Psychotropics India Ltd Vs Syncom Healthcare Ltd.

Introduction:

When a decree has been granted to the plaintiff in a lawsuit pertaining to trademark infringement, one might assume that the matter has been resolved definitively. However, what if the defendants persist in manufacturing and selling infringing products even after the decree? 

This is a situation where the decree holder seeks a remedy through the initiation of execution proceedings. But, how can an instantaneous remedy be imposed to curtail the infringing activities of the judgment debtor? The answer lies in the appointment of a Local Commissioner in an execution proceeding, as highlighted by a significant ruling from the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

The Case at Hand:

In a case that came before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the judgment debtor continued to sell infringing products even after a decree had been issued in favor of the plaintiff. In response, the judgment holder filed an application under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking the appointment of a Local Commissioner during the execution proceeding. The primary purpose of this appointment was to seize the infringing products in possession of the judgment debtor. However, the Trial Court rejected this application, leading to challenge before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi through a Civil Miscellaneous Main Petition.

Applicability of Order XXVI Rule 18A CPC:

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, in its deliberations, invoked Order XXVI Rule 18A of the CPC to underscore that the provisions of Order XXVI are not limited to the main suit but extend to execution proceedings as well. This interpretation lays the foundation for utilizing the mechanism of a Local Commissioner in the execution phase to achieve a swifter resolution of issues pertaining to the enforcement of court orders.

Significance of Appointing a Local Commissioner in Execution Proceedings:

In the context of execution proceedings following a decree in trademark infringement cases, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi highlighted the critical role played by a Local Commissioner. The importance of this appointment can be analyzed from two key perspectives.

1. Ensuring Thorough Investigation:

One primary function of a Local Commissioner is to guarantee a comprehensive investigation into the activities of the defendant. This is particularly relevant in cases of trademark infringement, where the depth of the inquiry is essential to establish the extent of the violation. The Local Commissioner's involvement ensures that the court possesses a complete understanding of the defendant's actions.

2. Effective Enforcement of Court Orders:

Secondly, the appointment of a Local Commissioner serves as a mechanism to enforce court orders effectively. It provides a structured process to report and address any violations promptly. In cases where monetary damages might be a component of the final judgment, the presence of a Local Commissioner becomes even more crucial. The commissioner's involvement ensures that the court can efficiently handle issues related to damages, if warranted, in a systematic and timely manner.

:Crucial Role in Trademark Infringement Matters:

In trademark infringement cases, the significance of appointing a Local Commissioner becomes particularly evident. If Local Commissioners are not appointed in execution petitions, especially when continuous violations of the judgment or decree occur, the effectiveness of permanent injunctions granted during the initial decree is compromised. This is especially relevant in trademark infringement, where brand owners' rights and the interests of consumers and the general public are at stake.

For example, in cases involving medicinal preparations, the absence of Local Commissioners in execution proceedings can result in patients unwittingly purchasing products bearing infringing trademarks. This poses potential harm to their health and is contrary to their interests. By allowing for the appointment of Local Commissioners in execution petitions, the court can promptly and effectively address trademark infringement issues, safeguarding the rights of the decree holder and protecting the broader interests of society.

The Concluding Note:

In conclusion, the case before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi underscores the pivotal role that Local Commissioners can play in execution proceedings following a decree in trademark infringement cases. The appointment of a Local Commissioner not only ensures a comprehensive investigation into the defendant's activities but also facilitates the enforcement of court orders. This mechanism becomes especially crucial when trademark infringement cases involve continuous violations and where the interests of consumers and the general public are at risk. By allowing for the appointment of Local Commissioners in execution petitions, the court can swiftly and effectively address trademark infringement issues, thereby upholding the rights of the decree holder and safeguarding the broader interests of the society.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:30/09/2019

Case No. CM M 1409 of 2019

Neutral Citation No: N.A.

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Prathiba M Singh, H.J.

Case Title: Psychotropics India Ltd Vs Syncom Healthcare Ltd.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, 

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com, 

Mob No: 9990389539

Puma SE Vs Ashok Kumar

Decree of Damages and the Role of the Local Commissioner's Report in Trademark Infringement Cases

Introduction:

This article discusses the significance of the Local Commissioner's report in assessing damages in a trademark infringement case, with reference to a recent judgment by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

The PUMA Trademark Infringement Lawsuit:

The Plaintiff in this case filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, alleging trademark infringement and passing off. The Plaintiff asserted proprietor rights in the well-known PUMA trademark, as well as the iconic leaping cat device. The Defendants were found to be selling counterfeit PUMA products, leading to the infringement suit. The Defendants were initially restrained ex-parte, and as they failed to file a written statement, the suit was decreed in favor of the Plaintiff.

