Monday, April 7, 2025

Star India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Magicwin.games

Star India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Magicwin.games & Ors.Court: High Court of Delhi Case Number: CS(COMM) 490/2024 Neutral Citation: [2025/DHC/4210] Date of Decision: April 2, 2025 Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Facts: Star India Pvt. Ltd. is a prominent broadcaster in India, holding exclusive media rights for various sports events. It operates over seventy channels across multiple languages and platforms, including their streaming service, Disney+ Hotstar. The case centers around their broadcasting rights for the "ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2024," held from June 2 to June 29, 2024.

Star India entered a Media Rights Agreement with the International Cricket Council (ICC) on August 27, 2022, granting them exclusive digital media and television broadcasting rights in India for ICC events from 2024 to 2027. Given the immense popularity of cricket in India, Star India anticipated significant revenue from streaming and broadcasting the T20 World Cup.

The defendants, identified as rogue websites, engaged in unauthorized streaming and dissemination of Star India’s content, alongside operating illegal betting and gambling services contrary to the Public Gambling Act of 1867. The defendants included various domain name registrars, internet service providers, and governmental telecommunications bodies.

Legal Proceedings: Upon filing the suit, Star India sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from further unauthorized dissemination of their content. The court issued an ex-parte ad interim injunction on May 30, 2024, prohibiting the defendants from infringing upon Star India's exclusive rights. It required domain registrars to disclose the details of the rogue websites and directed internet service providers to block access to these sites.

As the proceedings progressed, additional rogue websites were identified, leading Star India to amend its pleadings and include these new defendants. Notably, despite being duly served, defendants failed to submit a written statement or contest the claims.

Judgment: The court analyzed the merits of the case, noting that the defendants’ activities had significantly harmed Star India’s interests by infringing on its broadcast rights and diluting its content's value. The court found that, with no contest from the defendants, the allegations in the plaint were deemed admitted.

On this basis, the court issued a decree for a permanent injunction agait the defendants, preventing them from disseminating Star India's exclusive content. The plaintiff did not pursue other reliefs beyond the injunction, and the court ordered that a decree sheet be drawn up.

Chime Financial, Inc Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

The case pertains to an appeal filed by Chime Financial, Inc. against a decision by the Registrar of Trademarks, which refused the registration of Chime's trademark application. Below is the detailed summary of the appeal along with citations from the document.

Overview of the Case

  • Case Title and Reference: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 64/2024
  • Date of Decision: 2nd April 2025
  • Court: High Court of Delhi
  • Appellant: Chime Financial, Inc.
  • Respondent: The Registrar of Trade Marks
  • Judgment Author: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Background and Relevant Facts

  1. Formation and Business: Chime Financial, Inc. is a financial technology company incorporated in 2012 in the USA. It provides online banking and financial products under its trademark.
  2. Usage of Trademark: The mark has been in continuous use since March 2014 on the website www.chime.com and is associated with a mobile banking platform that boasts an active user base of over 14 million.
  3. Recognition: The company has been recognized in various prestigious lists for its contributions, such as being valued at $25 billion and ranking high in various industry accolades.

Trademark Application

  • Chime filed an application (no. 5241586) on a "proposed to be used basis" for their trademark in Classes 9, 35, 36, 41, and 42, claiming priority from a previous U.S. application filed on 27th August 2021.

Grounds for Refusal

  1. Cited Marks: The Registrar cited several existing trademarks that were reportedly phonetically and visually similar to the appellant's mark, leading to the refusal of the application based on Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. This section relates to the refusal of marks that are either identical or similar to an existing mark in relation to similar goods/services, if a likelihood of confusion exists,.
  2. Response from Chime: Chime responded to each cited mark disputing the similarities based on the dissimilarity of goods/services and consumer classes, arguing that no confusion was likely.

Court's Findings

  • The Court scrutinized the cited marks, concluding that they pertain to goods/services dissimilar to those of the appellant, thus there should not be a likelihood of confusion:
  • Cited marks ranged from aerospace to real estate, which were not closely related to Chime’s financial services,.
  • The Court noted that the Registrar had failed to analyze the cited marks individually and had instead made generalized assertions regarding their similarity.

Conclusion

  • The appeal was allowed, and the Court overturned the Registrar’s refusal, directing that the Registrar proceed with advertising Chime's mark within two months of the decision.
  • This judgment underscores the importance of assessing each case on its merit, particularly the uniqueness of goods/services offered under the trademarks in question.

Citation

  • Chime Financial, Inc. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 64/2024, High Court of Delhi, decided on April 2, 2025.

Saturday, April 5, 2025

BTS Research International Pty Ltd Vs. The Controller General of Patents & Designs,

Case Citation: BTS Research International Pty Ltd vs. The Controller General of Patents & Designs, Mumbai & Ors., IPDPTA 56 OF 2023, High Court at Calcutta, Judgment on: 03.04.2025, Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur.

Summary: BTS Research International Pty Ltd filed an appeal under section 117 of the Patents Act, 1970, against an order dated June 16, 2020, rejecting their patent application (no. 0041/KOLMP/2012). The invention claimed is titled “Method of generating hybrid/chimeric cells and uses thereof,” which specifically involves the creation of a tri-hybrid cell by artificially fusing three somatic cells, including at least one human cell and potentially a non-human cell (like a mouse cell). The appellant argued that this process involves significant human intervention and is not merely a biological process for producing or propagating plants or animals.

The Controller General of Patents rejected the patent application based on section 3(j) of the Patents Act, which addresses non-patentable inventions related to biological processes and living organisms. The rejection was largely premised on the argument that the hybrid cells retained attributes of their parent cells, thereby classifying the processes involved within those excluded from patentability. The order stated that the resultant hybrid cell falls under the categorization of a structural and functional unit of the organism from which the cells were taken and considered as a product of essentially biological processes.

In arguing against the rejection, the appellant contended the following:

  1. The impugned order was based on a misinterpretation of the Patents Act.
  2. Following a response to the First Examination Report (FER), a Second Examination Report (SER) should have been issued, as mandated by the law.
  3. Prior art documents cited in the examination had been acknowledged in European proceedings where the patent had been granted, yet this was ignored in the impugned order.
  4. Section 3(j) was deemed inapplicable, arguing that the application involves substantial human intervention and does not constitute an essentially biological process.

Conversely, the respondents maintained that the hybrid cells in question are derived from stem cells capable of developing into organisms and provided adequate reasoning for the applicability of section 3(j). They referenced the decision in Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors. vs. Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors., supporting their stance.

The judgment highlighted several critical points:

  • It stressed the failure of the examination authorities to issue a SER after the objections to the FER were raised, which contravenes the statutory mandates.
  • The findings from European patent proceedings and prior art documentation were not duly considered, despite their relevance to the assessment of the patent application.
  • The Court underscored that the rejection order lacked substantial reasoning regarding how the invention constituted an essential biological process, thereby misapprehending the nature of the invention as involving significant human intervention.

Ultimately, the Court found the impugned order to be flawed, unsubstantiated, and based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the sections of the Patents Act. The patent application was therefore remanded for fresh adjudication, with the direction that it be heard by a different Hearing Officer and be decided afresh while allowing the appellant to amend and submit additional documents.

Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar Vs. Assistant Registrar of Trademark

The case in question involves Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar, representing his company M/s. Pencia Biotech, who filed a writ petition (W.P.(IPD) No. 3 of 2025) against the Assistant Registrar of Trademarks and M/s. Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. The proceedings took place in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, presided over by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

Summary of Proceedings:

1. Background:

- The petitioner, Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar, applied for the trademark "LABAPEN" (Application No. 6180911) in class 5 on November 9, 2023.

- Following this, an examination report was received on December 4, 2023, and responded to on December 19, 2023. The application was subsequently accepted and published in the trademark journal on February 19, 2024.

1. Notice of Opposition:

- The petitioner was unaware that a notice of opposition (No. 1323965) was lodged against his application until he received the order that deemed his application abandoned on December 26, 2024.

- This notice of opposition was reportedly dispatched via email to the counsel for the petitioner on June 24, 2024. However, there was no evidence to confirm that the petitioner or his counsel received this email.

1. Legal Arguments:

- The petitioner argued that he was deprived of the right to respond to the notice of opposition due to not receiving it, thus leading to a violation of natural justice principles.

- The Registrar of Trademarks contended that the email was sent to the registered email address. Despite this, the counsel for the petitioner emphasized that there was no proof of receipt.

