintiff owns multiple registrations/applications for “SAGA” and its formative marks (e.g., SAGAFIXIM, SAGACOXIB, SAGAPDIN, SAGAMOL, SAGAPANTO, SAGAFO SA, SAGAFORM, SAGASARTAN) primarily in Class 05. Key registration: Application No. 3482073 dated 14.02.2017 (user claimed since 01.05.1981) registered in Class 05 for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations.

The Plaintiff’s products are exported to various countries (Vietnam, Togo, Kazakhstan, etc.), with substantial turnover (₹109,22,42,602 in FY 2021-2022 under the Subject Mark). The Plaintiff claims the mark has acquired immense reputation and goodwill.

The Defendants (Defendant No. 1 – M/s Anaadi Global Co.) adopted the Impugned Mark “HALESAGA / HALE’SAGA” (with a device/logo) and filed applications in Classes 03 & 05 (Application No. 5059298 dated 26.07.2021 – proposed to be used; later applications Nos. 5171554 & 5171547 dated 13.10.2021 claiming user since 01.08.2021). The Defendants claimed the mark was coined by combining “HALE” (meaning healthy/hearty) + “SAGA” (meaning a long story) to convey “maintaining good health is a long-term process”. The Defendants sell nutraceutical/health supplements (protein powder, pre-workout, etc.) through e-commerce platforms (Flipkart, Amazon) with claimed sales of ₹1.16 Cr+ and significant advertisement spend.

The Plaintiff opposed the Defendants’ applications (oppositions filed, some pending/rectification filed). The Plaintiff alleged the Defendants were riding on its goodwill by prominently featuring “SAGA” in the Impugned Mark.

Procedural Background

The Plaintiff filed the suit CS(COMM) 574/2023 seeking permanent injunction for infringement, passing off, etc. Along with the suit, it moved I.A. 15667/2023 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC for ad-interim injunction. I.A. 19731/2023 is also mentioned (likely related to additional relief/documents). Both sides were represented (Mr. Vikas Khera for Plaintiff; Mr. Anshuman Upadhyay for Defendant No. 1). The matter was heard at length. The Court passed a detailed interim order on 28.03.2026 disposing of the injunction application.

Core Dispute

Whether the Defendants’ use of “HALESAGA / HALE’SAGA” for pharmaceutical/medicinal/nutraceutical preparations amounts to infringement of the Plaintiff’s registered “SAGA” mark and passing off, entitling the Plaintiff to an ad-interim injunction. Key issues included: deceptive similarity (dominant “SAGA”), triple identity, territorial jurisdiction (e-commerce sales in Delhi), effect of export sales under Section 56, honest adoption defence, estoppel from Reply to Examination Report, and balance of convenience.

Arguments Raised by Both Parties

Plaintiff’s Arguments:

Long continuous use since 1981 + multiple registrations/applications; “SAGA” is arbitrary/distinctive for the goods.

Impugned Mark is deceptively similar – entire “SAGA” is subsumed; “HALE” is descriptive; apostrophe and colour give “SAGA” dominant position.

Goods identical/similar (Class 05 pharma/nutraceuticals); same trade channels (e-commerce); triple identity.

Export sales constitute “use” in India under Section 56 (application in India to goods exported).

Defendants’ adoption dishonest – attempt to ride on Plaintiff’s goodwill.

Confusion inevitable among trade/public.

Plaintiff not claiming relief in Class 03 cosmetics at interim stage.

No estoppel – Reply to Examination Report (where “SAGA” was distinguished from other marks) does not cover Impugned Mark; inadvertent error by erstwhile attorney.

Defendants’ Arguments :

Honest adoption – “HALE” (healthy) + “SAGA” (long story) coined as composite mark with device/apostrophe; unique combination.

“SAGA” is a common English word (long story), not coined; many third-party users; no acquired distinctiveness.

Plaintiff uses “SAGA” only as house mark/device, not standalone; products exported only, not sold in domestic Indian market → no goodwill/reputation in India.

Different goods (Defendants: nutraceuticals/health supplements; Plaintiff: pharma); different purchasing public and trade channels.

No likelihood of confusion – products not identical; no domestic overlap.

