Wednesday, May 23, 2018

ITC V. M/s Laboratoire Garnier


TM No. 227/11

 M/s Laboratoire Garnier Vs ITC  


29.08.2014


Present :        Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman Advocate for the Plaintiff

                       Mr. V.P.Singh, Senior Advocate for the Defendant


1.     The plaintiff / applicant through constituted attorney Ms. Surbhi Bansal filed joint application on behalf of plaintiff namely M/s Laboratoire Garnier & CIE alongwith applicant M/s L'Oreal u/o 22 Rule 10 of CPC r/w order 6 Rule 7 of CPC also read with section 151 of CPC stating that during the pendency of the proceedings, the plaintiff has been dissolved by applicant M/s L'Oreal vide Deed of Dissolution dated 28.11.2011. The plaintiff was incorporated under the Law of France and by way of commercial acquisition and merger of corporation, the applicant herein had acquired all the shares in the plaintiff company which had been a subsidiary company of applicant company. Therefore, by virtue of aforesaid dissolution, the plaintiff has assigned all its rights, statutory, common law pertaining to trademark “LONG & STRONG” including the copy right trademark involved therein relation to the products alongwith goodwill of business concerned. The applicant has been recorded as subsequent proprietor of the subject matter trademark. A prayer was made that applicant herein being a necessary and proper party be substituted and Ms. Surbhi Bansal who instituted the suit is also the constituted attorney of L'Oreal applicant be taken on record. Further prayer was made that in view of above mentioned substitution and change of constituted attorney permission be granted to make amendment in the case title and para 3 and 19 (f) of the plaint.


1.1. The aforesaid application is accompanied by copy of dissolution deed dt. 28.11.2011, documents relating to recordial and copy of Resolution cum Authority in favour of Ms. Surbhi Bansal, Constituted Attorney.


2.                           The  defendant  contested  the  application  and  filed  reply 
inter alia submitting that L'Oreal has no locus standi to move an application u/o 6 rule 17 of CPC which only allows a 'party' to move to amend pleadings as plaintiff Laboratoire Garnier & CIE has already stated that they have ceded their rights in the subject matter of the suit. This submission can only be entertained only after adjudication of application u/o 22 rule 10 of CPC. The document described as Dissolution Deed 28.11.2010 marked as Annexure P1 (the French and English language translation supplied therein) only stipulates the conditions under which the dissolution may occur and does not evidence any dissolution or creates or assignment of any right in favour of L'Oreal. No documents have been placed on record pertaining to alleged merger of M/s Laboratoire Garnier &  CIE and M/s L'Oreal. A commercial acquisition or merger cannot be assumed and the plaintiff has to prove that the acquisition of assets, rights and liabilities if any, has even taken place. The documents accompanying application do not in any manner show a transfer of rights and liabilities of Laboratoire Garnier & CIE to L'Oreal. The documents placed on record do not vest any rights particularly the intellectual property of Laboratoire  Garnier & CIE as L'Oreal. Further submitted that Dissolution Deed dt. 28.11.2011 has only been brought to the notice of this Court after more than two and a half years of existence. It is not even brought to the notice of Hon'ble High Court when the plaintiff has filed appeal for setting aside order dated 17.4.2011 and when if it is assumed that contents of the application under reply regarding the joint applications claims viz a viz the import of this document were true, it would vitiate all actions purportedly undertaken by the plaintiff in these and related proceedings subsequent to 28.11.2011. On aforesaid grounds a prayer was made that in the absence of any established rights of either party to contribute proceedings in the instant suit, the application is liable to be dismissed.

3.                           Ld counsel for plaintiff argued that the name of M/s L'Oreal has been substituted at the place of M/s Laboratoire Garnier & CIE to the subject matter (registered trademark LONG & STRONG under no. 1238990 in class 03) because of Dissolution Deed dated 28.11.2011. The Registrar of Trademarks has recorded the name of M/s L'Oreal after obtaining the proofs of title within meaning of S. 45 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. By virtue of section 31, the registration of trademarks and all subsequent assignments and transmissions of the trademarks is prima facie evidence of proof of title and validity of transfer of right in favour of M/s L'oreal.

