Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal

Public Prosecutor’s Role in Political Defamation

Facts:The case arose from a controversy surrounding a book published in 2015 which contained certain passages and allegations about the personal life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of West Bengal. The author of the book had claimed that the Chief Minister had been secretly married prior to assuming office and had attempted to conceal this fact from the public. The book described the alleged relationship and questioned the integrity and honesty of the Chief Minister, suggesting that her public persona did not match her private conduct.

In the same book, the author published a letter dated 30 April 2012 addressed to the Chief Minister in her capacity as Chairperson of the All India Trinamool Congress. The letter contained two specific questions — whether a particular individual (allegedly her spouse) had attended her oath-taking ceremony at Raj Bhavan on 20 May 2011, and whether that individual was present in her official chamber at the Writers’ Buildings on the same day when she assumed charge as Chief Minister. These questions, according to the author, were meant to expose what he described as “undisclosed facts of her personal life.”

The book was never banned or restricted by any government order and continued to be sold publicly.

The petitioner, Koustav Bagchi, an advocate and political figure, uploaded certain pages from the book—particularly the page containing the 2012 letter—on social media platforms. He also made comments on television channels referring to the same content. This act led to allegations that he had defamed the Hon’ble Chief Minister. Consequently, the Public Prosecutor of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta filed a complaint under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), corresponding to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, invoking Section 222(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which allows the Public Prosecutor to file a defamation complaint on behalf of certain public functionaries such as the President, Governors, or Ministers for defamatory acts committed against them in the discharge of their official duties.

Procedural Background:Upon receiving the complaint, the Chief Judge of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta, after hearing the petitioner as required under Section 223 of the BNSS, took cognizance of the offence under Section 356(2) BNS and issued summons to the petitioner.

Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a criminal revision application before the Calcutta High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 of the CrPC), seeking to quash the proceedings. He raised three principal arguments.

First, that the book had been published nearly a decade earlier and was freely available in the market, and therefore, merely reproducing its content on social media did not constitute a new offence.

Second, that since the original author had not been prosecuted and the book had not been banned, his act of reproduction could not be treated as defamation.

Third, that even if the statements were defamatory, they did not relate to the Chief Minister’s conduct in discharge of her public duties, and therefore, the Public Prosecutor had no authority to initiate proceedings under Section 222(2) BNSS; only the Chief Minister herself could have done so as an aggrieved person.

The State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor, opposed the revision, arguing that at the stage of cognizance, the Court should not conduct a detailed inquiry or “mini-trial” but only see whether a prima facie case existed. He relied on Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338 and Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221), to emphasize that the trial court had correctly taken cognizance on the basis of the material on record.

The Core Dispute:The key legal questions before the Court were:

1. Whether the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 222(2) of the BNSS was maintainable when the allegedly defamatory statements concerned the personal life of the Chief Minister and not her conduct in discharge of official duties.

2. Whether mere reproduction or sharing of a previously published book on social media amounted to fresh defamation, attracting criminal liability.

3. Whether the learned Chief Judge erred in issuing summons to the petitioner without sufficient grounds.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis: Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 222 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The section provides that ordinarily, only an aggrieved person can file a complaint for defamation. However, under sub-section (2), the Public Prosecutor may file a complaint if the defamation concerns the conduct of certain high constitutional functionaries—including the President, Governors, or Ministers—in the discharge of their public functions, provided that the appropriate government grants prior sanction.

The Court first acknowledged that the Public Prosecutor indeed has authority to file such complaints, but this authority is limited strictly to instances where the alleged defamation concerns the official or public conduct of the functionary. Personal or private matters of life fall outside the ambit of this provision. Relying on K.K. Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2018) 6 SCC 676] and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [(2016) 7 SCC 221]*, the Court emphasized that the Public Prosecutor must independently examine whether the material truly relates to the conduct of the public official in discharge of public duties and must act with independence, not as a mere agent of the State.

In the present case, while the initial allegations in the book related to the personal and private life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, certain references—such as whether a particular person was present during the oath-taking ceremony or inside her office chamber at the Writers’ Buildings—could arguably relate to her official capacity. The Court noted that the definition of “conduct” includes not only action but also demeanor and behavior. Therefore, if the statements linked her personal relationship to the functioning of her office, they could potentially relate to her conduct in discharge of public duties.

Court observed that determining whether the defamatory content was purely personal or had a nexus with the Chief Minister’s public conduct required a full trial and examination of evidence. Hence, the complaint could not be dismissed at the preliminary stage.

On the second issue, regarding republication, the Court held that re-sharing or reproducing defamatory material amounts to a fresh act of defamation. The Court referred to Kaikhusuru Naroji Kabraji v. Jehangir Byramji Murzban (1890 ILR 14 Bom 532), where the reprinting of a defamatory article made the re-publisher equally liable as the original author. It also relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Arvind Kejriwal v. State [2024 SCC OnLine Del 719], where retweeting defamatory content without disclaimer was held to constitute republication.

The Court further cited Ruchi Kalra v. Slowform Media [2025 SCC OnLine Del 1894], which held that hyperlinking or referencing defamatory content could amount to republication if it expands the defamatory reach. Similarly, in Amber Quiry v. Yohan Tangra [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1093], the Bombay High Court reiterated that every repetition of defamatory material gives rise to a new cause of action.

Court emphasized that even though the book was not banned, it carried a clear copyright notice prohibiting reproduction without permission from the author. The petitioner had failed to show that he had obtained such permission. Therefore, his act of sharing the pages online amounted to unauthorized reproduction, both in defamation law and copyright terms.

The Court also discussed K.K. Mishra (supra) in depth, where the Supreme Court quashed a similar complaint because the alleged defamatory remarks did not concern the Chief Minister’s official duties but personal matters. However, in the present case, the defamatory imputations included references to the Chief Minister’s office and oath ceremony, thereby partially overlapping with her public functions. This, according to the Court, justified the continuation of proceedings.

Lastly, the Court reiterated that the role of the Public Prosecutor, as laid down in Subramanian Swamy and Bairam Muralidhar v. State of A.P. [(2014) 10 SCC 380], is not mechanical. He must independently assess the materials before filing the complaint. However, in the absence of evidence showing mala fides or lack of independent scrutiny at this stage, the Court found no basis to interfere with the complaint.

Decision:The Calcutta High Court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the order dated 18 June 2025 of the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. Justice Apurba Sinha Ray held that the cognizance taken by the trial court was legally valid and that the proceedings could not be quashed at the preliminary stage.

The Court observed that whether the alleged statements were truly connected to the Chief Minister’s official duties or were purely personal was a matter of evidence and trial. Hence, the complaint was not barred in law. The Court clarified that its observations were only for the purpose of the revisional application and not on the merits of the trial.

Consequently, the revision application (CRR 2817 of 2025) was dismissed, along with the connected application (CRAN 1 of 2025). The interim stay, if any, stood vacated, and the Court directed that the book produced during proceedings be returned to the petitioner’s counsel.

Conclusion:This judgment in Koustav Bagchi v. The State of West Bengal sheds light on the delicate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation, particularly concerning public functionaries. It clarifies the limited scope of Section 222(2) of the BNSS, emphasizing that the Public Prosecutor can intervene only when the defamatory act is connected to a Minister’s official duties, not private life. However, where private life allegations spill into official conduct—such as office presence or public events—the matter may warrant judicial scrutiny through trial.