Assessing Damages:

In the aftermath of the decree in favor of the Plaintiff, a key question emerged: how should damages be evaluated based on the evidence available? This is where the role of the Local Commissioner's report becomes crucial.

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi relied on a recent judgment in "M L Brother LLP v. Mahesh Kumar Bhrualal Tanna [CS(COMM) 126/2022]". The judgment cited Order 26, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which stipulates that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. This provision establishes the evidentiary value of the Local Commissioner's report.

"In light of this legal provision, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi confirmed that the Local Commissioner's report can be considered as evidence in the case, thereby enabling the court to rely on it for the purpose of assessing damages."

The Local Commissioner's Report:

The court turned to the Local Commissioner's report to evaluate the damages suffered by the Plaintiff due to the Defendants' infringing activities. The report revealed critical information, including the Defendant's average weekly sales and the duration of their involvement in the infringing business.

According to the report, the Defendant's average weekly sale amounted to 200 pairs of shoes, resulting in a weekly revenue of Rs. 40,000 and a monthly revenue of Rs. 1,60,000. The Defendant informed the Local Commissioner that they had been engaged in this infringing business for the last two years. Accordingly, the report estimated that the unauthorized 'PUMA' marked shoes had been sold for a total of 24 months, with a total revenue of Rs. 38,40,000.

The Hon'ble Court observed that considering the costs of raw materials and other expenses were approximately 50% of the revenue, the Defendant was found to have made a profit of approximately Rs. 18 to Rs. 19 lakhs.

Decree of Damages:

Based on the information provided in the Local Commissioner's report, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi awarded a decree of damages. The court ordered the Defendants to pay Rs. 10 lakhs as damages, in addition to an extra cost of Rs. 2 lakhs.

The Concluding Note:

The recent judgment in this case, emphasizing the evidentiary value of the Local Commissioner's report, demonstrates the importance of reliable evidence in calculating damages in such cases. It underlines the courts' ability to use comprehensive reports to assess the financial harm incurred by the plaintiff and, in doing so, ensures that justice is served in trademark infringement disputes.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:20/10/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 703/2017

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:7696

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Prathiba M Singh, H.J.

Case Title: Puma SE Vs Ashok Kumar

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Strix Ltd vs Maharaja Appliances Limited

Pith and Marrow Test in Patent Infringement

Introduction:

In the case of patent infringement, courts must carefully examine the asserted patent's claims and the allegedly infringing product to determine whether the latter incorporates the essence of the invention claimed. One such approach used to evaluate patent infringement is the "pith and marrow" test, which was recently applied in the case of Sotefin SA v. Indraprastha Cancer Society and Research Centre (2022:DHC:595). This article delves into the significance of the pith and marrow test through a case study involving a patent infringement lawsuit in India.

The Suit Patent: Liquid Heating Vessels:

In the case at hand, the Plaintiff obtained a patent for "Liquid Heating Vessels" (Patent No. 192511/95) on 11th November 2005, claiming priority from a UK application dated June 9, 1994.

The patent was valid for twenty years from the date of application, expiring on 8th June 2015. The Plaintiff alleged that they had been using the invention described in the Suit Patent since 2002.

The key claim of the Suit Patent revolves around a liquid heating vessel comprising a liquid receiving container and an electrical heating element in thermal contact with the base of the container.

The Infringement Lawsuit:

The Plaintiff initiated legal proceedings against the Defendant, asserting that the Defendant's product, the "Maharaja Whiteline Model No. EK 172," infringed upon the Suit Patent. To establish infringement, the court had to evaluate whether all the essential features claimed in the Suit Patent were present in the Defendant's product.

The Pith and Marrow Test:

In patent infringement cases, courts traditionally perform a claim-by-claim analysis, comparing each element of the patent claims with the corresponding features of the accused product. However, the recent case of (2022:DHC:595) Sotefin SA v. Indraprastha Cancer Society and Research Centre introduced a different approach—the "pith and marrow" test.

