Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia & Anr

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10643-10644 OF 2010

Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd.              ... Appellant
Vs.
Sanjay Dalia & Anr.                                ... Respondents

(With C.A. No.4912/2015 @ SLP [C] No.8253/2013)
                               J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1.    Leave granted in SLP[C] No.8253 of  2013.

2.    In the appeals, the question arising for consideration is  as  to  the
interpretation of section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and  section  134(2)
of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 with regard to the place where a  suit  can  be
instituted by the plaintiff.

3.    The plaintiff/appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-44/2010  had  filed
a  suit  praying  for  relief  against  defendant  No.1  so  as  to  prevent
infringement of the rights of the plaintiff without obtaining  the  licence.
The  defendant  owns  cinema  halls  in   Maharashtra   and   Mumbai   where
infringement is alleged and the entire cause of action, as  alleged  in  the
plaint, has arisen in Mumbai, Maharashtra.

4.    Civil Suit FAO (OS) No. 359/2007 has been filed in the High  Court  at
Delhi, by virtue of the fact that the Branch  Office  of  the  plaintiff  is
situated at Delhi and the plaintiff is carrying on the  business  at  Delhi.
However, it is not disputed that the plaintiff’s Head Office is situated  at
Mumbai. The objection was  raised  by  the  defendant  with  regard  to  the
territorial jurisdiction of the court at Delhi. The  single  Bench  and  the
Division Bench of the High Court have upheld the  objection  and  held  that
the suit should have been filed in the facts of the case, in  the  court  at
Mumbai. Hence, the impugned order has been questioned in the appeals.

5.    In Civil Appeal arising out  of  SLP  [C]  No.  8253/2013  –  (Advance
Magazine Publishers Inc. & Anr. v. Just Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd.), the  suit  has
been  filed  with  respect  to  the  infringement  of  the  trademark.   The
registered office of “Vogue India” is in Mumbai. The magazine  is  processed
and published in Mumbai. It was submitted that  because  the  plaintiff  has
branch  office  at  Delhi,  it  had  sufficient  ground  for  invoking   the
jurisdiction under section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. The  plaintiff  filed
an application seeking an amendment in the plaint under Order 6 Rule  17  of
the Code of Civil Procedure so as to indicate how the court at  Delhi  would
have  the  jurisdiction.  The  magazine  is  sold  and  circulated  to   the
subscribers at Delhi.  The  application  seeking  amendment  has  also  been
dismissed by the High Court as even if allowed, amended pleadings would  not
confer jurisdiction upon the court. Merely situation  of  branch  office  is
not enough as no cause of action as per the plaint,  has  arisen  in  Delhi.
The Division Bench has allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed  by
the Single Bench, allowing the amendment. The said order has  been  impugned
in SLP [C] No.8253/2013.

6.    It was submitted by Shri T.R.  Andhiarujina,  learned  senior  counsel
representing the appellants, that a special right has been  conferred  under
section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the  Trade  Marks  Act
containing non-obstante clause to the applicability of  the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure or any other law for the time being in force,  and  the  plaintiff
has been conferred a right to file a suit where it carries on its  business.
That cannot be whittled down by combining with it the cause of  action.  The
impediment of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure is  not  applicable.
Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the  Trade  Marks  Act
have no co-relation to the cause of action  and  suit  can  be  filed  where
plaintiff resides or carries on his business or personally works  for  gain.
The interpretation made by the High  Court  is  contrary  to  the  aforesaid
provisions. Convenience of the defendant is not  a  relevant  consideration.
The binding decision  of  this  Court  in  Exphar  SA  &  Anr.  v.  Eupharma
Laboratories Ltd. & Anr [2004 (3) SCC 688]  has been violated. The  judgment
has not been taken into consideration though it was decided earlier  to  the
passing of the impugned decision. Reliance  has  also  been  placed  on  the
decisions of this Court in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi [2006  (9)  SCC  41],
Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries [2008 (10) SCC 595]  and  various  other
decisions of the High Court of Delhi viz.,  Smithkline  Beecham  &  Anr.  v.
Sunil Singhi & Anr. [2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.)], Caterpillar Inc.  v.  Kailash
Nichani & Ors. [2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.)],  Intas  Pharmaceuticals  Ltd.  v.
Allergan Inc.  [132 (2006) Delhi Law Times 641] to contend  that  under  the
aforesaid provisions accrual of cause of action wholly or  in  part  is  not
necessary at a place where the plaintiff chooses to file a suit where he  is
carrying on business.

7.    On behalf of the applicants in C.A.  Nos.  10643-44/2010,  Mr.  Sudhir
Chandra, learned senior counsel, submitted that while  interpreting  section
62 of the Copyright Act and  section  134(2)  of  the  Trademarks  Act,  the
intention of Parliament is to be gathered from plain  and  natural  meaning.
Heydon’s ‘rule of mischief’ is not attracted where the words of the  statute
are clear and unambiguous. There is no challenge to the vires of section  62
of the Copyright Act. Thus, the court cannot invoke the doctrine of  reading
down  the  provisions.  Section  62  of  the  Copyright  Act  is  a  special
legislation and confers a special right on the plaintiff  where  it  carries
on business or resides. Reading the Explanation to section 20  of  the  Code
of Civil Procedure into section 62 will do violence to  the  Copyright  Act.
The requirement of cause of action or Explanation as to the  corporation  of
Section 20 C.P.C. cannot be added to  the  aforesaid  provisions.  Facts  of
few cases cannot be considered so as to make interpretation  of  provisions.
Interpretation of the statute is to be made de hors the facts of  individual
cases. The intention of legislation is also  clear  from  the  Parliamentary
Debates  and where the law has held the field for a long time it should  not
be unsettled. The decision in Dhodha  House  (supra)  holds  the  field.  As
such, if a different interpretation is  to  be  made,  the  case  should  be
referred to a larger Bench of this  Court.  Non-obstante  clause  cannot  be
diluted.

8.    On the other hand, on behalf of  the  respondents,  it  was  submitted
that abuse of provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section  134
of the Trade Marks Act cannot be permitted at the  hands  of  multi-national
corporations to harass the defendant/s.  With  respect  to  the  suit  being
filed by the Corporation, section  20  is  not  inapplicable.  ‘Carrying  on
business’ cannot be defined subjectively.  Reliance  has  been  placed  upon
Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay  v. Prasad Trading Co. [1991 (4) SCC  270].  The
object of the Parliament behind enacting section 62  of  the  Copyright  Act
and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act has to be  taken  into  consideration
while interpreting the said provisions. The  mischief  rule  of  Heydon  has
been pressed into service so as to prevent harassment of the defendants  and
abuse of the said provisions. Court is duty-bound to avoid  disproportionate
counter  mischief  while  interpreting  a  provision.  Public   policy   and
convenience  to  parties  have  to  be   taken   into   consideration.   The
interpretation of provisions must be  such  so  as  to  avoid  hardship  and
absurdity. The decisions relied upon by the appellants have been  sought  to
be distinguished.

9.    The Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  contains  the  provisions  under
section 20 with respect to institution of the suits where defendant  resides
or cause of action arose. Section 20 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  reads
thus :
“Section 20 - Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or  cause
of action arises. -- Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit  shall
be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction --

(a)  the defendant, or each of the defendants  where  there  are  more  than
one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually  and  voluntarily
resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or

(b)  any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at  the  time  of
the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides,  or  carries
on business, or personally works  for  gain,  provided  that  in  such  case
either the leave of the Court  is  given,  or  the  defendants  who  do  not
reside, or carry on business, or personally work  for  gain,  as  aforesaid,
acquiesce in such institution; or

(c)    the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

[Explanation]. : A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business  at  its
sole or principal office in India or, in respect  of  any  cause  of  action
arising at any place where  it  has  also  a  subordinate  office,  at  such
place.”

