Thursday, September 20, 2012

Cannon Kabushiki Kaisha Vs Ms. Alka Gupta Trading As Guide Men Tape Industries,


Equivalent citations: 2008 143 CompCas 485 NULL


Bench: M Ansari, S Usha

Cannon Kabushiki Kaisha (A Corporation Duly Organized Under The Laws Of Japan)
vs Ms. Alka Gupta Trading As Guide Men Tape Industries, Bhagirath Prasad And
Company And Assistant Registrar Of Trade Marks on 22/2/2008

ORDER

M.H.S. Ansari, J. (Chairman)


    1. 1. Instant appeal is directed against the order dated 12.9.2006 passed by the
      Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks in the matter of opposition No. DEL−9199
      against application No. 508643.


    2. By the impugned order dated 12.9.2006, respondent No. 3 has allowed the
      application of respondent No. 1 for registration of the mark ’CANON’ label in
      class 9. The opposition of the appellant was disallowed.
  1. Opponent before the learned Registrar is the appellant herein. Respondent
    No. 1 claims to be the subsequent proprietor of the trade mark in question
    whereas respondent No. 2 is the applicant who filed the initial application for
    registration of the label mark in question.


    1. 3. It is the case of the appellant that it adopted ’CANON’ as a part of its
      company name as early as the year 1947. It manufactures products of various
      kinds including office imaging products, computer peripherals, business
      information products, cameras, optical products amongst others. Appellant has
      averred that its net sales of products is around $31,815 million and has its
      presence around the globe through 200 subsidiaries employing around 1,15,583
      employees. It is asserted that the appellant has the distinction of being ranked
      overall 35^th in the Best Global Brands by Business Week. The Fortune magazine
      has ranked the appellant 154^th in total sales and 96^th in profits for the
      fiscal year 2004. The appellant also features in Financial Times FT Global 500
      for the year 2005 and has been globally ranked 106^th in the category of market
      capitalization for the year 2005. In the top 10 corporations receiving U.S.
      patents in 2005 the appellant ranked second with 1,828 patents. The further case
      of the appellant is that it is the proprietor of the trade mark ’CANON’ and is
      now registered in more than 180 countries and regions worldwide. In India the
      appellant is registered proprietor of the trade mark ’CANON’ in various classes,
      details whereof are given in para 5 of the appeal. There are about 34 such
      registrations in India of the trade mark ’CANON’ registered since 17.1.1983 in
      respect of various classes of goods, scientific and electrical apparatus and
      instruments, computer and computer software, yarns and threads in, lace and
      embroidery ribands, pins and needles. Thus the appellant asserts that its trade
      mark ’CANON’ is a household name in India and around the world. It is further
      asserted that the mark through extensive sale and propogation has won the
      distinction of being a famous mark. The appellant sponsored the world press
      photo contest and was an official sponsor of the world cup French soccer
      championship. In the year 1982, the photographic equipment manufactured by the
      appellant was designated as the official equipment of the IX Asian Games 1982.
      Signboards depicting ’CANON OFFICIAL CAMERA’ in the Asiad were also displayed in
      the main stadium for the games as well as the Asiad Games villages. The Asian
      Games were viewed by millions of Indians and the mark became engraved in the
      memories of Indian public. The mark has been extensively advertised around the
      world and in India through the print and electronic media as well as through the
      internet. It is, therefore, the appellant’s case that the mark ’CANON’, due to
      decades of use and advertisement has become synonymous with the appellant and
      the public associates the word ’CANON’ with the appellant alone and none else.
      This is coupled with the fact that the word ’CANON’ is a vital and memorable
      part of the appellants company name since as early as the year 1947. It is,therefore, contended that the mark is entitled to protection from usurpation for
      different goods.

  2. The grievance of the appellant is with respect to the trade mark
    application No. 508643 filed in the name of Mr. Satyapal and Mr. Virender Kumar
    trading as M/s Bhagirath Prasad & Company respondent No. 2 herein. The said
    application was filed on 13.4.1989 for registration of CANON label for the goods
    Tailor’s tape (measuring tape) in class 9. The same was advertised before
    acceptance in Trade Marks Journal No. 1086 dated 08.09.1994. The appellant filed
    its notice of opposition based, inter alia on the ground that the mark sought to
    be registered is identical with the mark ’CANON’ of which the appellant is the
    registered proprietor. Objections were raised under Sections 9, 11(a), 12(1) and
    18 of the Act.


  3. However, it transpires that a Form TM−16 dated 25.2.1995 was allowed vide
    order dated 19.2.1997 without giving any opportunity to the appellant for filing
    its objections and before filing of counter statement of respondent No. 1


  4. Respondent No. 1 subsequently filed its counter statement on 10.4.1997. it
    also filed documentary evidence under Rule 54 vide affidavit dated 5.1.1998. The
    appellant vide their letter dated 25.7.1997 stated that they were not filing any
    affidavit evidence in support of opposition and relied on facts stated in notice
    of opposition. However, appellant filed affidavit evidence dated 21.10.1998
    under Rule 55 enclosing documentary evidence in the form of invoice, publicity
    material, annual reports, sales and publicity expenses from the year 1979 etc.


  5. An interlocutory petition dated 28.4.1999 was filed by the appellant on
    3.5.1999 raising serious objections to Form TM−16 filed by respondent No. 1 for
    bringing itself on record as subsequent applicant of the impugned mark by virtue
    of deed of assignment. By order dated 21.10.1999 the respondents herein were
    directed to provide their statement on affidavit pertaining to the assignment
    dated 1.10.1992 apart from furnishing other particulars. It is the case of the
    appellant that the information was supplied piece meal. Serious objections have
    been raised with regard to deed of assignment in the context of the objections
    under Section 18(1) of the Act with respect to the proprietorship in the mark
    ’CANON’.


  6. It must be stated here that there was an application No. 460087 for
    registration of the trade mark ’CANON’ (word per se) pending in class 9 in the
    name of M/s Bhagirath Prasad and Company, respondent No. 2 herein in respect
    whereof the appellant was the opponent and the opposition was bearing No.
    Del−6861.


  7. Instant appeal arises out of application No. 508643 label mark dated
    13.4.1989 in the matter of opposition Del−9199, whereas the application No.
    460087 was in respect of mark ’CANON’ (word per se). The opponent in both the
    applications was the same, appellant herein. Respondent No. 1 had in both the
    applications filed request on Form TM−16 for coming on record as subsequent
    proprietor of the mark applied for.


  8. With regard to Application No. 460087 in the matter of opposition No.
    Del−6861, learned Registrar has allowed the opposition of the appellant herein
    and refused the application for registration No. 460087 to proceed for
    registration in class 9. A copy of the order dated 12.9.2006 of the learned
    Assistant Registrar has been filed as annexure ’O’ of the evidence of the
    appellant. By the said order learned Assistant Registrar held that there is an
    inordinate delay in filing the request on Form TM−16 and there is no explanation
    for the delay and in that view rejected the request on Form TM−16. Significantly
    the objection of the opponent as to proprietorship of the applicant under
    Section 18 of the Act was upheld. It was further held that in the absence of
    evidence filed on behalf of the applicant the opponent’s objection under Section
    12 of the Act was sustained. As regards the exercise of discretion it was held



in the said order that:

I have given careful consideration of the pleading and evidence placed on
record by both the parties. There is no reason for me to exercise the discretion
in favour of the applicants.


