Monday, March 10, 2025

Astrazeneca AB & Anr. Vs. Westcoast Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.

There is no statutory bar on instituting Patent infringement suit while post-grant opposition is pending

Introduction: Astrazeneca AB & Anr. filed a suit against Westcoast Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. alleging patent infringement. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant was manufacturing and selling a pharmaceutical product that infringed upon their patented invention. The defendant, in response, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, seeking the rejection of the suit based on grounds of want of pecuniary jurisdiction, want of territorial jurisdiction, and applicability of the Supreme Court's judgment in Aloys Wobben v. Yogesh Mehra.

Detailed Factual Background: The plaintiffs, Astrazeneca AB and its Indian subsidiary, claimed to hold a valid patent for the compound Osimertinib under patent number IN 297581. The patent was granted on June 11, 2018. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant was attempting to manufacture and distribute a product that infringed on their patent rights.

Post-grant oppositions were filed against the patent by Sunshine Organics Pvt. Ltd. on May 14, 2019, and by Natco Pharma Ltd. on June 10, 2019. The plaintiffs argued that despite these oppositions being pending before the Controller General of Patents, they retained the right to file an infringement suit. The defendant, in contrast, argued that the plaintiffs' rights were not crystallized until the resolution of post-grant opposition proceedings.

Detailed Procedural Background: The plaintiffs filed a commercial intellectual property rights (IPR) suit before the Delhi High Court, seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant from manufacturing or selling the allegedly infringing product. In response, the defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint based on:

  1. Lack of pecuniary jurisdiction

  2. Lack of territorial jurisdiction

  3. Applicability of the Supreme Court's judgment in Aloys Wobben, which the defendant claimed precluded the filing of an infringement suit while post-grant opposition proceedings were pending.

Issues Involved in the Case:

  1. Whether the suit was maintainable despite the pending post-grant opposition proceedings?

  2. Whether the decision in Aloys Wobben precluded the plaintiffs from filing an infringement suit while the post-grant opposition was pending?

Detailed Submission of Parties Plaintiffs' Arguments:

  • The plaintiffs asserted that Section 11A(3) of the Patents Act allows an infringement suit to be filed once a patent is granted and does not mandate waiting for post-grant opposition proceedings to conclude.

  • They relied on precedents such as Novartis AG v. Natco Ltd. and CDE Asia Ltd. v. Terex India Pvt. Ltd., which held that the right to sue for infringement exists immediately upon the grant of a patent.

  • The plaintiffs argued that the judgment in Aloys Wobben was inapplicable to their case, as it dealt with the issue of whether a party could file both a revocation petition and a counterclaim in an infringement suit, not with the maintainability of an infringement suit pending post-grant opposition.

Defendant's Arguments:

  • The defendant relied on para 19 of the Aloys Wobben judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ patent rights had not crystallized while post-grant opposition proceedings were pending.

  • They claimed that as per the judgment in Toni & Guy Products Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Nagpal, the suit should have been filed before a lower court due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction.

  • They further argued that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC, as the defendant’s principal place of business was outside Delhi.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited and Their Context:

  • Aloys Wobben v. Yogesh Mehra (2014) 15 SCC 360: The Supreme Court held that once a party has filed a revocation petition, they cannot file a counterclaim in an infringement suit. The plaintiffs argued that this case was distinguishable as it did not discuss the maintainability of an infringement suit during post-grant opposition.

  • Novartis AG v. Natco Ltd.: The Delhi High Court held that a patentee could sue for infringement even while a post-grant opposition was pending.

  • CDE Asia Ltd. v. Terex India Pvt. Ltd.: The court reaffirmed that the pendency of a post-grant opposition does not preclude the filing of an infringement suit.

  • Toni & Guy Products Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Nagpal: The court found that the valuation of damages in a quia timet action does not establish pecuniary jurisdiction unless actual damages are demonstrable.

  • Sergi Transformer Explosion Prevention Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. CTR Manufacturing Industries Ltd.: The Bombay High Court initially held that a post-grant opposition impacted an infringement suit, but the Supreme Court overturned this decision, allowing the suit to proceed.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Delhi High Court, presided over by Justice C. Hari Shankar, rejected the defendant’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, reasoning as follows:

  • The court held that there is no statutory bar on instituting an infringement suit while post-grant opposition is pending. The only requirement under Section 11A(3) of the Patents Act is that a patent must be granted before an infringement suit can be filed.

  • The court distinguished the case from Aloys Wobben, noting that the Supreme Court’s observations in para 19 were obiter dicta and not binding precedents.

  • On pecuniary jurisdiction, the court found that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded damages exceeding the threshold for the Delhi High Court’s jurisdiction.

  • On territorial jurisdiction, the court held that the plaintiffs had a subordinate office in Delhi, and the infringing products were likely to be sold in Delhi, satisfying jurisdictional requirements.

Final Decision The Delhi High Court dismissed the defendant’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, allowing the suit to proceed. The court reaffirmed that a patentee can initiate an infringement suit immediately upon the grant of a patent, irrespective of pending post-grant oppositions.

Law Settled in This Case:

  • The mere pendency of a post-grant opposition does not bar a patentee from filing an infringement suit.

  • The right to sue for infringement crystallizes upon the grant of a patent under Section 11A(3) of the Patents Act.

  • The Supreme Court’s observations in para 19 of Aloys Wobben are obiter dicta and do not constitute binding precedent.

  • Pecuniary jurisdiction is established if damages are claimed in excess of the court’s threshold, even in a quia timet suit.

  • Territorial jurisdiction exists where the infringing products are sold or likely to be sold, even if the defendant's principal place of business is elsewhere.

Case Title: Astrazeneca AB & Anr. Vs. Westcoast Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.
Date of Order: 15 May 2023
Case No.: CS(COMM) 101/2022
Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:3337
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Karan Johar Vs India Pride Advisory Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Fact of the Case:

Karan Johar, a well-known filmmaker and television personality, filed a lawsuit against India Pride Advisory Pvt. Ltd. and others for using his name, "Karan Johar," in the title of the cinematographic film “Shaadi Ke Director Karan Aur Johar.” He alleged that the use of his name without consent violated his personality and publicity rights, causing commercial and reputational harm.

Procedural Background (in Brief):

  1. The plaintiff discovered the film's trailer on June 5, 2024, and issued a cease-and-desist notice on June 6, 2024.
  2. As the defendants did not respond, the plaintiff urgently filed a commercial IPR suit and an interim application seeking an injunction.
  3. The Bombay High Court granted an ad-interim injunction on June 13, 2024, preventing the release of the film.
  4. The defendants later sought to vacate the injunction but agreed to modify the film's publicity and some content.

Reasoning of the Court:

  1. Personality and Publicity Rights: The Court recognized that Karan Johar, being a highly reputed public figure, has an economic and legal right to control the use of his name.
  2. Commercial Exploitation: The Court found that the defendants’ use of "Karan Johar" in the film’s title and dialogues directly associated the film with the plaintiff, attempting to commercially exploit his goodwill.
  3. Irrelevance of Censor Board Certification: The Court ruled that a CBFC certification does not evaluate violations of personality or publicity rights, so it could not override Johar’s claim.
  4. Inadequacy of Defendants' Modifications: The Court found that merely adding "Aur" between "Karan" and "Johar" did not remove the association with the plaintiff.

Decision:

The Bombay High Court upheld Karan Johar’s claim and granted an injunction preventing the defendants from using his name in the title and promotional materials of the film. The Court ruled in favor of Johar, confirming that his personality and publicity rights had been infringed.


