Saturday, February 1, 2025

PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. vs. BundlePe Innovations Pvt. Ltd.

Common industry terms cannot be monopolized

Introduction:This case revolves around a trademark infringement and passing-off dispute between PhonePe Pvt. Ltd., a leading digital payment company, and BundlePe Innovations Pvt. Ltd., which operates a similar platform. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s use of the marks “BundlePe” and “LatePe” violates its intellectual property rights over “PhonePe” and misleads consumers into associating the services. The suit seeks a declaration of PhonePe as a well-known trademark, a permanent injunction against the defendants from using similar marks, and damages of ₹10,00,000 for the alleged trademark violation.

Plaintiff’s Business & Trademark Rights: PhonePe, a digital payments platform, was incorporated as FX Mart Pvt. Ltd. before rebranding. It operates under licenses from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and has over 450 million users.It claims ownership of the "PhonePe" mark, registered under multiple classes under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.The plaintiff has spent heavily on marketing, including celebrity endorsements (Aamir Khan & Alia Bhatt), and dominates 48% of all UPI transactions in India.

Defendant’s Business & Alleged Infringement: BundlePe Innovations Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated in 2022 and provides similar payment services under the marks “BundlePe” and “LatePe”.PhonePe alleges that the phonetic and visual similarity between these marks creates consumer confusion.The plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice in March 2023, but the defendants refused to comply, leading to the lawsuit.

Jurisdiction & Procedural Challenges:The defendants argued that since PhonePe’s registered office is in Mumbai and BundlePe’s in Kolkata, the case should not be heard in Chennai.However, the Madras High Court retained jurisdiction, citing Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which allows suits where the plaintiff carries out business (PhonePe has a branch in Chennai).

Plaintiff’s Submissions: The "Pe" suffix is a distinct identifier of PhonePe and is not a generic word in English. The defendants’ marks closely resemble “PhonePe” and create confusion in the digital payments sector. The use of capital "P" in "Pe" is an attempt to copy the plaintiff’s branding. The Delhi and Bombay High Courts have previously ruled against similar claims, which the plaintiff argues should not affect this case.

Defendants’ Submissions:The words "Phone" and "Pe" are generic and widely used in the payments industry (e.g., Paytm, Google Pay). The prefixes “Bundle” and “Late” make their marks sufficiently distinct. The Delhi High Court previously rejected PhonePe’s claim over the exclusivity of the word "Pe" in BharatPe's case (CS (Comm) 292 of 2019). The plaintiff is trying to monopolize common industry terms, which is against trademark law. No evidence was provided of actual consumer confusion or financial harm to PhonePe.

Issues Framed by the Court:The court examined ten key issues, including whether:"BundlePe" & "LatePe" are deceptively similar to "PhonePe".  The plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction for infringement. "PhonePe" qualifies as a well-known trademark under Section 2(zg) & Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act.

Key Findings & Reasoning of the Judge: No Deceptive Similarity: The court ruled that “BundlePe” and “LatePe” were not deceptively similar to “PhonePe”, as the term "Pe" is commonly used in the digital payment industry.No Infringement or Passing Off: Since PhonePe failed to prove consumer confusion, no injunction was granted.No Damages: PhonePe did not provide financial proof of harm, making the damages claim speculative.Not a Well-Known Trademark: While PhonePe is a popular brand, it does not qualify as a "well-known trademark" under Section 11, as “Pe” is widely used.Domain Name Dispute: The plaintiff sought an injunction against bundlepe.com & latepe.in, but the court ruled that domain names were not deceptively similar.

Decision:Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed, with all issues decided against PhonePe.No injunction, damages, or trademark recognition was granted.

Concluding Note:This case highlights the limits of trademark protection for generic terms in India. The ruling underscores that: Common industry terms cannot be monopolized (e.g., "Pe" in the payments sector).Consumer confusion must be proven with market evidence.

Case Title: PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. vs. BundlePe Innovations Pvt. Ltd.
Date of Order: January 21, 2025
Case No.: Civil Suit (COMM DIV) No. 119 of 2023
Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
Judge: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney]
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Pfizer Inc. vs. Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.

Third parties can be compelled to provide evidence if it aids justice.

Introduction: This case concerns an international patent dispute between Pfizer Inc. and Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., arising from litigation pending before the United States District Court, Delaware. The petitioners sought to execute Letters Rogatory under the Hague Evidence Convention, 1970, requesting judicial assistance from the Madras High Court for collecting evidence and recording testimony related to alleged patent infringement concerning the pharmaceutical drug VYNDAMAX® (Tafamidis 61 mg capsules), used in the treatment of Transthyretin Amyloid Cardiomyopathy.The main issue before the Madras High Court was whether it could execute the Letters Rogatory and direct the appointment of a Local Commissioner to collect evidence from Softgel Healthcare, an entity based in India but not a party to the U.S. litigation.

Petitioner's submission: Petitioner alleged that Indian pharmaceutical companies, including CIPLA and Zenara (now Hikma), had filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of VYNDAMAX® before the expiry of Pfizer’s U.S. Patent No. 441.

Respondents Submission: Respondent Claimed to be an independent entity not involved in the U.S. litigation.Allegedly possessed documents and information related to Zenara and CIPLA’s ANDA products, which Pfizer sought for use in the U.S. litigation.

Proceedings in the U.S.:Pfizer filed lawsuits against Zenara, CIPLA, Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., and Dexcel Pharma Technologies Ltd. in the U.S. District Court, Delaware.The U.S. Court issued Letters Rogatory on May 13, 2024, requesting the Madras High Court’s assistance in collecting testimonies and documentary evidence from Softgel Healthcare. Reliefs Sought by Pfizer in India:Appointment of a Local Commissioner to collect evidence/documents.Formation of a Confidentiality Club to safeguard sensitive information.Conducting in-camera proceedings to protect confidential data.Forwarding the collected evidence to the U.S. Court in a sealed cover.

Petitioners (Pfizer Inc. and Others): The Hague Evidence Convention, 1970, allows international judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters.Softgel Healthcare possessed relevant documents and information concerning Zenara and CIPLA’s generic versions of VYNDAMAX®.The Madras High Court had jurisdiction under Order XXVI Rules 19-22 of CPC and Sections 75-78 CPC to execute the Letters Rogatory.There was no violation of India’s sovereignty or security, as required under Article 12 of the Hague Convention for denying a request.The petition did not violate Indian patent laws, as the evidence was sought only for U.S. litigation and not for enforcing Pfizer’s patent in India.Past precedents support executing Letters Rogatory, including: Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc. vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Inc. (AP High Court),Pfizer Inc. vs. Unimark Remedies Ltd. (Bombay High Court),Wooster Products Inc. vs. Magna Tek Inc. (Delhi High Court)

Respondent (Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.):Softgel was not a party to the U.S. litigation, making the request unjustified. Confidentiality concerns: Disclosing sensitive pharmaceutical R&D data could harm commercial interests. Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement protects confidential business data. Pfizer’s Indian patent application for VYNDAMAX® was rejected under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 (for being a modification of a known substance).The Hague Convention cannot override Indian laws if disclosure violates domestic regulations.The request amounted to a fishing expedition, violating Article 23 of the Hague Convention.Gujarat High Court precedents (Leighton International Ltd. and Fenix Diamonds LLC) held that Indian courts are not bound to execute Letters Rogatory against third parties.

Key Legal Precedents Considered:Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale vs. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (U.S. Supreme Court)Clarified that international judicial assistance should be granted unless it disrupts national interests.Norwich Pharmacal Co. vs. Customs and Excise Commissioners (House of Lords) Held that third parties can be compelled to provide evidence if it aids justiceAventis Pharmaceuticals Inc. vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Inc. (AP High Court)Allowed execution of Letters Rogatory in a similar pharmaceutical patent case. Pfizer Inc. vs. Unimark Remedies Ltd. (Bombay High Court)Ruled that both oral and documentary evidence can be obtained under Order XXVI Rule 19 CPC. Leighton International Ltd. vs. Gavin John Hodge (Gujarat High Court, 2014)Held that Indian courts cannot compel non-parties to foreign litigation. Fenix Diamonds LLC vs. Carnegie Institute of Washington (Gujarat High Court, 2020)Denied execution of Letters Rogatory, citing confidentiality concerns.