1. Reference to Precedent:

- The judge referred to a similar case (Ramya S. Moorthy v. Registrar of Trademarks), wherein it was ruled that the statutory time limit to file a counter statement should be calculated from the date of receipt of the notice of opposition, not merely from the dispatch of the email. This precedent favored the petitioner’s situation.

1. Court's Decision:

- The court allowed the writ petition, quashing the previous order that declared the application abandoned. The trademark application and the notice of opposition were restored for reconsideration.

- The petitioner was granted a month to file the counter statement in response to the notice of opposition.

1. Recommendations for Improvement:

- The judge suggested that a technical solution be implemented to ensure proof of email receipt is available, in order to prevent similar issues in the future.

Conclusion:

The ruling underscored the importance of ensuring that applicants receive due notice regarding oppositions to their trademark applications. It reinforced the principles of natural justice, ensuring that applicants have the opportunity to respond to any oppositions effectively. The decision was aimed at rectifying the oversight in the notification process that led to the initial ruling of abandonment of the trademark application.

Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar Vs. Assistant Registrar of Trademark W.P.(IPD) No. 3 of 2025, High Court of Judicature at Madras, Decided on April 3, 2025, Coram: The Honourable Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:903.

Friday, April 4, 2025

Freeelective Network Private Limited Vs. Matrimony.Com Limited

Descriptive marks require robust evidence of secondary meaning for exclusivity

The case of M/S Freeelective Network Private Limited vs. M/S Matrimony.Com Limited is a significant trademark dispute adjudicated by the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The Plaintiff, Freeelective Network Private Limited, sought to protect its registered trademark "Jodi365" against the Defendant, Matrimony.Com Limited, which launched a mobile application under the mark "Jodii." The Plaintiff alleged infringement and passing off, claiming that "Jodii" was deceptively similar to "Jodi365." The judgment, delivered on July 14, 2022, by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, explores critical trademark law principles, including the distinctiveness of composite marks, the scope of protection under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the threshold for passing off. This case study provides an in-depth analysis of the factual background, procedural history, issues, submissions, judicial reasoning, and legal outcomes.


Detailed Factual Background

The Plaintiff, M/S Freeelective Network Private Limited, incorporated in March 2010 as a subsidiary of FreeElective LLC, operates in the matchmaking and matrimonial services sector. It adopted the trademark "Jodi365" in 2009 for its flagship matchmaking platform and registered it under Class 99 (covering Classes 35, 38, and 41) on May 26, 2010, with the registration renewed until May 26, 2030. "Jodi365" was used continuously since 2009, evidenced by domain registration (Ex.P1), a mobile app launched in January 2020 with over 50,000 downloads (Ex.P7), revenue figures (e.g., Rs. 31,28,190 for 2020, Ex.P5), and advertising expenditure of Rs. 30 lakhs since December 2019 (Ex.P6). The Plaintiff claimed that "Jodi365" had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation, supported by media coverage (Ex.P8).

The Defendant, M/S Matrimony.Com Limited, a prominent player in the matrimonial services industry, operates under the registered trademark "BHARATMATRIMONY" since 1999 (Ex.D1, Ex.D2). In October 2021, it launched a Tamil-language mobile app named "Jodii" under the "BHARATMATRIMONY" umbrella (Ex.P9, Ex.D7). The Plaintiff discovered this in October 2021, alleging that "Jodii" was deceptively similar to "Jodi365" and that the Defendant’s targeted advertisements (Ex.P10) indicated mala fide intent to leverage the Plaintiff’s goodwill. A cease-and-desist notice was issued on November 2, 2021 (Ex.P12), to which the Defendant replied on November 17, 2021 (Ex.P13), asserting that "Jodi" was a descriptive term not monopolizable by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction, surrender of infringing materials, and Rs. 1 crore in damages, arguing that "Jodii" infringed its registered mark and amounted to passing off.


Detailed Procedural Background

The case was filed as Civil Suit (Comm. Div.) No. 122 of 2021 before the Madras High Court under Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), and Sections 27, 28, 29, 134, and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Alongside the suit, the Plaintiff filed applications O.A. Nos. 826 and 828 of 2021 and A. No. 442 of 2022 for interim relief. The court, presided over by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, reserved judgment on April 29, 2022, and pronounced it on July 14, 2022.

Both parties opted not to present oral evidence, relying on documentary submissions. The Plaintiff submitted 14 exhibits (Ex.P1 to Ex.P14), including trademark certificates, financial statements, and media clippings. The Defendant countered with 14 exhibits (Ex.D1 to Ex.D14), such as its "BHARATMATRIMONY" registration and evidence of third-party use of "Jodi." Oral arguments were advanced by Mr. R. Sathish Kumar for the Plaintiff and Mr. P.S. Raman (Senior Counsel), assisted by Mr. Arun C. Mohan, for the Defendant, supplemented by written submissions.


Issues Involved in the Case

The court framed six issues for determination:

  1. Whether the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademark "JODI365" under No. 1971072 in Class 99?
  2. Whether the Defendant’s trademark "JODII" is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s "JODI365"?

Detailed Submission of Parties

Plaintiff’s Submissions
  • Proprietorship and Use: The Plaintiff asserted ownership of "Jodi365," registered since May 26, 2010 (Ex.P2), renewed in 2020 (Ex.P3), and used since 2009 (Ex.P1). It highlighted its business metrics (Ex.P4, Ex.P5) and app downloads (Ex.P7) to establish goodwill.
  • Deceptive Similarity: "Jodii" was argued to be visually and phonetically similar to "Jodi365," with "Jodi" as the essential feature, likely to cause confusion (Section 29(3), Trade Marks Act). Targeted ads (Ex.P10) suggested the Defendant’s awareness and intent.
  • Infringement and Passing Off: The Plaintiff claimed "Jodii" infringed its registered mark and passed off its services, citing prior use and reputation. It sought a permanent injunction under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, arguing monetary relief was inadequate.
  • Damages: Rs. 1 crore was claimed, asserting that damages in such cases are hard to quantify, warranting judicial discretion.
  • Precedents: Cited Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65 for passing off and Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 1952 for phonetic similarity.
Defendant’s Submissions
  • Descriptive Nature: The Defendant argued that "Jodi" (meaning "pair" in Indian languages, Ex.D11) was descriptive of matrimonial services, not distinctive, and thus not protectable (Section 17, Trade Marks Act).
  • Composite Mark: The Plaintiff’s registration was for "Jodi365" as a device mark, not "Jodi" alone. "Jodii" under "BHARATMATRIMONY" (Ex.D1, Ex.D2) was visually and contextually distinct.
  • Third-Party Use: Evidence of widespread use of "Jodi" by others (Ex.D8, Ex.D9) indicated it was publici juris, negating exclusivity.
  • No Confusion: The Defendant’s established reputation and distinct trade dress precluded confusion or passing off.
  • Precedents: Relied on Consim Info Ltd. v. Google India Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (6) CTC 813 to argue that descriptive elements in composite marks lack protection.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

