Thursday, May 23, 2024

Seagate Technology LLC Vs Daichi International

Giving life to the End of life product [Refurbished HDDs]

We are looking into a legal case decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, titled Seagate Technology LLC Vs Daichi International, concerning the refurbishment and sale of Hard-Disk Drives (HDDs) by refurbishers in India, with a focus on the implications of trademark infringement when original brand names are removed.

This case is significant as it sets a precedent on how refurbished goods can be marketed without infringing on the trademark rights of the original manufacturers. The Court's interpretation of Sections 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act serves as a guiding framework for similar disputes, ensuring that refurbishers respect the original trademarks while promoting the legal resale of end-of-life products.

Subject Matter HDDs [The End of Life product]:

Used Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) are imported by a number of Indian importers and subsequently sold to refurbishers. These refurbishers undertake a process where they remove the original "Seagate" or "Western Digital" brand names from the HDDs. After the removal of these trademarks, the refurbishers rebrand the HDDs under different names and provide an extended two-year guarantee along with them. These refurbished HDDs are no longer covered by the original manufacturer's warranty and are thus categorized as End of Life (EOL) products.

These EOL products were initially supplied to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for integration into laptops, desktop computers, and various other electronic devices. Despite their designation as EOL, these HDDs still possess functional capabilities and are repurposed for alternative applications such as in surveillance systems or custom-built workstations.

The Refurbishment:

The refurbishment process, while extending the useful life of these HDDs, involves significant alterations, particularly the removal of original brand names, which raises legal and trademark concerns. The absence of the original warranty and the introduction of an extended guarantee by the refurbishers highlight the transition of these HDDs from their initial OEM deployment to a secondary market. The case involving Seagate Technology LLC and Daichi International thus examines the legality and implications of these practices under trademark law, particularly focusing on the balance between facilitating the reuse of technological products and protecting the trademark rights of the original manufacturers.

Plaintiff's basic contention:

The Plaintiff in this case alleged that the Defendant's actions of removing the Plaintiff's brand name from these end-of-life (EOL) hard disk drives (HDDs) and subsequently selling them as refurbished products constituted trademark impairment. The Plaintiff argued that such actions violated Sections 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

 Section 30(3) addresses the situation where the trademark has been applied without proper authorization, and Section 30(4) deals with the use of a trademark in a manner that may lead to the misrepresentation of the goods' origin or quality. The Plaintiff contended that by removing the brand name and selling the HDDs as refurbished products, the Defendant was misleading consumers and undermining the value and reputation of the Plaintiff's trademark.

Defense of Defendants:

According to rhe Defendant, The Defendant argued that they were not causing any functional impairment to the hard drives (HDDs). Instead, the plaintiffs had no use for the HDDs, as they considered them "end-of-life" and had discarded them. The original manufacturer’s warranty had expired. The Defendant claimed they were revitalizing the HDDs by repairing and refurbishing them, offering a new two-year warranty with support services. They would inspect the drives, return defective ones to the supplier, and reformat the functional ones, erasing all previous data. 

The refurbished HDDs were sold for their functionality, not aesthetics, benefiting consumers by providing a cheaper alternative. The Defendant argued that removing the branding did not violate Sections 29 or 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, as they lawfully procured the HDDs and provided details of the transactions, including GST invoices.

The Primary Legal Issue:

The legal issue in this case centered on whether the Defendant's practice of selling refurbished hard disk drives (HDDs) after removing the original brand names and without any reference to the original manufacturers constituted trademark infringement. This issue involved determining if the Defendant's actions misled consumers regarding the origin and quality of the products, thereby potentially causing confusion and harming the reputation of the original manufacturers' trademarks. 

The court needed to consider whether the removal of the brand names and lack of attribution to the original manufacturers violated the exclusive rights granted to trademark holders under the relevant trademark laws, including protections against unauthorized use and misrepresentation.

Finding:

The court found that once the hard disk drives (HDDs) were integrated into electronic equipment and sold with a composite warranty provided by the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the original manufacturers, who were the plaintiffs in this case, no longer had control over the HDDs.

The plaintiffs did not extend any warranty to the end-users of the electronic equipment, effectively severing their connection with the HDDs at the point of integration into the equipment. The court observed that the defendants sold the refurbished HDDs through formal, legitimate transactions, which included the issuance of invoices and the payment of Goods and Services Tax (GST).