Reasoning of the Court:Jurisdiction & Applicability of Hague Convention:Since India is a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, the Madras High Court had the authority to execute Letters Rogatory. Balancing Confidentiality & Evidence Collection: A Confidentiality Club was ordered to protect sensitive data. Only specific persons could access confidential documents. Non-Party Argument Rejected: The Norwich Pharmacal doctrine allows non-parties to be compelled if they possess crucial evidence. Softgel’s involvement with Zenara and CIPLA made it relevant to the U.S. case. Article 23 of the Hague Convention Not Violated:India’s reservation under Article 23 applies to pre-trial discovery. Here, specific documents were sought, not general discovery.

Decision of the Court: Petitions Allowed: The Madras High Court permitted execution of the Letters Rogatory. Local Commissioner Appointed: Mr. Adarsh Ramanujam was appointed to collect evidence. Confidentiality Club Established: Only designated members could access the evidence. In-Camera Proceedings Ordered: Hearings would be conducted privately. Evidence to be Sent to the U.S. Court in a Sealed Cover.

Concluding Note:This ruling reinforces India’s commitment to international judicial cooperation under the Hague Evidence Convention. The judgment carefully balanced intellectual property rights, confidentiality, and legal obligations, setting a precedent for handling cross-border patent disputes in India.

Case Title: Pfizer Inc. vs. Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.
Date of Order: January 28, 2025
Case No.: O.P. (PT) Nos. 5 & 6 of 2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:241
Court: Madras High Court
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abdul Quddhose

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney]
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.


Los Gatos Production Services India LLP Vs. Wunderbar Films Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Doctrine of Election and Jurisdiction of Court

Introduction:The case Los Gatos Production Services India LLP vs. Wunderbar Films Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. revolves around copyright infringement allegations concerning behind-the-scenes footage from the Tamil film "Naanum Rowdy Dhaan". The Plaintiff, Los Gatos Production Services India LLP (a Netflix unit), filed a suit against Wunderbar Films Pvt. Ltd. and others, alleging that a Netflix documentary titled "Nayanthara: Beyond the Fairytale" incorporated unauthorized footage from the film.

Two key applications were filed by the fifth Defendant, Vignesh Shivan: Application No. 6748 of 2024 – Seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.Application No. 6750 of 2024 – Seeking revocation of leave to sue granted by the Madras High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Key Allegations by Plaintiff: Unauthorized Use of Footage:The Netflix documentary "Nayanthara: Beyond the Fairytale" allegedly used behind-the-scenes (BTS) clips from "Naanum Rowdy Dhaan" without permission. Plaintiff claims copyright over the footage. Plaintiff’s Actions Prior to Filing Suit:Discovered the alleged infringement on November 9, 2024 via YouTube.Sent a legal notice on November 9, 2024 to Netflix.Netflix responded on November 11, 2024, denying infringement.The documentary was released on Netflix on November 18, 2024.Plaintiff filed the suit on November 24, 2024, seeking urgent interim reliefs. Jurisdiction and Cause of Action:Plaintiff claimed major parts of the cause of action arose in Chennai:The film "Naanum Rowdy Dhaan" was produced and released in Chennai.The Artist Agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants was executed in Chennai.The disputed footage was filmed in Chennai.Plaintiff sought leave to sue under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Defendant’s Arguments:The fifth Defendant, Vignesh Shivan, sought rejection of the plaint and revocation of leave to sue, raising the following objections: Lack of Jurisdiction:Argued that Netflix (Plaintiff) has no office in Chennai, so the Madras High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction.Claimed that no part of the cause of action arose in Chennai since Netflix operates from Mumbai. Doctrine of Election:Since the Plaintiff invoked Section 62 of the Copyright Act, which allows a suit to be filed where the Plaintiff resides or carries on business, they could not also invoke Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.Non-Compliance with Pre-Suit Mediation (Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015):The Defendant claimed that the Plaintiff should have first attempted mediation before filing a suit.The cause of action allegedly arose in 2020, yet the suit was filed only in 2024. No Copyright Violation:Defendant argued that the Plaintiff did not produce the footage, so they could not claim copyright.Invoked Section 16 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which bars infringement suits unless copyright is legally registered.

Plaintiff’s Arguments:The Plaintiff opposed both applications, stating:Jurisdiction is Proper:The major cause of action arose in Chennai.The film "Naanum Rowdy Dhaan" was produced, filmed, and released in Chennai.The Artist Agreement with the Defendants was executed in Chennai.Doctrine of Election Does Not Apply:Plaintiff argued that Clause 12 of the Letters Patent provides an additional remedy beyond Section 62 of the Copyright Act.The Court had discretion to allow jurisdiction.Urgency Justified Pre-Suit Mediation Exemption:The infringement became known only on November 9, 2024.The documentary was released on November 18, 2024, forcing an urgent legal response.

Discussion on Judgments & Cited Cases:The Court analyzed several precedents:Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia & Another:(2015) 10 SCC 161:Established that Section 62 of the Copyright Act does not override Section 20 of CPC.Plaintiff can file suits in multiple jurisdictions if cause of action arises in multiple places.Applied here to validate Plaintiff’s jurisdiction claim.Nagubai Ammal & Others v. B. Shama Rao & Others:AIR 1956 SC 593:Discussed Doctrine of Election, holding that if a party chooses one remedy, they cannot later switch to another.The Court held Doctrine of Election did not apply since the Plaintiff had invoked both remedies in a single suit.T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Another (1977) 4 SCC 467: Court ruled that plaintiffs cannot file suits based on frivolous or illusory causes of action.Defendant argued the Plaintiff was forum shopping, but the Court rejected this claim.Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi 2024 (5) SCC 815 Pre-suit mediation is not mandatory in urgent cases. Applied to reject the Defendant’s argument about non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.

Reasoning of the Judge: Justice Abdul Quddhose rejected both applications, reasoning:Jurisdiction Is Proper:Major cause of action occurred in Chennai.The film, agreement, and alleged infringement were all linked to Chennai.Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is an Additional Remedy:The Doctrine of Election does not bar the Plaintiff from invoking both Section 62 and Clause 12. Pre-Suit Mediation Was Not Required:The urgency of the case justified bypassing mediation.No Ground to Reject the Plaint:The Defendant failed to prove the suit was frivolous.

Decision:Application No. 6748 of 2024 (Rejection of Plaint) – Dismissed.2. Application No. 6750 of 2024 (Revocation of Leave to Sue) – Dismissed. Suit will proceed in the Madras High Court.

Concluding Note:This ruling reinforces copyright protection in the Indian film industry and clarifies jurisdiction principles in IP disputes. The Madras High Court reaffirmed its territorial authority in cases where a substantial part of the cause of action occurs within its jurisdiction.

Case Title: Los Gatos Production Services India LLP vs. Wunderbar Films Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Date of Order: January 28, 2025
Case Number: C.S. (Comm. Div.) No. 251 of 2024 
Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:240
Court Name: High Court of Madras
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abdul Quddhose

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney]
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

ITC Limited Vs. Raj Kumar Mittal

Civil Contempt of Court and Obstruction during the course of Local Commission.

Introduction:The case of ITC Limited vs. Raj Kumar Mittal & Ors. concerns trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, and copyright violations by the Defendants, who allegedly copied the packaging of ITC’s ‘AASHIRVAAD’ Atta. The Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction to prevent the Defendants from using deceptively similar trade dress and branding. The Court had earlier issued an ad interim injunction on November 28, 2019 to prevent the Defendants from continuing the infringement.Additionally, the Plaintiffs filed a contempt petition under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging that the Defendants deliberately disobeyed the injunction order and engaged in obstructive and contemptuous conduct during the enforcement of the Court’s directives.

Plaintiff: ITC Limited is a leading Indian conglomerate engaged in multiple sectors, including Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG), hotels, paperboards, and packaging. Manufacturer of ‘AASHIRVAAD’ branded wheat flour (atta), which has distinctive packaging.Defendants:Raj Kumar Mittal (Defendant No.1) Aand rem Chand Mittal (Defendant No.2) Both Defendants were running a business under Mittal Sales/Mittal Trading Company and were accused of selling wheat flour in deceptively similar packaging.

Key Allegations:The Defendants were selling wheat flour using packaging identical to ‘AASHIRVAAD’ Atta, thereby infringing ITC’s trademark and trade dress.The Delhi High Court granted an ex-parte ad interim injunction on November 28, 2019, prohibiting the Defendants from continuing the infringement. Local Commissioners were appointed to visit the Defendants’ premises and execute the order.