  1. B.K. Engineering Co. v. U.B.H.L. Enterprises (Regd), 1985 Arb LR 269
    • Context: Addressed injunctions in trademark disputes.
    • Relevance: Plaintiff cited it for protecting prior users, but it was not decisive due to distinctiveness issues.
  2. Automatic Electronic Ltd. v. R.K. Dhawan, 1999 SCC Online Del 27
    • Context: Focused on protecting established marks.
    • Relevance: Supported goodwill claims but was not applied given "Jodi"’s descriptiveness.
  3. Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65
    • Context: Defined passing off (misrepresentation, goodwill, damage).
    • Relevance: Plaintiff relied on it, but the court found no misrepresentation due to trade dress differences.
  4. Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions Pvt Ltd, 2004 (28) PTC 566 (SC)
    • Context: Recognized domain names as trademarks.
    • Relevance: Supported "Jodi365"’s distinctiveness as a composite mark, not "Jodi" alone.
  5. Central Park Estates Pvt Ltd. v. Godrej Skyline Developers Pvt Ltd, 2019 SCC Online Del 11580
    • Context: Protected "Central Park" as an essential feature.
    • Relevance: Plaintiff argued "Jodi" was essential, but the court distinguished it as "Central Park" was not descriptive.
  6. Dhariwal Industries Ltd. v. M.S.S. Food Products, AIR 2005 SC 1999
    • Context: Granted injunctions against similar marks.
    • Relevance: Not applied due to lack of distinctiveness in "Jodi."
  7. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd, AIR 2000 SC 1952
    • Context: Emphasized phonetic similarity in drug names.
    • Relevance: Plaintiff highlighted similarity, but trade dress differences prevailed.
  8. Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products Ltd, 2014 (57) PTC 617
    • Context: Protected "Marine" as distinctive.
    • Relevance: Distinguished as "Jodi" was descriptive, unlike "Marine."
  9. Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Dalmia Cement Industries Ltd, 2016 (67) PTC 314
    • Context: Limited protection for descriptive marks.
    • Relevance: Supported Defendant’s argument on "Jodi"’s descriptiveness.
  10. S.N.R. Dhall Mill v. Kaleesuwari Refinery Pvt Ltd, 2021 SCC Online Mad 1675
    • Context: Denied protection to descriptive terms.
    • Relevance: Reinforced the court’s stance on "Jodi."
  11. People Interactive (India) Pvt Ltd. v. Vivek Pahwa, MANU/MH/1661/2016
    • Context: Defined secondary meaning thresholds.
    • Relevance: Key in assessing "Jodi"’s lack of acquired distinctiveness.
  12. Consim Info Ltd. v. Google India Pvt Ltd, 2010 (6) CTC 813 & 2012 (5) LW 1
    • Context: Held "Bharat" and "Matrimony" non-distinctive in "BHARATMATRIMONY."
    • Relevance: Directly applied to deny "Jodi" protection.
  13. Matrimony.Com Ltd. v. V. Kalyan Jewellers India Ltd, MANU/TN/2685/2026
    • Context: Addressed distinctiveness standards.
    • Relevance: Supported Defendant’s position.
  14. P.M. Palani Mudaliar & Co. v. Jansons Exports, 2017 SCC Online Mad 1090
    • Context: Defined publici juris.
    • Relevance: Implicitly raised but not fully explored due to prior findings.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy’s analysis focused on distinctiveness, infringement, and passing off:

  • Issue 1: Proprietorship of "Jodi365"
    • The Plaintiff’s registration (Ex.P2) and renewal (Ex.P3) confirmed its proprietorship since May 26, 2010, valid until 2030.
  • Issues 2 & 3: Deceptive Similarity and Infringement
    • Distinctiveness: "Jodi" (meaning "pair," Ex.D11) was classified as descriptive for matrimonial services, per Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). "365" was suggestive but not decisive. The composite mark "Jodi365" acquired distinctiveness through long use (Ex.P4, Ex.P5, Ex.P8), but "Jodi" alone did not (People Interactive).
    • Secondary Meaning: Applying Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, the court found insufficient evidence that "Jodi"’s primary meaning (pair) was overshadowed by association with the Plaintiff. Third-party use (Ex.D8, Ex.D9) reinforced its descriptiveness.
    • Section 17, Trade Marks Act: Protection extends to the whole mark, not non-distinctive elements unless they acquire secondary meaning. "Jodii" did not infringe "Jodi365" as "Jodi" lacked independent protection.
  • Issue 4: Passing Off
    • Per Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980, passing off requires misrepresentation. Despite phonetic similarity (Cadila), the distinct "BHARATMATRIMONY" branding and trade dress (mobile app visuals) negated confusion.
  • Issue 5: Damages
    • With no infringement or passing off, damages were denied. The "big fish vs. small fish" argument was emotionally compelling but legally insufficient.
  • Conclusion: "Jodi365" as a composite mark was protectable, but "Jodi"’s descriptiveness precluded relief against "Jodii."

Final Decision

The suit was dismissed on July 14, 2022. No injunction, damages, or costs were awarded, and connected applications were closed.


Law Settled in This Case

  1. Composite Marks: Under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, protection applies to the entire mark, not non-distinctive elements unless they acquire secondary meaning.
  2. Descriptive Terms: Descriptive marks require robust evidence of secondary meaning for exclusivity (Abercrombie, Zatarains).
  3. Passing Off: Phonetic similarity alone does not establish passing off; overall trade dress and context are critical (Durga Dutt Sharma).

Case Details

  • Case Title: Freeelective Network Private Limited Vs. Matrimony.Com Limited
  • Date of Order: July 14, 2022
  • Case No.: Civil Suit (Comm. Div.) No. 122 of 2021
  • Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
  • Name of Judge: Hon'ble Shri Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Thursday, April 3, 2025

Ep.108:LG Corporation Vs Intermarket Electroplasters (P) Ltd.

Under Section 20(c) CPC, the sale of allegedly infringing goods within a court’s territory constitutes a part of the cause of action

Introduction:In the intricate world of trademark litigation, the case of LG Corporation and Anr. Vs. Intermarket Electroplasters (P) Ltd. stands as a testament to the complexities of territorial jurisdiction in India. Decided on February 13, 2006, by the Delhi High Court, this dispute pits a global electronics giant against an Indian company, revolving around the pivotal question of where a legal battle over trademark infringement should be fought. With allegations of passing off and a skirmish over the court’s right to hear the case, this judgment illuminates the interplay between statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and the practical realities of commerce, offering a nuanced exploration of jurisdiction in civil suits.

Detailed Factual Background:LG Corporation, a renowned South Korean multinational, along with its co-plaintiff, initiated a lawsuit against Intermarket Electroplasters (P) Ltd., an Indian company, and other defendants. The crux of LG’s grievance was that Intermarket was allegedly passing off its goods as those of LG by using a deceptively similar trademark

LG asserted that this infringement violated its intellectual property rights, prompting a suit for relief in the Delhi High Court.LG’s plaint rested on three jurisdictional anchors: The filing and advertisement of its trademark registration application at the Trade Mark Registry in DelhiThe applicability of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the sale of Intermarket’s allegedly infringing goods within Delhi. Specifically, LG pointed to invoices  evidencing sales of these goods to parties in Delhi, asserting that this commercial activity within the city triggered a cause of action sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Delhi High Court. Intermarket, a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act with no branch office or agent in Delhi, contested the court’s jurisdiction. It argued that its operations were not based in Delhi, and thus, it neither resided nor carried on business there, challenging LG’s claim to anchor the suit in the capital.

Detailed Procedural Background:The legal proceedings commenced when LG filed its suit in the Delhi High Court, invoking the court’s jurisdiction based on the aforementioned grounds. Intermarket responded by filing an application (IA No. 258/06) under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), effectively seeking the return or rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 10, arguing that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction. This application, also invoking the court’s inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, set the stage for a preliminary skirmish over venue.

Issues Involved in the Case:The central issue was whether the Delhi High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain LG’s suit? This hinged on interpreting Section 20 of the CPC, specifically whether the sale of allegedly infringing goods in Delhi constituted a part of the cause of action sufficient to anchor Jurisdiction under Section 20(c), given Intermarket’s lack of physical presence in the city.

Detailed Submission of Parties:LG’s counsel argued that the court’s jurisdiction was secured by the sale of Intermarket’s infringing goods in Delhi, as averred in paragraph 30 of the plaint: "the impugned goods of the defendants are also selling in Delhi, though without issuance of supporting invoices." They bolstered this with Intermarket’s own documents—invoices showing sales to Delhi parties—asserting that this commercial activity gave rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial ambit. LG emphasized that jurisdiction under Section 20(c) CPC extends to where any part of the cause of action arises, and the sale of goods directly tied to the passing-off claim satisfied this criterion.

Intermarket’s counsel countered that the company, lacking a branch office or agent in Delhi, neither resided nor carried on business there, as required under Section 20(a) CPC. They relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India to argue that mere sales did not equate to carrying on business, drawing parallels to Section 20(c)’s interpretation in writ jurisdiction. They further contended that even if a cause of action arose, the court could discretionarily decline jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum conveniens, urging the suit’s dismissal or transfer.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments :Cited by Parties and Their ContextThe parties leaned on key judicial precedents to fortify their positions: 

Dhodha House vs. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41: Cited by both sides, this Supreme Court ruling was pivotal. LG conceded it negated jurisdiction based on the Trade Mark Registry’s location and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides an additional forum only where the plaintiff resides or works for gain. Intermarket used it to argue that statutory jurisdiction must be explicitly conferred, reinforcing their stance that Delhi lacked a basis absent their business presence. The court clarified that Section 20 CPC governs trademark suits unless overridden by specific provisions, setting the stage for a cause-of-action analysis.

Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254: Intermarket relied on this Supreme Court decision, which interpreted jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by reference to Section 20(c) CPC. The court held that a small part of the cause of action within a High Court’s territory does not compel adjudication, allowing discretionary refusal under forum conveniens. Intermarket argued this principle applied to suits, suggesting Delhi could decline jurisdiction despite sales.

Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225: Supreme Court case established that a corporation’s residence is typically its registered office, supporting Intermarket’s claim of non-residence in Delhi absent a local office.