10.   In order to amend and consolidate the law relating to copyrights,  the
matter was referred to a Joint Committee. The Joint Committee of the  Houses
submitted the report  which  contained  the  object  of  the  provisions  of
section 62 is that many authors are deterred from  instituting  infringement
proceedings because the court in which the proceedings are to be  instituted
are at a considerable distance from the place of their  ordinary  residence.
Such impediments should be removed and the proceedings may be instituted  in
the local court where the  person  instituting  the  proceedings  ordinarily
resides, carries on business etc. Clause  61  of  the  Report  of  the  said
Committee is extracted below :
“Clause 61 (Original clause 65). --Sub-clause (2) of the original clause  65
has been omitted and replaced by a new sub-clause. The Committee feels  that
the  provisions  of  the  original  sub-clause  (2)  would  virtually   make
registration of copyright compulsory and would be an  undue  restriction  on
the owner of the copyright to exercise his rights. In  the  opinion  of  the
Committee  many  authors  are   deterred   from   instituting   infringement
proceedings  because  the  court  in  which  such  proceedings  are  to   be
instituted is situated at a considerable distance from the  place  of  their
ordinary residence. The Committee  feels  that  this  impediment  should  be
removed and the new sub-clause (2) accordingly  provides  that  infringement
proceedings may be instituted in the district court within the local  limits
of whose jurisdiction the  person  instituting  the  proceedings  ordinarily
resides, carries on business, etc.”
                                     (emphasis supplied by us)
Section 62 of the Copyright Act is extracted below :
“62. Jurisdiction of court over matters arising under this Chapter. --

(1) Every suit or other civil  proceeding  arising  under  this  Chapter  in
respect of the infringement of copyright in any work or the infringement  of
any other right conferred by this Act shall be instituted  in  the  district
court having jurisdiction.

(2)  For  the  purpose  of  sub-section  (1),  a  "district   court   having
jurisdiction" shall, notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the  time  being  in
force,  include  a  district  court  within  the  local  limits   of   whose
jurisdiction,  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the  suit  or  other
proceeding, the person instituting the suit or other  proceeding  or,  where
there are more than one such persons, any of them actually  and  voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.”

Section 134 of  the Trade Marks Act is also extracted below :
“134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted before  District  Court.
-- (1) No suit--

(a)   for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or

(b)   relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or

(c)   for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of  any  trade
mark which is identical with  or  deceptively  similar  to  the  plaintiff's
trade mark, whether registered or unregistered,

shall be instituted in  any  court  inferior  to  a  District  Court  having
jurisdiction to try the suit.

     (2)   For the purpose of clauses (a) and  (b)  of  sub-section  (1),  a
"District  Court  having  jurisdiction"  shall,   notwithstanding   anything
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other  law
for the time being in force, include  a  District  Court  within  the  local
limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit  or
other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or proceeding,  or,  where
there are more than one such persons any of them, actually  and  voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.

Explanation.--For the purposes of sub-section  (2),  "person"  includes  the
registered proprietor and the registered user.”


11.    Following portion of the Parliamentary Debates as  to  Copyright  Act
has been relied upon :
“Shri P. Trikamdas:  Ordinarily it should fall within  the  jurisdiction  of
the court where the infringing copy was published.  But there is nothing  to
prevent Parliament from making a  law,  as  for  instance  in  the  case  of
divorce, and saying that the cause of action may also  arise  at  any  place
where the author resides or where the original publication  took  place,  so
that you could drag the infringer to that court.    Instead  of  making  the
another run all over the country facing the  infringer,  the  right  may  be
given to the injured party-the author-to sue the main  in  the  place  where
the author resides or where the first copy was published.
      Dr. Raghubir Sinh:  So you agree to that?
      Shri P. Trikamdas: Yes, and I am obliged to you for   asking  me  that
question.
      Dr. Raghubir Sinh:  Does Mr. Masani also approve of it?
      Shri Masani : Yes.
     Shri P. Trikamdas:  It is desirable, also  because  it  may  act  as  a
deterrent  on the infringer when he knows that he  may  have  to  go  a  few
hundred miles off to a High Court where the author lives or where  the  book
got published first.”


12.   Considering the very language of section 62 of the Copyright  Act  and
section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, an additional forum  has  been  provided
by including a District Court within whose  limits  the  plaintiff  actually
and voluntarily resides or carries  on  business  or  personally  works  for
gain. The object of the provisions was to enable the plaintiff to  institute
a suit at a place where he or they resided or carried on  business,  not  to
enable them to drag defendant further away from such  a  place  also  as  is
being  done  in  the  instant  cases.  In  our   opinion,   the   expression
“notwithstanding anything contained in the Code  of  Civil  Procedure”  does
not oust the applicability of the provisions of section 20 of  the  Code  of
Civil Procedure and it is clear that additional remedy has been provided  to
the plaintiff so as to file a suit where  he  is  residing  or  carrying  on
business etc., as the  case  may  be.  Section  20  of  the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure enables a plaintiff to file a suit where the defendant resides  or
where cause of  action  arose.  Section  20(a)  and  section  20(b)  usually
provides the venue where the defendant or any of them  resides,  carries  on
business or personally works for gain. Section 20(c) of the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where the cause of  action
wholly or in part, arises. The Explanation to Section  20  C.P.C.  has  been
added to the effect that Corporation shall be deemed to  carry  on  business
at its sole or principal office in India or  in  respect  of  any  cause  of
action arising at any place where it has subordinate office at  such  place.
Thus, ‘corporation’ can be sued at a place  having  its  sole  or  principal
office and where cause of action wholly or in part, arises at a place  where
it has also a subordinate office at such place.

13.   Learned author Mulla in the Code of Civil Procedure,  18th  Edn.,  has
observed that under clauses (a) to  (c)  of  section  20,  plaintiff  has  a
choice of forum to institute a suit. The intendment of  the  Explanation  to
section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that once the  corporation  has
a subordinate office in the place where the cause of  action  arises  wholly
or in part, it cannot be heard to say that it cannot be sued  there  because
it did not carry on business at that place. The linking of  the  place  with
the cause of action in the  Explanation  where  subordinate  office  of  the
corporation is situated is reflective of the intention  of  the  Legislature
and such a place has to be the place of the filing of the suit and  not  the
principal place of business. Ordinarily the suit has  to  be  filed  at  the
place where there is principal place of business of the corporation.

14.   ‘Corporation’ in the Explanation would mean  not  only  the  statutory
corporation but companies registered under the Companies  Act,  as  held  by
this Court in Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay  v. Prasad Trading Co. etc.  [1991
(4) SCC 270] and New Moga Transport Co., through its  Proprietor  v.  United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [2004 (4) SCC  677].  The  domicile  of  the
company is fixed by the situation of its  principal  place  of  business  as
held in Jones v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co. (1886) 17 QBD 421.  In  the
case of companies registered under the Companies Act, the controlling  power
is, as a fact, generally  exercised  at  the  registered  office,  and  that
office is therefore not only for the purposes of  the  Act,  but  for  other
purposes, the principal place of business, as held in  Watkins  v.  Scottish
Imperial Insurance Co. (1889) 23 QBD 285. A company may have subordinate  or
branch offices in fifty different jurisdictions and it may be  sued  in  any
one of such jurisdictions in respect of a cause  of  action  arising  there,
has been held in Peoples’ Insurance Co. v.  Benoy  Bhushan  [AIR  1943  Cal.
190]; Home Insurance Co. v. Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co. [AIR 1952  Punj.  142];
and Prag Oil Mils Depot v. Transport Corpn. of India [AIR 1978 Ori. 167].

15.   Accrual of cause of action is a sine qua non for a suit to  be  filed.
Cause of action is a bundle of facts which  is  required  to  be  proved  to
grant relief to the plaintiff. Cause  of  action  not  only  refers  to  the
infringement but also the material facts on which right is founded.  Section
20 of the CPC recognises the territorial jurisdiction of  the  courts  inter
alia where the cause of action wholly or  in  part  arises.  It  has  to  be
decided in each case whether cause of action wholly or in part arises  at  a
particular place. As held by this Court in Rajasthan  High  Court  Advocates
Association v. Union of India & Ors.  [AIR 2001 SC 416]. Thus,  a  plaintiff
can also file a suit where the cause of action wholly  or  in  part  arises.

16.   On a due and anxious consideration  of  the  provisions  contained  in
section 20 of the CPC, section 62 of the Copyright Act and  section  134  of
the Trade Marks Act, and the object with which the  latter  provisions  have
been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly or  in
part,  where  the  plaintiff   is   residing   or   having   its   principal
office/carries on business or personally works for gain,  the  suit  can  be
filed at such place/s.  Plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit  at  a  place
where he is residing, carrying on business or personally works for  gain  de
hors the fact that the cause of action has  not  arisen  at  a  place  where
he/they are residing or any one of them is residing, carries on business  or
personally works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at  such  a
place has to be read subject  to  certain  restrictions,  such  as  in  case
plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a  particular  place/having
its head office and at such place cause of action has also arisen wholly  or
in part, plaintiff cannot ignore such a place under the  guise  that  he  is
carrying on business at other far flung places also. The very intendment  of
the insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act  is  the
convenience of the plaintiff. The rule of convenience  of  the  parties  has
been given a statutory expression in section 20 of  the  CPC  as  well.  The
interpretation of provisions has to be such which prevents the  mischief  of
causing inconvenience to parties.