Execution of Injunction Order: On December 7, 2019, a Local Commissioner, Ms. Latika Malhotra, Advocate, visited the Gurugram premises of Raj Kumar Mittal to seize infringing materials.Prem Chand Mittal obstructed the execution of the order by: Refusing to accept service of the Court’s order and the plaint.Directing workers to shut down the premises and lock the doors.Physically obstructing and misbehaving with the Local Commissioner.Engaging in altercations and assaulting the legal team.Tampering with evidence and preventing access to infringing materials.

Initiation of Contempt Proceedings:ITC Limited filed a contempt petition on February 28, 2020, against the Defendants for: Wilful disobedience of the injunction order. Obstructing the Local Commissioner and tampering with evidence.Court repeatedly directed the Defendants to clarify discrepancies in their statements and explain missing infringing goods.Bailable warrants were issued against Raj Kumar Mittal due to his non-appearance.Both Defendants gave inconsistent statements, shifting blame to a third brother, Radhey Shyam Mittal, who was not a party to the suit.

Plaintiff’s Submissions:Deliberate Disobedience of Court Orders: The Defendants knowingly violated the injunction order and continued their infringing activities. They misbehaved with Court-appointed officers and obstructed the enforcement process.Tampering with Seized Evidence: Despite the seizure of infringing goods, large quantities went missing. The Defendants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation.Obstruction and Assault on Local Commissioner: The Defendants engaged in physical fights, manhandling, and intimidation of the Local Commissioner and ITC representatives. Inconsistent & Misleading Statements: The Defendants repeatedly changed their stance on the missing infringing materials.

Defendants’ Submissions:The Defendants offered an unconditional apology for any misconduct.Claimed that any missing infringing materials were taken by their brother, Radhey Shyam Mittal. Denial of Tampering Allegations:Claimed they never obstructed the proceedings. Alleged bias by the Local Commissioner.Allegations of Misconduct Against Local Commissioner: Prem Chand Mittal accused the Local Commissioner of conniving with ITC, but later retracted these allegations.

Discussion on Judgments & Cited Cases:The Court referred to Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1139, which held:Contempt is meant to protect the administration of justice, not the dignity of a judge. Any deliberate interference with the judicial process is punishable.Civil contempt requires wilful disobedience to a court’s order.The case also cited Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai, (2008) 14 SCC 561, which outlined conditions for contempt:There must be a court order. There must be wilful disobedience of that order.The disobedience must be deliberate.

Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor (Deceased) Represented by LRs. & Others Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1139: Key Legal Principles from the Judgment: Objective of Contempt Law: The purpose of contempt proceedings is to ensure compliance with court orders and prevent interference with the administration of justice, not to protect the dignity of the judge. Interference with Judicial Process: Any act that obstructs judicial proceedings or pre-empts court decisions constitutes contempt.Elements of Civil Contempt: To establish contempt, three conditions must be met: A judgment, decree, order, or writ must exist.There must be disobedience of the said order. The disobedience must be wilful. Standard of Proof in Contempt Cases: The court must establish a clear case of contumacious conduct before holding a person guilty of contempt. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, requiring the same standard of proof as in criminal cases.Application in ITC Limited Case:The Court relied on this judgment to assess whether the Defendants' actions amounted to wilful disobedience of the injunction order dated November 28, 2019. The Court found that the Defendants obstructed the execution of the order, misled the Court, and tampered with evidence, thus meeting the criteria for civil contempt.

Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd.Citation: (1988) 4 SCC 592: Key Legal Principles from the Judgment:Public Interest and Contempt: Judicial decisions should not be pre-empted or circumvented by external actions.Protection of Court’s Authority: Any action that interferes with the fair dispensation of justice constitutes contempt.Balance Between Free Speech and Judicial Integrity: While free speech is fundamental, it must not obstruct court proceedings.Application in ITC Limited Case:The Court cited this judgment to emphasize that the Defendants' obstruction of the Local Commissioner and destruction of evidence was a direct interference with the judicial process, justifying contempt action.

Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai Citation: (2008) 14 SCC 561:Key Legal Principles from the Judgment:Conditions for Holding a Person Guilty of Civil Contempt:There must be an order, judgment, or decree of the Court.The person must have knowledge of the order.There must be wilful disobedience of the order.Application in ITC Limited Case:The Court applied these conditions to determine whether the Defendants knowingly and intentionally violated the Court's order. It found that the Defendants had full knowledge of the injunction order and wilfully disobeyed it by continuing the infringement and obstructing enforcement proceedings.

Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi Citation: (2012) 4 SCC 307:Key Legal Principles from the Judgment: High Standard of Proof in Contempt Cases: Since contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal, courts should act with caution and ensure strong evidence before holding someone guilty.Benefit of Doubt: If there is any ambiguity regarding the conduct of the alleged contemnor, the court should provide them with the benefit of the doubt.Application in ITC Limited Case:The Court took cognizance of the Defendants' apologies and expressions of remorse and, instead of imposing civil imprisonment, opted for monetary penalties. This aligns with the principle of leniency in contempt cases where the contemnor expresses regret.Reasoning of the Judge:Hon’ble Justice Amit Bansal found the Defendants guilty of contempt for:Repeatedly defying Court orders and engaging in deceptive practices.Misbehaving with Court officers and obstructing the enforcement of the injunction.Providing contradictory explanations regarding the missing infringing materials.Failing to show remorse until later in the proceedings.However, considering the Defendants’ eventual unconditional apology, the Court opted for monetary penalties instead of imprisonment.

Decision:Defendants found guilty of contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.No civil imprisonment was imposed.Monetary penalties imposed: ₹5,00,000 fine on Prem Chand Mittal (to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee).₹3,00,000 fine on Raj Kumar Mittal (to be deposited with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Authority). Mandatory affidavits of compliance & apology to be filed by Defendants. No impact on the ongoing suit regarding trademark infringement.

Concluding Note:The case highlights strict judicial enforcement of intellectual property rights and contempt proceedings for defiance of Court orders. While the Defendants engaged in blatant misconduct, the Court exercised judicial discretion by imposing heavy fines rather than imprisonment.This decision reinforces the importance of compliance with injunctions and protects the integrity of court proceedings in IP disputes.

Case Title: ITC Limited vs. Raj Kumar Mittal & Ors.
Date of Order: January 22, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 647/2019 | CCP(O) 9/2020
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:447
Court Name: High Court of Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney]
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Bajaj Resources Limited Vs Goyal Herbals Pvt. Ltd.

Amendment of Plaint: Passing off to Infringement Action

Introduction:The present case pertains to a trademark dispute between Bajaj Resources Limited ("Plaintiffs") and Goyal Herbals Pvt. Ltd. ("Defendants"). The Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the Defendants from using the mark ‘ALMOND DROPS’, alleging trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright infringement. During the pendency of the suit, the Plaintiffs sought to amend their plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to include newly obtained trademark registrations and other relevant facts.

Factual Background of the Proceedings:Institution of Suit (2016):The suit was filed by the Plaintiffs in November 2016 for infringement of trademark, trade dress, and copyright, as well as for passing off.The Plaintiffs did not have trademark registration for ‘ALMOND DROPS’ at the time of filing.

Defendants’ Defense:The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs could not claim statutory rights over the descriptive words ‘ALMOND DROPS’, the picture of almonds, and the golden-brown color combination. The Plaintiffs were denied an ex-parte ad-interim injunction due to the lack of trademark registration.

Proceedings Prior to the Amendment Application:2018: Issues framed. 2019-2022: Plaintiffs' witness cross-examined. 2023: Mediation attempt failed. 2024: Plaintiffs filed the present application to amend the plaint.

Amendments Sought by the Plaintiffs:Inclusion of three trademark registrations obtained after filing the suit.Details of an interim order and decree in a related case involving the Plaintiffs and the bottle manufacturer of the Defendants.Updated sales and advertising figures for Bajaj Almond Drops Hair Oil.Changes in the Plaintiffs’ corporate structure.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments: The amendments relate to events that occurred after the trial commenced. The Plaintiffs could not have introduced these facts earlier despite due diligence.The new trademark registrations grant statutory rights, allowing the Plaintiffs to sue for trademark infringement. If the amendments are not allowed, the Plaintiffs would have to file a separate suit. The amendments do not change the nature or character of the suit. No Prejudice to Defendants: No interim injunction is in place, meaning Defendants will not be prejudiced by a delay. Legal Precedents Cited:Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited & Anr. [(2022) 16 SCC 1]: Courts should allow amendments that help determine the real controversy. Pravesh Narula v. Raj Kumar Jain [2024 SCC OnLine Del 7537]: Allowed amendment even after the closure of the plaintiff’s evidence.

