Tuesday, April 29, 2025

Annikki GMBH Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs

Introduction:
This case pertains to an appeal filed by Annikki GMBH against the rejection of their Indian Patent Application No. 467/CHENP/2012 titled “Process for the Production of Carbohydrate Cleavage Products from a Lignocellulosic Material” by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs. The High Court of Madras adjudicated the matter under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970.

Factual Background and Procedural History:
Following the filing of the patent application, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) in 2017, citing prior art documents D1 to D6 and raising objections related to novelty and inventive step. Annikki GMBH responded with amended claims and written submissions. Despite a hearing in July 2018 and further representations, the application was rejected on 10.12.2019, leading to the current appeal.

Appellant’s Contentions:
Annikki argued that the claimed invention presents a non-fermentative process for producing xylitol, which distinguishes it from the cited prior art. The counsel highlighted specific technical advantages such as selective lignin degradation, low energy use, and absence of fermentation. The appellant contended that prior art D5, which the Controller heavily relied upon, involves fermentation, contrary to the conclusion drawn. The appellant also argued that objections under Section 3(d) were inapplicable as the process was not merely a known process and that the objections raised in the final decision were not previously communicated.

Respondent’s Contentions:
The Controller maintained that the invention lacked inventive step and fell within the scope of Section 3(d), asserting that the combination of processes from prior arts D1-D5 rendered the invention obvious. The Controller also concluded that the invention did not result in enhanced efficacy or a new product or reactant.

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning:
The Court critically analyzed the findings of the Controller, especially the application of Section 3(d). It held that combining two or more known processes does not amount to a “known process” under Section 3(d). Furthermore, it found that the conclusion regarding D5 being a non-fermentative process was erroneous, as D5 clearly describes fermentation. The Court also emphasized that conclusions based on general knowledge must be substantiated by source material. It found the treatment of prior art D2 and the overall reasoning as flawed and lacking evidentiary support.

Final Decision:
The High Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for reconsideration by a different officer, requiring a fresh, reasoned decision to be made within four months. The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the patent application.

Case Title: Annikki GMBH vs. Controller of Patents and Designs
Date of Order: 24 April 2025
Case No.: (T)CMA(PT) No.70 of 2023 (OA/19/2020/PT/CHN)
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Zine Davidoff S.A. Vs. Union of India

Background and Dispute
The petitioner, M/s Zine Davidoff S.A., challenged an order passed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) on 9 March 2012, which removed its registered trademark ‘DAVIDOFF’ (No. 454875 in Class 25) from the Register. The basis for removal was the alleged failure to renew the mark within the statutory deadline, thus treating it as lapsed. The petition was brought before the Delhi High Court seeking restoration of the mark.

Timeline of Renewal Attempts
The original trademark application was filed in May 1986 and was valid until May 1993. However, the registration certificate was issued only in December 1997. Upon receipt, the petitioner applied for renewal in June 1998, which was within the statutorily allowed six-month window post-expiry. A second renewal was sought in April 2001, covering the period from 2000 to 2007. Therefore, the petitioner argued that there was no break in renewal and that the trademark never actually lapsed.

Procedural Irregularity by Trademark Registry
The petitioner argued that the mandatory notice under Form O3—as required by Section 25 of the Trade Marks Act, 1958 and Rule 64 of the Trade Marks Rules, 1959—was never issued prior to the removal of the trademark from the Register. The High Court had previously directed the Trademark Registry to confirm issuance of the notice. An affidavit filed by the Registry later admitted that no records of issuing such a notice were available.

Legal Precedents and High Court's Reasoning
The petitioner relied on several judgments, including Union of India v. Malhotra Book Depot, CIPLA Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, and Epsilon Publishing House v. Union of India, which established that failure of the Trademark Registry to follow due procedure should not prejudice the trademark proprietor. The High Court noted that it had followed this line of reasoning in multiple recent cases, where it directed restoration of marks removed without due process.

Court’s Findings and Directions
The Delhi High Court found that the IPAB’s decision did not take into account the evolving legal position, particularly regarding the mandatory nature of issuing Form O3 notices. In the absence of any proof that such a notice was issued, the petitioner could not be penalized. Therefore, the court directed that the trademark ‘DAVIDOFF’ be restored to its original position in the Register and that the necessary database corrections be made by the Trademark Office.

Conclusion
The judgment emphasized that procedural lapses by the Trademark Registry cannot result in loss of rights for a diligent trademark owner. It reaffirmed the obligation of authorities to follow statutory processes before removing a registered mark.

Case Details
Case Title: Zine Davidoff S.A. Vs. Union of India and Anr.
Date of Order: 22 April 2025
Case No.: W.P.(C)-IPD 57/2021
Neutral Citation: DHC:2025:2991
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The Coca-Cola Company Vs. The Controller of Patents

Background and Subject Patent Application
The Coca-Cola Company filed a patent application (No. 1771/DELNP/2010) for a next-generation beverage dispenser capable of offering customized beverages to consumers. This invention aimed to overcome the limitations of traditional dispensers by enabling greater variety and personalization using consumer identification through wireless technology and a graphical user interface (GUI).

Rejection by the Patent Office
The Indian Patent Office refused the application via order dated 29 January 2020, primarily under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970. The rejection cited a lack of inventive step as defined under Section 2(1)(ja), referencing several prior art documents (D1 through D5) which allegedly disclosed similar features.

Objections Raised and Applicant’s Response
Initial objections raised in the First Examination Report (FER) included lack of novelty and inventive step, exclusion under Section 3(k) (computer programs), and insufficient disclosure. Coca-Cola responded in detail and submitted written arguments distinguishing its invention from the cited prior art. A hearing was held, followed by written submissions. Despite this, the Controller reiterated the lack of inventive step in the final order, asserting the invention was obvious in light of prior art.

Court’s Analysis and Findings
Justice Amit Bansal of the Delhi High Court found the Controller’s order cryptic and lacking in reasoning. The judgment criticized the Patent Office for failing to examine and discuss Coca-Cola’s detailed responses and for not applying the mandatory three-pronged analysis: (i) the invention disclosed in prior art, (ii) the invention in the current application, and (iii) why the current invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the art. This failure violated the standard laid out in precedent including the Agriboard case.

Remand and Direction to Patent Office
The High Court set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter to the Patent Office for fresh consideration. It directed that a reasoned order must be passed after giving Coca-Cola an opportunity for another hearing and ensuring that all its submissions are addressed. The court reiterated the duty of the Patent Office to pass speaking and reasoned orders, especially in matters involving technical analysis under patent law.

Conclusion
The court did not grant the patent but ensured procedural fairness by requiring the Patent Office to reconsider the application properly. It reaffirmed judicial expectations for administrative authorities to offer detailed reasoning when rejecting patent applications, especially when applicants have made substantive technical submissions.

Case Details
Case Title: The Coca-Cola Company Vs. The Controller of Patents & Anr.
Date of Order: 17 April 2025
Case No.: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 342/2022
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2947
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Coty Germany GMBH Vs. Xeryus Retail Private Limited

Background and Plaintiff’s Rights
The plaintiff, Coty Germany GmbH, a globally reputed company in the fragrance industry, holds registered trademarks in India for several well-known brands including “Calvin Klein,” “CK,” “CK One,” “Obsession,” “Eternity,” and “Euphoria.” These trademarks are used in relation to a wide range of perfumes and related goods, with stylized representations forming original artistic works protected under copyright law. Coty also operates the website www.calvinklein.com to promote its products.

Allegations Against the Defendants
Coty alleged that the defendants—Xeryus Retail Private Limited and another entity—were infringing its trademarks by selling Coty’s tester perfumes through unauthorized platforms such as www.perfumery.co.in and www.unboxed.in. These testers, intended only for sampling and not for commercial sale, were being marketed deceptively as retail products. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants were using marks identical or deceptively similar to Coty’s registered trademarks, thereby indulging in unfair trade practices and passing off their goods as those of Coty’s.

Legal Proceedings and Default by Defendants
The defendants initially filed written statements, which were later struck off due to non-compliance. Subsequently, they stopped appearing in the matter and were proceeded ex parte. Given the defendants' failure to respond, Coty filed an application under Order XIII-A of the CPC (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) seeking a summary judgment based on admitted facts and unrebutted evidence.

