Saturday, January 24, 2026

Sanjeev Kumar Juneja Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.

Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit in 2018 against Sanjeev Kumar Juneja and another for infringement of their registered trademark "MANTRA" and passing off due to defendants' use of similar "MANTRA" formative marks like "ROOP MANTRA" in medicinal and cosmetic goods. Defendants contested, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint which was dismissed and upheld in revision, then applied under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to challenge validity and stay the suit. Trial Court framed an additional issue on validity but dismissed the stay as belated. In revision, the High Court reasoned that Section 124 mandates stay of infringement suits once prima facie invalidity is found to allow rectification but does not apply to passing off actions, held composite suits permissible but severable under Order II Rule 6 CPC due to delay caused by joinder, and modified the order to grant three months for rectification, stay the infringement claim, and direct separation and proceeding of the passing off claim as a new suit.

  • Once the Trial Court finds a prima facie tenable issue regarding validity of a registered trade mark under Section 124(1)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, it must adjourn the suit for three months to enable the party to apply for rectification before the Registrar or High Court, and the Trial Court lacks jurisdiction to try validity itself: Sanjeev Kumar Juneja and another Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., CR No.6252 of 2023, High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Para 18.
  • Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 applies only to suits for infringement of registered trade marks and not to actions for passing off: Sanjeev Kumar Juneja and another Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., CR No.6252 of 2023, High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Para 19.
  • A composite suit joining causes of action for trade mark infringement and passing off is permissible, but the causes are severable, and the court can order separate trials under Order II Rule 6 CPC if joinder causes delay or inconvenience: Sanjeev Kumar Juneja and another Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., CR No.6252 of 2023, High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Para 25.

Case Title: Sanjeev Kumar Juneja Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Order date: 22.01.2026 Case Number: CR No.6252 of 2023 Neutral Citation: Not available Name of court: High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pankaj Jain

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit in August 2018 against Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh and others for infringing their Indian Patent No. 209816 covering Sitagliptin by advertising and exporting the infringing product SEPAMET-XR containing Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate, seeking permanent injunction, damages, rendition of accounts, delivery up, and costs. The court granted ex-parte interim injunction in August 2018. Defendants filed written statement denying infringement, export for domestic market, and court's jurisdiction but later ceased appearing, leading to ex-parte proceedings in March 2024 after substituted service. The patent lapsed in July 2022, rendering injunction infructuous, so plaintiffs restricted relief to damages and costs, filing unrebutted affidavit evidence. The court, accepting plaintiffs' evidence, calculated compensatory damages based on defendants' estimated export profits over 12 months at Rs.49,44,450 with 25% margin, awarded exemplary damages of Rs.10 lakhs for willful post-injunction infringement posing public health risks, and granted actual costs of Rs.21,67,074, holding defendants jointly liable.

  • In patent infringement suits proceeded ex-parte, unrebutted affidavit evidence of plaintiffs is sufficient to establish entitlement to compensatory damages calculated on the basis of infringer's estimated profits from export data with a reasonable profit margin: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. & Anr. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh & Ors., CS(COMM) 1075/2018, Delhi High Court, Para 25.
  • Exemplary damages may be awarded in patent infringement cases where defendants willfully disobey court injunction orders and continue infringing activities, considering public health risks from sub-standard medicines: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. & Anr. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh & Ors., CS(COMM) 1075/2018, Delhi High Court, Para 28.
  • Actual legal costs, including court fees and expenses supported by affidavit, are recoverable in commercial patent suits under the Commercial Courts Act, especially when unrebutted: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. & Anr. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh & Ors., CS(COMM) 1075/2018, Delhi High Court, Para 29.

Case Title: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh Order date: 23.01.2026 Case Number: CS(COMM) 1075/2018, I.A. 10890/2018, I.A. 15200/2018, I.A. 11751/2022 & I.A. 188/2025 Neutral Citation: Not available Name of court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Jesal Vimal Jetha Vs Controller General of Patents

Jesal Vimal Jetha filed a patent application in 2018 for a customizable comforter system with a supporter for therapeutic use, addressing issues like backache and posture through adjustable compartments for individual body needs.

The First Examination Report (FER) in January 2020 raised objections on novelty and inventive step based on prior arts D1 and D2, to which the appellant responded. Subsequent hearing notices introduced additional prior arts D3, D4, and D5, leading to hearings in July and September 2020 where the appellant submitted detailed technical replies.

The Controller rejected the application in October 2020 under Section 2(1)(ja) for lack of inventive step without adequately considering the appellant's responses, particularly the July 2020 reply addressing D3-D5, and contained factual errors in analyzing prior arts.

The Delhi High Court, finding violations of natural justice due to non-consideration of key submissions, jurisdictional infirmities, procedural unfairness, and inconsistencies like shifting the closest prior art from D1 to D3, set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with a new hearing, clarifying that merits were not examined.

  • The failure to consider the appellant's detailed technical response to objections based on newly cited prior arts in the hearing notice constitutes a violation of natural justice and procedural fairness Para 13.
  • The Controller's impugned order must explicitly advert to and consider all submissions, including highly technical responses to prior arts, and absence thereof renders the decision unfathomable and invalid:  Para 15.
  • Factual errors in the Controller's analysis of prior arts, such as misstating positional rearrangement of compartments not disclosed in the cited document, indicate non-application of mind and require judicial interference:  Para 16.
  • The ability to arrange or re-arrange compartments in any spatial manner, including multilayer stacking, may constitute a novel inventive feature when contrasted with linear parallel arrays in prior arts, and failure to address this vitiates the rejection:  Para 17.
  • Procedural fairness in patent examination may require issuance of a Second Examination Report (SER) under Section 13(3) of the Patents Act in cases involving amendments or new objections, to ensure all issues are compositely put to the applicant before response: Para 18.

Case Title: Jesal Vimal Jetha Vs Controller General of Patents:23.01.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 233/2022:2026:DHC:573:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Friday, January 23, 2026

LMC Computers Vs. iThink Apps Private Limited

In the suit filed by LMC Computers against iThink Apps Private Limited & Ors before the Delhi High Court, the plaintiff sought condonation of delay in filing replication to the written statement. The written statement was taken on record on 18.09.2025, replication was filed on 03.11.2025 (46th day, as the 45th day fell on Sunday), but served on defendants only on 10.11.2025 after Registry objection, despite defendants' email reminder on 05.11.2025. 

Plaintiff argued that filing on next working day after Sunday was valid under Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897 and Rule 6 Chapter I Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, while delay arose due to voluminous pleadings and multiple inter se litigations; defendants opposed, alleging deliberate non-service for unfair advantage and insisting strict compliance with Rule 5 Chapter VII requiring service endorsement for acceptance. 

The Court held that the 30+15 days limit under Rule 5 is strict and non-extendable beyond 45 days, but filing on next open day after Sunday was permissible; however, non-service provision in Rule 5 was held directory (mere irregularity, not mandatory illegality) condonable by Court in justice interests, unlike Registry's binding duty. Accordingly, replication was taken on record subject to plaintiff paying Rs.1,00,000 costs to defendants within four weeks. 

The Court also issued notice on plaintiff's applications for directions restraining defendants from intimidating proposed witness and for impleadment of two partners as co-plaintiffs, with replies/rejoinders directed and matter listed on 21.05.2026.

Law settled: 

The 30 days period for filing replication under Rule 5 Chapter VII Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 is extendable by maximum 15 days (total 45 days) and not thereafter; no further condonation possible even for sufficient cause, to ensure expeditious disposal of commercial disputes. Para 15, 19.

Where the last day of prescribed/extended period falls on a Sunday/holiday/Court-closed day, filing on the next working day is valid under Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897 read with Rule 6 Chapter I Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. Para 11, 16.

