Russell Corp Australia Pty Ltd. Vs Shri Ashok Mahajan

Removal of a Registered Trademark on Grounds of Non-Use

Introduction:

The removal of a registered trademark on the grounds of non-use is a crucial aspect of trademark law that ensures trademarks are actively used in commerce to maintain their exclusivity. 

This article analyzes a specific case involving the removal of the trademark "SHERRIN" under the provisions of Section 47(1)(a) and Section 57 of the Trademarks Act, as well as considerations of bad faith registration and habitual squatting.

Background and Facts of the Case:

The subject matter revolves around the brand name "SHERRIN," originally adopted in 1879 by Mr. Thomas William Sherrin, who established T.W. Sherrin Pty Ltd., a company manufacturing specially shaped footballs for Australian Football. Over time, the company changed ownership and was eventually acquired by Russell Brands, LLC in 2003.

The petitioner filed a cancellation petition based on the following grounds:

Non-Use: The petitioner claimed that the trademark "SHERRIN" had not been used in commerce for a considerable period.

Bad Faith Registration: Allegations of the trademark's registration in bad faith under Section 57 of the Act.

Habitual Squatting: Accusations that the Respondent No. 1 was a habitual squatter of well-known marks.

The petitioner also introduced evidence in the form of an investigator's affidavit, asserting that the trademark had ceased to be used. The investigator's findings revealed that the mark had been discontinued since 2010.

Legal Analysis:

The legal analysis primarily centers around the provisions of Section 47 of the Trademarks Act, which outlines the conditions under which a trademark can be removed from the register due to non-use. Specifically, Section 47(1)(b) stipulates that a registered trademark can be removed if it remains unused for a period of five years and three months preceding the date of filing the rectification petition.

In the case of "SHERRIN," the court considered the timeline of events:

The impugned mark was filed on February 27, 2007, and registered on March 18, 2010.

The investigator's affidavit confirmed that the trademark had been discontinued since 2010.

The rectification petition was filed in the year 2020, well beyond the stipulated five years and three months of non-use.

The Court's Ruling:

Based on the evidence presented, the court found that the requirements of Section 47(1)(b) were satisfied. Since the trademark "SHERRIN" had not been in use for more than five years and three months preceding the rectification petition, the court allowed the petition for removal.

Conclusion:

The case highlights the importance of active and continuous use of trademarks to maintain their registration and exclusivity. It emphasizes the legal mechanism for removing trademarks on the grounds of non-use and underscores the need for evidentiary support, such as investigator affidavits, to establish the absence of use. The ruling reinforces the principle that trademarks must be used in commerce to retain their protection, serving as a cautionary tale for trademark holders to ensure proper utilization of their marks.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:08/08/2023

Case No. CO Comm IPD TM 164 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:5556

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Prathiba M Singh, HJ

Case Title: Russell Corp Australia Pty Ltd. Vs Shri Ashok Mahajan

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Roxtec Ab and anr Versus Sukant Chakravarty and Ors

Maintainability of Suit for Infringement of Design by Unregistered Licensee 

Introduction:

The subject matter under scrutiny pertains to a legal dispute involving the maintainability of a suit for infringement of design filed by Plaintiff No.1 and Plaintiff No.2 jointly. 

Plaintiff No.1 is the registered proprietor of the design, while Plaintiff No.2 is a wholly owned Indian subsidiary of Plaintiff No.1. 

The crux of the matter revolves around the Defendants' application seeking the removal of Plaintiff No.2 from the suit on the grounds that the suit cannot be maintained by Plaintiff as the same is not a registered license of the design.

Contention of the Defendants:

The Defendants assert that a suit for infringement of design cannot be maintained by Plaintiff No.2, who is unregistered Licensee and the wholly owned subsidiary of Plaintiff No.1 in India under Sections 22 and 30 of the Designs Act, 2000 unless the assignment or license is registered with the Design office. They contend that the suit initiated by Plaintiff No.2 is not maintainable, arguing that Plaintiff No.2 should be deleted from the proceedings. The Defendants base their argument on the requirement for registration under the aforementioned sections.

Plaintiffs' Counterarguments:

The Plaintiffs present a counterargument, citing Section 30 of the Designs Act, 2000, which they interpret as conferring discretion upon the party to register the license or assignment. Additionally, they emphasize that Section 30(5) allows the Court to admit a license even if not registered. The Plaintiffs highlight the language used in Section 30(1) and Section 30(2), contending that the use of the term 'may make an application' suggests that registration is not mandatory but optional.

Court's Observations and Analysis:

Upon analyzing the arguments presented by both parties, the Court delves into the nature of Plaintiff No.2's involvement in the suit. The Court observes that Plaintiff No.2 has been included in the proceedings not as the registered owner of the design but as a wholly owned subsidiary of Plaintiff No.1. Plaintiff No.2's role is to establish critical factors such as sales, promotional expenses, and the extent of business conducted in India concerning the products in question. The Court deems Plaintiff No.2's participation as relevant and integral to the adjudication of issues pertaining to damages and the rendering of accounts.

Rationale for Maintainability:

The Court concludes that the suit for infringement of design by an unregistered licensee, specifically Plaintiff No.2, is indeed maintainable. The Court takes into account the discretionary nature of registration under Section 30, which affords parties the choice to register or not. Furthermore, the Court relies on Section 30(5) to emphasize that unregistered licenses can still be presented in the proceedings. 

The Concluding Note:

In light of the aforementioned arguments and analysis, the Hon'ble Court concludes that the suit for infringement of design by an unregistered licensee, specifically Plaintiff No.2, is maintainable. 