  1. Ms. Sheetal Vohra learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the
    same learned Assistant Registrar has allowed the application for registration of
    composite label mark which consists of the word ’CANON’ device of a tailor in
    respect of Tailor’s Tape (measure tape) included in class 9. It was submitted
    that the predominant feature in the label mark is the word ’CANON’ being a part
    of the corporate name of the appellant besides being registered trade mark of
    the appellant in various classes in India and various countries of the world.
    Learned Assistant Registrar could not have taken a diametrically opposite view,
    it was contended. Ms. Sheetal Vohra has referred us to the pleadings and
    material on record. Our attention was drawn to the order of the learned
    Assistant Registrar dated 12.9.2006 passed in application No. 460087 B and more
    particularly to page 437 where at the Form TM−16 was disallowed in that case on
    the ground of inordinate delay. It was contended by Ms. Sheetal Vohra that in
    the notice of opposition specific objections have been raised with regard to the
    alleged assignment. In the order under appeal there is no consideration
    whatsoever to the objections raised in the opposition. Reference was made to
    Annexure G at page 310 being the interlocutory petition filed by the opponent
    before the learned Registrar for hearing of Form TM−16 which was allowed even
    before filing of counter statement and without opportunity of hearing the
    opponent. By the order under appeal the interlocutory application was disallowed
    without assigning any reasons. The only reference to Form TM−16 in the order
    under appeal is that the hearing was fixed in the matter on 19.12.1997 and TM−16
    was allowed. Learned Counsel referred us to annexure H at page 313 of the
    typeset of papers being the order of the learned Assistant Registrar directing
    the applicant to provide statements on affidavits for consideration of the
    actual facts pertaining to assignment of the mark. Learned Counsel also assailed
    the conclusions and findings arrived at by the learned registrar in the order
    under appeal rejecting the objections based on Sections 9, 11 and 18(1) of the
    Act. Learned Counsel has also relied upon several judgments.


  2. In reply Shri Ajay Amitabh Suman learned Counsel submitted that notices
    were issued three times on Form TM−16. Learned Counsel relied upon exhibit A
    (colly) filled at page 1, 2 and 3 of the typeset of documents filed by the
    respondent as evidence on its behalf along with reply. Exhibit A fixes the date
    of hearing of the opposition No. DEL−9199 to application No. 509643 to
    19.2.1997. The notice of hearing also bears an endorsement in manuscript "TM−16
    allowed". Learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to explain the
    endorsement nor has been able to place any order passed by the learned Assistant
    Registrar allowing Form TM−16 nor it is established before us that any order was
    passed on Form TM−16 after having afforded an opportunity of hearing.


  3. Shri Ajay Amitabh Suman learned Counsel next contended that the opponent
    ought to have incorporated the challenge by amending the opposition or the only
    other remedy to the opponent was to file review or appeal against the order
    allowing the assignment in Form TM−16. It was further contended that in the deed
    of assignment the issue with regard to the person Virender Kumar or his
    signatures cannot be raised by the opponent, being a third party to the
    assignment. In other words it was contended that only parties to the assignment
    can object to the assignment or defects in the deed of assignment and not any
    third party. Learned Counsel has also relied upon several judgments in support
    of his contentions on the merits of the matter.


  4. We heard Ms. Sheetal Vohra learned advocate for the appellant and Shri
    Ajay Amitabh Suman learned advocate for the respondent at the sitting of the
    Bench at Delhi on 7.2.2008.


  5. In the order under appeal the objection under Section 9 of the Act was
    rejected on the ground that the impugned mark has been used for over a period of
    atleast 10 years from the date of application. The objection of the appellant
    raised under Section 11 of the Act which prohibits registration of the mark
    where there is identity of mark or similarity of goods or services covered by
    the trade mark, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public
    which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
    Learned Assistant Registrar in the impugned order, however, erroneously
    considered the objection under the repealed Act, 1958 whereas the Trade Marks
    Act, 1999 had come into force and effect from 15.9.2003.


  6. As regards the objection under Section 18 it was observed that the trade
    mark which consists of several characteristics including the word ’CANON’ which
    is not invented but a dictionary word and that the same has been adopted
    honestly and bonafidely. It was, therefore, held that the owner cannot prohibit
    the use by others of such mark in connection with goods of totally different
    characteristics. Discretion under Section 18(4) was exercised in favour of the
    applicants on the ground that:



I do not find any reason to exercise my discretion adversely to the
applicants.

It was finally concluded:

I have given careful consideration to the pleadings and evidence placed on
record by both the parties. The interlocutory petition filed by the opponents is
disallowed.

"As a result the opposition No. Del−9199 is dismissed and it is hereby
ordered that the application No. 508643 in class 09 shall proceed to
registration."


  1. In view of the diametrically opposite stands taken by the learned
    Assistant Registrar in the two applications filed in respect of identical marks
    applied for registration with the predominant feature of the word ’CANON’, we
    are of the view that instead of going into the merits of the matter, we should
    remand it back for consideration afresh by the Registrar to hear out the
    application on Form TM−16 afresh and in accordance with law after affording the
    opponents opportunity of filing its objections and thereafter affording an
    opportunity of being heard in the matter.


    1. 18. Although elaborate arguments have been advanced before us on merits by
      both the learned Counsel, we are of the view that as the main question, namely,
      about the respondent No. 1 coming on record as the subsequent proprietor of the
      mark by virtue of alleged deed of assignment and request on form TM−16 having
      been filed, the same was required to be disposed of before considering the
      matter on merits. Unless the subsequent proprietor was brought on record,
      question of disposal of the application for registration and opposition thereto
      on merits does not arise. The evidence of user filed on behalf of subsequent
      proprietor cannot be a matter of consideration in the application filed for
      registration of the mark by the alleged owner/adopter of the mark. We also find
      that the learned Assistant Registrar in the order under appeal has chosen to
      proceed with the merits of the matter without considering the question with
      regard to request in Form TM−16. No formal orders appear to have been passed
      thereon nor have been placed before us with regard to the request made on Form
      TM−16. We are to infer from the order under appeal that request on Form TM−16
      was allowed in favour of respondent No. 1 as it is mentioned in the order under
      appeal that the TM−16 was allowed. The notices referred to by Shri Ajay Amitabh
      Suman do not show that the said notices have been issued in respect of hearing
      fixed for TM−16. As a matter of fact there is no mention or reference to TM−16
      at all in those notices, except the manuscript endorsement "TM−16 allowed" at
      page 1 of exhibit A (colly). The question of the opponents filing any appeal or


    2. review against a non existent order does not arise. We are clearly of the view
      that the opponent was denied opportunity of being heard before the TM−16 was
      allowed.