3.1 Ld counsel further argued that by virtue of true copy of Deed of Dissolution dt. 28.11.2011, the applicant M/s L'oreal has become the owner of all shares of M/s Laboratoire Garnier & CIE and the plaintiff has been dissolved. All the rights and liabilities stood transferred in favour of M/s L'Oreal.

3.2 Ld counsel for plaintiff further argued that it is well settled preposition of law that by virtue of assignment and dissolution, the other legal entity denies the rights and liabilities of plaintiff company then on an application under order 22 rule 10 of CPC r/w order 6 rule 17 of CPC the entity may be substituted and placed reliance upon following judgment and order :­

(a)          Savitra Minda vs. Minda industries, 1997 PTC (17) 257.


(b)          Order dated 17.07.2014 passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court titled Court in suit bearing No. CS(OS) No. 897 of 2004, as M/s Izuk Chemicals s. Babu Ram Om Prakash & Ors.



3.3. Ld counsel for plaintiff next argued that when the trademark rights has been duly assigned by one party in favour of another party, the subsequent party becomes owner of all rights under the trademarks involved and the earlier party is not left with any right in the mentioned trademark and referred to following judgments:


(a)          2009 (41) PTC 320 Del. Paras No. 30 to 37 Cinni Foundation V. Raj Kumar Sah & Sons.


(b)            2001 PTC 629 Del Para No. 6. Harman Singh Vs.

          GurbaxSingh


(c)          AIR 2002 Calcutta 85 Para No. 13 and 14 Blue


(d)          2007 (35) PTC 365 (Del) Paras No. 10, 12 and 13, Harsh              Vardhan Rastogi V. Champion Corporation. 

3.4 It was next argued that the defendant in the reply did not challenge the validity of this document. The factum of dissolution has been admitted by him. Ld counsel referred the following judgment (2009) 107 DRJ 735 DB paras No. 8, 9 and 10, Pfizer Enterprises Vs. Cipla.

3.5 Ld counsel further argued that while deciding application u/o 22 rule 10 of CPC, a detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is not contemplated. The court has only to be prima facie satisfy for exercising its discretion in granting leave regarding the dissolution of right by payment and dissolution. The question about the existence and validity of assignment or dissolution can be considered at final hearing of the proceedings and replied upon judgment AIR 2005 SC 2209, para no. 12 Amit Kumar Sah & Ors. Vs. Farida Khatin & Ors.

3.6 Regarding delay ld counsel for plaintiff urged that the deed of assignment was executed on 28.11.11 and assignment was duly recorded by the Registrar of Trademarks vide order dated 19.02.2014. Application was filed in month of July 2014. There is no delay in filing of application and even if there is any delay the law of limitation is not applicable in the application under order 22 rule 10 r/w order 6 rule 17 of CPC and referred citations : C. Wright Neville V. E.H. Freser and Anr AIR 1944 Nag 137.

3.7 Ld counsel further argued that law is well settled that applications for seeking amendment should be treated liberally. The proposed amendment is necessary, for the purpose of adjudicating the lis between the parties and moreover no prejudice will be caused to the defendant and referred to citation Haridas Alidas Thadani and Ors Vs. Godrej Rustom Kermani AIR 1983 SC 319.

4.   On the other hand, Ld. Sr. Counsel for defendant no.1 argued that present suit for infringement and passing off the trade mark “LONG and STRONG” was filed by Laboratoire Garnier, a French company on 24.11.2011. The application for interim injunction was dismissed on 17.04.2012. and appeal was preferred and the same was withdrawn on 03.02.2014 with the observation that even if the suit is to be stayed so far as infringement action is concerned, the suit so far as passing off action is concerned will continue. Thereafter vide order dated 17.04.2014, the suit related to infringement of trade mark was stayed.

4.1 It was further argued that Joint application moved by plaintiff and applicant is misconceived and liable to be dismissed as the only document filed by the plaintiff herein in the support of dissolution and assignment of rights is a photocopy of non­statutory French document with an English Translation purporting to be a Deed of Dissolution. No assignment of any rights can be inferred there from. This document make no reference to any assignment of rights of Laboratoire Garnier to L'Oreal.

