Bharat Singh Vs. Karan Singh

Mediation Period is excluded from computing limitation for condoning delay in filing Written Statement

Introduction:The case Bharat Singh v. Karan Singh & Others revolves around a partition suit regarding two properties located in New Delhi and Chandigarh. The key issue pertains to the delay in filing the written statements by Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.4, and whether the time spent in mediation should be excluded from the 120-day limitation period for filing the written statement.The case is significant as it examines the applicability of procedural laws, particularly the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, and the impact of mediation on litigation timelines.

Facts of the case:Bharat Singh (Plaintiff) filed a partition suit seeking division of two properties:House No. H-21, Green Park Extension, New Delhi (463 sq. yards).House No. 11, Sector 4, Chandigarh (3813 sq. yards).The Plaintiff sought a division by metes and bounds for separate possession of his share.

Summons and Initial Orders:Summons were issued on July 26, 2022, and the suit was registered. On September 28, 2022, Defendants requested legible copies of the plaint and documents, which were provided on October 3, 2022.Mediation Referral:On November 2, 2022, the Plaintiff suggested mediation, which the Defendants did not oppose.The Court referred the matter to the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre. The Court also allowed Defendants to file their written statements after mediation. Failure of Mediation and Delay in Filing Written Statements:Mediation failed on January 24, 2023. Defendant No.1 filed his written statement on April 9, 2023. Defendant No.4 filed her written statement on April 12, 2023. Both Defendants filed applications seeking condonation of delay (74 & 77 days respectively) under Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC.

Rejection of Delay Condonation Application:On May 31, 2024, the Joint Registrar dismissed the applications, stating that the written statements were filed beyond the 120-day limit under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The Defendants' written statements were taken off record, and Plaintiff’s documents were deemed admitted.

Appeals Against the Registrar’s Order:Defendants No.1 and 4 filed appeals challenging the rejection of their written statements.

Defendants’ Arguments (Seeking Condonation of Delay):the Defendants argued:Time Limit Should Exclude Mediation Period:The 120-day limit should exclude the period from November 2, 2022 (referral to mediation) to January 24, 2023 (failure of mediation). The clock for filing written statements should resume from January 25, 2023. Defendants Filed Within 120 Days (Excluding Mediation Period) If mediation time is excluded, their written statements were filed within the permissible period. Precedents Support Excluding Mediation Time:Telefonaktiebolaget L.M. Ericsson v. Lava International Ltd. (2015 SCC OnLine Del 13903):

Courts should exclude time spent in settlement talks while computing procedural deadlines.

Greaves Cotton Ltd. v. Newage Generators (P) Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine Del 6556): Encouraged mediation as a mechanism to settle disputes, and held that filing pleadings during mediation may hamper the process.

Plaintiff’s Arguments (Opposing Delay Condonation):Time for Filing Started on October 3, 2022 The 120-day clock started when legible copies were served (October 3, 2022) and expired on February 1, 2023. Defendants filed their written statements in April 2023, beyond the deadline. No Power to Extend Beyond 120 Days:Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, Chapter VII, Rule 4 states: Written statement must be filed within 30 days (extendable up to 120 days but no further). Precedent: Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani (2020 SCC OnLine Del 1353): No power to condone delay beyond 120 days. Mediation Does Not Stop Limitation Clock Charu Aggarwal v. Ashok Kalia (2023 SCC OnLine Del 1238):Time limits in procedural laws are mandatory, and mediation does not pause limitation.

Court’s Discussion on Judgments and Citations: Court Considered the Spirit of Mediation:Vikram Bakshi v. Sonia Khosla (2014) 15 SCC 80 emphasized that: Mediation ensures win-win solutions and avoids prolonged litigation. Parties should not be burdened with procedural formalities during mediation.

Court Distinguished Prior Precedents:Charu Aggarwal (2023) and Ram Sarup Lugani (2020) were not applicable because they did not consider whether mediation time should be excluded.Court Followed Telefonaktiebolaget L.M. Ericsson (2015) and Greaves Cotton (2019) Time spent in mediation should be excluded to uphold the spirit of Section 89 CPC.

Reasoning of the Judge:Mediation Period Excluded from Computation:The Court excluded time from November 2, 2022, to January 24, 2023 for written statement filing. Defendants’ Written Statements Were Filed Within 120 Days (Excluding Mediation Time).Defendant No.1 filed on April 9, 2023 (within 120 days). Defendant No.4 filed on April 12, 2023 (within 120 days). Court Allowed Written Statements Subject to Costs

Conclusion:The Delhi High Court set aside the Joint Registrar’s order and held that: Mediation time should be excluded from the 120-day limit.Defendants’ written statements were filed within the permissible period. The written statements were accepted, subject to a penalty cost.This judgment reaffirms that mediation should not be discouraged by procedural rigidity, and courts must adopt a practical approach to procedural timelines.

Case Title: Bharat Singh Vs. Karan Singh & Others

Date of Order: February 3, 2025

Case No.: CS(OS) 427/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:777

Court: High Court of Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Justice Subramonium Prasad

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
[Patent and Trademark Attorney]
High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. 

Pidilite Industries Ltd. Vs. Astra Chemtech Private Ltd.

Suppression of Material Fact and vacation of stay

Introduction:This case involves a dispute between Pidilite Industries Limited (Plaintiff) and Astra Chemtech Private Limited & Ors. (Defendants) concerning allegations of trademark infringement. The plaintiff obtained an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on October 24, 2024, restricting the defendants from using certain marks. The defendants filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking vacation of the injunction on the grounds that it was obtained through misrepresentation and suppression of material facts.

Plaintiff's Claims:The plaintiff, Pidilite Industries Ltd., owns a registered trademark consisting of two elephants pulling in opposite directions.The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' trademark featuring rhinos in a similar pose was deceptively similar to its own mark and amounted to trademark infringement.Based on these claims, the plaintiff obtained an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on October 24, 2024 from the Bombay High Court.

Defendants' Contentions:The defendants argued that the plaintiff misrepresented their trademark before the Court. While the defendants’ actual registered trademark consists of six rhinos (three on each side facing each other), the plaintiff misrepresented it as containing only two rhinos to show deceptive similarity.The defendants also alleged that the plaintiff quoted a partial and misleading excerpt from their reply to a cease-and-desist notice, creating a false impression that the defendants had admitted to the likelihood of confusion.The defendants contended that the ex-parte injunction was obtained by suppressing material facts and misleading the Court, thereby violating legal principles governing injunctions.

Defendants’ Arguments (Applicants for Vacation of Injunction):Misrepresentation of the Defendants’ Trademark: The plaintiff knowingly misrepresented the defendants’ registered trademark, depicting it as having only two rhinos, rather than six rhinos facing each other in three pairs. This misrepresentation was repeated in the plaintiff’s pleadings, exhibits, and comparative analysis, misleading the Court into granting the injunction. Suppression of Material Facts: The registration certificate of the defendants' trademark was buried in voluminous exhibits without being highlighted in an objective manner.bThe plaintiff did not disclose that the defendants’ full trademark looked different from what was presented in the comparative table before the Court. Selective Quotation from the Defendants' Reply to Cease-and-Desist Notice: The plaintiff quoted only part of a sentence from the defendants’ reply, creating the impression that the defendants admitted the possibility of confusion.The full sentence actually refuted any likelihood of confusion.

Legal Precedents Cited by the Defendants:S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 – Fraud vitiates everything. If an order is obtained by misleading the Court, it must be vacated. Ramrameshwari Devi & Ors. vs. Nirmala Devi & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 249 – Courts should exercise caution before granting ex-parte injunctions, and they should issue short notices wherever possible. Kewal Ashokbhai Vasoya & Anr. vs. Surabhakti Goods Pvt. Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 3335) – Courts must assess whether the plaintiff made full and fair disclosures before granting ex-parte relief.

Plaintiff’s Arguments (Opposing Vacation of Injunction):No False Representation:;The plaintiff did not mislead the Court regarding the defendants’ trademark.;The plaintiff’s depiction of the defendants’ mark with only two rhinos was based on the defendants' own statements in their reply to the cease-and-desist notice. Material Facts Were Disclosed: The defendants’ full registered trademark was disclosed in paragraph 46 of the plaint. The registration certificate was attached to the exhibits, proving no suppression.Use of "SH" Mark by the Defendants: The defendants had earlier agreed in their reply to the cease-and-desist notice to stop using "SH", which proves they had no right to continue using it.