Case Details:

  • Case Title: Karan Johar Vs India Pride Advisory Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
  • Date of Order: March 7, 2025
  • Case Number: Comm IPR Suit (L) No. 17863 of 2024
  • Name of Court: Bombay High Court
  • Name of Hon’ble Judge: Justice R.I. Chagla

P. Pandian v. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, P. Pandian, sought renewal of the trademark WAHEED (TM No. 573302) in Class 24. The trademark was registered on 15.05.1992, and a registration certificate was issued on 12.09.2020 after a long procedural delay. However, upon checking the online registry, the petitioner found that the trademark was listed as expired on 15.05.2002. The petitioner was unable to file a renewal application online due to system inaccessibility and hence approached the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to permit renewal.


Procedural Background in Brief

  1. Trademark application was filed on 15.05.1992.
  2. After an examination report and a hearing, the petitioner awaited advertisement before acceptance.
  3. The advertisement was published in the Trade Marks Journal on 03.02.2020.
  4. The registration certificate was issued on 12.09.2020.
  5. The trademark status on the online registry reflected an expiry date of 15.05.2002.
  6. The petitioner did not receive a notice of expiry under Rule 58(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.
  7. The petitioner was unable to file a renewal application due to online portal inaccessibility, leading to the filing of the writ petition.

Reasoning of the Court

  1. Failure to Provide Notice: The Trade Marks Rules require that a notice be issued to the trademark holder before the expiration of the registration. Since no such notice was issued, the petitioner was entitled to apply for renewal.
  2. Precedents Considered: The Court relied on the Bombay High Court's decision in Motwane Private Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and the Madras High Court’s own decision in Jaisuryas Retail Ventures Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, which held that failure to issue an expiry notice allows the proprietor to seek renewal.
  3. No Removal from Register: Since the trademark had not been officially removed from the register, the petitioner still had the right to apply for renewal.

Decision

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to:

  1. Provide access to the online portal for the petitioner to file the renewal application.
  2. Alternatively, permit the petitioner to submit the renewal application and required documents in physical form.
  3. There was no order as to costs.

Case Details

  • Case Title: P. Pandian v. The Registrar of Trade Marks
  • Date of Order: 13.02.2025
  • Case Number: W.P.(IPD) No.36 of 2024
  • Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
  • Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Tahoe Research Ltd. Vs. The Controller of Patents

Brief Fact:
Tahoe Research Ltd., an Irish company, filed an Indian patent application (No. 201647014734) for an invention titled "Method for training a control signal based on a stroke signal in a memory module." The Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) on 27.09.2019, raising objections on novelty and inventive step. The applicant responded, and a hearing notice was issued on 23.02.2022, primarily objecting to a lack of clarity (Section 10(4) of the Patents Act, 1970) and novelty, particularly in light of prior art document D3. The Controller rejected the application on 19.01.2024.

Procedural Background in Brief
FER Issued (27.09.2019): Raised objections on novelty and inventive step.Response by Appellant (26.03.2020): Addressed objections.Hearing Notice (23.02.2022): Raised objections on clarity and novelty.Submission of Written Arguments & Amended Claims (28.03.2022): Incorporated features of original claims 2 and 4 into independent claim 1.

Order Rejecting Patent Application (19.01.2024): 
Cited lack of clarity and novelty, referencing European Patent Office (EPO) proceedings.Appeal Before the Madras High Court under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970.

Reasoning of the Court
Violation of Natural Justice: The rejection was based on objections to claims that were not originally objected to in the hearing notice, depriving the appellant of an opportunity to respond.Flawed Novelty Analysis: The Controller adopted the European Patent Office's (EPO) reasoning without recognizing material differences between the independent claim before the Indian Patent Office and the one before the EPO.Remand for Reconsideration: The Court found the rejection procedurally flawed and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

Decision:
The Madras High Court set aside the rejection order dated 19.01.2024 and remanded the matter for reconsideration under the following terms:

Case Title: Tahoe Research Ltd. Vs. The Controller of Patents
Date of Order: 18.02.2025
Case Number: CMA(PT)/35/2024
Neutral Citation: Not mentioned in the judgment.
Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Sunday, March 9, 2025

Havells India Limited Vs. Cab-Rio Industries

Fact of the Case:

Havells India Limited, the plaintiff, is a well-established company engaged in the business of electrical and power distribution equipment, including cables, wires, and other industrial and domestic circuit protection devices. The plaintiff has been using the brand name "REO" since 2012 and claims that it is a well-known trademark. The plaintiff obtained trademark registration for "REO" under classes 7, 9, and 11 and was granted copyright registration for its packaging. The plaintiff alleged that Cab-Rio Industries, the defendants, were manufacturing and selling electrical cables and wires under the name "CAB-RIO," which was deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s mark. The plaintiff contended that the defendants adopted the mark dishonestly to mislead consumers and pass off their products as those of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants for trademark infringement and passing off.

The defendants argued that they had been using the mark "CAB-RIO" since 2017 and had a valid trademark registration for the same under Class 9. They contended that their mark was distinct and that the term "CAB" referred to cables, which was a descriptive term. The defendants further claimed that the plaintiff’s trademark registration was invalid as a third-party rectification petition was pending against it. The defendants also argued that the plaintiff’s brand "REO" was often used along with the "Havells" brand, and thus, there was no likelihood of confusion among consumers.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The plaintiff filed the suit for a permanent injunction against the defendants in the Delhi High Court, along with an application for an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. On November 11, 2024, the Court issued summons and appointed a Local Commissioner to inspect the defendants' premises. The Local Commissioner conducted an inspection on November 18, 2024, and prepared an inventory of the defendants’ products. After hearing both parties, the Court reserved judgment on January 27, 2025, and delivered its decision on February 17, 2025.

Reasoning of the Court:

The Court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim of prior use and found that the plaintiff had produced invoices showing use of the mark "REO" since 2012, while the defendants' earliest invoice under the mark "CAB-RIO" was from 2019. Based on this, the Court held that the plaintiff was the prior user of the mark. The Court compared the marks "REO" and "CAB-RIO" and observed that the dominant and prominent part of the defendants’ mark was "RIO," which was phonetically and structurally similar to "REO." The Court relied on the principles laid down in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) and S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai (2016) to determine deceptive similarity. The Court emphasized that consumers, particularly electricians, contractors, and builders, were of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, making them susceptible to confusion between the two marks.

The Court rejected the defendants' contention that "CAB-RIO" should be considered as a whole and found that the defendants’ use of the mark was not bona fide. It noted that the defendants had failed to provide any reasonable explanation for adopting the mark "RIO." The Court also found that the defendants' website and advertisements used "CAB" as an acronym for cables, reinforcing the likelihood of confusion. The Court concluded that the adoption of the mark "CAB-RIO" was intended to ride on the goodwill of the plaintiff’s mark "REO."

Decision:

The Court granted an interim injunction in favor of the plaintiff, restraining the defendants from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, advertising, or dealing in electrical cables and wires under the mark "CAB-RIO" or any other mark deceptively similar to "REO" until the final adjudication of the suit. The Court also directed the defendants to change their corporate name within one month.

Case Ttitle: Havells India Limited Vs. Cab-Rio Industries & Ors.
Date of Order: February 17, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 995/2024 & I.A. 44613/2024
Neutral Citation: Not provided in the document
Court: High Court of Delhi
Hon’ble Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Amit Bansal

Tapton Tea Company Vs. The Liptons Ltd.