"The pith and marrow test emphasizes that to establish patent infringement, it is not necessary to engage in meticulous and detailed specifications comparisons. Instead, the court should focus on the core or essence of the invention claimed in the patent. In other words, the court should identify the heart of the invention and determine whether the accused product infringes upon that core."

Application of the Test:

In the present case, the court applied the pith and marrow test to assess the Defendant's product, Maharaja Whiteline Model No. EK 172, against the Suit Patent. The court observed that the Defendant's product utilized temperature controls that, in essence, infringed upon the core of the invention claimed in the Suit Patent. By incorporating similar heating mechanisms and thermal controls in their product, the Defendant's product was found to be in violation of the pith and marrow of the patented technology.

The concluding Note:

The application of the pith and marrow test in the case of (2022:DHC:595) Sotefin SA v. Indraprastha Cancer Society and Research Centre represents a notable shift in the evaluation of patent infringement in India. This approach simplifies the process by directing the court's attention to the essence of the patented invention. It enables a more focused and efficient analysis, reducing the need for exhaustive comparisons of detailed specifications.

In the case discussed, the court effectively used the pith and marrow test to conclude that the Defendant's product infringed upon the Suit Patent's core innovation. This case demonstrates that the pith and marrow test can serve as a valuable tool in patent litigation, promoting clarity and expeditious resolution of infringement claims.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:20/10/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 806/2017

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:7667

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Pratiba M Singh, H.J.

Case Title: Strix Ltd vs Maharaja Appliances Limited

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Dharampal Satpal Limited Vs Basant Kumar Makhija

Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999 and Contents of Replication

Introduction:

Section 124 of the Trademarks Act 1999 plays a crucial role in determination of prima facie invalidity of trademark registration. This article explores the legal intricacies of Section 124 and delves into the question of whether the contents of a replication can be considered in adjudicating an application under this section.

Section 124 of the Trademarks Act 1999:

Section 124 of the Trademarks Act 1999 provides the framework for addressing the issue of trademark invalidity raised by a plaintiff in response to a defendant's assertion of rights based on the registration of their trademark. When a defendant raises the Defense of Section 30(2)(e) of the Trademarks Act 1999, they are essentially claiming the right to use their registered mark as a defense against charges of infringement and injunction.

The Legal Conundrum:

A critical question arises regarding the procedural steps a plaintiff must take to invoke Section 124 when a defendant utilizes Section 30(2)(e) as their defense strategy. The key debate revolves around whether a plaintiff can raise the issue of invalidity in the replication or if they are required to amend the initial plaint.

The Defendant's Argument:

In a specific case before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the defendant argued that the plea concerning the invalidity of their registered trademark should be incorporated into the original plaint. They contended that the averments contained in the replication could not constitute "pleadings" regarding the registration's invalidity. To support their stance, the defendant relied on the judgment of Travellers Exchange Corporation Ltd. v. Celebrities Management Pvt. Ltd. (2023) 93 PTC 425.

The Court's Interpretation:

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi interpreted the provision of Section 124(1)(b) differently in response to this argument of defendant. "The court emphasized that a Section 30(2)(e) defense involves the defendant's assertion of rights derived from the registration of their trademark. The latter half of Section 124(1)(b) specifies that the plaintiff can plead the invalidity of the defendant's trademark registration. It became evident that the provision was designed to address a challenge by the plaintiff only when the defendant asserts rights stemming from the registration."

Consequently, the court ruled that the plaintiff's occasion to plead the invalidity of the defendant's trademark, as per Section 124(1)(b), arises exclusively when the defendant raises a Section 30(2)(e) defense. This interpretation allowed the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi to consider the contents of the replication and enabled the plaintiff to proceed with their application under Section 124 of the Trademarks Act 1999 by framing an additional issue of the invalidity of the defendant's registered trademark.

The Concluding Note:

The case before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi underscores the significance of a meticulous interpretation of trademark laws, especially in situations where a defendant raises the Defense of Section 30(2)(e). Section 124 of the Trademarks Act 1999 clarifies that a plaintiff can indeed raise the issue of trademark invalidity in the replication, provided that the defendant has asserted rights deriving from the registration.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:17/10/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 806/2017

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:7667

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, H.J.