The plaintiffs were unable to present any evidence proving that these transactions were illegal. Their argument relied solely on the assertion that the payment of GST did not inherently legitimize the transactions. However, the court determined that this assertion was insufficient to establish any illegitimacy in the sale of the refurbished HDDs by the defendants. Consequently, the court concluded that there were no grounds to consider the defendants' sales activities as unlawful, and thus, the sale of refurbished HDDs by the defendants was deemed legitimate.

Giving Life to End of Life product:

By permitting the sale of refurbished hard disk drives (HDDs) under specific conditions, the court's ruling carefully balances the interests of the original manufacturers with the practical realities and demands of the secondary market for end-of-life (EOL) products. This decision acknowledges the necessity for a robust secondary market, allowing for the reuse and recycling of electronic components, while also protecting the rights and reputations of trademark holders. It clarifies that as long as the refurbishers adhere to legitimate business practices and the original manufacturers have no ongoing control or warranty obligations over the refurbished products, such sales do not inherently constitute trademark infringement.

Legal Implication:

This case highlights the intricacies of trademark law in the context of refurbished goods. The court's decision underscores the necessity for plaintiffs to provide concrete evidence of illegality in transactions rather than relying on assumptions about the implications of GST payments. The ruling also clarifies that the removal of original brand names from refurbished products does not inherently constitute trademark infringement if the original manufacturer has no ongoing control or warranty obligation over the products post-integration.

In the absence of ongoing control or warranty commitments from the original manufacturer, the sale of such refurbished goods, when conducted through formal and legitimate channels, does not automatically infringe on trademark rights. 

This ruling sets a precedent that mere removal of a brand name, coupled with proper commercial practices like issuing invoices and paying GST, does not, on its own, provide sufficient grounds for claiming trademark infringement. This case thus provides valuable insights into how trademark laws are applied in the context of refurbished products and the evidentiary standards required to prove illegality in such transactions.

Ratio:

The court's rationale was based on the fact that the original manufacturers lost control over the end-of-life (EOL) hard disk drives once these drives were sold to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and incorporated into electronic devices. With the plaintiffs' association with the HDDs ending at that point, the actions of the refurbishers were not considered trademark infringement. The court highlighted the necessity for plaintiffs to present substantial evidence to demonstrate the illegitimacy of transactions involving refurbished goods.

Conclusion:

The judgment in this case establishes a significant precedent for the sale of refurbished products and the application of trademark laws in such contexts. It highlights that trademark holders must provide compelling and substantial evidence when alleging trademark infringement, particularly in situations involving the resale of refurbished goods. The decision underscores the insufficiency of merely assuming infringement based on the act of refurbishment or the presence of formal transactions, such as the payment of Goods and Services Tax (GST).

This ruling provides guidance for future cases involving refurbished goods, emphasizing the importance of detailed evidence and the context in which refurbished products are sold. It ensures that the rights of trademark holders are protected without unduly stifling the secondary market, thereby promoting sustainability and economic efficiency in the reuse of EOL products.

Case Title: Seagate Technology LLC Vs Daichi International
Order Date: 21.05.2024
Case No. CS Comm 67 of 2024
Neutral Citation:2024:DHC:4193
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Anish Dayal. H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

Pidilite Industries Limited Vs Dubond Products India Pvt. Ltd.

Letters from Dealers, Having Similar Contents, Do Not Prove Use of Defendant's Trademark

Abstract:

This article examines a legal judgment where the court restrained the defendant from using the trademarks ‘LW’ and ‘LW+’. The case emphasizes the importance of genuine evidence over similar letters from different dealers to prove the use of a trademark. The defendant was denied the benefit of trademark registration due to registration in a different class and the established prior use by the plaintiff. Additionally, the defendant's adoption of a similar trademark to the plaintiff’s was found to be indicative of dishonesty.

Fact:

The plaintiff and defendant were involved in a trademark dispute where the plaintiff held registrations for the trademarks ‘LW’ and ‘LW+’ in Class 19. The defendant had a registration for a similar mark in Class 01 but was restrained from using ‘LW’ and ‘LW+’. The plaintiff demonstrated prior use of these trademarks, strengthening their claim. The defendant, previously using the mark ‘HYDROBUILD’, adopted ‘HYDROBUILD LW+’ subsequently.