Plaintiff’s registration in Ahmedabad; business in Surat → no territorial jurisdiction in Delhi (mere e-commerce availability insufficient).

Estoppel – Plaintiff in Reply to Examination Report distinguished “SAGA” from similar marks, cannot now claim similarity.

Delay – Plaintiff knew since 2022 but filed suit in 2023.

Balance of convenience against injunction; irreparable harm to Defendants.

Judgement with Complete Citations and Their Context Referred in Reasoning of Judge

The Court analysed jurisdiction first, then deceptive similarity, likelihood of confusion, passing off, and other defences.

Territorial Jurisdiction (paras 7–11):

Rejected Defendant’s plea. Products available in Delhi via e-commerce platforms (Flipkart, Amazon). “Principle of dynamic effect and mere looming presence on the internet” confers jurisdiction. Section 20 CPC satisfied as cause of action arises in part in Delhi. No need for specific targeting pleaded.

Deceptive Similarity (paras 12–20):

Restricted relief to Class 05 only (Class 03 registration irrelevant).

Impugned Mark subsumes entire “SAGA”; mere prefix “HALE” (descriptive) + apostrophe + colour does not distinguish. “SAGA” given dominant position.

Prima facie deceptively similar for pharmaceutical/medicinal/nutraceutical preparations.

“SAGA” arbitrary (not descriptive of goods) despite being dictionary word.

Likelihood of Confusion & Triple Identity (paras 21–24):

Goods identical/similar; trade channels identical (e-commerce).

Export use deemed “use” in India under Section 56(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 – “The application in India of trade mark to goods to be exported from India … shall be deemed to constitute use of the trade mark”. Cited and applied Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Sami Khatib of Mumbai, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 484 (export sales satisfy infringement/passing-off requirements).

Passing Off (paras 25–27):

Substantial goodwill proved by ₹109 Cr+ turnover (FY 2021-22) + continuous use since 1981 + invoices.

Dishonest adoption – implausible Defendants unaware of Plaintiff’s mark.

Likelihood of confusion → misrepresentation → damage to goodwill.

Reply to Examination Report Defence (paras 28–30):

Rejected. Principle of approbate-reprobate/estoppel applies only when cited mark in Examination Report is the same as later impugned mark. Here, Impugned Mark was never cited in Plaintiff’s 2017 Examination Report. No concession regarding HALESAGA.

Conclusion & Balance of Convenience (paras 31–34):

Prima facie case established.

“This is a case of triple identity” (deceptively similar marks + identical product category + identical trade channels/consumer base).

Balance of convenience and irreparable injury favour Plaintiff.

Injunction granted during pendency of suit.

The Final Decision of Court

I.A. 15667/2023 is allowed. During pendency of the suit, the Defendants, their proprietors, partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors and all others acting for/on their behalf are restrained from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, directly/indirectly dealing in pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations under Class 05 under the Impugned Mark “HALESAGA / HALE’SAGA” or any other mark identical with or deceptively similar to Plaintiff’s “SAGA” mark, so as to cause infringement and/or passing off. The application stands disposed of. (No interim relief in Class 03 cosmetics pressed.)

Point of Law Settled in the Case

Export sales constitute “use” in India under Section 56(1) for infringement and passing-off actions (Cadila Pharmaceuticals v. Sami Khatib applied).

Triple identity (similar marks + identical/similar goods + same trade channels) strongly supports injunction in pharma/nutraceutical cases.

Mere addition of a descriptive prefix (“HALE”) + apostrophe/device does not avoid deceptive similarity when the plaintiff’s mark (“SAGA”) is the dominant/essential feature.

E-commerce availability in the Court’s territory confers territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC (dynamic effect of internet sales).

Estoppel/approbate-reprobate from Reply to Examination Report applies only to the specific cited marks; not to a later-adopted unrelated Impugned Mark.

Dictionary/common words can still be arbitrary/distinctive when used for unrelated goods; no automatic descriptiveness defence.

Case Title: Saga Lifesciences Limited Vs M/s Anaadi Global Co. & Anr.