Legal Precedents Cited by the Plaintiff: K.L.F. Nirmal Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Marico Limited (2023 Bom HC) – Even if there is a minor incorrect statement, ex-parte injunction should not be vacated unless it causes injustice. Farooq Usman Batliwala vs. Hindustan Unilever Limited (2022 Bom HC) – Courts can uphold ex-parte injunctions in the interest of justice even if some details were inadvertently omitted.

Court’s Discussion on the Judgments and Citations:The Court agreed with the defendants' contention that the plaintiff’s misrepresentation of the defendants’ trademark as having only two rhinos instead of six rhinos was misleading.The Court held that the plaintiff should have fairly presented the entire registered trademark of the defendants and not depicted it in a truncated form. The Court also found that quoting only a part of the defendants' reply to the cease-and-desist notice was misleading and created an incorrect impression.  However, regarding the use of "SH" by the defendants, the Court found that the defendants had earlier agreed to stop using the mark. Therefore, the injunction related to "SH" was justified.

Court’s Decision and Reasoning:The ex-parte ad-interim injunction concerning the defendants’ trademark (six rhinos) was vacated as the plaintiff obtained it through misleading representations. The injunction concerning the "SH" mark was upheld, as the defendants had already agreed to stop using it in their prior communications. The goods bearing the six-rhino trademark were ordered to be de-sealed and returned to the defendants.  However, goods bearing the "SH" mark would remain seized until further orders.

Conclusion:The Bombay High Court partly allowed the defendants' application, emphasizing the importance of full and honest disclosure while seeking ex-parte relief. The ruling reinforces the principle that any attempt to mislead the Court, even through selective representation of facts, can lead to vacation of reliefs granted.

Case Title: Pidilite Industries Limited Vs. Astra Chemtech Private Limited & Ors.

Date of Order: February 6, 2025

Case No.: Interim Application (Lodging) No. 37828 of 2024 in Commercial IP Suit (Lodging) No. 32867 of 2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:1821

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Judge: Hon'ble Justice Manish Pitale

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney] 

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Tractors and Farm Equip Ltd. Vs. Massey Ferguson Corp.

Naked Licensing of Trademark and its Effect

Introduction:The case of Tractors and Farm Equipment Limited (TAFE) Vs. Massey Ferguson Corp (MFC) revolves around the doctrine of naked licensing—where a trademark owner allegedly fails to exercise quality control over a licensed brand, leading to possible abandonment of trademark rights.TAFE, which has used the Massey Ferguson (MF) brand in India since 1960, argued that MFC did not supervise or enforce quality standards over its products for over 60 years, effectively abandoning its trademark in India. MFC countered that it remained the legal owner and had conducted sporadic quality checks.The Madras High Court found prima facie evidence of naked licensing, noting that MFC’s lack of enforcement may amount to abandonment. To prevent disruption, the Court maintained the status quo, allowing TAFE to continue using the MF brand until the final trial determines ownership and licensing rights. This case is a landmark in Indian trademark law, addressing the consequences of long-term non-supervision in licensing agreements.

Factual Background of Proceedings:TAFE: A prominent Indian manufacturer of tractors and agricultural equipment, which has used the Massey Ferguson (MF) brand in India since 1960 under various agreements with MFC.MFC: A US-based corporation that owns the MF trademarks globally and claims to have only licensed their use to TAFE.

Longstanding Business Relationship:A Joint Venture (JV) Agreement was signed in 1960, followed by multiple licensing agreements.Over six decades, TAFE used and built the MF brand in India, developing infrastructure, dealer networks, and technological know-how.Termination of Agreements & Legal Dispute:A Standstill Agreement (2014–2019, renewed in 2019) restricted TAFE from increasing its shareholding in AGCO (MFC’s parent company).In April 2024, MFC unilaterally terminated the trademark licensing agreements, asserting its ownership rights.TAFE challenged the termination, arguing that MFC had abandoned its trademark in India by failing to exercise quality control over the brand.TAFE sought an interim injunction to prevent MFC from interfering with its continued use of the MF trademarks​

.

TAFE’s Argument: MFC Has Abandoned the MF Trademark in India:TAFE claimed that MFC’s failure to exercise quality control over its MF-branded products for over 60 years resulted in abandonment of trademark rights. The key points raised were:MFC did not enforce any quality control over TAFE’s tractors and agricultural equipment in India. TAFE has independently built the MF brand’s reputation in India through innovation, manufacturing, and customer service without any direct involvement from MFC. Public Perception: Farmers, distributors, and consumers associate MF-branded tractors solely with TAFE, proving that MFC’s role has diminished. MFC never directly manufactured or sold MF-branded tractors in India, further weakening its claim to active ownership​.

MFC’s Counterarguments: No Abandonment, Quality Control Was Exercised:MFC countered TAFE’s naked licensing claim by arguing that:MFC is the registered proprietor of the MF trademark in India, and TAFE was only a permitted user under various licensing agreements.Periodic quality control checks were conducted, including:Inspections at TAFE’s manufacturing plants.Correspondence regarding product modifications.Opposition filings against third-party trademark applications to protect MF brand integrity.TAFE cannot claim abandonment while simultaneously relying on the licensing agreements. Under the doctrine of election, TAFE cannot challenge MFC’s ownership while enjoying benefits under the trademark license​.

Court’s Analysis and Findings on Naked Licensing:The Court conducted a detailed examination of whether MFC exercised sufficient quality control and made the following observations: Prima Facie Case for Naked Licensing.The Court acknowledged that MFC failed to demonstrate continuous and effective quality control over MF-branded products in India. Only sporadic instances of quality control efforts were presented by MFC, which the Court found insufficient to disprove abandonment​.TAFE used the MF brand continuously since 1960 without any interference from MFC, indicating an implicit acquiescence to TAFE’s control over brand quality.Acquiescence & Abandonment:The Court noted that MFC had:Never directly manufactured MF-branded tractors in India. Allowed TAFE to use the mark without active supervision. Failed to specify quality control measures in termination notices—suggesting that quality was never a genuine concern​.Public Interest Consideration:The Court emphasized the importance of public reliance on TAFE’s MF-branded tractors:TAFE employs over 5,600 workers and indirectly supports 1.6 million livelihoods. Millions of Indian farmers use MF-branded tractors sold by TAFE, and disrupting their service would have severe economic consequences.

Final Decision: Status Quo in Favor of TAFE.The Court did not conclusively rule that MFC abandoned the trademark but found strong prima facie evidence that it failed to exercise quality control.It maintained the status quo, allowing TAFE to continue using the MF brand in India until the full trial determines ownership and licensing rights.The Court rejected MFC’s request for an immediate injunction, stating that the issue required full trial consideration with oral and documentary evidence.

Key Takeaways from the Judgment on Naked Licensing:Sporadic quality checks are insufficient—trademark owners must consistently enforce quality control to maintain ownership.Long-term non-enforcement can be construed as abandonment, especially when the licensee builds brand goodwill independently.Public interest considerations played a significant role in favoring TAFE.Indian trademark law does not explicitly recognize naked licensing as abandonment, but courts may interpret prolonged non-supervision as a ground for loss of rights.

Conclusion:Trademark abandonment through non-use is a significant issue in long-term licensing relationships.Public perception & reliance on a brand’s Indian user may override foreign ownership claims.Preliminary injunctions favoring longstanding users may be granted to prevent irreparable harm.

The outcome of the final trial will determine whether TAFE secures ownership over MF trademarks in India or MFC reclaims its exclusive rights.

Case Title: Tractors and Farm Equipment Limited Vs Massey Ferguson Corp

Date of Order: February 5, 2025

Case Number: C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.190 of 2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:319

Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Judge: Hon'ble Justice Abdul Quddhose

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written by: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,[Patent and Trademark Attorney],High Court of Delhi

Anshul Vaish Vs Hari Om and Co.

Hindi translations of the Trademark written in English constitute trademark infringement

Introduction:This case pertains to a trademark rectification dispute before the Delhi High Court, wherein the petitioner, Anshul Vaish, sought the removal of the respondent’s registered trademark "ROHIT" from the Register of Trade Marks. The matter involves competing claims over prior use, deceptive similarity, and alleged bad faith registration.