Defendants’ Arguments: Plaintiffs waited until 2021 to apply for trademark registration despite the Court's earlier observations. During cross-examination, the Plaintiffs’ witness was unaware of any trademark applications. Plaintiffs had earlier filed for additional documents in 2022 but did not submit trademark registration details. Amendments Would Change the Nature of the Suit: Originally, the case was based on passing off. Now, it seeks to introduce statutory trademark infringement claims. Bad Faith Attempt to Strengthen the Case.  The amendments were sought to bolster a weak case. The delay in proceedings would prejudice the Defendants.

The Court analyzed various legal precedents on amendments of pleadings. Life Insurance Corporation (2022):Established that amendments should be allowed if necessary for determining the real controversy.Amendments should be denied only if:They introduce a time-barred claim.They change the nature of the suit.They are sought in bad faith.Pravesh Narula (2024):Allowed amendment after trial commencement to include a supervening event (trademark registration).The amendment did not introduce a new cause of action, only strengthened the existing one. Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi [(2006) 4 SCC 385]:Reaffirmed that courts should permit amendments that clarify the real dispute.Courts should avoid a hyper-technical approach.

Reasoning of the Judge: Hon’ble Court considered the Plaintiffs’ right to bring a fresh suit on the basis of new trademark registrations. The Court reasoned:No Change in Suit’s Nature:The original suit involved trademark infringement and passing off.The new trademark registrations only add statutory protection to the Plaintiffs’ claims.Avoidance of Multiplicity of Proceedings:If denied, the Plaintiffs would file a fresh suit.Allowing the amendment saves judicial time.Defendants Not Prejudiced:There was no interim injunction, meaning Defendants were not restricted from continuing business.

Past Precedents Supported Plaintiffs:Prior cases permitted post-trial amendments for supervening events.The present amendment met the legal threshold for allowing changes.

Decision:The Court allowed the amendment of the plaint.Plaintiffs were permitted to file the amended 

Concluding Note:The judgment reinforces that amendments that help determine the real controversy should be allowed, provided they do not unfairly prejudice the other party. The principle of avoiding multiplicity of litigation played a crucial role in the Court’s decision. By permitting the Plaintiffs to update their pleadings, the Court ensured that all relevant issues would be adjudicated in a single proceeding, thereby promoting judicial efficiency.

Case Title: Bajaj Resources Limited & Anr. Vs. Goyal Herbals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Date of Order: January 22, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 1564/2016
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:442
Court Name: High Court of Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney]
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Tuesday, January 28, 2025

Patel Field Marshal Agencies Vs P.M. Diesels Ltd.

Patel Field Marshal Agencies Vs P.M. Diesels Ltd.-Trademark Rectification and Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999

Case Title: Patel Field Marshal Agencies & Anr. Vs. P.M. Diesels Ltd. & Ors.
Date of Order: November 29, 2017
Case Nos.: Civil Appeals Nos. 4767-4769/2001
Neutral Citation: N/A
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justice Navin Sinha, H.J.

Introduction: The case of Patel Field Marshal Agencies & Anr. v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. & Ors. decided by the Supreme Court of India on November 29, 2017, is a landmark judgment in the domain of trademark law. The dispute centered around the use of the trademark "Field Marshal," with the respondent claiming infringement by the appellants, who sought to register the mark "Marshal." The primary issue revolved around the interplay of rights under Sections 46, 56, 107, and 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. This judgment provides clarity on procedural aspects related to rectification proceedings and the implications of deemed abandonment of invalidity claims in trademark infringement suits.

Detailed Factual Background of the Case:

Respondent’s Business and Trademark Registration: P.M. Diesels Ltd., the respondent, is the registered owner of the following trademarks:Trademark No. 224879: "Field Marshal" (registered on October 16, 1964).Trademark No. 252070: "Field Marshal" in a specific lettering style (registered on October 4, 1968).Trademark No. 252071-B: "FM Field Marshal" (registered on October 4, 1968).These trademarks were registered for use in relation to diesel engines and machinery, and the respondent had been using these marks extensively in its business, gaining goodwill and recognition in the market.

Appellants’ Business and Trademark Application:The appellants, Patel Field Marshal Agencies & Anr., were engaged in a similar business of manufacturing and trading diesel engines and related machinery. In 1982, the appellants applied to register the trademark "Marshal" for their products. The respondent opposed this application, claiming that "Marshal" was deceptively similar to "Field Marshal," which could lead to consumer confusion and dilute the distinctiveness of its trademarks. 

Respondent’s Infringement Suit (1989):In 1989, the respondent filed Suit No. 1612 of 1989 before the Delhi High Court seeking the following reliefs: Injunction: Restraining the appellants from using the trademarks "Marshal" or "Patel Field Marshal Agencies/Industries." Rendition of Accounts: Seeking damages or profits earned by the appellants through the use of the disputed trademark. Declaration of Infringement: Asserting exclusive rights over its registered trademarks.

The appellants, in their defense, raised the following: Jurisdictional Objections: Challenged the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. Validity of Respondent’s Trademarks: Claimed the trademarks were invalid and sought their rectification from the register. Rectification Proceedings by Appellants (1997) While the infringement suit was pending, the appellants filed three rectification applications in 1997 before the Gujarat High Court under Sections 46 and 56 of the 1958 Act, challenging the validity of the respondent’s trademarks.

The grounds for rectification included: Non-Use: Alleging the trademarks had not been used continuously as required by law. Improper Registration: Claiming the marks were descriptive and lacked distinctiveness at the time of registration. The Gujarat High Court dismissed the rectification applications in 1998, and this dismissal was upheld by its Division Bench.

Developments in the Infringement Suit: Interim Injunctions: The respondent sought temporary injunctions in the Delhi High Court, which were initially denied by a Single Judge on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Appeals and Transfers: The matter was transferred to the Rajkot District Court in 2009 after the Delhi High Court ruled that jurisdiction lay in Gujarat.

Key Issue Before the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court had to address whether, in cases where an infringement suit is pending and the issue of trademark validity has been raised, parties can pursue independent rectification proceedings under Sections 46 and 56, or whether Section 111 restricts such actions to rectification proceedings initiated following the trial court's prima facie findings.

Cases Referred and Discussed:The Supreme Court relied on several precedents and interpretations to resolve the central issue in this case. Below is a detailed analysis of the cases referred to and discussed in the judgment, along with their relevance to the matter at hand.

National Bell Co. v. Metal Goods Mfg. Co. (1971 AIR 898):Context: This case defined the term "person aggrieved" under Sections 46 and 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Court’s Discussion in the Present Case: The appellants relied on this case to assert that they, as parties aggrieved by the registration of "Field Marshal," had an independent statutory right to file rectification applications.The Supreme Court acknowledged this interpretation but clarified that when a suit for infringement is pending, the procedural scheme under Sections 107 and 111 restricts the independent exercise of rights under Sections 46 and 56.

Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. (1983 4 SCC 625):Context: This case discussed the inability of lower courts to restrain parties from pursuing statutory remedies in higher forums.Court’s Discussion in the Present Case: The appellants argued that requiring trial court permission to file rectification applications violated this principle. The Court distinguished the procedural requirement under Section 111, emphasizing that it was not a matter of granting permission but ensuring prima facie tenability before invoking rectification.

Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2006 (32) PTC 733):Context: This decision of the Delhi High Court dealt with Section 124(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (similar to Section 111 of the 1958 Act), focusing on the stay of infringement suits pending rectification proceedings.Court’s Discussion in the Present Case:The Supreme Court noted the Delhi High Court’s view that when a trial court does not find a prima facie case of invalidity, the party can only challenge this finding on appeal.However, the Supreme Court rejected any interpretation allowing parallel rectification proceedings, stating that the procedural scheme must avoid inconsistent outcomes.