The Court's decision hinges on the discretionary nature of registration, the ability to introduce unregistered licenses, and the interpretation of relevant sections of the Designs Act, 2000. 

This legal determination underscores the significance of Plaintiff No.2's role in establishing crucial evidence related to damages and financial matters in the proceedings.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:07/08/2023

Case No. CS Comm 1045 of 2016

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:5572

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Prathiba M Singh, HJ

Case Title: Roxtec Ab and anr Versus Sukant Chakravarty and Ors

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Paul Components Pvt. Ltd. Vs Hi Tech Arai Pvt. Ltd.

Date of Judgement/Order:09/08/2023

Case No. CS Comm 374

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:5612

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, HJ

Case Title: Paul Components Pvt. Ltd. Vs Hi Tech Arai Pvt. Ltd.

Defendant's Burden of Proof under Section 34 of the Trademarks Act 1999

Introduction:

The case at hand involves a dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant over the alleged infringement of the Plaintiff's registered trademark "HTA" for oil seals and automobile rubber parts. 

The Plaintiff claims to have extensively and openly used the mark since 1977, while the Defendant, lacking a trademark registration, is accused of using similar marks "HTA" and "ARS-HTA" for oil seals. 

The Plaintiff seeks an injunction against the Defendant's alleged infringing use. This article will delve into the requirements for the Defendant to successfully avail the protection provided by Section 34 of the Trademarks Act 1999 in light of the presented facts and relevant legal principles.

Section 34 of the Trademarks Act 1999:

Section 34 of the Trademarks Act 1999 provides a limited defense to an unregistered user of a mark that is registered in favor of another party. It allows the infringer to escape an injunction if their use of the impugned mark predates the use or the registration, whichever is earlier,  of the mark owned by the plaintiff This provision seeks to balance the rights of a registered trademark owner with those of an unregistered user who has established prior use.

Analysis of Defendant's Case:

To take advantage of the protection offered under Section 34, the Defendant must establish the following elements:

Prior Use: The Defendant needs to demonstrate that they have been using the impugned mark (in this case, "HTA" and "ARS-HTA") before the Plaintiff's date of  registered mark "HTA or user , whichever is earlier. In this case, the Defendant claims to have used the mark since 1985.

Precedence over Plaintiff's Use: The Defendant must establish that their use of the impugned mark began before the Plaintiff's use of their registered mark in 1977. This chronology is crucial for the Defendant's case under Section 34.

Good Faith: The Defendant's prior use should be established in good faith, without attempting to capitalize on the Plaintiff's established reputation or goodwill associated with their mark.

In the present case, while the Plaintiff's registered trademark dates back to 2007, while its use of the mark "HTA" since 1977 becomes relevant. The Defendant asserts use since 1985, which would place their use subsequent to the Plaintiff's use. This timeline potentially jeopardizes the Defendant's ability to invoke Section 34 as a defense. Result was that the Defendant failed in taking advantage of Section 34 of Trademark Act 1999.

Conclusion:

Section 34 of the Trademarks Act 1999 provides an exception to the general principle of protecting registered trademarks by allowing an unregistered user to continue using a mark under certain circumstances. To successfully avail this defense, the Defendant must prove their prior and non-infringing use of the impugned mark, with the use predating the Plaintiff's use or  registration, whichever is earlier.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue  involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

The Role of Judges in Shaping Public Policy in India

Introduction

The Constitution of India stands as the bedrock of the nation's legal and political framework, enshrining the principles of justice, equality, and democratic governance. Central to this framework is the concept of an independent judiciary, tasked with interpreting the law and safeguarding the rights of citizens. This article delves into the nuanced debate surrounding the extent to which judges should actively shape public policy, examining the delicate balance between judicial activism and judicial restraint within the Indian context.

The Judiciary's Constitutional Mandate

India's judiciary, as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, holds a pivotal role in upholding the rule of law and ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society. Its independence is enshrined to safeguard against undue influence from the executive and legislative branches. The judiciary's power to strike down unconstitutional laws or actions, thus serving as a check on potential government overreach, underscores the significance of its role in maintaining a just and equitable society.

The Dilemma of Judicial Activism

The concept of judicial activism refers to instances where judges go beyond mere interpretation of the law and actively engage in shaping public policy. While this can be a powerful tool to safeguard citizens' rights in the face of legislative or executive inaction, it also raises concerns about a potential encroachment on the domain of the other branches of government. The question of whether judges should limit themselves to interpreting the law or actively participate in shaping public policy is at the heart of a vigorous debate.

The Necessity of Judicial Activism

Proponents of judicial activism argue that the judiciary's active involvement in shaping public policy is a necessity, particularly when the executive and legislative branches fail to adequately protect citizens' rights. Instances of social injustice, environmental degradation, or human rights violations might call for judicial intervention to ensure that justice is served. In a diverse and dynamic society like India, where marginalized communities may not have a strong voice in the political process, judicial activism can play a vital role in addressing systemic issues.

The Limits of Judicial Activism

On the other hand, those in favor of judicial restraint contend that judges should refrain from overstepping their role as interpreters of the law. They posit that the executive and legislative branches are accountable to the electorate and are better equipped to formulate and implement policy decisions. Excessive judicial activism, they argue, could lead to an imbalance of power, where unelected judges wield disproportionate influence over matters of public policy, potentially undermining the principles of democracy.

Preserving Judicial Independence

The independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of India's democratic fabric. It serves as a critical check on the other branches of government, ensuring that no one branch becomes unchecked in its power. This independence is not just a legal principle but a fundamental safeguard for citizens' rights and freedoms. Any discussion on the role of judges in shaping public policy must carefully consider the delicate balance required to preserve this independence while fulfilling the judiciary's broader responsibilities.