Petitioner’s Business & Trademark Use: The petitioner, Anshul Vaish, is a partner in M/s Rohit Wrapers, a firm incorporated on April 13, 2000, engaged in the manufacturing and trading of PVC pipes. The petitioner has used various trademarks, including "Rohit Wrapers," "Rohit Tubes," "Rohit Varadan," "Rohit Gold," and "Rohit Durable", with the name “Rohit” as the dominant feature. The petitioner filed Trademark Application No. 1989126 on July 5, 2010, which was registered in February 2016.

Respondent’s Trademark Registration: The respondent, Hari Om & Co., applied for trademark "ROHIT" under Application No. 2408221 on October 9, 2012, claiming use since January 1, 2005. The mark was registered on August 14, 2014 in Class 17 for PVC pipes.

Dispute Between Parties: The petitioner alleged that the respondent's mark was deceptively similar and was adopted in bad faith. The respondent issued a legal notice in 2015 to the petitioner, claiming trademark infringement. In response, the petitioner filed for rectification of the respondent's trademark registration, asserting prior and continuous use since 2000.

Arguments by the Petitioner (Anshul Vaish & Rohit Wrapers): Prior Use & Continuous Business Activity: The petitioner had been using "Rohit" as a trademark and trade name since April 2000, predating the respondent's claimed use of 2005. Documentary evidence included TIN Registration (2000), Central Excise Certificate (2002), Sale Invoices (2004-2016), and a Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) Certificate (2003). Trademark Similarity & Deceptive Use: The respondent adopted "Rohit" in Hindi, which is phonetically and visually identical to the petitioner’s mark in English. The respondent misled consumers, causing confusion and associating its goods with the petitioner’s established brand.Bad Faith Adoption & Fraudulent Claims: The respondent's invoices for 2005-2006 contained a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) that was only granted in 2007, exposing document falsification. The respondent’s Partnership Deed was modified in 2007 to include PVC pipes, contradicting their claim of use since 2005. Violation of Trademark Law & Paris Convention: Under Sections 9(1)(a), 9(2)(a), 11(1), and 11(3)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the registration of deceptively similar marks is prohibited. Article 8 of the Paris Convention mandates that trade names are protected even without registration.

Arguments by the Respondent (Hari Om & Co.):Legitimate Registration & Prior Use Claim: The respondent argued that it had been using the mark since 2005, predating the petitioner’s trademark application. The trademark was registered in 2012 without any opposition. Business Growth & Market Presence: The respondent submitted invoices and sales data to show extensive business activity under the disputed trademark since 2005. Defensive Argument Against Fraud Allegations: The respondent denied any fraudulent intent and stated that its adoption of the mark was coincidental and not in bad faith.

Discussion on Judgments & Cited Cases:The Court referred to several landmark decisions while evaluating deceptive similarity and prior use claims:  Delhi High Court in South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc. & Anr. (2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953): Held that dominant features of trademarks are crucial for assessing infringement. The respondent’s adoption of “Rohit” in Hindi was identical in sound and meaning to the petitioner’s mark, leading to confusion. Delhi High Court in Bhatia Plastics v. Peacock Industries Ltd. (1994 SCC OnLine Del 387):Held that English and Hindi translations of the same word can constitute trademark infringement (e.g., "MAYUR" vs. "PEACOCK"). Bombay High Court in Indian Express Ltd. v. Chadra Prakash Shivhare (2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5541):Ruled that a registered mark cannot be used in another language if it creates confusion (e.g., “Indian Express” in Devanagari script).

Reasoning of the Judge:Hon'ble Court ruled in favor of the petitioner based on the following findings: Petitioner’s Prior Use Proven: The petitioner had been using "Rohit" since 2000, whereas the respondent's claimed use from 2005 was unsupported by credible evidence. Respondent’s False User Claim & Forged Documents: The TIN number in the respondent's invoices for 2005-2006 was issued only in 2007, proving falsification. The respondent’s Partnership Deed was modified in 2007 to include PVC pipes, disproving its claim of business since 2005. Deceptive Similarity Between the Trademarks: The Court found that the respondent’s Hindi trademark was phonetically, visually, and conceptually identical to the petitioner’s English mark. Such usage was likely to cause consumer confusion and deception. Bad Faith Intent of the Respondent: The respondent deliberately copied the petitioner’s mark to benefit from its established goodwill.

Decision of the Court:The respondent’s trademark registration (No. 2408221 in Class 17) was canceled.The Trade Marks Register was directed to rectify the entry and remove the mark. The Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks was notified for compliance.

Concluding Note:This case underscores the importance of prior use in trademark disputes and how courts assess deceptive similarity between marks in different languages. The judgment reaffirms that: Prior continuous use prevails over later registrations. Trademark adoption in bad faith is grounds for cancellation. Translations of marks into different languages can still constitute infringement. This ruling provides strong protection for brand owners against dishonest competitors attempting to ride on their goodwill.

Case Title: Anshul Vaish Vs Hari Om and Co.

Date of Order: February 07, 2025

Case No.: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 86/2021

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:733

Name of Court: Delhi High Court

Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written by:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman:[Patent and Trademark Attorney]:High Court of Delhi

Natco Pharma Ltd. Vs Kudos Pharma Ltd.

Effect of Expiry of Subject Matter Patent during pendency of Appeal proceeding

Introduction:This case concerns an intellectual property dispute in the pharmaceutical sector. The appeal, filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, challenges the ad interim injunction imposed by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court on Natco Pharma Limited. The injunction restrains Natco from manufacturing or selling Olaparib under the brand name BRACANAT or any other brand until the final disposal of the suit.

Factual Background of Proceedings:Kudos Pharmaceuticals Limited and other respondents filed a suit (CS (COMM) 29/2023) seeking to restrain Natco Pharma from manufacturing and selling Olaparib, alleging infringement of its patent rights. The Single Judge granted an ad interim injunction on 01.03.2024 in favor of Kudos Pharmaceuticals. Natco Pharma Limited challenged this order before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court via FAO(OS) (COMM) 43/2024.

During the pendency of the appeal, the patent for Olaparib expired: The Supreme Court, in SLP (C) 16237/2024 (Novartis AG & Anr. vs. Natco Pharma Limited), had held that once a patent expires, an injunction based on patent rights ceases to have practical relevance. Similarly, in another case, Indoco Remedies Ltd. v. Bristol Myers Squibb Holdings Ireland Unlimited Company & Ors., the Delhi High Court Division Bench had also observed that an injunction loses relevance post-expiry of the patent. Given these precedents, Natco Pharma argued that the injunction should be vacated.

Arguments of the Appellant (Natco Pharma Limited):Patent Expiry: The appellant contended that since the patent had expired, the injunction was meaningless and should be vacated. Potential Prejudice: Natco argued that the injunction, if not set aside, could be misused in future litigations or create confusion in ongoing commercial dealings. Supreme Court's Precedents: The appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Novartis AG & Anr. vs. Natco Pharma Limited, asserting that the Division Bench should not entertain the appeal since the patent had expired.No Continuing Infringement: Natco argued that patent-based injunctions serve no purpose once the patent term ends, as exclusivity ceases to exist.

Arguments of the Respondents (Kudos Pharmaceuticals Limited & Others):Single Judge’s Order Valid at the Time of Issuance: The respondents maintained that the order was passed when the patent was still in force, making the injunction valid at that time. Relevance of Injunction in Trial Proceedings: Kudos Pharmaceuticals contended that the injunction order might influence future proceedings and should not be dismissed outright. Reliance on Precedents: The respondents referenced the Single Judge’s reasoning and attempted to distinguish their case from past judgments where injunctions had been lifted after patent expiration.

Discussion on Judgments & Cited Cases: Supreme Court’s Order dated 02.08.2024, passed  in SLP (C) 16237/2024 titled Novartis AG & Anr. vs. Natco Pharma Limited, and the Order dated 15.10.2024, passed in the Review Petition (Civil) (D No. 43943/2024): The Supreme Court ruled that once a patent expires, an injunction based on patent rights ceases to have any practical significance. The Court criticized lower courts for continuing to entertain disputes over expired patents. This case was directly applicable to Natco Pharma’s appeal, reinforcing the appellant’s argument.Delhi High Court’s Division Bench Order dated 06.10.2022, passed in FAO(OS) (COMM) 3/2020, titled Indoco Remedies Ltd. v. Bristol Myers Squibb Holdings Ireland Unlimited Company & Ors, The Division Bench held that injunctions should not extend beyond the life of a patent.The case clarified that post-expiry commercial rights return to the public domain, rendering injunctions meaningless.These two key precedents strongly supported Natco Pharma's position and influenced the Division Bench’s decision.