4.2 This documents only stipulates the conditions under which the dissolution may occur, as a future date and does not even conclusive state that there is a dissolution effective on a certain date. No date of dissolution of Laboratoire Garnier can be identified from any of the documents placed on record. The English translation of documents only states that “ a dissolution shall commence on 28.11.2011 in accordance with Article 1844­5 of Civil code”. Nothing has been placed on record to show that this document has been followed through and a dissolution with proper transfer of rights achieve in accordance with the French Law and consequent thereto a valid assignment of right as alleged has taken place in accordance with Article 1844­5 of French Civil Code.

4.3 It is was further argued that the Dissolution Deed can be no means be presumed that L'Oreal will be successor in interest of or the Laboratoire Garnier rights particularly with regard to the continuing litigation and intellectual property rights. Which has to be specifically assigned. Even the judgments cited by Ld. Counsel for plaintiff themselves speaks that assignment of rights has to be clear and express in the documents being produced before the court and the same cannot be presumed. It is incumbent upon the applicants to state the nature of assignment or devolution is claimed and referred AIR 1969 Patna 228 Para no. 7 Ms. Jharkhand Mines & Industries Ltd. & Anr. V. Nand Kishore Prasad & Anr.


4.4 Ld. Sr. counsel further argued that Dissolution dated 28.11.2011 has only brought to the notice of the court after more than two and half years of its alleged existence. It was not even brought in the notice of Hon'ble High court when the matter travelled up till there. Even presuming without prejudice that assertion of the plaintiff are correct, all action purportedly undertaken by the plaintiff in these related proceedings subsequent to 28.11.2011 stand vitiated.


4.5 Ld. Sr. counsel further argued that defendant have already filed a fresh application for rectification of Trade mark Registry vis. a vis trade mark number 1238990. Any proceedings for passing of will rely on the goodwill and the goodwill over long and strong cannot be assiged under law leaving L with no cause of action.

5.    I have heard arguments advanced by Ld. Counsel for plaintiff and Ld. Sr. counsel for defendant and gone through relevant law and judgments cited by respective parties.

6. In order to appreciate the issue involved in present application, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Order 22 of the Code.



7.      Rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 prescribe procedure in case of devolution of interest on the death of party to a suit. Under these rules, if a party dies and right to sue survives, the court on an application made in that behalf is required to substitute legal representative of the deceased party for proceeding with a suit but if such an application is not filed within the time prescribed by law, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased party is concerned. Rule 7 of order 22 deals with case of creation of an interest in a husband on marriage and Rule 8 of order 22 deals with case of assignment on the insolvency of a plaintiff.


8.     Order 22 Rule 10 provides for cases of assignment, creation 
and devolution of interest during the pendency of suit other than those referred to in the foregoing rules and is based on principle that trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of the suit is devolved upon another during its pendency but such a suit may be continue with the leave of Court by or against the person upon whom such interest has devolved.

9.    In the case of Dhurandhar Prashad Singh AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2552 (1) Hon'ble Supreme Court had observed as under :

The legislature while enacting Rules 3, 4 and 10 has made clear­cut distinction. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under R.9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by R.10, the Legislature has not prescribed any such procedure in the event of failure to apply for leave of the court to continue the proceeding by or against the person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of a suit which shows that legislature was conscious of this eventuality and yet has not prescribed that failure would entail dismissal of the suit as it was intended that proceeding would continue by or against the original party although he ceased to have any interest in the subject of dispute in the event of failure to apply for leave to continue by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved for bringing him on the record.

10.  Appropriately guided by judgment (supra), it has been judicially settled that the rights of applicant under order 22 rule 10 of CPC are not prejudiced nearly because there has been delay. Further at the stage of application, the court has to prima facie be satisfied about the factum of assignment of the rights and not require to conduct deep inquiry.

11.    In the present case, the applicant L'Oreal has filed alleged Deed of Dissolution (Declaration of Dissolution of Company Laboratoire Garnier & CIE carried out by company L'Oreal) dated 28.11.2011 and more important that trade mark authority has brought on record the name of L'Oreal as subsequent proprietor of impugned trademark “LONG AND STRONG”. These facts prima facie satisfy the requirement of Order 22 and Rule 10 and therefore the name of L'Oreal needs to be substituted. The question about the existence and validity of assignment and devolution can be considered at the trial of the suit on merits. However, it is also important that fact brought on record by way of application has thrown another issue which need to be adjudicated during the course of trial : Whether or not L'Oreal is lawful assignee of impugned trade mark by Laboratoire Garnier & CIE as claimed? OPP.