Striking the Balance

Ultimately, the dichotomy between judicial activism and judicial restraint is not a binary choice but a nuanced balancing act. Judges must exercise discretion, considering the specific circumstances of each case, the gravity of the issues at hand, and the potential consequences of their decisions. While judges should generally limit themselves to interpreting the law, there will be instances where judicial activism is essential to safeguard the principles of justice, equality, and human rights.

Conclusion

The role of judges in shaping public policy in India presents a complex and multifaceted challenge. The Constitution envisages an independent judiciary as a guardian of citizens' rights, with the authority to strike down unconstitutional laws and actions. Striking the right balance between judicial activism and judicial restraint is crucial to maintaining the integrity of India's democratic system. While judges must exercise caution to avoid overreach, they should also be prepared to step in when necessary to protect the rights and interests of the citizens they serve. The ongoing debate underscores the vitality of a robust, independent judiciary in upholding the ideals of the Indian Constitution and ensuring justice for all.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
IP ADJUTOR
Patent and Trademark Attorney
ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com
9990389539

A Comprehensive Analysis of Proposed Amendments to IPC, CRPC, and Evidence Act

A Comprehensive Analysis of Proposed Amendments to IPC, CRPC, and Evidence Act: A Legal Perspective

Introduction:

The Bills proposing amendments to the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC), and the Evidence Act encompass a myriad of salient features that aim to address various shortcomings within the criminal justice system. This article undertakes a detailed analytical examination of these proposed amendments, shedding light on their potential implications and the broader legal landscape they seek to reshape.

Digitization of Criminal Justice Process:

The proposed digitization of the entire criminal justice process, from FIR registration to judgment delivery, is a transformative step towards efficiency and transparency. This modernization can streamline proceedings, reduce paperwork, and expedite justice delivery.

Video Conferencing for Trial:

Facilitating complete trials, including cross-examinations, through video conferencing can revolutionize courtroom procedures. This move addresses logistical challenges, enhances witness protection, and accelerates the trial process.

Videography of Statements and Search & Seizure:

Mandatory videography of victims' statements in sexual crimes and during search & seizure operations bolsters the authenticity of evidence. This could potentially deter manipulation and ensure a fair and accurate portrayal of events.

Timelines for Filing Charge Sheet and Judgment:

The stipulation of timeframes for filing charge sheets and delivering judgments reinforces the principle of speedy justice. However, provisions for extensions acknowledge the complexity of certain cases and ensure thorough examination.

Online Availability of Judgments:

Mandating the online publication of judgments within 7 days enhances transparency, accessibility, and public accountability. This move aligns with the global trend of open justice and promotes a better-informed society.

Forensic Teams and Mobile FSLs:

Requiring forensic teams to visit crime scenes for serious offenses and deploying mobile Forensic Science Laboratories (FSLs) at the district level enhances evidence collection and analysis, potentially strengthening the prosecution's case.

Mob Lynching Provision:

The introduction of a distinct provision to address mob lynching, with penalties ranging from 7 years' imprisonment to the death penalty, is a significant step towards curbing this menace. This provision emphasizes the severity of such crimes and aims to deter potential offenders, thereby safeguarding the fundamental right to life and personal security.

Zero FIR' and Jurisdiction:

The formalization of the 'Zero FIR' concept is a progressive move, empowering citizens to report crimes at any police station, irrespective of jurisdiction. This ensures prompt action and prevents delays in initiating investigations, ultimately enhancing access to justice.

Deemed Sanction' for Prosecution:

The concept of 'deemed sanction' adds an element of accountability to the prosecution of civil servants and police officers accused of criminal offenses. By mandating prosecution in case of authority's inaction within 120 days, this provision promotes transparency and combats potential misuse of power.

Separate Provisions for Specific Offenses:

The inclusion of separate provisions for organized crimes, rape under false pretexts, chain snatching, and similar offenses underscores the intent to address specific societal challenges with tailored legal responses.

Commutation of Sentences:

The provision limiting the commutation of death penalties, life terms, and shorter sentences underscores the gravity of certain offenses. This calibrated approach aims to balance punishment and rehabilitation, while accounting for the severity of the crime.

The Concluding Note:

The proposed amendments to the IPC, CRPC, and Evidence Act signify a comprehensive overhaul of India's criminal justice system. By addressing specific shortcomings and introducing innovative measures, these amendments strive to expedite justice delivery, enhance accountability, and ensure the protection of individual rights. While the efficacy of these changes will depend on their implementation and interpretation, they reflect a significant stride towards a more just and efficient legal framework.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
IP ADJUTOR
Patent and Trademark Attorney
ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com
9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Google LLC Vs DRS Logistics Pvt. Ltd

Date of Judgement/Order:10.08 2023

Case No. FAO OS Comm 02 of 2022 

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:5615-DB 

Name of Hon'ble Court: Dlehi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Vibhu Bakhru and Amit Mahajan, HJ

Case Title: Google LLC Vs DRS Logistics Pvt. Ltd

Google Ad Programme and Trademark Infringement 

Introduction:

The case at hand involves a legal dispute between AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS  and Google with regard to the use of trademarks as keywords in the Google Ads Programme.

The Plaintiff alleges that Google's practice of allowing the use of its trademark as keywords in the Ads Programme infringes upon its trademarks and diverts internet traffic to competitors, leading to confusion among potential customers. This article aims to analyze the legal aspects of this case, focusing on whether such use constitutes trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Background and Allegations:

The Plaintiff claims that its trademark/trade name 'AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS' has acquired goodwill and reputation due to continuous use, advertising campaigns, marketing efforts, and quality control. 