The requirement under Rule 5 Chapter VII Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 that replication shall not be accepted unless it contains endorsement of service on defendant/his advocate is directory and not mandatory; non-service constitutes mere irregularity condonable by Court in interests of justice, though binding on Registry. Para 17-18.

Case Title: LMC Computers Vs. iThink Apps Private Limited & Ors.:14.01.2026:CS(COMM) 729/2025: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Thursday, January 22, 2026

Yatishkumar Baburao Gaikwad Vs. Sachin Sariya

The petitioners/defendants challenged the Trial Court's order dated 17.09.2025 dismissing their application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC for rejection of the plaint in a trademark infringement suit, contending that the plaint disclosed no cause of action and that Delhi courts lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the defendants were based in Solapur (Maharashtra), manufactured fuses there, never supplied goods beyond Maharashtra, and the plaintiff's bald averments in para 46 about availability/sale in Delhi markets (Naraina, R.K. Puram, Sarojini Nagar) and through Just Dial lacked supporting documents or proof of actual purchase/sale.

The plaintiff/plaintiff opposed, relying on averments in paras 46-48 of the plaint about advertising, soliciting, supplying, and offering for sale via Just Dial e-commerce platform, plus filed Just Dial printouts, arguing this conferred jurisdiction. 

The High Court held that at the Order VII Rule 11 stage only plaint averments are to be considered without mini-trial or requiring proof/documents, and the averments in paras 46-48 sufficiently alleged facts conferring territorial jurisdiction on Delhi courts, particularly in view of evolved law on e-commerce/online offers for sale.

The defendants' contentions on absence of actual sale or documents were matters for trial, not rejection at threshold, hence the petition under Article 227 was dismissed without costs, with liberty to raise similar objections in written statement for Trial Court consideration.

Law settled: 

In trademark infringement/passing off cases involving e-commerce platforms, mere accessibility and looming presence of a website/offer for sale in a geography, even without aggressive targeting or actual completed sale, is sufficient to characterize it as targeting the forum and to confer territorial jurisdiction on courts where such commercial transaction could be concluded, as the tort stands committed where infringing goods are capable of being sold/purchased.

Once allegedly infringing goods are listed/available for sale on e-commerce platforms (accessible in the forum), the situs of the tort of infringement includes every place where a commercial transaction could be concluded, enabling suit filing in courts having jurisdiction over such place, irrespective of whether listing was at defendant's instance or by third party. 

Case Title: Yatishkumar Baburao Gaikwad Vs. Sachin Sariya:19.01.2026 : CM(M)-IPD 40/2025 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Wednesday, January 21, 2026

Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Archana Debnath

The plaintiffs (widow and son of late renowned cartoonist Narayan Debnath) filed Title Suit No.01 of 2026 before the District Judge at Alipore alleging copyright infringement by the appellant-publisher (Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt Ltd) in respect of Debnath's literary and artistic works, claiming a 2012 agreement granted only two-year publishing rights after which unauthorized publication continued without adequate royalty.

They asserted inheritance via a 2020 Will (plaintiff no.1 as Executrix, plaintiff no.2 as legatee). The Trial Court granted ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from publishing/selling/distributing the works till February 9, 2026, just before a book fair.

The appellant appealed (FMAT 18 of 2026), contending lack of locus standi of plaintiffs absent probate under Section 213 Indian Succession Act 1925 (applicable in West Bengal).

Bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC due to prior suit dismissal for default, suppression of facts, delay/laches defeating equity, balance of convenience against injunction causing huge losses, and non-compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 guidelines. 

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, upholding the injunction, holding that even in Section 57/213 areas, an executor/legatee can protect/defend the estate pre-probate as "intermediate acts" validated retrospectively under Sections 211 and 227.

Copyright infringement cause of action is continuing/day-to-day, so no bar under Order IX Rule 9/limitation/delay applies, no material suppression occurred (copy of prior order annexed), and prima facie case/irreparable injury justified injunction at ad interim stage per settled precedents, though observations not conclusive at trial.

Law Point:

An executor or legatee under a Will of a Hindu in territories specified under Section 57 (including West Bengal) can maintain a suit to protect/defend the estate/prevent infringement pre-grant of probate, as such acts qualify as "intermediate acts" validated retrospectively upon probate grant under Sections 211 and 227 of Indian Succession Act 1925 (Paras 59–62).

In copyright infringement cases, the cause of action is continuing and arises de die in diem; thus, injunction is normally granted as a matter of course on prima facie case, delay/laches do not bar relief, and prior suit dismissal for default does not attract bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC as the cause is not the "self-same" one (Paras 66–69)

At ad interim ex parte stage, the Court proceeds on plaint averments as sacrosanct without mini-trial; damages not necessarily adequate remedy in widespread copyright infringement; non-strict repetition of Shiv Kumar Chadha/Morgan Stanley guidelines does not vitiate reasoned order (Paras 70–83).

Case Title: Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Archana Debnath:22.01.2026: FMAT 18 of 2026: 2026:CHC-AS:96-DB: Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Tuesday, January 20, 2026

Dr. Dulal Kumar De Vs Union of India

Dr. Dulal Kumar De along with co-inventors filed patent application No. 202031002063 on 17 January 2020 for “Herbal Anti-Venom against Catfish Sting”, published on 14 February 2020; 

First Examination Report issued on 4 July 2022 via email to Midnapore College's registered address, with response deadline 4 January 2023 extended to 4 April 2023; 

Email overlooked due to college's 150th anniversary celebrations, status inquiry on 9 June 2023 revealed abandonment under section 21(1) of Patents Act 1970; 

Petitioner filed writ petition alleging invalid service without postal communication under section 149, claiming time period not triggered and abandonment erroneous. 

Court reasoned section 149's "may" for postal service is permissive not mandatory, Rules 2003 as amended in 2016 and Office Order 23/2016 recognize email as valid service especially since petitioner provided email address, harmonizing with Information Technology Act 2000; time limits under section 21 and Rule 24B mandatory, non-compliance deems abandonment without judicial relaxation; distinguished petitioner's cited cases on strict statutory compliance as inapplicable here. Writ petition dismissed, upholding abandonment.

Law Point:

Service of notices under section 149 of the Patents Act, 1970 is permissive and not mandatory by post; email service is valid and effective as per amended Patents Rules, 2003 and Office Order 23/2016: paras 7-9.

Time limits for responding to First Examination Report under section 21(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 read with Rule 24B are mandatory; non-compliance results in automatic abandonment without scope for judicial extension: 

Subordinate rules framed under section 159 of the Patents Act, 1970 supplement the Act without superseding it, allowing alternative modes like email service for efficiency: para 8.

Case Title: Dr. Dulal Kumar De Vs  Union of India:19/01/2026:WPA-IPD No.2 of 2025:2026:CHC-AS:78:The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

The Supreme Industries Limited Vs Moorthi Rabeha

The Supreme Industries Limited filed a commercial IP suit against Moorthi Rabeha for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off, alleging adoption of "SUPREME" mark since 1987 for plastic products with registrations in class 17 and others, stylized label with copyright, and massive goodwill from sales over Rs.10,000 crores in 2023-24; discovered defendant's "SUPREMES GOLD" registration in class 19 in June 2024, filed rectification, and suit in October 2024 upon finding goods, seeking interim injunction. 

Defendant defended claiming "SUPREME" descriptive and common, marks dissimilar in color/font/layout, own use since 2015 with registration, and plaintiff's concealment of class 19 refusal. Court reasoned deceptive similarity visually/phonetically/structurally as defendant copied essential stylized "SUPREME" adding 's' and "GOLD" dishonestly to ride on goodwill, 

Defendant's registration ex facie invalid under sections 9/11 as likely to confuse average imperfect-recollecting consumer for identical goods, plaintiff proved prior use/goodwill/reputation without needing actual damage, balance of convenience and irreparable harm favored plaintiff despite defendant's registration. Interim injunction granted restraining defendant from using "SUPREMES GOLD" or similar marks.