12.   Further it is a guiding principle of amendment that all amendments of pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of real controversy in a suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new cause of action on the basis of which the original lis was raised or defence taken. Proposed amendment would only amounts to additional approach on the same facts and avoid multiplicity of suits and will not prejudice the defendant in any other way. Accordingly application stands allowed.


           Amended memo as well as amended plaint is already on record. Re­list this case for filing of amended written statement if any for 08.09.2014 and disposal of pending application.



(Vineeta Goyal)

Additional District Judge­1

NDD/PHC New Delhi/29.08.2014









Lacoste S.A Vs Rediff.com India Limited and others








TM. no. 30/2013


06.07.2015



Present:


Sh. Ajay Amitabh with Sh. Pran Kishan, counsel for plaintiff.

Proxy counsel for defendant no.1.

Sh. Pankaj, counsel for defendant no.2.

Sh. Vipul Sharma, counsel for defendant no.3.



The plaintiff is yet to provide its application U/o I Rule 10 CPC, it is assured to provide the same today. In that eventuality reply will be filed on the next date and arguments will be heard.

However, there are two more applications viz one U/o I Rule 10 CPC by defendant no.3 and another U/o I Rule 10 by defendant no.2. Both are heard in detail; list for orders on 14.07.15. And then for reply arguments on application U/o I Rule 10 CPC of plaintiff on 23.07.15.






A


(Inder Jeet Singh)

ADJ­02 (South), Saket

New Delhi /06.07.2015












TM No. 30/2013


23.07.2015


ORDER

{on defendant no. 3's application dated 11.07.2014 under order I Rule 10(2) CPC

(hereinafter referred as first application) AND on defendant no. 2's application dated 02.08.2014 under order I Rule 10(2) CPC (hereinafter referred as second application)}


Present:

Clerk for counsel for plaintiff.

None for defendant no. 1.

None for defendant no. 2.

None for defendant no. 3.



Arguments on applications under order I Rule 10(2) CPC of defendants no. 2 and 3 were heard on 06.07.2015, the same is scheduled for orders today. Bar has suspended the work today.

XXXXXX             (Introduction) ­ The plaintiff M/s. Lacoste S.A, filed suit for permanent injunction, under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act, for restraining the defendants from infringing intellectual property rights, as plaintiff is registered proprietor of trade mark / label / domain name LACOSTE. Moreover, the plaintiff adopted the trade mark LACOSTE as an essential and material part of its e­mail ID and domain name www.lacoste.com and www.shop.lacoste.com. Whereas the defendant no. 1 Rediff.com India Limited is a registrant and owner of website www.shopping.rediff.com and it is engaging in displaying, selling, offering for sale, supplying, soliciting and conducting trade through its website, of







apparel, perfumes, shoes, bags, purses, accessories and plaintiff discovered that defendant no. 1 is conducting its business without leave and license from plaintiff by infringing the plaintiff's trademark. That is why, the suit to restrain it.

The defendants no. 2 Network Solutions LLC is registrar of defendant no. 1's website www.shopping.rediff.com. The defendant no. 3 Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT­In) is an administrative body constituted under the provisions of Information Technology Act, it has authority to block the viewing of a website, which is in violation of any laws for the tine being in force. The plaintiff seeks relief against the defendant no. 2 to direct it to de­register the defendant's website and take down the contents of the aforesaid website, which is infringing plaintiff's trademarks and decree is sought against the defendant no. 3 to block the viewing the said website of defendant for displaying or sale or delivery of products bearing the plaintiff's trademarks.

The defendants no. 1 and 3 filed their written statements, however, the defendant no. 2 by way of separate application is seeking leave to file written statement.