The Plaintiff alleges that Google encourages third parties to use its registered trademarks as keywords, leading to the display of sponsored links for websites that infringe its trademarks.

The Plaintiff contended that such use of its trademarks diverts potential customers and causes confusion, ultimately infringing upon its trademarks.

Legal Analysis:

The central issue before the court is whether the use of trademarks as keywords in the Google Ads Programme constitutes trademark infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The court's analysis revolves around the following key points:

Use of Trademarks as Keywords: 

The court acknowledges that Google's Ads Programme allows advertisers to display sponsored links based on users' search queries. The use of trademarks as keywords is a way to identify relevant internet users. However, the court emphasizes that not all use of marks, even similar ones, constitutes infringement.

Deceptiveness and Confusion: 

The Plaintiff's contention is that the use of its trademark as keywords leads to confusion among internet users, causing them to believe that they are accessing the Plaintiff's services. The court acknowledges this concern but notes that the use of trademarks as keywords is not inherently deceitful.

Detriment to Character or Repute: 

The court establishes that the use of a trademark as a keyword, without blurring or tarnishing the trademark's distinctiveness, is not necessarily detrimental. However, if the displayed ads harm the character or reputation of the trademark, an action for infringement may be warranted.

Goods and Services: 

The court distinguishes between goods and services covered under the registered trademark and those offered by the advertiser. If the goods or services are similar, Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act might not apply. However, if dissimilar goods are involved and the trademark has a reputation, the court considers whether the use provides unfair advantage and damages the trademark's distinctive character.

Use of Trademarks and Infringement: 

The court rejects the notion that the mere use of trademarks to display advertisements automatically constitutes trademark infringement. It emphasizes that context, such as the impact on the trademark's reputation and character, must be considered.

Conclusion:

In this case, the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi upheld that the use of trademarks as keywords in the Google Ads Programme does not per se amount to infringement. 

The court's decision hinges on the absence of blurring or tarnishing of the trademark's distinctiveness, and it clarifies that the use of trademarks as keywords is in relation to the goods and services offered by the advertiser. 

The court emphasizes that each case must be examined on its own merits to determine if trademark infringement has occurred. Therefore, while the Plaintiff's concerns regarding confusion and diversion of traffic are acknowledged, the court's analysis underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of trademark infringement in the digital advertising realm.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue  involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Iftikhar Alam Vs M M I Tobacco Pvt Ltd.

Date of Judgement/Order:07.08.2023

Case No. First Appeal from Order No.77 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2023:AHC:157460

Name of Hon'ble Court: Allahabad High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Kshitij Shailendra, HJ

Case Title: Iftikhar Alam Vs M M I Tobacco Pvt Ltd.

Analyzing the Necessity of Prima Facie Case, Balance of Convenience, and Damages in Deciding Interim Applications for Injunctions

Introduction: 

The legal landscape surrounding interim applications for injunctions is a complex and multifaceted arena that requires a careful consideration of various factors. In the case at hand, where an appeal challenges an order granting a temporary injunction based solely on a registered trademark, it becomes imperative to delve into the necessity of establishing a prima facie case, balancing the convenience of the parties involved, and assessing potential damages while deciding such applications.

Prima Facie Case:

 In the present case, the trial court granted the injunction based solely on the existence of a registered trademark, MUSA KA GUL, without engaging in a comprehensive analysis of the respondent's prima facie case. It is imperative for the court to scrutinize factors such as the strength of the trademark, the likelihood of confusion, and the evidence of prior usage to determine the validity of the applicant's claim. The Court also discussed the claim of prior user by the Appellant , besides other disputed facts. The Appellate Court emphasized that while evaluating interim injunction, Observation on Prima facie case is required.

Balance of Convenience:

In this case, it appears that the trial court failed to adequately consider the balance of convenience. While the registered trademark was the basis for the injunction, the court should have assessed whether the respondent would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction and whether the appellant would be unjustly restrained from conducting their business.

Assessment of Damages:

Determining the need for an interim injunction also involves assessing the potential damages that could arise from either granting or denying the injunction. Injunctions are intended to prevent irreparable harm, which cannot be adequately compensated by monetary damages. In the case at hand, the trial court did not engage in a thorough analysis of the potential damages that could result from granting or denying the injunction. The court should have evaluated the financial impact on both parties and the feasibility of providing compensation in case of an adverse outcome.

The Concluding Note:

The decision to grant or deny an interim injunction is a nuanced process that requires a holistic evaluation of various legal and factual elements. In the context of the present case, where the trial court's decision was primarily based on the existence of a registered trademark, it becomes evident that a more comprehensive analysis of the respondent's prima facie case, the balance of convenience, and potential damages was warranted. A well-reasoned and thorough approach to interim applications for injunctions is crucial to ensuring that the rights of both parties are adequately protected and that justice is served. 

The appellate court's decision to set aside the order and remand the matter for re-adjudication highlights the importance of conducting a comprehensive analysis before granting or denying interim injunctions.

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

1RM Fitness Equipment Vs Ms. Priyanka Barua

Date of Judgement/Order:02.08.2023

Case No. Interim Application No.1360 of  2023 in First Appeal No. 141 of 2023

Neutral Citation: NA

Name of Hon'ble Court: Bombay High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Prithviraj K Chavan, HJ

Case Title: 1RM Fitness Equipment Vs Ms. Priyanka Barua

Difference between Non-Disclosure of Cause of Action and Defective Cause of Action 

Introduction:

This analytical legal article discusses the distinction between non-disclosure of cause of action and defective cause of action in the context of a trademark infringement case. The case in question involves an appeal challenging the rejection of a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C) on the ground that the plaint does not disclose the cause of action. The crux of the dispute centers around the timing of trademark registration and its impact on the existence of the cause of action for trademark infringement.