Case Title: Dharampal Satpal Limited Vs Basant Kumar Makhija

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Himalaya Wellness Company Vs Abony Healthcare

In case of Dishonest adoption, similarity of trademark has to be seen , even if it is less

Introduction:

Trademark infringement cases often hinge on the balance between the similarity of trademarks and the element of dishonesty by the alleged infringer. In a recent case involving the trademarks "LIV.52" and "LIV.55 DS, LIV 999" the court's decision shed light on the significance of dishonesty and how it can tilt the scales in favor of the plaintiff, even if the similarity between the trademarks is not substantial.

The Case Overview:

The case at hand involves a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants regarding the use of the mark "LIV.52." Plaintiff 2 had obtained registration of this trademark with registration number 180564 dating back to July 10, 1957. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants infringed upon their trademark by using the mark "LIV.55 DS and LIV 999" for a similar liver tonic. Furthermore, the defendants' packaging bore a trade dress strikingly similar to that of the plaintiffs.

The Court's Observations:

The court began by scrutinizing the trade dress of both parties. A mere glance at the packaging of the plaintiffs and the defendants revealed that the latter had intentionally replicated the trade dress of the former. This included the thin orange border at the top, the central white strip, and the green lower half of the bottle/package. The lettering, written in white with similar fonts, also resembled that of the plaintiffs. Even when analyzing the wordmarks in isolation, "LIV.52" and "LIV.55 DS and LIV 999" were unmistakably deceptively similar.

The Importance of Dishonesty:

In trademark infringement cases, the element of dishonesty plays a pivotal role. When the court is prima facie convinced that the defendant has intentionally copied or imitated the plaintiff, the presumption arises that the Defendant has successfully confused consumers. This presumption stems from the belief that the defendant's actions were driven by dishonesty. "When dishonesty on the part of the defendant is evident, the court's focus shifts towards the similarities between the trademarks, even if these similarities are not extensive."

In the case under consideration, the court observed that the defendant's trademarks, "LIV.55" and "LIV.999," were deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark "LIV.52." The court's ruling was influenced by the apparent dishonesty of the defendant in replicating the plaintiff's trade dress and trademark. Consequently, the suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff.

The Concluding Note:

This case serves as a pertinent illustration of the legal principles governing trademark infringement cases. Dishonesty on the part of the alleged infringer can weigh heavily in favor of the plaintiff. When the court discerns that the defendant has deliberately copied or imitated the plaintiff, it presumes that consumer confusion is inevitable. In such instances, the court's attention is directed towards the similarities between the trademarks, even if they are not overwhelmingly alike.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:17/10/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 476/2021

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:7668

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, H.J.

Case Title: Himalaya Wellness Company Vs Abony Healthcare

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Yamini Manohar Vs T.K.D.Keerthi

Exemption Under Section 12 A of Commercial Court Act 2015

Introduction:

Section 12 A of Commercial Court  Act 2015 has been a subject of debate, specifically regarding the mandatory requirement for pre-institution mediation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in its judgment in the case of Patil Automation Private Limited and Ors. Vs Rakheja Engineers Private Limited (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1028), played a pivotal role in interpreting the applicability and necessity of pre-institution mediation under this section. This Judgement  further clarification the Scope of Section 12 A of Coonercial Court Act 2025  in the case at hand.

Background of the case:

In the case at hand, the defendants/petitioners filed application under O 7 Rule 11 seeking rejection of suit C.S. (Comm.) No. 205/2022 on the ground that there was no application seeking exemption  under Section 12A of Commercial Court Act 2015 . However, the Trial Court rejected this application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This led to the matter being brought before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for consideration.

Mandatory Pre-Institution Mediation:

In its earlier judgment in Patil Automation Private Limited and Ors. Vs Rakheja Engineers Private Limited, the Supreme Court held that Section 12 A of the Commercial Court Act 2015 mandates pre-litigation mediation. This mandate stands unless the suit contemplates urgent interim relief. This interpretation laid down a significant precedent regarding the requirement for mediation in commercial disputes.

No Requirement for Exemption Application:

One of the key aspects of the Supreme Court's interpretation was the clarification that Section 12 A does not contemplate seeking leave of the court, nor does it necessarily require an application seeking exemption from pre-institution mediation. The Court highlighted that the language and wording of the section do not impose such conditions. Instead, the provision primarily requires that pre-litigation mediation should be sought unless the suit specifically involves urgent interim relief.