Reasoning of the Division Bench: Reaffirming Supreme Court's Position: The Bench agreed with the Supreme Court’s observation that a patent’s expiry renders injunctions meaningless. Ensuring No Prejudice in Trial Proceedings: To address Natco’s concerns, the Bench clarified that the Single Judge’s order would not be treated as binding in the trial stage. Avoiding Unnecessary Litigation: The Bench emphasized that no further time should be spent litigating expired patents, dismissing the appeal while leaving legal questions open for trial.

Decision of the Court:The Delhi High Court disposed of the appeal in favor of Natco Pharma Limited.

The Bench did not affirm the Single Judge’s injunction but left the legal questions open for further consideration at trial. It ruled that the injunction should not prejudice Natco in future proceedings or be considered binding in other cases.

Concluding Note:This case is significant for patent litigation in India, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector. It reinforces the principle that injunctions lose relevance once a patent expires. The ruling aligns with global intellectual property norms, where expired patents return products to the public domain, fostering competition and access to medicines.

Case Title: Natco Pharma Ltd. Vs Kudos Pharma Ltd.

Date of Order: 31.01.2025

Case No.: FAO(OS) (COMM) 43/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:611-DB

Name of Court: Delhi High Court

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla, Hon’ble Ms. Justice Shalinder Kaur

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written by : Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,[Patent and Trademark Attorney],High Court of Delhi

Johnson & Johnson PTE Ltd. Vs. Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar

Jurisdiction of Court and Defendant's product available on third party interactive website

Introduction: The present case concerns a trademark infringement and passing off suit filed by Johnson & Johnson PTE Ltd. against Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar and others before the Delhi High Court. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were selling electrolyte drinks under the deceptively similar mark "ORSI" and using a trade dress similar to its well-known brand, "ORS-L" / "ORSL". The main issue before the Court was whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the defendants contested the jurisdiction, arguing that they do not conduct business in Delhi. The suit was filed under:Section 134(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Sections 27 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 20(c) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908.

Factual Background of the Proceedings: Plaintiff’s Business & Trademark Usage: Johnson & Johnson PTE Ltd. (plaintiff) is a Singapore-based company that manufactures healthcare products. It acquired the brand ORS-L and ORSL from Jagdale Industries Limited via an Assignment Deed dated November 7, 2014. The ORS-L brand has been in use in India since 2003, with multiple flavors (Lemon, Orange, and Apple). The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of various ORS-L and ORSL formative trademarks in Classes 30, 31, 32, and 33. Defendant’s Alleged InfringementThe defendants were marketing and selling electrolyte drinks under the brand "ORSI", which the plaintiff claimed was deceptively similar to "ORSL." Defendant No. 1 (Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar) was the marketer of the impugned products under "ORSI." Pure Tropic (Defendants 2-5) was the manufacturer of these products. Defendant No. 1 had obtained trademark registration (No. 5323696, dated February 10, 2022) for the mark ORSI and had applied for additional trademarks under Class 32.

Plaintiff’s Cease-and-Desist Actions & Discovery of Infringement: In September 2022, the plaintiff discovered the impugned ORSI products in India. A Cease-and-Desist notice (dated September 5, 2022) was sent to Defendant No. 1 and M/s Pure Tropic, but it remained undelivered. The plaintiff later found that Defendant No. 1 had filed another trademark application (No. 5525855, dated July 12, 2022) for ORSI. In September 2023, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants were selling their products on the website www.dhanalakshmiagency.in, which allegedly delivers products across India, including Delhi.

Defendant No. 1’s Arguments (Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC - Rejection of Suit): The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Key arguments:The suit was filed to harass and eliminate a competitor. No cause of action arose in Delhi as Defendant No. 1’s business was concentrated in Andhra Pradesh (85%), with small portions in Odisha, Tamil Nadu, and Telangana. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that the impugned products were sold in Delhi. The third-party website (www.dhanalakshmiagency.in) was allegedly operated by a trader in Vijayawada (Mr. Sagar), who previously worked for the plaintiff. The defendant had no connection with the website. The website’s jurisdiction clause mentioned Delhi courts, but this did not prove actual sales in Delhi.

Plaintiff’s Arguments in Reply: The plaintiff opposed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, asserting that:The defendant’s arguments did not satisfy the threshold for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The website (www.dhanalakshmiagency.in) offered delivery to Delhi, which was sufficient to invoke jurisdiction. The website was modified and later shut down only after the filing of the suit—indicating an attempt to evade legal action. The defendants' product was listed on IndiaMart, which offered nationwide delivery, including Delhi.

Court’s Reasoning on Territorial Jurisdiction: The Delhi High Court rejected the defendant's application, ruling that it had territorial jurisdiction based on the following findings: Presence of an interactive website: The website www.dhanalakshmiagency.in was accessible from Delhi and accepted orders from Delhi. The website delivered across India, including Delhi, which constitutes "use in the course of trade" under Section 2(2)(c) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.  Legal Precedents Supporting Territorial Jurisdiction: Shakti Fashion & Another v. Burberry Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1636Held that territorial jurisdiction exists if the defendant offers goods for sale through an interactive web portal. Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881Held that advertising and promoting goods online constitutes ‘use of a mark’ under the Trade Marks Act.Plaintiff's Cause of Action Was Valid:The order placed by the plaintiff from Delhi was accepted, even if the delivery had not been completed. Use of a mark includes advertising and offering goods for sale, even if no actual sale occurs in the jurisdiction.  No Merits in Defendant’s Arguments: The defendant’s plea that it had no connection to the website was not supported by evidence. The website was modified and later deactivated after the filing of the suit, showing attempted evasion.

Decision of the Court: The Delhi High Court dismissed Defendant No. 1’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, ruling that:The suit could proceed in Delhi since the impugned products were advertised and available for order in Delhi. Territorial jurisdiction was established based on online accessibility and intent to sell in Delhi. The Court held that:The plaintiff had raised triable issues regarding infringement and passing off. The defendants’ arguments lacked merit and were an attempt to avoid accountability.

Concluding Note:This case reinforces the principle that in trademark infringement cases, territorial jurisdiction extends to locations where the impugned products are advertised and available for sale, even if no actual sales occur. The judgment upholds Delhi’s jurisdiction in online trademark disputes, protecting brand owners from deceptive business practices.

Case Title: Johnson & Johnson PTE Ltd. Vs. Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar

Date of Order: February 4, 2025

Case No.: CS(COMM) 801/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:662

Court: High Court of Delhi

Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written by:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,[Patent and Trademark Attorney],High Court of Delhi

Godai Global Inc. Vs. Shahnawaz Siddiqui

Bad Faith Adoption and Trademark Rectification

Introduction:This case pertains to a rectification petition filed by Godai Global Inc., a South Korean company, under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the High Court of Delhi. The petition sought the removal of a device mark registered under application number 5635163 in Class 3 by the respondent, Shahnawaz Siddiqui. The primary contention of the petitioner was that the respondent had dishonestly registered an identical or deceptively similar mark to the petitioner’s well-established trademark, “Beauty of Joseon,” which is widely recognized in the global skincare market.

Factual Background of the Proceedings:Petitioner’s Business & Trademark UsageGodai Global Inc. is a South Korean entity engaged in the manufacture of Korean beauty and personal care products across 54 countries under the brand name "Beauty of Joseon."Since 2010, the company has been distributing skincare products such as serums, cleansing oils, sunscreens, and pore masks, inspired by traditional Korean beauty treatments. The petitioner registered its website (https://beautyofjoseon.com/) on March 2, 2017, making its products globally available, including in India via e-commerce platforms. Entry into the Indian Market & Opposition to Respondent’s MarkIn August 2022, the petitioner officially commenced exports to India. The petitioner applied for international trademark protection for its device mark in India, but in December 2023, the Trade Mark Registry issued a provisional refusal, citing lack of distinctiveness. During this process, the petitioner discovered that Respondent No. 1 (Shahnawaz Siddiqui) had registered an identical mark under application number 5635163 on October 3, 2022, on a ‘proposed to be used’ basis. Additionally, Respondent No. 1 also applied for registration of the word mark “Beauty of Joseon” under application no. 6236043. The petitioner opposed this application on March 7, 2024.