Law Point:

In passing off, deceptive similarity is assessed by overall impression on average consumer with imperfect recollection, considering visual, phonetic, structural aspects holistically without dissection: 

Court can grant interim injunction against registered trademark if registration is ex facie illegal, fraudulent, or shocks conscience, despite section 28, as validity challenge at interlocutory stage possible on strong prima facie case.

Passing off requires goodwill, misrepresentation leading to likely deception no fraudulent intent needed), and likelihood of damage presumed from confusion without actual proof: para 34 

Registration of label mark without disclaimer confers exclusivity over distinctive word element if no other features, and defendant estopped from claiming descriptiveness after own registration: paras 31-32.

Case Title: The Supreme Industries Limited Vs  Moorthi Rabeha :19/01/2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 336 of 2024:2026:BHC-OS:1417:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Khandelwal Dhaba Vs. Khandelwal Dhaba

Mohit Khandelwal, plaintiff, filed a passing off suit against Manoj Bhagchandani, defendant, claiming exclusive rights to "Khandelwal Dhaba" since 2001 with established goodwill, alleging defendant fraudulently adopted identical name in 2009 for adjacent restaurant causing confusion. Defendant countered with authorization from Shyam Sunder Khandelwal (plaintiff's father) who purportedly used it since 1977 and filed counterclaim for injunction. 

Trial court framed issues, granted permanent injunction to plaintiff in 2017 dismissing counterclaim; on appeal, High Court remanded issue 4 in 2019; trial court reaffirmed in 2019 favoring plaintiff based on documents proving continuous use since 2001, defendant's admissions, and failure to prove valid authorization or honest adoption. Defendant appealed. 

High Court analyzed passing off trinity: plaintiff proved goodwill via documents/telephone bills/licenses and defendant's pleadings admitting use; misrepresentation via dishonest adoption without justification for "Khandelwal" (defendant from Sindhi community lacking surname connection) inferring intent to deceive; likelihood of damage presumed from confusion. 

Law Point:

Prior user's rights in passing off emanate from common law and prevail over subsequent registration or authorization, unaffected by Trade Marks Act provisions: 

Dishonest adoption of identical/similar mark without justification raises strong presumption of mala fides and intent to ride on prior user's goodwill: 

In passing off, no proof of actual damage required; likelihood of confusion/deception presumes injury to goodwill: 

Adoption of another's trade/corporate name, if likely to cause confusion, constitutes passing off even if derived from personal elements

Case Title:  Khandelwal Dhaba Vs. Khandelwal Dhaba :15/01/2026:S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 283/2020 :[2025:RJ-JP:43211]Name of court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur :Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeet Purohit  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pramod Kumar Vs Gannon Dunkerley

Pramod Kumar, appointed as Junior Engineer with Gannon Dunkerley in 1992 and rising to Deputy General Manager over 27 years, was terminated in February 2020 during approved leave for his son's wedding, invoking a 2012 policy clause. He claimed unpaid dues totaling Rs.4,10,184 including balance notice pay, leave encashment for 153 days, travel expenses, and laptop deposit refund, sending legal notices in 2020 and 2022 without response. He filed a recovery suit in Commercial Court, which dismissed it on 30.04.2024 holding it was not a "commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 as it involved employee-employer service recovery from a private entity. In appeal, the High Court agreed the dispute was non-commercial, not fitting categories like merchants or traders, but reasoned that under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Commercial Court erred by dismissing instead of returning the plaint for presentation to a competent non-commercial court, distinguishing dismissal as final merits adjudication from return as procedural for wrong forum, citing precedents like AJ Organica Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1311) and Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP (2020) 15 SCC 1 emphasizing return to avoid remedilessness. The appeal was allowed, impugned judgment set aside, suit restored, and Commercial Court directed to return plaint under Order VII Rule 10A CPC with appearance date 03.02.2026, permitting pragmatic use of existing pleadings and evidence with parties' consent for de novo proceedings per EXL Careers v. Franklin Aviation Services (2020) 12 SCC 667.

  • A recovery suit for salary or terminal benefits by an employee against a private employer does not qualify as a "commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as it falls outside enumerated categories like merchants, bankers, financiers, traders, or specified commercial transactions (Para 11).
  • Upon determining lack of jurisdiction due to a non-commercial dispute, a Commercial Court must return the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for presentation to the competent court, rather than dismiss the suit, as dismissal constitutes final adjudication while return is procedural for wrong forum (Paras 12-13, citing AJ Organica Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1311 at Para 14; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP & Anr., (2020) 15 SCC 1 at Para 14-17).
  • On return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, de novo proceedings are required, but courts may utilize existing pleadings and evidence (documentary and oral) with parties' consent for pragmatic efficiency (Para 19, citing EXL Careers v. Franklin Aviation Services, (2020) 12 SCC 667).

Case Title: Pramod Kumar Vs Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd.:20.01.2026:RFA(COMM) 348/2024:2026:DHC:2026:DHC:464-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Mahajan

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Saturday, January 17, 2026

Hirotsu Bio Science Inc Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Hirotsu Bio Science Inc filed a national phase patent application No. 201617022947 on July 4, 2016, titled “Cancer Detection Method Using Sense of Smell of Nematode” based on PCT application dated December 10, 2014, claiming a method using Caenorhabditis elegans nematodes' chemotaxis to detect cancer odors in biological samples like urine ex vivo, with nematodes attracting to cancer patient samples and avoiding healthy ones. 

Request for examination filed October 31, 2017, First Examination Report issued August 19, 2020 citing objections, reply with amended claims December 28, 2020, hearing notices with objections under Sections 2(1)(j), 3(i), 3(j), and 10(4), hearing April 11, 2023 after adjournments, post-hearing submissions May 26, 2023 with further amendments, but application rejected August 29, 2023 under Section 3(i) as diagnostic method. 

Appellant appealed under Section 117A arguing it's mere detection not diagnosis, in vitro not practiced on body, citing spec paras [0027]-[0028] and cases like EMD Millipore and Chinese University of Hong Kong. Respondent countered it's diagnostic as identifies disease via signs in samples, extends to in vitro per EPO G 1/04 criteria including data collection, comparison, deviation finding, and clinical attribution. 

Court reasoned Section 3(i) excludes diagnostic methods, and absence of "practiced on body" phrase means it covers both in vivo and in vitro per Chinese University of Hong Kong case; method involves sample collection, nematode behavior analysis via chemotaxis index, repetition for accuracy yielding high sensitivity/specificity (95%/81%), leading to cancer presence conclusion akin to diagnostic processes in Sequenom, thus excluded under 3(i); no need to examine other grounds. Appeal dismissed, impugned order upheld.

Law Point:

The term "diagnostic" under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970 extends to both in vivo and in vitro methods, as the provision lacks the limiting phrase "practised on the human or animal body" unlike EPC Article 52:  (Para14, 17).

Case Title: Hirotsu Bio Science Inc Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs :17.01.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 45/2023 :2026:DHC:421 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Karan Rathore Vs Registrar of Trade Marks

Karan Rathore, assignee of the registered trademark 'JBR' (device mark) in Class 12 for motor parts since 2010 with claimed use from 2000 via predecessor Jagdish Joshi who assigned it in May 2023.

Opposed Respondent No. 2's application No. 5854000 for 'JBR' (word mark) in Class 12 for car/bike/vehicle covers claiming use from July 2020, advertised in May 2023; opposition filed in May 2023, countered in July 2023, evidences exchanged, hearing in March 2024 led to Registrar dismissing opposition on March 14, 2024 holding goods dissimilar and Appellant not prior user for covers, issuing certificate; Appellant appealed under S.91. 