Date of Order: 28 March 2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 574/2023

Neutral Citation:2026:DHC:2600

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Suggested Titles for YouTube Explainer Video

“SAGA vs HALESAGA: Delhi HC Grants Injunction in Pharma Trademark Copycat Case – Full Breakdown”

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Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited Vs Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited

Likelihood of confusion, even without actual confusion, is sufficient to grant injunction

**Head Note of the Case**  

In this pharmaceutical trademark infringement suit, the High Court of Delhi granted a **permanent injunction** restraining Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited from using the mark ‘BEVATAS’ (Bevacizumab biosimilar for colorectal, ovarian, cervical, lung cancer and glioblastoma) which was held deceptively similar to Sun Pharma’s registered mark ‘BEVETEX’ (Paclitaxel for breast, non-small cell lung and pancreatic cancer). Despite different active ingredients, dosage forms, indications, prices and modes of administration, the Court applied the **strict Cadila test** for pharmaceutical marks, emphasising public health and the low threshold of confusion among doctors, pharmacists, nurses and patients. The Plaintiff’s registration since 1983 and use since 2015 established prior rights; the Defendant’s 2016 adoption (even if coined from the salt + house mark) was subsequent. Defences of non-use/hoarding, different molecules, Schedule-H nature, price differential, honest adoption and lack of actual confusion were rejected. The Court held that likelihood of confusion (not actual confusion) is sufficient, especially for life-saving cancer drugs.

**Introduction**  

The present case is a classic pharmaceutical trademark infringement battle between two leading Indian generic/biosimilar manufacturers. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited (Plaintiff) sought a permanent injunction, damages and other reliefs against Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited (Defendant) for alleged infringement of its registered trademark ‘BEVETEX’, passing off, unfair competition and dilution. The suit concerns two anti-cancer injectable drugs used in oncology but containing entirely different active pharmaceutical ingredients. The judgment, delivered on **28 March 2026** by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia in CS(COMM) 39/2023, is a detailed 34-page reasoned decision after full trial, granting permanent injunction to the Plaintiff while deciding all key issues in its favour.

**Factual Background**  

The Plaintiff is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, one of India’s largest pharmaceutical companies with global operations in over 150 countries. The Plaintiff coined and registered the mark **BEVETEX** in 1983 (Trade Mark No. 410744 dated 16.09.1983, Class 5) for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations. The drug under BEVETEX is **Paclitaxel** (a synthetic chemical cytotoxic agent/microtubule inhibitor) used for treatment of metastatic breast cancer, non-small cell lung cancer and pancreatic cancer. The Plaintiff launched the product in 2015, incurred substantial promotional expenses (₹53.79 Lac approx. in 2015-17) and achieved sales of ₹1076.06 Lac in the same period. The mark is an invented word and inherently distinctive.

The Defendant adopted the mark **BEVATAS** (applied for registration in 2016 on proposed-to-use basis, opposed by Plaintiff) for its biosimilar **Bevacizumab** (a monoclonal antibody/anti-angiogenic agent, rDNA product). The Defendant’s drug is used for colorectal cancer, ovarian cancer, cervical cancer, lung cancer and recurrent glioblastoma. The Defendant launched the product in October 2016 (or 2017 as per Plaintiff’s knowledge) after obtaining DCGI approvals in June-July 2016. The Defendant claimed the mark was coined by combining “BEVA” (from Bevacizumab) + “TAS” (from its house mark INTAS).

Both products are Schedule-H (prescription-only) injectable vials administered by IV infusion in oncology settings under specialist supervision, but they belong to different pharmacological classes, have different dosages, reconstitution methods, infusion times, toxicity profiles and non-overlapping primary indications (with some overlap in lung/breast cancer contexts).

**Procedural Background**  

The suit was originally filed before the District Judge, Saket Courts, Delhi. On 02.01.2018 the Trial Court refused ex-parte ad-interim injunction citing public interest in cancer drugs. After hearing both sides, the Trial Court vide order dated 17.09.2018 dismissed the Order XXXIX application, finding no prima facie case. Issues were framed on 17.12.2018 (11 issues covering registration, prior use, infringement, confusion, hoarding, authorisation, delay/laches, cause of action, etc.).