Fact of the Case:
Tapton Tea Company, a firm based in Amritsar, applied for the registration of the trade mark "Tapton Tea". The application was opposed by Lipton Ltd., a company registered in England with its head office in India at Calcutta. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay refused the application for registration based on the opposition filed by Lipton Ltd. The appellant, Tapton Tea Company, filed an appeal before the Punjab High Court challenging the refusal of registration. The key issue in the case was whether the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, given that the order was passed by the Deputy Registrar at Bombay.

Procedural Background in Brief:
The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks at Bombay rejected the trade mark application of Tapton Tea Company upon opposition from Lipton Ltd. The appellant, instead of filing an appeal before the Bombay High Court, filed it before the Punjab High Court, citing its place of business in Amritsar as the basis for jurisdiction. The respondents objected, arguing that under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, appeals against the Registrar’s decisions must be filed in the High Court having jurisdiction, which, in this case, was the Bombay High Court.

Reasoning of the Court:
The court analyzed Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, which provides that an appeal against a decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks must be filed in the High Court having jurisdiction. The court relied on the precedent set in Abdul Ghani Ahmad vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1947 Lah 171, where it was held that an appeal against an order of the Registrar at Bombay must be filed in the Bombay High Court, even if the appellant's business was located elsewhere.

The court rejected the appellant’s argument that Section 76 did not explicitly state that appeals must be filed in the High Court of the Registrar's location. It held that the phrase "High Court having jurisdiction" was intended to refer to the High Court within whose territorial limits the office of the Registrar passing the order was situated. The court also noted that in James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. vs. National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., AIR 1951 Bom 147, a Madras firm had appealed against an order of the Registrar at Bombay before the Bombay High Court, which further established that jurisdiction lay with the Registrar’s location, not the appellant’s business location.

The court concluded that allowing appeals to be filed in different High Courts based on the appellant’s place of business would create confusion and lead to conflicting decisions. It also found that the proviso to Section 76(1), which allows an appeal to be filed in a different High Court only if a related suit or proceeding is already pending there, did not apply to the present case.

Decision:
The Punjab High Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and directed that the memorandum of appeal be returned to the appellants for presentation before the proper court, i.e., the Bombay High Court. No order as to costs was made.

Case Title: Tapton Tea Company Vs. The Liptons Ltd.
Date of Order: July 26, 1954
Case Number: F.A.F.O. No. 93 of 1953
Neutral Citation: AIR 1954 P&H 270
Name of Court: Punjab High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judges: Hon’ble Justice G.D. Khosla and Hon’ble Justice D. Falshaw

Priya Enterprises vs. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd.


Fact of the Case:
Priya Enterprises, a sole proprietorship engaged in manufacturing rubber gaskets for pressure cookers, filed a petition for rectification of the trade mark "Prestige," registered under Trade Mark No. 141602 in Class 21. The trade mark was originally registered in 1949 in the name of an English company, later transferred to Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd., Bangalore, with effect from October 4, 1985. Priya Enterprises claimed that Prestige Housewares had not used the trade mark for over five years and sought its removal for non-use.

The respondent, Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd., issued a cease-and-desist notice to Priya Enterprises, restraining it from using the word "Prestige" in relation to its products. Fearing legal consequences, Priya Enterprises filed a petition for rectification, arguing that the respondent’s trade mark should be removed from the register. The respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, asserting that the trade mark was registered at the Trade Marks Registry in Calcutta, and therefore, any rectification proceedings should be filed before the Calcutta High Court.

Procedural Background in Brief:
Priya Enterprises filed a rectification petition before the Madras High Court, seeking the removal of the respondent’s trade mark for non-use. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd. filed an application challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, arguing that, under Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, only the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Trade Marks Registry was located had authority over rectification matters. Since the trade mark was registered in Calcutta, the respondent contended that only the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction.

The petitioner countered this argument by stating that the respondent’s principal place of business was in Bangalore, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Trade Marks Registry in Madras. The petitioner relied on Section 3(e) of the Act, which applies where the registered proprietor had no place of business in India at the time of registration. The matter was heard before Justice B. Akbar Basha Kadiri of the Madras High Court.

Reasoning of the Court:
The court examined Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which determines the jurisdiction of High Courts in trade mark matters. It found that the appropriate forum for rectification applications is the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Trade Marks Registry where the mark was registered is located. Since the trade mark "Prestige" was registered in the Calcutta Trade Marks Registry, only the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction over rectification proceedings.

The court rejected the petitioner’s argument under Section 3(e), which applies when the registered proprietor had no place of business in India at the time of registration. The respondent’s trade mark registration explicitly mentioned an address for service in India at the time of registration, which was in Calcutta. The court held that this fact conferred jurisdiction on the Calcutta High Court and not the Madras High Court.

The court relied on previous judgments, including Chunulal Seetaram vs. G.S. Muthiah & Bros. (AIR 1959 Mad 359), Vikas Manufacturing Co. vs. Bharaj Manufacturing Co. (1980 (1) PLR 16), and a decision in O.P. No. 803 of 1994, which established that trade mark rectification proceedings must be filed before the High Court with jurisdiction over the Trade Marks Registry where the mark is registered.

Decision:
The Madras High Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition. It directed that the petition be returned to the petitioner for presentation before the Calcutta High Court. The application challenging jurisdiction was allowed, and the main petition for rectification was ordered to be filed in the proper court.

Case Title: Priya Enterprises vs. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd.
Date of Order: April 3, 1998
Case Number: O.P. No. 474 of 1995, Application No. 3670 of 1997
Neutral Citation: 1998(Suppl.) ARBLR 624 (Madras), 1998(18) PTC 539 (Mad)
Name of Court: Madras High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Justice B. Akbar Basha Kadiri

Lakha Ram Sharma Vs. Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd


Fact of the Case:
Lakha Ram Sharma filed an application under Sections 46 and 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, seeking rectification of Trade Mark No. 507445, which was registered on March 23, 1989, under Class 9 for electrical accessories and fittings, including switches, fuse units, wires, and electrical irons. The registered owner of the trade mark was Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., the first respondent in the case. The petitioner claimed prior use of the trade mark "KUNDAN/KUNDAN CAB/KUNDAN CABLES INDIA" since 1980 and filed a suit for permanent injunction before the District Court, Delhi, upon discovering the respondent’s trade mark registration.

During the proceedings in the District Court, the respondent disclosed that it held a registered trade mark, prompting the petitioner to file the rectification application, seeking the cancellation of the mark from the Trade Marks Register. The primary issue was territorial jurisdiction, as the trade mark was registered at the Trade Marks Registry in Chennai, but the petitioner had filed the rectification application before the Delhi High Court.

Procedural Background in Brief:
The petitioner initially filed a suit for permanent injunction before the District Judge, Delhi. Upon learning that the trade mark "KUNDAN/KUNDAN CAB" was already registered in favor of the respondent, the petitioner sought rectification before the Delhi High Court. The respondent objected, arguing that under Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, the rectification application could only be filed in the Madras High Court, as the trade mark was registered at the Trade Marks Registry in Chennai.

The petitioner contended that since Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. was based in Delhi, the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction under Section 3(a) of the Act. However, the respondents relied on Section 3(b) of the Act, arguing that jurisdiction lay with the High Court within whose territorial limits the Trade Marks Registry was located—in this case, Chennai. The matter was heard before Justice A.K. Sikri of the Delhi High Court.