  2. Learned Assistant Registrar under Section 22 of the Act has been
    conferred the power to permit an amendment of the application for registration
    filed under Section 18, corresponding Rule 41 prescribes that an application for
    amendment of the application is to be made in Form TM−16. Once an application
    for registration is under consideration and opposition thereto has been filed,
    amendment to the application for registration, notice thereof is required to be
    given to the opponent in compliance with principles of natural justice. No
    amendment, in our view can be allowed or made to the application for
    registration during the pendency of opposition proceedings without affording an
    opportunity of hearing to the opponent. It is the opponent in the opposition
    proceedings that is vitally affected by any orders of amendment to the original
    application for registration and, therefore, should be afforded an opportunity
    of being heard in the matter before an application for amendment of the original
    application for registration is allowed. As regards the contention of Shri Suman
    that no third party in the assignment can raise objections to the assignment, we
    are of the view that it is not for us to consider the said contention. We are,
    accordingly, leaving it open for being raised and considered by the learned
    Registrar. In the instant case, no opportunity was afforded to the opponent to
    either file its objections or an opportunity of being heard in the matter before
    amendment in Form TM−16 was allowed. From the order under appeal it would appear
    that Form TM−16 was allowed without giving particulars of the date on which the
    same was allowed. Although it is stated in the order under appeal that the
    bearing was fixed in the matter on 19.2.1997, the notice annexure ’A’ filed on
    behalf of the respondent shows that it bears a manuscript endorsement showing
    that Form TM−16 was allowed. It has not been established before us that any
    hearing was fixed or that any formal order was passed on Form TM−16 on
    19.2.1997. The reasons based on which the request on Form TM−16 was allowed is
    also not known.


  3. In the absence of any formal order passed on request on Form TM−16
    bringing on record subsequent proprietor, we are not inclined to consider the
    impugned order as having been validly passed. This is for the reason that unless
    the request on Form TM−16 is formally allowed the application for registration
    cannot proceed in the name of the alleged assignee.


  4. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order. We however
    remand the matter and direct that the learned Registrar of Trade Marks shall
    consider the application filed by respondent No. 1 in Form TM−16 in accordance
    with law and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and such
    other parties as are considered necessary and thereafter dispose of the same by
    a reasoned speaking order which shall be communicated to the appearing parties
    and thereafter depending upon the result thereof, it shall be open to the
    learned Assistant Registrar to dispose of application No. 508643 on its own
    merits. In the facts and circumstances of the cases there shall be no order as
    to costs.

CALCUTTA WIRE NETTING INDUSTRIES VS RAMESHWAR DAYAL GUPTA


*  IN  THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  DELHI  AT  NEW  DELHI

                        Judgment Reserved on: 27th October, 2009

                            Judgment Delivered on: 11th November, 2009  

      CRL.R.P.225/2002 & CRL.M.A. Nos.424/2002,479/2002  M/S

  CALCUTTA WIRE NETTING INDUSTRIES          ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman, Advocate.      

 Versus 

RAMESHWAR DAYAL GUPTA & ORS.                            ..... Respondents Through: Mr.Manoj Ohri, APP for the State.

  CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR 

                1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
                2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?  Yes      

                3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?               Yes 

  INDERMEET KAUR, J.

1.  On 27.1.1998 M/s Calcutta Wire Netting Industries through its sole proprietor Madan Lal Arora had filed a complaint under Sections 78 & 79 of the Trade & Merchandise Act 1958 as also under Section 63 & 64 of the Indian Copy Right Act 1957 and under Section 420 of the IPC.  This complaint was filed against certain unknown persons.  The allegations in the complaint were that the complainant firm had adopted the trade mark “TIGER BRAND” label with device of TIGER in respect of wires and wire netting in the year 1964 and had been continuously using the same since up to the date of the filing of the complaint.   Business carried on by the complainant firm was extensive and goods bearing its trade mark were in high demand in the market on account of its quality and precision.  Complainant firm vide application No.537068 had applied for registration of this trade mark “TIGER BRAND” on 1.9.1997.  Complainant firm is the owner of the artistic work in the aforementioned trade mark titled “TIGER BRAND” label with the device of TIGER as the same being original in character.

 2. On 29.3.1998 a search and seizure order was passed by the concerned Court before whom the complaint had been filed.  Pursuant to the search warrants articles bearing falsified mark “TIGER” were recovered from the possession of the accused Rameshwar Dayal Gupta from premises of M/s Gupta Industrial Corporation No.2, Gali no.9, Anand Prabhat, New Delhi.  Recoveries were also effected from the possession of Satish Gupta on 30.3.1998 from premises no.1101,1102, Rucka Hajrasmal Mohalla Sita Ram Bazar, Delhi.  Further recoveries were also made from the possession of accused Bharat Bhushan Gupta from premises no. K-429/135, G.T. Karnal Road, Adarsh Nagar Extension.  This recovery was effected on 3.9.1998. 3. On 3.12.1997 a notice of opposition had been filed by Rameshwar Dayal against the aforestated application of the complainant seeking registration of his trade mark. As per the complainant the communication of this notice of opposition had been made to the petitioner on 11.6.1999 only and this is evident from the endorsement on page no.137 of the documents filed along with this petition.  It is submitted that this notice of opposition having been filed by Rameshwar Dayal was not within the knowledge of the petitioner till 11.6.1999 and that is why it did not find mention in the complaint filed by him on 27.1.1998.

4. It is further submitted that the registration of a trade mark is not a condition precedent for initiation of an action under Section 78 & 79 of the Trade Mark & Merchandise Act 1958; for this proposition reliance has been placed upon State of U.P. vs. Ram Nath  AIR 1972 SC 232 as also the proposition as laid down in the judgment, Century Traders vs. Roshan Lal Duggar Co. AIR 1978 Delhi 250.

 5. Order impugned before this court is the order dated 27.3.2002 vide which the respondents i.e. Rameshwar Dayal, Satish Gupta and Bharat Bhushan Gupta had been discharged.  Finding of the court below was primarily on two counts:- i. Complainant was not a registered owner of the trade mark. ii. Concealment of material facts.

  6.  Perusal of the record and submissions made by the petitioner substantiate his stand; in  „State of U.P.‟ supra, it has been inter alia held :-   “ The definition of „trade mark‟ in S.2(1)(v) that for the purpose of Chapter „X‟ of the Act which deals with the criminal offences, a trade mark includes a registered  as well as unregistered trade mark.  An offence under Ss. 78 or 79 therefore relates to a trade whether it is registered or unregistered.”  
7.  It is thus clear that the registration of a trade mark is not a condition precedent for the initiation of a complaint under Sections 79 & 79 of the Trade Mark & Merchandise Act.

 8.  Second finding of the Trial Judge is also an erroneous finding as the documents filed on record prima facie show that the notice of opposition purportedly filed by Rameshwar Dayal.on 3.12.1997 had been communicated to the petitioner only on 11.6.1999; that is why it did not find mention in the complaint which was filed on 27.1.1998.  This is no suppression of material facts.

9.  The petitioner along with his complaint has filed various documents in support of his submission that he has been using this trade mark since February 1967. These includes an application for interim injunction filed in Suit No.234/96 by the petitioner against M/s Soni Udhyog. The High Court while granting the ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff had held that the plaintiff has placed on record prima facie sufficient material sufficient to show that it had been marketing its product under the trade mark “TIGER BRAND” from the year 1967; the sale figures disclosed also show that it had acquired a reputation/goodwill with the use of the trade mark “TIGER BRAND” brand in respect of wire netting.

10 Section 78 of the Trade Mark and Merchandise Act relates to the making of false marks and Section 79 relates to the sale, exposure or possession of the offending marks.  Both the offences are statutory offences; mens rea and dishonest intention is not a necessary ingredient.  In Mohamod Khalil Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 1982 PTC 411 while dealing with the provisions of Section 78 & 79 of the aforestated Statute it had been held that for an offence under the statutory Act the principle of mens rea cannot be applied with the same rigor;  statutory offences have to be determined in the circumstances and the conditions prescribed by the statute.
11.  In the instant case, it has prima facie been established that the petitioner had a prior user, goodwill, reputation and proprietary right in the said trade mark i.e. “TIGER BRAND”.