Court’s Findings and Reasoning
The court accepted Coty's claims, noting that the use of registered trademarks by the defendants for unauthorized commercial purposes, including selling tester products, amounted to trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violation. Since the defendants failed to appear or contest the allegations, the assertions in the plaint were deemed admitted. The court also found that the defendants’ conduct involved bad faith and constituted an unethical business practice.

Relief Granted
The court granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the infringing marks or selling tester perfumes as retail products. The court also ordered delivery of infringing goods, disclosure of supply chains, and awarded costs of ₹1,00,000 to Coty, payable by the defendants within four weeks. Other monetary claims like damages and rendition of accounts were not adjudicated in this order.

Conclusion
The decision underscores the seriousness of trademark and copyright violations, especially in the context of deceptive online sales, and reinforces the legal remedies available to brand owners against rogue sellers who misrepresent or misuse their brand identity.

Case Details
Case Title: Coty Germany GMBH Vs. Xeryus Retail Private Limited and Another
Date of Order: July 21, 2023
Case No.: CS(COMM) 1298/2018 
Neutral Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4273
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

San Nutrition Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Arpit Mangal

Introduction and Context
This case concerns the rising influence of social media influencers in India and their dual role as brand promoters and consumer watchdogs. The lawsuit arises from the tension between influencers’ freedom of expression and the rights of businesses to protect their reputation. San Nutrition Pvt. Ltd. (the plaintiff), a company selling nutraceutical products under the trademark "DC DOCTOR’S CHOICE," has filed a suit for permanent injunction against several influencers, alleging defamation, trademark infringement, product disparagement, and unfair trade practices through videos posted on YouTube and Instagram.

Plaintiff’s Allegations
San Nutrition claims that its ISO PRO whey protein product was wrongly targeted in videos by the defendants, who are influencers. These videos allegedly misrepresented the nutritional content of the product using questionable testing methods and thereby misled consumers. The plaintiff contends that the videos have caused a significant drop in sales and have harmed the brand’s reputation. The plaintiff also alleges that these influencers have a vested interest in promoting rival brands and violated ASCI (Advertising Standards Council of India) guidelines by failing to disclose sponsorships.

Defendant No.1’s Defense (Arpit Mangal)
The defendant claimed to have conducted independent lab tests on the plaintiff’s products, which allegedly revealed discrepancies in the stated and actual protein content. Asserting his right to freedom of speech, he maintained that his videos served public interest and were based on scientific data from accredited labs. He invoked the defenses of truth and fair comment, arguing his intention was to inform the public about potential quality issues in the fitness supplement industry.

Legal Issues and Applications
Two applications were central:

  1. Plaintiff's request for interim injunction (I.A. 29793/2024) to restrain the publication of the allegedly defamatory content.

  2. Defendant’s application (I.A. 36110/2024) under Order VII Rule 10 and 11 CPC to reject/return the plaint, arguing the case was barred by limitation and lacked jurisdiction.

Court's Ruling on Maintainability
The court rejected the defendant’s plea that the suit was time-barred, holding that since the defamatory content remained accessible online, each view constituted fresh publication, thereby creating a continuing cause of action. It also ruled that the case fell within the ambit of a commercial dispute under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 due to its intellectual property and economic implications.

Interim Injunction and Legal Principles
The court applied principles from Indian and foreign jurisprudence, notably the "Bonnard v. Perryman" rule, which discourages pre-trial injunctions in defamation suits unless the defense is bound to fail. It found that since the defendant had produced lab reports and the plaintiff failed to submit counter-reports, the defense of truth could not be dismissed summarily.

Balancing Fundamental Rights
The court emphasized the need to balance Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech), Article 21 (right to reputation), and the public’s right to know. It recognized that influencer speech could be "commercial" if it was revenue-driven or affiliated with competing brands, but also acknowledged the growing legitimacy of critical content in the digital age.

Final Decision on Interim Relief
The court denied the plaintiff’s request for interim injunction, holding that the defendant had a credible defense based on truth and fair comment supported by lab evidence. However, it left open the possibility for the plaintiff to prove its claims during the trial.

Conclusion
The court reiterated that social media criticism backed by evidence, even if commercially motivated, does not automatically amount to defamation or trademark infringement. Businesses must be prepared to withstand scrutiny, especially when no prima facie case of malice or falsity is proven. The matter will proceed to full trial for detailed adjudication.

Case Details
Case Title: San Nutrition Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Arpit Mangal & Ors.
Date of Order: 28 April 2025
Case No.: CS(COMM) 420/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2973
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma:Obiter of High Court is not binding

Introduction: In a significant reaffirmation of judicial discipline and statutory interpretation, the Delhi High Court in Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma resolved a pressing question of precedent: can obiter dicta—especially those made without reasoning—bind a coordinate bench of the same High Court? The question emerged from a trademark dispute, but its implications stretch far into how Indian courts must treat passing judicial observations when they conflict with established law.

Factual Background:The petitioner, Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., has been engaged in manufacturing electrical goods under the trademark "KUNDAN" and "KUNDAN CAB" since 1975 through its predecessor-in-interest. The respondent, Lakha Ram Sharma, trading as Kundan Cable India, also deals in similar electrical products using the trademarks "KUNDAN" and "KUNDAN CABLE." This overlap in trademarks led to a series of legal battles dating back to the 1990s, with both parties initiating various suits relating to trademark infringement and passing off, and in one instance, copyright infringement.

These suits included TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, 932/2016 and 931/2016, which were consolidated for the purpose of trial. In 2018, the Trial Court declined to grant interim injunctions in favor of the petitioner. Subsequently, by an order dated 30 May 2022, the Trial Court allowed the suits to proceed solely on the issue of passing off, while staying proceedings related to infringement, citing the precedents in Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del) (DB) and J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Ltd., 2007 (75) PTC 44 (Del).

In January 2025, the respondent sought a stay of the entire proceedings—including those for passing off—under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, citing a stray reference to passing off in paragraph 44 of the Division Bench judgment in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652. The Trial Court allowed this request and stayed all proceedings except the suit under the Copyright Act. This order prompted the petitioner to approach the High Court once again.

Submissions of the Parties: Petitioner, submitted that the reference to "passing off" in Amrish Aggarwal was a non-binding obiter dicta, made without any analysis, and therefore could not displace established precedent. He emphasized that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act applies only to suits for infringement, not to actions for passing off, which derive from common law principles and remain independent of trademark registration. The Petitioner relied on authoritative decisions such as Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405, State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 647, and Gudri v. Ram Kishun, 1983 SCC OnLine All 415: AIR 1984 All 5, to argue that judicial observations made in passing, especially where no issue was raised or decided, do not create binding law.

The respondent, countered that paragraph 44 of the Division Bench’s ruling in Amrish Aggarwal explicitly referred to passing off claims being subject to stay, and therefore the Trial Court was justified in relying on it. Respondent relied on Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman, 2002 (2) Mah LJ 115, and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957, to assert that even the obiter dicta of a larger bench ought to be followed by a smaller one.

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning:Delhi High Court delivered a meticulous opinion that began by contextualizing the Division Bench’s judgment in Amrish Aggarwal. The core issue in that case was whether rectification proceedings pending after the abolition of the IPAB under the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, should compel the stay of infringement suits under Section 124. The High Court held they should. However, a reference to “passing off” appeared in paragraph 44 of the judgment, without any analysis or argument on that issue. Justice Bansal examined this in light of the precedential authority of Puma Stationer, where the Division Bench had unambiguously held that only infringement actions must be stayed pending rectification, while passing off claims can proceed.

It was noted that Amrish Aggarwal did not overrule Puma Stationer, nor did it engage with the distinction between infringement and passing off. The reference to passing off, in the absence of any legal reasoning, was determined to be a passing comment—not binding precedent. Justice Bansal also emphasized the clear language of Section 124, which applies only to suits for infringement. Moreover, Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 explicitly preserves the right to bring a passing off action irrespective of trademark registration.

In discussing whether the obiter dicta of a High Court Division Bench binds a coordinate or subordinate bench, the Court referred to the Constitution Bench ruling in Mohinder Singh Gill, which clarified that a precedent is binding only for the proposition of law that it actually decides. In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, the Supreme Court similarly held that stray observations or casual expressions in a judgment are not binding authority. The judgment in Gudri v. Ram Kishun was invoked to show that when a larger bench makes an observation without actually considering or deciding the issue, it is not binding on a later bench that must adjudicate the issue directly.