The Court’s observations on republication underline that digital repetition, retweeting, or reposting of defamatory material is legally equivalent to fresh defamation. The decision also underscores the principle that the Public Prosecutor must act independently and cautiously when filing defamation complaints under statutory authority.

Case Title: Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr.

Order Date: 31 October 2025

Case Number: CRR 2817 of 2025 with CRAN 1 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:2011

Court: High Court at Calcutta, Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Apurba Sinha Ray

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ramesh Chandra Sahoo Vs State of Orissa

Case Title: Ramesh Chandra Sahoo Vs State of Orissa

Order Date: 16 October 2025

Case Number: BLAPL No. 10425 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:ORI:HC:10425

Court: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

Hon’ble Judge: Justice G. Satapathy

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Facts

The petitioner, Ramesh Chandra Sahoo, was the Principal of Swami Arupananda Higher Secondary School of Education and Technology, Kurtanga, in Jagatsinghpur district. The case arose from an incident of sexual harassment of a minor girl student by a Mathematics lecturer named Saswat Kumar Mohanty, who was employed at the same school. On 15 January 2025, the victim girl complained to the petitioner about the lecturer’s misbehavior and harassment. The petitioner conducted an internal inquiry, and the accused lecturer reportedly admitted to his misconduct. However, despite such admission, the petitioner neither reported the matter to the Governing Body of the school nor to the local police, as required under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

The victim, dissatisfied with the inaction of the Principal, submitted a written complaint to the Sub-Collector, Jagatsinghpur, during a Jana Sunani (public grievance hearing). Upon receiving the complaint, the Sub-Collector called for a report from the petitioner. After evaluating the situation, the Sub-Collector himself lodged an FIR on 22 July 2025 before the Inspector-in-Charge, Jagatsinghpur Police Station. A “Zero FIR” was registered as Jagatsinghpur P.S. Case No. 07/2025, later transferred to Raghunathpur Police Station as Case No. 155/2025, which was then taken up as Special G.R. Case No. 74/2025 before the Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the POCSO Act, Jagatsinghpur.

The petitioner was accused not of directly committing sexual assault but of failing to report the offence, which amounted to a contravention of Section 19(1) read with Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. The maximum punishment prescribed for such an omission is imprisonment for up to one year along with fine.

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Procedural Background

After the FIR was registered, the petitioner first sought anticipatory bail by filing ABLAPL No. 9129 of 2025 before the Orissa High Court. The Court, however, declined to grant anticipatory bail and instead directed the petitioner to surrender before the trial court and move an application for regular bail, which was to be considered on the same day. The co-accused lecturer also filed a separate anticipatory bail application in ABLAPL No. 9395 of 2025. The petitioner accordingly surrendered before the Special Court at Jagatsinghpur and applied for bail. The Special Court, however, rejected his bail plea and remanded him to judicial custody.

Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner filed the present bail application (BLAPL No. 10425 of 2025) under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking post-arrest bail before the Orissa High Court.

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The Core Dispute

The central question before the High Court was whether the offence alleged against the petitioner under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act was bailable or non-bailable in nature. The petitioner’s counsel argued that since the maximum punishment under Section 21(2) is only one year, the offence should be classified as bailable under the First Schedule of the BNSS (formerly the CrPC). The prosecution, however, resisted this argument and supported the trial court’s decision to deny bail.

The question thus involved an interpretative issue: how should courts classify offences under “special laws” like the POCSO Act when those laws themselves do not explicitly categorize offences as bailable or non-bailable?

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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice G. Satapathy began by examining the statutory scheme of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The POCSO Act defines and penalizes a range of offences relating to child sexual abuse but does not specify whether those offences are bailable or non-bailable. Instead, Section 31 of the POCSO Act makes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (and now, the BNSS, 2023) applicable to proceedings under the Act, unless inconsistent with its provisions. Therefore, to determine whether an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act is bailable, the Court referred to Table II of the First Schedule of the BNSS, which classifies offences under “other laws.”

According to Table II of the First Schedule of the BNSS:

1. If the punishment prescribed is death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding seven years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Sessions Court.

2. If the punishment is imprisonment between three and seven years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the First Class.

3. If the punishment is imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only, the offence is non-cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate.

The Court then analyzed Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, which states that any person in charge of an institution who fails to report an offence under Section 19(1) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine. Based on the punishment structure, the Court concluded that this offence clearly falls within the third category—that is, it is bailable and non-cognizable.

In support of this interpretation, the Court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi [(2022) 10 SCC 221; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 668]*, where the Apex Court examined Section 63 of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court had clarified that where the maximum punishment is up to three years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, and where it is less than three years, it becomes non-cognizable and bailable. Applying this reasoning, the Orissa High Court held that an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act—punishable with imprisonment up to one year—is clearly bailable.

The Court then turned to the constitutional perspective under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Justice Satapathy emphasized that denying bail to a person accused of a bailable offence amounts to unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and constitutes a violation of Article 21. He observed that when an offence is bailable, the accused has a right to be released on bail upon furnishing surety or even on a personal bond if indigent. The trial court’s refusal to grant bail, therefore, amounted to a constitutional infraction.

The High Court criticized the Special Court for failing to notice that the alleged offence was bailable in nature and for mechanically remanding the petitioner to custody. Justice Satapathy observed that the learned trial court had undertaken an extensive analysis of the allegations but still reached an erroneous conclusion by denying bail. The Court described this as a gross violation of the petitioner’s personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.

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Decision

The Orissa High Court allowed the bail application and directed the immediate release of the petitioner on bail in accordance with law. It also quashed the impugned order of the Special Court that had refused bail and ordered the Registrar General of the High Court to circulate the judgment to all POCSO Courts in the state. The purpose was to ensure that trial courts handling offences under the POCSO Act do not mistakenly deny bail in cases where the alleged offence is bailable.

The Court further directed that the copy of the judgment be sent electronically to the concerned court and observed that even if courts are closed for holidays, the bail order must be implemented immediately since the accused was in custody for a bailable offence. The judgment thus affirmed the principle that in bailable offences, bail is not a matter of judicial discretion but a matter of right.

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Conclusion

The judgment in Ramesh Chandra Sahoo v. State of Orissa is a landmark ruling on the classification of offences under the POCSO Act and their intersection with the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. It clarifies that where a special statute does not specify whether an offence is bailable or not, the classification provided in the First Schedule of the BNSS will apply. The decision also reinforces the constitutional dimension of bail as an extension of personal liberty under Article 21.

By holding that failure to report an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act is a bailable offence, the Orissa High Court has ensured that procedural fairness and personal liberty remain central to criminal jurisprudence. The ruling also serves as guidance for all Special Courts dealing with POCSO matters to distinguish between serious offences and procedural omissions, preventing unnecessary incarceration for minor lapses.