 12.  At the stage of framing of charge the details of all the material which the prosecution will produce or rely on during the stage of trial are not expected to be produced or referred to before the learned judge at the time of opening of the case for the prosecution.  Under Section 227 and 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code the court has to satisfy itself that the accusation made against the accused person is not frivolous and there is some material for proceedings against him; the stage prior to the framing of a charge is not expected to be a dress rehearsal of a trial.
13. The impugned order clearly calls for interference.  Prima facie, the ingredients of the offences as mentioned in the complaint are made out against the accused persons.  Impugned order being illegal and based on erroneous finding; it is liable to be set aside; revision petition is allowed.    

 14.  Parties to appear before Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 26.11.2009 who will proceed with the complaint in accordance with law. 15. Record of the Trial court be returned.   


                        (INDERMEET KAUR)                                                                    JUDGE      11th November, 2009 nandan

BALAR MARKETING PVT. LTD VS N RAMU DEVI


IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

SUBJECT : Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

IA No. 12460/2007 and CS (OS) 1942/2006

Judgment delivered on : 31.10.2007

M/S BALAR MARKETING PVT. LTD. .......Plaintiff


-versus

N. RAMU DEVI ........ Defendant


Advocates who appeared in this case: For the Plaintiff : Mr Ajay Amitabh Suman For the Defendant : Ms Sandeep Kumar

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)

1                    This is a joint application filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for recording the compromise / settlement arrived at between the parties and for decreeing the suit in terms thereof.

2                    The plaintiff had instituted the suit in respect of its trademarks KUNDAN and KUNDAN CAB in respect of electric accessories and fittings including electric switch gears, main switches, fuse unit wires and cables. The defendant had adopted the mark KHUMAN CAB in respect of the same goods. Now, the parties have settled the disputes whereby the defendant has acknowledged that the plaintiff is the proprietor of the trademarks KUNDAN and KUNDAN CAB in respect of the said goods. The defendant has also undertaken not to directly or indirectly manufacture any of the goods in question under or using the imitation labels or any other packaging material and /or wrapper bearing the trade marks KUNDAN CAB, KHUMAN CAB and KHUMAN CAB LABEL or any other deceptively similar trademark as that of the plaintiff. It has also been agreed that the defendant shall not use any artistic work, colour scheme, getup or layout which is similar to that of the plaintiff's artistic work, colour scheme, getup or layout in respect of the said goods. The defendant has also undertaken to withdraw the application for registration of the trademark KHUMAN CAB which she had filed before the Trade Mark Registry. The parties have agreed that the suit may be decreed in terms of paragraph 26 (i) (a),


(b) and (c) of the plaint. The plaintiff has agreed to give up all the other reliefs claimed by it in the plaint. The parties have also agreed that they shall be bound by the terms of this settlement and that it also binds their agents, representatives, legal heirs and all other persons claiming under them.

                        3. The application has been signed by Smt. N. Ramu Devi, who is the proprietor of the defendant concern. It has also been signed by Mr Paras Jain, who is a director in the plaintiff

                        company. The application is also signed by the respective counsel for the parties. The application is also supported by affidavits of the said Smt. N. Ramu Devi and Mr Paras Jain.

2                    I have examined the contents of the compromise/ settlement, arrived at between the parties and I find the same to be lawful. Accordingly, the compromise is taken on record. The suit is decreed in terms of paragraph 26(i) (a), (b) and (c) of the plaint. The suit is dismissed in respect of the other prayers. This application is marked as Ext. C-1 and shall form part of the decree. The formal decree be drawn up. This application, the suit and other pending applications stand disposed of. The next date of 16.11.2007 stands cancelled.


Sd./-BADAR DURREZ AHMED,J

October 31, 2007

BABBAR WRECKERS PRIVATE LTD. VS ASHOK LEYLAND LTD


* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI DECIDED ON: 02.11.2010

+ I.A. Nos.5916, 8163/2009 & 1396/2010 in CS (OS) 803/2009
M/S BABBAR WRECKERS PRIVATE LTD. ..... Plaintiff Through: Mr. Hemant Singh with Ms. Mamta R. Jha and Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocates.
versus
M/S ASHOK LEYLAND LTD. & ORS...... Defendants Through: Mr. S.K. Bansal with Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman, Mr. Anand Vikas Mishra and Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Advocates.


CORAM:MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT


  1. Whether the Reporters of local papers YES may be allowed to see the judgment?


  2. To be referred to Reporter or not? YES


  3. Whether the judgment should be YES reported in the Digest?



MR. JUSTICE S.RAVINDRA BHAT

% I.A. Nos.5916/2009 (O-XXXIX, R-1&2, CPC) & 8163/2009 (O-XXXIX, R-4, CPC)


          1. 1. The plaintiff (hereafter referred to as "Babbar Wreckers") seeks a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants (the first defendant is hereafter called "Ashok Leyland"; the second defendant is hereafter called "Perfect" and the third defendant is hereafter called "Niles"), to restrain the manufacturing, fabrication, sale and offering for sale light recovery vehicles (LRVs) using, or reproducing in any manner engineering drawings which are the subject matter of the technical specification Nos. CQA (QFV)/VEH/STLN/003/2005 and CQA (QFV)/VEH/STLN/003/2001 (hereafter called as 2005 and 2001 specifications) and other injunctive reliefs including a decree for mandatory injunction to direct Ashok Leyland to take delivery of 50 LRVs fabricated by


          2. Babbar Wreckers. Consequential money decrees and a decree for rendition of accounts in respect of the sale of superstructure mounted on Stallion 4X4 vehicles of Ashok Leyland produced in accordance with 2005 and the 2001 specifications, are claimed.


        1. The Court had initially granted the ex parte injunction on 4.5.2009 restraining the use of the drawings pertaining to the two specifications or even from manufacture and supply to the fourth defendant i.e. Central Government. The defendants had carried the matter in appeal; the Division Bench disposed of the appeal recording that Ashok Leyland would move an application for vacation of the interim order. Accordingly, I.A. No.8163/2009 was filed by Ashok Leyland on which notice was served. This order proposes to dispose of the plaintiff’s interim injunction application -I.A. No.5916/2009 and the defendant’s application for vacation of the interim order, I.A. No.8163/2009.


        2. The brief facts necessary for the case according to the suit averments are that the Babbar Wreckers claims to be engaged in manufacturing and designing wreckers (also known as LRVs) for more than 40 years and to having supplied them to various Government departments. The equipments are reliable and easy to operate and are mounted on suitable commercial vehicles. Babbar Wreckers claims to have earned substantial reputation and goodwill for the performance of its wrecker equipment and also claims to have spent considerable money in designing and development them having regard to their functionality. It is submitted that in 1980-85, one model of a wrecker known as "Babbar Model GN-7 Medium Recovery Breakdown" (BWGN-7) was designed. An application for trademark registration was made on 28.7.1983. Babbar Wreckers claims to have participated in 1995 in the India International Trade Fair and demonstrated its equipments mounted on TATA 1210D LPT to various vendees. It is submitted that in September, 1995, Central Government through the Ministry of Defence was looking for supply of LRVs and the first defendant submitted its specifications to Army Headquarters with regard to development and supply of LRV on 5/7.5 Ton Stallion MK-II on Ashok Leyland Chassis for procurement of purchase order. It is stated that this was rejected by the Ministry of Defence. Subsequently, on 9.1.1996, a technical group of the Army Headquarters wrote to the Director General, EME (Eqpt.), informing that preliminary assessment of the specifications submitted by the Ashok Leyland for



        development of LRV on 5/7.5 Ton Stallion MK-II was found untenable. It is stated that

        the same letter recommended the plaintiff for development of LRVs of 7.5 Ton capacity.