Reasoning of the Court:
The court analyzed Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which governs the jurisdiction of High Courts in trade mark matters. It found that the relevant provision for determining jurisdiction in rectification applications was Section 3(b), which states that the appropriate High Court for trade mark matters is the one within whose jurisdiction the Trade Marks Registry where the mark is registered is located. Since the trade mark "KUNDAN/KUNDAN CAB" was registered at the Trade Marks Registry in Chennai, the appropriate forum for appeals was the Madras High Court.

The court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Section 3(a), which applies only to trade marks that were already on the register at the time of the Act’s commencement. In this case, the trade mark was registered after the Act came into force. The court also clarified that subsequent assignment of the trade mark to a party located in Delhi did not change the jurisdiction, as jurisdiction is determined based on where the original application for trade mark registration was filed and registered.

The court relied on previous judgments, including Priya Enterprises v. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd., 1998 PTC (18) 539, Satya Narayan Khub Chand v. Rama Chandra Laxmi Narayan, AIR 1977 AP 360, and Vikas Manufacturing Company v. Maharaj Manufacturing Company, 1981 PTC 87. These cases reaffirmed that the jurisdiction for rectification applications remains with the High Court where the trade mark is registered, regardless of subsequent assignments or changes in business location.

Decision:
The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and directed that the rectification application be returned to the petitioner for presentation before the appropriate court, i.e., the Madras High Court. The court emphasized that confining rectification proceedings to a single jurisdiction ensures uniformity and prevents forum shopping.

Case Title: Lakha Ram Sharma Vs. Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Date of Order: October 10, 2001
Case Number: C.O. No. 19 of 1995
Neutral Citation: 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1142, (2002) 97 DLT 342, PLR 2002 131 Del 36, (2002) 24 PTC 115, (2001) 4 RAJ 276
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Justice A.K. Sikri

Chunulal Seetaram vs. G.S. Muthiah and Brothers & Ors.

Trademark Rectification has to be filed before the High Court under which Trademark Registry, granting Trademark Registration is situated

Fact of the Case:
Chunulal Seetaram filed an appeal under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, against the decisions of the Registrar of Trade Marks regarding the rectification of the Trade Marks Register. 

The main issue in the case revolved around the determination of the High Court having jurisdiction over appeals related to trade mark rectification. 

The appellant approached the Madras High Court, challenging the decisions of the Registrar of Trade Marks regarding rectification matters. The respondents objected, arguing that the proper jurisdiction for such appeals was the Bombay High Court, as the office of the Registrar of Trade Marks was situated in Bombay, and the Trade Marks Register was maintained there.

Procedural Background in Brief:
The appellant filed appeals against the Registrar's decision on trade mark rectification before the Madras High Court under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The respondents raised an objection, contending that since the Registrar’s Office and the Trade Marks Register were in Bombay, any appeal against the Registrar’s decisions should be filed before the Bombay High Court. The case was heard by Chief Justice P.V. Rajamannar and Justice Ganapatia Pillai of the Madras High Court. The court had to determine whether the Madras High Court had jurisdiction to hear these appeals or whether the proper forum was the Bombay High Court.

Reasoning of the Court:
The court ruled that under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, an appeal against the Registrar’s decision must be filed in the High Court having jurisdiction. Since the Registrar of Trade Marks’ office was located in Bombay and the rectification of the trade mark register was made there, the appropriate forum for appeals was the Bombay High Court. 

The court relied on previous judgments, including Abdul Ghani v. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1947 Lah 171, Tapton Tea Co. v. Liptons Ltd., MANU/PH/0131/1954, and Satyadeo v. Amrit Dhara Pharmacy, AIR 1958 All 823, all of which held that appeals related to trade mark rectification must be filed before the High Court where the Registrar’s Office is located.

The Madras High Court concluded that accepting appeals in different High Courts based on the applicant’s location would lead to jurisdictional confusion and contradictory rulings, which was not the intention of the legislature.

Decision:
The Madras High Court held that the appeals were incompetent and directed the memoranda of appeals to be returned to the appellants for presentation before the proper court, i.e., the Bombay High Court, within two months. The appellants were also directed to pay half the costs of the appeal to the respondents.

Case Title: Chunulal Seetaram Vs. G.S. Muthiah and Brothers & Ors.
Date of Order: February 17, 1959
Case Number: A.A.O. Nos. 74 of 1955 and 363 of 1956
Neutral Citation: AIR 1959 Mad 359, (1959) ILR Madras 823, 1959-72 LW 298, (1959) IMLJ 304
Name of Court: Madras High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judges: Hon’ble Chief Justice P.V. Rajamannar and Hon’ble Justice Ganapatia Pillai

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Alpha Foundation for Education and Research Vs. Akara Education Private Limited

Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 is procedural and directory in nature

Fact of the Case:

Alpha Foundation for Education and Research, a charitable educational trust established in 1993, had been using the trademarks "AKARA," "AKARA STAR KIDS," and its associated logo for its educational institutions since 2011. The plaintiff was the registered proprietor of these trademarks under Classes 41 and 16. Akara Education Private Limited applied for the registration of the trademark "AKARA" in Classes 9, 37, and 41. The appellant opposed these applications, claiming that the impugned trademark was identical to or deceptively similar to its own, leading to confusion among the public.

The opposition notices were filed by the appellant on various dates in 2017, challenging the respondent's trademark applications. However, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the opposition, treating it as abandoned on procedural grounds due to a delay in filing evidence. The appellant challenged this order, arguing that it was not given a fair opportunity to present its case.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The appellant filed opposition notices in 2017, objecting to the respondent's trademark applications. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks fixed different hearing dates for the cases. The appellant submitted its evidence under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules but filed it after the stipulated two-month period. The Assistant Registrar rejected the evidence for being belated and held that the opposition was abandoned.

The appellant challenged these orders before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), but due to the dissolution of IPAB, the cases were transferred to the Madras High Court. The matter was heard by Justice N. Seshasayee, who examined whether the rejection of the opposition on procedural grounds was justified.

Reasoning of the Court:

The court observed that the Assistant Registrar failed to comply with Section 21(3) read with Rule 44(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 and Rule 49(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2022, which require the Registrar to serve a copy of the counter-statement on the opponent. The court found that there was no proof that the counter-statement was duly served on the appellant, which was a crucial procedural requirement before evidence could be demanded from the opponent.

The court further held that Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, was procedural and directory in nature and could not override the substantive right of the opponent to contest the registration of a trademark. The Registrar's decision to reject the opposition merely on the ground of delay in submitting evidence was found to be arbitrary and inconsistent with the purpose of maintaining the purity of the trademark register.

The court reasoned that the Registrar could not insist on the submission of evidence unless the counter-statement had been properly served on the opponent. Since the Registrar failed to prove that the counter-statement was duly served, the rejection of the opposition as abandoned was unsustainable. The benefit of doubt had to be given to the opponent, as what was at stake was the statutory right to oppose the registration of a potentially conflicting trademark.

Decision:

The Madras High Court set aside the impugned orders of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. It directed the Registrar to restore the opposition along with the appellant’s evidence and pass a fresh order on merits within four months. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.