Respondent No. 2, Appellant's cousin, had obtained authorization in July 2020 for six months to sell covers under 'JBR' on e-commerce, admitting Appellant's rights. 

Court reasoned that marks are identical in essential feature 'JBR', goods similar as automotive accessories with same consumers, trade channels, and potential confusion per factors in FDC Limited (nature, use, users, channels, competition); authorization implies similarity acknowledgment; no monopoly over class but similarity triggers S.11 prohibition.

Appeal allowed, impugned order set aside, registration removed under S.57.

Law Point:

Factors for determining similarity of goods/services include nature and composition, uses, users, physical nature, trade channels, competition, and complementarity:  (Para 17-18).

 It is well-established in law that an owner of a Mark is always entitled to expand its goods and services, as a natural consequence in expansion of its business. (Para 20)

Registration liable to refusal under S.11 if identical/similar marks for similar goods likely to cause confusion: Trade Marks Act, 1999, S.11 (Para 21).

Case Title: Karan Rathore Vs Registrar of Trade Marks:17.01.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 23/2024:2026:DHC:422: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mumtaz Ahmed

GM Modular Pvt. Ltd., a leading manufacturer of electrical goods, switches, and allied products since adopting the 'GM' mark in 1999, with extensive registrations across multiple classes, significant sales turnover reaching ₹1372.49 crores in FY 2020-21, and copyright registration in its stylized 'GM' artistic work, discovered in August 2024 the registered mark 'GMW' (Application No. 1978669 in Class 11) in the name of Respondent No. 1 (trading as Grand Metal Works) for electric fans, blowers, heaters and parts, claiming user from 2007 and registered in 2010. 

Petitioner filed rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 seeking removal of the impugned mark on grounds of prior use, deceptive similarity, and dishonest adoption; notice was issued on 11.09.2024,.

Respondent No. 1 was served but failed to appear despite multiple opportunities including through trade mark agent, leading to ex-parte proceedings on 13.08.2025, with final arguments on 26.11.2025. 

Court held that Petitioner's prior adoption and continuous use since 1999, coupled with substantial goodwill evidenced by sales figures and registrations, prevails over Respondent No. 1's later claimed user from 2007 and subsequent registration; impugned mark 'GMW' is deceptively similar to Petitioner's 'GM' for identical/similar goods, adoption appears dishonest and intended to ride on Petitioner's reputation, and uncontroverted averments deemed admitted due to non-appearance, warranting rectification to protect the sanctity of the Register. 

Petition allowed, impugned mark ordered to be removed from the Register, with directions to the Registry for compliance.

Law Point:

Prior use and goodwill of a trade mark override the rights of a subsequent registered proprietor, even where the latter claims earlier user but fails to contest the petition: Para 9.

Continuous, uninterrupted, and substantial use since 1999, supported by registrations and massive sales turnover, establishes prior proprietary rights and association of the mark with the petitioner in the market: Paras 7, 8, 10.

Adoption of a deceptively similar mark ('GMW') for identical/similar goods by a subsequent user constitutes dishonest conduct aimed at riding on the prior user's goodwill, justifying removal of the wrongly remaining entry under Section 57: Paras 8, 11, 12.

Case Title: GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mumtaz Ahmed:17.01.2026: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 176/2024: 2026:DHC:408: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Del

Alkem Laboratories Limited Vs Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt Ltd

Alkem Laboratories Limited, established in 1973 and a major player in pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals, adopted the coined marks 'A TO Z' in 1998 and 'A TO Z-NS' in 2008 for multivitamin supplements, claiming extensive use, sales over Rs. 34,000 lakhs in 2023-24, and registrations in Classes 5, 29, and 30, along with copyright in the stylized 'AZ' logo and trade dresses. 

In December 2024, it discovered Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt Ltd, founded in 2018 with over 1,500 products, using 'MULTIVEIN AZ' since August 2020 for similar nutraceuticals, prompting a cease-and-desist notice met with denial of similarity. 

Plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off, securing ex parte interim injunction on January 30, 2025, restraining Defendant's use; Defendant sought vacation via IA 6055/2025.

 Court reasoned that 'A TO Z' is descriptive and generic for multivitamins symbolizing completeness without secondary meaning, no monopoly on 'A' and 'Z'.

Marks not deceptively similar when viewed holistically under anti-dissection rule due to differences in structure, phonetics, colors, and addition of 'MULTIVEIN', no copyright infringement as styles distinct, and Plaintiff concealed material facts like opposed and abandoned applications disentitling equitable relief. Consequently, interim injunction application dismissed and ex parte order vacated.

Law Point:

Generic, descriptive, and commonly used expressions like 'A TO Z' are publici juris, incapable of distinctiveness or monopoly without secondary meaning:  (Para 13-15).

Rival marks must be compared as a whole without dissection, considering overall impression including appearance, structure, and commercial impact: Pernod Ricard India (supra) (Para 17,22).

Device marks protect specific visual representation, not underlying words or letters in isolation: (Para 21).

Concealment of material facts, such as opposed trademark applications, disentitles plaintiff to equitable relief like interim injunction: (Para 26).

No copyright infringement where common elements like letters 'A' and 'Z' are stylized differently and overall impression distinct: (Para 27).

Case Title: Alkem Laboratories Vs Prevego Healthcare:17.01.2026:CS(COMM) 84/2025:2026:DHC:411: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Friday, January 16, 2026

Vishal Choudhary Vs. SNPC Machines-DB

SNPC Machines Private Limited, holding four patents for innovative mobile brick-making machines that automate the process by eliminating manual labor through a mechanism where the machine moves on the ground, fills dies on a roller with raw material from a hopper, molds bricks, and lays them automatically, filed a suit for permanent injunction against Vishal Chaudhary for infringing these patents by manufacturing and selling similar machines under the name 'Padma'.

Along with the suit, SNPC sought temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, which the Single Judge granted on 05.03.2024, restraining Chaudhary from using, making, or selling the machines.

Chaudhary appealed, arguing lack of territorial jurisdiction in Delhi High Court (as his operations are in Haridwar and the alleged sale was a trap), significant differences in design (e.g., his machine requires attachment to a tractor for mobility via kinetic energy, lacks a cabin and steered wheels, and needs manual control), improper application of pith and marrow doctrine instead of all elements rule, failure to apply doctrine of equivalents' FWR test, and imbalance in prima facie case, convenience, and irreparable harm.

The Division Bench rejected the jurisdiction challenge, holding that an offer for sale in Delhi suffices for injunction suits, even if not fructified.

On merits, it reasoned that the pith and marrow of SNPC's invention is the mobility-integrated assembly for automated brick-making without manual handling, and Chaudhary's variations (e.g., using a tractor instead of integrated cabin/motor) are non-essential, amounting to infringement under pith and marrow, though it deferred detailed analysis of doctrines like all elements rule or equivalents to trial to avoid prejudicing the suit.

It found the Single Judge's view reasonable and not perverse, with balance of convenience favoring SNPC to protect patent rights and goodwill, as Chaudhary's losses could be compensated monetarily if the suit fails. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the injunction.

Law Point:

  • For maintaining a suit for injunction in patent infringement cases, an offer for sale or quotation within the court's territorial jurisdiction, even if not resulting in an actual transaction, is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, as injunction is prohibitive relief not requiring a concluded sale: Para 47-49.
  • The essence or pith and marrow of a patented invention (here, mobility in brick-making machines to automate processes and reduce labor) must be assessed for infringement; non-essential variations like replacing integrated mobility (cabin, steered wheels, motor) with attachment to a tractor do not avoid infringement: Para 37-41, 54-57.
  • Third-party infringements are irrelevant in determining a defendant's liability in patent disputes: Vishal Choudhary vs. SNPC Machines Private Limited & Ors., FAO(OS) (COMM) 64/2024, Para 39.