Data Infosys Ltd. v. Infosys Technologies Ltd. (2016 (65) PTC 209):Context: This Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court clarified the abandonment of invalidity pleas under Section 124(3) of the 1999 Act (analogous to Section 111(3) of the 1958 Act).Court’s Discussion in the Present Case:The Supreme Court endorsed this case, holding that the abandonment of invalidity claims in an infringement suit extends beyond the suit and bars subsequent rectification applications.It rejected the argument that abandonment is limited to the context of the suit alone.

B. Mohamed Yousuff v. Prabha Singh Jaswant Singh (2008 (38) PTC 576): Context: This Madras High Court case argued that the right to file rectification under Sections 47 and 57 of the 1999 Act is not contingent on obtaining permission from a trial court under Section 124(1)(ii).Court’s Discussion in the Present Case:The Supreme Court disagreed with this view, reiterating that the legislative intent under Sections 111 and 124 was to channel rectification claims through a controlled process to avoid duplicity and conflicts.

York Products Ltd. v. York International Corp. (AIR 2001 SC 1491):Context: This case addressed the concept of deceptive similarity and the rights of registered trademark owners under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Court’s Discussion in the Present Case: Although not directly linked to rectification, this case was referenced to reaffirm the exclusive rights granted to registered trademark owners and the procedural safeguards for protecting those rights. 

Key Takeaways from Court’s Use of These Cases: The Court distinguished between the substantive rights of aggrieved parties and the procedural mechanisms controlling their exercise. It emphasized the legislative intent to prevent conflicting outcomes by channeling rectification claims through the trial court's prima facie assessment during infringement suits.

The Reasoning and Discussion by the Court:

Exclusive Jurisdiction of Statutory Authorities on Trademark Validity Principle Established:The Court reaffirmed that the validity of a registered trademark must exclusively be decided by statutory authorities—the Registrar of Trademarks, the High Court, or the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB)—and not by civil courts.Rationale:Sections 46 and 56 of the 1958 Act confer jurisdiction on statutory authorities to entertain applications for rectification of the trademark register.Sections 107 and 111 further specify that once the validity of a trademark is raised in an infringement suit, the civil court is required to stay the suit and direct the concerned party to approach the statutory authorities for rectification.Key Observation:"The Act mandates that decisions rendered by the prescribed statutory authority will bind the civil court, which is not empowered to decide the question of validity."

Interplay Between Sections 46, 56, and 111 (Rectification and Stay of Proceedings)Principle Established: Section 111 creates a procedural regime that governs rectification claims when an infringement suit is pending. If a party raises the issue of trademark validity, they must follow the process outlined in Section 111. This overrides independent rights under Sections 46 and 56. Key Points: Prima Facie Tenability: The civil court must first assess whether the claim of invalidity is prima facie tenable. Only if the court finds merit in the claim can it frame an issue and grant time for the concerned party to file a rectification application. Stay of Suit: Once rectification proceedings are initiated, the infringement suit remains stayed until a decision is rendered on the validity of the trademark.

Deemed Abandonment (Section 111(3)): If the concerned party fails to initiate rectification proceedings within the prescribed time (three months or as extended), the plea of invalidity is deemed abandoned, not just in the suit but for all future rectification claims.Key Observation:"The legislative scheme under Section 111 ensures that issues relating to invalidity are decided comprehensively in one forum, avoiding multiple proceedings and conflicting decisions."

Parallel Proceedings and Avoidance of Conflicts:Principle Established: Parallel rectification proceedings under Sections 46/56 and 111 are prohibited when an infringement suit is pending. Once the issue of validity is raised in a suit, all rectification claims must adhere to the procedural mechanism of Section 111. Rationale: Allowing parallel proceedings could result in conflicting decisions, one by the civil court and another by the statutory authority. The Supreme Court clarified that the legislature intended rectification issues in pending suits to be governed solely by Section 111 to maintain procedural consistency. Key Observation: "Once a civil court is approached, the rights under Sections 46 and 56 must be exercised through the procedural safeguards under Section 111."

Dismissal of Appeals and Final Decision:Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' appeals, upholding the Gujarat High Court's decision. It affirmed that the appellants had abandoned their plea of invalidity under Section 111(3) by failing to initiate rectification proceedings within the prescribed time.  Implications of the Law Laid Down: Streamlined Litigation: Ensures that trademark validity issues are dealt with comprehensively by statutory authorities, reducing the burden on civil courts. Judicial Finality: Deemed abandonment provisions under Section 111(3) provide certainty to trademark disputes, preventing indefinite challenges to registration. Safeguard Against Abuse:The prima facie assessment ensures only legitimate challenges proceed, protecting trademark owners from frivolous claims.Consistency Across Forums:Prohibits parallel rectification proceedings to avoid conflicting decisions, maintaining the integrity of trademark law.

Conclusion:The judgment in Patel Field Marshal Agencies lays down a clear procedural framework for handling trademark validity challenges in the context of infringement suits. By emphasizing the exclusivity of statutory authorities and the finality of deemed abandonment, the Court has strengthened the integrity of trademark litigation, ensuring efficient and consistent outcomes.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written by: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman:[Patent and Trademark Attorney]: High Court of Delhi

Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma Vs. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories

Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma Vs Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories:Difference between Trademark Infringement and Passing off

Introduction:The case of Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma Vs Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories is a landmark judgment concerning trademark law in India. It highlights the interplay between statutory rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and the common law remedy of passing off. The primary question revolved around whether the appellant’s use of the term "Navaratna" infringed the respondent's registered trademarks. In this case Appellant was the Defendant and Rectification Petitioner against registered Trademark of Respondent while Respondent was Plaintiff and registered proprietor of the mark against which Rectification petition was filed by the Appellant:

Plaintiff/Respondent's Business: Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, a firm established in 1926 by Dr. Sarvothama Rao, manufactured Ayurvedic medicinal products. The firm initially operated under the name "Navaratna Pharmacy" before changing it to "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories" in 1945. Trademark Usage: Since inception, the respondent used the term "Navaratna" to identify its products, establishing its reputation in the market. Trademark Registration: In 1928, the respondent declared ownership of the "Navaratna" and "Navaratna Pharmacy" marks with the Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta.  Under the Cochin Trade Marks Act, 1944, the respondent registered "Navaratna" (January 31, 1947) and "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories" (February 17, 1948). These marks were further registered with the Trade Marks Registry in Bombay, as permitted under reciprocal recognition laws (Section 82-A of the Trade Marks Act, 1940).

Defendant/Appellant's Business Activities:Appellant's Business: Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma operated a business manufacturing Ayurvedic pharmaceutical products under the name "Navaratna Kalpa Pharmacy" in Jalandhar, Punjab. Trademark Application: In October 1946, the appellant applied for registration of "Navaratna Kalpa" as a trademark for Ayurvedic preparations. The application was opposed by the respondent, who argued that "Navaratna" was descriptive, lacked distinctiveness, and could not be monopolized. The opposition succeeded, and the registration was refused in 1950.

Initiation of Proceedings:Following the appellant's refusal of registration, both parties initiated legal actions: Respondent's Suit for Infringement and Passing Off: Filed a suit (O.S. No. 233 of 1951) in the District Court, Anjikaimal, seeking: A permanent injunction to restrain the appellant from using "Navaratna" or any similar mark in connection with Ayurvedic products.nProtection of their statutory and common law rights.

Appellant's Application for Rectification: Filed a petition (O.P. No. 19 of 1952) in the High Court of Travancore-Cochin to remove "Navaratna" from the respondent’s registered trademarks, alleging: "Navaratna" was a generic term in Ayurvedic trade and lacked distinctiveness.

District Court's Judgment :The District Court ruled in favor of the respondent, finding: Passing Off: The appellant was not guilty of passing off, as the packaging, get-up, and labels used by both parties were sufficiently distinct to avoid confusion.

Infringement: The word "Navaratna" alone could not be exclusively claimed as it was generic and descriptive in Ayurvedic terminology. However, "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories" was deemed a valid trademark due to its long and exclusive use by the respondent since before 1937. Relief Granted: The court issued a perpetual injunction against the appellant, limiting it to the use of "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories."

Appeal to the High Court:The appellant appealed the District Court's decision (A.S. No. 233 of 1959), arguing that: The respondent’s trademark should not have been registered. The findings on passing off and infringement were contradictory. The respondent should disclaim exclusive rights to "Navaratna." The High Court consolidated this appeal with the appellant’s rectification petition (O.P. No. 19 of 1952) and upheld the District Court's judgment.