Case Title: Alpha Foundation for Education and Research Vs. Akara Education Private Limited & Anr.
Date of Order: March 13, 2024
Case Number: (T)CMA(TM) No.82 of 2023 and other connected appeals
Neutral Citation: Not specified
Name of Court: Madras High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Justice N. Seshasayee

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Abdul Ghani Ahmad Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

The cause of action for filing appeal against Order passed by Registrar of Trademark arise in that High Court where the decision was made by the Registrar of Trademarks

Introduction: 
The case of Abdul Ghani Ahmad vs. Registrar of Trade Marks addressed a significant issue concerning the interpretation of “the High Court having jurisdiction” under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The primary legal question was whether the Lahore High Court had jurisdiction to entertain appeals against the Registrar of Trade Marks, whose office was situated in Bombay. The decision settled the principle that appeals against orders of the Registrar must be filed in the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Registrar's office is located unless an exception applies under the proviso to Section 76(1).

Detailed Factual Background:
The appellants, including Messrs. Abdul Ghani, Haji Ahmad, and Mohammad Sidik, applied for the registration of the trademark “Bombay Cloth House” with the Registrar of Trade Marks in Bombay. Separately, another appellant, Gowardhan Das, proprietor of Punjab Pharmaceutical Works, applied for the registration of the trademarks “Chinol” and “Grippe Wassar.” The Registrar of Trade Marks rejected these applications on different dates, specifically March 31, 1945, January 11, 1945, and March 23, 1945.

Following these rejections, the applicants requested the Registrar to provide written reasons for the refusals, as per Section 14(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Upon receiving these reasons, they decided to challenge the Registrar's decisions by filing appeals before the Lahore High Court under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act.

Detailed Procedural Background:
The appeals were filed before the Lahore High Court, raising a preliminary jurisdictional question: whether the Lahore High Court had the authority to entertain appeals against the decisions of the Registrar of Trade Marks, whose office was located in Bombay. The appellants contended that their applications for trademark registration had been sent from Lahore, and therefore, the Lahore High Court should have jurisdiction. The Registrar of Trade Marks opposed this claim, arguing that the appeals could only be filed in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Registrar’s Office was situated, i.e., the Bombay High Court.

The Lahore High Court examined the statutory framework of the Trade Marks Act and considered the impact of territorial jurisdiction on appeals against the Registrar’s decisions. The matter was heard by Justice Abdur Rahman, who had to determine the proper forum for such appeals.

Issues Involved in the Case:
Whether the Lahore High Court had jurisdiction under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, to entertain appeals against the decisions of the Registrar of Trade Marks, whose office was located in Bombay?

Detailed Submission of Parties:
The appellants argued that the Trade Marks Act does not expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court within whose territory the application was filed. Since the applications for trademark registration were sent from Lahore, the Lahore High Court should have jurisdiction over the appeals. Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which governs territorial jurisdiction, should be applied by analogy to grant jurisdiction to the Lahore High Court. The appellants had no control over where the Registrar’s Office was located, and therefore, jurisdiction should be determined based on the applicants’ residence or place of business.

The respondent argued that jurisdiction under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act was tied to the location of the Registrar’s Office, which was in Bombay. Allowing multiple High Courts to entertain appeals would lead to conflicting decisions and jurisdictional chaos. The Trade Marks Act was a special law, and general principles of civil jurisdiction under the CPC did not apply. The proviso to Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act explicitly provided for exceptions where jurisdiction could be determined based on pending litigation concerning the disputed trademark, but this proviso did not apply in the present case.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by the Parties:
The respondents relied on the legal principles and cases. In Rangoon Botatouing Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Rangoon (40 Cal 21 (27)), the case emphasized that in matters governed by special statutes, jurisdiction should be strictly interpreted based on the language of the statute. In Special Officer Salsette Building Sites v. Dorabhai Bezonji Motivalla (20 IC 763 (PC)), the Privy Council held that when a statute provides a specific appellate forum, appeals must be filed before the designated authority and not any other court. In Nur Mahomed v. S.M. Solaiman (49 CWN 10 (17)), the Calcutta High Court ruled that jurisdiction cannot be inferred from the plaintiff’s or petitioner’s place of residence unless expressly provided by statute.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:
Justice Abdur Rahman ruled that the Lahore High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeals for the following reasons. 

The phrase "High Court having jurisdiction" in Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act must be interpreted based on the location of the Registrar’s Office. 

Jurisdiction in such matters does not arise from where the application was sent or where the applicant resides. The cause of action for the appeal arose where the decision was made, i.e., in Bombay.

Applying general principles of civil jurisdiction under the CPC was inappropriate because the Trade Marks Act was a special statute with its own jurisdictional framework. The proviso to Section 76(1) allowed an appeal to be filed in a different High Court only if a trademark-related suit was already pending there. Since no such suit was pending in Lahore, this proviso was inapplicable. Allowing multiple High Courts to hear appeals against the Registrar’s decisions would create a risk of contradictory judgments, which would be against legislative intent.
Final Decision

The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeals on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and directed the appellants to file the appeals in the proper High Court, i.e., the Bombay High Court. However, since the issue was one of first impression, the court ordered that each party should bear its own costs.

Law Settled in This Case:

Appeals against decisions of the Registrar of Trade Marks under Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, must be filed in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Registrar’s Office is located. The place from which a trademark application was sent or the residence of the applicant is irrelevant in determining appellate jurisdiction. The Trade Marks Act is a special statute, and its appellate jurisdiction must be determined based on its own provisions, not by analogy to general civil procedure principles. The proviso to Section 76(1) applies only when a trademark-related suit is already pending in a High Court or District Court and does not otherwise alter the jurisdiction of appeals.

Case Title: Abdul Ghani Ahmad Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks
Date of Order: May 29, 1946
Case Number: First Appeal Nos. 170 to 172 of 1945
Citation: AIR 1947 Lah 171
Name of Court: Lahore High Court
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Justice Abdur Rahman

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Saturday, March 8, 2025

Nirav Nimmi Corporation Vs. Ashish Traders

Court can grant interim injunction pending rectification petition under Section 124(5) of Trademarks Act 1999

Facts of the Case:
Nirav Nimmi Corporation, a proprietary firm engaged in the spice business, has been using the trademark "ARJUN" since 1988. The plaintiff alleged that Ashish Traders, which was initially a distributor of the plaintiff’s products, started selling products under the "ARJUN" brand without authorization and falsely labeling them as “marketed” by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violation and sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from using the trademark.

Procedural Background:
The plaintiff filed a trademark suit in 2024 before the 4th Additional District Judge, Mehsana at Visnagar, seeking an injunction. The Trial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction on October 28, 2024, restraining the defendant from using the "ARJUN" mark. The defendant contested the suit, arguing that it had permission from Subhashbhai Shah, the brother of the plaintiff, who claimed prior rights over the "ARJUN" mark. The Trial Court eventually rejected the plaintiff’s injunction application on December 30, 2024, holding that no prima facie case was made out. The plaintiff then filed an Appeal from Order (AO) No. 9 of 2025 before the Gujarat High Court, challenging the rejection of the injunction.

Reasoning of the Court:
The Gujarat High Court found that the Trial Court erred in rejecting the injunction application. The plaintiff held trademark registration for "ARJUN" since 1993 and a copyright registration since 2006, which established prima facie statutory rights. The court held that the SMV firm, originally owned by the plaintiff’s father and later by his brother Subhashbhai Shah, was dissolved in 1994. As per Clause 18 of the partnership deed, no goodwill was transferred. Subhashbhai ceased business operations in 2013, making his claims of prior rights untenable. The defendant had no valid license or written authorization to use the "ARJUN" mark, violating Sections 28, 29, and 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Trial Court wrongly relied on the pending rectification petition filed by Subhashbhai Shah in 2022, ignoring that Section 124(5) of the Trade Marks Act allows for interim relief even during rectification proceedings. The defendant’s use of identical trade dress and packaging clearly indicated an intent to mislead consumers, amounting to passing off and trademark infringement.