Case Title: Vishal Choudhary Vs. SNPC Machines Private Limited:16.01.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 64/2024: 2026:DHC:399-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Mehta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

People Interactive India Pvt.Ltd. Vs Ammanamanchi Lalitha Rani

People Interactive India Private Limited, proprietor of the well-known trademark "Shaadi.com" for matrimonial and matchmaking services since 1996, filed a suit in 2015 against defendants for infringement and passing off by using the deceptively similar domain and mark "getshaadi.com" for identical services, including embedding "Shaadi.com" as meta-tags to divert over 73% of internet traffic. Despite service, defendants did not appear, leading to an ex-parte proceeding; interim injunction was granted in 2014 and confirmed in 2019.

The court reasoned that the marks are deceptively similar with "Shaadi.com" subsumed in the impugned mark, causing confusion, and defendants' dishonest adoption, bad faith use of meta-tags, and traffic diversion amounted to infringement under Sections 28-29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, passing off, and dilution, while "Shaadi.com" qualifies as a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg) due to extensive use, reputation, and awards.

The suit was decreed with permanent injunction restraining use, directing domain deregistration, ordering delivery up of infringing materials, and awarding costs of Rs. 25 lakhs to plaintiff, with 8% interest if unpaid within 12 weeks.

  • Domain names function as business identifiers and are protectable under passing off laws even without specific legislation, as they can lead to consumer confusion: Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 (Para 24).
  • Dishonest adoption of a mark warrants injunction regardless of delay, as mala fides vitiates the defendant's claim: Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 90 (Para 26).
  • Use of another's trademark as meta-tags or keywords constitutes infringement and passing off by diverting traffic and hijacking goodwill: Observations from prior order in Suit (I) No. 622 of 2014 (Para 21-22).
  • A mark qualifies as well-known under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, if it has long, exclusive use, high reputation, substantial advertising, and public association transcending its field: Applied criteria from Sections 11(6)-(7) (Para 33F-G).
  • In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, courts must award realistic, compensatory costs considering parties' conduct, including exemplary costs for dishonesty: Section 35 CPC as amended (Para 33H).

Case Title: People Interactive India Private Limited Vs Ammanamanchi Lalitha Rani:06.01.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 225 of 2015:: 2026:BHC-OS:685: Arif S. Doctor, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Merck Sharp and Dohme Corporation Vs Glenmark Pharmaceuticals

Introduction

In the realm of intellectual property law, patent disputes often serve as battlegrounds where innovation meets commercial interests. The case of Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation (MSD) versus Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, adjudicated by the Delhi High Court, stands as a pivotal example of such a conflict. This case, centered on the alleged infringement of MSD’s patent for Sitagliptin, a drug used to manage Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM), encapsulates the intricate interplay between patent rights, public interest, and equitable principles. It raises critical questions about the scope of patent claims, the necessity of full disclosure, and the balance between protecting innovation and ensuring access to essential medicines. This case study delves into the factual and procedural intricacies, the legal issues, the parties’ submissions, the judicial reasoning, and the final decision, offering a comprehensive analysis of a landmark ruling that shaped India’s patent jurisprudence.

Detailed Factual Background

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation, a New Jersey-based pharmaceutical giant, held Indian Patent No. 209816 for Sitagliptin, a Dipeptidyl Peptidase-IV (DPP-IV) inhibitor used to lower blood sugar levels in T2DM patients. Marketed under the trademarks Januvia and Janumet, and licensed to Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for sale as Istavel and Istamet, Sitagliptin was a cornerstone of MSD’s diabetes treatment portfolio. The patent, granted on September 6, 2007, covered Sitagliptin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, with Claim No. 19 specifically addressing Sitagliptin and its salts, including the phosphate monohydrate form. MSD claimed that Sitagliptin was a groundbreaking innovation, developed after nine years of research and significant investment, offering a novel mechanism to manage T2DM without the risk of hypoglycemia associated with older drugs like Metformin.

Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, a global pharmaceutical company, entered the Indian market with its products Zita (Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate) and Zitamet (a combination of Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate and Metformin Hydrochloride). MSD alleged that these products infringed its patent, as the production of Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate necessarily involved the use of the patented Sitagliptin molecule. MSD highlighted that its patent was granted in 102 countries and was unopposed in India, underscoring its validity and commercial success. The company also emphasized its efforts to make Januvia affordable in India, pricing it at one-fifth of its U.S. price, and investing in patient education and access programs.

Glenmark, however, contended that its products did not infringe MSD’s patent. It argued that Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate was a distinct compound, not covered by MSD’s patent, and pointed to MSD’s abandoned patent applications for the phosphate salt as evidence of its novelty. Glenmark further challenged the validity of MSD’s patent, alleging non-disclosure of related patent applications and insufficient specification, and claimed that Sitagliptin and its hydrochloride salt were unstable and industrially inapplicable.

Detailed Procedural Background

The dispute commenced when MSD filed a suit in the Delhi High Court on April 1, 2013, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Glenmark from manufacturing, selling, or distributing Zita and Zitamet, along with damages, rendition of accounts, and delivery up. Concurrently, MSD applied for an ad interim injunction (IA 5167/2013) to immediately halt Glenmark’s activities. Glenmark, on caveat, appeared at the first hearing on April 2, 2013, before a Single Judge. MSD relied on its patent claims and judicial precedents, while Glenmark opposed the injunction, alleging suppression of material facts by MSD, particularly the abandonment of patent applications for Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate. Glenmark also submitted documents to support its claim that its products were distinct from MSD’s patented compound.

On April 5, 2013, the Single Judge dismissed MSD’s application for an interim injunction. The judge acknowledged that minor variations in Glenmark’s product did not necessarily negate infringement but found that MSD failed to plead how Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate was medically equivalent to Sitagliptin or merely a new form without enhanced efficacy. The judge also noted MSD’s abandoned patent applications, suggesting that MSD itself treated the phosphate salt as a distinct invention.

MSD appealed the decision (FAO (OS) 190/2013) before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Najmi Waziri. On April 12, 2013, the court allowed Glenmark to file a substantive reply and additional documents, with MSD permitted to respond. The appeal was heard extensively, with arguments concluded on January 6, 2014, and the judgment reserved on January 9, 2015, pronounced on March 20, 2015. The Division Bench conducted a detailed examination of the patent claims, infringement allegations, and equitable considerations, ultimately overturning the Single Judge’s order.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case presented several critical legal and technical issues:

  1. Whether Glenmark’s products, Zita and Zitamet, infringed MSD’s patent for Sitagliptin by using the patented molecule or its salts.

  2. Whether MSD’s patent was valid, or if it was liable for revocation due to non-disclosure of related patent applications, insufficient specification, lack of inventive step, or industrial inapplicability.

  3. Whether MSD’s non-disclosure of abandoned patent applications for Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate and other compounds constituted suppression of material facts, warranting denial of interim relief.

  4. Whether the balance of convenience and public interest favored granting an interim injunction to MSD, considering the accessibility of diabetes treatment.

  5. Whether the court should mandate disclosure of X-ray Diffraction (XRD) data to compare the compounds, and if its absence affected MSD’s case.

Detailed Submission of Parties

MSD’s Submissions

MSD argued that its patent (IN 209816) comprehensively covered Sitagliptin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, including the phosphate monohydrate form used by Glenmark. The company emphasized that Sitagliptin was the active ingredient in both its and Glenmark’s products, and producing Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate required using the patented Sitagliptin molecule, thus constituting infringement under Section 48 of the Patents Act, 1970. MSD cited Glenmark’s U.S. Patent No. 8334385, which acknowledged Sitagliptin as the active free base, as evidence of infringement.