Non-Disclosure of Cause of Action:

Non-disclosure of cause of action occurs when a plaintiff fails to adequately present the essential facts and circumstances that give rise to the claim. In the case at hand, the respondent contends that the appellants did not have a cause of action for trademark infringement at the time of filing the suit since their device/logo "1RM Fitness" was not registered as a trademark on the date of institution of the suit, which was 25th September 2020. As per the respondent's argument, the cause of action did not exist on the specified date, and thus, the plaint should be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C.

Defective Cause of Action:

On the other hand, defective cause of action pertains to a situation where the cause of action exists but is improperly presented or formulated by the plaintiff. The appellants argued that a typographical error occurred in para 18 of the plaint, which was meant to state the date when the cause of action first arose to file the suit. 

They contend that the omission of this date should not result in the rejection of the plaint, as the defective cause of action should be decided during the trial and not at the stage of plaint scrutiny.

Analysis:

The crucial issue in this case is whether the typographical error regarding the date of the cause of action should be accepted by the court. The respondent contends that such an admission cannot be allowed to mitigate the absence of trademark registration at the time of filing the suit. According to their argument, the error is not merely a minor mistake but rather indicative of the appellants' lack of due diligence and failure to comply with mandatory requirements for initiating a trademark infringement claim.

The respondent further emphasizes that the cause of action for trademark infringement arises from the existence of a registered trademark. Since the appellants did not possess a registered trademark at the time of filing the suit, there was no question of infringement, as the trademark was not statutorily recognized. The registration of the trademark on 17th March 2021, long after the suit was filed, is seen as a clear indication of the appellants' failure to adhere to the statutory requirement, further supporting the contention that the cause of action was lacking.

The Courr observed that the appellants admitted to a typographical error in stating the date when the cause of action first arose in their trademark infringement claim. However, the respondent argues that this admission cannot be accepted to overlook the absence of trademark registration at the time of filing the suit. Since the trademark was not statutorily recognized due to late registration on 17th March 2021, the respondent rightly contended  that there was no infringement. This also  highlights the appellants' lack of due diligence and failure to comply with mandatory requirements regarding keeping the date of the cause of action empty in that para. This can not be regarded as merely defective casue of action. In fact this is a case of non disclosure of cause of action. In view of the above finding  the Appeal was rejected.

The Concluding Note:

There is distinction between non-disclosure of cause of action and defective cause of action is pivotal in determining the fate of the plaint in this trademark infringement case. The court will have to assess whether the absence of trademark registration at the time of filing the suit indeed renders the cause of action non-existent or if it can be categorized as a defect in the presentation of the cause of action.

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

V R Holding Vs Heo Investcorp Limited

Date of Judgement/Order:04.08.2023

Case No. LPA 397 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC : 5458

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Yashwant Varma , H.J. and Dharmesh Sharma HJ

Case Title: V R Holding Vs Heo Investcorp Limited

Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against Judgment passed by High Court in a Trademark Rectification Petition

Introduction:

The issue of maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against a judgment passed by the High Court in a Trademark Rectification Petition has been a matter of contention. This article analyzes the recent case  post  Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Phonepe Private Limited & Anr [2023:DHC:3426-DB] and subsequent developments that affirm the maintainability of such appeals.

Background:

The case in question involved the dismissal of a rectification petition of a trademark by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. The respondent challenged the judgment by contending that the earlier decision of the Delhi High Court in Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Phonepe Private Limited & Anr did not consider the scope of Limitation put by  Section 13 of the Commercial Court Act 2015 to Appeals, particularly with reference to Letters Patent Appeal.

Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Phonepe Private Limited & Anr:

In Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Phonepe Private Limited & Anr, the Delhi High Court answered the issue of maintainability of an LPA against a judgment passed by the High Court in a rectification petition, in affirmative. However, the respondent argued that this judgment failed to consider the provisions of Section 13 of the Commercial Court Act 2015, which seemingly restricts any other intra-Court appeal, beyond the provision of Order 43 CPC.

The Hon'ble High Court's Ruling:

The Hon'ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in the present case, reaffirmed its earlier judgment in Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Phonepe Private Limited & Anr and held that an LPA against the judgment of a Single Judge in a Trademark Rectification Petition is maintainable, albeit supplementing with reasoning , as left out in Resilient Judgement.

Reasoning:

The Division Bench elucidated that the bar under Section 13 of the Commercial Court Act 2015 does not apply to judgments passed by Single Judges of the High Court in a Rectification Petition under Section 57 of Trade Marks Act 1999[ TMA]. 

The rationale behind this conclusion lies in the nature of jurisdiction exercised by a Judge in the Commercial Division while entertaining a petition under Section 57 of TMA. Section 57 enables any aggrieved person to seek cancellation or variation of a registered trademark before the High Court or the Registrar.

The power vested in the High Court under Section 57 is a specific authority conferred by the TMA and not derived from its existing ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Hence, when the High Court entertains a petition under Section 57, it does so solely through the avenue created by the TMA, rather than its general civil jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Court referred to Section 13(1A) of the 2015 Act, which specifically mentions a judgment or order rendered by a commercial court exercising "original civil jurisdiction." Since the power exercised by the Commercial Division under Section 57 is not traceable to its original jurisdiction, appeals against judgments or orders not arising from the exercise of original jurisdiction would not be governed by Section 13 of the 2015 Act.