17.   The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted in  the  Copyright
Act and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a forum to the plaintiff where  he
is residing, carrying on business or personally works for gain.  The  object
is  to  ensure  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  deterred   from   instituting
infringement proceedings “because the court in which proceedings are  to  be
instituted is at a considerable distance from the place  of  their  ordinary
residence”. The impediment created to the plaintiff by section 20 C.P.C.  of
going to a place where it was not having  ordinary  residence  or  principal
place of business was sought to  be  removed  by  virtue  of  the  aforesaid
provisions of  the  Copyright  Act  and  the  Trade  Marks  Act.  Where  the
Corporation is having ordinary residence/principal  place  of  business  and
cause of action has also arisen at that place, it has to  institute  a  suit
at the said place and not at other places. The provisions of section  62  of
the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act never  intended  to
operate in the field where the plaintiff is having its  principal  place  of
business at a particular place and the cause of action has  also  arisen  at
that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant  place  where  its
subordinate office is situated though at such place no cause of  action  has
arisen. Such interpretation would cause great harm and would  be  juxtaposed
to the very legislative intendment of the provisions so enacted.

18.   In our opinion, in a case where cause of action has arisen at a  place
where the plaintiff is residing or  where  there  are  more  than  one  such
persons, any of them actually or voluntarily resides or carries on  business
or personally works for gain would oust  the  jurisdiction  of  other  place
where the cause of action has not arisen though at such a place,  by  virtue
of having subordinate office, the plaintiff  instituting  a  suit  or  other
proceedings might be carrying on business  or  personally  works  for  gain.

19.   At the same time, the provisions of section 62 of  the  Copyright  Act
and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have removed the embargo of suing  at
place of accrual of cause of action wholly or in  part,  with  regard  to  a
place where the plaintiff or any of  them  ordinarily  resides,  carries  on
business or personally works for gain. We agree to the aforesaid extent  the
impediment imposed under section 20 of the CPC to a plaintiff  to  institute
a suit in a court where the defendant resides  or  carries  on  business  or
where the cause of action wholly or in part arises, has  been  removed.  But
the right is subject to the rider in  case  plaintiff  resides  or  has  its
principal place of business/carries on  business  or  personally  works  for
gain at a place where cause of action has also arisen, suit should be  filed
at that place not at other  places where plaintiff is having branch  offices
etc.

20.   There is no doubt about it that the words used in section  62  of  the
Copyright Act and section 134 of  the  Trade  Marks  Act,   ‘notwithstanding
anything contained in CPC or any other law for the  time  being  in  force’,
emphasise that the requirement of section 20 of the CPC would  not  have  to
be complied with by the plaintiff  if he resides or carries on  business  in
the local limits of the court where he has filed the suit but, in our  view,
at the same time, as  the  provision  providing  for  an  additional  forum,
cannot be interpreted in the manner that it has authorised the plaintiff  to
institute a suit at a different place other  than  the  place  where  he  is
ordinarily residing or having principal office and  incidentally  where  the
cause of action wholly or in part has also arisen. The  impugned  judgments,
in  our  considered  view,  do  not  take  away  the  additional  forum  and
fundamental basis of conferring the right and advantage to  the  authors  of
the Copyright Act and the Trade  Marks  Act  provided  under  the  aforesaid
provisions.

21.   The provisions of section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and  section  134
of the Trade Marks Act are pari materia. Section 134(2) of the  Trade  Marks
Act is applicable to clauses (a) and (b) of  section  134(1)  of  the  Trade
Marks Act. Thus, a procedure to  institute  suit  with  respect  to  section
134(1)(c) in respect of “passing off” continues to be  governed  by  section
20 of CPC.

 22.  If the interpretation suggested by the appellant is accepted,  several
mischiefs may result, intention is that the plaintiff should not go  to  far
flung places than that of residence or  where  he  carries  on  business  or
works for gain in order to deprive defendant a  remedy  and  harass  him  by
dragging to distant place.  It  is  settled  proposition  of  law  that  the
interpretation of the provisions has to be  such  which  prevents  mischief.
The said principle was explained in Heydon’s case [76 ER 637]. According  to
the mischief rule, four points are required to be taken into  consideration.
While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the  statute  was
designed to remedy should first be identified and then a  construction  that
suppresses the problem and  advances  the  remedy  should  be  adopted.  The
Heydon’s mischief rule has been referred to in  Interpretation  of  Statutes
by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edn., at pp. 124-125 thus :

“(b) Rule in Heydon’s case; purposive construction: mischief rule
     When  the  material  words  are  capable  of  bearing   two   or   more
constructions the most firmly established  rule  for  construction  of  such
words “of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,  restrictive
or enlarging of the common law)” is the rule laid down in Heydon’s case  (76
ER 637) which has “now attained the status of a  classic  [Kanailal  Sur  v.
Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 1957 SC 907]. The  rule  which  is  also  known  as
‘purposive construction’ or ‘mischief rule’ [Anderton v. Ryan 1985 2 ALL  ER
355], enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act:  (i)  What
was the law before the making of the Act, (ii)  What  was  the  mischief  or
defect for which the law did not provide, (iii) What is the remedy that  the
Act has provided, and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The  rule  then
directs that the courts must adopt that construction which  “shall  suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy”. The rule was explained in  the  Bengal
Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar [AIR  1955  SC  661]  by  S.R.  DAS,  CJI  as
follows:  “It  is  a  sound  rule  of  construction  of  a  statute   firmly
established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s  case  (supra)  was
decided that for the  sure  and  true  interpretation  of  all  Statutes  in
general (be they penal  or  beneficial,  restrictive  or  enlarging  of  the
common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
 1st - What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2nd - What was the mischief and defect for which  the  common  law  did  not
provide?
3rd -  What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed  to  cure  the
disease of the commonwealth, and
4th -      The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the judges is always  to  make  such construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance  the  remedy,  and  to  suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance  of  the  mischief,  and  pro
private commodo, and  to  add  force  and  life  to  the  cure  and  remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act,   pro  bono  publico.
[Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (supra)].”

23.   Considering the first aspect of aforesaid principle,  the  common  law
which was existing before the provisions of law were passed was  section  20
of the CPC. It did not provide for the plaintiff to institute a suit  except
in accordance with the provisions contained in section  20.  The  defect  in
existing law was inconvenience/deterrence caused to  the  authors  suffering
from  financial  constraints  on  account  of  having  to  vindicate   their
intellectual property rights at a place far away  from  their  residence  or
the place of their business. The said mischief or  defect  in  the  existing
law which did not provide for the plaintiff to  sue  at  a  place  where  he
ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain,  was
sought to be removed.  Hence, the  remedy  was  provided  incorporating  the
provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act. The  provisions  enabled  the
plaintiff or any of them to file a suit at  the  aforesaid  places.  But  if
they were residing or carrying on business or  personally  worked  for  gain
already at such place, where cause of action has arisen, wholly or in  part,
the said provisions have not provided additional remedy to them  to  file  a
suit at a different place. The said provisions never intended to operate  in
that field. The operation of the provisions was limited and their  objective
was clearly to enable the plaintiff to file a suit at the place where he  is
ordinarily residing or carrying on business etc., as enumerated  above,  not
to go away from such places. The Legislature has  never  intended  that  the
plaintiff should not institute the suit where he ordinarily  resides  or  at
its Head Office or registered  office  or  where  he  otherwise  carries  on
business or personally works for gain where the  cause  of  action  too  has
arisen and should drag the defendant to a subordinate office or other  place
of business which is at a far distant place under  the  guise  of  the  fact
that the plaintiff/corporation is carrying on  business  through  branch  or
otherwise at such other place also. If such an interpretation is  permitted,
as rightly submitted  on  behalf  of  the  respondents,  the  abuse  of  the
provision will take place. Corporations and big conglomerates etc. might  be
having several subordinate offices throughout  the  country.  Interpretation
otherwise would permit them to institute infringement proceedings at  a  far
flung place and at unconnected place as compared to a place where  plaintiff
is carrying on their business, and at such place, cause of  action  too  has
arisen.  In  the  instant  cases,  the  principal  place  of  business   is,
admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of action has  also  arisen  in  Mumbai.
Thus, the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section  134  of
the Trade Marks Act cannot be interpreted  in  a  manner  so  as  to  confer
jurisdiction on the Delhi court in the aforesaid circumstances to  entertain
such suits. The Delhi  court  would  have  no  territorial  jurisdiction  to
entertain it.