Proceedings in the Present Petition: The petition was filed under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking removal of the registered device mark. The High Court issued notice on July 4, 2024, granting four weeks for Respondent No. 1 to file a reply. Despite service, the respondent did not file a reply or make an appearance. Consequently, the right to reply was closed on October 8, 2024, and the respondent was proceeded ex-parte on October 21, 2024 with an interim injunction granted in favor of the petitioner.

Petitioner’s Arguments (Godai Global Inc.): Bad Faith Registration: The respondent obtained the trademark dishonestly and in bad faith, intending to unlawfully benefit from the goodwill of the petitioner.Prior Use & Global ReputationThe petitioner’s device mark has been registered in approximately 30 countries and has been in use since 2010.Various international magazines have recognized and endorsed the petitioner’s products.Likelihood of ConfusionThe impugned mark is identical to the petitioner’s mark and is registered for similar goods (skincare products), creating a high likelihood of consumer confusion.

Legal Precedents Supporting Cancellation of the Mark: Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trademarks & Anr. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5844)Held that where a mark is identical to a globally recognized brand, the registration must be canceled due to bad faith adoption.BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati & Anr. (2023 3 HCC (Del) 164)Ruled that bad faith registrations made after a brand’s entry into the market warrant cancellation.Respondent’s Arguments (Shahnawaz Siddiqui & Anr.)No defense was presented, as the respondent did not appear before the Court.

Court’s Analysis & Findings: Failure of Respondent to Contest the CaseAs no reply was filed by Respondent No. 1, the Court deemed the averments made by the petitioner to be admitted in law. Comparison of the MarksA side-by-side comparison revealed that the impugned mark was nearly identical to the petitioner’s device mark.The Korean characters in the petitioner’s mark had no relevance to India, reinforcing that the respondent had copied the mark.Application of the ‘Bad Faith’ PrincipleFollowing the rulings in Kia Wang (supra) and BPI Sports (supra), the Court found that bad faith adoption was evident.The respondent’s actions constituted ‘trademark squatting’, which is prohibited under Section 11(10)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.  Consumer Deception & Unfair AdvantageThe identical nature of the marks and their application in the same class of goods made consumer confusion inevitable. The Court emphasized that unauthorized registration of well-known international trademarks in bad faith is not permissible.

Decision: The Court allowed the rectification petition, directing the Trade Mark Registry to remove the impugned registered trade mark (No. 5635163) from the Register of Trade Marks.A copy of the order was sent to the Trade Mark Registry for compliance.

Concluding Note: This judgment reinforces the principle of bad faith adoption in trademark disputes. The ruling underscores that Indian courts will not tolerate ‘trademark squatting’ and will protect international brand owners from unfair advantage-seeking registrations.

Case Title: Godai Global Inc. Vs. Shahnawaz Siddiqui & Anr.

Date of Order: January 28, 2025

Case No.: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 81/2024 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:649

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney]

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt Ltd Vs. V-Guard Industries Ltd

Introduction: This case involves a dispute between Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt Ltd (Plaintiff) and V-Guard Industries Ltd (Defendant) regarding the alleged infringement of registered designs of switch plates. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from using its “MATTEO” range of switch plates, claiming infringement of its registered designs (Nos. 296178, 296179, and 296180).The case also discusses the defendant's counter-claim for cancellation of the plaintiff’s designs on the grounds of prior registration, prior publication, and lack of novelty. The dispute primarily concerns intellectual property law, particularly design rights under the Designs Act, 2000.

Plaintiff’s Claim:The plaintiff claimed that its switch plate designs were novel and original, giving them a distinct aesthetic appeal.It alleged that the defendant’s “MATTEO” switch plates were a clear imitation of its registered designs.Reliefs sought included injunction, damages, and delivery up of infringing materials.

Defendant’s Counter-Claim:The defendant filed a counter-claim (CC No. 2/2022), seeking cancellation of the plaintiff’s designs.It argued that the plaintiff’s designs lacked novelty and originality, citing prior registrations and prior publications.It further claimed that the plaintiff’s own group entities had obtained earlier foreign design registrations, proving that the designs were not new.

Procedural Developments:The defendant amended its written statement based on additional facts introduced by the plaintiff in its replication and counter-claim response.The defendant filed an application under Order XI Rule 1(4) CPC to introduce additional documents regarding a prior design known as “Concept 6.”This application was allowed on 27th January 2023.The defendant filed another application under Order XI Rule 1(10) CPC (the subject of this order) to place additional documents on record, claiming they were discovered after an internal investigation.

Defendant’s (V-Guard Industries Ltd) Submissions:Newly Discovered Evidence:The additional documents were not in the defendant’s power or control at the time of filing the written statement or amended counter-claim.The defendant discovered these documents during an ongoing internal investigation.Prior Registrations and Publications:The plaintiff’s group entities had earlier foreign design registrations, proving that the plaintiff’s designs were not new.The plaintiff had allegedly failed to disclose these prior registrations.Designs Not Novel: The defendant conducted a comparative analysis and found that the plaintiff’s designs were substantially similar to previously published designs by: Plaintiff’s group company (Legrand) Third parties (Elley’s E-Square, Wipro’s Venia switch plates, etc.).Plaintiff’s Concealment:The plaintiff allegedly withheld material facts to monopolize the market with non-novel designs.

Plaintiff’s (Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt Ltd) Submissions:Defendant’s Application Not Maintainable:The documents were in public domain and should have been filed earlier with the written statement or counter-claim.The defendant had ample opportunity to research and collect materials before filing earlier pleadings.Repeated Filings:The defendant had already filed four sets of additional documents between November 2021 and January 2023.The present application was an afterthought and lacked bona fide intent.No Justification for Late Filing:The defendant provided no reasonable explanation for why these documents were not filed earlier.Irrelevance of Additional Documents:The new documents had no bearing on the subject matter and could not challenge the validity of the injunction order.

Discussion on Judgments & Cited Precedents: Sudhir Kumar Alias S. Baliyan Vs. Vinay Kumar G. B. (2021) 13 SCC 71: Held that newly discovered documents can be introduced without the need to establish a reasonable cause for prior non-disclosure if they were genuinely not in the party’s possession at the time of original filing.Agva Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Agfa-Gevaert NV (2023 SCC OnLine Del 7914). Allowed additional documents to be introduced before trial begins if they do not alter the core issues or set up a new case. K. Mallesh Vs. K. Narender & Others (2015 SCC OnLine SC 1184) Stated that admissibility and relevance of additional documents should be decided during the final hearing, not at the stage of filing.Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India (2024 SCC OnLine Cal 4046). Merely because documents are in public domain does not mean they were in the defendant’s possession. 

Reasoning of the Judge:Newly Discovered Documents Can Be Allowed:Since the defendant discovered the documents after internal inquiries, the delay was justified. Defendant’s Challenge to Design Validity Was Consistent: The additional documents did not introduce a new argument but rather supported the existing counter-claim. No Procedural Violation: Issues had not yet been framed, and the trial had not begun—allowing additional documents would not prejudice the plaintiff. Precedents Supported Defendant’s Claim: The Supreme Court had ruled in Sudhir Kumar and Agva Healthcare that newly discovered documents should be allowed if they were genuinely not available earlier. Imposition of Costs: The defendant was allowed to introduce the documents, but a cost of Rs. 50,000 was imposed to compensate the plaintiff for the procedural delay.

Decision: Defendant’s application was allowed, and the additional documents were taken on record. Costs of Rs. 50,000 were imposed on the defendant, payable to the plaintiff within four weeks.

Concluding Note: This judgment reinforces the principle of procedural flexibility in commercial litigation. The court acknowledged that newly discovered evidence may be introduced even at a later stage, provided it does not introduce a new claim or prejudice the opposing party. The case also emphasizes the importance of design law in protecting original industrial designs while preventing monopoly over non-novel elements.

Case Title: Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt Ltd Vs. V-Guard Industries Ltd

Date of Order: 3rd February 2025

Case No.: CS(COMM) 567/2021 & CC(COMM) 2/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:650

Name of Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney]

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Unilin Beheer B.V. Vs. Balaji Action Buildwell

Non Filing of Admission Denial Affidavit and its consequences

Introduction:This case pertains to the failure of the defendant to file an affidavit of admission and denial of documents as per procedural requirements. The main legal question before the Delhi High Court was whether such a failure should be treated as a situation under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) or if it merely results in the documents being deemed admitted while the written statement is still considered.