The Plaintiff’s appeal (FAO 447/2018) was dismissed by the High Court on 09.01.2020. The SLP (No. 3385/2020) was also dismissed on 14.02.2020 with a direction that the Trial Court decide the suit uninfluenced by High Court observations. The Plaintiff thereafter revalued the suit and got it transferred to the High Court. Evidence was led, documents exhibited (including Power of Attorney as Ex. PW-1/1), and final arguments concluded. Judgment was reserved on 01.12.2025 and pronounced on 28.03.2026.

**Core Dispute**  

Whether the Defendant’s use of ‘BEVATAS’ for its Bevacizumab injection amounts to **infringement** of the Plaintiff’s registered mark ‘BEVETEX’ under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and passing off, given the structural, phonetic and visual similarity of the marks, even though the drugs contain different active ingredients and treat partially different cancers. Ancillary issues included alleged hoarding/non-use of the Plaintiff’s mark since 1983, honest adoption by Defendant, effect of Schedule-H status, price difference, and whether public health concerns justify injunction despite specialist administration.

**Arguments Raised by Both Parties**  

**Plaintiff’s Arguments**:  

- Statutory rights under registration since 1983 give exclusive use; Defendant’s mark is deceptively similar structurally, phonetically and visually (common “BEVE”/“BEVA” prefix + similar ending).  

- Likelihood of confusion is high in oncology setting; patients/attendants/chemists/nurses may confuse the drugs due to imperfect recollection, illegible prescriptions and inability to pronounce complex salts.  

- Both are cancer drugs administered by IV infusion in similar vials; wrong drug can be fatal (different toxicity profiles).  

- Public interest demands injunction to prevent disastrous consequences (reliance on *Cadila Healthcare v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals*).  

- Section 29(3) presumption of confusion applies; strict test in pharma cases.  

- No hoarding – registration itself suffices; deemed use concept; no rectification application filed by Defendant.  

- Suit filed promptly upon knowledge in Dec 2017; no delay/laches.

**Defendant’s Arguments:  

- Marks must be compared as a whole – BEVETEX vs BEVATAS are visually, structurally and phonetically dissimilar (different prefix phonetics BEVE vs BEVA, endings TEX vs TAS; different labels).  

- Different molecules (Paclitaxel synthetic vs Bevacizumab biosimilar), different indications, reconstitution, infusion times, dosages, toxicity and prices (Defendant’s drug 3x costlier).  

- Both Schedule-H drugs administered only by super-specialist oncologists in hospitals – no scope for confusion.  

- Defendant coined mark honestly from salt + house mark INTAS; prior user since 2016 with regulatory approvals.  

- Plaintiff hoarded the mark (registered 1983, used only from 2015) – no goodwill; *Neon Laboratories* cited.  

- Plaintiff’s sales/turnover lower than Defendant’s; no evidence of actual confusion or goodwill.  

- No infringement/passing off; suit barred by delay, unclean hands and manufactured cause of action (Plaintiff knew of launch since 2016 via opposition).

**Judgement with Complete Citations and Their Context Referred in Reasoning of Judge**  

The Court decided the suit issue-wise after detailed analysis of evidence and law.

**Issue Nos. 1 & 2 (Registration & Prior Use)**: Plaintiff proved registration in 1983 and use since 2015 with documentary/oral evidence. Mark is invented and inherently distinctive. Defendant’s use (2016) is subsequent. Issues decided in Plaintiff’s favour (paras 11-14).

**Issue Nos. 9 & 10 (Defendant’s Proprietorship/Honest Prior Use)**: Defendant’s adoption in 2016 is subsequent to Plaintiff’s registration (1983) and use (2015). Even if coined from salt + house mark, it is not prior use. Honest subsequent use is no defence to infringement. Issues decided in Plaintiff’s favour (paras 15-18).

**Issue Nos. 3 & 4 (Infringement & Likelihood of Confusion)**: The core reasoning.  

- Marks compared as a **whole** (anti-dissection rule) – structurally and phonetically similar; first and last syllables almost identical (*United Biotech v. Orchid Chemicals*, 2012 (50) PTC 433 (Del) (DB) – overall impression of ordinary shopper, not technical dissection).  

- Common prefix ‘BEV’/‘BEVA’ not exclusively claimed by Plaintiff, but overall mark is deceptively similar. “Common to register” does not prove “common to trade” (*Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar*, AIR 1978 Del 250; *Pankaj Goel v. Dabur India Ltd.*, 2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del)).  