Pfizer Products, Inc. vs. Rajesh Chopra and Ors., CS (OS) No. 311/2005 (Delhi High Court, decided February 8, 2006): LG’s counsel noted this recent Delhi High Court ruling which diverged from Dhodha House by suggesting that a trademark application in Delhi could confer jurisdiction. Though LG conceded this point, the citation highlighted evolving judicial thought, though not decisive here.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:
The court affirmed that Section 20 CPC governs territorial jurisdiction in trademark suits, absent overriding statutory provisions. Under Section 20(a), the agreed with Intermarket that it neither resided nor carried on business in Delhi, as it lacked a local office or agent, aligning with Morgan Stanley and Dhodha House. The explanation to Section 20 deems a corporation’s business location as its principal or subordinate office, neither of which Intermarket had in Delhi.

Turning to Section 20(c), the court focused on whether part of the cause of action arose in Delhi due to the sale of infringing goods. The court upheld LG’s averment in the plaint, supported by invoices, as sufficient at the preliminary stage, noting that jurisdiction hinges on pleadings, not their truth, per established law. The sale, he reasoned, was not incidental but central to the passing-off claim, giving LG a legal right to sue in Delhi. This nexus distinguished the case from mere peripheral activity, grounding jurisdiction firmly in the city.Addressing Intermarket’s reliance on Kusum Ingots, the court distinguished writ jurisdiction’s discretionary nature under Article 226 from a suit’s mandatory adjudication under CPC. In suits, he held, jurisdiction is not discretionary once a cause of action is established—there’s no room for forum conveniens to override a plaintiff’s choice of a competent court. The court dismissed the discretionary refusal argument as inapplicable, reinforcing that sales in Delhi sufficed. The court also acknowledged the Pfizer ruling but sidestepped it, given LG’s concession on registry-based jurisdiction, focusing solely on the sales ground. 

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court rejected Intermarket’s application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, affirming its territorial jurisdiction to hear the suit. 

Law Settled in This Case:The judgment clarified that: (1) Under Section 20(c) CPC, the sale of allegedly infringing goods within a court’s territory constitutes a part of the cause of action, conferring jurisdiction in trademark passing-off suits, irrespective of the defendant’s residence or business presence; (2) Unlike writ jurisdiction, courts in civil suits cannot discretionarily refuse jurisdiction based on forum conveniens when a cause of action is established; (3) Post-Dhodha House, trademark registry location or Section 134(2) does not automatically grant jurisdiction unless the plaintiff resides or works there.

Case Title: LG Corporation Vs Intermarket Electroplasters (P) Ltd.
Date of Order: February 13, 2006
Case No.:CS (OS) 1359 of 2004
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri A.K. Sikri

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi


Wednesday, April 2, 2025

Mankind Pharma Limited Vs Novakind Bio Sciences Private Limited

Section 29(5) is an additional, not exclusive, ground for infringement, and its non-applicability did not oust Sections 29(1) to (4).

Introduction:
In the fiercely competitive landscape of pharmaceuticals, where brand identity can be a lifeline for both companies and consumers, the clash between Mankind Pharma Limited and Novakind Bio Sciences Private Limited emerges as a riveting tale of trademark law, deceptive similarity, and judicial interpretation. Decided on August 7, 2023, by the High Court of Delhi, this case pits a pharmaceutical giant against a smaller player, unraveling the complexities of protecting a “family of marks” and the boundaries of corporate naming rights under India’s Trade Marks Act, 1999. With the plaintiff wielding its well-established “KIND” suffix against the defendant’s “NOVAKIND” branding, the court’s ruling offers a profound exploration of infringement, public safety, and the delicate balance between statutory compliance and intellectual property rights. This case study delves into the intricacies of the dispute, tracing its factual roots, procedural twists, legal arguments, and the judiciary’s nuanced reasoning, culminating in a decision that reinforces the sanctity of trademarks in the medicinal domain.

Detailed Factual Background:
Mankind Pharma Limited, the plaintiff, stands as India’s fifth-largest pharmaceutical company, a titan in the industry with a legacy dating back to 1986 when its founder, Ramesh Chand Juneja, adopted the trademark “MANKIND” as its trading style. Renowned for its extensive portfolio, the company boasts 268 brands ranked among the top five in their respective pharmaceutical categories, with 85 at the pinnacle and 67 in second place. Mankind has meticulously cultivated a “KIND family of marks,” incorporating “KIND” as a suffix in various product names, a branding strategy that has become a hallmark of its identity. The company holds registrations for the “MANKIND” mark across all classes and operates a plethora of websites, including mankindpharma.com, mankindmanforce.com, and vetmankind.com, underscoring its pervasive market presence.

The defendant, Novakind Bio Sciences Private Limited, entered the pharmaceutical fray with a corporate name and product branding that sparked Mankind’s ire. Novakind manufactures and sells medicinal preparations, notably Deflazacort tablets under the brand “DEFZAKIND,” prominently featuring “NOVAKIND BIO SCIENCES PRIVATE LIMITED” on its packaging with a registered trademark symbol (®). Mankind perceived this as an encroachment on its “KIND” family, arguing that “NOVAKIND” phonetically and structurally mimicked “MANKIND,” potentially confusing consumers and diluting its goodwill. On August 25, 2020, Mankind issued a cease-and-desist notice, demanding that Novakind abandon its use of “NOVAKIND” and “DEFZAKIND,” claiming infringement of its registered trademark. Novakind’s refusal to comply precipitated this legal showdown.

The crux of the dispute lies in the similarity between “MANKIND” and “NOVAKIND,” compounded by the shared “KIND” suffix, and Novakind’s bold display of its corporate name on product strips, which Mankind argued functioned as a trademark rather than a mere identifier. The stakes were high, given the pharmaceutical context where confusion could endanger public health, a factor that loomed large in the court’s considerations.

Detailed Procedural Background:
The legal saga began with Mankind Pharma filing CS(COMM) 188/2021 before the High Court of Delhi, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Novakind from using “KIND” as part of its trade name or trademark for any pharmaceutical products. Concurrently, Mankind moved I.A. 5700/2021 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, requesting an interim injunction. On April 20, 2021, the court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, barring Novakind from manufacturing, marketing, or selling any pharmaceutical product bearing the “KIND” suffix or otherwise infringing Mankind’s registered trademark. This order remained in effect, casting a shadow over Novakind’s operations.Unwilling to acquiesce, Novakind countered with I.A. 3248/2023 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC, seeking to vacate the interim injunction. Both parties completed their pleadings, submitting detailed arguments and evidence, including product packaging and statutory references. 

Issues Involved in the Case:
The case presented a tapestry of legal and factual questions demanding resolution. Foremost was whether Novakind’s use of “NOVAKIND BIO SCIENCES PRIVATE LIMITED” and “DEFZAKIND” infringed Mankind’s registered “MANKIND” trademark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly given the shared “KIND” suffix? A pivotal issue was whether “NOVAKIND” functioned as a trademark or merely a corporate name, impacting the applicability of infringement provisions under Sections 29(2)(b) versus 29(5)? The court had to reconcile conflicting judicial precedents on the scope of Section 29(5) versus Sections 29(1) to (4), determining the legal framework for assessing infringement by corporate name usage.

Detailed Submission of Parties:
Mankind Pharma anchored its case on trademark infringement and public interest. Sibal argued that “MANKIND” and its “KIND” family of marks were deeply entrenched in the market, with registrations across all classes and a reputation synonymous with quality pharmaceuticals. He contended that “NOVAKIND” was deceptively similar to “MANKIND,” phonetically and structurally, risking consumer confusion, particularly given the “KIND” suffix’s prominence in Mankind’s branding. Pointing to the “DEFZAKIND” strip, plaintiff highlighted Novakind’s use of “NOVAKIND BIO SCIENCES PRIVATE LIMITED” in bold letters with a registered trademark symbol, asserting it functioned as a source identifier, not just a corporate name, thus falling under Section 29(2)(b). Plaintiff cited Novakind’s own admissions in its application—acknowledging recognition by doctors and intent to build reputation under “NOVAKIND”—to rebut claims of mere corporate use. Sibal challenged the Bombay High Court’s Cipla ruling, relying on Delhi High Court precedents like Bloomberg and Novartis to argue that Sections 29(1) to (4) remained applicable even if Section 29(5) did not fit. Emphasizing the pharmaceutical context, he invoked Supreme Court dicta from Cadila Health Care, stressing the heightened risk of confusion in medicinal products and the need for strict protection.