Appeal to the Supreme Court:Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, the appellant sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, raising the following concerns: The inconsistency in granting exclusive rights to a descriptive term like "Navaratna." The lack of deceptive similarity between "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories" and "Navaratna Kalpa." The failure to order a disclaimer under Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940.The Supreme Court ultimately addressed these issues, providing clarity on acquired distinctiveness, statutory rights, and the distinction between infringement and passing off.

Appellant (Defendant) Submission:Generic Nature of "Navaratna": Argued that "Navaratna" referred to a class of Ayurvedic medicines and was commonly used in the trade. Claimed it lacked distinctiveness and could not be monopolized.No Deceptive Similarity: Asserted that "Navaratna Kalpa" and its packaging were distinct and did not deceive or confuse consumers.  Registration Objections: Contended that combining "Navaratna" with descriptive terms like "Pharmaceutical Laboratories" could not confer distinctiveness under Section 6 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940.

Respondent (Plaintiff) Prior Use and Acquired Distinctiveness: Highlighted the continuous use of "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories" since 1926, creating distinctiveness and goodwill. Trademark Validity: Argued that under Section 6(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, trademarks in use prior to February 25, 1937, could gain registration despite lacking inherent distinctiveness. Deceptive Similarity: Claimed that "Navaratna Kalpa" was visually, phonetically, and conceptually similar, leading to consumer confusion.

Judgments Referred:

India Electric Works Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1949) 49 CWN 425: The Appellant referred to this decision to emphasize that marks could qualify for registration through factual distinctiveness, provided the evidence demonstrated market recognition.  The Supreme Court distinguished this case by pointing out that the evidence in India Electric Works did not establish distinctiveness, whereas in the present case, the respondent had uncontroverted evidence of market association. 

Citation Discussed: Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, (1897) AC 199:The Supreme Court relied on Lord Watson’s observations that the determination of deceptive similarity is a question of fact requiring judicial analysis of the marks.

Kerly on Trade Marks (8th Edition, p. 407):The Court referred to the principle that in cases involving common elements, marks must be assessed in their entirety, not disregarding shared components.

Citation Discussed: Yorkshire Copper Works Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1954) 71 RPC 150:The Court discussed this case to highlight the distinction between inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness, rejecting the appellant’s argument that descriptive elements could not gain protection.

Distinction between infringement and Passing Off Action:

Basis of the Legal Remedy: Infringement the Statutory Right: Infringement arises from the violation of a statutory right granted to the registered proprietor of a trademark under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The essence of an infringement action is the unauthorized use of a registered trademark or a deceptively similar mark for the same or similar goods.Passing Off is Common Law Right: Passing off is a tort rooted in common law, designed to protect the goodwill and reputation of a trader from being misrepresented as associated with another. The claim revolves around preventing one party from passing off their goods or services as those of another.

Key Elements to Prove:In Infringement the plaintiff must establish that:The defendant's mark is either identical to or deceptively similar to the registered trademark. The mark was used in the course of trade for goods or services for which the trademark is registered. No further proof of confusion or deception is required if similarity is evident. In passing Off the plaintiff must prove three elements, commonly known as the "Classical Trinity": Goodwill: The plaintiff has built a reputation in the market for its goods or services. Misrepresentation: The defendant's actions mislead the public into believing that its goods or services are associated with the plaintiff. Damage: The misrepresentation causes harm to the plaintiff’s goodwill or business.

Role of Packaging, Get-Up, and Other Distinguishing Features in  Infringement is Irrelevant: The court emphasized that in an infringement action, the focus is solely on the similarity of the marks. Even if the packaging, get-up, or labeling of the defendant’s product clearly distinguishes its origin, the plaintiff's rights under the registered trademark are still violated if the marks are deceptively similar. While in passing Off action, role of get UP is Critical: The defendant can escape liability by showing that the packaging, get-up, and other distinguishing features are sufficiently different to prevent consumer confusion. Factors like the display of the manufacturer’s name and distinct physical characteristics of the goods play a significant role.

Deceptive Similarity:Infringement:Determined by comparing the two marks based on visual, phonetic, and conceptual resemblance. The focus is on whether the defendant's mark is likely to deceive or confuse consumers. The registered proprietor’s statutory right is paramount, and even minor deceptive similarity can result in liability.In assing Off Action,  The court evaluates whether the overall presentation of the defendant’s goods is likely to mislead consumers into believing they are purchasing the plaintiff’s goods. Factors beyond the trademark itself, such as packaging and marketing strategies, are considered.

Independent Nature of Claims:

Infringement: A registered trademark owner has an exclusive statutory right, making infringement an independent cause of action.No proof of actual deception is required beyond the similarity of marks.Passing Off: Protects business reputation and consumer trust, requiring proof of actual or potential damage caused by the misrepresentation.

Application in the Case:Infringement: The Court found the appellant's mark "Navaratna Kalpa" deceptively similar to the respondent’s registered trademark "Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories." Despite differences in packaging and labeling, the statutory right to the registered trademark was violated.  Passing Off: The respondent’s passing off claim was rejected because the appellant's packaging, labeling, and get-up clearly distinguished its products from those of the respondent. These differences negated the likelihood of consumer deception.

Concluding Note: The Supreme Court clarified that while passing off and infringement may overlap in certain cases, they remain distinct remedies with different requirements. Passing off focuses on protecting market goodwill and consumer trust, whereas infringement safeguards statutory rights associated with registered trademarks, irrespective of external factors like packaging or labeling.

Case Title: Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories
Date of Order: October 20, 1964
Case No.: Civil Appeals Nos. 522 and 523 of 1962
Neutral Citation: AIR 1965 SC 980
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Hon'ble Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, and Justice J.C. Shah

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,[Patent and Trademark Attorney],High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Monday, January 27, 2025

Usha Drager Pvt. Ltd. Vs Draegerwerk Aktiengesellschaft

Increase in valuation of Suit and Amendment of Plaint 

Introduction:The case concerns a petition challenging the dismissal of an amendment application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The petitioners sought to amend the valuation of their suit from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 200 crores, citing revelations of the defendant's turnover during the proceedings. The rejection of this amendment formed the focal point of the dispute.

Background:This litigation arose out of disputes concerning a joint venture agreement dated May 9, 1987, and a subsequent Foreign Collaboration Agreement dated February 20, 1990. The suit initially filed in the High Court of Delhi was transferred to the District Court due to changes in pecuniary jurisdiction. The petitioners claimed a permanent injunction and rendition of accounts, initially valuing the relief at Rs. 1 lakh. During the proceedings, the petitioners discovered the respondent's turnover and sought to revise the suit's valuation to Rs. 200 crores, asserting that it was essential for justice.

Original Filing: Suit filed for injunction and rendition of accounts. Valuation: Rs. 1 lakh. Venue: Transferred to the District Court in 2016. Amendment Application: Under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, petitioners sought to amend the valuation based on evidence suggesting the respondent's turnover exceeded Rs. 1000 crores. Valuation proposed: Rs. 200 crores. Justification: 20% commission on the turnover as compensation.

Dismissal by Trial Court: Application dismissed due to delay (16 years since knowledge of turnover figures). Lack of due diligence and timing (application filed after final arguments commenced). 

Legal Precedents Cited: Petitioners relied on Lakha Ram Sharma vs. Balar Marketing Ltd. and Mount Mary Enterprises vs. Jivratna Medi Treat Pvt. Ltd. to argue that amendments to correct valuation are permissible, even if they shift jurisdiction.

Issues Raised:Whether the petitioners demonstrated due diligence in seeking the amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC?  Can the valuation of a suit be amended at a belated stage, particularly after final arguments have begun? Does the proposed amendment alter the nature of the suit or prejudice the respondents?

Petitioner Submission: Asserted that the amendment was necessary for the suit's proper adjudication. Cited affidavit evidence showing respondent's turnover and argued for a just valuation. Emphasized that courts must adopt a liberal approach to amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Argued that rejection based solely on a jurisdictional shift is impermissible. Relied on judgments, including: Lakha Ram Sharma vs. Balar Marketing Ltd., (2008) 17 SCC 671. Mount Mary Enterprises vs. Jivratna Medi Treat Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 4 SCC 182.