2.1
The defendant no. 3 in its application / first application, requests
to strike off the name of
defendant no. 3. CERT­In operates pursuant to
delegated
authority  and
under  the  Ministry  of  Communications  and

Information Technology, pursuant to notification dated 27.10.2009 and it serve







as national agency for incident response under section 70B of the Information Technology Act by notification G.S.R. 181(E) dated 27.02.2003 and G.S.R. 529(E) dated 07.07.2003, it is a single authority for issuing of instructions in context of blocking of websites and procedure for blocking of websites, however, by another notification G.S.R. 410(E) dated 17.05.2010, last two notifications have been rescinded. Therefore, due to absence/ want of blocking power, the defendant no. 3 will not be in a position to comply with any directions with regard to block viewing of the impugned website. Otherwise, the defendant no. 3 will comply the directions to be given by the Court but so far statutory requirements are concerned, the defendant no. 3 has no such powers lies with CERT­In.

2.2 Similarly, the defendant no. 2 by way of its application / second application, requests to delete the name of defendant no. 2 from the array of parties, since there are allegations of online sale of infringing products against the defendant no. 1, the defendant no. 2 has been added as a proforma party, as it is registrar of domain name www.rediff.com. However, the defendant no. 2 has been wrongly impleaded, there is no allegation of infringement against the defendant no. 1 and relief sought against the defendant no. 2 is to be directed to de­register the impugned website and take down the contents of website. Since the defendant no. 2 merely registrar of domain name and it is not responsible for the contents therein, the presence of defendant no. 2 is not required, otherwise the defendant no. 2







undertakes to this Court, it shall abide by the directions or orders passed by the Court.

2.3 Shri Vipul Sharma, counsel for defendant no. 3 and Shri Pankaj, counsel for defendant no. 2, argued in support of the application. The defendant no. 2 is deriving reasons from the submissions of defendant no. 3.

The defendant no. 3 relies upon the gazette notifications to demonstrate that defendant no. 3 performs its functions within the set up of statutory provisions of law and under delegated authority and there is no power to block the impugned site, consequently, it is not a necessary party. Moreover, there are certain parameters to be observed for blocking of the site, which were demonstrated and existing under the provisions of guidelines/ notifications, like interest of the sovereignty and integrity of the Indian security of the State, friendly relations with the foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement of the commission of any cognizable offences and none of them covers the individual case, alike of the plaintiff, therefore, the defendant no. 3 is not a necessary or proper party. Lastly, Ld. counsel for defendant no. 3 relies upon various orders dated 23.07.2014 in M/s. Lacoste S.A. vs. M/s. Ninty Nine Labels P. Ltd. (TM No. 310/2013), M/s. Tommy Hilfiger Licencing LLC vs. M/s. Ninty Nine Labels P. Ltd. (TM No. 311/2013) and The Polo Lauren Company vs. M/s. Ninty Nine Labels P. Ltd. (TM No. 312/2013), wherein the name of CERT­In was deleted and in one of the case, even the plaintiff therein, has consented to drop the name of CERT­







In.    On the same analogy there is no point by the present plaintiff M/s.

Lacoste S.A. to keep the name of defendant no. 3 in the array of parties.



2.4 Ld. counsel for defendant no. 2 also relies upon the decisions in various cases presented by the defendant no. 3 that name of defendant no. 2 Network Solutions LLC was dropped from the array of parties in those cases. Accordingly, the name of defendant no. 2 is to be strike off as it would not serve any purpose nor there is any possibility of decree against defendant no. 2, since the suit is based on allegation between the plaintiff on one side and defendant no. 1 on the other side.

3.                            Whereas the plaintiff has juxtaposition reservations particularly after having occasion to listen the submissions of defendant no. 3 and of defendant no. 2, Ld. counsel for plaintiff requests that defendants 2 & 3 are proper parties, if not, necessary parties, they cannot be relieved at this juncture from the array of parties. Ld. counsel has gone through the pleading as well as the notification of defendant no. 3 and material gathered/ data called from the website that even in 2015, there were block orders or sites were blocked by the defendant no. 3. At this stage, plain reading of plaint, is suffice to gather the allegations against the defendant no. 2 and defendant no. 3, their status is not disputed, therefore, their names are to be kept alive till disposal of the suit. Further submissions of the plaintiff are based on the reasons given in case law, the same are as follows :­

(i)    Lalli Enterprises vs. Dharam Chand & Sons, 100 (2002) DLT 20 – In a







suit for injunction under the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 question for territorial jurisdiction was raised and it was held that the averments made in the plaint are suffice to see the territorial jurisdiction and it may require evidence to be lead to be determine the territorial jurisdiction.