Novakind, through mounted a multi-pronged defense. Mahapatra argued that Mankind lacked standalone registration for “KIND,” precluding exclusivity over the suffix, and that “NOVAKIND” was a corporate name, not a trademark, used in compliance with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act’s labeling mandates. He leaned heavily on Section 29(5), asserting it exclusively governed infringement by corporate name usage, and since “MANKIND” and “NOVAKIND” were not identical, no violation occurred. Citing the Bombay High Court’s Cipla Full Bench decision, he contended that Sections 29(1) to (4) were inapplicable. Mahapatra further posited that pharmaceutical products, prescribed by trained professionals, minimized confusion risks, and that drugs were sold by brand names like “DEFZAKIND,” not manufacturer names, diluting any association with Mankind. He dismissed public health concerns, arguing that doctors and pharmacists’ expertise negated deception, and urged the court to vacate the injunction based on statutory necessity and lack of trademark use.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:
The parties wielded an arsenal of judicial precedents, each illuminating distinct facets of trademark law. Mankind relied on Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (AIR 1963 SC 449), where the Supreme Court deemed “AMRITDHARA” and “LAKSHMANDHARA” confusingly similar for medicinal products, emphasizing phonetic and structural likeness from a consumer’s perspective. This bolstered Mankind’s claim of deceptive similarity between “MANKIND” and “NOVAKIND.” Mankind Pharma Ltd v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd ((2015) 61 PTC 465) from the Delhi High Court reinforced this, enjoining “METROKIND” due to the “KIND” suffix’s dominance in Mankind’s marks, affirming its source-identifying role. Bloomberg Finance LP v. Prafull Saklecha ((2014) 207 DLT 35) and Novartis AG v. Novaegis (India) Private Limited (MANU/DE/1012/2023), both Delhi High Court rulings, countered the Cipla view, holding that Section 29(5) did not preclude Sections 29(1) to (4), allowing broader infringement analysis when a mark doubles as a corporate name. Cadila Health Care Ltd v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd ((2001) 5 SCC 73) underscored the Supreme Court’s stance on heightened scrutiny for medicinal trademarks, rejecting the notion that professional dispensing eliminated confusion risks.

Novakind invoked Cipla Ltd v. Cipla Industries Pvt Ltd (AIR 2017 Bom 75), a Bombay High Court Full Bench decision, asserting that Section 29(5) alone applied to corporate name usage, requiring identity of marks, not mere similarity, thus favoring Novakind’s non-identical “NOVAKIND.” Dhiren Krishna Paul v. Health and Glow Retailing Pvt Ltd (2013 (53) PTC 355 (Mad)) and Chronicle Publications (P) Ltd v. Chronicle Academy Pvt Ltd (2010 (44) PTC 78 (Del)) echoed this, limiting infringement claims absent identical corporate name use in the same trade. These cases aimed to narrow the legal lens to Section 29(5), shielding Novakind from broader infringement claims.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:
The court's reasoning wove a meticulous tapestry of statutory interpretation, factual analysis, and public policy. The began by affirming Mankind’s robust trademark rights in “MANKIND,” registered across all classes, and its “KIND” family’s market recognition. Comparing “MANKIND” and “NOVAKIND,” he found them phonetically and structurally similar, with the shared “KIND” suffix heightening confusion risks, especially in pharmaceuticals where “KIND” was not generic. Drawing from Amritdhara and Cadila Pharmaceuticals (from Mankind v. Cadila), he held that such similarity satisfied Section 29(2)(b)’s test of deceptive similarity and likelihood of association for identical goods.

Addressing Novakind’s Section 29(5) defense, the judge grappled with the Cipla precedent but sided with Delhi High Court’s Bloomberg and Novartis rulings. The Court reasoned that Section 29(5) was an additional, not exclusive, ground for infringement, and its non-applicability did not oust Sections 29(1) to (4). Examining the “DEFZAKIND” strip, he noted “NOVAKIND BIO SCIENCES PRIVATE LIMITED”’s prominent display with a registered trademark symbol, concluding it functioned as a trademark under Section 2(zb), not merely a corporate name. This factual distinction from Cipla—where the mark was solely a corporate identifier—rendered Section 29(2)(b) applicable, as Novakind used “NOVAKIND” in trade to indicate source.

The Court dismissed Novakind’s ancillary arguments. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act’s naming requirement, he held, did not license infringing names; Novakind could adopt a non-conflicting identity. The contention that professional dispensing negated confusion was rebutted by Cadila Health Care’s insistence on a higher standard for medicinal marks, given human fallibility and prescription errors. He emphasized the consumer’s perspective—a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection—over professional expertise, noting the real-world reliance on manufacturer names in India’s diverse healthcare landscape. Citing extensive U.S. and Indian precedents, he underscored the dire public health implications of medicinal confusion, refusing to speculate on its improbability.

Final Decision:
The court made the ad interim injunction of April 20, 2021, absolute, restraining Novakind from using “KIND” in its trade name or trademarks pending the suit’s disposal. 

Law Settled in This Case:
The judgment clarified that Section 29(5) does not monopolize infringement analysis for corporate name usage; Sections 29(1) to (4) remain viable if the mark serves as a trademark. It affirmed that phonetic and structural similarity, especially in pharmaceuticals, suffices for infringement under Section 29(2)(b) when goods are identical and confusion or association is likely. The ruling entrenched a heightened duty of care for medicinal trademarks, prioritizing public safety over professional safeguards, and held that statutory naming obligations do not excuse infringement.

Case Title: Mankind Pharma Limited Vs Novakind Bio Sciences Private Limited
Date of Order: August 7, 2023
Case No.: CS(COMM) 188/2021
Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:5653
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri C. Hari Shankar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nuvoco Vistas Corporation Limited Vs. JK Lakshmi Cement Limited

Registration under Section 28 grants exclusive rights, irrespective of packaging differences, if essential features are copied

Introduction:
In the bustling world of India's cement industry, where brand identity can make or break a company, a fierce legal battle unfolded between Nuvoco Vistas Corporation Limited and JK Lakshmi Cement Limited. This case, decided by the High Court of Delhi on April 15, 2019, revolves around the contentious issue of trademark infringement, pitting the plaintiff’s registered mark "CONCRETO" against the defendants’ allegedly similar mark "CONCRETA." What began as a dispute over phonetic and visual similarity escalated into a complex examination of ownership, bad faith, and statutory rights under India’s trademark law. This case study delves into the intricate details of the factual and procedural background, the legal issues at stake, the arguments presented by both parties, the judicial reasoning, and the final outcome, offering a comprehensive look at a landmark trademark dispute.
Detailed Factual Background

Nuvoco Vistas Corporation Limited, the plaintiff, is a prominent player in India’s cement industry, tracing its lineage to Lafarge India Limited, a subsidiary of the French company Lafarge SA. The plaintiff claimed ownership of the trademark "CONCRETO," registered since November 30, 2005, under Registration No. 1402591 in Class 19 for cement and building materials. Additionally, Nuvoco held registrations for various labels featuring "CONCRETO" as the dominant element, including a distinctive slanting roof design, with usage dating back to 2002. The company asserted that it had invested heavily in promoting "CONCRETO," achieving significant sales and establishing it as a well-known mark, bolstered by prior legal victories against infringers.

The defendants, JK Lakshmi Cement Limited, another major cement manufacturer, introduced a product under the mark "CONCRETA," accompanied by a label design that Nuvoco alleged mimicked its own. The plaintiff argued that "CONCRETA" was deceptively similar to "CONCRETO," both visually and phonetically, and that the defendants’ adoption of this mark for identical goods—cement—constituted infringement, passing off, and unfair competition. The defendants, however, countered that "CONCRETO" was a descriptive term derived from "concrete," a generic word interchangeable with "cement," and thus incapable of exclusive appropriation. 

They further challenged Nuvoco’s ownership of certain marks due to a divestment process mandated by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). The backdrop to this dispute includes a significant corporate restructuring. In 2015-2016, following the global merger of Lafarge SA and Holcim, the CCI ordered the divestment of Lafarge’s Indian business to prevent monopolistic practices. This led to the creation of Nuvoco Vistas Corp. Ltd. through a Share Purchase and Transitional Agreement dated October 4, 2016, between LafargeHolcim and Nirchem Ltd. The agreement allowed Nuvoco to use certain "Corporate Marks" (including those with "Lafarge") during an 18-month phase-out period ending March 25, 2018, but explicitly recognized Nuvoco’s ownership of standalone marks like "CONCRETO."