Decision:
The Gujarat High Court set aside the Trial Court’s order and granted an interim injunction in favor of the plaintiff, restraining the defendant from using the "ARJUN" mark. The appeal was allowed, reinforcing the plaintiff’s exclusive trademark rights.

Case Title: Nirav Nimmi Corporation Vs. Ashish Traders
Date of Order: March 7, 2025
Case Number: R/AO/9/2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:GUJHC:14665
Name of Court: Gujarat High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Maulik J. Shelat

Eureka Forbes Limited Vs. Om Sai Enterprises

Non denial of admission denial affidavit does amount to be admission of documents

Facts of the Case:
Eureka Forbes Limited, a leading company engaged in manufacturing and selling home appliances, including water purifiers under the well-known trademark AQUAGUARD, discovered that Om Sai Enterprises and its associates were selling counterfeit spare parts and consumables under identical or deceptively similar marks. The defendants’ products bore trademarks such as AQUAGUARD, AQUASFILTER, and ACTIVE COPPER MAXX, misleading consumers and infringing upon the plaintiff’s intellectual property rights. The plaintiff alleged trademark and copyright infringement and sought a permanent injunction along with damages and costs.

Procedural Background:
The suit was filed on August 17, 2023, seeking to restrain the defendants from infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks. On August 21, 2023, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restraining the defendants from using the disputed trademarks. Local Commissioners were appointed, who seized counterfeit products from the defendants' premises on August 28, 2023.

Defendant No. 1 settled the case on November 27, 2024, and the suit was decreed against them. Defendant No. 3 stopped appearing after May 2, 2024, and was proceeded against ex parte. The plaintiff then sought a decree against Defendant No. 3 under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC.

Reasoning of the Court:
The court found that Defendant No. 3 had failed to file a written statement, and as per Rule 3 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, all averments in the plaint were deemed admitted. The plaintiff had submitted extensive evidence, including trademark registrations, sales invoices, and an investigation report proving that the defendants were selling counterfeit products. The Local Commissioner’s report also revealed that Defendant No. 3 obstructed legal proceedings and attempted to disrupt the evidence collection process.

The court held that the plaintiff had established a clear case of trademark and copyright infringement. The defendants had taken unfair advantage of the plaintiff’s goodwill, deceived consumers, and dishonestly adopted its trademarks and artistic works without any valid explanation.

Decision:
The Delhi High Court granted a permanent injunction against Defendant No. 3, restraining them from selling counterfeit goods using the plaintiff’s trademarks. The court also awarded ₹2,00,000 in damages and costs in favor of the plaintiff. The suit was disposed of accordingly, with directions to draw up a decree.

Case Title: Eureka Forbes Limited Vs. Om Sai Enterprises
Date of Order: March 4, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 567/2023
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1535
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Jansen Pharmaceutica NV Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs

Order rejecting Patent Application must be reasoned order

Facts of the Case:
Jansen Pharmaceutica NV filed an Indian patent application (No. 1337/KOLNP/2008) for a dry formulation of tipifarnib, a composition designed for intravenous administration. The formulation aimed to benefit patients with impaired oral intake. The Patent Office rejected the application under Section 3(e) of the Patents Act, 1970, stating that the invention lacked technical advancement, was merely a mixture of known substances, and did not demonstrate an inventive step.

Procedural Background:
The First Examination Report was issued on August 12, 2014, and the applicant submitted objections on August 11, 2015. A hearing notice was issued on April 2, 2018, and ultimately, the Deputy Controller of Patents rejected the application on July 31, 2018. The applicant challenged this rejection before the Calcutta High Court, arguing that the order lacked reasoning, did not properly analyze prior art, and failed to apply settled legal principles regarding inventive step.

Reasoning of the Court:
The court found that the Patent Office failed to provide detailed reasoning for rejecting the patent, particularly regarding the lack of inventive step, without proper analysis of prior art documents (D1, D2, D3). The conclusion that the composition was a mere admixture was made without evaluating whether it had synergistic properties under Section 3(e). The rejection also failed to apply the principles laid down in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd. (2016 (65) PTC 1 (DB)) and Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents (2022 Delhi HC), which require a structured assessment of inventive step.

Decision:
The Calcutta High Court set aside the rejection and remanded the matter to the Controller of Patents for reconsideration. The court directed the Controller to decide the case afresh within three months after granting a right of hearing to the applicant. It clarified that it had not adjudicated on the merits, leaving all questions open for reassessment.

Case Details:
Case Title: Jansen Pharmaceutica NV Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs
Date of Order: March 4, 2025
Case Number: IPDPTA/30/2023
Name of Court: Calcutta High Court 
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Kiranakart Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mohammad Arshad

Allegation of non use deemed admitted as registered proprietor did not file reply. Trademark Rectified on the ground of non use

Facts of the Case: Kiranakart Technologies Pvt. Ltd., a well-known startup operating under the brand name ZEPTO, provides quick commerce services across India. The company discovered that Mohammad Arshad had registered the trademark "ZEPTO" under Class 35 in 2014 but had not used it for the claimed services. Kiranakart filed a rectification petition under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the respondent's mark due to non-use.

Procedural Background:The Delhi High Court issued notice to the respondents on May 17, 2024. Respondent No. 2 appeared, but Respondent No. 1, Mohammad Arshad, initially appeared on September 25, 2024 and later stopped attending hearings. Despite multiple opportunities, he neither filed a reply nor contested the case. The petitioner provided evidence of its widespread use and promotion of the ZEPTO mark, while also demonstrating that the respondent had not used the mark for over eight years.

Reasoning of the Court:The court noted that since Respondent No. 1 failed to contest the case, the allegations of non-use were deemed admitted. Relying on precedents such as DORCO Co. Ltd. v. Durga Enterprises (2023 SCC OnLine Del 1484), the court emphasized that a trademark must be genuinely used for the registered services. In this case, the respondent’s mark ZEPTO had not been used in Class 35 for a continuous period exceeding five years, making it liable for cancellation under Section 47(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act.

Decision:The court ordered the removal of the trademark ZEPTO (Reg. No. 2773519) in Class 35 from the Trade Marks Register. It directed the Trade Marks Registry to cancel the registration and dispose of all pending applications.
Case Details

Case Title: Kiranakart Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mohammad Arshad 
Date of Order: March 3, 2025
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 62/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1500
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Aishwarya Agriprocessors Vs. Sri Aishwarya Food Industries

Unseasoned Order is liable to be set aside

Facts of the Case:Sri Aishwarya Food Industries Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit against Aishwarya Agriprocessors Pvt. Ltd. for trademark infringement, alleging unauthorized use of the mark "Aishwarya/Aiswarya" in selling, marketing, and advertising their products. The plaintiff obtained an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the disputed mark. The defendants challenged this injunction, arguing that they had an independent right to use the mark and sought its vacation.

Procedural Background:The District Judge (Commercial Court) at Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, granted an ex parte ad interim injunction on September 20, 2024, restraining the appellants from using the mark. The appellants filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC, seeking the vacation of this injunction, but it was dismissed by the Trial Court on December 13, 2024. The appellants then approached the Delhi High Court, challenging the orders.