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Bail as a Right, Not a Favour: Orissa High Court’s Guidance under the BNSS and POCSO Act

2. Failure to Report under POCSO: A Bailable Offence Clarified by the Orissa High Court

3. Liberty, BNSS, and Bailable Offences: Understanding the Case of Ramesh Chandra Sahoo v. State of Orissa

4. When Silence Isn’t a Crime: Judicial Interpretation of Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act

5. Protecting Liberty in Procedural Justice: A Simple Reading of Orissa High Court’s 2025 Bail Judgment

Everest Entertainment LLP Vs Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar

When Delay Defeats Copyright Claims

Facts:Everest Entertainment LLP, the plaintiff, claimed to be the sole and exclusive owner of the copyright and intellectual property in the Marathi film “Mee Shivajiraje Bhosale Boltoy!” produced under an assignment agreement dated June 26, 2008, and its addendum dated August 28, 2013, executed with the first defendant, Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar. Under this agreement, Manjrekar, the director and original rights holder, assigned all intellectual property rights in the film—including the script, dialogues, cinematograph film, and promotional materials—to Everest Entertainment.

In 2025, the defendants, led by Manjrekar and others associated with Krizolh Filmz LLP, Satyasai Productions Pvt. Ltd., and Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., began production and promotion of a new Marathi film titled “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale.” The plaintiff alleged that the new film was a direct copy or unauthorized sequel to its earlier film. The plaintiff contended that the defendants had not only copied the storyline, theme, and characters but also used the same title format, font style, and promotional materials that were confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s work.

Everest Entertainment further asserted that the original film had gained immense popularity and goodwill among audiences and that the impugned film’s title and marketing strategy misrepresented an association or continuity, leading to public confusion and deception. The plaintiff, therefore, sought to restrain the release of the defendants’ film, scheduled for theatrical release on October 31, 2025.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff filed the commercial intellectual property suit on October 10, 2025, along with an interim application seeking ad-interim injunctions to restrain the defendants from releasing the impugned film. The initial bench recused itself from hearing the matter, after which the case was reassigned. On October 17, 2025, another bench directed the defendants to arrange a private screening of the impugned film for the plaintiff without background music. The screening took place on October 20, 2025.

After viewing the film, the plaintiff claimed to have identified over 30 points of substantial similarity between the two works and sought to amend the plaint accordingly. The vacation court heard the matter on October 24, 2025, when the plaintiff pressed for ad-interim injunctions restraining the release of “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale.”

The defendants strongly opposed the grant of any injunction, contending that the plaintiff had delayed unreasonably in filing the suit despite being aware of the impugned project since April 2025.

The Core Dispute:The core question before the Court was whether the defendants’ film “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale” amounted to an infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright and whether the plaintiff was entitled to an ad-interim injunction stopping its release.

The plaintiff’s claim was twofold: first, that there was substantial copying of its film, including the story, theme, and dialogues, constituting copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957; and second, that the defendants’ use of a similar title and presentation amounted to passing off, misleading the public into believing that the impugned film was a sequel or derivative of the plaintiff’s original film.

The defendants, on the other hand, denied all allegations. They argued that there can be no copyright in an idea, historical concept, or the name “Shivaji Raje Bhosale”, which refers to a historical and cultural figure. They contended that their film had a completely different storyline—focused on farmer distress and corruption—while the plaintiff’s earlier film was centered on a modern man rediscovering his Marathi identity with the spiritual guidance of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. The defendants further claimed that they had invested crores in production and promotion and that any injunction at this stage would cause irreparable loss.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:The Court noted that the plaintiff had admitted knowledge of the impugned film’s production as early as April 2025 and had even issued a legal notice on April 30, 2025. Replies from the defendants were received in July 2025, yet the plaintiff waited until October 10, 2025, to file the suit. The Court found no plausible explanation for this delay. Citing earlier Bombay High Court precedents, including Anil Kapoor Film Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Make My Day Entertainment (2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8119) and Dashrath B. Rathod v. Fox Star Studios India Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (1) Mh. L.J. 474], the Court reiterated that litigants who approach the Court at the eleventh hour to stop film releases after months of inaction cannot claim equitable reliefs.

The Court held that ad-interim injunctions are discretionary and equitable remedies, which require the applicant to show bona fides and promptness. Since the plaintiff delayed nearly five months despite knowing of the alleged infringement, its request was deemed to be a tactical move to pressure the defendants close to the release date. Hence, on this ground alone, the Court held that no urgent injunction could be granted.

On the merits, the Court examined the plaintiff’s claims of copyright infringement. Justice Jamsandekar clarified that under Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, a copyright in a cinematograph film is limited to protection against making a facsimile copy of the film. Referring to Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Leo Burnett (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2 Bom LR 655, the Court noted that producing a new film with similar themes or ideas does not constitute infringement unless it reproduces the original recording itself. Thus, since the defendants had independently produced their film, it could not be termed a “copy” of the plaintiff’s work.

Regarding the script and dialogues, the Court observed that the plaintiff had not produced the full script to substantiate its claim. Even from the alleged similarities, the Court found no substantial reproduction of the plaintiff’s literary work. The dialogues claimed—such as “Yaj Sathi Kela Hota Attahas” or “Marathi Mansala Kana Nahi”—were considered common Marathi expressions and therefore not eligible for copyright protection. The Court reasoned that accepting such a claim would mean granting monopoly over common cultural phrases, which would be against the spirit of copyright law.

On the title and promotional material, the Court held that the plaintiff could not claim exclusivity over the name “Shivaji Raje Bhosale”, a historical and revered public figure. The use of this name in a film title could not amount to infringement or passing off. Both posters depicted Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, a common cultural motif, and the use of similar imagery could not be monopolized.

Thus, the Court concluded that neither the title, dialogues, storyline, nor the visuals of the impugned film amounted to any actionable infringement or passing off. Moreover, the plaintiff’s conduct lacked diligence, making it ineligible for equitable relief.

Final Decision:Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for ad-interim injunctions, holding that there was both gross delay and no prima facie case of infringement. The Court emphasized that film production involves massive investment, and last-minute attempts to stall releases without timely action must be strongly discouraged.

Accordingly, the Court refused to restrain the release of “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale”, which was scheduled for October 31, 2025, and observed that the plaintiff’s remedy, if any, lies in pursuing the suit on merits after the defendants file their written statements.

Conclusion:This judgment underscores the importance of promptness in seeking equitable remedies in intellectual property disputes involving films. It also reiterates settled principles of copyright law that protect the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The Court made it clear that generic titles, historical names, and culturally rooted dialogues cannot be monopolized under copyright law. The case thus reinforces the balance between protecting creative works and preserving public domain expressions within cultural heritage.

Case Title: Everest Entertainment LLP Vs Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar & Ors.

Date of Order: October 24, 2025

Case Number:Commercial IP 32984 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:19882

Court: High Court of Bombay

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Amit S. Jamsandekar 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Swapan Dey Vs. Competition Commission of India

Case Title: Swapan Dey Vs. Competition Commission of India & Anr.

Case Number: Competition Appeal (AT) No. 5 of 2023

Order Date: 30th October 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:NCLAT:5

Court: National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi

Coram: Justice Yogesh Khanna (Judicial Member) and Mr. Ajai Das Mehrotra (Technical Member)

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Facts of the Case

The appellant, Mr. Swapan Dey, a medical professional and CEO of a hospital operating under the Pradhan Mantri National Dialysis Programme (PMNDP) through a Public-Private Partnership, filed information before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) against Vifor International (AG), a Swiss pharmaceutical company, alleging anti-competitive practices. The central issue revolved around the manufacture and sale of a drug known as Ferric Carboxymaltose (FCM) — a patented molecule used in treating Iron Deficiency Anaemia (IDA), which is a prevalent condition among dialysis patients, women, and children in India.