The Court distinguished Crocs Inc. and Naseemunisa Begum, holding that those judgments dealt with issues that were squarely raised and decided, whereas in the present case, the issue of stay of passing off suits was not even under consideration in Amrish Aggarwal.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the Trial Court’s order dated 18 January 2025, which had stayed all proceedings including those concerning passing off. It held that the reference to passing off in Amrish Aggarwal was an inadvertent obiter dicta, lacking any binding force. The Court directed that the consolidated suits, particularly those involving passing off, must proceed to trial without delay.

Law Declared:This judgment firmly establishes that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 applies only to suits for infringement and does not affect the trial of passing off actions. It reaffirms that passing off is a common law remedy not dependent on trademark registration. Most significantly, it underscores the principle that obiter dicta—especially those made without analysis or contextual necessity—do not create binding precedent, even when made by a larger bench of the same court.

Case Title: Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma , Date of Order: 27th March 2025,Case No.: CM(M)-IPD 5/2025 ,Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2322,Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi,Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, Patent and Trademark Attorney, Delhi High Court

Monday, April 28, 2025

Uto Nederland B.V. Vs Tilaknagar Industries Ltd.

Introduction
The case of Uto Nederland B.V. vs Tilaknagar Industries Ltd. arose from a trademark dispute involving alleged infringement and misuse of marks such as "Mansion House" and "Savoy Club" originally licensed by the appellants to the respondent. The primary legal issue centered around whether orders on temporary injunctions are discretionary in nature or constitute prima facie adjudications, thereby affecting the scope of appellate review.

Factual Background
Uto Nederland B.V., a Dutch company engaged in liquor exports, entered into a licensing agreement in 1983 with Tilaknagar Industries Ltd., permitting use of its trademarks in India. The appellants later alleged that the respondents dishonestly attempted to register the same trademarks in India and filed a suit for infringement and passing off. An application for interim injunction was dismissed by the trial court in 2011, prompting an appeal in 2012.

Legal Controversy and Reference
The Division Bench, while hearing the appeal, identified conflicting judicial views within the Bombay High Court regarding the nature of orders on temporary injunctions—whether they are discretionary decisions or amount to prima facie adjudication. The court found inconsistency between its previous rulings in Colgate Palmolive v. Anchor Health, which treated injunction orders as discretionary, and other rulings like Parksons Cartamundi and Goldmines Telefilms, which treated them as adjudicatory. Hence, the matter was referred to a larger bench.

Submissions by Parties
The appellants argued that the trial court's order involved prima facie determination and not mere discretion, thereby allowing a wider scope for appellate interference. The respondents contended that injunctions are discretionary reliefs decided based on established principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm, and appellate review should be limited unless discretion was exercised perversely or arbitrarily.

Judicial Analysis
The Court analyzed the “trinity test” for injunctions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. It reviewed leading judgments from Indian and English law, including Wander Ltd. v. Antox India, Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, and American Cynamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., emphasizing that the court at the interim stage does not conclusively decide merits but only ensures that the claim is serious and not frivolous.

Scope of Appeal in Injunction Orders
The Court reaffirmed the principle in Wander Ltd. that appellate courts should not substitute the trial court’s discretion unless the order is arbitrary, capricious, or against settled legal principles. It rejected the view taken in Parksons Cartamundi and Goldmines Telefilms that interim injunction orders are not discretionary. It concluded that the discretion of trial courts must be respected unless shown to be perversely or unreasonably exercised.

Final Decision on Reference
Answering the reference, the larger bench held that the decision in Colgate Palmolive correctly represents the law. It affirmed that orders on temporary injunctions are discretionary, and their appellate review is limited to examining whether that discretion was exercised properly. The contrary decisions relying on Hiralal Prabhudas and National Chemicals, which addressed Registrar decisions under trademark law, were held irrelevant in the context of CPC-based injunction appeals.

Case Title: Uto Nederland B.V. & Anr. Vs Tilaknagar Industries Ltd.
Date of Order: 28 April 2025
Case No.: Appeal No. 66 of 2012
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:7110-DB
Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Original Side)
Name of Hon'ble Judges: Chief Justice Alok Aradhe, Justice M. S. Karnik, Justice Shyam C. Chandak

Curewin Hylico Pharma Pvt. Ltd. Vs Curewin Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction
The case concerns a commercial dispute between Curewin Hylico Pharma Pvt. Ltd. (petitioner/defendant) and Curewin Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (respondent/plaintiff), primarily involving issues of delay in filing a written statement, proper institution of suit, and payment of appropriate court fees under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and CPC provisions.

Factual Background
The plaintiff filed a commercial suit in 2021 against the defendant for copyright infringement relating to the artistic work on a product called "ENERZY." The plaintiff initially paid a nominal court fee with an undertaking to pay the full amount later.

Procedural History
The petitioner challenged the suit under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for undervaluation and insufficient court fee. The trial court upheld the objection and directed the plaintiff to deposit the ad valorem court fee. The plaintiff amended the plaint and deposited the requisite court fee in May 2024. Subsequently, the trial court struck off the petitioner’s right to file a written statement, accepting the plaintiff’s application under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC, citing expiry of 120 days from service of summons.

Legal Issues

1. Whether the suit could be treated as properly instituted before payment of ad valorem court fee.


2. Whether the 120-day limitation for filing a written statement in a commercial suit begins from the date of service of summons or from the date of proper institution upon payment of the full court fee.


3. Whether striking off the defence under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC was justified.

Submissions
The petitioner argued that the suit was properly instituted only after payment of the correct court fee, and thus the 120-day timeline to file the written statement should begin from that date. The plaintiff contended that the deadline is fixed and not extendable under commercial suit procedure.

Judicial Reasoning
The High Court held that a commercial suit is not duly instituted until proper court fees are paid and pre-institution mediation (if not exempted) is complied with. Relying on precedents and provisions of the Commercial Courts Act and CPC, the Court ruled that in such a scenario, the countdown for filing a written statement starts only after proper institution of the suit. Since the petitioner filed the written statement within 120 days of the payment of full court fees, the defence could not have been struck off.

Final Decision
The High Court allowed the petition, set aside the Commercial Court's order dated 07.11.2024, and restored the petitioner’s right to file a written statement.

Case Title: Curewin Hylico Pharma Pvt. Ltd. Vs Curewin Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. and Others
Date of Order: 22 April 2025
Case No.: Misc. Petition No. 6965 of 2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:MPHC-IND:10912
Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench
Hon'ble Judges: Justice Vivek Rusia and Justice Gajendra Singh

L’Oréal S.A. Vs. Registrar of Trademarks

Introduction
This case involves an appeal filed by L’Oréal S.A. under Section 91(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the removal of its registered trademark “GARNIER SKIN NATURALS” (Registration No. 1021740) from the trademark register.

Appellant’s Argument
L’Oréal argued that it had been using the mark since 2001 and had acquired ownership after the merger of Laboratoire Garnier Et Cie with L’Oréal. The registration was valid till June 2011, and L’Oréal had applied to be recorded as the subsequent proprietor. During a random website check in 2017, they found the mark listed for removal due to non-renewal. Although they filed an interlocutory petition for restoration in January 2018, the Registrar proceeded to remove the mark without permitting fee deposit. L’Oréal claimed it never received the mandatory renewal notice under Section 25(3).

Respondent’s Argument
The Registrar produced a copy of the renewal notice allegedly sent on 6th April 2011 and maintained that removal was justified as L’Oréal did not renew the mark on time.

Court’s Analysis and Decision
The Court noted that although the Registrar claimed to have sent the notice, no proof of dispatch was provided. L’Oréal’s denial of receipt was consistent and recorded earlier in the interlocutory petition. Since the removal happened much later in 2019 and without clear evidence of notice, the Court found the removal unsustainable.

Conclusion
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the removal order, and directed restoration and renewal of the trademark, instructing L’Oréal to deposit the necessary fee within two weeks.

Case Title: L’Oréal S.A. Vs. Registrar of Trademarks
Date of Order: 9th December, 2022
Case No.: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 30/2021
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Narula

Hari Chand Shri Gopal Vs. Chaurasia Tobacco Products

Introduction
The case concerns a trademark and copyright infringement dispute where the plaintiff, M/s Hari Chand Shri Gopal, sought a permanent injunction against Chaurasia Tobacco Products for using deceptively similar branding on their tobacco products.