Filing of Suit: The plaintiff, Unilin Beheer B.V., filed CS(COMM) No. 1683/2016 seeking a permanent injunction restraining infringement of Patent No. 193247 and related reliefs. However, the patent validity lapsed during the proceedings, rendering the permanent injunction moot. The suit was then pursued only for damages.

Counter Claim & Revocation Proceedings:The defendant, Balaji Action Buildwell, contested the suit and was granted liberty (order dated 29th January 2018) to file a Counter Claim for revocation of the subject patent if it withdrew the pending rectification proceedings under Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970 before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).The defendant filed the Counter Claim with an advance copy to the plaintiff’s counsel on 23rd February 2018 and re-filed on 30th July 2018.

Procedural Delays & Non-compliance:The plaintiff filed the written statement to the Counter Claim on 19th April 2018, but the acknowledgment of receipt by the defendant’s counsel was on 2nd May 2018.The written statement was re-filed after objections on 2nd May 2018 and 10th October 2018.The defendant filed IA No. 10200/2018 under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, seeking:Rejection of the plaintiff’s written statement to the Counter Claim.Deeming all documents filed by the defendant as admitted.Allowing the Counter Claim forthwith.

Plaintiff’s Submissions (Unilin Beheer B.V.):The delay in filing the written statement and affidavit of admission/denial of documents should be excused under Rule 14 of Chapter I of Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, which allows courts to dispense with compliance in exceptional cases.The affidavit requirement (Rule 3 of Chapter VII) was introduced only on 1st March 2018, and the plaintiff was not fully aware of the consequences of non-filing. Since the defendant filed a replication to the written statement, it had implicitly condoned the delay. The plaintiff had, in its written statement, dealt with the defendant’s documents, so an affidavit was not strictly necessary.

Defendant’s Submissions (Balaji Action Buildwell):The written statement was not filed within 30 days and was beyond the maximum 120-day period, making it inadmissible as per SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. vs. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SC). Without an affidavit of admission/denial, the written statement cannot be taken on record as per Rule 3 of Chapter VII. The plaintiff’s reliance on Rule 14 (power to dispense with compliance) was misplaced, as it cannot override a mandatory rule.

Key Legal Provisions Considered:Order VIII Rule 10 CPC – Deals with consequences of non-filing of a written statement.Order XI Rule 4 CPC (as applicable to Commercial Courts Act, 2015) – Mandates an affidavit of admission/denial of documents. Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018: Rule 3 of Chapter VII – Requires an affidavit of admission/denial to accompany the written statement.Rule 4 of Chapter VII – States that failure to file such an affidavit results in the documents being deemed admitted.Rule 14 of Chapter I – Grants discretion to the court to dispense with procedural requirements in certain cases.

Citations & Their Context: SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. vs. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SC)Established that strict timelines for filing pleadings in commercial suits must be adhered to.

Defendant relied on this case to argue that time limits could not be extended beyond the statutory period.Xerox Corporation vs. P.K. Khansaheb (2018 Del HC)Affirmed the mandatory nature of procedural rules in commercial suits.Used to counter the plaintiff’s request for exemption under Rule 14 of Chapter I.

Reasoning of the Judge: Affidavit of admission/denial is mandatory – The court held that without an affidavit, the written statement cannot be taken on record. Non-filing has serious consequences – The court interpreted Rule 3 and Rule 4 of Chapter VII together, concluding that failure to file an affidavit results in:Written statement not being taken on record.Documents being deemed admitted.The court proceeding under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, which allows judgment based on admissions.Legislative intent must be upheld – The rules were designed to prevent delays and ensure efficient case management. Allowing a lenient approach would defeat the purpose of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Balancing procedural strictness with fairness: Despite the strict interpretation, the judge considered the facts and held that: Since the written statement was re-filed within the maximum 120-day limit, it could still be taken on record. However, this would be subject to costs of Rs. 3 lacs to be paid to the defendant’s counsel.

Decision: The written statement was allowed to be taken on record, but the plaintiff was directed to pay costs of Rs. 3 lacs. The applications were disposed of with the following orders: Written statement and affidavit of admission/denial to be accepted. Counter Claim to proceed with framing of issues on 13th August 2019.

Concluding Note:This case reinforces the strict procedural requirements in commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The judgment strikes a balance between enforcing procedural compliance and preventing undue prejudice to parties due to technical defaults. It serves as a precedent on the consequences of failing to file an affidavit of admission/denial and the judicial discretion available under Rule 14 of Chapter I.

Case Title: Unilin Beheer B.V. Vs. Balaji Action Buildwell

Date of Order: 9th April 2019 

Case No.: CS(COMM) 1683/2016 & CC(COMM) 38/2018

Court: Delhi High Court

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney]

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Birendra Prasad Sah Vs. Debendra Jalewal

Appointment of Advocate Commissioner Without Notice Under Order 26 Rule 18 CPC is illegal

Introduction: The case involves a commercial dispute relating to trademark infringement, search and seizure, and ex-parte injunction orders passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nalbari, Assam. The petitioner, engaged in manufacturing food products, challenged the orders appointing an Advocate Commissioner for search and seizure, as well as an ex-parte injunction restraining him from using a similar trademark. The case raises significant legal questions regarding due process in ex-parte injunctions and procedural propriety under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC).

Factual Background: The petitioner, Birendra Prasad Sah, manufactures and sells food products, including "Matar Mixture," in Siliguri, West Bengal. On 03.11.2023, officials along with the police entered his factory, seized packaging rolls, and halted production based on an order obtained ex-parte.The respondent, Debendra Jalewal, filed Commercial Suit No. 03/2023 alleging that the petitioner was using a deceptively similar trademark "Krisaan" to his registered trademark "Krishan."The Civil Judge, Nalbari, passed ex-parte orders on 05.10.2023, granting:Misc (J) Case No. 27/2023: Appointment of an Advocate Commissioner for search and seizure under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC.Misc (J) Case No. 28/2023: Ex-parte injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, restraining the petitioner from selling products with similar artistic work. The petitioner argued that he was not served any prior notice, violating Order 39 Rule 3 CPC.

Petitioner's Submissions: Violation of due process: The ex-parte orders were obtained without serving notice, depriving him of the opportunity to present his case. Delay in urgency claim: The applications for injunction were filed on 25.08.2023, while the orders were passed on 05.10.2023 (after 42 days), contradicting the claim of urgency. Illegality of search and seizure order: The appointment of an Advocate Commissioner was without notice, violating Order 26 Rule 18 CPC. Improper execution: His son was forced to sign seizure documents without explanation. Lack of prima facie case: The court failed to assess the validity of the defendant’s trademark registration before granting an injunction.Wrong choice of forum: An appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC was available, making the revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution improper. Cited precedents:Cadila Healthcare Ltd. vs. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 1 – Comparative similarity test in trademark cases. Rajbir Kaur vs. S. Chokesiri (1988 AIR SC 1845) – Principles for granting injunctions.

Respondent's Submissions:Prior use and trademark registration: The respondent has used "Krishan" since 2017 and holds a valid trademark under Class 30, registered on 26.05.2019 (valid till 2028).Similarity between marks: The petitioner’s mark "Krisaan" is deceptively similar to "Krishan," differing by only one letter, indicating bad faith. Legality of search and seizure: The Advocate Commissioner acted within authority under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC. Maintainability of revision petition:Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, provides an appeal remedy under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, making the Article 227 petition improper. Cited Decision: A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan (2000) 7 SCC 695 and Jagdish Singh vs. Ambalal (2014) 10 SCC 610 – High Courts should not entertain Article 227 petitions when statutory appeals exist.

Judicial Analysis and Citations:Trademark Infringement and Ex-Parte Injunctions.The Delhi High Court in Dabur India Ltd. vs. Emami Ltd. (FAO (OS) (COMM) 171/2023) held that: An injunction against a registered trademark holder is improper unless the court determines the invalidity of the registration. If a defendant is already in the market before suit filing, they must be allowed to oppose an interim injunction. The Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (1990 Supp SCC 727) stated that injunctions in IP cases should not be granted ex-parte without proper scrutiny. The Delhi High Court in Silvermaple Healthcare vs. Dr. Ajay Dubey (regarding DHI vs. DFI hair treatment trademarks) refused an ex-parte injunction without allowing the defendant to file a reply. Search and Seizure Without Notice: The Gauhati High Court noted that Order 26 Rule 18 CPC requires notice before execution of a commission.Similar rulings in Mohar Yadav vs. Pramod Yadav (2021 SCC Jhk 544) and Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538 emphasize that High Courts should not entertain Article 227 petitions where statutory appeals exist.