The appellant contended that due to the anti-competitive conduct of Vifor, the FCM injection had become inaccessible and unaffordable for Indian consumers. He alleged that Vifor abused its dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 and entered into restrictive licensing arrangements in violation of Section 3 of the Act. The essence of his grievance was that Vifor granted limited manufacturing and distribution licences only to Emcure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Lupin Ltd., thereby restricting wider market access and keeping prices high.

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Procedural History

Mr. Swapan Dey initially approached the Competition Commission of India (CCI) by filing Case No. 5 of 2022 on 12th January 2022. After considering his complaint, the CCI, through its order dated 25th October 2022, closed the matter under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002, finding no prima facie case of anti-competitive conduct or abuse of dominance by Vifor International.

Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) under Section 53B of the Act. The appeal was heard by a Bench comprising Justice Yogesh Khanna and Mr. Ajai Das Mehrotra. During the pendency of the appeal, Vifor’s patent on the FCM molecule expired on 21st October 2023, making the product available in the public domain for free exploitation.

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Core Dispute

The primary legal question before the Tribunal was whether the CCI possessed jurisdiction to examine alleged anti-competitive conduct by a patentee in relation to its patented invention, or whether such matters exclusively fall within the purview of the Patents Act, 1970.

The appellant argued that CCI failed to properly define the relevant market, assess Vifor’s dominance, and examine whether the limited licensing arrangement restricted competition and consumer access. He also alleged that CCI conducted an “ex-ante” analysis rather than an “ex-post” assessment as required for evaluating violations of Section 3(4) and Section 4 of the Competition Act.

On the other hand, Vifor contended that since the dispute concerned the exercise of patent rights protected under the Patents Act, the CCI had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Vifor relied on Section 3(5) of the Competition Act, 2002, which exempts reasonable restrictions imposed by a patentee to protect its intellectual property rights. Vifor also emphasized that its licensing agreements were reasonable, time-limited, and non-exclusive, and that it had no control over the final retail pricing of FCM injectables sold in India.

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Detailed Reasoning and Judicial Discussion

The NCLAT undertook a detailed review of the CCI’s findings and the broader legal framework governing the intersection between competition law and intellectual property law.

The Tribunal noted that CCI had examined the appellant’s allegations in detail and found no evidence of anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance. The CCI had emphasized that Vifor’s licensing terms were not unreasonable, that Emcure and Lupin were independent market participants, and that the agreements were short-term in nature with provisions for renewal. Importantly, the patent on FCM was due to expire in 2023, which would open the market to new manufacturers.

The CCI had also relied on its previous decisions, such as In Re: Hiveloop and Britannia (Case No. 18 of 2021), to reaffirm that a patentee enjoys the freedom to choose its licensees, subject to legal limitations. Moreover, the Commission had referred to Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. CCI (WP (C) No. 1776/2016, Delhi High Court, judgment dated 20.05.2020), which held that the CCI’s jurisdiction was not ousted merely because the subject matter involved patent rights.

However, during the pendency of the appeal, the legal landscape changed significantly. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. CCI (2023 SCC OnLine Del 4078, LPA 247/2016), held that where the dispute involves the exercise of patent rights, the Patents Act, 1970 prevails over the Competition Act, 2002. The Court observed that Chapter XVI of the Patents Act provides a complete mechanism for addressing issues like abuse of patent rights, unreasonable licensing conditions, and compulsory licensing.

The High Court reasoned that since both the Patents Act and the Competition Act deal with issues of restrictive practices, but the Patents Act is a special law addressing such issues specifically in the context of intellectual property, it must prevail by virtue of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant — meaning that a special law overrides a general law.

This position was later affirmed by the Supreme Court of India in CCI v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (SLP No. 25026 of 2023), which dismissed the CCI’s appeal on 2nd September 2025, thereby solidifying the principle that the CCI lacks jurisdiction to investigate matters relating to the exercise of patent rights governed by the Patents Act, 1970.

The NCLAT, therefore, drew direct guidance from these landmark rulings and noted that the statutory provisions under Section 83 and 84 of the Patents Act sufficiently empower the Controller of Patents to address concerns about public access, reasonable pricing, and non-working of patents through mechanisms like compulsory licensing. These provisions inherently serve as checks against potential abuse of patent monopolies.

The Tribunal observed that the Competition Act’s Section 3(5) expressly preserves a patentee’s right to impose reasonable conditions for protecting patent rights. Hence, any allegation that arises purely out of the exercise of such rights, without demonstrable evidence of mala fide restriction beyond the patent’s legitimate scope, cannot be entertained under competition law.

Moreover, since the patent for FCM had already expired by October 2023, the issue of alleged dominance or restriction in market access had become purely academic and devoid of practical consequence.

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Final Decision

After considering the arguments from all sides, including the legal precedents from the Delhi High Court and the Supreme Court, the NCLAT held that the CCI had rightly dismissed the information under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act. The Tribunal concluded that the Competition Commission of India lacked the jurisdiction to examine the alleged anti-competitive behavior of Vifor International in respect of its patented product, as such matters squarely fall within the exclusive domain of the Patents Act, 1970.

The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs. The Tribunal also directed that any pending applications connected with the case be closed.

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Law Settled and Broader Implication

This decision reinforces the principle that where the alleged anti-competitive conduct arises from the legitimate exercise of patent rights, the Patents Act serves as the exclusive regulatory framework. The Competition Commission of India cannot intrude into matters involving licensing, pricing, or distribution of patented products unless there is clear evidence of conduct exceeding the lawful scope of patent protection.

In essence, this case reaffirms the harmonious interpretation between intellectual property law and competition law — ensuring that innovation is protected while balancing consumer interest. However, it firmly establishes that the remedy for any alleged misuse of patent rights lies under Chapter XVI of the Patents Act through mechanisms like compulsory licensing, rather than under the Competition Act.

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. “Patent Power versus Competition Control: The Jurisdictional Divide in Swapan Dey v. CCI”

2. “Balancing Innovation and Market Freedom: NCLAT on Patent Monopoly and Competition Law”

3. “When Patent Law Prevails: A Study on the Limitation of CCI’s Jurisdiction under Section 3(5)”

4. “The Ferric Carboxymaltose Dispute: Understanding the Interface between Patent Protection and Market Competition”

5. “NCLAT Upholds Patent Supremacy: Legal Insights from Swapan Dey v. CCI & Vifor International”

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

R.C. Plasto Tanks and Pipes Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Gouri Industries

Case Title: R.C. Plasto Tanks and Pipes Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Gouri Industries & Anr.

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 868/2022 & I.As. 16726-16728/2022

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:—

Date of Decision: 20th February, 2023

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Sanjeev Narula

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Factual Background

The petitioner, R.C. Plasto Tanks and Pipes Pvt. Ltd., is a well-known manufacturer and supplier of water storage tanks, PVC pipes, and fittings under its registered trademark “PLASTO.” The company also holds artistic copyright registrations for its labels and designs. The respondent, Ganesh Gouri Industries, is engaged in a similar line of business involving water storage tanks and allied goods.