Plaintiff’s Case
The plaintiff, engaged in the manufacture and sale of flavoured chewing tobacco under the mark ‘GOPAL’, has been using the trademark since 1950 and owns multiple registrations under Class 34. Their branding prominently features the ‘Lord Krishna’ device along with distinct packaging elements protected under copyright law. The plaintiff claimed substantial goodwill and reputation due to consistent sales and promotional activities.

Defendant’s Case
The defendant, operating under the proprietorship of Mr. Rajesh Kumar Chaurasiya, contended that 'GOPAL' is a common name associated with Lord Krishna and therefore generic. They argued that they adopted 'RAJESH GOPAL 65' in good faith and had been using it openly since September 2022.

Proceedings
The Court initially granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the mark ‘GOPAL 65’ along with the ‘Lord Shiva’ device. A Local Commissioner was appointed who seized 592 cartons of infringing products from the defendant's premises. Despite opportunities, the defendant failed to actively contest the suit and was proceeded against ex parte.

Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Court held that the plaintiff had proven its rights over the trademarks and copyrights. The defendant's packaging and branding were found to be deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s, involving identical use of Hindu deity imagery, similar colour combinations, and layout design. The Court observed that the defendant unfairly leveraged the plaintiff’s established goodwill, leading to a clear case of infringement and passing off.

Relief Granted
The Court awarded a decree of permanent injunction against the defendant and granted damages and costs amounting to ₹5,00,000 to the plaintiff. It also accounted for the expenses incurred by the plaintiff on court fees and the local commissioner's fees.

Case Title: Hari Chand Shri Gopal Vs. Chaurasia Tobacco Products
Date of Order: 15th April, 2025
Case No.: CS(COMM) 895/2022
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2783
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

AstraZeneca AB Vs. P. Kumar

Introduction

In the high-stakes world of pharmaceutical patents, where innovation meets commerce, disputes over intellectual property rights often determine access to life-saving drugs. The case of AstraZeneca AB & Ors. v. P. Kumar & Anr., along with related suits against T. Rao & Anr. and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., decided by the Delhi High Court on August 8, 2019, epitomizes such a battle. At its core, this litigation involves AstraZeneca’s attempt to protect its patents for TICAGRELOR, a critical antiplatelet drug marketed as BRILINTA, against alleged infringement by Indian generic manufacturers Micro Labs Ltd., Natco Pharma Ltd., and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. The plaintiffs sought interim injunctions to restrain the defendants from launching generic versions, claiming infringement of three patents: IN 209907 (Species Patent), IN 247984 (Polymorph Patent), and IN 272674 (Formulation Patent). The defendants countered with a robust challenge, alleging that TICAGRELOR was disclosed in an expired genus patent (IN 241229), rendering the suit patents invalid due to anticipation, lack of inventive step, and evergreening under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970. This case study delves into the intricate factual and legal landscape, the parties’ submissions, judicial precedents, and the court’s reasoning, culminating in a decision that underscores the vulnerability of pharmaceutical patents to credible challenges and the balance between innovation and public access to affordable medicine.

Detailed Factual Background

AstraZeneca AB, a Swedish pharmaceutical giant, along with its affiliates, holds three Indian patents related to TICAGRELOR, an antiplatelet drug used to prevent thrombotic events in patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS), such as heart attacks or strokes. TICAGRELOR, with the international non-proprietary name (INN) and IUPAC designation (1S,2S,3R,5S)-3-[7-[(1R,2S)-2-(3,4-Difluorophenyl)cyclopropylamino]-5-(propylthio)-3H-[1,2,3]triazolo[4,5-d]pyrimidin-3-yl]-5-(2-hydroxyethoxy)cyclopentane-1,2-diol, has an empirical formula of C23H28F2N6O4S and a molecular weight of 522.57. The drug, marketed globally as BRILINTA and in India as BRILINTA and AXCER, received regulatory approval in India in May 2012 and was commercially launched in October 2012 at ₹50 per tablet. TICAGRELOR’s significance lies in its ability to reduce the risk of cardiovascular events in ACS patients, addressing a gap where one in three patients previously faced death, repeat myocardial infarction, or re-hospitalization within six months despite existing treatments.

The three patents at issue are: IN 209907 (Species Patent), granted on September 11, 2007, covering TICAGRELOR as a specific compound within a Markush formula and detailing its synthesis process; IN 247984 (Polymorph Patent), covering four crystalline forms of TICAGRELOR; and IN 272674 (Formulation Patent), covering TICAGRELOR’s pharmaceutical composition. AstraZeneca asserted that these patents, valid and subsisting, grant exclusive rights under Section 48 of the Patents Act to prevent others from making, using, selling, or importing TICAGRELOR or its claimed forms. The Species Patent, published in 2005, faced no pre-grant or post-grant oppositions, though Micro Labs filed a revocation petition in 2015, pending before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).

The defendants—Micro Labs Ltd., Natco Pharma Ltd., and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.—are Indian generic manufacturers planning to launch TICAGRELOR under names like BIGRELOR, an unnamed generic, and TICAFLO, respectively. AstraZeneca received market intelligence in March and April 2018 indicating imminent launches by Micro Labs (early April 2018) and Natco (third week of April 2018), with Micro Labs allegedly promoting to doctors and preparing packaging. For Dr. Reddy’s, AstraZeneca learned in July 2018 of plans for a full commercial launch, supported by a manufacturing license and offers to business partners. The defendants denied current commercialization but admitted to preparatory activities, with Dr. Reddy’s actively selling TICAFLO.

A critical contention was the defendants’ reliance on an expired genus patent, IN 241229 (granted June 24, 2010, expired July 14, 2018), which they claimed disclosed TICAGRELOR. AstraZeneca admitted IN 229 generically covered TICAGRELOR among 150 quintillion (1.5 × 10^20) compounds but argued it lacked specific disclosure, requiring the inventive step of IN 907 to isolate TICAGRELOR. The defendants cited AstraZeneca’s Form 27 filings, which reported BRILINTA and AXCER sales under IN 229, and U.S. litigation asserting infringement of US 910 (IN 229’s equivalent) by TICAGRELOR generics, as admissions of disclosure. They further alleged evergreening, claiming the suit patents extended IN 229’s monopoly without enhanced therapeutic efficacy, violating Section 3(d). Additional defenses included invalidity due to anticipation, obviousness, and non-compliance with Section 8’s disclosure requirements, citing foreign patent revocations.

Detailed Procedural Background

AstraZeneca filed three suits in the Delhi High Court: CS(COMM) 749/2018 against P. Kumar and Micro Labs Ltd., CS(COMM) 792/2018 against T. Rao and Natco Pharma Ltd., and CS(COMM) 1023/2018 against Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. Each suit sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing IN 907, IN 984, and IN 674 by marketing TICAGRELOR generics, alongside damages and other reliefs. Concurrently, AstraZeneca filed interim injunction applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: IA No. 3986/2018 in CS(COMM) 749/2018, IA No. 4771/2018 in CS(COMM) 792/2018, and IA No. 9332/2018 in CS(COMM) 1023/2018. Micro Labs also filed IA No. 5096/2018 under Order 39 Rule 4 to vacate the interim order in CS(COMM) 749/2018.

The court granted ex parte interim injunctions: on March 22, 2018, in CS(COMM) 749/2018, restraining Micro Labs from selling TICAGRELOR; on April 23, 2018, in CS(COMM) 792/2018, noting Natco’s launch during pendency; and on July 18, 2018, in CS(COMM) 1023/2018 against Dr. Reddy’s. The defendants filed written statements, with Natco and Micro Labs also lodging counter-claims for revocation of the suit patents, citing grounds under Section 64, including anticipation by IN 229, lack of inventive step, and Section 3(d) violations. Extensive hearings before Justice Jayant Nath involved detailed submissions, with AstraZeneca seeking to confirm the injunctions and the defendants urging their vacation based on the patents’ vulnerability.

Issues Involved in the Case

The primary issue was whether AstraZeneca was entitled to interim injunctions to restrain the defendants from marketing TICAGRELOR generics, alleging infringement of IN 907, IN 984, and IN 674. This hinged on whether the defendants raised a credible challenge to the patents’ validity, rendering them vulnerable under Section 64 of the Patents Act. Sub-issues included whether TICAGRELOR was disclosed in the expired IN 229, negating novelty and inventive step under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), and (k); whether the suit patents constituted evergreening under Section 3(d) by lacking enhanced therapeutic efficacy; and whether AstraZeneca’s non-disclosure of foreign patent revocations violated Section 8, warranting revocation under Section 64(1)(m). The court also considered whether AstraZeneca’s Form 27 filings and U.S. litigation constituted admissions that IN 229 disclosed TICAGRELOR, and whether the balance of convenience and irreparable harm favored maintaining the injunctions.