        The plaintiff’s name was recommended to Ashok Leyland. The said letter reads as

        follows:
        "4. In Dec. 95 M/s Babbar Wrecker Pvt. Ltd. demonstrated their wrecker eqpt during the exhibition of India International Trade Fair –
        95. This firm has been manufacturing wrecker eqpt. for last 30 yrs and they have already supplied over 200 wrecker eqpts to various agencies in India. The gist of the points, after detailed discussion with M/s Babbar Wrecker Pvt. Ltd., are as follows:


        1. (a) Thefirm demonstrated their wrecker eqpt mounted on Tata 1210D LPT, to Chief Automotive Engineer, which could lift 7.5 ton dead weight on outriggers, without stay anchor, with single line pull. They have already developed PTO, winch-gear, booms, super structure and outriggers to handle load up to 15 Tons on single line pull.


        2. (b) M/s Babbar Wrecker Pvt. Ltd. claims that their wrecker eqpt, to handle 7.5 tons lift and line pull, will weigh under 3.5 Tons.


        3. (c) The firm offers to supply wrecker eqpt with 7.5 Ton line pull within 4 to 6 weeks on receipt of orders, for trials. They have also offered to undertake development of 7.5 ton LRV on any suitable chasses.




        1. In view of para 4 above M/s Babber Wrecker Pvt. Ltd. has been asked to provide specifications compatible to GSQR. In addition, Mr. P. Dhanasekaran, Senior Dev elopement Manager (Spl Veh) of M/s Ashok Leyland, has also been provided details of M/s Babber Wrecker Pvt. Ltd. to facilitate dev elopement of Light Recovery Vehicle of 7.5 Ton capacity.


        2. Considering the feasibility of development 7.5 ton Wrecker eqpt, the following options are now available.


        Option-1. M/s Ashok Leyland be advised to procure 7.5 ton wrecker equipment from M/s. Babbar Wrecker Pvt. Ltd. for development of prototype LRV.
        Option-2. One 5/7.5 ton Stallion MK-II be offered to M/s.
        Babbar Wrecker for development of LRV preferably on „no cost no commitment‟ basis under the aegis of HQ Tech Group. This
        option provides a scope for development of LRV by the Army Base Wksp.  Option-3. Assigning one of the Army Base Wksp eqpt. Ex. M/s. Babbar Wrecker. One 5/7.5 Ton Stallion MK-II be made
        available to the assigned Base Wksp for this task. This option will be suitable on long term basis as the existing financial rules
        and procedure would require some alterations."

        4. Babbar Wreckers contends having represented on 24.1.1996, enclosing its "Breakdown Wrecker" brochure to the Army Headquarters showing its interest for the supply of the required equipment. The suit avers that Ashok Leyland on 12.03.1996 wrote to Babbar Wreckers requesting it to provide super structure drawings and technical data in respect of 7.5 ton wrecker equipments to seek further approval from the Army Headquarters. The material part of the letter reads as follows: -
        "… In order to proceed with the project, it is necessary to make a superstructure drawing and get it approved. Kindly also furnish all the technical data regarding the 7.5 ton Wrecker to enable us make an offer to Defence and to recheck at our end the Wreckter transmission ratio, service drum gear ratio and the sprocket ratio.
        Kindly arrange to send the drawing and the technical details at
        the earliest…."

        5. Babbar Wreckers submits that on 31.07.1996 it informed Ashok Leyland about fabrication of a prototype recovery breakdown Wrecker of 7.5 tons capacity on its

        (Ashok Leyland’s) vehicle, Stallion 4X4 and that it was ready for inspection and testing

        by the Army.


          1. 6. The suit further states that Ashok Leyland on 11.12.1999 wrote a letter to Babbar Wreckers asking it to prepare and submit the fabrication drawings of the LRV. The suit relies upon the Minutes of the Meeting dated 17.04.2000 held at the Army Headquarters to decide the modalities for inspection of pilot LRV 5/7.5 Stallion and states that its drawings were actually agreed to be furnished to Central Government. Babbar Wreckers states that it thereafter prepared the engineering drawings which were computer generated and specially prepared by its Draftsman under the direct supervision of Mr. Naresh Babbar, its Managing Director. The drawings were furnished to Ashok Leyland and the Central Government. They were provisionally approved by the Deputy Controller, CQAE (OFV), Jabalpur, of the Central Government. Babbar Wreckers further states that it developed and designed the wrecker equipment as per specifications of the Central Government which were tested and approved. Later on 9.6.2000, the Central


          2. Government issued a purchase contract to Ashok Leyland for supply of 195 LRV based on 5/7.5 ton Stallion as per the approved specification No. CQA (OFV)/VEH/STLN/LRV/2K/03 (hereafter called as "2K specification") on the understanding that Babbar Wreckers would be fabricating the LRVs on Ashok Leyland’s vehicles. Ashok Leyland thereafter issued a letter of intent dated 8.8.2000 for supply of 195 breakdown wreckers units, out of which 100 were supplied by Babbar Wreckers and 95 by Perfect. Babbar Wreckers relies upon a joint inspection and its Minutes of meeting to say that the LRVs were fabricated by it was in conformity with its engineering drawings and specifications. The Minutes of meeting/inspection report has been filed.


        1. Babbar Wreckers claims to have entered into an arrangement whereby Perfect was granted license to use its drawings at the behest of Ashok Leyland; reliance is placed on agreements dated 8.9.2000, 21.9.2000, 7.2.2002 and 15.4.2002 for payment of what is termed as nominal royalty of 3% to 7% of the basic price of the LRVs. Perfect is alleged to have paid royalty to Babbar Wreckers, till 2002. The agreement between the parties dated 7.2.2002 was valid till completion of the work order. It is stated that even though Perfect did not pay royalty despite its obligation to do so, Babbar Wreckers allowed it to use the drawings as a gesture of goodwill but at the same time that cannot be construed as waiving its right to claim such royalty. Babbar Wreckers then mentions about the various contracts between 2000-2005 where the work orders were procured by Ashok Leyland for supply of the entire LRV; the fabrication and supply of wreckers were distributed between the Babbar Wreckers and Perfect. These have been detailed in paragraph-24. For the period 2000-2009, such orders for supply of 1121 vehicles was given by the Central Government in five lots; Babbar Wreckers was given the contract (or sub-contract) to fabricate 664 wreckers assemblies. Babbar Wreckers submits that according to the understanding between the parties whenever Ashok Leyland procured the orders for supply of the vehicles with the wrecker assemblies, it (Babbar Wreckers) invariably was given a proportionate order for fabrication of the wrecker assembly and Perfect was to get a proportionately lower quantity. The suit mentions about a legal notice dated 1.10.2005 to Perfect, calling upon it to pay royalty which led to intervention



        of the Central Government. In this letter, the Central Government stated that unless the

        matter was resolved inter se, it would not place any further orders on Ashok Leyland. It

        is stated that in these circumstances, on 27.12.2005, Babbar Wreckers wrote to the

        Central Government stating that the matter had been resolved.