(ii)Ms. Susanne Lenatz vs. C.J. International Hotels Limited, ILR (2007) Supp. (2) Delhi 210 and Sundargarh Shramik Sangh vs. The Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited, 2005 (II) OLR 366 – While dealing with an application u/o VII rule 11 CPC read with order I rule 10 (2) CPC, on the point of proper or necessary party, it was held that presence of parties is necessary for complete and final decisions of question involved in the suit, while elobrating necessary party is one, without whom no order can be made effectively and proper party is one in whose absence effective order can be made but its presence is necessary for complete and final decision.

It is concluded that the first and the second applications are liable to be dismissed, since the same are without merits and the same has been filed to delay the proceedings.

FINDINGS ­

4.1 The contentions of both the sides are considered and assessed. During healthy arguments of parties, both the parties sincerely concedes that there were two notifications and at later point of time, the last two notifications were rescinded, however, in the year 2009, section 69A was introduced vis a vis The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 were framed, the relevant section 69A and rule 10 are being reproduced hereunder: ­


Section 69A – Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource. ­ (1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do,







in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub­section(2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.

(2)          The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.

Rule 10 ­ Process of order of Court for blocking of information – In case of an order from a competent Court in India for blocking of any information or part thereof generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in a computer resource, the Designated Officer shall, immediately on receipt of certified copy of the Court order, submit it to the Secretary, Department of Information Technology and initiate action as directed by the Court. (underline supplied)

4.2 For the following reasons, the first application and the second application are allowed :­

(i)     What was existing once upon a time in the form of notification, it is replaced by codified law in the form of section 69A of Act 2000 and procedure embodied in rule 10 of Rules 2009 in respect of blocking of information.


(ii)   There are two type of modalities to be followed one under the rules 2009, when there is a complaint, the Nodal officer deals it as per rule 6 and the same is examined by the Committee and second is the process of order of the court; the plaintiff had not made any request or complaint to the Nodal officer, whereas the suit was filed in December 2013. So far process of order of court is concerned, the matter is still sub­judice in the court.


(iii)The substantial relief claimed in the prayer clause either with regard to injunction order, order for rendition of account of profit or delivery of are against defendant no. 1, the relief claimed against defendant no. 2 is to deregister the impugned website and against defendant no. 3 is to the extent to block the view of the impugned website, which are subject matter of the Act, 2000 and Rules 2009.

(iv)In paragraph 13 of orders dated 23.07.2014 (in TM no. 310/2013,







311/2013, 312/2013), placed on record by defendant no. 3, also shows that there was no objection by the M/s. Lacoste SA to delete name of CERT­In and in terms thereof the application was allowed and name of M/s. CERT­In was deleted in three cases.

Accordingly, both the applications stand disposed off and names of defendant no. 2 and defendant no. 3 are deleted from the array of defendants. Let amended memo of parties be filed.

List on 09.11.2015 for arguments on application u/o XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC qua the plaintiff and defendant / M/s. Rediff.com India Ltd.

(Inder Jeet Singh)

ADJ­02 (South), Saket

New Delhi /23.07.2015







Mahesh Namkeen Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Patola Industies and anr


IN THE COURT OF SH.CHANDRA SHEKHAR :ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS, NEW DELHI

TM No. 27 of 18

Title : Mahesh Namkeen Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Patola Industies and anr


27-03-2018

Present :          Sh. Ajay Amitabh Suman, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff.

None is present for the defendant.

Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that he has received the copy of application under order 39 rule 4 CPC filed on behalf of the defendant. He seeks some time to file reply of the same.
I have considered the submissions, as none is present for the defendant, therefore, put up at 11.30 a.m

( CHANDRA SHEKHAR )
Additional District Judge-04
Judge Code : DL0003
PHC, New Delhi/27.03.2018

At 12.50 p.m

Present :          Sh. Som Nath Dey, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff.

None is present for the defendant.

Put up at 2 p.m.


( CHANDRA SHEKHAR )
Additional District Judge-04
Judge Code : DL0003
PHC, New Delhi/27.03.2018

At 2.45 p.m

Present :          Sh. Ajay Amitabh Singh, Sh. Kamal Naresh, Sh. Rahul Sharma and Sh. Som Nath Dey, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff.
Ms.Aparna Jain with Ms. Shashav Manu, Ld. Counsel for the defendant.
I have heard the submissions of both the parties on pending application

...cont2 /-

: 2 :

of the defendant under order 39 rule 4 CPC.