Reasoning of the Court:The Delhi High Court observed that the order of December 13, 2024, passed by the Trial Court was un reasoned. The respondents fairly conceded that the matter should be reconsidered by the Trial Court. The High Court found it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to another Commercial Court within the same District for fresh consideration. It directed that the case be reassigned by the Principal District and Sessions Judge (Central) and listed before the new court on December 24, 2024. The transferee Judge was instructed to decide the pending applications afresh within three weeks without being influenced by previous observations.

Decision:The Delhi High Court set aside the Trial Court’s order dated December 13, 2024, and directed the case to be transferred to another Commercial Court for fresh consideration. Additionally, the costs imposed on the appellants for the late filing of their written statement were waived. The appeal and pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Case Title: Aishwarya Agriprocessors  Vs. Sri Aishwarya Food Industries
Date of Order: December 20, 2024
Case Number: FAO (COMM) 246/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9855:DB
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Shalinder Kaur

Eureka Forbes Limited vs. Mr. Vinod K

Facts of the Case:Eureka Forbes Limited, engaged in manufacturing and selling home appliances such as water purifiers under the trademark ‘AQUAGUARD,’ discovered that the defendant, Mr. Vinod K., was selling counterfeit spare parts under similar trademarks and labels. The defendant's products closely resembled those of the plaintiff, misleading consumers. Eureka Forbes claimed trademark and copyright infringement and sought an injunction.

Procedural Background :The suit was filed on May 19, 2023, seeking an injunction against the defendants. On May 23, 2023, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restricting the defendants from using the disputed trademarks. Local Commissioners were appointed, who seized infringing products from the defendants' premises. Defendant No. 1 failed to appear in court, and Defendant No. 2 settled the case on December 11, 2024. Defendant No. 1 was proceeded against ex parte, and the plaintiff sought a decree under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.

Reasoning of the Court:The plaintiff's trademark ‘AQUAGUARD’ was well-known, registered since 1992, and had acquired goodwill. The defendant's products were nearly identical, using similar names, labels, and packaging, causing consumer deception. As no written statement was filed by Defendant No. 1, the court presumed all averments in the plaint to be true. The defendant’s actions constituted trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off. The conduct of Defendant No. 1, including threatening the court-appointed commissioners, warranted punitive damages.

Decision:The court granted a permanent injunction against Defendant No. 1, restraining further infringement. Damages and costs of ₹3,00,000 were awarded to the plaintiff. The suit was decreed under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC due to Defendant No. 1’s failure to file a defense.

Case Title: Eureka Forbes Limited vs. Mr. Vinod K. & Anr.
Date of Order: March 4, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 335/2023
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1534
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon’ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Friday, March 7, 2025

Priya Enterprises Vs. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd.

Priya Enterprises Vs. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd.: Effect of dynamic Effect on Trademark Cancellation

Introduction
The case Priya Enterprises vs. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd. pertains to the rectification of a registered trademark and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters. The petitioner, Priya Enterprises, sought the removal of the registered trademark "Prestige" from the register due to its alleged non-use by the respondent, Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd. A key legal issue was whether the Madras High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition, given that the trademark was originally registered at the Calcutta Trade Marks Registry. This case explores the interpretation of Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which governs the jurisdiction of High Courts in trademark rectification matters.

Detailed Factual Background
Priya Enterprises, a sole proprietorship based in Saidapet, filed a petition seeking rectification of the register and removal of the trademark "Prestige" on grounds of non-use. The disputed trademark, bearing registration No. 141602 under Class 21, was initially registered in 1949 in the name of Plaster and Stampers Limited, Lancashire, England. It was later transferred to The Prestige Group Limited, England, in 1957. Subsequently, in 1989, the trademark was registered in the name of Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd., Bangalore, with effect from October 4, 1985.

Priya Enterprises was engaged in manufacturing rubber gaskets used in pressure cooker lids, which were compatible with multiple brands, including Prestige, Killicks, Videocon, and Usha. The petitioner used these brand names to indicate compatibility with corresponding pressure cooker models.

Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd. issued a cease-and-desist notice to Priya Enterprises, alleging unauthorized use of its registered trademark "Prestige." In response, Priya Enterprises filed a rectification petition before the Madras High Court, seeking the removal of the trademark from the register on the ground that the respondent had not used it for over five years. The respondent contested the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, arguing that the trademark was originally registered at the Calcutta Trade Marks Registry, and hence, any rectification proceedings should be initiated before the Calcutta High Court.

Detailed Procedural Background
Priya Enterprises filed O.P. No. 474 of 1995 before the Madras High Court, challenging the validity of the respondent's trademark. The respondent subsequently filed an application (Application No. 3670 of 1997) seeking the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds, asserting that the rectification petition should have been filed in the Calcutta High Court.

The petitioner did not file a formal counter but contested the matter on the basis that the respondent's registered office was in Bangalore, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Madras Trade Marks Registry. The respondent argued that since the trademark was registered at the Calcutta Trade Marks Registry, rectification proceedings should be filed before the Calcutta High Court, as per Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.

Issues Involved in the Case
Whether the Madras High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition.
Whether the location of the registered office of the trademark proprietor (Bangalore) had any bearing on territorial jurisdiction.
Whether the rectification petition should be filed before the High Court having jurisdiction over the Trade Marks Registry where the trademark was originally registered.

Detailed Submission of Parties
The respondent argued that under Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, jurisdiction for rectification petitions is determined by the location of the Trade Marks Registry where the trademark is registered. Since the "Prestige" trademark was registered at the Calcutta Trade Marks Registry, any rectification petition should be filed in the Calcutta High Court. The respondent relied on multiple precedents to support this argument.

The petitioner contended that since the respondent's registered office was in Bangalore, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Madras Trade Marks Registry, the Madras High Court had jurisdiction. The petitioner further argued that Section 3(e) of the Act was applicable since the original owner of the trademark was a foreign company with no place of business in India at the time of registration. Thus, the petitioner claimed that jurisdiction should be determined based on the respondent’s current business location.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties
The respondent relied on the following judgments to support its contention that jurisdiction is determined by the location of the Trade Marks Registry where the trademark is registered:


Chunulal v. G.S. Muthiah & Bros., MANU/TN/0211/1959 : AIR 1959 Mad 359
Held that since the Registrar of Trade Marks is located in Bombay and the register is maintained there, the Bombay High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over rectification matters.


Vikas Manufacturing Co. v. Bharaj Manufacturing Co., 1980 (1) P.L.R. 16
The Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled that under Section 3, read with Section 5 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, jurisdiction lies with the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Trade Marks Registry is located.


A recent decision in O.P. No. 803 of 1994 and Appln. No. 2495 in C.S. No. 5 of 1994
The Madras High Court held that an application under Section 56 of the Act can only be entertained by the High Court specified under Section 3 of the Act, meaning that jurisdiction is tied to the original registration location.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge
Justice B. Akbar Basha Kadiri analyzed the provisions of Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and emphasized that jurisdiction for rectification proceedings is determined by the location of the Trade Marks Registry where the trademark was registered. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that the registered office of the respondent should influence jurisdiction, holding that the situs of the original trademark registration remains the determining factor.

The judge observed that prior to 1959, Calcutta was the sole Trade Marks Registry for all of India. After the establishment of regional registries, trademarks continued to be registered in their respective registries based on applications. Since the "Prestige" trademark was registered in Calcutta, rectification petitions could only be filed in the Calcutta High Court.

The judge further noted that even in cases where a foreign company initially registered a trademark, jurisdiction remains fixed at the location where the application was filed and the register is maintained. The address for service in India, as recorded in the Trade Marks Registry, was in Calcutta, further confirming the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

Final Decision
The Madras High Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition. The petition was returned for presentation before the Calcutta High Court. The respondent’s application (A. No. 3670 of 1997) was allowed, and O.P. No. 474 of 1995 was directed to be filed before the proper court.