The defendant provided letters from different dealers, all with similar content, as evidence of their use of the trademark. However, these letters were not found to be convincing. The court also noted that the defendant could not argue that the trademark was descriptive, generic, or common to trade since they had applied for its registration themselves.

Finding:

The court found that the plaintiff was the prior user of the trademarks ‘LW’ and ‘LW+’, thus establishing their right over the marks. The defendant’s evidence, consisting of letters from different dealers with similar content, was deemed insufficient to prove their use of the trademarks. The court further noted that the defendant's registration in a different class (Class 01) did not entitle them to use the trademarks in question, as the plaintiff's prior use and registration in Class 19 took precedence. The defendant’s subsequent adoption of ‘HYDROBUILD LW+’ after using ‘HYDROBUILD’ was viewed as an act of dishonesty.

Legal Implication:

This case underscores the principle that mere submission of letters from different dealers with similar content does not constitute credible evidence of trademark use. The decision highlights the necessity for genuine and substantial proof of use when asserting trademark rights. Furthermore, the judgment reinforces the significance of prior use in trademark disputes, particularly when registrations are in different classes. The ruling also illustrates that a defendant cannot claim a trademark to be generic or descriptive if they have sought its registration.

Ratio:

The core reasoning in the court's decision is that the plaintiff's prior use of the trademarks ‘LW’ and ‘LW+’ establishes their superior rights over the marks, regardless of the defendant's registration in a different class. The similarity in content among the letters submitted by the defendant from various dealers does not provide sufficient evidence of trademark use. Moreover, the defendant’s subsequent adoption of a similar mark to that of the plaintiff demonstrates dishonesty, further weakening their position.

Concluding Note:

The judgment serves as a crucial reminder for parties in trademark disputes to present authentic and substantial evidence of use. It reiterates that mere letters with similar content from different dealers are inadequate to prove trademark use. The case highlights the importance of prior use in establishing trademark rights and the limitations of registrations in different classes. Additionally, it underscores the judiciary's stance against dishonest practices in trademark adoption.

Case Title:Pidilite Industries Limited Vs Dubond Products India Pvt. Ltd.
Order Date: 21.05.2024
Case No. CS Comm 523 of 2023
Neutral Citation:2024:BHC:OS:8329
Name of Court: Mumbai High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: R.I.Chagla. H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited Vs Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited

Google Search is Not Sufficient to Show Trademark Confusion

Abstract:

This article analyzes a legal judgment wherein the court denied an interim injunction sought by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from allegedly infringing on their trademarks. The decision explores the limitations of using Google search results as evidence of trademark confusion and emphasizes the importance of substantial, tangible evidence to prove trademark infringement. The case sheds light on the legal standards and requirements for establishing trademark confusion in the context of interim injunctions.

Fact:

The plaintiff filed a suit for a permanent injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to restrain the defendants from allegedly infringing on their trademarks ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS’, ‘BABY ESSENTIALS’, ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS-BABY ESSENTIALS’, ‘LUXURIOUS AYURVEDA’, and ‘SOUNDARYA’. The plaintiff claimed proprietorship over these marks and sought to prevent the defendants from using any deceptively similar trademarks.

The plaintiff specifically emphasized their use of ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS BABY’ and ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS-BABY ESSENTIALS’ since 2006. However, the plaintiff had not sought registration for these specific marks, despite their claimed long-term use. Documents submitted by the plaintiff indicated that the baby care products were marketed under the main brand ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS’, rather than as distinct sub-brands.

Finding:

The court found that the plaintiff’s reputation primarily revolved around the ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS’ trademark. The plaintiff failed to provide conclusive evidence that ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS BABY’ or ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS-BABY ESSENTIALS’ had been used independently of the main ‘FOREST ESSENTIALS’ trademark. The court noted that Google search results, which the plaintiff presented to demonstrate trademark confusion, were insufficient as they could be manipulated through various search algorithms and repeated searches by different individuals.

Legal Implication:

The case highlights the evidentiary standards required to prove trademark confusion in seeking an interim injunction. The reliance on Google search results was deemed inadequate due to the potential for manipulation and the inherent limitations of search algorithms. The court emphasized the need for more robust evidence, such as consumer surveys or documented instances of actual confusion, to establish a prima facie case of trademark infringement.

Ratio:

The court's decision is grounded in the principle that trademark confusion must be demonstrated through reliable and concrete evidence. Google search results, susceptible to algorithmic biases and manipulation, do not meet the legal threshold for proving confusion. The judgment underscores the necessity for plaintiffs to present clear, unambiguous evidence of trademark use and confusion, particularly when seeking interim relief.