The Concluding Note:

The Hon'ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, through its reaffirmation of the earlier judgment in Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Phonepe Private Limited & Anr, has clarified the maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals against judgments passed by the High Court in Trademark Rectification Petitions. The Court's reasoning underscores the distinction between the jurisdiction exercised under Section 57 of the TMA and the general civil jurisdiction of the Commercial Division, thus confirming the viability of such Letters Patent appeals.

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Foodlink F and B Holdings India Pvt.Ltd. Vs WOW Momo Foods Private Limited

Date of Judgement/Order:03.08.2023

Case No. Co Comm (IPD-Pat) 3 of 2021

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC : 5521

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, H.J.

Case Title: Foodlink F and B Holdings India Pvt.Ltd. Vs WOW Momo Foods Private Limited

The Effect of Disclaimers on Subsequently Associated Registered Trademarks:

Abstract: 

This article analyzes a recent judgment before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, which addressed the effect of disclaimers attached to an earlier registered trademark on subsequently associated registered trademarks. 

The case involved a dispute between the plaintiff, holding the registration for "CHINA BISTRO," and the defendant using the trademark "WOW CHINA BITRO." 

The defendant argued that disclaimers attached to earlier registered trademarks also apply to subsequently associated registered trademarks. The court's ruling clarified the scope of associated trademarks and the applicability of disclaimers to later trademarks.

Introduction:

When trademarks are associated, it allows for the transfer and assignment of multiple trademarks as a single unit. This article delves into the legal implications of disclaimers attached to an earlier registered trademark concerning subsequently associated registered trademarks, using the recent CHINA BISTRO case as a reference.

Background of the CHINA BISTRO Case:

The plaintiff, who owned the registered trademark "CHINA BISTRO," filed a suit against the defendant's use of the trademark "WOW CHINA BITRO." The defendant's argument centered on the idea that subsequently registered trademarks of the plaintiff, which were associated with the earlier registered trademarks having disclaimers, should also be subject to the same disclaimer.

Plaintiff's Clarification on Associated Trademarks:

The plaintiff countered the defendant's argument by referring to Section 44 of the Trade Marks Act, asserting that associated trademarks are treated as a single unit only for the purpose of assignment and transmission. Other than that consideration, each trademark, even if associated with each other, should be treated as separate trademarks. Thus, the disclaimer attached to trade mark no. 1470912 and 2264846 would not apply to the later trademarks.

Court's Observations and Ruling:

The court carefully examined the arguments presented by both parties. It noted that no provision was shown indicating that a disclaimer in an earlier registered trademark would automatically apply to subsequently associated registered trademarks. 

The court emphasized that if the intent of the registering authority was to include such disclaimers for later marks, the certificate of registration for those marks would expressly reflect that.

Based on its interpretation of Section 44 of the Trade Marks Act and considering the lack of evidence supporting the automatic extension of disclaimers, the court ruled that the disclaimer in the present case would apply only to the first two registered trademarks, i.e., trade mark no. 1470912 and 2264846. The subsequently associated registered trademarks, including "WOW CHINA BITRO," would not be subject to the earlier disclaimers.

The Concluding Note:

The CHINA BISTRO case provides valuable insights into the legal aspects of disclaimers attached to earlier registered trademarks concerning subsequently associated registered trademarks. The court's ruling clarified that such disclaimers do not automatically extend to later trademarks, unless expressly stated in the certificate of registration.

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Dr. Reddys Laboratories Limited Vs The Controller of Patent

Date of Judgement/Order:03.08.2023

Case No. Co Comm (IPD-Pat) 3 of 2021

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC : 5520

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, H.J.

Case Title: Dr. Reddys Laboratories Limited Vs The Controller of Patent

Revocation Petition for Patent: Suit or Not within  Section 10 CPC?

Introduction:

The matter at hand revolves around the question of whether a revocation petition for a patent can be treated as a suit within the meaning of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). 

The Patentee sought a stay on the cancellation of the revocation proceeding pending before the Delhi High Court under Section 10 CPC, claiming that a suit proceeding was filed before the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

Background:

The subject matter pertains to Indian Patent No. IN 268846. The revocation petition was electronically uploaded on the Delhi High Court's website on 16.10.2021 but listed before the Court on 22.10.2021. 

Conversely, the Suit was filed before the Himachal Pradesh High Court on 19.10.2021 but listed before the Court on 20.10.2021. The Delhi High Court deemed the revocation petition as earlier instituted, considering the electronic upload date of 16.10.2021, which preceded the Suit's filing on 19.10.2021.

The Court's Analysis:

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi carefully analyzed the provisions of Section 10 CPC and relevant aspects of patent revocation proceedings to arrive at its decision.

Absence of Provision: 

The court observed that there is no explicit provision by which a revocation petition under Section 64 of the Patents Act can be treated as a suit under the CPC. Absence such a provision, the court stated that it cannot deem a revocation petition to be a suit.

Difference in Procedural Nature: 

The court highlighted the procedural distinctions between a revocation petition and a suit proceeding. In a case where Section 10 CPC applies, the court handling the later suit may still pass interlocutory orders under Order XXXIX of the CPC and other related provisions. The trial of the suit is the only aspect stayed. However, in patent revocation proceedings, there is no provision for a trial like a suit proceeding.

Inconsistency in Application: 

The court addressed the concern of potentially inconsistent application of Section 10 CPC. If certain revocation petitions require a trial while others do not, only the former would become subject to Section 10 CPC. This inconsistency would not align with the intended legal position.