24.   The avoidance of counter mischief to the defendant is  also  necessary
while giving the remedy to the plaintiff under the provisions  in  question.
It was never visualised by the law makers that both  the  parties  would  be
made to travel to a distant place in spite of the fact  that  the  plaintiff
has a remedy of suing at the place where the  cause  of  action  has  arisen
where he is having head office/carrying on business etc. The  provisions  of
the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks  Act  provide  for  the  authors/trade
marks holders to sue at their ordinary residence  or  where  they  carry  on
their business. The said provisions of law never intended to  be  oppressive
to  the  defendant.  The  Parliamentary  Debate  quoted  above  has  to   be
understood in the  manner  that  suit  can  be  filed  where  the  plaintiff
ordinarily resides or carries on business  or  personally  works  for  gain.
Discussion was to provide remedy to plaintiff at  convenient  place;  he  is
not to travel away. Debate was not to enable plaintiff to take defendant  to
farther place, leaving behind his  place  of  residence/business  etc.   The
right to remedy given is not unbriddled and is subject to the prevention  of
abuse of the aforesaid provisions,  as  discussed  above.  Parliament  never
intended that the subject provisions  to  be  abused  by  the  plaintiff  by
instituting suit in wholly unconnected jurisdiction. In the  instant  cases,
as the principal place of business is at Mumbai the cause of action is  also
at Mumbai but still the place for suing has been chosen at Delhi. There  may
be a case where plaintiff is carrying on the business at  Mumbai  and  cause
of action has arisen in  Mumbai.  Plaintiff  is  having  branch  offices  at
Kanyakumari and    also  at  Port  Blair,  if  interpretation  suggested  by
appellants is acceptable, mischief may be caused by such plaintiff  to  drag
a  defendant  to  Port  Blair  or  Kanyakumari.  The  provisions  cannot  be
interpreted in the said manner devoid of the object of the Act.



25.   It was also submitted that Heydon’s rule is not applicable  where  the
words of the statute are clear. Reliance has been  placed  on  M/s.  Hiralal
Rattanlal etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Anr. etc. [1973  (1)  SCC  216]  in
which it has been observed that when the provision  is  unambiguous  and  if
from the provision legislative intent is clear,  the  court  need  not  call
into aid the other  rule  of  construction  of  statutes  such  as  that  of
‘mischief’. However, we opine, when two interpretations  are  possible,  the
court has to adopt the one which furthers the  object  as  provided  in  the
statute itself.

26.   Reliance has been placed on Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors.v. State  of
Tamil Nadu and Ors. [AIR 2002 SC 1334] in which it has  been  observed  that
the intention of the Legislature must be found in  the  words  used  by  the
Legislature itself. Reliance has also been placed on Grasim Industries  Ltd.
v. Collector of Customs, Bombay [2002 (4) SCC 297]  in  which  it  has  been
observed  that  wherever  the  language  is  clear,  the  intention  of  the
Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing  so,  what
has been said as also what has not been said, has to be noted. There  is  no
dispute with the aforesaid proposition. However, the object of the  Act  and
the intention of the Legislature is clear which is to the otherwise.

27.   Bennion on Statutory Interpretation in section 318  in  Part  XXI  has
mentioned that strict construction may be avoided or  at  least  reduced  by
limiting the remedy where a counter  mischief  would  arise  if  the  remedy
provided by the Act was eschewed widely. It may appear  to  the  court  that
one of the  opposing  construction  of  the  enactment,  if  adopted,  would
operate a mischief of its own. The prospects  of  this  would  constitute  a
negative factor  in  weighing  the  applicability  of  the  construction  in
question. The court also  has  in  mind  the  consequences  for  the  public
welfare. Bennion has discussed thus :
“General presumption against ‘absurdity’ For the  general  presumption  that
an ‘absurd’ result is not intended, of which  the  present  section  depicts
one aspect, see Code s.312.
     Mischief As to the ‘mischief’ to which an  enactment  is  directed  see
Code s.289.
     Counter-mischief Clearly it would be absurd to suppose that  Parliament
intended to abolish one mischief only at the cost  of  establishing  another
which is just as bad, or even worse.  Many legal rules  have  adverse  side-
effects, and the policy of the  law  is  to  discard  possible  rules  whose
disadvantages outweigh their benefits.
Example 318.1 Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:
‘My Lords, s.4 of the Statute of Frauds was enacted in  1677  to  address  a
mischief facilitated, it seems, by the procedural deficiencies of the  day….
 It  quickly  became  evident  that  if  the  seventeenth  century  solution
addressed one mischief it was capable of giving rise to another….’
Regulatory Acts Some types  of  remedy  necessarily  carry  in  their  train
corresponding drawbacks.  One of the most frequent and inescapable of  these
is the  loss  of  freedom  that  accompanies  a  regulatory  measure.   Such
consequences are manifest, and must  be  treated  as  part  of  Parliament’s
intention.
      Strict construction  Where  a  counter-mischief  would  arise  if  the
remedy provided by the Act were construed widely, the court may avoid or  at
least reduce it by limiting the remedy.
      Example 318.2 Section 1  of  the  Domestic  Violence  and  Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1976 (repealed) empowered the county court  to  make  orders
excluding  a violent husband  from  the  matrimonial  home.   No  limit  was
specified for the duration of such exclusion orders.  The courts held  that,
to reduce the counter-mischief of  keeping  a  man  out  of  his  own  home,
exclusion orders should be made only  for  a  brief  period.   In  one  case
Viscount Dilhorne inferred that the purpose of the 1976 Act  was  ‘immediate
relief not permanent resolution’.  In another case Ormrod LJ said  the  1976
Act was to be regarded as ‘a short-term remedy essentially’.
It may appear to the court that one of the  opposing  constructions  of  the
enactment, if adopted, would create a  mischief  of  its  own.   It  is  not
unusual for a construction contended for by one of the parties  to  have  as
one of its consequences the infliction of a serious injustice on  the  other
party.  The prospect of this would constitute a negative factor in  weighing
the applicability of the construction in question.  The court  also  has  in
mind the consequences for the public welfare.
                                  x x x x x
Often it is reasonable to assume that the counter-mischief that  has  arisen
was quite unforeseen by Parliament.  Enacted law suffers by comparison  with
unwritten law in  that  it  involves  Laying  down  in  advance  an  untried
remedy.....”

            As observed, such  a  counter  mischief  to  the  defendant  was
unforeseen by Parliament and it is the court’s duty to mitigate the  counter
mischief.
28.   Strong reliance has been placed by the appellants on  the  discussions
made by Bennion on avoiding disproportionate counter-mischief at  page  1006
thus :
      “the Court seeks to avoid a construction that cures the  mischief  the
enactment was  designed  to  remedy  only  at  the  cost  of  setting  up  a
disproportionate counter-mischief  since  this  is  unlikely  to  have  been
intended by Parliament. Sometimes there are overriding reasons for  applying
such a construction, for example, where the Parliament  really  intended  it
or a literal meaning is too strong.”

            We find no overriding reasons to  apply  construction  solicited
by the appellants as that was never intended by the Parliament.

29.   Bennion has also observed that public policy must inform  the  court’s
interpretation of the relevant statutory provision and  that  public  policy
ascertained from the Act  of  the  Parliament.  In  our  opinion,  right  to
approach the court/pursuing the legal remedy  cannot  be  made  a  farce  or
oppressive as that would not be conducive for the  effective  administration
of justice.