Concluding Note:

This judgment serves as a critical reminder for trademark proprietors about the importance of thorough and substantive evidence in trademark infringement cases. Google search results alone are insufficient to demonstrate trademark confusion. Plaintiffs must provide robust evidence, such as documented instances of actual consumer confusion or comprehensive consumer surveys, to substantiate their claims.

Case Title:Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited Vs Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited
Order Date: 15.05.2024
Case No. CS Comm 523 of 2023
Neutral Citation:2024:DHC:4053
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Anish Dayal, H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

Honey well International Inc Vs The Controller of Patent

What kind of amendments in claims of Patent are permissible

Abstract:

This article examines the permissible scope of amendments to claims in a patent application under the Patents Act, 1970, in the context of an appeal against the rejection of amended claims by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs. The case in question involves a patent application for "Organic Fluorescent Compositions," where the appellant sought to amend the claims from a composition to the compound itself. The analysis focuses on the legal implications of such amendments and the rationale behind the court's decision to allow the amendments.

Fact;

The appellant filed a patent application (Application No. 3150/DELNP/2010) on May 5, 2010, seeking protection for "Organic Fluorescent Compositions." The original claims were Markush claims, detailing a composition comprising an organic compound with a structure according to formula I. Post-hearing, the appellant submitted written submissions with a set of amended claims, shifting the scope from "composition comprising a compound" to "the compound" itself, thus eliminating the compositional aspect. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs rejected these amended claims on April 28, 2017, stating that they extended beyond the scope of the originally filed claims.

Finding:

In Appeal, it was found that the amendment merely pared down the original claims without introducing new subject matter. The formula I in the amended claims remained the same as in the original claims, with the only change being the removal of the term "composition." This indicated that the scope was narrowed rather than broadened, as no new compounds were claimed, and the essence of the original invention remained intact.

Legal Implication:

Under Section 59 of the Patents Act, 1970, amendments to a patent application are permissible provided they do not introduce new matter beyond what was originally disclosed. The critical issue is whether the amendments broaden the scope of the claims or merely narrow it. In this case, the court found that the amendments were a narrowing of the claims, aligning with the statutory requirements. Therefore, the rejection by the Assistant Controller was deemed unsustainable as it misinterpreted the nature of the amendments.

Ratio:

The court's decision hinged on the interpretation that amendments which narrow the scope of the claims do not constitute new matter and are permissible under the Patents Act. The key ratio decidendi is that the deletion of the term "composition" and the focus on the "compound" did not extend beyond the original disclosure but rather specified the invention more precisely. This interpretation supports a more flexible approach to claim amendments, provided they remain within the bounds of the original invention disclosure.

Concluding Note:

The court's decision underscores the importance of understanding the permissible scope of amendments in patent claims. Amendments that narrow the claims and provide greater precision without introducing new matter are consistent with the legislative intent of the Patents Act, 1970. This case reaffirms that the protection of the original invention's essence is paramount, and technical adjustments that do not alter this essence should be allowed.

Case Title:Honey well International Inc Vs The Controller of Patent
Order Date: 21.05.2024
Case No. CA (Comm IPD Pat) 396 of 2022
Neutral Citation:2024:DHC:4712
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Anish Dayal, H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

Monday, May 20, 2024

Vodafone Idea Limited Vs Saregama India Limited and another

Payment of Royalty to the copyright holder for Value-Added Services (VAS) in relation to Musical Work

Abstract:

The ruling of Calcutta High Court mandates that Vodafone must obtain a license from IPRS and pay royalties before commercially exploiting musical and literary works in their Value-Added Services (VAS). This includes activities such as ringtones, caller tunes, and other music-related services offered to their customers.The court's decision is a pivotal affirmation of the rights of content creators and copyright holders, reinforcing the importance of intellectual property rights. By emphasizing the legal necessity of licensing and royalty payments under the amended Copyright Act, the judgment ensures that artists and creators are fairly compensated for their work.

Fact:

In this case, Vodafone Idea Ltd. used musical and literary works in their VAS without obtaining the necessary licenses from IPRS, arguing that such use did not constitute a public performance or communication under the Copyright Act. IPRS, representing the rights of authors and creators, contended that Vodafone's activities required proper licensing and payment of royalties.