Conclusion:

Based on the analysis of Section 10 CPC and the nature of patent revocation proceedings, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi concluded that a revocation petition under Section 64 of the Patents Act cannot be treated as a suit proceeding within the meaning of Section 10 CPC. The absence of an explicit provision and the different procedural nature of the two proceedings were the key factors that influenced the court's decision.

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Hem Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs ITC Limited.

Date of Judgement/Order:11.04.2012

Case No. Notice of Motion No. 3940 in Suit No.2808 of 2009

Neutral Citation: NA

Name of Hon'ble Court: Bombay High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: S.J. Vazifdar, H.J.

Case Title: Hem Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs ITC Limited.

Intention to Use an Expression as a Descriptor is Immaterial if it Actually Results in Confusion

Introduction: 

In this legal article, we delve into a case where the plaintiff claimed to be the registered proprietor of the marks "MADHUR" and "MADHUR MADHUR GULAB" written in devanagari script. The subject matter of the suit was filed against the defendant's use of the trademark "MANGALDEEP MADHUR."

The defendant argued that they use the expression "MANGALDEEP MADHUR" not as a trademark but merely to describe their product and its characteristics. 

However, the court rejected this contention and restrained the defendant, emphasizing that even if the intention to use the mark as a trademark was absent, infringement could still occur if confusion resulted.

The Court's Decision:

The Court observed that the intention to use a mark as a trademark is not the sole determinant of infringement. Under section 29(1) and section (2)(zb)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, a registered trademark is infringed if it is used in a manner likely to be taken as a trademark, regardless of the user's intent.

Trademark Infringement and Connection in the Course of Trade:

The court pointed out that the use of a registered trademark would constitute infringement if it indicates a connection in the course of trade between the person and their goods or services, irrespective of their intention. The crucial factor here is whether the use of the mark creates a likelihood of confusion among consumers, leading them to believe there is a connection between the defendant's goods and the registered proprietor's goods.

Descriptive Sub-Brands and Confusion:

The defendant argued that their products were sold under the umbrella brand "MANGALDEEP" and that the descriptors such as "MADHUR" and "MADHUR 100" were used to signify the quality and characteristics of the product. 

However, the court rejected this argument, stating that even if the defendant genuinely intended to use the mark only as a description of the product's aroma, it would not make any difference if the use of the mark was likely to be taken as a trademark.

The Concluding Note:

This case sets a precedent that the intention to use an expression as a descriptor is immaterial if it actually results in confusion among consumers, leading them to believe that the expression is being used as a trademark. 

It reinforces the need for businesses to exercise caution while using marks, especially when they are similar to registered trademarks, to avoid potential infringement claims. As the court highlighted, the use of a registered trademark would still be considered an infringement if it indicates a connection in the course of trade, irrespective of the user's intention. 

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

=====

V Guard Industries Ltd Vs Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals Ltd

Date of Judgement/Order:12.05.2022

Case No. CS Comm 92 of 2022

Neutral Citation: NA

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Jyoti Singh, H.J.

Case Title: V Guard Industries Ltd Vs Crompton Greaves Consumer Electricals Ltd

Use of Housemark as Prefix and Trademark Infringement:

Introduction: 

This article discusses a legal case involving the use of a house mark as a prefix with another trademark and its potential implications for trademark infringement. 

The case revolves around a plaintiff who claimed ownership of the trademark "PEBBLE" and filed a suit against a defendant using the trademark "CROMPTON PEBBLE" for dry irons. 

The defendant argued that the use of the house mark "CROMPTON" distinguished its products from the plaintiff's, but the court rejected this defense and restrained the defendant from using the trademark "PEBBLE."

Background:

The plaintiff was the registered proprietor of the trademark "PEBBLE" under no. 2503134 in Class 11 for water heaters, electric water heaters, heating coils, electric water geysers, etc. The defendant was using the trademark "CROMPTON PEBBLE" in relation to dry irons, which the plaintiff alleged to infringe upon their registered trademark.

Defendant's Defense:

The defendant argued that there would be no confusion among the public since they were using "CROMPTON PEBBLE" and not "PEBBLE" for dry irons, which were not sold by the plaintiff.

 They contended that their products were known for their quality and were sold in the market with various product identification marks associated with the house mark "CROMPTON." 

The defendant further asserted that the plaintiff could not claim exclusive rights to the word "PEBBLE" and, therefore, could not allege infringement against "CROMPTON PEBBLE."

Court's Ruling:

The court rejected the defendant's contentions by observing that the Trade Marks Act does not recognize the concept of subbranding.

In cases of infringement involving label or word marks, the test for infringement is based on the prominent word of the mark. 

Therefore, adopting a prominent word from the plaintiff's label/device mark, as the defendant did with "PEBBLE," constitutes infringement. 

In this case, "PEBBLE" was an essential part of the plaintiff's registered trademark, and the defendant could not argue for exclusive use of the word based on registration.

Additionally, the court noted that the defendant had consistently used the mark "PEBBLE" with its house mark "CROMPTON" as a source identifier for its products.

The plaintiff had been using the registered mark/label with the dominant part being the word "PEBBLE" since 2013. 

The defendant's lack of a plausible explanation for adopting the word "PEBBLE" in conjunction with "CROMPTON" further strengthened the court's decision.

The Concluding Note:

In light of the court's observations, the defendant was restrained from using the trademark "PEBBLE." 

The case highlights the importance of not using prominent words from other trademarks as part of a new trademark, even if a house mark is used as a prefix. 