30.   Justice G.P. Singh in ‘Principles of Statutory  Interpretation’,  12th
Edition, has observed that regard be had to the subject and  object  of  the
Act. The court’s effort is to harmonise the words of the  statute  with  the
subject of enactment and the object the Legislature has in  view.  When  two
interpretations are feasible, the court will prefer the one  which  advances
the remedy and suppresses the mischief as envisioned. The  relevant  portion
is extracted below :
“As stated earlier (Chapter 1, title 2 ‘Intention of the Legislature’,  text
and notes 57 to 69, pages 14 to 17)  and as approved by the  Supreme  Court:
"The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to  be
understood in the sense in which they best harmonise  with  the  subject  of
the enactment and the object  which  the  Legislature  has  in  view.  Their
meaning is found not  so  much  in  a  strict  grammatical  or  etymological
propriety of  language, nor even in its popular use, as in  the  subject  or
in the occasion on which they are used, and  the  object  to  be  attained".
[Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate,  AIR
1958 SC 353, p.356 ...]  The courts  have  declined  "to  be  bound  by  the
letter, when it frustrates the patent purposes of the statute".  [Cabell  v.
Markham, 148 F 2d 737 92nd cir 1945), (Judge Learned Hand).   In  the  words
of SHAH, J.: "It is a recognised rule of  interpretation  of  statutes  that
expressions used therein should ordinarily  be  understood  in  a  sense  in
which they best  harmonise  with  the  object  of  the  statute,  and  which
effectuate the object of the Legislature". [New India Sugar  Mills  Ltd.  v.
Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax,  Bihar,  AIR  1963  SC  1207,  p.  1213  ...].
Therefore when two interpretations are feasible the court will  prefer  that
which advances the remedy and suppresses the  mischief  as  the  Legislature
envisioned. [Carew & Company v.  Union  of  India,  AIR  1975  SC  2260,  p.
2270...]. The Court should adopt an  object  oriented  approach  keeping  in
mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so  long  as
interpretative possibility permits. (Busching Schmitz Private Ltd.  v.  P.T.
Menghani, AIR 1977  SC  1569,  pp.  1575,  1576...].   The  object  oriented
approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to  the
plain language used by rewriting the section or substituting words in  place
of the actual words used by the Legislature. [CIT v. Budhraja  and  Company,
AIR 1993 SC 2529, p. 2535].
     Having regard to the object of the U.P.  Bhoodan  Yagna  Act,  1953  to
implement the Bhoodan movement, which  aimed  at  distribution  of  land  to
landless labourers who were versed in  agriculture  and  who  had  no  other
means of subsistence, it was held that the expression 'landless persons'  in
section 14, which made provision for grant  of  land  to  landless  persons,
was limited to landless labourers as described above and did not  include  a
landless businessman residing in a city. [U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v.  Braj
Kishore, AIR 1988 SC 2239].”

31.   In Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani [1977 (2) SCC  835],
it has been observed  that  purposive  interpretation  may  be  made  having
regard to the object of the provisions and to avoid any obvious lacuna.
32.   The learned author Justice G.P. Singh in Interpretation  of  Statutes,
12th Edn. has also observed that it is the court’s duty to  avoid  hardship,
inconvenience, injustice, absurdity  and  anomaly  while  selecting  out  of
different interpretations. The doctrine must be applied with great care  and
in case absurd inconvenience is to be caused that interpretation has  to  be
avoided. Cases of individual hardship  or  injustice  have  no  bearing  for
enacting the natural construction. The relevant discussion at pages  132-133
and 140-142 is extracted hereunder :
 “(a)   Hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and
          anomaly to be avoided
   In selecting out of different interpretations "the court will adopt  that
which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that  which  is  none  of
those things" [Holmes v. Bradfield Rural District Council, (1949) 1  All  ER
381, p. 384] as it may be presumed "that the Legislature  should  have  used
the word in that interpretation which least offends our sense  of  justice".
[Simms v. Registrar  of  Probates,  (1900)  AC  323,  p.  335  CPC]  If  the
grammatical construction leads to  some  absurdity  or  some  repugnance  or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, it may be  departed  from  so
as to avoid that absurdity, and inconsistency. [Grey v.  Pearson,  (1857)  6
HLC 61, p. 106].  Similarly, a construction giving rise to anomalies  should
be avoided. [Veluswami Thevar v. G.Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC  422,  pp.  427,
428].  As approved by VENKATARAMA  AIYAR,  J.,  "Where  the  language  of  a
statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,  leads  to  a
manifest                                                       contradiction
                      of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or  to  some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not  intended,
a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of  the  words,
and even the structure of the sentence.” [Tirath Singh v.  Bachittar  Singh,
AIR 1955 SC 830].”'
                                  x x x x x
“Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding a  particular
construction is a rule which must be applied with great care. "The  argument
ab inconvenienti", said LORD MOULTON, "is one  which  requires  to  be  used
with great caution". [Vacher  &  Sons  v.  London  Society  of  Compositors,
(1913) AC 107]. Explaining why  great  caution  is  necessary  LORD  MOULTON
further observed: "There is a danger that it  may  degenerate  into  a  mere
judicial criticism of the propriety of the Acts of Legislature. We  have  to
interpret statutes according  to  the  language  used  therein,  and  though
occasionally the respective consequences of two  rival  interpretations  may
guide us in our choice in between them, it can only  be  where,  taking  the
Act as a whole and viewing it in connection with existing state of  the  law
at the time of the passing of the Act, we can satisfy   ourselves  that  the
words cannot have been used in the sense  to  which  the  argument  points".
[Vacher & Sons v. London Society of Compositors, (1913) AC  107].  According
to BRETT, L.J.,  the  inconvenience   necessitating  a  departure  from  the
ordinary sense of the words should not only be  great  but  should  also  be
what he calls an  “absurd  inconvenience”.  Moreover,  individual  cases  of
hardship  or  injustice  have  no  bearing   for   rejecting   the   natural
construction, [Young & Co. v. Leamington Spa Corporation, (1993) 8 AC  517],
  and it is only  when  the  natural  construction  leads  to  some  general
hardship or injustice and some other construction is  reasonably  open  that
the natural construction may be departed from. It is often found  that  laws
enacted for the general advantage do  result  in  individual  hardship;  for
example laws of Limitation, Registration, Attestation although  enacted  for
the public benefit, may work injustice  in  particular  cases  but  that  is
hardly any reason to depart from the normal rule  to  relieve  the  supposed
hardship or injustice in such  cases.  [Lucy  v.  Henleys  Telegraph  Works,
(1969) 3 All ER 456]. "It is the duty of all courts of justice",  said  LORD
CAMPBELL, "to take care for the general good of  the  community,  that  hard
cases do not make bad law". [East India Company v. Odichurn Paul, 7  Moo  PC
85]. 'Absurdity' according to WILLES, J., should be understood "in the  same
sense as repugnance that is to say something which would be so  absurd  with
reference to the other words of the statute as to amount to  a  repugnance".
[Christopherson v. Lotinga, (1864) 33 LJ CP 121].   "Absurdity",  said  LORD
GREENE, M.R., "like public policy, is  a  very  unruly  horse".  [Grundt  v.
Great Boulder  Proprietary  Gold  Mines  Ltd.,  (1948)  1  All  ER  21].  He
proceeded to add: "There is one rule, I think which is clear that,  although
the absurdity or the  non-absurdity  of  one  conclusion  as  compared  with
another may be and very often is, of assistance to  the  court  in  choosing
between two possible meanings of ambiguous words, it  is  a  doctrine  which
must be applied with great care, remembering that judges may be fallible  in
this question of an absurdity and in any event it must not be applied so  as
to result in twisting language into a meaning which it cannot bear. It is  a
doctrine which must not be used to re-write the language in a way  different
from that in which it was  originally  framed".  [Grundt  v.  Great  Boulder
Proprietary  Gold  Mines  Ltd.  (supra)].   The   alternative   construction
contended for must be such which does not put an undue strain on  the  words
used; [Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907] and  does  not
require recasting of the Act or any part of  it.  It  must  be  possible  to
spell the meaning contended for out of the words actually used. [Shamrao  V.
Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana AIR 1952 SC 324].
 No doubt in cases of ambiguity that construction which  better  serves  the
ends of fairness and justice will be accepted, but otherwise it is  for  the
Legislature in forming its  policy  to  consider  these  elements.  [IRC  v.
Mutual Investment Co. (1966) 3 All ER 265]. If no  alternative  construction
is open, the court cannot ignore a statutory provision "to relieve  what  it
considers a distress resulting from its  operation;  a  statute  has  to  be
given effect to whether the court likes it or not".  [Martin  Burn  Ltd.  v.
Calcutta Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 524]. The function  of  the  court  is  to
find out what is legal and not what is right. [Chandavarkar Sita  Ratna  Rao
v. Ashalata S.Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447].  It is presumed that  a  legislative
body intends which is the necessary effect of its  enactments;  the  object,
the purpose and the intention of the enactment is the same; it need  not  be
expressed in any recital or preamble; and it is not competent for any  court
judicially to ascribe any part of the legal  operation  of  the  statute  to
inadvertence.  [Kariapper v. Wijesinha, (1967) 3 All ER 485].
The Courts should as far as possible avoid a construction which  results  in
anomalies. [N.T.Veluswami Thevar v. G.Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422].”