The Court's View on Exemption Application:

The Supreme Court made it clear that while an application seeking a waiver based on grounds and reasons related to urgent interim relief can be beneficial and assist the court in making an informed decision, it is not a statutory mandate under Section 12 A of the Commercial Court Act. According to the Court's interpretation, the existence of such an application is not a precondition.

Application to the Present Case:

In the case in question, the Plaintiff  sought urgent interim relief, meeting the condition that the plaint "contemplates" such relief. This fact satisfied the requirement of Section 12 A of the Commercial Court Act. Consequently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the impugned judgment/order of the Delhi High Court, which had, in turn, confirmed the order of the District Judge (Commercial Court)-01, South District at Saket, New Delhi. The Supreme Court's decision to dismiss the appeal reinforced the interpretation that Section 12 A of the Act does not mandate a formal exemption application and that the existence of urgent interim relief is the determining factor.

The Concluding Note:

The Supreme Court's interpretation in Patil Automation Private Limited and Ors. Vs Rakheja Engineers Private Limited has provided valuable clarity on the applicability of Section 12 A of the Commercial Court Act 2015. The judgment emphasizes that pre-institution mediation is mandatory unless the suit specifically contemplates urgent interim relief. Moreover, it clarifies that an application seeking exemption is not a statutory requirement.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:13/10/2023

Case No. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 32275/2023

Neutral Citation No: N.A.

Name of Hon'ble Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Sanjeev Khanna and S.V.N.Bhatti, H.J.

Case Title: Yamini Manohar Vs T.K.D.Keerthi 

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, 

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com, 

Mob No: 9990389539

Hulm Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs Fantasy Sports MYFAB11 Pvt. Ltd.

Copyright Infringement in Fantasy Games Leagues Mobile App

Introduction:

Let us delve into a recent legal case pending before Hon'ble Justice Ms. Jyoti Singh, Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, in which a plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant, alleging copyright infringement regarding a Fantasy Sports Mobile App. The lawsuit revolves around the introduction of a new feature by the defendant in their MYFAB11 app and the alleged copying of the plaintiff's concept, working, features, and execution. This article provides an analytical assessment of the case, examining the core arguments presented by both parties and the court's observations.

The Plaintiff's Allegations:

The plaintiff, in this case, claimed that they had developed a unique Fantasy Sports Mobile App, registered under the Copyright Act, 1957, as a literary and dramatic work. The app differentiated itself from conventional Fantasy Games Leagues. The subject matter suit was filed to prevent the defendant from making the plaintiff's copyrighted work available for download through their MYFAB11 app, or any similar app using the same application or computer program, thereby allegedly infringing the plaintiff's copyrighted works. The defendant had introduced a new feature, 'STOCKS,' in their Fantasy Sports League Mobile App MYFAB11, which the plaintiff asserted not only copied the concept but also its working, features, and execution of the plaintiff's buy/sell interface.

The Defendant's Defense:

The defendants contested the plaintiff's claims by arguing that the plaintiff had concealed the fact that they were not the first to combine the features of Fantasy Sports Leagues with the stock market. They pointed out the existence of numerous third-party applications with similar concepts. The defendant further contended that the plaintiff's assertion of copyright infringement in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of their app was misconceived, as no copyright was claimed in any artistic work.

Court's Observations:

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, while refusing to grant interim injunction relief, made several critical observations. The court noted that although the plaintiff claimed to have introduced the unique idea of integrating Fantasy Sports Leagues with the stock market in 2010, no material evidence was provided to substantiate this claim. The absence of concrete evidence raised questions about the originality and uniqueness of the plaintiff's concept.

The Court's Analysis:

The central question addressed by the court was whether the plaintiff had merely adopted a pre-existing idea or reproduced it in a different form, tone, or tenor to give it a new expression and infuse new life into the concept. In examining the plaintiff's mobile app, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of proof. The court's decision rested on the principle that copyright protection is not granted to ideas but to the expression of those ideas.

The Concluding Note:

This case highlights the importance of concrete evidence and a strong legal basis in copyright infringement suits, particularly in the dynamic world of mobile applications. It underscores the need for plaintiffs to provide substantial proof of originality and uniqueness when claiming copyright infringement in the face of similar concepts.

The Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement/Order:17/10/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 244/2022

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:7593

Name of Hon'ble Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Jyoti Singh, H.J.

Case Title: Hulm Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs Fantasy Sports MYFAB11 Pvt. Ltd.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor - Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539