MSD contested Glenmark’s claim that the patent was limited to Sitagliptin Hydrochloride, arguing that Example 7 in the patent specification was merely illustrative, not exhaustive. The company relied on legal precedents such as Edward H. Phillips v. AWH Corporation (415 F.3d 1303) and F.H and B Corporation v. Unichem Laboratories (AIR 1969 Bom 255) to assert that patent claims define the invention’s scope, not specific examples. MSD also argued that its abandoned applications for Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate were inessential details, abandoned due to Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, which restricts patents for new forms without enhanced efficacy. The company cited Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013 (6) SCC 1) to support its position that non-disclosure of such applications did not invalidate the patent.

MSD underscored the public interest in protecting its patent rights, noting its efforts to make Januvia affordable and its investment in patient education. It argued that allowing Glenmark to operate would lead to irreparable market harm, as price reductions by an infringer could permanently depress prices, citing SmithKline Beecham v. Generics ((2002) 25(1) IPD 25005) and SmithKline Beecham Plc v. Apotex ([2003] EWCA Civ L37).

Glenmark’s Submissions

Glenmark vehemently opposed MSD’s claims, asserting that its products did not infringe the patent because Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate was a distinct compound, not covered by MSD’s patent. It pointed to MSD’s abandoned application (5948/DELNP/2005) for the phosphate salt, where MSD described it as a “newly discovered” invention with superior stability, as evidence that it was not subsumed under the suit patent. Glenmark argued that accepting MSD’s broad claims would nullify Section 3(d), allowing patent protection for unpatentable derivatives.

Glenmark challenged the patent’s validity on multiple grounds: non-disclosure of foreign and Indian patent applications under Section 8, insufficient specification under Section 10(4), lack of inventive step, and industrial inapplicability due to the instability of Sitagliptin and its hydrochloride salt. It cited cases like Teva Canada v. Pfizer Canada (2012 SCC 60) and Abraham Esau’s & C. Lorenz Application (1932 (49) RPC 85) to argue that inadequate disclosure invalidated the patent. Glenmark also relied on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla (2009 (40) PTC 125) to underscore the mandatory nature of Section 8 disclosures.

Glenmark further contended that MSD failed to provide XRD data to prove that its products used the patented compound, citing Hoffmann-La Roche (2012 (52) PTC 1) for the necessity of such data in pharmaceutical patent cases. It argued that public interest favored denying the injunction, as diabetes treatment accessibility should not be curtailed, and highlighted that MSD’s high prices limited access compared to its lower-priced generics.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

The parties cited numerous judicial precedents to bolster their arguments, each serving a specific context in the case:

  1. Edward H. Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Federal Circuit, 2005): MSD cited this U.S. case to emphasize that patent claims define the invention’s scope. The court held that claims are interpreted based on their plain meaning as understood by a person skilled in the art, supporting MSD’s argument that its patent covered all pharmaceutically acceptable salts, not just the hydrochloride salt in Example 7.

  2. F.H and B Corporation v. Unichem Laboratories, AIR 1969 Bom 255: MSD relied on this Indian case to reinforce that the claims, not illustrative examples, determine a patent’s scope. The Bombay High Court held that the patent’s protection extends to the claimed invention, aligning with MSD’s contention that Glenmark’s use of Sitagliptin infringed its patent.

  3. Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2013 (6) SCC 1: MSD cited this Supreme Court decision to argue that non-disclosure of abandoned applications was not fatal. The court clarified that patent coverage can exceed disclosure and upheld Section 3(d)’s restriction on new forms without enhanced efficacy, explaining MSD’s abandonment of the phosphate salt application.

  4. CFMT Inc. v. YieDup International Corporation, 349 F.3d 1333 (Federal Circuit, 2003): MSD referenced this case to argue that improvement patents (like the phosphate salt) do not negate the validity of a basic patent. The court recognized that subsequent improvements could be patented separately without undermining the original patent’s scope.

  5. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla, 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Delhi High Court, Division Bench): Glenmark cited this case to argue that non-disclosure of patent applications violated Section 8, warranting revocation. The court held that Section 8 mandates disclosure of foreign applications, but the Division Bench’s view that Indian applications must also be disclosed was contested by the court in this case.

  6. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla, 2012 (52) PTC 1 (Delhi High Court, Single Judge): Glenmark relied on this decision to assert that non-disclosure of related applications justified denying an injunction. The Single Judge emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 8 disclosures, but the Division Bench clarified that revocation is discretionary.

  7. Teva Canada v. Pfizer Canada, 2012 SCC 60 (Supreme Court of Canada): Glenmark cited this case to argue that insufficient disclosure invalidated the patent. The Canadian court held that patents must enable a skilled person to practice the invention, supporting Glenmark’s claim that MSD’s patent lacked details on Sitagliptin’s isolation.

  8. Abraham Esau’s & C. Lorenz Application, 1932 (49) RPC 85: Glenmark referenced this UK case to argue that inadequate disclosure rendered a patent invalid. The court held that patents must provide clear instructions for practicing the invention, aligning with Glenmark’s challenge to MSD’s specification.

  9. SmithKline Beecham v. Generics, (2002) 25(1) IPD 25005 (UK High Court): MSD cited this case to argue that allowing an infringer to operate could cause irreparable market harm. The court granted an injunction, noting that price reductions by infringers could permanently depress prices, a concern echoed in MSD’s submissions.

  10. SmithKline Beecham Plc v. Apotex, [2003] EWCA Civ L37 (UK Court of Appeal): MSD relied on this case to reinforce the market harm argument. The court upheld an injunction, emphasizing that the patentee’s sole supplier status warranted protection against price erosion.

  11. Maj. (Retd.) Sukesh Behl v. Koninklijke Phillips Electronics, FAO 16/2014 (Delhi High Court, decided on 07-11-2014): The court cited this recent Division Bench ruling to clarify that Section 8 violations do not automatically lead to revocation, as Section 64(1) grants discretionary power, supporting MSD’s position on non-disclosure.

  12. Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Takeshwar Prasad and Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 568: The court referenced this Supreme Court decision to caution against conducting a mini-trial at the interim stage, emphasizing that detailed factual inquiries should await the full trial.

  13. American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396 (UK House of Lords): The court cited this seminal case to outline the triple test for interim injunctions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, guiding its equitable analysis.

  14. Bayer Corporation v. Cipla, 162 (2009) DLT 371 (Delhi High Court): The court relied on this case to underscore the public interest in maintaining patent integrity, noting that allowing unauthorized use undermines the Patents Act’s objectives.

  15. K. Ramu v. Adayar Ananda Bhavan, 2007 (34) PTC 689 (Madras High Court): The court cited this case to support granting an injunction when the patentee is already in the market, a factor favoring MSD.

  16. Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. TVS Motor Company Ltd., 2008 (36) PTC 417 (Madras High Court): This case reinforced the relevance of the patentee’s market presence in granting interim relief.

  17. National Research Development Corporation of India v. The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1980 Del 132: The court cited this decision to emphasize that the patentee’s established market operations weigh in favor of an injunction.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The Division Bench, comprising Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Najmi Waziri, conducted a meticulous analysis, overturning the Single Judge’s dismissal of the interim injunction. The court’s reasoning focused on three pillars: the prima facie case of infringement, the balance of convenience, and the potential for irreparable injury.