The dispute traces back to the year 2018 when the petitioner discovered that the respondent was selling water tanks under the mark “AQUA PLAST” accompanied by the tagline “NAAM HI GUARANTEE HAI.” The petitioner alleged that this mark and slogan were deceptively similar to its own registered mark “PLASTO” and its slogan “PLASTO HAI TO GUARANTEE HAI.” According to the petitioner, this amounted to infringement of trademark and copyright, as well as passing off.

This dispute initially led to a civil suit being filed by R.C. Plasto before the District and Sessions Judge, Nagpur, registered as Suit No. 3 of 2018. The parties subsequently reached an amicable settlement, which was recorded in the judgment dated 21st February 2019. The settlement was based on express undertakings and terms that became central to the present rectification petition.

Under the settlement, the respondent agreed not to use the mark “PLASTO” or any identical or deceptively similar mark, tagline, or trade dress. Specifically, the respondent undertook not to use the slogans “PLASTO HAI TO GUARANTEE HAI” or “NAAM HI GUARANTEE HAI,” and agreed to remove all infringing material from its products and marketing items. In return, the petitioner agreed not to object to any mark or logo of the respondent that included the word “PLAST,” provided it was not deceptively similar to the petitioner’s marks. Both parties thus agreed to maintain distinct trade identities.

However, in 2022, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had obtained copyright registration No. A-142047/2022 for an artistic label titled “Gauri Aqua Plast”. The petitioner alleged that this label used a blue background and white lettering similar to its own “PLASTO” logo and colour scheme. Viewing this as a breach of the earlier settlement and an act of copying, the petitioner filed the present petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 seeking removal of the impugned copyright from the Register of Copyrights.

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Procedural History

The rectification petition was filed before the Delhi High Court’s Intellectual Property Division (IPD) under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The respondent’s reply to the petition was delayed by 33 days, which was condoned by the Court upon sufficient cause being shown.

The petitioner’s argument primarily rested on three pillars: that the impugned registration was (i) in violation of the 2019 settlement terms, (ii) deceptively similar to the petitioner’s copyrighted artistic label, and (iii) dishonest and mala fide in nature. The respondent opposed the petition, arguing that its artwork was original, distinct, and in compliance with the settlement terms, and that the petitioner’s claim amounted to monopolizing generic elements such as colours and shapes.

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Core Dispute

The legal question before the Court was whether the respondent’s copyright registration for the label “Gauri Aqua Plast” was liable to be cancelled under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, on the grounds that it was not original and constituted a substantial reproduction or colourable imitation of the petitioner’s artistic work.

The case also tested the limits of contractual undertakings in prior settlements and whether the use of common design elements like colour combinations and word stems (like “PLAST”) could amount to infringement or breach of settlement.

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Arguments of the Petitioner

Counsel for the petitioner, Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, contended that the respondent’s impugned copyright was a clear violation of the 2019 settlement terms. It was argued that the respondent had expressly undertaken not to use any mark or slogan similar to “PLASTO HAI TO GUARANTEE HAI” or to imitate the petitioner’s blue-and-white colour scheme.

The petitioner argued that the impugned artwork “Gauri Aqua Plast” was substantially similar to its own “PLASTO” label, both in visual presentation and conceptual impression. The label used a blue background and white lettering identical to that of the petitioner, thereby creating confusion among consumers.

It was also submitted that the petitioner’s goodwill and reputation, developed over decades, were being unfairly exploited by the respondent. According to the petitioner, the adoption of the impugned label was not independent or bona fide but an act of bad faith aimed at riding on the petitioner’s established reputation.

The petitioner relied on Section 13(1)(a) and Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, arguing that since originality is a prerequisite for copyright registration, any registration obtained through imitation or copying is liable to be cancelled. The petitioner further pointed out that the Delhi District Commercial Court, in CS (COMM) 545/2021, had already granted an injunction restraining the respondent from using similar trade dress and label, indicating prima facie infringement.

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Arguments of the Respondent

The respondent, represented by Advocate Salim A. Inamdar, opposed the petition by asserting that its artwork was independently created and bore no resemblance to the petitioner’s label. It was argued that the petitioner was attempting to monopolize generic and functional elements such as the colour blue or the shape of the label, which are common in the plastic products industry.

The respondent emphasized that under the 2019 settlement, the petitioner had agreed not to object to the respondent’s use or registration of any mark that included the word “PLAST,” provided it was not deceptively similar. The respondent’s new label, it was argued, fully complied with this term as it used “Aqua Plast” with distinctive design features.

The impugned label contained a stylized “G” representing the company’s name “Gouri,” designed in the form of an “OK” hand gesture enclosing three waves, symbolizing water — a feature completely absent from the petitioner’s label. The respondent further pointed out that it used the tagline “NAAM HI KAAFI HAI” instead of “NAAM HI GUARANTEE HAI,” which indicated creativity rather than imitation.

Lastly, the respondent argued that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, colours, or common expressions but only to the original artistic arrangement. Hence, similarity in broad elements such as colour or shape could not justify cancellation of registration.

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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Sanjeev Narula commenced the analysis by examining the scope of Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which allows the High Court to order rectification of the Register of Copyrights if a registration has been “wrongly made” or if any entry has been made or remains on the Register “without sufficient cause.” The Court noted that to justify removal, the petitioner must establish either lack of originality in the respondent’s work or substantial reproduction of the petitioner’s existing copyrighted work.

The Court compared both the labels in question and observed that while both used the word “PLAST” and had blue and white colours, the overall artistic impression was different. The respondent’s label had distinct visual elements such as the stylized letter “G,” additional taglines, and differentiated fonts. The composition, artistic layout, and design collectively rendered it an original work capable of copyright protection.

The Court emphasized that copyright law protects expression and not mere ideas or functional aspects. A blue-and-white colour scheme or a rectangular label are common features in packaging and cannot form the exclusive property of one entity. Referring to the settled principle laid down in R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films (AIR 1978 SC 1613), the Court reiterated that where the expression of ideas is substantially different, no case of infringement or copying arises.

Justice Narula also relied on the petitioner’s own settlement terms to underscore that the petitioner had explicitly agreed not to object to the respondent’s use of “Aqua Plast” so long as it was not deceptively similar. Since the impugned label bore clear differences in artistic features, font styles, and slogans, it did not violate the settlement agreement. The use of the word “PLAST” was held to be generic, derived from the word “plastic,” and not exclusively associated with the petitioner.

The Court concluded that the petitioner’s claim was primarily based on broad similarities that could not satisfy the legal test of substantial reproduction under copyright law. The mere use of the same colour background and general layout was insufficient to prove copying or breach of settlement.

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Final Decision

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition, holding that no ground was made out for removal of the impugned copyright under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The Court observed that the respondent’s label was original and did not constitute a reproduction of the petitioner’s copyrighted work.

Justice Sanjeev Narula further held that the terms of the prior settlement had not been violated and that the petitioner was attempting to overextend its exclusive rights beyond reasonable limits. The Court imposed costs of ₹10,000 on the petitioner, payable to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority, and dismissed all pending applications.

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Significance and Legal Insight

This case is significant as it clarifies the distinction between artistic similarity and copyright infringement in label design disputes. It reinforces the principle that copyright does not protect common design elements or colour combinations used widely across an industry. Moreover, it highlights the importance of honouring settlement terms and restricting legal action to clear cases of deception or bad faith.