        8. Babbar Wreckers relies upon the grant of provisional Proprietary Article

        Certificate by the Central Government on 9.6.2004, which was granted. The said

        Proprietary Article Certificate dated 2.2.2005 reads as follows:
        "M/s Babbar Wrecker Pvt. Ltd., B-11, Mayapuri Industrial AreaPh-1, New Delhi -110 064
        PAC FOR SUPERSTRUCTURE OF LRV 5/7.5 TON MODEL BWGN-7C/BWGN-7C/A MOUNTED ON STALLION 4X4
        Dear Sirs,
        Reference: (i) Your letter No.BWPL/CQAV/04 dt. 25.12.04.

        (ii) this office letter of even No. dt. 5.1.05 and 25.1.05.


        1. Superstructure Model BWGN-7C/BWGN-7C/A, developed and designed by M/s. Babbar Wreckers was trial evaluated at VRDE and by users extensively. Accordingly, Specification No. CQA (OFV)/VEH/STLN/003/2001 was formulated.


        2. Details of items for which PAC is accorded except bought out and hardware items as indicated in the ISPL submitted by you are enclosed as


        Appendix „A‟.
        4. Further, as requested vide our letter dated 25.1.05 copy of two sets of complete manufacturing drgs. consisting of Gp 32.01 to 32.23 including Assys/Sub-Assys as given in general arrangement, Accessories and SMTs may please be forwarded to this Controllerate. The drgs. are required to be forwarded within 7 days to this Controllerate four our sealing and scrutiny purpose. It is pertinent to mention here that no changes/modification shall be carried out without the prior approval of this Controllerate.
        Thanking you, Yours Sincerely
        (J.S. Sangwan)"

        9
        . Babbar Wreckers complains that a departure from the previous understanding and

        agreement took place, when Ashok Leyland was placed with an order of supply of 286

        LRVs in January, 2009, the contract/order for fabrication and supply of all the wrecker

        assemblies was, however, placed on Perfect. It is stated that this was in breach of the

        agreement as Babbar Wreckers had put in tremendous labour and effort in securing its

        drawings approved and was entitled to at least half of the order but was content to

        maintain cordial relations by executing the orders for wrecker assemblies only in respect

        of 50 LRVs. It is submitted that if the past precedent and practice were to be taken into

        account, Babbar Wreckers was entitled to manufacture at least 50% of the total orders

        placed upon Ashok Leyland; the latter kept on evading and giving vague assurances.

        Ultimately, a legal notice dated 7.4.2009 was issued to the first three defendants,

        terminating the license to use the drawings and specifications. Babbar Wreckers claims

        that it is the author and owner of the copyright in the 2001 and 2005 specifications; the

        claim is founded on the following plea:
        "36. It is submitted that the specification no.CQA(OFV)/VEH/STLN/LRV/2003/01 and specification no.CQA (OFV)/VEH/STLN/LRV/2003/05 approved by the Ministry of
        Defence for fabrication of LRVs comprise of Plaintiff‟s
        engineering drawings, specifications and technical know-how. The subject matter of the said specification contains several engineering drawings of Wrecker equipments which illustrate the functional features thereof. The said engineering drawings constitute original artistic works within the meaning of Section 2
        (c) of the Copyright Act, 1957 and are entitled to copyright protection. All the engineering drawings are computer generated drawings prepared by the draftsman Mr. Aman under the employment of the plaintiff and under the supervision of Mr. Naresh Babbar, Managing Director of the Plaintiff. The said engineering drawings are artistic works, designed and created at instance of Plaintiff for valuable consideration paid. The plaintiff, therefore, is the owner of copyright therein having exclusive right to use or reproduce features thereof in any material form, directly or indirectly, including three dimensional form from two dimensional drawings or three dimensional form by the process of
        "reverse engineering". The fabrication of any Wrecker
        equipment (LRV) based on the engineering drawings and specifications of the Plaintiff without plaintiff‟s authorization constitute violation of Plaintiff‟s copyright in the engineering drawings pertaining thereto, which, apart from constituting infringement under Section 51 (a) of the Copyright Act, 1957, also amounts to cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine up to Rupees Two lakhs, under Sections-63
        and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957."


          1. 10. The plaintiff argues that the pleadings and documents on record prove beyond doubt, that it is the copyright owner of the drawings conforming to the specifications of 2001 and 2005, used by the Ashok Leyland and Perfect for assembling the wrecker units. It is submitted that such drawings are artistic works under Section 2 (c) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereafter called "the Act"). Counsel argues that these drawings are product of the creative effort put in at the plaintiff’s behest. It is submitted the authority and


          2. right to exclusively reproduce the drawings in material, three dimensional form, vests in the plaintiff, which both Ashok Leyland and Perfect have infringed.


        1. Babbar Wreckers relies on the judgments reported as John Richard v. Chemical Process Equipment (P) Ltd. AIR 1987 Del 372; Escorts Construction Equipment Ltd. & Anr. v. Action Construction Equipment (Pvt.) Ltd. 1999 PTC 36 (Del), etc. for the proposition that drawings are deemed to be artistic works, and entitled to protection under the Act. It is submitted that having used Babbar Wreckers drawings, and secured orders from the Central Government, which were exploited fully, the plaintiff cannot be deprived of the benefit of copyright, by the defendants. It is submitted that despite service of summons, steps have not been taken by the Central Government to contest the suit.




        1. The plaintiff contends in addition that the defendants particularly the Ashok Leyland and Perfect cannot dispute its copyright because of the circumstance that royalty was consistently paid in accordance with the previous arrangements. It is argued that the Babbar Wrecker’s copyrights thereby stand explicitly established and it is entitled to the injunction as claimed. The reliance is placed upon the judgment reported as Najma Heptulla v. M/s Orient Longman Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1989 Del 623.


          1. 14. The first three defendants have filed a common written statement. They contend that in 1995, Ashok Leyland offered to supply LRVs consisting of its Stallion 4X4 Chassis with wrecker to the Central Government as per the latter’s requirement which was later published as JSQR No.2320-03 of 1996. It is stated that in 1995 itself Ashok


          2. Leyland prepared its drawing X9828800 disclosing the basic lay out of the proposed LRVs. The submission is that the Ashok Leyland does not fabricate wreckers itself and, therefore, had approached various vendors. It is stated that in 1996, the plaintiff’s name -for fabrication of the concerned wrecker units-was suggested to the Central Government. The defendants’ claim that the wrecker units were assembled according to the specifications spelt out on the basis of the said drawing X9828800 and even the proto-type was made subsequently.

        2. The defendants’ emphasize on the averments in the suit to the effect that the prototype of the recovery breakdown wrecker of 7.5 tons capacity, was fabricated sometime in July, 1996 and a letter to the same effect had been given by the plaintiff. It is submitted that the documents placed on the record clearly demonstrates that the drawings on which copyright is claimed are dated 9.7.2000 and consequently the claim for creation of original drawings in 1996 is ex facie untenable. The defendants argue that the entire basis of the suit claim about the subsistence of the copyright, therefore, is without documentary basis.