Detailed Submission of Parties

AstraZeneca argued that the suit patents were valid, subsisting, and infringed by the defendants’ planned or actual TICAGRELOR sales. They asserted that IN 907 specifically claimed TICAGRELOR, selected from 150 quintillion compounds in IN 229’s Markush formula, requiring an inventive step unachievable by a skilled artisan based on IN 229’s generic disclosure. They denied anticipation, arguing IN 229’s publication post-dated IN 907’s priority date (December 4, 1998 vs. February 2, 1999), and lacked specific TICAGRELOR disclosure. On prior claiming under Section 13(1)(b), they contended IN 229’s broad claims did not individually claim TICAGRELOR. Regarding Section 3(d), AstraZeneca argued TICAGRELOR was not a derivative of a known IN 229 compound, and even if applicable, Dr. Robert Riley’s affidavit (filed by Dr. Reddy’s) demonstrated TICAGRELOR’s superior metabolic stability and bioavailability. They addressed Section 8, admitting revocations of IN 907 and IN 984 equivalents in China and Europe but noting pending appeals with automatic stays and grants in 57, 55, and 60 countries for IN 907, IN 984, and IN 674, respectively, claiming substantial compliance. AstraZeneca refuted evergreening, arguing Form 27 filings showed IN 229 was worked through TICAGRELOR post-isolation via IN 907, not that IN 229 disclosed it, and U.S. litigation aligned with broader U.S. infringement standards. They emphasized servicing 600,000 patients annually, justifying injunctions to protect their market and public interest.

The defendants—Micro Labs, Natco, and Dr. Reddy’s—presented largely aligned defenses, asserting the suit patents’ invalidity. They argued IN 229 disclosed TICAGRELOR through claims 1, 2–7, and substitutions detailed in its specification, supported by AstraZeneca’s Form 27 filings listing BRILINTA and AXCER under IN 229 and U.S. litigation claiming US 910 (IN 229 equivalent) covered TICAGRELOR. They alleged evergreening, claiming the suit patents extended IN 229’s monopoly post-expiry (July 14, 2018) without inventive step or enhanced efficacy under Section 3(d), as the plaint lacked efficacy pleadings. They invoked Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), and (k), arguing IN 907 was anticipated by IN 229, obvious to a skilled artisan, and not an invention. On Section 8, they highlighted suppressed revocations of IN 907 in China, IN 984 in Europe, China, and South Korea, and IN 674’s refusal in China, alleging non-compliance. Micro Labs noted its 2015 IPAB revocation petitions as pre-existing challenges, while Natco criticized AstraZeneca’s impleadment of individuals (P. Kumar, T. Rao) to obscure corporate defendants. Dr. Reddy’s emphasized TICAFLO’s reliance on the public-domain IN 229 and cited Novartis AG v. UOI to reject the coverage-disclosure dichotomy. The defendants argued generics at ₹20 per tablet (vs. ₹50 for BRILINTA) served public interest, and any harm to AstraZeneca was compensable, tilting the balance of convenience against injunctions.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

AstraZeneca relied on Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co. Ltd., [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat), where the UK High Court held that a genus patent’s general formula does not destroy novelty of a specific compound unless disclosed in individualized form, supporting their claim that IN 229’s broad Markush formula did not disclose TICAGRELOR. In Eli Lilly & Company Ltd. v. Apotex Pty Ltd., [2013] FCA 214, the Federal Court of Australia rejected the notion that a skilled artisan could easily derive a specific compound (olanzapine) from a genus patent’s vast compound class, reinforcing AstraZeneca’s argument against obviousness. Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265, from the Supreme Court of Canada, upheld selection patents as encouraging improvements over genus patents, countering evergreening concerns by noting selection patents may be sought by third parties and apply beyond pharmaceuticals.

The defendants heavily relied on Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between patent coverage and disclosure, holding that a patent’s monopoly depends on enabling disclosure, not broad claims. The court’s disapproval of a coverage-disclosure gap undermined AstraZeneca’s claim that IN 229 covered but did not disclose TICAGRELOR, and its strict interpretation of Section 3(d) supported the defendants’ evergreening argument. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del), a Delhi High Court Division Bench decision, established that a credible challenge to patent validity, especially under Section 3(d), justifies denying interim injunctions, bolstering the defendants’ case. Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, AIR 1982 SC 1444, clarified that novelty and inventive step are mixed questions of law and fact, requiring expert evidence, supporting the defendants’ call for trial. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 223 (2015) DLT 454, emphasized courts’ reliance on expert testimony in technical patent disputes, aligning with the defendants’ stance that TICAGRELOR’s disclosure required factual inquiry. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. J.D. Joshi, 2015 (64) PTC 135 (Del), noted that Section 64 challenges involve fact-dependent questions, justifying the defendants’ demand for evidence. Chemtura Corporation v. Union of India, 2009 (41) PTC 260 (Del), and F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 (225) DLT 391, clarified Section 8’s discretionary revocation, supporting AstraZeneca’s compliance claim but not overriding the defendants’ validity challenges.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Jayant Nath’s analysis focused on three key issues: whether TICAGRELOR was disclosed in IN 229, whether the suit patents violated Section 3(d), and whether Section 8 non-compliance warranted vacating the injunctions. On the first issue, the court examined whether IN 229’s disclosure negated the suit patents’ novelty and inventive step. AstraZeneca argued IN 229’s vast compound class (150 quintillion) lacked specific TICAGRELOR disclosure, while the defendants claimed claims 1, 2–7, and substitutions enabled derivation. The court, citing Bishwanath Prasad and Merck Sharp & Dohme, noted that novelty and inventive step are mixed questions requiring expert evidence, unavailable at this stage. However, it heavily weighed AstraZeneca’s Form 27 filings (2014–2018), identically reporting BRILINTA and AXCER sales under IN 229, IN 907, IN 984, and IN 674, and U.S. litigation asserting US 910’s infringement by TICAGRELOR generics. These “admissions” suggested IN 229 disclosed TICAGRELOR, and AstraZeneca’s explanation—that IN 229 was worked through TICAGRELOR post-IN 907 isolation—was absent from the plaint, constituting suppression of material facts per F. Hoffmann-La Roche (2009). The court rejected AstraZeneca’s coverage-disclosure distinction, citing Novartis, which negated broad claims without enabling disclosure, finding a prima facie case that IN 229 disclosed TICAGRELOR.

On Section 3(d), the defendants argued TICAGRELOR was a derivative of IN 229 compounds, requiring enhanced therapeutic efficacy, absent in the plaint. AstraZeneca denied TICAGRELOR was a derivative, citing structural differences, and belatedly relied on Dr. Robert Riley’s affidavit, claiming superior metabolic stability. The court, referencing Novartis and F. Hoffmann-La Roche (2009), held that Section 3(d) demands strict therapeutic efficacy proof for derivatives. The plaint’s silence and Riley’s affidavit, which noted both IN 229 and IN 907 compounds inhibit platelet aggregation with IN 907’s advantages (lower dose, stability) not clearly tied to therapeutic efficacy, failed to meet this standard. The court found a prima facie Section 3(d) violation, rendering the patents vulnerable.

On Section 8, the defendants alleged suppression of foreign revocations (IN 907 in China, IN 984 in Europe, China, South Korea). AstraZeneca countered with pending appeals and grants in 55–60 countries. Citing Chemtura and F. Hoffmann-La Roche (2015), the court found substantial compliance, as the omissions were not material enough to vacate the injunctions. However, the strong validity challenges under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), (k), and 3(d), supported by F. Hoffmann-La Roche (2009) and Bristol-Myers Squibb, led the court to conclude the defendants raised a credible challenge. The balance of convenience favored the defendants, given IN 229’s expiry, generics’ lower price (₹20 vs. ₹50), and compensable harm to AstraZeneca, outweighing potential market loss.

Final Decision

On August 8, 2019, the Delhi High Court vacated the interim injunctions in IA Nos. 3986/2018, 4771/2018, 9332/2018, and 5096/2018, allowing the defendants to market TICAGRELOR generics. The court directed the defendants to maintain accurate sales accounts, file quarterly affidavits verified by a director, and submit chartered accountant-authenticated statements. The applications were disposed of, with the suits listed for further proceedings.