The court found that MSD established a strong prima facie case for patent validity and infringement. It held that MSD’s patent covered Sitagliptin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, including the phosphate monohydrate form, as evidenced by Claim No. 19 and the patent specification. The court rejected Glenmark’s argument that the patent was limited to Sitagliptin Hydrochloride, citing Edward H. Phillips and F.H and B Corporation to affirm that claims, not examples, define the patent’s scope. Glenmark’s U.S. Patent No. 8334385, which acknowledged Sitagliptin as the active component, further supported MSD’s infringement claim. The court dismissed Glenmark’s contention that it produced Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate without using Sitagliptin, noting the absence of evidence and the logical necessity of using the patented molecule.

On patent validity, the court addressed Glenmark’s challenges under Sections 8, 10(4), and 64 of the Patents Act. It clarified that Section 8 mandates disclosure of foreign, not Indian, patent applications, aligning with the Single Judge’s interpretation in Hoffmann-La Roche (2012 (52) PTC 1) and the Justice Ayyangar report. The court found that MSD’s Form 3 disclosures and subsequent updates satisfied Section 8, and the non-disclosure of Indian applications (e.g., 5948/DELNP/2005) was not fatal. Citing Maj. Sukesh Behl, the court emphasized that Section 64(1)(m) revocation is discretionary, and non-disclosure alone did not justify denying interim relief at this stage.

The court also rejected Glenmark’s argument on insufficient specification, finding that the patent provided detailed instructions for producing Sitagliptin, as confirmed by Glenmark’s own U.S. patent claims. Allegations of obviousness and industrial inapplicability were deemed premature without a full trial, per Anand Prasad Agarwalla. Regarding XRD data, the court clarified that Hoffmann-La Roche did not mandate its disclosure in all cases, as it depends on the drug’s nature, and no polymorph differentiation was at issue here.

On equitable considerations, the court applied the triple test from American Cyanamid. It found the balance of convenience favoring MSD, as Glenmark’s operation could lead to irreversible price erosion, citing SmithKline Beecham cases. The court noted that MSD’s price reduction to one-fifth of the U.S. price and the absence of a significant price differential with Glenmark’s products mitigated public interest concerns about access. Unlike Hoffmann-La Roche, where a 300% price difference for a life-saving drug justified denying an injunction, diabetes was deemed a manageable condition, not life-threatening, and WHO’s essential medicines list excluded Sitagliptin combinations.

The court also considered Glenmark’s failure to challenge the patent before launching Zita, citing SmithKline Beecham and Pharmacia Italia to highlight that such conduct weighs against the infringer at the interim stage. To mitigate harm to Glenmark, the court imposed conditions, including MSD’s undertaking to compensate Glenmark if the suit failed and Glenmark’s obligation to account for earnings.

Final Decision

The Division Bench allowed MSD’s appeal, set aside the Single Judge’s order, and granted the interim injunction (IA 5167/2013) on March 20, 2015. The court issued the following directions:

  1. MSD to file an affidavit undertaking to compensate Glenmark for losses if the suit is dismissed, within two weeks.

  2. Glenmark to undertake compliance with the injunction within two weeks.

  3. Glenmark to file a detailed account of earnings from Zita and Zitamet since the suit’s filing, verified by a chartered accountant, within four weeks.

  4. Glenmark permitted to sell existing stock in the market but prohibited from further production or distribution of Zita and Zitamet.

  5. Parties to appear before the Single Judge on April 10, 2015, with directions to expedite the trial using limited expert evidence and a technical expert under Section 115 of the Patents Act.

Law Settled in This Case

This case clarified several aspects of Indian patent law:

  1. Scope of Patent Claims: Patent claims, not illustrative examples, define the invention’s scope, and broad claims covering pharmaceutically acceptable salts are enforceable if supported by the specification.

  2. Section 8 Disclosure: Section 8 mandates disclosure of foreign, not Indian, patent applications. Non-disclosure of Indian applications does not automatically invalidate a patent or deny interim relief, and revocation under Section 64(1)(m) is discretionary.

  3. Public Interest in Pharmaceuticals: Accessibility concerns are significant but not absolute. For non-life-threatening conditions like diabetes, patent enforcement may take precedence if price differentials are not substantial.

Case Title:Merck Sharp and Dohme Corporation Vs Glenmark Pharmaceuticals
Date of Order:March 20, 2015
Case No.FAO (OS) 190/2013
Citation:MANU/DE/0852/2015
Name of Court:High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judges:Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Najmi Waziri

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Thursday, January 15, 2026

Laboratoires Griffon Vs. Rajiv Mukul

In this interim application in a commercial IP suit filed by Laboratoires Griffon Private Limited & Anr against Rajiv Mukul & Ors, the plaintiffs, registered proprietors of GLIMET and GLIMET DS trademarks for anti-diabetic pharmaceuticals, sought injunction alleging defendants breached a 2021 court undertaking to cease using similar mark GLYNET by continuing its use and adopting deceptively similar GLYZET. In the prior 2021 suit, disposed via consent order, defendants agreed to stop GLYNET, withdraw registrations, and dispose stock. Plaintiffs presented evidence of post-2021 manufacture/sale under GLYNET and GLYZET on defendants' website. Defendants denied infringement, claimed no post-2021 GLYNET use, justified GLYZET as derived from Glimepiride (GLY) and company name (ZET), and argued no similarity or confusion risk. 

The court reasoned that defendants' GLYZET adoption was dishonest, inconsistent with own explanation, and calculated to circumvent prior order; marks GLIMET and GLYZET were deceptively similar structurally (six letters, GL_ ET), visually, phonetically (GLI/GLY), warranting stricter pharma test due to public health risks and potential confusion/deception; defendants perjured via false affidavits denying continued use, as evidence showed breach; lacked clean hands by violating undertakings and making false statements; superficial "read as GLYZET" endorsement was subterfuge; balance of convenience favored plaintiffs to prevent irreparable harm. Court granted interim injunction restraining use of GLYNET/GLYZET or similars, initiated perjury proceedings against defendants 1,2,4, imposed Rs 50 lakh costs payable within 12 weeks with 12% interest if delayed, and stayed order for 4 weeks.

Law Point:

A party breaching solemn undertakings to the court and making false statements on oath lacks clean hands and is disentitled to any equitable consideration or relief, as such conduct sullies the process of law. 

In cases involving medicinal/pharmaceutical trademarks, a stricter test for deceptive similarity applies due to overriding public health considerations; even a reasonable possibility of confusion or deception is sufficient for injunctive relief, irrespective of packaging differences or prescription sales. 

Trademarks must be compared as a whole from the standpoint of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, considering overall structural, visual, and phonetic similarity rather than microscopic side-by-side dissection. 

Superficial or cosmetic alterations to an infringing mark, such as endorsements like "read as", do not obviate liability and would encourage repeated litigation, amounting to a premium on dishonesty. 

In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, costs must ordinarily follow the event with due regard to parties' conduct; unscrupulous litigants polluting justice through falsehoods warrant exemplary costs. 

Breach of court undertakings and false evidence on oath constitutes an offence under Section 227 BNS, empowering the court to take cognizance and initiate proceedings under Sections 215 and 379 BNSS. 

Case Title: Laboratoires Griffon Vs. Rajiv Mukul :13.01.2026:Comm IP Suit No. 213 of 2022: 2026:BHC:1038  : Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arif S. Doctor

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Siyaram Silk Mills Limited Vs Stanford Siyaram Fashion

In this commercial IP suit filed in 2008 by Siyaram Silk Mills Limited against Stanford Siyaram Fashion Private Limited & Ors., the plaintiff sought injunction against defendants' use of "Siyaram" in their corporate name and marks for textiles, alleging trademark infringement and passing off based on plaintiff's prior use since 1977, registrations from 1984, extensive sales, promotion and goodwill.