Finding:

The court found in favor of IPRS, dismissing Vodafone's claim that their use of the works did not necessitate royalties. The judgment clarified that the use of musical and literary works in VAS indeed falls under activities that require licensing and royalty payments. The court underscored that the amendments to the Copyright Act, particularly those introduced by the Copyright (Amendment) Act of 2012, grant substantive rights to authors of original works, ensuring they receive compensation for the public performance or communication of their works.

Legal Implication:

The ruling has significant legal implications for the commercial use of copyrighted works in India. By affirming the necessity of licensing and royalty payments, the court reinforced the legal obligations of commercial entities to respect the rights of content creators. This decision underscores that:

Licensing and Royalty Obligations:

Commercial entities must obtain proper licenses and pay royalties for the use of copyrighted works in their services.

2Protection of Authors' Rights:

The amendments to the Copyright Act provide robust protections for authors, ensuring they receive fair compensation.

Preventing Exploitation:

The judgment aims to prevent the exploitation of creators, particularly those with weaker bargaining power, by enforcing stringent licensing requirements.

Ratio:

The court's rationale was rooted in the provisions of the Copyright Act, especially the amendments introduced in 2012. These amendments were designed to enhance the rights of authors and ensure they are compensated for the use of their works. The court highlighted that any commercial use of copyrighted material without proper licensing and royalty payments is a violation of these rights. The decision emphasized the legal principle that the creators' rights are paramount and must be protected to maintain the integrity and fairness of the intellectual property system.

Concluding Note:

The Calcutta High Court's judgment in favor of IPRS against Vodafone Idea Ltd. is important decision that reinforces the rights of content creators and copyright holders. By mandating licensing and royalty payments, the court has set a crucial precedent for the commercial use of copyrighted works in India.

Case Title:Vodafone Idea Limited Vs Saregama India Limited and another
Order Date: 17.05.2024
Case No. CS/23/2018
Neutral Citation:NA
Name of Court: Calcutta High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ravi Krishan Kapoor, H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

Saturday, May 18, 2024

Mr. Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product Vs Venus Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. and another

Stay of Suit proceeding under Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999

Abstract:

This article analyzes the legal issue concerning the stay of civil suit proceedings under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) by the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. The discussion centers on the correctness of the view expressed in Sana Herbals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mohsin Dehlvi: 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4482, particularly regarding whether a stay is required during the pendency of a rectification petition. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi examines the statutory implications of Section 124(2) and addresses the erroneous presumption that infringement suits and rectification actions would always be adjudicated by the High Court. There by Hon'ble Division Bench negated the finding of Sana Herbals and observed that under Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999, suit proceeding is liable to be stayed.

Facts:

In the case of Sana Herbals Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mohsin Dehlvi, the Court examined the impact of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, which led to the abolition of the IPAB. The jurisdiction for rectification petitions under the Trade Marks Act reverted to the High Courts. The Single Judge in Sana Herbals held that because both the rectification petition and the suit for infringement would be handled by the High Court, there was no need to stay the civil suit proceedings during the pendency of the rectification petition. This view was contested, and the correctness of this legal interpretation was brought before a Division Bench for consideration.

Findings:

The Division Bench found that the Single Judge in Sana Herbals erroneously assumed that both the suit for infringement and the rectification petition would always be instituted before the High Court. This presumption neglected the reality that suits and rectification actions could be pending before different forums, potentially leading to conflicting decisions. Consequently, the Bench emphasized that the statutory mandate to stay civil suit proceedings under Section 124(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, remains relevant and necessary to avoid jurisdictional conflicts and ensure legal coherence.

Legal Implication:

The legal implication of this case is significant for the interpretation and application of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The decision clarifies that the abolition of the IPAB and the reversion of its jurisdiction to the High Courts does not eliminate the need for a stay of civil proceedings during the pendency of rectification petitions. This interpretation ensures that the procedural safeguards intended by the legislature to prevent contradictory rulings remain intact, thereby maintaining the integrity of the judicial process in trademark disputes.

Ratio:

The ratio decidendi of the Division Bench's decision is that the statutory requirement to stay civil suit proceedings under Section 124(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, persists even after the abolition of the IPAB. This is based on the understanding that rectification petitions and infringement suits might not always be concurrently pending before the same High Court, thus necessitating a stay to prevent potential conflicts in judicial decisions. The decision underscores the need for consistency and coherence in the adjudication of trademark disputes.