Ld. Counsel for the defendant has submitted that initially the trademark MAHESH was registered in the name of Rajesh Sindhwani in the year 2011, the application was filed in the year 2008 though the use of the said trademark was started since year 2000. The registration is in class 30 of Trade Marks Act. Thereafter, Sh. Rajesh Sindhwani became partner in Patola Industries i.e. defendant no.1 in the year 2010, he had through an affidavit transferred the rights of the said trademark in the name of Patola Industries. Since then Patola Industries which is partnership firm is using the said trademark. The plaintiff had given a cease and desist notice on 22.08.2016, the defendant replied to that notice on 23.09.2016 stating that defendant is using the trademark in question since 2000 and the fact that earlier it was in the name of Sh. Rajesh Sindhwani but the same was transferred in the year 2010 in the same of defendant was also disclosed in the said reply. There was a typographical error on the part of concerned trademark office regarding description of the goods for which trademark MAHESH was registered. The defendant had applied for registration in class 30 for its goods namkeen and sweets but the said trademark office registered the same for the goods Madhuram Sweets. Therefore, the defendant applied for correction of the certificate much prior to receiving of the aforesaid notice from the plaintiff. As the defendant is the registered owner in the same class in which the plaintiff is registered and for the same trademark and same kinds of goods, therefore, defendant be permitted to carry on its business till disposal of the application filed by defendant under order 39 rule 4 CPC and the application of the plaintiff under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 CPC.

Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has opposed the submissions of Ld. Counsel for the defendant stating that in reply to the aforesaid cease and desist notice defendant had not disclosed that defendant had applied for registration in class 30 for its goods for namkeen and bhujiya. The certificate in question reflected that defendant is registered in class 30 for Madhuram Sweets. The defendant had also not disclosed in reply that Sh. Rajesh Sindhwani had ever transfer his rights of registration of the aforesaid trademark in the name of defendant, therefore, plaintiff was not aware

...cont3/-


: 3 :


that the said trademark was transferred in the name of the defendant. The plaintiff had filed reply of the defendant alongwith the plaint, therefore, plaintiff has not suppressed anything. The renewal form has been filed in November, 2017 in the name of Rajesh Kumar Sindhwani only, therefore, if the rights relating to the trademark was transferred how renewal can be sought in the individual name. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has relied upon the judgment 'Neon Laboratories ltd. Vs. Medical Technologies Ltd. and ors. in Civil appeal no. 1018 of 2006; 2015 (64) PTC 225 (SC) decided on 05.10.2015'.
I have heard the submission of Ld. Counsel for both the parties and perused the record.
It seems at this stage that both the parties are the registered proprietor in class 30 for the trademark MAHESH, the defendant has claimed that defendant applied for registration of the trademark MAHESH in the year 2008 claiming use since 2000. The disposal of the application under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 CPC of the plaintiff and under Order 39 rule 4 CPC of the defendant will take some time. It seems that since defendant no.1 is also the registered proprietor of trademark MAHESH, therefore, it is in the interest of justice that permission be given to the defendant to carry on its business using trademark MAHESH till disposal of the aforesaid applications, subject to the condition that the defendant shall maintain the record of the sale of its goods and keep on filing the invoices/receipts in the court after every 15 days and simultaneously supply copy of the same to the plaintiff. However, it is clarified that the observation made in this order shall have no affect on the merits of the case at any stage.

Plaintiff is directed to supply the copy of the plaint and documents to the Ld. Counsel for the defendant within two days from today.
Put up for filing reply and arguments on the application under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 CPC of the plaintiff and under Order 39 rule 4 CPC of the defendant on 10.04.2018. Both the parties are directed to file the documents, exchange the copies of

...cont. 4/-

: 4 :

reply and rejoinder prior to the next date through their respective counsel.

Copy of the order be given dasti to Ld. Counsel for both the parties, as

prayed.


( CHANDRA SHEKHAR )
ADJ-04 Judge Code : DL0003
PHC, New Delhi/27.03.2018

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