- Pharma-specific strict test: *Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.*, AIR 2001 SC 1952 – stricter approach in pharmaceutical cases; courts must ensure no likelihood of confusion; public health paramount; even Schedule-H drugs sold without prescription in practice; doctors/pharmacists/patients may confuse.  

- Likelihood (not actual) confusion sufficient; Section 29(3) presumption. Confusion dangerous when marks used for different ailments (*Novartis v. Crest Pharma*, 2009 (41) PTC 57 (Del); *Charak Pharma v. Glenmark*, 2014 (57) PTC 538 (Bom); *Sun Pharma v. Glenmark*, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3786).  

- Consumer not expected to know salts/compounds; imperfect recollection test (*Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd.*, AIR 1960 SC 142).  

- Risk exists at prescribing, dispensing and purchase stages, not only specialist level. Price/molecule differences do not eliminate confusion in oncology setting.  

- Issues decided in Plaintiff’s favour; infringement established (paras 19-29).

**Issue No. 5 (Hoarding/Non-Use)**: Section 47 allows rectification for non-use but Defendant never applied. Registration subsists; rights under Section 28(1) protected. Actual use not required to be proved in infringement suit (*Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co.*, (1995) 5 SCC 545; *Wockhardt Ltd. v. Eden Healthcare*, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 163). *Neon Laboratories* misplaced. Issue decided in Plaintiff’s favour (paras 30-33).

Other issues (delay, authorisation, cause of action) also decided in Plaintiff’s favour on facts/evidence.

**The Final Decision of Court**  

The suit is **decreed**. A permanent injunction is granted restraining the Defendant, its directors, servants, agents, etc., from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or dealing in any pharmaceutical preparation under the mark ‘BEVATAS’ or any deceptively similar mark. The Defendant is directed to deliver up or destroy all infringing material. Costs and other reliefs (rendition of accounts/damages) were not pressed by Plaintiff in public interest; limited relief of injunction granted. All issues decided in favour of the Plaintiff.

**Point of Law Settled in the Case**  

1. In pharmaceutical trademark cases, a **stricter approach** must be adopted; likelihood of confusion (even without actual confusion) is sufficient to grant injunction, especially for life-saving drugs (*Cadila Healthcare* principle reaffirmed and applied rigorously).  

2. Registration alone confers statutory rights under Section 28(1); non-use/hoarding is not a defence in infringement suit unless the mark is actually removed via rectification under Section 47.  

3. Marks must be compared as a **whole** (anti-dissection rule); minor differences or common prefixes derived from salts do not save a deceptively similar mark.  

4. Different active ingredients, indications, prices, Schedule-H status or specialist administration do **not** mitigate confusion risk in oncology drugs; public health overrides such factors.  

5. Honest/coined adoption or higher sales by defendant is irrelevant if the mark infringes a prior registered mark.  

6. Cause of action in infringement arises upon knowledge of infringing use; opposition to registration does not bar subsequent suit.

Case Detail: Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited Vs Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited  

Date of Order: 28 March 2026  

Case Number: CS(COMM) 39/2023  

Neutral Citation:2026:DHC:2601

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi  

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

**Suggested Titles for YouTube Explainer Video**  

1. “BEVETEX vs BEVATAS: Sun Pharma Wins Big! Delhi HC Grants Permanent Injunction in Pharma Trademark War”  

2. “Why Delhi High Court Stopped Intas from Using BEVATAS – Full BEVETEX Infringement Judgment Explained”  

3. “Cadila Rule Applied Strictly: Sun Pharma v Intas Cancer Drug Trademark Case Breakdown (2026)”  

4. “Different Molecules but Still Infringement? Delhi HC Pharma Trademark Ruling on BEVETEX vs BEVATAS”  

5. “Hoarding Defence Rejected: Sun Pharma Beats Intas in Landmark Cancer Drug Name Battle”  

6. “Public Health Wins: Delhi HC Permanent Injunction in BEVATAS Infringement Case – Full Analysis”  

7. “BEVETEX Protected! Why Different Cancer Drugs Can’t Have Similar Names – Justice Tejas Karia Judgment”  

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