Law Settled in This Case

The case clarified several patent law principles. It reinforced that a credible challenge to patent validity, particularly under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), (k), and 3(d), can defeat interim injunctions, emphasizing vulnerability over definitive invalidity at the interim stage. The court affirmed Novartis’ rejection of the coverage-disclosure dichotomy, requiring enabling disclosure for monopoly claims, impacting genus-species patent disputes. Section 3(d)’s strict therapeutic efficacy requirement for derivatives was upheld, with silence in pleadings fatal to patent holders. The decision underscored the necessity of full disclosure in plaints, including prior patents and admissions, per F. Hoffmann-La Roche (2009). On Section 8, discretionary revocation was clarified, requiring material non-disclosure. The case balanced innovation with public interest, prioritizing affordable generics when validity is credibly challenged, especially post-expiry of a genus patent.

Case Title:AstraZeneca AB Vs. P. Kumar
Date of Order:August 8, 2019
Case No.CS(COMM) 749/2018,
Name of Court:High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge:Jayant Nath, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sunday, April 27, 2025

Cipla Limited Vs. Novartis AG

Importation of Patented product constitutes “working” a patent in India if it meets public demand

Introduction: In the intricate realm of patent litigation, where innovation intersects with public health, the case of Cipla Limited vs. Novartis AG & Anr., decided by the Delhi High Court on March 9, 2017, stands as a pivotal exploration of patentee rights, public interest, and interim injunctive relief. This appeal, arising from a suit to restrain patent infringement, pitted Novartis AG, a Swiss pharmaceutical giant, against Cipla Limited, an Indian generic drug manufacturer, over the bronchodilator drug Indacaterol, patented under Indian Patent No. 222346. The dispute centered on whether Novartis’s importation-based working of the patent justified an injunction against Cipla’s generic version, or if public interest and alleged non-working warranted its denial. The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge’s interim injunction, navigating the complex interplay of the Patents Act, 1970, public health considerations, and global trade obligations. 

Detailed Factual Background:Novartis AG, a Swiss company (Respondent No. 1), holds Indian Patent No. 222346 for Indacaterol, a bronchodilator used to manage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), marketed in India as Onbrez through Lupin Limited (Respondent No. 2), an Indian company, under a 2012 agreement. Indacaterol, a novel beta-agonist, offers 24-hour relief with rapid onset within five minutes, distinguishing it from other bronchodilators. Novartis manufactures Indacaterol in Switzerland, importing it into India without local production. 

Cipla Limited, an Indian pharmaceutical company, launched its generic Indacaterol under the brand Unibrez in October 2014, later renamed Indaflo following a trademark dispute. Cipla priced its drug at Rs. 130 for 10 tablets, significantly lower than Novartis’s Rs. 677, claiming greater affordability and access for COPD patients. Cipla alleged that Novartis imported only small quantities (e.g., 53,865 units in 2013, equating to roughly 4,000 patients’ monthly supply), insufficient for India’s estimated 1.5 crore COPD patients, thus failing to work the patent locally. N

ovartis countered that its imports met demand and denied the 1.5 crore patient estimate, asserting that Indacaterol’s unique efficacy justified its patent protection. A prior trademark suit (CS(OS) 3356/2014) saw Cipla undertake to cease using “Unibrez” on November 17, 2014, after Novartis alleged passing off. Cipla also filed a revocation petition under Section 66 of the Patents Act on October 22, 2014, citing public interest, shortly before launching its generic product.

Detailed Procedural Background:The dispute originated in CS(OS) 3812/2014, filed by Novartis in the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Cipla from infringing Patent No. 222346, alongside damages, rendition of accounts, and delivery-up. Novartis filed IA 24863/2015 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for an interim injunction. On January 9, 2015, the Single Judge granted the injunction, restraining Cipla from manufacturing, selling, or importing Indacaterol or Indacaterol Maleate, pending either the suit’s resolution or the outcome of a compulsory license application, if Cipla filed one. The order allowed Cipla to seek modification if a compulsory license was granted. Aggrieved, Cipla appealed in FAO(OS) 21/2015, accompanied by applications CM Nos. 731/2015, 1288/2015, and 2098/2015. Novartis filed a cross-objection (CM No. 2090/2015), challenging the injunction’s limitation tied to compulsory licensing. 

Issues Involved in the Case:The case presented several critical legal questions at the nexus of patent law, public interest, and interim relief:

Whether Novartis’s importation of Indacaterol constituted sufficient “working” of the patent in India under the Patents Act, entitling it to an injunction under Section 48? Whether Section 83’s general principles, emphasizing local working and public interest, curtailed the patentee’s exclusive rights under Section 48, particularly for a life-managing drug like Indacaterol?

Detailed Submission of Parties: Cipla argued that the injunction was unjust, as Novartis failed to work the patent in India. Cipla contended that Section 48’s patentee rights, prefaced by “subject to the other provisions contained in this Act,” were subordinate to Section 83’s principles, which require patents to be worked commercially in India, not merely imported, and to ensure affordable public access. Cipla highlighted Novartis’s limited imports (e.g., 53,865 units in 2013, serving ~4,000 patients against 1.5 crore COPD patients), arguing that this constituted non-working and impeded public health, per Section 83(d). Cipla’s Indaflo, priced at Rs. 130 versus Onbrez’s Rs. 677, better served public interest by enhancing access. Cipla cited F. Hoffmann La Roche vs. Cipla (2009) for public interest as a fourth factor in injunctions, alongside Article 7 of TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, and India’s GATT submissions, which prioritize public health and local working. Cipla also referenced Franz Xaver Huemer vs. New Yash Engineers (1996), where non-use justified denying an injunction, and Glaverbel S.A. vs. Dave Rose (2010), suggesting royalties as an alternative. Cipla argued that the Single Judge erred in excluding Section 83’s principles from civil court considerations, asserting that public interest warranted denying the injunction.

Novartis defended the injunction, arguing that Section 48 granted exclusive rights to prevent unauthorized use, unimpeded by Section 83, which applies to compulsory licensing under Chapter XVI, not civil injunctions. Novartis emphasized that its patent faced no credible validity challenge, establishing a prima facie case. It denied Cipla’s 1.5 crore patient estimate, asserting that its Swiss-manufactured imports, marketed via Lupin, sufficiently met India’s COPD demand, per Telemecanique & Controls vs. Schneider Electric (2002). Novartis highlighted Indacaterol’s unique efficacy, justifying its patent protection and higher pricing. It accused Cipla of mala fide conduct, citing the Unibrez trademark imitation and premature generic launch post-revocation filing, undermining Cipla’s equitable standing. Novartis distinguished Cipla’s precedents: Hoffmann La Roche involved a challenged patent, unlike the present case; Franz Xaver Huemer concerned total non-use, not applicable to Novartis’s imports; and E Bay’s public interest test was U.S.-specific. Novartis’s cross-objection challenged the injunction’s linkage to compulsory licensing, arguing that Section 48 rights were absolute pending trial.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties: The court’s analysis was shaped by a robust array of precedents, each contextualized to address patent rights, public interest, and interim relief. The key judgments, their complete citations, and their relevance are as follows:

F. Hoffmann La Roche Limited vs. Cipla Limited, 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del) (DB): The Division Bench recognized public interest as a fourth factor in injunctions, alongside prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm, noting that access to life-saving drugs in India warranted caution. Cipla relied on this to argue that Indacaterol’s role in COPD and its pricing disparity favored public interest over injunction. The court distinguished it, noting that Hoffmann La Roche involved a challenged patent, unlike Novartis’s unchallenged patent, and Indacaterol was not a life-saving drug.

Franz Xaver Huemer vs. New Yash Engineers, 1996 PTC (16) 232 (Del) (DB): The Division Bench held that a patentee’s non-use disentitled them to interim injunctions, citing English and U.S. authorities like Plympton vs. Malcolmson (1875). Cipla cited this to argue that Novartis’s non-manufacture constituted non-working. The court distinguished it, finding that Novartis’s imports constituted working, unlike the total non-use in Huemer.

Telemecanique & Controls (I) Limited vs. Schneider Electric Industries SA, 2002 (24) PTC 632 (Del) (DB): The Division Bench held that imports suffice for working a patent if they meet public demand, rejecting the need for local manufacture. Novartis relied on this to defend its importation model. The court applied this, finding no conclusive evidence that Novartis’s imports were insufficient, pending trial.