Court’s Reasoning and Decision:Ex-Parte Orders Were Procedurally Flawed: Order 39 Rule 3 CPC was violated as no notice was served before granting an injunction. The absence of urgency (42-day delay in passing the order) weakened the ex-parte claim. Search and Seizure Order was Irregular.The appointment of an Advocate Commissioner without notice violated Order 26 Rule 18 CPC. The execution of seizure without proper documentation and explanation to the petitioner’s son was irregular.Revision Under Article 227 Was Not Maintainable:An appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC was the correct remedy instead of invoking Article 227.The petition was dismissed on procedural grounds despite the flaws in the original orders.

Conclusion:This case highlights the importance of procedural fairness in ex-parte injunctions and search orders in trademark disputes. While the court recognized the irregularities in the orders, it ultimately dismissed the petition as not maintainable due to the availability of an alternate remedy (appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC). The ruling underscores that ex-parte orders in commercial disputes should only be granted with strict adherence to procedural safeguards.

Case Title: Birendra Prasad Sah Vs. Debendra Jalewal

Case No.: CRP(IO)/68/2024

Date of Order: 24.01.2025

Neutral Citation: GAHC010200732024

Court: Gauhati High Court (High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram & Arunachal Pradesh)

Judge: Honourable Mrs. Justice Malasri Nandi

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney]

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

Honest concurrent use is not a defense unless the mark is registered

Introduction:This case pertains to a trademark infringement and passing-off dispute between Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. (plaintiff) and Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (defendant). The dispute arises over the alleged deceptive similarity between the plaintiff’s registered trademark "BILTEN" and the defendant’s mark "BELATIN", both used for antihistamine pharmaceutical preparations containing Bilastine as the main ingredient. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from using the mark "BELATIN" and demanded the surrender of infringing materials, account of profits, and damages.The defendant, however, contended that it was the prior adopter of the mark "BELATIN", having conceived it before the plaintiff’s trademark registration. The court was required to determine whether the defendant’s use of "BELATIN" constituted trademark infringement or passing off and whether prior adoption of a mark could be a defense against infringement.

Factual Background & Procedural History: Plaintiff’s Case (Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.)  Laboratories adopted the trademark "BILTEN" in June 2019 and applied for registration on July 25, 2019, in Class 5 for pharmaceutical products.The trademark was officially registered under No. 4246358 in 2019.The product launch occurred in November 2019, following the grant of a drug license on October 15, 2019.The plaintiff noticed the defendant using the mark "BELATIN" for a Bilastine-based antihistamine in August 2020.Since both marks are phonetically and visually similar, Apex claimed this constituted infringement and passing off.Defendant’s Case (Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd.) conceived and adopted the mark "BELATIN" in May 2019 and applied for trademark registration on June 22, 2019 (Application No. 4214272).The defendant obtained a drug license on October 15, 2019, and launched the product in November 2019.It argued that pharmaceutical trademarks are often derived from the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), and Bilastine-based trademarks are commonly formulated.The defendant claimed to be an honest and concurrent user and contended that the plaintiff's registration was based on a "proposed to be used" application, making Macleods the first actual user.

Court Proceedings:The case was filed under Sections 27, 28, 29, 134, 135 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, and Sections 51, 55, 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957.The Madras High Court granted an interim injunction restraining Macleods from using "BELATIN".Both parties submitted documentary evidence, including trademark applications, invoices, drug licenses, and promotional expenses.

Plaintiff’s Submissions (Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd.):Prior use: Apex argued that it adopted the mark in April 2019 and began actual sales in November 2019.Trademark registration: Apex’s trademark was officially registered, making it the first registered user.Deceptive similarity: "BILTEN" and "BELATIN" are phonetically and visually similar, causing a likelihood of confusion.Reputation and goodwill: Apex had established market presence and sales turnover, and the defendant’s mark diluted its brand identity.Judicial Precedents: The plaintiff relied on: Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) – Held that pharmaceutical trademarks require the highest degree of protection due to the risk of patient confusion.Neon Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. (2015) – Established that prior user rights take precedence over registration.

Defendant’s Submissions (Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd.): Prior adoption: Macleods conceived "BELATIN" in May 2019 and applied for registration before Apex’s application.Industry practice: Pharmaceutical trademarks often derive from the API (Bilastine), making similarities inevitable.Honest & concurrent use: Macleods had no intention to mislead consumers and had undertaken a trademark search before adoption.Defenses based on case law:Sun Pharmaceuticals v. Cipla (2007) – Held that prior trademark applicants have legitimate rights.Plus Systems v. Plus Computers (IPAB 2008) – Stated that actual use is not necessary to claim rights in a trademark.

Issues :The court examined the following: Whether "BILTEN" was a registered trademark?  Who was the prior user – Apex or Macleods?  Whether the trademarks "BILTEN" and "BELATIN" are deceptively similar?  Whether Macleods could claim "honest concurrent use"?

Prior Use Principle: Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 Cited by: Plaintiff (Apex Laboratories): The Supreme Court held that prior use of a trademark takes precedence over mere registration. Even if a defendant registers a mark earlier, the entity that first uses it in commerce has stronger rights.Relevance to this case:Apex Laboratories proved prior commercial use of "BILTEN" from November 2019, while Macleods only started selling "BELATIN" in February 2020.Thus, prior use rights overruled Macleods' claim of prior adoption.

Deceptive Similarity in Pharmaceutical Trademarks: Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 1952:Cited by: Plaintiff (Apex Laboratories):The Supreme Court emphasized higher protection standards for pharmaceutical trademarks due to the risk of consumer confusion and potential health hazards.Even minor phonetic or visual similarities can mislead doctors and patients, increasing the likelihood of prescribing errors.Key Observations (Paragraphs 22, 23, 26, and 27 of the Judgment):Courts should strictly assess confusion in pharmaceutical cases.The similarity of the names should be assessed from the perspective of an average consumer, not a highly trained expert.Relevance to this case:The marks "BILTEN" and "BELATIN" are phonetically and visually similar.Both are antihistamines containing Bilastine, increasing the risk of prescription errors.Following Cadila’s ruling, the court held that such similarity justified granting an injunction.

Strength of API-Based Trademarks: Wockhardt Limited v. Aristo Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (1999) 5 CTCOL 921 (Madras HC)Cited by: Plaintiff (Apex Laboratories):The Madras High Court ruled that even if a trademark is derived from an active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), it can still be protected if another mark deceptively resembles it.The defendant's use of SPASMO-FLEXON was found deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s SPASMO-PROXYVON, even though both derived from the word "Spasmo".Relevance to this case:Macleods argued that "BELATIN" was coined from the API "Bilastine", making it generic and non-protectable.The court rejected this defense, holding that API-based names can be protected if another mark is deceptively similar.

Honest Concurrent Use as a Defense: Abdul Rasul Nurullah v. Regal Footwear, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 10:Cited by: Plaintiff (Apex Laboratories):The Bombay High Court ruled that "honest concurrent use" is a defense available only in trademark registration cases, not in infringement suits.If a mark is not registered, the defendant cannot claim concurrent use as a defense in an infringement case.Relevance to this case:Macleods had not obtained registration for "BELATIN", making its "honest concurrent use" defense invalid.The court ruled in favor of Apex, stating that concurrent use does not justify infringement.

No Defense of Honest and Concurrent Use in Infringement Cases: D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brook Bond Tea of India Ltd., 1959 SCC OnLine Kar 79 Cited by: Plaintiff (Apex Laboratories) & Considered by the Court:The Mysore High Court ruled that an "honest and concurrent user" can only be a valid argument if the defendant has successfully registered its trademark.A defendant who has not obtained trademark registration cannot claim this defense in an infringement lawsuit.Relevance to this case:Macleods was still awaiting registration for "BELATIN".Since Macleods' trademark was not yet registered, its defense under "honest concurrent use" was invalid.The court reaffirmed that only a registered concurrent user can claim protection under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Delay and Acquiescence: Dhariwal Industries Ltd. v. M.S.S. Food Products, AIR 2005 SC 1999 Cited by: Plaintiff (Apex Laboratories):The Supreme Court ruled that mere delay in filing a lawsuit does not amount to acquiescence unless the plaintiff actively permits or tolerates the defendant’s use.Relevance to this case:Macleods argued that Apex delayed filing the suit (filed in August 2020 while BELATIN was in use since February 2020).The court rejected this argument, stating that Apex filed the lawsuit soon after discovering Macleods' use.Since Apex opposed Macleods' trademark application, it could not be said to have acquiesced.