Law Settled in This Case
Jurisdiction for trademark rectification petitions is determined by the location of the Trade Marks Registry where the trademark is registered.
The situs of the original registration remains unchanged even if the trademark is later assigned to an entity in another jurisdiction.
The registered office of the trademark proprietor does not affect territorial jurisdiction for rectification proceedings.
Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, is the governing provision for determining jurisdiction in trademark rectification cases.

Case Details
Case Title: Priya Enterprises Vs. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd.
Date of Order: 03.04.1998
Case No.: O.P. No. 474 of 1995, Application No. 3670 of 1997
Neutral Citation: MANU/TN/1746/1998; 1998(Suppl.)ARBLR624(Madras); 1998(18)PTC539(Mad)
Court: Madras High Court
Judge: Justice B. Akbar Basha Kadiri

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Lakha Ram Vs Balar Marketing

Lakha Ram Vs Balar Marketing: Effect of dynamic Effect on Trademark Cancellation-Para ii

Introduction
The case of Lakha Ram Sharma vs. Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. primarily revolves around the issue of territorial jurisdiction in rectification proceedings concerning a registered trademark. The petitioner, Lakha Ram Sharma, sought the rectification of the trademark "KUNDAN/KUNDAN CAB" registered in favor of Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. The dispute centered on whether the High Court of Delhi had the jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition or if it should have been filed in the Madras High Court, given that the trademark was originally registered at the Trade Marks Registry in Chennai. The case provides an insightful analysis of the interplay between Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and procedural rules governing trademark rectification proceedings.

Detailed Factual Background
Lakha Ram Sharma, the petitioner, claimed that he had been using the trademark "KUNDAN/KUNDAN CAB/KUNDAN CABLES INDIA" since 1980 for electrical accessories, including switches, fuse units, and cables. However, he later discovered that respondent No. 1, Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., had obtained registration of the trademark "KUNDAN/KUNDAN CAB" under Class 9. This registration had been originally applied for by respondent No. 2, a firm based in Chennai. Before the application was granted, respondent No. 2 assigned the trademark to respondent No. 1, which is based in Delhi.

The petitioner had earlier filed a suit for a permanent injunction in the District Court of Delhi against the respondent's use of the trademark. In response, the respondent filed a counterclaim asserting its registered ownership of the mark. This prompted the petitioner to file a rectification petition, seeking the cancellation of trademark registration No. 507445 from the Trade Marks Register. The primary legal question that arose was whether the High Court of Delhi had jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition, given that the trademark had been registered at the Chennai Trade Marks Registry.

Detailed Procedural Background
The petitioner filed the rectification petition under Sections 46 and 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The respondents contested the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, arguing that as per the territorial jurisdiction rules in the Act, the petition should have been filed before the Madras High Court. The respondents relied on Section 3(b) of the Act, which states that jurisdiction lies with the High Court within whose appellate jurisdiction the Trade Marks Registry is situated. Since the application for registration had been made at the Chennai Trade Marks Registry, they argued that only the Madras High Court had jurisdiction.

The petitioner, on the other hand, contended that after the assignment of the trademark to respondent No. 1, which was based in Delhi, the jurisdiction should shift to Delhi under Section 3(a) of the Act. The petitioner also argued that rectification proceedings should be treated as a suit under Section 107 of the Act, and since respondent No. 1 had its office in Delhi, the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction.

Issues Involved in the Case
Whether the High Court of Delhi had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the rectification petition.
Whether the assignment of a trademark during the pendency of a registration application altered the jurisdiction of rectification proceedings.
Whether Section 3(a) or Section 3(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, was applicable to determine the proper forum for rectification.

Detailed Submission of Parties
The respondents argued that since the application for the registration of the trademark was originally filed at the Chennai Trade Marks Registry, the rectification petition could only be filed in the Madras High Court. They relied on the definitions provided under Section 2(1)(h) and the territorial jurisdiction provisions under Section 3(b) of the Act. The respondents also emphasized that under Rule 4 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959, the appropriate office for rectification applications was the Trade Marks Registry where the trademark was registered. They cited judgments supporting the view that jurisdiction remains fixed with the original Trade Marks Registry, irrespective of any subsequent assignment.



The petitioner, however, contended that since the registered owner (respondent No. 1) was based in Delhi, the rectification petition should be maintainable in Delhi. The petitioner relied on Section 3(a) of the Act, which allows jurisdiction to be determined based on the proprietor’s principal place of business. He further argued that rectification proceedings should be treated akin to a civil suit, which should be heard where the affected party resides.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties
The respondents relied on the following judgments to support their argument that the rectification petition should be filed in the Madras High Court:


Priya Enterprises v. Prestige Housewares (India) Ltd., 1998 (18) PTC 539
Held that rectification applications must be filed in the High Court that has jurisdiction over the Trade Marks Registry where the mark is registered.

Satya Narayan Khub Chand and Ors. v. Rama Chandra Laxmi Narayan, MANU/AP/0105/1977 : AIR 1977 AP 360
Reaffirmed the principle that the situs of the Trade Marks Registry determines jurisdiction for rectification petitions.


Vikas Manufacturing Company v. Maharaj Manufacturing Company, 1981 PTC 87
Ruled that subsequent assignment of a trademark does not change the jurisdiction of rectification proceedings.

The petitioner cited the following judgments:


Amrutanjan Ltd. v. Ashwin Fine Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, 1991(2) Arb.L.R. 384 (Mad)
Argued that civil suits could be filed where the registered proprietor carries on business.


K.B. Venkatachala Mudaliar v. Vanaja Match Works, 1990 PTC 259
Addressed the relevance of principal place of business in determining jurisdiction.


Ramu Hosiery Rep. by M. Murugeshan v. Ramu Hosiery Rep. by Pandela Ramu and Anr., 1999 PTC 183
Discussed the implications of assignment on jurisdiction.


Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge
Justice A.K. Sikri analyzed Section 3 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and ruled that Section 3(a) did not apply since it covered trademarks already on the register at the commencement of the Act. Instead, Section 3(b) applied to trademarks registered after the Act came into force, in which case the jurisdiction is based on the location of the Trade Marks Registry where the application was filed.



The judge emphasized that even though the trademark had been assigned to a Delhi-based entity, the situs of the trademark’s original registration determined jurisdiction. The judge noted that allowing jurisdiction to change upon assignment would create uncertainty and inconvenience. Thus, the appropriate forum for rectification remained the Madras High Court.


Final Decision
The Delhi High Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the rectification petition. The petition was returned for presentation before the appropriate court, i.e., the Madras High Court.



Law Settled in This Case
The territorial jurisdiction for rectification petitions is determined by the location of the Trade Marks Registry where the original application was filed, not by the location of the assignee.
Subsequent assignment of a trademark does not alter the jurisdiction for rectification proceedings.
Section 3(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, is the relevant provision for determining jurisdiction in cases of trademark rectification.

Case Details
Case Title: Lakha Ram Sharma vs. Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Date of Order: 10.10.2001
Case No.: CO No. 19 of 1995
Neutral Citation: MANU/DE/1900/2001; 97(2002)DLT342; 2002(24)PTC115(Del); 2002(3)RCR(Civil)246
Court: Delhi High Court
Judge: Justice A.K. Sikri
Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.


Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

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