Glaverbel S.A. vs. Dave Rose, 2010 (43) PTC 630 (Del): A Single Judge suggested royalties as an alternative to injunctions in certain patent disputes. Cipla cited this to propose royalties over injunction. The court found it inapplicable, as Novartis’s prima facie case and Cipla’s infringement warranted injunctive relief.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. vs. C.R. Bard, Inc., 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012): The U.S. Court of Appeals considered royalties in lieu of injunctions in licensing disputes. Cipla cited this to support royalties. The court deemed it irrelevant, as no licensing arrangement existed, and U.S. law differed from India’s patent regime.

Novartis AG vs. Mehar Pharma, 2005 (30) PTC 160 (Bom): The Bombay High Court denied an injunction due to a challenged patent’s validity. Cipla cited this to question injunctions, but the court distinguished it, noting no credible challenge to Novartis’s patent.

Advanced Cardiovascular Systems vs. Medtronic Vascular, 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008): A U.S. court considered prior licensing in injunction decisions. Cipla cited this, but the court found it inapplicable absent licensing in the present case.

eBay Inc. vs. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006): The U.S. Supreme Court included public interest in its four-factor injunction test. Cipla relied on this, but the court rejected its applicability, noting India’s distinct statutory framework.

Baer vs. Union of India, WP 1323/2013 (Del, decided on 15.07.2014): A compulsory licensing case irrelevant to civil injunctions. Cipla cited it, but the court dismissed its relevance.

The court also considered Article 7 of TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, and India’s GATT submissions, cited by Cipla, but found them more relevant to compulsory licensing than civil injunctions.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The Division Bench meticulously upheld the Single Judge’s injunction, grounding its decision in statutory interpretation, precedent, and equitable principles. The court first addressed the patent’s validity, noting no credible challenge to Patent No. 222346, establishing Novartis’s prima facie case under Section 48, which grants exclusive rights to prevent unauthorized manufacture, sale, or import. Cipla’s infringement, by launching Indaflo, was undisputed, strengthening Novartis’s claim.

On the interplay between Sections 48 and 83, the court rejected Cipla’s argument that Section 83’s principles curtailed Section 48 rights in civil injunctions. Section 48’s preface, “subject to the other provisions,” did not extend to Section 83, which operates under Chapter XVI (Working of Patents, Compulsory Licenses, and Revocation) and guides authorities, not courts, in exercising powers like granting compulsory licenses. Section 83’s own preface, “without prejudice to the other provisions,” further insulated Section 48 from its ambit. The court clarified that Section 83’s considerations—local working, public health, affordability—apply to compulsory licensing proceedings, not interim injunctions, ensuring that patentee rights remain robust absent statutory overrides like Section 84 or 85.

The court addressed the “working” issue, relying on Telemecanique to hold that imports constitute working if they meet demand. Cipla’s data (e.g., 53,865 units for ~4,000 patients) and Novartis’s counter-articles on COPD prevalence were inconclusive without trial evidence, but the court found no basis to deem imports insufficient at the interim stage. Indacaterol’s non-life-saving status, unlike cancer drugs, and the availability of other COPD treatments, diminished Cipla’s public interest argument.

On public interest, the court acknowledged its relevance, per Hoffmann La Roche, but held it insufficient to override a valid patent’s protection absent a challenged validity or exceptional circumstances. Cipla’s pricing advantage was noted, but the court prioritized Novartis’s statutory rights, finding that denying the injunction would cause irreparable harm via market erosion, uncompensable by damages. Cipla’s mala fide conduct—trademark imitation and launching Indaflo post-revocation filing—further weakened its equitable standing.

The court dismissed Novartis’s cross-objection, finding the Single Judge’s linkage to compulsory licensing a reasonable interim measure, though not affecting Section 48’s primacy. The court concluded that the balance of convenience favored Novartis, given the patent’s validity and Cipla’s clear infringement, and public interest did not sufficiently countervail to deny relief.

Final Decision:On March 9, 2017, the Delhi High Court dismissed Cipla’s appeal (FAO(OS) 21/2015) and Novartis’s cross-objection (CM No. 2090/2015), upholding the Single Judge’s interim injunction restraining Cipla from manufacturing, selling, or importing Indacaterol or Indacaterol Maleate until the suit’s resolution or a compulsory license determination. No costs were ordered.

Law Settled in this Case: The judgment clarified several principles governing patent injunctions and public interest:

Section 48 of the Patents Act grants patentees exclusive rights to prevent unauthorized use, subject only to provisions directly impinging on those rights, not Section 83’s general principles.

Section 83’s principles, emphasizing local working and public interest, apply to compulsory licensing and revocation under Chapter XVI, not civil court injunctions.

Importation constitutes “working” a patent in India if it meets public demand, negating the need for local manufacture .

Public interest is a factor in interim injunctions but does not override a valid patent’s protection absent a credible validity challenge or exceptional circumstances.

A patentee’s prima facie valid patent and clear infringement establish entitlement to an injunction, with irreparable harm presumed from market erosion.

Mala fide conduct, like trademark imitation or premature generic launches, weakens a defendant’s equitable claim against injunctions.

Sufficiency of imports to meet demand is a triable issue, not determinable at the interim stage without conclusive evidence.

Case Title: Cipla Limited Vs. Novartis AG & Anr.
Date of Order: March 9, 2017
Case No.: FAO(OS) 21/2015
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed, Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Burger King Corporation Vs. Techchand Shewakramani

Use under the Trade Marks Act, per Sections 2(2)(c), 28, 29, and 56, encompasses non-physical activities like online promotions

Introduction: In the vibrant arena of trademark litigation, where brand identity clashes with territorial boundaries, the case of Burger King Corporation vs. Techchand Shewakramani & Ors., decided by the Delhi High Court on August 27, 2018, emerges as a landmark exploration of jurisdictional competence in intellectual property disputes. 

The plaintiff, Burger King Corporation, a U.S.-based fast-food giant, sought to protect its iconic trademarks “Burger King” and “Hungry Jack’s” against alleged infringement by a group of Mumbai-based defendants operating under the same “Burger King” mark. 

The defendants challenged the Delhi High Court’s jurisdiction, arguing a lack of cause of action and territorial nexus. The court meticulously dissected the interplay of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, dismissing the defendants’ applications to reject or return the plaint. This case study delves into the factual matrix, procedural intricacies, legal issues, parties’ arguments, judicial precedents, the court’s reasoning, and the broader implications, painting a vivid picture of a jurisdictional chess game in India’s trademark landscape.

Detailed Factual Background:Burger King Corporation, a renowned U.S.-based fast-food chain, holds global trademark registrations for “Burger King” and “Hungry Jack’s,” used for its restaurants and corporate identity. Planning to launch franchise outlets in New Delhi, the plaintiff had entered into agreements, sought regulatory approvals, and established a business presence in the city. 

The defendants, all based in Mumbai, included individuals and companies allegedly infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks. Defendant No. 5, Burger King Restaurant Pvt. Ltd., and Defendant No. 6, Hungry Jacks Fast Food Pvt. Ltd., were companies operating at 99/C, Rosewood Chambers, Tulsiwadi, Tardeo, Mumbai. Defendant No. 7, Ras Resorts and Apart Hotels Pvt. Ltd., shared the same address and was promoted by the same individuals. Defendant No. 1 was a director of Defendants No. 5 and 7; Defendant No. 2 was an executive director of Defendant No. 7 and a director of Defendants No. 5 and 6; Defendant No. 3 was the managing director of Defendant No. 7 and a director of Defendants No. 5 and 6; and Defendant No. 4 was a director of Defendant No. 6. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were using “Burger King” for restaurants and carts in locations like Silvassa, Daman, and Pune, and were actively promoting the mark through a website, theburgerking.in, registered by Defendant No. 3 on July 9, 2014. 

This website, linked to Ras Resorts, offered franchise opportunities and listed the administrative office as Ras Group of Hotels, suggesting a nexus with Defendant No. 7. The plaintiff apprehended that the defendants planned to expand into Delhi, citing franchise queries from Delhi areas like Madangiri, Okhla, and Dwarka, and a Business Digest article dated July 30, 2014, quoting Defendant No. 3 on nationwide expansion plans. The defendants’ Memorandum of Association further declared intentions to establish branches across India, reinforcing the plaintiff’s concerns.