Detailed Procedural Background:
The legal proceedings commenced with Nuvoco filing a suit (CS(COMM) 256/2017) in the High Court of Delhi, seeking a permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs against JK Lakshmi for trademark infringement and passing off. On April 11, 2017, the court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from using "CONCRETA." Subsequently, Nuvoco filed I.A. No. 4261/2017 under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to confirm this interim relief, while JK Lakshmi filed I.A. No. 5564/2017 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC to vacate the injunction, arguing misrepresentation by the plaintiff.

The case was reserved for judgment on March 25, 2019, after extensive hearings involving arguments, rejoinders, and sur-rejoinders. Both parties submitted detailed pleadings, affidavits, and documentary evidence, including trademark registration certificates, CCI orders, and the Transitional Agreement. 

Issues Involved in the Case:
Whether Nuvoco had valid ownership and exclusive rights over the "CONCRETO" trademark, particularly in light of the CCI divestment orders and the Transitional Agreement? Whether the defendants’ mark "CONCRETA" was deceptively similar to "CONCRETO," constituting infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999? Whether "CONCRETO" was a descriptive term incapable of trademark protection, and if the defendants’ use of "CONCRETA" was in bad faith?

Plaintiff’s Submissions:
Nuvoco argued that it was the registered proprietor of "CONCRETO" since 2005 and had used it since 2002, establishing it as a well-known mark through extensive promotion and sales. The plaintiff highlighted seven registrations listed in paragraph 8 of the plaint, emphasizing "CONCRETO" as the essential feature. It contended that "CONCRETA" was visually and phonetically similar to "CONCRETO," with the defendants’ label mimicking its slanting roof design, suggesting bad faith given their shared industry. Nuvoco cited Laxmikant V. Patel vs. Chetanbhat Shah [2002 (24) PTC 1] to argue that even innocent infringement is actionable, though it asserted the defendants’ actions were deliberate. Regarding ownership, Nuvoco clarified through an affidavit dated November 30, 2018, that the CCI orders and Transitional Agreement preserved its rights over "CONCRETO," distinct from "Lafarge" marks, and accused the defendants of shifting to "PLATINUM" post-injunction, indicating guilt.

Defendants’ Submissions:
JK Lakshmi, argued that "CONCRETO" was descriptive, derived from "concrete," a generic term for cement in multiple languages, and thus lacked distinctiveness, citing J.R. Kapoor vs. Micronix India [1994 Supp (3) SCC 215]. They challenged Nuvoco’s ownership of five marks containing "Lafarge," excluded from the divestment business per the CCI order of February 2, 2016, asserting that Nuvoco lacked locus standi as a mere permitted user, not a proprietor. The defendants accused Nuvoco of suppressing the Transitional Agreement and CCI orders, violating the duty of utmost good faith (Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs. Kartick Das [1994] 4 SCC 225]), and sought vacation of the injunction. They further argued that "CONCRETA" and "CONCRETO" targeted different cement types and markets (East India vs. Rajasthan), minimizing confusion.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:

Laxmikant V. Patel vs. Chetanbhat Shah [2002 (24) PTC 1]: Cited by the plaintiff to argue that even innocent infringement is actionable, though bad faith was evident here. The court used this to infer the defendants’ knowledge of "CONCRETO" given their industry overlap, rejecting any defense of innocence. J.R. Kapoor vs. Micronix India [1994 Supp (3) SCC 215]: The defendants relied on this Supreme Court ruling to assert that descriptive prefixes like "concrete" cannot be monopolized. The court, however, distinguished this by noting the defendants’ own registration application for "CONCRETA," undermining their argument. Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs. Kartick Das [1994] 4 SCC 225]: Cited by the defendants to emphasize the plaintiff’s duty of utmost good faith in seeking ex parte relief. The court rejected this, finding no material suppression given the confidential divestment process and sufficient disclosure in the plaint. Amritdhara Pharmacy vs. Satyadeo Gupta [1963 SCR 484]: Referenced by the court to assess phonetic and visual similarity, emphasizing overall impression over minute differences, supporting the finding of deception between "CONCRETO" and "CONCRETA." K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar vs. Shri Ambal and Co. [1969] 2 SCC 131]: Used by the court to affirm that resemblance in sound and sight suffices for infringement, reinforcing the phonetic similarity argument.Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma vs. Navaratna Pharmaceuticals Laboratories [AIR 1965 SC 980]: The court relied on this to distinguish infringement (statutory right) from passing off (common law), holding that essential feature adoption trumps packaging differences. Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. vs. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel [AIR 2006 SC 3304]: Cited to counter the defendants’ claim that corporate name use diluted "CONCRETO," affirming its prominence in branding.Pankaj Goel vs. Dabur India Ltd. [2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del) DB]: Used to dismiss the defendants’ argument of third-party use, holding that inaction against minor infringers does not waive rights.P&G Manufacturing vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care [FAO(OS) 241/2014]: Applied to reject the defendants’ descriptive claim, as their registration application for "CONCRETA" contradicted their stance.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:
The court first tackled ownership, finding no falsehood or suppression by Nuvoco. The court noted that all seven marks in paragraph 8 of the plaint were registered to Lafarge India (Nuvoco’s predecessor) at filing, and the Transitional Agreement permitted "Lafarge" use during the phase-out period, ending March 25, 2018. Crucially, "CONCRETO" was not a Corporate Mark, and Nuvoco retained exclusive rights post-phase-out, supported by unchallenged registration certificates.

On infringement, the court found "CONCRETA" visually and phonetically similar to "CONCRETO," differing only by one letter ("O" to "A"), satisfying Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Citing Amritdhara and Kaviraj Pandit, it emphasized overall impression over technical differences, dismissing the defendants’ "hammer and hand" logo as irrelevant to the essential feature’s similarity. The goods (cement) being identical further bolstered this conclusion.

The judge inferred bad faith from the defendants’ industry knowledge and lack of justification for adopting "CONCRETA," aligning with Laxmikant V. Patel. He rejected equity-based defenses (Morgan Stanley), noting infringers cannot claim good faith. The court also dismissed arguments about different trade channels or third-party use, citing Pankaj Goel and the broad scope of "cement" registration under Section 28. Finally, the defendants’ own application for "CONCRETA" registration (P&G Manufacturing) estopped their descriptive claim, showcasing their inconsistent stance.

Final Decision:
The court dismissed JK Lakshmi’s I.A. 5564/2017, refusing to vacate the April 11, 2017 injunction, and confirmed it via I.A. 4261/2017 until the suit’s final disposal. These findings were prima facie, preserving the parties’ rights at trial.

Law Settled in This Case:
Registration under Section 28 grants exclusive rights, irrespective of packaging differences, if essential features are copied.Phonetic and visual similarity suffices for infringement, judged by overall impression.Bad faith can be inferred from industry knowledge and lack of justification.Third-party use or inaction against minor infringers does not waive rights.A party cannot claim a mark is descriptive while seeking its registration.

Case Title: Nuvoco Vistas Corporation Limited Vs. JK Lakshmi Cement Limited
Date of Order: April 15, 2019
Case No.: CS(COMM) 256/2017
Neutral Citation: AIRONLINE 2019 DEL 630
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manmohan

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Eicher Goodearth Pvt Ltd Vs Krishna Mehta


Designs, even if inspired by public domain elements, can be protected under passing off if it generates goodwill and consumer recognition 

Introduction: In the vibrant world of lifestyle products, where creativity and originality reign supreme, the clash between Eicher Goodearth Pvt Ltd and Krishna Mehta & Ors stands as a compelling narrative of intellectual property rights, artistic inspiration, and commercial ethics. Decided on June 29, 2015, by the High Court of Delhi, this case delves into the intricate realm of passing off, where the plaintiff, a renowned retailer of unique home décor and lifestyle items, accused the defendants, including a former design consultant, of misappropriating its distinctive designs. This case study explores the factual intricacies, procedural journey, legal issues, arguments, judicial reasoning, and the ultimate resolution, shedding light on the delicate balance between inspiration and imitation in the creative industry.

Detailed Factual Background: Eicher Goodearth Pvt Ltd, the plaintiff, operates a chain of retail stores under the brand "GOODEARTH," celebrated for its exclusive and aesthetically pleasing lifestyle products, including home décor, furniture, and apparel. The company prides itself on its in-house creative team, which designs unique motifs, patterns, and artworks inspired by natural beauty and cultural heritage, such as Mughal art and architecture. Among its notable collections are SERAI, PERIYAR, VRINDAVAN, BALI MYNAH, LOTUS, ROSE PRINCESS, and FALCON, some of which, like Periyar, Vrindavan, and Lotus, are registered under the Designs Act, 2000. With a turnover of Rs. 91 crores in the financial year 2012-2013 and a global presence, including stores in India, Singapore, Turkey, and Nepal, GOODEARTH has cultivated a formidable reputation.