The judgment also serves as a practical lesson for intellectual property owners: once a settlement allows limited use of certain terms or design elements, they cannot later object to such use merely on the basis of stylistic similarities.

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Colour, Shape, and Settlement: Delhi High Court on the Limits of Copyright Protection

2. When Blue is Just a Colour: RC Plasto v. Ganesh Gouri and the Meaning of Originality

3. Copyright, Contract, and Commonality: A Study in Industrial Label Disputes

4. The Fine Line Between Inspiration and Infringement: Lessons from RC Plasto Case

5. Generic Words and Common Colours: Delhi High Court Redefines Copyright Boundaries in Label Art

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pradeep Bailey Vs Gilma Daniel

Additional documents at the stage of trial

Factual Background:The dispute between the petitioner, Mr. Pradeep Bailey, and the respondent, Ms. Gilma Daniel, arose from a long-standing family property conflict concerning ownership and possession of a shop measuring 8’x10’ located at property No. WZ-5A/31, Vishnu Garden, New Delhi. The petitioner, Mr. Bailey, claimed to be the rightful owner of the property by virtue of documents executed by his late mother in 2003, while the respondent, his sister, asserted ownership on the basis of a prior Will dated 17th November, 1994.

In 2021, Mr. Bailey filed a civil suit for recovery of possession, eviction, mesne profits, and injunction against the respondent, alleging that she had been permitted to reside in the property as a licensee but had later refused to vacate. The respondent, on the other hand, claimed that she was the true owner of the property under her mother’s 1994 Will, under which the mother had disinherited the petitioner due to his alleged misconduct and lack of filial care.

The dispute soon extended beyond mere ownership claims. Mr. Bailey, during the pendency of the trial, sought to introduce additional documents which, according to him, were vital to prove his ownership, occupation, and contribution to the family, including two subsequent Wills of 2000, house tax receipts, bills, professional certificates, and membership records.

Procedural Background:The civil suit was registered as Civil DJ No. 934/2021 before the District Judge, where the respondent filed her written statement in March 2022. Subsequently, Mr. Bailey filed a replication along with an application under Order VII Rule 14 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking permission to place additional documents on record.

The trial court, however, dismissed this application on 17th May, 2023. The trial judge held that the petitioner had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for not filing the documents with the plaint or at least mentioning them earlier in the replication. The judge also observed that the receipts and property tax documents appeared to have interpolations, such as the petitioner’s name being added in a different handwriting, and that some of the documents, like electricity and water bills, had no direct relevance to the main issues.

Aggrieved by this order, Mr. Bailey approached the Delhi High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, contending that the trial court’s refusal was arbitrary and unjust, particularly when the case was still at the evidence stage and no prejudice would be caused to the respondent by admitting the documents.

Core Legal Dispute:The essential legal question before the High Court was whether the trial court had erred in refusing to permit the petitioner to file additional documents under Order VII Rule 14 CPC, despite his claim that those documents were necessary for just adjudication and were not in his possession when the plaint was filed.

This dispute brought into focus the balance between procedural compliance and substantive justice — whether technical delay in filing documents should defeat a party’s right to produce crucial evidence for determining the truth.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:Counsel for the petitioner argued that the documents sought to be placed on record were highly relevant for proving his ownership and rebutting the respondent’s claims. These documents included Wills dated 19.09.2000 and 24.08.2000, house tax receipts, tent house business vouchers, electricity and water bills, membership of a traders’ association, and payment slips of burial expenses of the mother.

The petitioner contended that the documents could not be filed earlier because his previous counsel had failed to include them and some were later discovered when handed over by his sister-in-law in 2022. He maintained that since the case had not yet proceeded to evidence, allowing such documents would not prejudice the respondent. Reliance was placed on Kapil Kumar Sharma v. Lalit Kumar Sharma (Civil Appeal No. 2330/2009) and Nishant Hannan & Ors. v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation (CM(M) 262/2014), where courts permitted additional documents at later stages in the interest of justice.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent:The respondent’s counsel opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner was attempting to fill lacunae in his case. He argued that the petitioner had already filed replication with new documents and was now attempting to introduce even more without justification. The delay of over two years was deliberate and not supported by a credible explanation.

According to the respondent, their late mother had, by a Will dated 17th November 1994, bequeathed the suit property solely to her daughter (the respondent) and had expressly disinherited the petitioner for his neglectful and abusive behavior. The respondent further contended that the petitioner’s conduct had forced their parents to publicly debar him through an affidavit and newspaper publication.

The respondent relied on several precedents including Asia Pacific Breweries v. Superior Industries (2009) 158 DLT 670, Gold Rock World Trade Ltd. v. Veejay Lakshmi Engineering Works Ltd. (2007) 143 DLT 113, and Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Haldiram Bhujiawala (2009) 5 ILR (Del) 503, all of which emphasize that courts must exercise discretion in allowing late filing of documents strictly and sparingly, to prevent misuse and delay.

Legal Analysis and Judicial Reasoning:  Court analyzed the intent and scope of Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC, which mandates that all documents relied upon by the plaintiff should ordinarily be filed with the plaint. However, sub-rule (3) provides that a document not produced at that stage may later be received in evidence with the leave of the court. The judge observed that the 2002 amendment to this rule was enacted precisely to soften the earlier rigid embargo on filing documents belatedly, thereby allowing genuine parties an opportunity to present relevant materials if justice so requires.

The Court referred to the Delhi High Court’s own ruling in Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Haldiram Bhujiawala (2009 5 ILR (Del) 503), which clarified that this is a discretionary power to be used sparingly, only in genuine cases and not as a matter of routine.

The Court also cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs v. P. Rajkumar (2020) 10 SCC 706, where it was held that procedural rules should not act as stumbling blocks in the path of substantive justice. The Apex Court had emphasized that the objective of such provisions is to aid in discovering the truth rather than penalizing inadvertent procedural lapses. Similarly, reference was made to Mohanraj v. Kewalchand Hastimal Jain (AIR 2007 Bom 69), which held that courts should take a liberal approach in allowing relevant documents necessary for a fair decision.

The petitioner’s additional documents, the Court noted, were directly relevant to his claim that he was employed, financially independent, and had been taking care of his mother, contrary to the respondent’s allegations of negligence. Moreover, some of the documents, such as property tax receipts and municipal payment slips, were public records whose authenticity could be verified at a later stage through evidence.

The judge found that the trial court had taken an overly rigid and mechanical approach in rejecting the documents solely on procedural grounds. He reasoned that since the trial was still at the initial stage and evidence had not commenced, allowing the petitioner to file these documents would not cause any serious prejudice to the respondent. Rather, it would enable the court to effectively adjudicate the real issues between the parties.

The High Court also observed that even if the petitioner’s explanation about his previous counsel’s negligence appeared weak, courts should adopt a pragmatic and compassionate view. Minor mistakes or lapses by litigants or their counsel should not deprive them of a fair chance to present their case, especially when no substantial delay or prejudice is caused to the opposite side.

Final Decision:The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the trial court’s order dated 17th May 2023. It permitted Mr. Bailey to place the additional documents on record and prove them in accordance with law. Justice Dudeja emphasized that “procedural rules are meant to advance the cause of justice, not to obstruct it.” Excluding potentially relevant documents at this stage, he said, would elevate technical formalities over the pursuit of truth.