33.   Bennion on  ‘Statutory  Interpretation’  has  mentioned  law  to  same
effect under section 312 and has observed that there is a  presumption  that
absurd result is not intended and in section 314 it has been  observed  that
the  court  has  to  avoid  an  inconvenient  result  while  interpreting  a
provision. It was stated that it can be  presumed  that  Parliament  intends
that while construing an enactment the court will avoid a construction  that
is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical as  the
same is unlikely to be intended by the Parliament. In Rosali  V.   v.  Taico
Bank and Ors. [2009 (17)  SCC  690],  this  Court  referring  to  Halsbury’s
Commonsense construction rule held that it is a  well-settled  principle  of
law that common sense construction rule should be taken recourse in  certain
cases.

 34.  This Court in Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [2010  (1)
SCC 135] has also laid down law to the same effect  and  has  discussed  the
term ‘branch office’ used in section 17(2) of the Consumer  Protection  Act,
1986 in the context  of cause of action.  Section  17(2)  of  the  said  Act
reads thus :

“17(2)  A complaint shall be instituted in a  State  Commission  within  the
limits of whose jurisdiction,--

(a)  the opposite party or each of the opposite  parties,  where  there  are
more than one, at the time of the institution  of  the  complaint,  actually
and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has  a  branch  office  or
personally works for gain; or

(b)  any of the opposite parties, where there are  more  than  one,  at  the
time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily  resides,
or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for  gain,
provided that in such case either the permission of the State Commission  is
given or the opposite parties who do not reside  or  carry  on  business  or
have a branch office or personally works for  gain,  as  the  case  may  be,
acquiesce in such institution; or

(c)    the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.]”

                  This Court while interpreting the provision held that  the
term ‘branch office’ as used in the  amended  section  17(2)(b)  has  to  be
interpreted to mean only that branch office where the cause  of  action  has
arisen. Thus, the court departed from the plain and literal meaning  of  the
words of section 17(2)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act in order  to  avoid
absurdity. The decision in Somic Surgical (supra) has been approved by  this
Court in  State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan &  Anr.
[2011 (7) SCC 639] inasmuch as this Court has  observed  that  in  case  the
natural meaning leads to mischievous consequences, it  must  be  avoided  by
accepting other permissible construction.

35.   Reliance has been placed by the appellants on the  decision  in  Union
of India & Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323] so  as  to
contend that the court cannot usurp the  legislative  intention  and  cannot
supply omissions to a statute.  There  is  no  dispute  with  the  aforesaid
proposition. However, we are simply interpreting the provisions  considering
the object of the Act.

36.   Respondents have placed reliance on Patel Roadways  Ltd.,  Bombay   v.
Prasad Trading Co.  etc.  [1991  (4)  SCC  270]  in  which  this  Court  has
considered the provisions of section 20 of the CPC. This Court has  observed
thus :

“12. We would also like to add that the interpretation sought to  be  placed
by the appellant on  the  provision  in  question  renders  the  Explanation
totally redundant. If the intention of the legislature was, as  is  said  on
their behalf, that a suit against a corporation could be  instituted  either
at  the  place  of  its  sole  or  principal  office  (whether  or  not  the
corporation carries on business at that place) or at any other  place  where
the cause of action arises, the provisions  of  clauses  (a),  (b)  and  (c)
together with the first  part  of  the  Explanation  would  have  completely
achieved the purpose. Indeed the effect would  have  been  wider.  The  suit
could have been instituted at the place of the principal office  because  of
the situation of such  office  (whether  or  not  any  actual  business  was
carried on there). Alternatively, a suit could have been instituted  at  the
place where the cause of action arose  under  clause  (c)  (irrespective  of
whether the corporation had a subordinate office  in  such  place  or  not).
This was, therefore, not the purpose of the Explanation. The Explanation  is
really an Explanation to clause (a). It is in the nature of a  clarification
on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to where the corporation can be  said  to
carry on business. This, it is  clarified,  will  be  the  place  where  the
principal office is situated  (whether  or  not  any  business  actually  is
carried on there) or the place where a business is carried  on  giving  rise
to a cause of action (even though the principal office  of  the  corporation
is not located there) so long as  there  is  a  subordinate  office  of  the
corporation situated at such place. The linking together of the place  where
the cause of action arises with the place  where  a  subordinate  office  is
located clearly shows that the intention of the  legislature  was  that,  in
the case of a corporation, for the purposes of clause (a), the  location  of
the subordinate office, within the local limits of which a cause  of  action
arises, is to be the relevant place for the filing of a  suit  and  not  the
principal place of business. If the intention was that the location  of  the
sole or principal office [pic]as well as the  location  of  the  subordinate
office (within the limits of which a cause  of  action  arises)  are  to  be
deemed to be places where the  corporation  is  deemed  to  be  carrying  on
business, the disjunctive “or” will not be there. Instead, the  second  part
of the Explanation would have read “and, in respect of any cause  of  action
arising at any place where  it  has  a  subordinate  office,  also  at  such
place”.

13. As far as we can see the interpretation which we  have  placed  on  this
section does not create any practical or undue difficulties or  disadvantage
either to the plaintiff  or  a  defendant  corporation.  It  is  true  that,
normally, under clauses (a) to (c), the plaintiff has a choice of forum  and
cannot be compelled to go to the place  of  residence  or  business  of  the
corporation and can file a suit  at  a  place  where  the  cause  of  action
arises. If a corporation desires to be protected  from  being  dragged  into
litigation at some place merely because a cause of action  arises  there  it
can save itself from such a situation by an exclusion  clause  as  has  been
done in the present case. The clear intendment of the Explanation,  however,
is that, where the corporation has a subordinate office in the  place  where
the cause of action arises, it cannot be heard to  say  that  it  cannot  be
sued there because it does not carry on business at that place. It would  be
a great hardship if, in  spite  of  the  corporation  having  a  subordinate
office at the place where the cause of action  arises  (with  which  in  all
probability the plaintiff  has  had  dealings),  such  plaintiff  is  to  be
compelled to travel to the place where the  corporation  has  its  principal
place. That place should be convenient  to  the  plaintiff;  and  since  the
corporation has  an  office  at  such  place,  it  will  also  be  under  no
disadvantage. Thus the Explanation provides an  alternative  locus  for  the
corporation’s place of business, not an additional one.”

            This Court has considered while interpreting  the  provision  of
section 20 CPC that no  practical  or  undue  difficulties  or  disadvantage
either to the plaintiff or the defendant corporation  could  be  caused.  It
has also been observed that it would be a great hardship if in spite of  the
corporation having a subordinate office  at  a  place  where  the  cause  of
action arises, such plaintiff is compelled to travel where  the  corporation
has its principal office. That place should be convenient to  the  plaintiff
and the corporation has an office at such  place,  will  also  be  under  no
disadvantage.

37.   Under clauses (a) to (c) of section 20 CPC, a plaintiff has  a  choice
of forum and cannot be compelled to go to a place of business  or  residence
of the defendant and can file a suit where the cause of action  arises.  The
intendment of the Explanation has also  been  taken  into  consideration  by
this Court in New Moga Transport Co. (supra) thus :

“9.  Normally, under clauses (a) to (c) the plaintiff has a choice of  forum
and cannot be compelled to go to the place of residence or business  of  the
defendant and can file a suit at a place where the cause of  action  arises.
If the  defendant  desires  to  be  protected  from  being  dragged  into  a
litigation at some place merely because the cause of action arises there  it
can save itself from such a situation by  an  exclusion  clause.  The  clear
intendment of the Explanation, however, is that where the corporation has  a
subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises  it  cannot
be heard to say that it cannot be sued there because it does  not  carry  on
business at that place. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 inter  alia  refer
to a court within the local  limits  of  whose  jurisdiction  the  defendant
inter alia “carries on business”. Clause (c) on the other hand refers  to  a
court within the local limits of whose  jurisdiction  the  cause  of  action
wholly or in part arises.