Plaintiff discovered defendants' incorporation and use in 2007, sent cease-desist notice, and filed notice of motion for interim relief in 2013. Defendants defended claiming prior use by their father since 1992 under "Siyaram Fashion Store", adoption as Hindu god name, mandatory company name disclosure under Weights Act, registration of composite label "Apricott – a Product of Stanford Siyaram Fashions Pvt. Ltd.", and plaintiff's delay/acquiescence. 

The court reasoned that defendants failed to prove assignment of goodwill from father, making prior use claim untenable; plaintiff's registrations crystallized before defendants' incorporation in 2006; defendants' adoption was dishonest with knowledge of plaintiff's mark; composite registration confers no exclusivity over "Siyaram" per Sections 17 and 28(3) of Trade Marks Act; honesty of adoption irrelevant once infringement/passing off established; likelihood of confusion imminent given identical trade; defense of god name rejected as mark acquired distinctiveness and no statutory bar; no acquiescence without positive encouragement, and delay insignificant in dishonest adoption cases. Balancing factors, court found strong prima facie case for plaintiff, balance of convenience favoring injunction to prevent irreparable harm, and granted interim relief restraining infringement and passing off.

Law Point:

Prior use of a mark by a predecessor cannot be claimed by a company without pleading and proving assignment or transfer of the mark along with associated goodwill. 

Honesty of adoption is irrelevant if trademark infringement or passing off is otherwise established, and a defendant cannot use a deceptively similar corporate/trading name to a registered mark. (Para F, citing F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Geoffrey Manners, Kirloskar Diesel Recon Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd., Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah)

-Acquiescence requires positive acts encouraging the defendant's use, and delay does not bar relief in cases of dishonest adoption. (Para J, citing Charak Pharma v. Ajanta Pharma, Sun Pharma v. Anglo French Drugs, Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia)

Marks comprising names of deities are not barred if they acquire distinctiveness and have no descriptive nexus to goods. 

Case Title: Siyaram Silk Mills Limited Vs  Stanford Siyaram Fashion Pvt. Ltd: 13.01.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 23 of 2008:2026:BHC:1037:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arif S. Doctor

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

SM Motorenteile GmbH Vs. A.A. Automobiles

In this trademark infringement suit filed by German company SM Motorenteile GmbH against A.A. Automobiles & Ors., the Plaintiff claimed exclusive rights over SM Logo-1 and SM Logo-2 in India and sought permanent injunction alleging that Defendants were selling counterfeit gaskets bearing identical SM Logos. Plaintiff relied on Indian registrations and history of ownership changes between Schoettle Motorenteile GmbH and itself. Defendants contended they were authorized distributors of SM branded products since 1997 through Schoettle Motorenteile GmbH and its successor NPR of Europe GmbH, placing on record a 2022 confirmation letter from NPR and import documents. 

The Court found that SM Logo-2 registration in India still stands in the name of Schoettle Motorenteile GmbH (not Plaintiff), SM Logo-1 is registered in India in Plaintiff's name but acknowledged as jointly owned with Schoettle in foreign jurisdictions, and Defendants produced a prima facie credible authorization document from joint owner NPR of Europe GmbH. Holding that triable issues exist regarding ownership, authorization and genuineness of Defendants' documents, the Court rejected Plaintiff's prayer for pre-trial final judgment granting permanent injunction and directed the matter to proceed to framing of issues.

Law Point:

A pre-trial final judgment granting permanent injunction cannot be passed when credible disputed questions of fact exist regarding title/ownership of trademark and authority to use the mark, even if defence is weak or documents are challenged only by way of bald assertions in written submissions. (Para 31)

Mere assertion in written submissions that a document produced by defendant appears forged/fabricated is not sufficient to disregard it at pre-trial stage without supporting evidence such as affidavit disputing its genuineness from concerned authority. (Para 28)

When joint ownership of trademark is acknowledged (especially in foreign jurisdictions) and one co-owner has apparently authorized the defendant to use the mark, the plaintiff cannot obtain final injunction without impleading the co-owner and proving exclusive rights in trial. (Para 29–30)

Case Title: SM Motorenteile GmbH Vs. A.A. Automobiles:15.01.2026:2026:DHC:360: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Flipkart Internet Private Ltd Vs. The Joint Controller of Patents

Flipkart Internet Private Limited filed an appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970 challenging the order dated 09.10.2023 passed by the Joint Controller of Patents dismissing Flipkart's post-grant opposition against Indian Patent No. 312437 granted to Voicemonk Inc. titled “Systems and Methods for Virtual Agents to Help Customers and Business”. 

The patent, granted on 08.05.2019 after multiple amendments, relates to a virtual agent system that receives audio input, identifies desired user actions (search, sort, select, submit, compare), stores and uses correlations (sequential, hierarchical or lateral) between these actions, executes them in a combined manner, and displays a single consolidated output page instead of multiple sequential pages. 

Flipkart primarily contended lack of novelty, inventive step, patentability under Section 3(k), insufficiency of disclosure, and violation of natural justice principles. 

After detailed claim-wise comparison of the cited prior arts (D1 to D7), analysis of characterizing features, and following the legal principles on novelty and inventive step laid down in Lava International Limited vs. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (2024 SCC OnLine Del 2497), the Madras High Court held that the impugned order was well-reasoned, considered all relevant materials, and did not suffer from any perversity or violation of natural justice. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Law Point:

While deciding questions of novelty and inventive step, the principles and the systematic “Seven Stambhas Approach” for assessment of novelty laid down by the Delhi High Court in *Lava International Limited vs. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson* (2024 SCC OnLine Del 2497) should be taken as guiding principles. (Para 9 in)

The test of novelty requires that the prior publication must contain the whole of the invention impugned i.e. all the features by which the particular claim is limited; anticipation must describe or amount to an infringement of the attacked claim. (Para 11)

Prior art must provide clear and unmistakable directions which, when carried out, would inevitably result in something falling within the claims of the patent; mere suggestion or putting on the road is not sufficient. 

Case Title: Flipkart Internet Private Ltd Vs. The Joint Controller of Patents: 05.01.2026  :CMA(PT) No. 9 of 2024  : Madras  HC:The Honourable Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs. E. R. Squibb and Sons

Zydus Lifesciences Limited appealed a single judge's order restraining its anti-cancer biosimilar drug ZRC 3276 (claimed 70% cheaper than respondent's 5C4/Nivolumab/Opdivo under IN 340060) as allegedly infringing the respondent's patent for an isolated monoclonal antibody binding specifically to PD-1 with specified amino acid sequences in a quia timet suit filed before commercial launch. 

No direct product-to-claim mapping existed; single judge relied on indirect biosimilar-to-reference biologic comparison assuming identical sequences and non-exclusive "specifically," overlooking appellant's evidence of statistically significant binding. 

Division bench found flawed reasoning on biosimilar identity, "specifically" per prosecution history requiring no significant cross-binding, and mapping standards under Patents Act.

Absent conclusive mapping or irrefutable prima facie infringement amid technical triability, public interest in life-saving cancer therapy outweighed absolute injunction despite patent protection needs, especially with patent expiry on 2 May 2026.

Modifying order to vacate injunction conditioned on appellant filing audited sales accounts till expiry.

Law Point:

In patent infringement suits, product-to-claim mapping is indispensable to establish prima facie case under S.48 Patents Act; its absence requires overwhelming, unbroken circumstantial evidence sans presumption.

For life-saving drugs like anti-cancer therapies, public interest paramount in interlocutory injunctions alongside prima facie case/balance of convenience; absolute restraint unjustified if triable issues/expert evidence needed—secure via accounts instead.

Case Detail:Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs E.R. Squibb and Sons:12.01.2026:FAO(OS) (COMM) 120/2025:2026:DHC:178:DB: Justice C. Hari Shankar, Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

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