Detailed Procedural Background:The dispute crystallized in CS(COMM) 919/2016, filed by Burger King Corporation before the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain trademark infringement and passing off, along with damages. The suit was accompanied by a counterclaim, CC(COMM) 122/2017, by the defendants. The defendants filed three applications: I.A. 23496/2014 by Defendant No. 7 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint for lack of cause of action and territorial jurisdiction; I.A. 17220/2015 by Defendants No. 1, 2, 3, and 5 under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, seeking return of the plaint for lack of jurisdiction; and I.A. 17221/2015 by Defendant No. 6 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, mirroring the jurisdictional objections. 

Issues Involved in the Case:The case presented several critical legal questions at the intersection of trademark law and civil procedure:Whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 of the CPC, given the defendants’ Mumbai-based operations and the plaintiff’s claim of imminent infringement in Delhi?Whether the plaintiff’s invocation of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, based on its business activities in Delhi, conferred jurisdiction, or if it was barred by precedents limiting such claims.Whether the defendants’ promotion of the “Burger King” mark through websites, franchise queries, and public statements constituted “use” under the Trade Marks Act, creating a cause of action in Delhi?Whether the plaintiff’s apprehension of the defendants’ expansion into Delhi was credible and sufficient to establish a cause of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC?Whether subsequent events, such as franchise queries post-filing, could be considered to determine jurisdiction, or if jurisdiction was fixed at the date of filing?

Detailed Submission of Parties:The plaintiff argued that the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction under both Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act and Section 20 of the CPC. Under Section 134(2), the plaintiff claimed to carry on business in Delhi through agreements, contracts, and regulatory approvals for its imminent Burger King franchise launch. Under Section 20(c), the plaintiff asserted a credible apprehension of the defendants expanding into Delhi, evidenced by franchise queries from Delhi, the interactive website theburgerking.in, and Defendant No. 3’s public statements on nationwide expansion. 

The defendants argued that the Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction, as all defendants resided and operated in Mumbai, with no infringing activities in Delhi. They cited Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia (2015) and Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Purshottam Kumar Chaubey (2016) to argue that Section 134(2) did not apply, as the plaintiff’s Delhi presence was insufficient without a cause of action arising there. Under Section 20, they contended that the plaintiff’s apprehension was speculative, lacking evidence of actual sales or operations in Delhi. Defendant No. 7 emphasized its distinct business (Ras Resorts) and lack of connection to the “Burger King” mark, arguing that its website (rasresorts.com) was unrelated to the infringement. The defendants asserted that the cause of action, if any, was quia timet and arose in Mumbai, where their operations were based. They further argued that subsequent events, like post-filing franchise queries, could not confer jurisdiction, and the issue was purely legal, not requiring factual inquiry.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties:The court’s analysis was informed by a rich array of precedents, each providing context to jurisdictional principles in trademark disputes. The key judgments, their complete citations, and their relevance are as follows:

Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 63 PTC 1 (SC): The Supreme Court clarified that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act provide additional forums where the plaintiff resides or carries on business, but do not oust Section 20 of the CPC. The defendants relied on this to argue that the plaintiff’s Delhi branch office did not confer jurisdiction without a cause of action, but the court distinguished it, noting that Section 20(c) independently applied due to the defendants’ use of the mark in Delhi.

Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Purshottam Kumar Chaubey, 227 (2016) DLT 320 (DB) (Delhi High Court): The Division Bench outlined scenarios for jurisdiction under Section 134(2) and Section 62(2), emphasizing that a plaintiff with a principal office cannot sue at a subordinate office unless the cause of action arises there. The defendants cited this to challenge the plaintiff’s Section 134(2) claim, but the court held that Section 20(c) jurisdiction was established, rendering Section 134 analysis secondary.

Laxmikant V. Patel vs. Chetanbhat Shah, AIR 2002 SC 275: The Supreme Court held that passing off actions consider future business harm, not just existing facts, and likelihood of damage suffices for injunctions. The plaintiff relied on this to justify jurisdiction based on the defendants’ expansion plans, and the court applied it to find that the defendants’ promotional activities in Delhi created a credible cause of action.

Federal Express Corporation vs. Fedex Securities Ltd., 2018 (74) PTC 205 (Del) (DB): The Division Bench ruled on jurisdiction under Section 134, not Section 20. The defendants cited it to argue lack of jurisdiction, but the court found it inapplicable, as the plaintiff’s case rested on Section 20(c) due to the defendants’ activities in Delhi.

HSIL Ltd. vs. Marvel Ceramics, 2018 (73) PTC 77 (Del) (DB): The Division Bench found no cause of action in Delhi under Section 134. The defendants relied on this, but the court distinguished it, noting that the defendants’ franchise solicitations and promotions in Delhi established a cause of action under Section 20(c).

Additionally, the court referenced Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (13th Edn., 2001) to define “use” under Section 2(2)(c) of the Trade Marks Act, encompassing advertising, promotion, and franchise solicitations, which supported the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court first addressed the defendants’ interconnectedness, noting that Defendants No. 1, 2, and 3 were common directors across Defendants No. 5, 6, and 7, all sharing the same Mumbai address. The website theburgerking.in, registered by Defendant No. 3, listed Ras Resorts as its administrative office and offered franchise forms, linking Defendant No. 7 to the infringing mark. This nexus undermined the defendants’ claim of independence, justifying their joinder in the suit.

On jurisdiction, the court held that Section 20(c) of the CPC was satisfied, as the defendants’ actions constituted “use” of the “Burger King” mark in Delhi, creating a cause of action. The court expansively interpreted “use” under Section 2(2)(c) and Sections 28, 29, and 56 of the Trade Marks Act, per Kerly’s Law, to include promotion, advertising, and franchise solicitations. The defendants’ website, franchise queries from Delhi (e.g., Madangiri, Okhla), and Defendant No. 3’s public statements on nationwide expansion, corroborated by a Business Digest article and the Memorandum of Association, evidenced active promotion in Delhi. The court emphasized the modern context of e-commerce, noting that online franchise solicitations targeting Delhi customers conferred jurisdiction, reflecting the dynamic nature of trademark use.

The court distinguished IPRS vs. Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home, clarifying that while these cases limited Section 134(2) jurisdiction, they did not dilute Section 20(c)’s applicability. The plaintiff’s agreements and approvals in Delhi supported Section 134(2), but the court found Section 20(c) independently sufficient, as the cause of action arose from the defendants’ Delhi-directed activities. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that jurisdiction was fixed at the filing date, citing Laxmikant V. Patel to hold that passing off considers future harm, and each instance of mark use creates a fresh cause of action. The defendants’ own documents, including franchise requests and a counterclaim asserting Delhi jurisdiction, further undermined their objections.

The court also addressed procedural fairness, criticizing indiscriminate document denials under the Commercial Courts Act. It directed fresh admission/denial affidavits to focus on genuine disputes, warning against delays through unjustified denials, aligning with the Act’s efficiency goals. The defendants’ lack of cause of action argument was dismissed, as their promotional activities and expansion plans established a credible threat of infringement in Delhi.

Final Decision:On August 27, 2018, the Delhi High Court dismissed I.A. 17221/2015, I.A. 17220/2015, and I.A. 23496/2014, upholding its jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 

Law Settled in this Case:The judgment clarified several principles governing jurisdiction in trademark disputes: Section 20(c) of the CPC confers jurisdiction where a cause of action arises, including through trademark “use” such as promotion, advertising, or franchise solicitations in the forum’s territory.“Use” under the Trade Marks Act, per Sections 2(2)(c), 28, 29, and 56, encompasses non-physical activities like online promotions and franchise queries, reflecting e-commerce realities.Passing off and infringement actions consider future business harm, and jurisdiction is not fixed at the filing date, as each mark use creates a fresh cause of action .Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act supplements, but does not exclude, Section 20 of the CPC, allowing jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s business activities or cause of action (IPRS vs. Sanjay Dalia).Interconnected defendants, sharing directors or addresses, can be joined in a suit if linked to the infringing mark, preventing jurisdictional evasion.In commercial suits, indiscriminate document denials violate the Commercial Courts Act’s efficiency goals, and courts may impose sanctions for unjustified delays.A credible apprehension of trademark infringement, supported by promotional activities or expansion plans, suffices to establish a cause of action in quia timet actions.

Case Title: Burger King Corporation Vs. Techchand Shewakramani
Date of Order: August 27, 2018
Case No.: CS(COMM) 919/2016
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Prathiba M. Singh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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