Respondent Submission: Opposed the amendment as belated and lacking due diligence. Argued that the turnover figures were available since 2008. Contended that amendments after final arguments would disrupt proceedings. Highlighted judgments such as: Basavaraj vs. Indira, (2024) SCC Online SC 208. South Konkan Distilleries vs. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik, (2008) 14 SCC 632.

Judgment:Court’s Findings: The trial court's dismissal was upheld. The petitioners failed to justify the 16-year delay in seeking amendment despite having access to the turnover figures since 2008. The proposed amendment, if allowed, would disrupt proceedings after extensive final arguments (26 dates). The amendment was not essential for resolving the real controversy as the valuation did not affect the substantive relief sought.

Legal Reasoning: Under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, amendments are permissible if: They are necessary for adjudicating real controversies. Due diligence is demonstrated. No undue prejudice is caused to the opposing party. The Court emphasized the 2002 amendment’s proviso requiring diligence, which was absent in this case.

Judgments Referred: Lakha Ram Sharma vs. Balar Marketing Ltd. (Liberal approach to valuation amendments unless mala fide). Mount Mary Enterprises vs. Jivratna Medi Treat Pvt. Ltd. (Valuation amendments should not be denied solely due to jurisdictional shifts). M. Revanna vs. Anjanamma (2002 CPC amendment introduced stricter diligence requirements).

Provisions of Law Discussed:Order 6 Rule 17 CPC: Governing amendment of pleadings. Proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC: Restricts amendments post-commencement of trial unless due diligence is shown.  Pecuniary Jurisdiction: Relevant to the jurisdictional implications of valuation changes.

Analysis:The judgment reinforces the principle that amendments, especially post-trial, require strict scrutiny. Petitioners failed the diligence test, rendering their reliance on precedents misplaced. The respondents successfully demonstrated procedural prejudice and delay. The Court struck a balance between procedural integrity and substantive justice, favoring the former in this instance.

Decision:The High Court dismissed the petition, affirming the trial court’s order. No costs were imposed.

Concluding Note: This case underscores the significance of procedural diligence and timeliness in seeking amendments. The judiciary's cautious approach ensures that amendments do not become a tool for delay or jurisdictional manipulation.

Case Details:

Case Title: Usha Drager Private Ltd & Anr. vs Draegerwerk Aktiengesellschaft & Ors.
Date of Order: January 14, 2025.
Case No.: CM(M) 2296/2024.
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:368
Court: High Court of Delhi.
Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravinder Dudeja.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney] 
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.


J.B. Williams Co Vs. H. Bronnley

J.B. Williams Co Vs. H. Bronnley-:Standard for assessing similarity in trademarks

Introduction:This case revolves around the alleged passing off of shaving soap by imitating the packaging design of the plaintiff's product. The J.B. Williams Company, a prominent American manufacturer of shaving soap, accused the defendants, H. Bronnley & Co. Ltd. and J.H. Williams, of adopting packaging resembling their distinctive maroon-colored, dome-shaped, tin-lined boxes, which were claimed to have acquired a secondary meaning in the market. The court was tasked with determining whether the defendants' actions amounted to unfair competition and passing off.

Background:The concept of passing off protects the goodwill associated with a product by preventing others from misrepresenting their goods as those of another. This case arose when the J.B. Williams Company alleged that the defendants intentionally designed their packaging to deceive consumers into believing they were purchasing the plaintiff's product.

Detailed Facts of the Case: Plaintiffs: J.B. Williams Company, an American corporation, manufactured and sold shaving soap in maroon-colored, dome-shaped, tin-lined boxes.Defendants: H. Bronnley & Co. Ltd., a London-based soap manufacturer, sold similar shaving sticks in packaging alleged to imitate the plaintiff's boxes. J.H. Williams, a chemist in Bournemouth, sold products in packaging supplied by Bronnley & Co., allegedly resembling the plaintiff's.

Claims by Plaintiffs: The maroon-colored boxes with specific design features had acquired distinctiveness, symbolizing the plaintiff's product. The defendants' packaging was calculated to deceive consumers and pass off their goods as the plaintiff's.

Defendants' Defense: The design and color of the packaging were common to the trade. There was no intention to deceive or pass off their products as the plaintiff's.

Issues Raised:Whether the plaintiff's packaging had acquired distinctiveness in the market Whether the defendants' packaging was so similar to the plaintiff's as to deceive consumers? Whether the defendants' actions constituted passing off? 

Plaintiffs Submission: Argued that their maroon-colored, dome-shaped, tin-lined boxes were distinctive and associated with their shaving soap. Presented evidence from trade witnesses to demonstrate that the packaging was recognized in the market as representing their product. Claimed that the defendants' packaging imitated their design, leading to consumer confusion.

Defendants Submission: Contended that the color maroon and the shape of the boxes were common in the trade and not unique to the plaintiff's product. Highlighted that their packaging included distinctive labels and designs, differentiating it from the plaintiff's. Denied any intent to deceive or mislead consumers.

Trial Court: Neville J. dismissed the plaintiff's claims, holding that: The maroon color and dome-shaped tin boxes were common in the trade and not distinctive to the plaintiff's product. The defendants' packaging was sufficiently distinct from the plaintiff's, with no intention to deceive consumers. No evidence of actual deception was established.

Court of Appeal:

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court, comprising Cozens-Hardy M.R., Fletcher Moulton L.J., and Farwell L.J., held: The plaintiffs failed to prove that their packaging had acquired a secondary meaning or distinctiveness. The defendants were entitled to use common trade features such as maroon-colored, tin-lined boxes. The plaintiffs' claim to a monopoly over such packaging was untenable.

Judgments and Citations Referred:

Schweppes Ltd. v. Gibbens (22 R.P.C. 601)

Discussion: The court cited Lord Halsbury’s statement that in cases of passing off, the question is whether the overall appearance of the product, taken in its entirety, is such that a reasonable person might be deceived. The court applied this principle to evaluate whether the defendants’ packaging, when viewed as a whole, was likely to mislead consumers into believing it was the plaintiff’s product. The court concluded that the defendants’ packaging was sufficiently distinct and not calculated to deceive.

Payton v. Snelling (17 R.P.C. 48) Discussion: This case emphasized that features common to the trade cannot be monopolized unless additional elements create distinctiveness.
Application: The court noted that the maroon color and dome-shaped tin boxes were common trade features. It highlighted that the plaintiffs’ claim to exclusivity over these elements was untenable without additional distinguishing features.

Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton & Murray (16 R.P.C. 408) Discussion: Lord Davey’s judgment in this case was referenced to illustrate the difficulty of acquiring monopoly rights over generic or descriptive features.Application: The court drew parallels, stating that the plaintiffs could not claim exclusivity over packaging features (such as maroon-colored tin boxes) that were common in the industry.

Lever v. Goodwin (4 R.P.C. 492) Discussion: This case dealt with the principles of passing off and the requirement to prove intentional deception.Application: The court found no evidence of intentional fraud or deception by the defendants and emphasized that their conduct was within the bounds of fair trading.

Weingarten v. Bayer & Co. (22 R.P.C. 341)Discussion: This case addressed the importance of the overall impression created by the get-up of a product in determining whether passing off had occurred. Application: The court reiterated that the plaintiffs’ packaging lacked distinctive features that could establish a secondary meaning, making it unlikely to deceive consumers.

Court's Discussion on the Citations:

Distinctive Get-Up and Secondary Meaning:
The court emphasized that the plaintiffs failed to establish a distinctive get-up for their product. Referring to Schweppes Ltd. v. Gibbens, the court noted that the overall impression of the packaging must be evaluated. Since maroon-colored, dome-shaped tin boxes were common in the trade, the plaintiffs could not claim a monopoly over these features.

Common Trade Features: The court leaned on Payton v. Snelling and Cellular Clothing Co. v. Maxton & Murray to highlight that trade practices and generic features could not be monopolized. The plaintiffs’ claim to exclusivity over the packaging design was dismissed as it lacked originality and distinctiveness.

Fair Trading and Fraudulent Intent: The court, referencing Lever v. Goodwin, emphasized the absence of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants. It noted that the defendants’ packaging included clear labels and names, distinguishing their products from the plaintiffs’.

Likelihood of Deception:Referring to Weingarten v. Bayer & Co., the court stressed that passing off requires a likelihood of deception. Since the defendants’ packaging contained distinguishing features and trade witnesses admitted that the differences were noticeable upon inspection, the court concluded that there was no likelihood of deception.