The defendants, Krishna Mehta and his company India Circus (Defendant No. 2), along with a technological collaborator (Defendant No. 3), entered the fray as competitors in the lifestyle product market. Krishna Mehta, Defendant No. 1, had previously worked as a design consultant for GOODEARTH on a retainership basis from May 10, 2010, until September 30, 2012. During this period, he was privy to the plaintiff’s creative processes and designs. After leaving GOODEARTH, Mehta established India Circus in November 2011, launching a website (www.indiacircus.com) that sold products bearing motifs and designs strikingly similar to those of GOODEARTH. The plaintiff alleged that these designs infringed upon its goodwill, constituting passing off, unfair competition, and dilution, especially given Mehta’s prior association and access to its creative output.

The plaintiff highlighted specific designs—Falcon (depicting a Mughal emperor with a falcon), Rose Princess (a princess with a rose), Periyar (palm trees), Serai (a window with an elephant), Vrindavan (trees), Lotus, and Bali Mynah—as being replicated by the defendants. It argued that these designs, though inspired by historical or natural elements, were uniquely adapted and applied to its products, earning significant market recognition. The defendants countered that these designs were neither original nor exclusive to GOODEARTH, drawing from centuries-old public domain artworks, and thus could not be monopolized.

Detailed Procedural Background: The legal battle commenced with Eicher Goodearth filing a suit, CS(OS) 1234/2014, in the High Court of Delhi, seeking an injunction against Krishna Mehta and others for passing off. Alongside the suit, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 8010/2014 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for an interim injunction to restrain the defendants from using the disputed designs. On May 1, 2014, the court granted an ex-parte interim injunction in favor of the plaintiff, prohibiting the defendants from selling products with the impugned designs.

In response, the defendants filed I.A. No. 13372/2014 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC, seeking to vacate the interim order. They submitted a written statement, reply, and counterclaim, asserting their right to use the designs and challenging the plaintiff’s claims. Both parties presented extensive written submissions and evidence, including design comparisons, sales figures, and historical references, to bolster their positions. 

Issues Involved in the Case:Whether the plaintiff’s designs, though inspired by public domain elements, were sufficiently distinctive and associated with GOODEARTH to warrant protection under the law of passing off?Whether the defendants’ use of similar designs on identical products constituted misrepresentation, leading consumers to confuse their goods with those of the plaintiff?Whether the defendants’ actions, particularly given Krishna Mehta’s prior employment with GOODEARTH, amounted to passing off, unfair competition, or dilution of the plaintiff’s goodwill?The scope of protection for designs used as trademarks in a passing off action, distinct from statutory rights under the Designs Act, 2000.

Plaintiff’s Submissions:The plaintiff argued that this was a classic case of passing off, not design infringement, emphasizing three key elements: goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. GOODEARTH asserted that its designs, applied to products like cushions, crockery, and bed linen, had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation since 1996, evidenced by a turnover exceeding Rs. 91 crores and widespread media coverage. It claimed that consumers instantly recognized these designs as synonymous with GOODEARTH, even without explicit branding.

The plaintiff accused the defendants of misrepresentation by replicating its designs on identical product ranges sold via www.indiacircus.com, creating confusion among online buyers who could not physically inspect the goods. It highlighted Krishna Mehta’s role as a former consultant, alleging he exploited his insider knowledge to copy designs like Periyar (created in 2003) after leaving in 2012. The plaintiff submitted sales data—e.g., Rs. 10.53 crores for Periyar from 2005-2014—demonstrating commercial success and argued that the defendants’ actions damaged its reputation and business.

GOODEARTH dismissed the defendants’ claim of public domain inspiration, asserting that its creative application of historical motifs to modern lifestyle products was original and protectable. It cited precedents like Mohan Lal v. Sona Paints (200(2013) DLT 322) to argue that passing off protects goodwill irrespective of design registration, and pointed to Mehta’s shift in design style post-employment as evidence of mala fide intent.


Defendants’ Submissions:The defendants contended that the plaintiff’s designs lacked originality, being derived from centuries-old Mughal art and natural elements in the public domain. They argued that no exclusive rights could be claimed over such motifs, citing examples like Falcon (a Mughal painting from 1600-1605) and Rose Princess (a 17th/18th-century portrait). They challenged the plaintiff’s registered designs (Periyar, Vrindavan, Lotus), alleging non-production of certificates and prior publication, rendering them unprotectable under the Designs Act, 2000.

The defendants emphasized that their products, sold under the distinct brand “India Circus” on www.indiacircus.com, bore no resemblance to GOODEARTH’s trade dress or branding, negating any misrepresentation. They argued that luxury product consumers, the target market, were discerning enough to distinguish between brands, especially given the price and distribution differences. Krishna Mehta defended his freelance career, noting his work with multiple brands and asserting that his designs, though similar, incorporated unique elements (e.g., elephants, jail windows in Periyar).

Citing cases like Benchairs Ltd. v. Chair Centre Ltd. ([1972] FSR 397) and Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd. ([1995] FSR 169), the defendants argued that mere similarity does not constitute passing off absent a clear intent to deceive, which they denied. They also referenced Servewell Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Dolphin ((2010) 43 PTC 507 (Del)) to assert that commonplace design elements lack copyright protection.

Plaintiff’s Citations: Mohan Lal v. Sona Paints & Hardwares (2013) DLT 322) - This Delhi High Court ruling clarified that a design can function as a trademark and be protected under passing off if it generates goodwill. The plaintiff relied on this to argue that its designs, though unregistered in some cases, were distinctive identifiers of GOODEARTH, supporting its claim of consumer association and goodwill. Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah ((2002) 3 SCC 65) - The Supreme Court emphasized that passing off protects goodwill against confusion, even without fraudulent intent. GOODEARTH used this to assert that the defendants’ actions, intentional or not, harmed its reputation by mimicking its designs.Vicco Laboratories v. Hindustan Rimmer (AIR 1979 Delhi 114) - This case upheld an injunction based on identical get-up and color schemes, despite different trademarks. The plaintiff cited it to argue that the defendants’ near-identical designs on similar products created a likelihood of confusion.Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore (AIR 1972 SC 1359) - The Supreme Court held that marks are remembered by general impressions, not minute details, especially by consumers with imperfect recollection. GOODEARTH invoked this to highlight the risk of deception among online buyers.Charan Dass v. Bombay Crockery House (1984 (4) PTC 102 (Del)) - This case restrained an ex-dealer from passing off goods, emphasizing the duty of former associates. The plaintiff used it to underscore Mehta’s breach of trust as an ex-employee.

Defendants’ Citations:Benchairs Ltd. v. Chair Centre Ltd. ([1972] FSR 397) - The Chancery Division ruled that passing off requires a false representation of origin, not mere copying. The defendants argued that their distinct branding precluded such misrepresentation.Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. v. Wards Mobility Services Ltd. ([1995] FSR 169) - This case noted the difficulty of proving passing off without a clear trade origin badge. The defendants used it to assert that consumers bought their products for their appeal, not GOODEARTH’s reputation.Servewell Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Dolphin ((2010) 43 PTC 507 (Del)) - The Delhi High Court denied copyright to commonplace floral designs lacking originality. The defendants cited this to argue that GOODEARTH’s motifs were unprotectable.Schweppes Ltd. v. Gibbons ((1905) 22 RPC 601 (HL)) - Lord Halsbury held that overall similarity must deceive a reasonable person. The defendants argued that their branding and website distinguished their goods.S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury Ltd. ((2000) 5 SCC 573) - The Supreme Court noted that trade dress might help a defendant escape passing off (later overruled by Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001 (21) PTC 300 (SC))). The defendants relied on this to highlight their distinct trade dress.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The Court's  reasoning navigated the complex interplay of design originality, passing off principles, and the defendants’ conduct. The court began by acknowledging that the plaintiff’s suit rested on passing off, not design infringement, thus shifting the focus from statutory registration to common law goodwill. Drawing from Mohan Lal and Laxmikant V. Patel, he outlined the “classical trinity” of passing off: goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage.