10. On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section  20  CPC  it  is  clear
that the Explanation consists  of  two  parts:  (i)  before  the  word  “or”
appearing between the words “office in India”  and  the  words  “in  respect
of”, and (ii) the  [pic]other  thereafter.  The  Explanation  applies  to  a
defendant which is a corporation, which term would include even  a  company.
The first part of the Explanation applies only  to  such  corporation  which
has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that  event,  the
court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the  company
is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as  even  if  the  defendant
may not actually be carrying on business at that place, it  will  be  deemed
to carry on business at that place because of the  fiction  created  by  the
Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a  case  where
the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at  one
place and has also a subordinate office at  another  place.  The  expression
“at such place” appearing in the Explanation and  the  word  “or”  which  is
disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within  the  latter  part
of the Explanation it  is  not  the  court  within  whose  jurisdiction  the
principal office of the defendant is situate  but  the  court  within  whose
jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone  has  the  jurisdiction
“in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also  a
subordinate office”.

38.   In  Exphar SA  (supra),  this  Court  had  considered  the  provisions
contained in section 62 of the Copyright Act and has observed that the  word
‘include’ shows that the jurisdiction for  the  purpose  of  section  62  is
wider than that  of  the  court  as  prescribed  under  the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure, 1908. This Court has laid down thus:

 “12. We would like to emphasise the word "include".  This  shows  that  the
jurisdiction for the purposes of Section 62 is wider than that of the  Court
as prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The relevant  extract
of the report of the Joint Committee  published  in  the  Gazette  of  India
dated   23-11-1956   which   preceded   and   laid   the   foundation    for
Section 62(2) said :

        "In the opinion of the Committee  many  authors  are  deterred  from
instituting  infringement  proceedings  because  the  court  in  which  such
proceedings are to be instituted is  situated  at  a  considerable  distance
from the place of their ordinary residence. The Committee  feels  that  this
impediment  should  be  removed  and  the  new  sub-clause  (2)  accordingly
provides that infringement proceedings may be  instituted  in  the  District
Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the  person  instituting
the proceedings ordinarily resides, carries on business etc."

13. It is, therefore, clear that the object and reason for the  introduction
of sub-section (2) of Section 62 was not  to  restrict  the  owners  of  the
copyright to exercise their rights but to remove any impediment  from  their
doing so. Section 62(2) cannot be read as limiting the jurisdiction  of  the
District Court only to cases where the person instituting the suit or  other
proceeding, or where there are more than  one  such  persons,  any  of  them
actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or  presently  works
for  gain.  It  prescribes  an  additional   ground   for   attracting   the
jurisdiction of a court over and above the “normal” grounds as laid down  in
Section 20 of the Code.”

         This Court held therein  that  the  Delhi  court  had  jurisdiction
since the plaintiff had averred that it has its registered office  in  Delhi
and seize and desist notice was also received by the  appellants  at  Delhi.
The decision in Exphar SA (supra) does not oust  the  applicability  of  the
provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure as  this  Court  has
laid down that section 62 has prescribed an  additional  ground  other  than
the normal ground prescribed in section 20 of the CPC.  The  question  posed
before us in the instant cases is different. In our considered opinion,  the
decision in Exphar SA (supra) buttresses the interpretation adopted by us.
39.   Reliance has also been placed on decision in Dhodha House  (supra)  in
which this Court considered the question about the  maintainability  of  the
composite suit for infringement of the Copyright  Act,  and  the  Trade  and
Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The Trade Marks Act, 1999 was also  considered.
This Court has laid down that composite suit may be maintainable  under  the
Copyright Act and the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 but that  may  not  be
relevant for the purpose of determining the question  of  a  forum  where  a
suit can be instituted. In case the court is not having  jurisdiction  under
one of the Acts, merely by combining the causes of action, the  jurisdiction
cannot be conferred  upon  the  court.  In  that  context,  this  Court  has
observed thus :

“20.  The jurisdiction of the District Court to determine a  lis  under  the
1957 Act as also the 1958 Act must, thus, be instituted where the  whole  or
a part of cause of action arises. Sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the  1957
Act provides for an additional forum therefore in the following terms:
"(2)  For  the  purpose  of  sub-section  (1),  a  "district  court   having
jurisdiction" shall, notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  of
civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the  time  being  in
force,  include  a  district  court  within  the  local  limits   of   whose
jurisdiction,  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the  suit  or  other
proceeding, the person instituting the suit or other  proceeding  or,  where
there are more than one such persons, any of them actually  and  voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain."

Admittedly, no such additional forum  had  been  created  in  terms  of  the
provisions of the 1958 Act.

                                  x x x x x
44.  A cause of action in a given case both  under  the  1957  Act  as  also
under the 1958 Act may  be  overlapping  to  some  extent.  The  territorial
jurisdiction conferred upon the court in terms  of  the  provisions  of  the
Code of civil Procedure indisputably shall apply to  a  suit  or  proceeding
under the 1957 Act as also the 1958 Act. Sub-section  (2)  of  Section 62 of
the 1957 Act provides for an additional forum.  Such  additional  forum  was
provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who may not otherwise  be
in a position to file a suit at different places  where  his  copyright  was
violated. The Parliament while enacting the Trade and Merchandise Marks  Act
in the year 1958 was aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act. It  still  did
not choose to make a similar provision therein.  Such  an  omission  may  be
held to be a conscious action on the part of the Parliament.  The  intention
of the Parliament in not providing for an additional forum  in  relation  to
the violation of the  1958  Act  is,  therefore,  clear  and  explicit.  The
Parliament while enacting the Trade Marks Act, 1999  provided  for  such  an
additional forum by enacting sub-section (2)  of  Section 134 of  the  Trade
Marks Act. The court shall not, it is  well  well-settled,  readily  presume
the existence of jurisdiction of a court which  was  not  conferred  by  the
statute. For the purpose of attracting the jurisdiction of a court in  terms
of sub-section (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the  conditions  precedent
specified therein must be fulfilled, the requisites wherefor  are  that  the
plaintiff must actually and voluntarily  reside  to  carry  on  business  or
personally work for gain.
                                  x x x x x

47. A corporation in view of Explanation appended to Section 20 of the  Code
would be deemed to be carrying on business inter alia at a  place  where  it
has a subordinate office. Only because, its goods are being sold at a  place
would thus evidently not mean that it carries a  business  at  that  place.”

(emphasis supplied by us)
              In Dhodha House (supra), the question which  is  posed  before
us did not come up for consideration and it has been observed that  the  Act
provides for an additional forum. Such additional forum was provided  so  as
to enable a plaintiff who may not be otherwise in a position to file a  suit
at different places where the copyright was violated.    We  have  anxiously
considered the aforesaid observations made and the object  of  the  Act,  we
find that the interpretation made  by  us  does  not  militate  against  the
observations made by this  Court   in  Dhodha  House  (supra),  the  precise
question which is before us, was not involved  in  the  aforesaid  case.   A
decision is not to be construed like a statute nor  by  inferential  process
it can be assumed that this Court has decided the  question  also  which  is
before this Court in the instant cases.

40.   This Court in Paragon Rubber Industries  &  Ors.  v.  Pragathi  Rubber
Mills & Ors. [2014 (57) PTC 1(SC)] held that a composite suit would  not  be
maintainable unless the court had jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  suit  in
relation to both the  Copyright  Act  and  the  Trade  Marks  Act.  No  such
question is involved in the cases.