Court’s Final Conclusion Based on These Judgments:Apex Laboratories was the prior user, giving it stronger trademark rights (Syed Mohideen case). BILTEN and BELATIN were deceptively similar, justifying an injunction (Cadila Healthcare case). API-based trademarks can still be protected if confusion exists (Wockhardt case). Macleods could not claim honest concurrent use since its mark was unregistered (Regal Footwear and Adinarayana Setty cases). Delay did not amount to acquiescence, as Apex opposed Macleods' trademark application (Dhariwal Industries case).

Court’s Reasoning:Trademark Registration: Apex proved that it held the first registered trademark for "BILTEN".Prior Use vs. Prior Adoption: The court found that Macleods applied for registration first but used the mark commercially only in February 2020. Since Apex’s commercial use began in November 2019, Apex was the prior user.Deceptive Similarity: The court held that "BELATIN" was deceptively similar to "BILTEN", increasing the risk of consumer confusion.Honest Concurrent Use: The court ruled that honest concurrent use is not a valid defense in an infringement suit unless the mark is registered. Macleods had not obtained trademark registration, so the defense was invalid.Acquiescence: The court rejected Macleods’ claim that Apex acquiesced to its use of "BELATIN".

Final Decision:Injunction Granted: The court permanently restrained Macleods from using the mark "BELATIN".Liquidation Period: Macleods was given four months to sell existing inventory of "BELATIN".Damages Rejected: The court ruled that Apex had not proven financial loss, so no damages were awarded.Counterclaim Dismissed: Macleods' claim for ₹50,00,000 in damages was dismissed.

Concluding Note:This case reinforces the principle of prior use in trademark law. Key takeaways include: Trademark registration provides stronger protection, but prior use can override it. Pharmaceutical trademarks require a higher standard to prevent consumer confusion. Honest concurrent use is not a defense unless the mark is registered. Prior adoption does not automatically confer rights unless commercial use is established first.

Case Title: Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

Date of Order: January 23, 2025

Case No.: C.S. (Comm. Div.) No. 232 of 2020

Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:211

Court: Madras High Court

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney]

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Saregama India Limited Vs. Vels Film International Limited

The 2012 Copyright Act amendment does not apply retrospectively

Introduction:This case revolves around the alleged copyright infringement of the song "En Iniya Pon Nilave" from the 1980 Tamil film "Moodu Pani" by Saregama India Ltd. (the plaintiff) against Vels Film International Ltd. (defendant no. 1). The plaintiff claims to hold exclusive rights to the sound recording, musical composition, and literary work (lyrics) of the song, while the defendant contends that the music composer (defendant no. 3) retains rights to adapt and recreate the composition under the Copyright Act, 1957. The suit primarily concerns whether the producer of a cinematograph film or the original music composer holds the copyright to a song used in the film.

Plaintiff’s Business & Copyright Claim:Saregama India Ltd. (formerly Gramophone Company of India Ltd., known as His Master’s Voice - HMV) is engaged in acquiring, distributing, and exploiting copyrights in sound recordings, musical compositions, and lyrics across various media.The plaintiff owns an extensive catalog of Indian film music, including Tamil music, and licenses these works to third parties.The producer of the 1980 film "Moodu Pani," Raja Cine Arts, assigned all copyright in its songs, including "En Iniya Pon Nilave," to Saregama via an agreement dated February 25, 1980.This agreement granted Saregama exclusive ownership of the sound recording, musical composition, and literary work (lyrics) in perpetuity.

Alleged Infringement by the Defendants:On January 9, 2025, the plaintiff discovered that Vels Film International was promoting a song titled "recreation" of "En Iniya Pon Nilave" in its upcoming film "Aghathiyaa."The defendants (Vels Film International & music composer, defendant no. 3) created a new recording of the song, using the same lyrics and composition.Despite receiving a cease-and-desist notice on January 10, 2025, the defendants continued releasing and streaming the song.Defendant no. 1 argued that it had legally obtained a license from the original composer (defendant no. 3) to use and adapt the song.

Interim Injunction & Court Proceedings:On January 16, 2025, the Delhi High Court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendants from publishing, releasing, or distributing the song on any platform.On January 27, 2025, defendant no. 2 (the distributor) was removed from the case after it complied with the court’s order to take down the song.Defendant no. 1 (Vels Film) continued its defense, arguing that it had legitimately licensed rights from the original composer, making the lawsuit unwarranted.

Plaintiff’s Submissions (Saregama India Ltd.):Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 states that the producer of a cinematograph film is the first owner of all copyrights in the sound recording, lyrics, and composition.Since the film producer (Raja Cine Arts) assigned the rights to Saregama, the music composer (defendant no. 3) does not hold any rights to issue licenses for adaptation.Defendant no. 3 is not the author of the lyrics and cannot grant rights over them.The adaptation claim is false because the defendants copied the original composition and lyrics without any substantial modifications.The 2012 Copyright Act amendment does not apply retrospectively, meaning any claim of rights by defendant no. 3 post-2012 is invalid.

Defendant No. 1’s (Vels Film International) Submissions:Defendant no. 3 (composer) is the original author of the musical composition and retains the right to adapt it under Section 14(1)(a)(vi) of the Copyright Act.The plaintiff’s reliance on Section 17 is flawed, as Section 13(4) ensures that composers retain copyright even if their work is used in a film.The Delhi High Court’s ruling in RDB & Co. HUF v. Harper Collins held that screenplay authors retain rights, implying that music composers also retain their rights.Defendant no. 1 paid ₹5,40,000 to defendant no. 3 for adaptation rights, making the claim of infringement unfounded.Plaintiff’s request for an injunction would cause irreparable harm to the defendant since the film was scheduled for release on January 31, 2025.

Defendant No. 3’s (Composer) Submissions:As the composer, he owns the "musical work" and retains the right to adapt, reproduce, and license it.Section 14(1)(a)(vi) explicitly grants composers the right to create adaptations, which he legally exercised.The 2012 Copyright Act amendment reinforces composers’ rights, and Saregama’s claim contradicts legislative intent.The plaintiff cannot claim a blanket copyright over all aspects of the song without proving a specific assignment of adaptation rights.

Issues: Does the plaintiff (Saregama) hold exclusive copyright over the song, including its adaptation rights? Can a music composer (defendant no. 3) grant adaptation rights if the song was originally assigned to a third party (Saregama)?Does the 2012 Copyright Amendment impact rights in a song composed in 1980? Does creating a "recreation" using the same lyrics and composition amount to infringement?

Key Findings & Reasoning of the Judge:The original agreement (1980) assigned all rights to Saregama, meaning the composer cannot license adaptation rights independently.The defendants' version was not an adaptation but an unauthorized reproduction, making it a clear infringement.The 2012 amendment is prospective, meaning it does not affect prior assignments, invalidating the composer’s claim.Vels Film’s monetary investment does not justify copyright infringement; however, the court considered an alternative remedy.

Decision & Relief Granted: Injunction granted: Vels Film cannot use the song without Saregama’s license.Monetary relief granted: Defendant no. 1 must pay ₹30 lakh to the court registry within two days to use the song in its film.Failure to pay would result in a complete ban on using the song.

Concluding Note:This judgment reinforces that:Film producers hold the first copyright in a film’s music unless expressly stated otherwise. Composers do not retain adaptation rights after assigning their work to film producers.The 2012 Copyright Amendment does not apply retrospectively. Unauthorized recreation of music using the same lyrics and composition is infringement, not adaptation.The decision balances copyright protection and commercial interests by allowing the defendant to use the song only upon payment of a fair license fee.

Case Title: Saregama India Limited Vs. Vels Film International Limited & Ors.

Date of Order: January 30, 2025

Case No.: CS(COMM) 38/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:647

Court: Delhi High Court

Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman

[Patent and Trademark Attorney]

High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.