Concluding Note:

The Division Bench's decision in this case reaffirms the necessity of staying civil suit proceedings under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, during the pendency of rectification petitions, despite the abolition of the IPAB. The judgment addresses and corrects the erroneous assumptions made in Sana Herbals, ensuring that the procedural mechanisms designed to prevent conflicting decisions remain effective.

Case Title: Mr. Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product Vs Venus Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. and another
Order Date: 17.05.2024
Case No. CA Comm IPD TM 258 of 2022
Neutral Citation:2024:DHC:3991-DB
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Yashwant Varma and Ravinder Dudeja, H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

Alimentary Health Limited Vs Controller of Patent and Design

Evaluation of Inventive steps and Obviousness in Light of Prior Art

Abstract:

Here we are discussing refusal of Indian Patent Application No. 3989/DELNP/2012 concerning a probiotic formulation utilizing the Bifidobacterium longum strain NCIMB 41676 (AH1714). The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs rejected the application on grounds of obviousness under Section 15 of the Patent Act, 1970. The central legal issue involves determining whether the claimed probiotic formulation exhibits an inventive step and technical advancement over existing prior art. The Court ultimately set aside the refusal, remanding the case back to the Controller for a fresh evaluation.

Facts:

The Indian Patent Application No. 3989/DELNP/2012 describes a probiotic formulation incorporating the Bifidobacterium longum strain NCIMB 41676 (AH1714) at concentrations exceeding 10^6 colony-forming units (cfu) per gram, combined with an ingestible carrier. These carriers can be pharmaceutical forms like capsules or food products such as yogurt. The formulation is claimed to have unique synergistic effects and significant technical advancements over prior art.

The Prior Arts:

The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs cited prior art documents, specifically:
- D1: US 20040265279
- D2: WO 2009127566
- D3: WO 2006SE01117
- D4: Medina et al.
- D5: Imaoka et al.

The Controller concluded that the use of the Bifidobacterium strain as a probiotic was already known and did not exhibit an inventive step.

Evaluation of Inventive steps and Obviousness :

The Court reviewed the Assistant Controller's decision, focusing on whether the claimed formulation was obvious in light of the prior art documents. The prior art indicated that the specific strain of Bifidobacterium and its use in probiotic formulations were known, but the claimed concentrations and the specific combination with carriers were scrutinized for their inventive step.

The Court emphasized the need to avoid hindsight bias in evaluating the inventive step, underscoring that the assessment should be based solely on information available before the priority date of the application. The Court found that none of the prior art documents, either individually or in combination, provided sufficient motivation to a person skilled in the art (PSITA) to arrive at the claimed formulation.

Legal Implication:

The judgment underscores the critical aspect of avoiding hindsight bias in patent law when evaluating the inventive step. The Court's decision highlights that the inventive step must be assessed based on prior public knowledge without using knowledge gained from the patent application itself. This case illustrates the judiciary's role in ensuring that patent applications are assessed fairly, respecting the boundaries of known prior art while recognizing genuine innovation.

Ratio:

The Court's ratio decidendi hinged on the principle that the inventive step must be evaluated without hindsight and must be evident based on prior public knowledge. The claimed probiotic formulation with the Bifidobacterium longum strain at specified concentrations and combined with particular carriers was found to be non-obvious, as prior art did not motivate a PSITA to arrive at this specific formulation.

Concluding Note:

The decision to remand the case for reevaluation reflects the judiciary's commitment to fair patent adjudication, ensuring innovations are not unjustly denied protection due to improper application of legal standards. This case reaffirms the importance of a meticulous and unbiased approach in evaluating inventive steps, crucial for fostering innovation and protecting genuine advancements in technology.

The judgment highlights the nuanced balance between prior art and genuine invention, reiterating the importance of a fair and thorough evaluation process in patent law. The Court's decision serves as a precedent in reinforcing the correct application of inventive step analysis, promoting an equitable patent system that duly recognizes and rewards innovation.

Case Title: Alimentary Health Limited Vs Controller of Patent and Design
Order Date: 14.05.2024
Case No. CA Comm IPD PAT 458 of 2022
Neutral Citation:2024:DHC:3920
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Sanjeev Narual, H.J.

Disclaimer:

Ideas, thoughts, views, information, discussions and interpretation expressed herein are being shared in the public Interest. Readers' discretion is advised as these are subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney,
Ph No: 9990389539

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