The judge found that GOODEARTH established substantial goodwill through its long-standing use of the designs since 1996, evidenced by sales figures (e.g., Rs. 10.53 crores for Periyar) and media recognition. He rejected the defendants’ public domain argument, noting that while the raw inspirations (e.g., Mughal paintings) were old, their creative application to lifestyle products was novel and distinctive to GOODEARTH. Citing Gammeter v. Controller of Patents and Designs ((1918) ILR 45 Cal 606) and Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd. (AIR 2008 SC 2520), he held that originality in design law includes new applications of old motifs, bolstering the plaintiff’s claim.

On misrepresentation, The court emphasized Krishna Mehta’s prior employment, inferring mala fide intent from his sudden adoption of GOODEARTH’s design style post-2012. He compared the products visually, finding Falcon, Rose Princess, Serai, and Vrindavan designs “almost same” to the plaintiff’s, likely to confuse consumers, especially online buyers with imperfect recollection (Parle Products). However, he noted dissimilarities in Lotus and Bali Mynah, weakening the plaintiff’s case for those designs.

Addressing damage, the judge inferred irreparable harm to GOODEARTH’s reputation from the defendants’ actions, particularly given Mehta’s sale of designs on third-party websites under his name, potentially linking him to GOODEARTH. He dismissed the defendants’ branding defense, citing Vicco Laboratories and Nova Ball Bearing Industries v. Mico Ball Bearing (19(1981) DLT 20), which prioritized overall similarity over distinct trademarks in passing off cases.

The court balanced the defendants’ arguments, acknowledging that public domain elements cannot be monopolized (Servewell Products), but concluded that the plaintiff’s unique application and goodwill trumped this defense. He also considered Mehta’s ex-employee status, referencing Charan Dass and J.K. Jain v. Ziff-Davies Inc. (2000 (56) DRJ 806), to infer a duty not to exploit prior knowledge unfairly.

Final Decision: The court  made the interim injunction absolute for the designs Falcon, Rose Princess, Serai, and Vrindavan, restraining the defendants from using them in similar businesses due to their near-identical nature and likelihood of confusion. For Periyar, the defendants conceded non-use during arguments, reinforcing the restraint. However, he vacated the injunction for Lotus and Bali Mynah, finding them substantially dissimilar, though he prohibited the defendants from using these titles in similar business contexts to prevent confusion. 

Law Settled in This Case:This judgment reinforced several legal principles: Designs, even if inspired by public domain elements, can be protected under passing off if their creative application generates goodwill and consumer recognition. Ex-employees bear a heightened duty not to misuse knowledge gained during employment, strengthening passing off claims when they replicate former employers’ designs. In passing off, visual similarity and consumer confusion outweigh distinct branding, especially in online markets where physical inspection is absent. The threshold for originality in design application is met when old motifs are newly applied to commercial products, distinguishing them from raw inspiration.

Case Title: Eicher Goodearth Pvt Ltd Vs Krishna Mehta
Date of Order: June 29, 2015
Case No.: CS(OS) 1234/2014
Neutral Citation: 2015(63)PTC444(Del)
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Manmohan Singh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Tuesday, April 1, 2025

Cadila Healthcare Ltd. Vs. Dabur India Ltd.

Commonly used terms describing product attributes cannot be monopolized as a Trademark.

Introduction: The case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Dabur India Ltd., decided by the Delhi High Court, revolves around the claim of exclusive rights over the expression "SUGAR FREE" by Cadila Healthcare Ltd. The dispute primarily concerns whether the term "SUGAR FREE" has acquired distinctiveness as a trademark and whether Dabur’s use of the term in its product "Chyawanprakash" amounts to passing off. The case raises significant questions regarding the intersection of intellectual property rights and generic descriptive terms.

Factual Background: Cadila Healthcare Ltd., a leading pharmaceutical company in India, introduced a low-calorie tabletop sweetener under the brand name “SUGAR FREE” in 1988. Despite the lack of formal trademark registration, the company argued that over the years, the term had acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness, making it uniquely associated with their brand. Dabur India Ltd., a well-known manufacturer of Ayurvedic and food products, introduced a sugar-free variant of its product, "Chyawanprakash." The packaging of this product prominently displayed the term “SUGAR FREE,” which Cadila alleged was an attempt to mislead consumers and exploit its goodwill.

Procedural Background: Cadila Healthcare filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against Dabur India, restraining them from using the term "SUGAR FREE." The suit also included claims for damages, rendition of accounts, and delivery of infringing goods.Along with the plaint, Cadila Healthcare sought an interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed this application in an order dated July 9, 2008. Aggrieved by this decision, Cadila Healthcare filed an appeal (FAO(OS) No. 387/2008) before the Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues Involved in the Case: Whether the term "SUGAR FREE" had acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness in relation to Cadila Healthcare's product?Whether Dabur India's use of the term "SUGAR FREE" constituted passing off?Whether the expression "SUGAR FREE" was merely descriptive or had become a well-known trademark?

Submissions of Cadila Healthcare Ltd.: Argued that "SUGAR FREE" had acquired distinctiveness through long and extensive use since 1988. Cited the case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd., 2008 (36) PTC 168 (Del.), where the court recognized a level of distinctiveness in the term.Contended that Dabur's use of "SUGAR FREE" was deceptive and likely to mislead consumers.Stressed that the Single Judge had overlooked the findings in the Gujarat Cooperative Milk case while ruling in favor of Dabur.

Submissions of Dabur India Ltd. :Claimed that "SUGAR FREE" was a generic and descriptive term, commonly used to indicate a product's sugar-free nature.Argued that their product packaging clearly displayed the "DABUR" trademark and "Chyawanprakash" in a prominent manner, reducing any likelihood of confusion. Submitted that in an appeal against an interlocutory order, the appellate court should refrain from substituting its discretion for that of the Single Judge unless there was an arbitrary or perverse exercise of discretion.

Discussion on Judgments Cited:

  1. Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd., 2008 (36) PTC 168 (Del.)

    • The court had acknowledged that "SUGAR FREE" had acquired some distinctiveness but also recognized that a term commonly used to describe a product’s feature cannot be monopolized.

    • The judgment was relied upon by both parties: Cadila used it to argue for distinctiveness, while Dabur cited its ruling that generic terms cannot be monopolized.

  2. Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Suppl. (1) SCC 727

    • Supreme Court laid down the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with the discretionary orders of a lower court unless it was arbitrary or perverse.

    • Dabur relied on this case to argue that the appeal should be dismissed, as the Single Judge’s order was based on sound reasoning.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench examined the following aspects while upholding the learned Single Judge’s decision:

  1. Descriptive vs. Distinctive Nature of "SUGAR FREE"

    • The court held that "SUGAR FREE" is fundamentally a descriptive term, indicating that a product is free from sugar.

    • Even if it had acquired secondary meaning for Cadila’s product, it was not sufficient to grant an exclusive right to its use.

  2. Comparison of Packaging

    • The court reviewed the packaging of both parties and observed that Dabur prominently displayed its brand name "DABUR" and the product name "Chyawanprakash."

    • "SUGAR FREE" was used in a smaller font, reinforcing that it was merely describing the product's attribute rather than serving as a trademark.

  3. Application of Precedents

    • The court agreed with the Single Judge that the case did not warrant the application of the Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. judgment, as the circumstances were different.

    • Relying on Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., the court concluded that appellate interference was unwarranted.

  4. No Likelihood of Confusion

    • The court ruled that the packaging was distinct enough to prevent consumer confusion.

    • Since Dabur used "SUGAR FREE" in an appropriate context to describe its product rather than as a trademark, there was no case of passing off.

Final Decision

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, affirming the learned Single Judge’s ruling. The court reiterated that:

  • "SUGAR FREE" could not be monopolized by any single company.

  • Dabur’s packaging was sufficiently distinctive.

  • There was no prima facie case of passing off.

Law Settled in This Case

  1. Generic and Descriptive Terms Cannot be Exclusively Claimed as Trademarks

    • The judgment reinforces the principle that commonly used terms describing product attributes cannot be monopolized.

  2. Passing Off Requires Likelihood of Confusion

    • A successful claim of passing off necessitates proof that consumers are misled into believing the defendant's product originates from the plaintiff.

  3. Limited Scope of Appellate Intervention in Interim Orders

    • The court reaffirmed that appellate courts should not interfere with discretionary interim orders unless there is arbitrariness or perversity.



Case Title: Cadila Healthcare Ltd. Vs. Dabur India Ltd.
Date of Order: September 29, 2010
Case No.: FAO (OS) 387/2008
Neutral Citation: 2008:DHC:2662-DB
Court: High Court of Delhi
Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mool Chand Garg


Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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