        3. Amplifying the submissions, it is further stated that the plaintiff’s case that the prototype of the wrecker were ready in 1996 in turn constitute a implicit admission that they were based on some other drawings which unambiguously point to the plaintiff’s JSQR No.2320-03 of 1996 specifications and drawing X9828800. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could not have developed and fabricated the wrecker unit or even its pilot prototype in the absence of drawings. It is, therefore, urged that these facts are sufficient to foreclose the claim for injunction and certainly prima facie rebut the submission that the plaintiff is a copyright owner of the drawings embodying in the 2001, 2003 and 2005 specifications. The defendants urged that any two dimensional rendering or reduction/recording of a three dimensional object is subject to copyright protection in terms of Section 14; according to them in this case, the three dimensional rendering was of prototype/pilot wreckers in 1996 itself. The plaintiff, it is stated, does not claim copyright over such articles -nor can claim it. Therefore, the copying or recording of such articles in two dimensional forms does not confer exclusive rights.


        4. The defendants argue that the wrecker units are just constituents of an overall



        article which they were contracted to supply to the Central Government. It is stated that such articles i.e. LRVs are essential for public use by the defence forces and that grant of an injunction of the kind sought for, would led to untoward consequences. The defendants, in this regard, submit that the drawings are not subject to copyright protection since they constitute Government works under Section-17 (d) of the Copyright Act, which is in the following terms:
        "17. First owner of copyright.
        -Subject to the provisions of this Act, the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein Provided that-
        XXX XXX XXX
        (d) in the case of a Government work, Government shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright therein;"

        18. The defendants further submit that in any event, the use of drawings as is complained of does not constitute copyright infringement under Section-52 (x) of the Act which is in the following terms:
        "52. Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright. -(1) The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:
        XXX XXX XXX
        (x) the reconstruction of a building or structure in accordance with the architectural drawings or plans by reference to which the building or structure was originally constructed:
        Provided that the original construction was made with the consent or licence of the owner of the copyright in such drawings and plans;"

        19. The defendants further submit that in terms of the JSQR No.2320-03 of 1996 published by the Central Government which forms the basis or foundation in the formulation of specifications for wrecker units, the proprietary rights over all the drawings and allied literature vests with the Central Government. The relevant condition in Paragraph-37 is relied upon:
        "PROPRITORY RIGHTS 37. In the event of the proto-type vehicle being accepted as a standardized product, the aforesaid vehicle design and literature submitted by the firm concerned shall be deemed to have become the property of Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence."


        1. It is submitted that there cannot be any estoppel as is argued by the plaintiff; as it would amount to undermining the public interest. The reliance is placed upon the judgment of the United States Court of Appeal of the VIth Circuit reported as Beer Nuts, INC, v. King Nut Company 477 F.2d 326. It is stated that the said judgment though in the context of patent protection applies equally in the case of copyrights where if a monopolist claims and is granted royalty on premises which the later discovered to be unfounded, it is in the public interest that estoppel is not held against the ostensible licensee. The defendants also rely upon the judgment reported as BRY Air India (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Western Engineering Company 1999 PTC (19) 48 for the submission that when information is furnished to someone on the basis of which drawings or specifications are formulated, the person who creates such drawings or specification under these circumstances cannot claim copyright.


        2. It is argued that the injunction granted initially by this Court is holding up all further negotiations and consequent award of similar contracts to Ashok Leyland which was undisputedly given the assignment of all previous actions, even according to the plaintiff. Ashok Leyland argues that its tender for supply of further 116 numbers of LRVs mounted on its 4X4 Stallion is subject to advance negotiations and only the price component has to be finalized. Learned counsel argues that if the Court were to confirm the injunction, even without a formal contract, it would be mandated to award a part of the contract to the plaintiff -a proposition which is contrary to the principles for grant of injunction which clearly are that the Courts cannot in exercise of their jurisdiction compel the parties to enter into a contract. It is submitted that at best if the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff is the prima facie copyright owner and that the previous arrangement between the parties entitled it to royalty, suitable orders to secure the plaintiff’s interest in that regard may be made.


          1. 22. It can be seen from the above discussion that Ashok Leyland manufactures the main assemblies of the LRVs; Babbar Wreckers and Pefect manufacture the wrecker


          2. units, mounted on it (Ashok Leyland’s heavy vehicle is known as the Stallion 4X4). It is the common case of parties that these vehicles are utilized by the Ministry of Defence. Babbar Wreckers claims to have been manufacturing 3.5 tonne capacity wreckers, earlier, and developed the prototype which matched the Central Government’s requirements, sometime in 1995. Its positive case is that its drawings formed the basis for a prototype manufactured, for the first time, in 1996; a letter dated 31-7-1996 is relied on. Similarly, it relies on several letters by Ashok Lelyland, asking it to prepare the drawings, for manufacturing the wrecker unit. The other materials include the letter to Ashok Leyland, dated 11-7-1999, and agreements dated 8.9.2000, 21.9.2000, 7.2.2002 and 15.4.2002 for supply of various quantities of wrecker assemblies, where the second defendant had agreed to pay royalty to the plaintiff.

        3. The plaintiff is correct when it submits that copyright can subsist, in mechanical drawings. The question here, however is, whether such prima facie case about the



        proprietorship as asserted by it has been made out. Though the plaintiff’s argument is that the drawings were made in 1996, under its Managing Director’s supervision, and

        direction, no such drawing has been produced. Significantly, all the drawings placed on the record are of mid-2000 vintage; each is contemporaneous to the date when the Central Government placed the orders upon Ashok Leyland. The plaintiff carefully avers that the prototypes of the wreckers, which were ultimately supplied, and were the subject matter of inter se understanding or arrangement with Ashok Leyland, were assembled for the first time, in 1996. Undeniably, such prototypes must have been prepared on the basis of some drawings. Yet, those drawings are not forthcoming. The plaintiff argues that the drawings were prepared, on the basis of such prototype. Now, a facial look at the product drawings and photographs would lead on to infer, at least prima facie, that some technical drawings were required for their manufacture, as they are expected to haul and carry heavy weights, and are to be mounted on chasis manufactured by another concern. Such being the case, the plaintiff’s argument about creation of the drawings after the prototypes were manufactured, seems implausible, to say the least. What is prima facie

        credible, on the other hand, is Ashok Leyland’s assertion that its prototype and

        specifications JSQR No.2320-03 of 1996 and drawing X9828800 were accepted by the Central Government, in 1995, after which Babbar Wreckers was approached in 1996, to make the wrecker units. The inter se correspondence with Ashok Leyland, then becomes

        comprehensible, as the latter’s insistence that the drawings, according to its

        specifications, were to be prepared.

        24. The second aspect, and an important one at that is that the court cannot shut its eyes to clause 37 of the JSQR which formed the basis for awarding the contract, unambiguously states that the Central Government would be the proprietor of the design

        and product ("proto-type vehicle being accepted as a standardized product, the aforesaid vehicle design and literature submitted by the firm concerned shall be deemed to have become the property of Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence."). This stipulation-coupled with Section 17 (d)-also prima facie point to copyright ownership of the Central Government, in the drawings. Here, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the contracts were primarily awarded to Ashok Leyland, which only parted with a portion of them, to the plaintiff, as regards wrecker assemblies. They were and are meant to be used for transportation of materials, and hauling of heavy loads and equipment, for defense purposes, and cater to an obvious public or national purpose.