41.   In Dabur India Ltd. (supra), the question was whether  composite  suit
of infringement of copyright and passing off  could  be  filed  in  a  court
having jurisdiction where the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides  or
carries on business or personally works for gain as provided  under  section
62 of the Copyright Act. This Court answered the question in  the  negative,
dismissed the appeal and held that Order 2 Rules 2 and 3 of the CPC  can  be
exercised only in the event when the court  has  otherwise  jurisdiction  in
respect of the cause of action wherefor the action has  been  brought.  This
Court has observed with respect to section 62 of the Copyright Act thus :
“32. There cannot  be  any  doubt  whatsoever  that  the  Parliament  having
inserted sub-section (2) in Section 62 of the 1957 Act, the jurisdiction  of
the court thereunder would be wider than the  one  under  Section 20 of  the
Code. The object and reasons for enactment of sub-section (2) of  Section 62
would also appear from the report of the Committee, as has been  noticed  by
this Court being a provision which has been specially designed to confer  an
extra benefit upon the authors  who  were  not  in  a  position  to  instate
copyright  infringement  proceeding  before  the  courts.  It  is   in   the
aforementioned context the law laid down  by  this  Court  in  paragraph  13
of Dhodha House (supra) must be understood.
                                  x x x x x
34.  What then would be meant by a composite suit?  A composite  suit  would
not entitle a court to entertain  a  suit  in  respect  whereof  it  has  no
jurisdiction, territorial  or  otherwise.   Order  2  Rule  3  of  the  Code
specifically states so and, thus, there is no reason  as  to  why  the  same
should be ignored.  A composite suit within the provisions of the  1957  Act
as considered in Dhodha House (supra), therefore, would mean the suit  which
is founded on infringement of a copyright and wherein the  incidental  power
of the court is required to be invoked.   A  plaintiff  may  seek  a  remedy
which can otherwise be granted by the court.  It  was  that  aspect  of  the
matter which had not been considered in Dhodha House (supra)  but  it  never
meant that two suits having  different  causes  of  action  can  be  clubbed
together as a composite suit.”
                                       (emphasis supplied by us)

                This Court in  Dabur  India  (supra)  with  respect  to  the
maintainability of a composite suit observed that  a  composite  suit  would
not entitle a court to entertain  a  suit  in  respect  whereof  it  has  no
jurisdiction territorial or otherwise. The decision in Dabur  India  (supra)
is of no help to the cause espoused by the appellants.

 42.  Now, we advert to various decisions of High Courts:
(a)    The decision of the Delhi High Court in Smithkline  Beecham   (supra)
has been relied upon. As the registered office was  situated  in  Delhi,  it
was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to  institute  a  suit  in  Delhi
court and the questions of  cause  of  action  etc.  did  not  come  up  for
consideration.
(b)   Delhi High Court in Caterpillar Inc. v. Kailash  Nichani  (supra)  has
observed that section 62 of  the  Copyright  Act  makes  a  significant  and
obvious departure from the norm  that  the  choice  of  jurisdiction  should
primarily be governed by convenience of the defendants.
(c)    In the decision in Intas Pharmaceuticals  Ltd.  (supra),  Delhi  High
Court has considered the provisions of section 20 of  the  CPC  and  section
134 of the Trade Marks Act. The High Court has observed in para  17  of  the
report  that  the  court  has  jurisdiction  by  virtue  of  the  provisions
contained in section 20(c) of the  CPC  as  the  defendant  is  selling  the
offending drug in Delhi.
(d)   In Ford Motor Co. & Anr. v. C.R. Borman  &  Anr.  [2008  (38)  PTC  76
(Del.)], Delhi High Court considered  that  the  plaintiff  carried  on  the
business in commercial quantities in Delhi and have authorised agents  also.
The pleadings of plaintiff have to be taken into consideration at  the  time
of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It was  observed  on
averments made that the Delhi High Court possessed territorial  jurisdiction
to entertain the suit as plaintiff carried on business at Delhi.
(e)   In Sap Aktiengesellschaft & Anr. v. M/s. Warehouse Infotech   [IA  No.
11153/2009 in CS(OS) No.623/2009 decided on 19.11.2009],  the question  came
up for consideration whether the plaintiff had a  right a file a suit if  he
carries on business in the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  Delhi.  The  High
Court held that in the plaint, jurisdiction was invoked on the  ground  that
the defendants are voluntarily residing and carrying on business  at  Delhi.
The plaintiff has branch office at Delhi and plaintiff’s authorised  partner
was offering the products  from  its  office  at  Delhi.  The  judgment  was
delivered considering the provisions of Order VII  Rule  10,  C.P.C.  taking
the plaint averments to be correct.
(f)   In Wipro Ltd. & Anr. v. Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd.  &
Ors. [2008 (37) PTC 269 Mad.], the High Court at Madras  has  observed  that
the provisions of section 20 CPC are not  applicable  as  far  as  the  High
Court at Madras is concerned. Therefore, the scope  of  section  62  of  the
Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act,  cannot  be  curtailed
by reference to section 20 CPC or clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

(g)   In Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique Chemicals & Ors. [2011 (47)  PTC
209  (Bom.)],  the  Bombay  High  Court  has  dealt  with  the   territorial
jurisdiction and held that section 134 of  the  Trade  Marks  Act  conferred
upon the plaintiff the benefit of  bringing  an  action  stipulated  therein
notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or  any  other
law.
(h)   In the case of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. & Anr. v.  Shree  Balaji  Cement
Industries & Ors. [2014 (58) PTC 1 (Bom.)], the High Court held that it  has
the  jurisdiction  as  the  plaintiff  carries  on   business   within   the
jurisdiction of the court and  plaintiff  No.1  has  registered  office  and
plaintiff No.2 has corporate office within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  said
court, though the defendants did not carry on  business  nor  do  they  have
place of business within the jurisdiction of that court.
The facts of the instant cases and the question  posed  is  different  which
did not come  up  for  consideration  in  any  of  the  aforesaid  decisions
rendered by the High Courts and even otherwise any observations  in  any  of
aforesaid  decisions  contrary  to  our  decision  cannot  hold  the  field.
Interpretation of provisions cannot be so wide  so  as  to  open  it  to  be
misused, it has to be subject to object of the Act as explained above.

43.    Coming  to  submission  that  vires  of  Section  62  has  not   been
questioned.  There is no doubt about it that the challenge to the  vires  of
section  62  has  not  been  made.  However,  the  question   is   that   of
interpretation and not that of  vires  of  the  provisions  which  has  been
considered by us. There will be no violence to section 62 of  Copyright  Act
and section 134 of Trade Marks Act by the interpretation adopted by  us  and
the right of the plaintiff which has been conferred  under  the  provisions,
also remains intact. There is no question  of  giving  disadvantage  to  the
plaintiff vis-a-vis the defendant but both will  stand  to  gain  by  proper
interpretation.

44.   We also find the submission to be  futile  that  the  law  as  to  the
otherwise on the basis of aforesaid decisions,  has  prevailed  for  a  long
time as such there should not be any interference.  Firstly,  the  judgments
are of recent origin. Even otherwise, we  have  considered  each  and  every
decision threadbare which has been referred to us.  It cannot be  said  that
the precise question involved in the cases before us  was  involved  in  the
aforesaid decisions or came up for consideration. In  Dhodha  House  (supra)
also,  the  question  posed  for  consideration  was   different   and   the
observations made therein are not supporting the cause raised on  behalf  of
the appellants. We are not taking  a  view  contrary  to  any  of  the  said
decisions of this Court. Thus, there is no need  to  refer  the  case  to  a
larger Bench.

45.   It was also submitted that as the bulk of litigation of such a  nature
is filed at Delhi and lawyers available at Delhi  are  having  expertise  in
the matter, as such it would be convenient  to the parties  to  contest  the
suit at Delhi. Such aspects are  irrelevant  for  deciding  the  territorial
jurisdiction. It is not the convenience of the lawyers  or  their  expertise
which makes out  the  territorial  jurisdiction.  Thus,  the  submission  is
unhesitatingly rejected.

46.   It was also submitted that the suit may be ordered to  be  transferred
to Delhi. We cannot order transfer of suit in  these  proceedings.  In  case
parties so desire, they are free to file  appropriate  application  but  the
suit is required to be presented in  the  court  of  competent  jurisdiction
only thereafter the question of transfer would be germane.

47.   In our opinion, the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act  and
section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to be interpreted in  the  purposive
manner. No doubt about it that a suit can be filed by  the  plaintiff  at  a
place where he is residing or carrying on business or personally  works  for
gain. He need not travel to file a  suit  to  a  place  where  defendant  is
residing or cause of action wholly  or  in  part  arises.  However,  if  the
plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a  place  where  cause
of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has  to  file  a  suit  at
that place, as discussed above. Thus, for the  aforesaid  reasons  mentioned
by us in the judgment, we are not inclined  to  interfere  with  the  orders
passed by  the  High  Court.  Appeals  are  hereby  dismissed.    No  costs.



..........................................J.
                                        (Jagdish Singh Khehar)

New                                                                   Delhi;
........................................J.
July 01, 2015.                               (Arun Mishra)