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Dr. Reddys Laboratories limited Vs Controller of Patent and Others

Date of Judgement/Order:10.11.2022

Case No. C.O.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 3/2021

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:004746

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Prathiba M Singh, HJ

Case Title: Dr. Reddys Laboratories limited Vs Controller of Patent and Others

The Static and Dynamic Effect of Patent and Territorial Jurisdiction of High Courts with Respect to Patent Appeal and Patent Revocation

Abstract:

This analytical legal article explores the territorial jurisdiction of High Courts concerning patent revocation and patent appeals after the abolition of the IPAB (Intellectual Property Appellate Board). It examines two scenarios involving different High Courts and patent applications filed in different locations. 

The article analyzes the concept of territorial jurisdiction under the 1970 Act, focusing on the static and dynamic effects of patent grants and their impact on commercial interests. The discussion revolves around the relevant considerations for determining the High Court's territorial jurisdiction in patent-related matters.

Introduction:

The territorial jurisdiction of High Courts plays a crucial role in patent revocation and appeal cases. This article delves into the complexities arising after the IPAB's abolition and how the jurisdiction is determined in two distinct scenarios: Patent Revocation and Patent Appeal.

Territorial Jurisdiction in Patent Revocation:

In cases of patent revocation, the High Court's territorial jurisdiction is determined based on both the static and dynamic effects of the patent grant. The High Court in the jurisdiction where the patent was granted would naturally be one of the fora with jurisdiction. However, considering the dynamic effect, the commercial interests of the petitioner, who may be affected in various jurisdictions, can influence other High Courts' jurisdiction. Such High Courts may entertain revocation petitions under section 64 of the Act. The cause of action consists of a series of events starting with the grant of the patent, and thus, the territorial jurisdiction for revocation petitions should be decided based on the impact on the applicant's commercial interests.

Territorial Jurisdiction in Patent Appeal:

In the case of patent appeals, the jurisdiction is determined by the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the appropriate office from where the patent application originates and which is the situs of the said application. Appeals challenging the order or direction of the Patent Office under Section 117A of the 1970 Act lie before the High Court with territorial jurisdiction over the relevant patent office. The concept of cause of action cannot be pleaded to vest jurisdiction in other High Courts, i.e., other than the one where the appropriate office is located.

Concluding Note:

The determination of territorial jurisdiction of High Courts in patent revocation cases post abolition of the IPAB involves considering both the static and dynamic effects of the patent grant. While the High Court where the patent was granted holds primary jurisdiction, other High Courts may also have jurisdiction based on the petitioner's commercial interests and the impact of the patent in different locations. On the other hand, patent appeals are limited to the High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of the appropriate patent office. 

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal

Eris Life Sciences Limited Vs Controller of Patent

Date of Judgement/Order:20.07.2023

Case No. C.O.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 3/2022

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:5201

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Prathiba M Singh, HJ

Case Title: Eris Life Sciences Limited Vs Controller of Patent

Transfer of Patent Cancellation Petition by one High Court to another High Court

Abstract:

This article examines the issue of transferring patent cancellation petitions between different High Courts in India. It analyses a specific case where the respondent no.2 sought the transfer of revocation petitions from the High Court of Delhi to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in light of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. The article also explores the powers of consolidation and transfer between High Courts and the limitations imposed by the relevant legal provisions.

Introduction:

The Patents Act, 1970 governs the law of patents in India, and it allows for the revocation of patents under Section 64. The Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) was responsible for hearing revocation petitions; however, with the enactment of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, the IPAB was abolished, and revocation petitions are now to be filed exclusively before High Courts. This article delves into the jurisdictional aspect of transferring such revocation petitions between High Courts.

Background:

In the case under consideration, the respondent no.2, in response to the revocation petitions filed before the High Court of Delhi, sought the consolidation of these petitions with infringement suits pending before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The respondent argued that the grounds for revocation and the defenses raised in the infringement suits were similar, justifying the consolidation of the cases.

The Court's Observations:

The Court acknowledged the changes brought about by the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, requiring all revocation petitions under Section 64 of the Patents Act to be filed before High Courts. The court, however, declined the request for transfer, stating that powers of consolidation under Rule 26(3) could only be exercised by the Intellectual Property (IP) Division of the Delhi High Court for Delhi matters only. The power of consolidation does not extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court.

Transfer between High Courts:

The Court emphasized that the transfer of proceedings between two separate High Courts is governed by Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), and such powers can be exercised only by the Supreme Court of India. Section 25 CPC provides that the Supreme Court, if it deems fit, can transfer any suit, appeal, or other proceedings from one High Court to another.

Limitations on Inter-High Court Transfers:

While the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, mandated the filing of revocation petitions in High Courts, it did not expressly address the issue of transferring such petitions between High Courts. Consequently, the High Court of Delhi could not entertain the request to transfer the revocation petitions to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, as this power is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court under Section 25 CPC.

The Concluding Note:

In light of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, and the abolition of IPAB, all revocation petitions under Section 64 of the Patents Act are now to be filed before High Courts. However, the Act does not provide a mechanism for transferring such petitions between different High Courts. The power of transfer between High Courts lies solely with the Supreme Court under Section 25 CPC. Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision allowing for inter-High Court transfers, the request to transfer the revocation petitions from the High Court of Delhi to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh was rightfully dismissed.

Disclaimer:

Information contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for legal advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the facts and law involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

IP ADJUTOR

Patent and Trademark Attorney

ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com

9990389539

#IP_Adjutor #Trademark #Copyright #Design_infringement #Patent_infringement #IPR #Intellectualpropertyright #Iprupdate #Iprnews #Iprblog #Legalblog #law #legal