The Court concluded that the trial court’s order suffered from “gross illegality and perversity,” as it failed to consider the importance of the documents for the fair adjudication of the matter. The petition was therefore allowed, with both parties directed to bear their own costs.

Legal Principle and Impact:This judgment reaffirms the settled principle that procedural law is a means to achieve justice, not an end in itself. The decision underscores the judiciary’s discretion under Order VII Rule 14 CPC to allow late filing of documents if it serves the interests of justice and does not prejudice the other party. It also serves as a guiding precedent for lower courts to adopt a balanced approach, avoiding undue rigidity in procedural compliance.

Case Title: Pradeep Bailey Vs Gilma Daniel

Case Number: CM(M) 1506/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4992

Date of Decision: 18th June, 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi 

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Ravinder Dudeja

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Sanjay Jayantbhai Patel & Anr.

Case Title: Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Sanjay Jayantbhai Patel & Anr.

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 880/2022, C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 881/2022 & C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 882/2022

Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:—

Date of Order: 4th November, 2024

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Mini Pushkarna

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Factual Background

This case arises out of a series of rectification petitions filed by Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd., earlier known as Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd., seeking cancellation of the copyright registered in favour of Mr. Sanjay Jayantbhai Patel (Respondent No. 1). The dispute essentially concerns the ownership and validity of certain copyright designs and artistic works allegedly used in the jewelry business of both parties.

Sonani Industries, a renowned jewelry manufacturer, contended that the registration obtained by Sanjay Patel was done in violation of the mandatory procedural safeguards under the Copyright Rules, 2013. The petitioner’s principal argument was that while submitting Form XIV for copyright registration, the respondent failed to comply with Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, which mandates the applicant to notify any person who is likely to have an interest in or objection to the registration. According to Sonani Industries, this rule is an essential part of the registration process, and failure to follow it renders the registration void.

At the same time, a separate civil suit for copyright infringement had been instituted by Sonani Industries before the District Court at Surat, alleging unauthorized use and copying of its artistic jewelry designs by the respondents. That civil dispute is still pending adjudication.

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Procedural History

The petitions for rectification were filed before the Delhi High Court’s Intellectual Property Division (IPD), which has jurisdiction over copyright rectification matters. Meanwhile, in the related civil proceedings at Surat, the trial court had refused to grant a full injunction in favour of Sonani Industries but had directed the respondents to maintain proper accounts of sales and refrain from disclosing the disputed copyright details to third parties.

Aggrieved by the partial relief, Sonani Industries approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 20025/2014, titled Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Prime Diamond Tech & Ors.. On 9th September 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the District Court, Surat, to make an effort to dispose of the pending civil suit within one year.

Meanwhile, in Delhi, the rectification petitions (C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 880/2022, 881/2022, and 882/2022) were taken up together by Justice Mini Pushkarna. The petitioner’s argument was centered on the illegality of the registration process, while the respondent argued that the issues raised in the rectification petitions overlapped entirely with the subject matter of the Surat civil suit.

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Core Dispute

The core dispute revolved around two principal questions:

First, whether the registration of copyright in favour of Respondent No. 1, Mr. Sanjay Patel, was valid when the petitioner was not notified as required under Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013.

Second, whether the Delhi High Court should proceed to hear the rectification petitions independently or defer its decision until the conclusion of the civil suit pending before the District Court, Surat, where similar issues were under consideration.

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Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner

Senior Advocate Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, representing the petitioner, emphasized that the registration in favour of Sanjay Patel suffered from fundamental procedural defects. He pointed out that Rule 70(9) mandates that, before filing Form XIV, the applicant must give prior notice to any party likely to be affected by the registration. Since Sonani Industries had been in continuous commercial use of the designs in question, failure to serve notice vitiated the process entirely.

Counsel further argued that statutory requirements under Rule 70(9) are not mere formalities but safeguards designed to prevent fraudulent or overlapping copyright claims. He cited Bharat Tea Suppliers v. Gujarat Tea Traders & Anr., 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 3637, where the Bombay High Court had underscored the importance of compliance with statutory provisions in copyright registration procedures.

Relying also on the Delhi High Court’s order dated 2nd May 2024 in C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 750/2022, the petitioner contended that the Registrar of Copyrights must act strictly in accordance with statutory procedure, and failure to do so renders the registration liable for rectification or cancellation under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Thus, since no notice had been given, the copyright entry in the Register of Copyrights could not stand.

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Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents

Senior Advocate Mr. Hay Savla, appearing for the respondents, countered the allegations by asserting that there was full compliance with Rule 70(9) and that the copyright registration in favour of Mr. Patel was validly obtained. He further argued that the Delhi High Court should not entertain these rectification petitions while the matter is pending before the Surat District Court, as both involve overlapping factual and legal issues.

According to the respondents, the petitioners were attempting to re-litigate issues already under active consideration in the civil suit. He also submitted that the copyright registration, once granted, is not a public notice of infringement but merely an administrative act confirming authorship and ownership. Hence, there was no requirement to presume that Sonani Industries had any right to object at the time of registration.

Mr. Savla highlighted that the District Court, Surat, had found no prima facie case of infringement against the respondents and had refused to grant an injunction restraining them from conducting their business. The only directions issued were to maintain accounts and not to disclose certain copyright-related information. These facts, he argued, demonstrated that the petitioner’s claim was weak even on merits.

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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Mini Pushkarna, after hearing both sides, observed that the rectification petitions raised complex questions that were deeply intertwined with the factual matrix of the ongoing civil suit in Surat. The Court noted that the Supreme Court itself had already directed the Surat court to expedite the proceedings and dispose of the suit within a year. Therefore, it would be premature for the Delhi High Court to adjudicate the rectification petitions independently while the same factual and legal questions were sub judice elsewhere.

The Court analyzed the petitioner’s reliance on Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013, which reads that the applicant for registration must give notice of the application to every person who claims or is likely to claim any interest in the subject matter. While acknowledging the importance of this procedural rule, the Court held that the issue of whether such notice was indeed necessary and whether non-compliance invalidated the registration could only be effectively decided after evaluating the evidence and findings of the Surat trial court in the related infringement suit.

Justice Pushkarna also emphasized judicial comity and the need to avoid conflicting decisions between courts. Since the copyright infringement suit was already being examined in depth by the Surat District Court, any decision on rectification by the Delhi High Court could potentially lead to inconsistency or duplication of judicial effort.

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court deemed it appropriate to await the outcome of the pending suit rather than proceed with parallel adjudication. The Court thus decided to defer hearing and re-notify the matter for further proceedings after the decision of the Surat District Court.

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Final Decision

The Delhi High Court did not pass any substantive findings on the merits of the rectification claim but directed that the petitions be re-notified on 28th April 2025. Justice Mini Pushkarna recorded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s direction for early disposal of the related civil suit, it would be in the interest of justice to await that verdict before examining the rectification issue.

This order demonstrates judicial restraint and recognition of the interconnected nature of copyright disputes involving both infringement and registration validity. The Court reaffirmed that when two parallel proceedings are based on overlapping facts, it is prudent to await the outcome of one to prevent contradictory rulings.

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Significance of the Case

The order highlights a key procedural aspect in intellectual property litigation—coordination between civil infringement proceedings and rectification petitions. It clarifies that while copyright registration disputes are maintainable before the Delhi High Court, where factual overlap exists with pending infringement suits, the High Court may defer adjudication to ensure consistency.