        25. As far as estoppel is concerned, the plaintiff relies on Najma Heptulla‟s case. In that, the plaintiff was a legal representative of Maulana Azad, who had supplied his book to Prof. Humanyun Kabir for its narration and translation. The plaintiff had received 50% royalty for 30 years, and granted copyrights to the publisher. The court restrained the plaintiff from challenging the validity of the agreement. The plaintiff was not granted injunction to stop the defendant from publishing the book even after the said term was over. In this case, however, the materials on record suggest that Perfect had stopped paying royalty to the plaintiff, sometime in 2002; this had led to exchange of legal notices, and the Central Government intervening with the plaintiff, which had withheld supplies. The plaintiff resumed supplies, and did not claim royalties. The legal notice which preceded the present case, too, did not claim royalty arrears, nor was any leave sought to claim them; in any case, such claims are now time barred. An added circumstance is that for the subsequent supplies, there was no payment of royalty. In these facts, the court is of the opinion that having regard to the wide nature of copyright claims, in such cases, which amount to declaration of monopolistic rights over the entire world, the grant of an equitable remedy of injunction solely on the behavioral principle of estoppel, would be inappropriate. In trademark infringement, however, considerations are different, because the nature of defences vary, as the defendant can establish honest concurrent user, prior user, etc, since the claim is uniquely asserted on a case to case basis. However, a copyright subsists for the longest duration, in the cluster of intellectual property rights, and the courts are entitled to test the wide and sweeping nature of rights asserted, undoubtedly in the context of an estoppel, but not soley on such bases. In this case, royalty was paid in about two instances, and had not been paid for over 7 years before this case was instituted. In the circumstances, there is no estoppel which bars the

        defendants from contesting the plaintiff’s copyright in the drawings.


        1. The court has noticed more than once, previously, in this judgment, that the contracts have an underlying public purpose, ie. catering to the needs of the Ministry of Defence. The documentary materials on record prima facie suggest that even though Ashok Leyland granted Babbar Wreckers the contract to manufacture wrecker assemblies, roughly in the proportion of 50% of what granted in the orders, there is no written arrangement. The plaintiff of course has averred that royalty of 3% to 7 % used to be paid to it by Perfect in respect of the wrecker units assembled by it. However, in the absence of any indication about the duration of the arrangement, and any positive evidence that such understanding was to operate in a specific manner, for all times to come, or for a period, it would be imprudent for the court to issue a direction to Ashok Leyland, to share its contract execution with Babbar Wreckers. Such a direction would result in the court enjoining a party to enter into a contract, which it clear cannot issue. Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that attaching any condition of the kind insisted upon by the plaintiff to permit execution of any contract by the Central Government with Ashok Leyland, would clearly not be in the public interest. Clause 37 of the JSQR, also points to the possibility of the Government being the owner and author of the works. In the circumstances, the court cannot be blind to the public interest element, which looms large in this case.


        2. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the plaintiff has been unable to



        establish, prima facie, to its being a copyright owner. At the same time, the court is conscious that it has been beneficiary in previous contracts, and that 3-7 % royalty was being paid to it – although some time ago. Having regard to these overall circumstances, and to balance the competing rights, and protect the plaintiff’s interest, Ashok Leyland is

        directed to furnish an undertaking to pay damages in the event of the plaintiff succeeding. It shall, to that end, also file accounts, and statements, in respect of the amounts received and profits, if any, derived in the contracts that were executed when the suit was filed, and further contracts to be executed, in the event of their being awarded to it, by the Central Government. Such accounts shall be filed once each year. Ashok Leyland is also directed to furnish a bank guarantee for the sum of Rs. 30,00,000/-in favour of the Registrar of this Court, to satisfy any money decree, within four weeks from today.

        28. IA Nos.5916, 8163/2009 and 1396/2010 are disposed of in the above terms.

        CS (OS) 803/2009
        th

        The suit shall be listed for further proceedings, on 29November, 2010.


        S. RAVINDRA BHAT (JUDGE)

        NOVEMBER 2, 2010

        ARIHANT TEA COMPANY VS JAYSHREE TEA


        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

        SUBJECT : CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

        Date of Decision: April, 22,2009

        CM(M) 903/2008 & CM 10911/2008

        ARIHANT TEA COMPANY ..... PetitionerThrough: Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman, Adv.

        versus

        JAYSHREE TEA & INDUSTRIES LTD ..... Respondent Through: Mr. Nitin Gupta, Advocate

        MANMOHAN, J : (Oral)

        1                    Present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 4th June, 2008 whereby Additional District Judge dismissed petitioner/plaintiff’s application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

        2                    Learned counsel for petitioner states that in view of coming into force of new Trade Marks Act, 1999 with effect from 2003, petitioner had applied for registration of its mark under class 35 in the category of services. In July, 2007 petitioner/plaintiff received a new certificate of registration under class 35 and consequently, in November, 2007 it filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for adding relief of infringement in an already pending passing off suit. He submitted that by way of the amendment application, petitioner/plaintiff wanted to bring on record the said subsequent event and at this stage, trial court could not have gone into merits or demerits of the proposed amendment – as it did.

                                3. Learned counsel for respondent/defendant, however, submitted that if the amendment were to be allowed, it would amount to introducing a new cause of action. In this context, he relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alka Puri Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Jayantibhai (deceased) Thr.

                                LRs. reported in I (2009) SLT 692. He further stated that though petitioner/plaintiff claims to have filed its application for registration in the year 2004, it did not bring this fact to the knowledge of the trial court till November, 2007. He lastly submitted that as trial had already commenced in the matter, present amendment application should not be allowed.

        3                    It is well-settled that Order 6 Rule 17 CPC gives power to the Court to allow such amendments which are necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. In the present case, petitioner/plaintiff is claiming protection of its mark and by virtue of the amendment application, petitioner/plaintiff only wants to bring on record subsequent event that its mark has been registered under class 35 of new Trade Marks Act, 1999. In my opinion, the amendment sought for is necessary for adjudication of the matter in controversy between the parties. The proposed amendment would also prevent multiplicity of litigation between the same parties. Moreover, the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court cited by respondent/defendant is inapplicable as I am of the view that by way of proposed amendment, there will be no change in the fundamental/basic character of the suit which is primarily aimed at protecting petitioner/plaintiff’s mark ‘Birla Tea’.

        4                    As far as respondent/defendant’s submission that petitioner should have earlier brought to the notice of trial court that it had applied for registration under class 35, I am of the view that there is a separate statutory procedure provided for registration of a mark. Under the said procedure there is no requirement or obligation on the part of petitioner/plaintiff to bring the fact of it having applied for registration to the notice or knowledge of trial court. In any event, it is pertinent to mention that before a registration certificate is issued, statutory procedure provides for an advertisement in a trade mark journal. Therefore, I am of the view that this objection is meaningless.

        5                    Respondent’s other objection that amendment cannot be allowed at this stage as trial has commenced is untenable in law, as I am of the view that after the 2002 amendment of CPC, court has power to allow amendment after trial has commenced if the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence a party could not have raised the matter before commencement of trial. Since in the present case, petitioner/plaintiff has applied for amendment within four months of it having received a registration certificate, I am of the view that there is no delay in filing amendment application and consequently, this objection of respondent/defendant is misconceived.

        6                    Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion, present petition is allowed and petitioner/plaintiff is directed to file an amended plaint within a period of four weeks from today. Trial court will permit defendant/respondent herein to file an amended written statement within a further period of six weeks. With the aforesaid observations, present petition and pending application stand disposed of.


        Sd/-MANMOHAN,J

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