Analysis and Reasoning:

Distinctiveness: The plaintiffs could not demonstrate that their packaging was uniquely associated with their product. The maroon color and tin-lined boxes were established as common trade features.

Consumer Confusion: The court emphasized that passing off requires a likelihood of deception. The defendants' packaging included distinguishing features such as labels and names, mitigating any potential confusion.

Monopoly Claims: The court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to claim exclusivity over common trade elements, underscoring the importance of fair competition.

Intent to Deceive:The court found no evidence of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants, further weakening the plaintiff's case.

Decision:The appeal was dismissed. Both defendants were found to have acted within the bounds of fair trade practices. The court awarded costs to the defendants.

Concluding Note:

This case highlights the challenges in establishing passing off claims, particularly when the alleged distinctive features are common in the trade. It underscores the need for clear evidence of distinctiveness and consumer confusion to succeed in such actions.

Case Title: J.B. Williams Company v. H. Bronnley & Co. Ltd. & J.H. Williams
Date of Order: November 24, 1909
Case No.: (1909) RPC 765
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Court: Court of Appeal
Judges: Cozens-Hardy M.R., Fletcher Moulton L.J., Farwell L.J.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney] 
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Heinz Italia Vs Dabur India Ltd

Heinz Italia Vs Dabur India Ltd- Trademark Infringement and Passing Off: An Examination of "Glucon-D" vs "Glucose-D"

Case Title: Heinz Italia & Anr vs  Dabur India Ltd
Date of Order: 18 May 2007
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 2756 of 2007
Neutral Citation: 2007 (35) PTC 1 SC
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Hon'ble Justice Shri B.P. Singh and Shri  Harjit Singh Bedi

Introduction:This case revolves around allegations of trademark infringement and passing off brought by Heinz Italia against Dabur India. The dispute concerns the use of the trademark "Glucon-D" and its packaging, which Heinz claims was deceptively copied by Dabur's product "Glucose-D." The Supreme Court of India adjudicated on the issue of granting an ad-interim injunction to prevent Dabur from using allegedly infringing marks and packaging.

Background: Heinz Italia, the successor to Glaxo Laboratories, owns the registered trademark "Glucon-D," which was first registered in 1975. The trademark, along with its goodwill and packaging rights, was assigned to Heinz in 1994. Dabur launched its product "Glucose-D" in 1989 and adopted packaging in 2000 that Heinz alleged was deceptively similar to its own.

The legal battle began when Heinz filed a suit for permanent injunction, accounts of profits, and damages, asserting that Dabur's actions constituted infringement under Sections 29 and 106 of the Trademarks Act, 1958, and copyright infringement under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Trademark Ownership:Heinz Italia owns the registered trademark "Glucon-D," originally registered in 1975 by Glaxo and assigned to Heinz in 1994. The packaging includes a distinctive green color and a "happy family" depiction.Allegations Against Dabur:Heinz alleged that Dabur's product "Glucose-D" used deceptively similar packaging and phonetic resemblance to "Glucon-D," which could mislead consumers.

Initial Proceedings: The Trial Court (2003): Rejected Heinz's application for ad-interim injunction, holding "Glucose" as a generic term and finding dissimilarities in packaging. Punjab and Haryana High Court (2005): Upheld the Trial Court's decision.

Supreme Court Appeal (2007): Heinz appealed against the denial of interim relief, seeking to restrain Dabur from using the disputed mark and packaging.

Issues Raised:  Whether the term "Glucose-D" constitutes a generic term, precluding exclusive trademark right? Whether Dabur's packaging was deceptively similar to Heinz's "Glucon-D" packaging. Whether prior use of the mark by Heinz established its goodwill and reputation in the market? Whether the delay in filing the suit by Heinz precluded the grant of interim relief? 
Submissions of the Parties:

Appellant (Heinz Italia) submission: Prior Use and Goodwill: The trademark "Glucon-D" and its packaging had been in use since 1940 (by Glaxo) and acquired significant goodwill. Deceptive Similarity: The phonetic resemblance between "Glucon-D" and "Glucose-D," coupled with similar packaging, was likely to confuse consumers.

Respondent (Dabur India) submission: Generic Nature of "Glucose": Argued that "Glucose" is a generic term, and no monopoly could be claimed over it. Dissimilar Packaging: Highlighted differences in the depiction of the "happy family" and overall design. Delay in Filing: Contended that Heinz's delay in initiating legal action indicated a lack of urgency.

Key Citations:

Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co. (AIR 1978 Delhi 250):In an action for passing off, the plaintiff must establish prior use of the trademark to secure an injunction. The registration of the mark, while relevant, is secondary to the principle of prior use. The Court relied on this judgment to emphasize that Heinz Italia's trademark "Glucon-D" had been in use since 1940 (by Glaxo) and subsequently by Heinz from 1994. The respondent, Dabur, began using "Glucose-D" much later, in 1989, making Heinz the prior user. This principle was crucial in granting interim relief to Heinz.

Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001 PTC 300 SC): This judgment laid down the test for deceptive similarity in trademark cases, focusing on the likelihood of consumer confusion. It emphasized that phonetic similarity and the overall impression created by the marks must be considered. The Court analyzed the phonetic similarity between "Glucon-D" and "Glucose-D," noting that the resemblance was likely to confuse consumers. The similarity in packaging, particularly the color scheme and depiction of a "happy family," further supported the argument of deceptive similarity.

Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd. (AIR 1960 SC 142): In cases of passing off, the intention to deceive and the likelihood of consumer confusion are critical factors. If a dishonest intention to exploit the goodwill of an established brand is evident, an injunction should follow. The Court found that Dabur's use of similar packaging and phonetic resemblance suggested an attempt to exploit the goodwill of Heinz's "Glucon-D." This dishonest intention was inferred from the similarities and Dabur's repeated modifications to its packaging.

Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors. 2004 (28) PTC 121 SC: In cases of trademark infringement or passing off, injunctions should be granted promptly if the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case of deceptive similarity. Delay in filing the suit does not defeat the plaintiff's right to protection. The Court rejected Dabur's argument that Heinz's delay in filing the suit (in 2003, despite Dabur's use since 1989) should preclude interim relief. The Court held that the delay did not negate Heinz's right to seek protection for its trademark.

Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Girnar Food & Beverages (P) Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 257: The Court held that even if a term is generic, exclusive rights may be claimed if it has acquired a secondary meaning or distinctiveness in the market. While Dabur argued that "Glucose" is a generic term, the Court noted that the addition of "D" and the distinctive packaging had given "Glucon-D" a unique identity in the market. The Court emphasized that generic terms could still warrant protection under special circumstances.

Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. (1990 Supp. SCC 727): Interim injunctions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC are discretionary and appellate courts should not interfere lightly unless the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court acknowledged this principle but distinguished the present case. Unlike Wander Ltd., where prior use was proven by the defendant, Heinz's long-standing use of "Glucon-D" warranted interference by the Supreme Court to grant interim relief.

J.B. Williams v. H. Bronnley (1909) RPC 765: This judgment discusses the standard for assessing similarity in trademarks and the need for evidence to substantiate claims of confusion. Dabur cited this case to argue that the alleged similarity between the marks and packaging required detailed evidence, which could only be assessed at trial. However, the Supreme Court held that the prima facie similarity and Heinz's established goodwill justified an interim injunction.

Provisions of Law Discussed:

Trademarks Act, 1958: Sections 29 (infringement of trademark) and 106 (remedies).
Copyright Act, 1957: Section 63 (infringement of copyright).
Code of Civil Procedure: Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 (injunctions).

Analysis and Reasoning:

Prior Use: The Court held that "Glucon-D" had been in use long before "Glucose-D," establishing its reputation.Deceptive Similarity: Despite minor differences, the overall resemblance in packaging and phonetic similarity was likely to mislead consumers.Generic Term Argument: While "Glucose" is generic, the addition of "D" and distinctive packaging gave "Glucon-D" a unique identity.Delay: The Court found that delay did not negate the right to protection against infringement.

Decision: The Supreme Court granted an interim injunction in favor of Heinz Italia, restraining Dabur from using the trademark "Glucose-D" and its packaging.

Concluding Note: This case underscores the importance of protecting established trademarks and the goodwill associated with them. It also highlights the Court's role in balancing competing interests while addressing deceptive similarities in trademarks.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,[Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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