Additionally, the case reiterates the importance of procedural compliance under the Copyright Rules, 2013, particularly Rule 70(9). The issue raised by the petitioner—whether failure to notify affected parties invalidates registration—is significant and will likely influence future decisions once the related suit is decided.

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Rule 70(9) and the Right to Notice: Procedural Integrity in Copyright Registration

2. Parallel Proceedings and Judicial Restraint: A Study of Sonani Industries v. Sanjay Patel

3. Copyright Rectification Deferred: When Civil and Administrative Jurisdictions Intersect

4. Procedural Defect or Overlap? Delhi High Court’s Measured Approach in Copyright Dispute

5. Balancing Copyright Rights and Judicial Comity: Lessons from Sonani Industries Case

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Court on its Own Motion Vs. Nitin Bansal

Obstruction in execution of Local Commission and Criminal Contempt of court

Factual Background:The case originated from a civil dispute titled Bina & Ors. v. Ashok Bansal, where an interim injunction was granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court restrained Mr. Ashok Bansal from dealing with or disposing of 30,000 tons of industrial coal and from alienating assets of the partnership firm M/s G&G Concrete Solutions.

Despite the order dated 31st May 2024, allegations surfaced that Mr. Ashok Bansal was violating the injunction by continuing to dispose of the coal. Consequently, an application was filed seeking appointment of a Local Commissioner to inspect the site and report the ground situation. On 12th July 2024, the Court appointed Advocate Ms. Nandini Bali as Local Commissioner to inspect the premises of M/s G&G Concrete Solutions located in Bhupani, Faridabad, Haryana, directing full cooperation and allowing requisition of police assistance for enforcement.

On 13th July 2024, the Local Commissioner, accompanied by police officers, reached the site. During the inspection, Mr. Nitin Bansal, son of Mr. Ashok Bansal, arrived and displayed a hostile and intimidating attitude. The Local Commissioner’s report later recorded that Mr. Nitin Bansal not only refused to cooperate but also placed a pistol on the table in front of her to threaten and obstruct the ongoing commission. The police seized the weapon as it appeared to be unlicensed.

The Local Commissioner’s report dated 17th September 2024 detailed the incident and the intimidating behavior, concluding that Mr. Nitin Bansal’s conduct amounted to deliberate obstruction of judicial proceedings.

Procedural History:Upon receiving the Local Commissioner’s report, the Single Judge, by order dated 28th October 2024, referred the matter to the Division Bench for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, observing prima facie interference with the administration of justice under Section 2(c)(iii) of the Act.

Pursuant to this reference, Court on its Own Motion v. Nitin Bansal was registered as CONT.CAS. (CRL) 16/2024. On 9th December 2024, notice was issued to the Contemnor to show cause why action for contempt should not be taken.

In his reply, Nitin Bansal denied all allegations, claiming he had cooperated during the inspection and that the object on the table was merely a toy gun used to scare animals. He asserted his innocence, stating that he was a law-abiding citizen with no criminal record.

To ascertain the truth, the Court, on 21st February 2025, directed the SHO of P.S. Bhupani, Faridabad to file a status report and produce the seized weapon. On 28th May 2025, the gun was produced in court by ASI Samsher Singh. Upon physical inspection, the Bench noted that the gun was not a toy gun but a real air gun.

Final arguments were heard on 8th September 2025. While Nitin Bansal maintained his innocence, his senior counsel tendered an unconditional apology on his behalf. The matter was reserved for judgment and pronounced on 29th October 2025.

Core Legal Issue:The central issue before the Court was whether Nitin Bansal’s conduct in threatening a court-appointed Local Commissioner with a weapon during execution of judicial orders constituted criminal contempt under Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and whether his subsequent claim that the weapon was a toy gun mitigated his liability.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:The Bench began by explaining the scope of criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, emphasizing that any act that interferes with, or obstructs, the administration of justice qualifies as criminal contempt. The Court cited the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204, which held that contempt jurisdiction safeguards the authority of the courts — the ultimate protector of citizens’ rights. The Supreme Court clarified that punishment for contempt requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, as the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. The conduct must be “wilful”, intentional, and done with full knowledge of its likely consequences.

The Court further referred to Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352, reiterating that contempt jurisdiction exists to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts, without which the democratic fabric of society would collapse.

Applying these principles, the Bench observed that Nitin Bansal’s claim that the weapon was a toy gun was false. The air gun produced in court was verified to be a real weapon. The Court found that the contemnor had deliberately misled the court by giving a false explanation, intending to evade responsibility. This false plea itself was an aggravating factor showing a deliberate and contumacious attitude.

The Court observed that a Local Commissioner is not an ordinary visitor but an extension of the court itself, entrusted with executing judicial directions. Any obstruction to her work is equivalent to direct interference in the functioning of the court. The Bench referred to Court on its Own Motion v. M/s Obsession Naaz & Ors. (2025:DHC:7206-DB), where individuals had assaulted court commissioners executing anti-counterfeiting orders, and the Court had condemned such behavior as a grave attack on the administration of justice.

Quoting extensively from that judgment, the Bench emphasized that threatening or attacking Local Commissioners “strikes terror in their minds” and, if unpunished, would erode public confidence in the judiciary. Similarly, the Court cited Court on its Own Motion v. Sanjay Rathod (Advocate) (2024:DHC:6390-DB), where disrespectful and scandalous conduct towards the court was held to constitute contempt in the face of the court.

The Court noted that Nitin Bansal’s behaviour—placing a gun on the table while the commission was in progress—was a clear and deliberate act of intimidation. His conduct was not accidental but calculated to obstruct the execution of the judicial commission. The Court rejected his apology, calling it “a mere lip service” lacking genuine remorse or repentance.

The judgment elaborated that acceptance of apology in contempt matters is not automatic; it must be sincere, unconditional, and accompanied by genuine remorse. In this case, the Court found none of these elements present. Instead, the contemnor’s repeated falsehoods and defiant stance reflected an intentional obstruction to the course of justice.

The Bench observed that allowing such conduct to go unpunished would set a dangerous precedent, emboldening litigants to defy and intimidate court officers. The judiciary’s authority, the Court remarked, “is the bedrock of rule of law; without respect for judicial orders, the democratic framework will collapse.”

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court held that Nitin Bansal’s conduct clearly amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court found his actions wilful, deliberate, and motivated by an intent to obstruct the administration of justice.

Under Section 12 of the Act, the Court sentenced Nitin Bansal to simple imprisonment for three months and imposed a fine of ₹2,000, with a direction that non-payment of the fine would result in an additional 15 days of imprisonment.

The Court ordered the police to take the contemnor into custody from the courtroom and commit him to jail. However, on his counsel’s request citing a family wedding, the Court allowed Nitin Bansal to voluntarily surrender before the Jail Superintendent, Tihar Jail, on 6th November 2025.

The judgment concluded with a strong observation that judicial officers and commissioners must be protected from intimidation and harassment, as they act under the authority of the court. Any attempt to interfere with their lawful duties strikes at the very foundation of the rule of law.

Case Title: Court on its Own Motion Vs. Nitin Bansal

Case Number: CONT.CAS. (CRL) 16/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9447

Date of Decision: 29th October, 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi