Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha

Introduction: This case study examines the legal proceedings involving Dr. Praveen R. and Dr. Arpitha, a matrimonial dispute that delves into the serious issue of perjury within the judicial system. It underscores the importance of timely and effective judicial action against false testimonies and fraudulent statements that threaten the integrity of the courts. The case primarily revolves around allegations of perjury, the court's discretionary powers in addressing such allegations, and the implications of delays in initiating proceedings for falsehoods sworn in affidavits and testimonies. The High Court of Karnataka analyzed whether the refusal to entertain an application related to perjury at an early stage was justified or if it hindered the course of justice by allowing falsehoods to persist.

Factual Background: Dr. Praveen and Dr. Arpitha, both medical practitioners of reputed standing, were embroiled in a matrimonial discord that led to legal proceedings. Dr. Praveen filed a petition seeking annulment of their marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, indicating an ongoing status of the marriage that needed judicial resolution. Concurrently, Dr. Arpitha sought maintenance and litigation expenses, claiming her unemployment and lack of income, which the trial court rejected. The dispute was further complicated by allegations made by Dr. Praveen, contending that Dr. Arpitha had falsely stated her employment status in affidavits supporting her applications for maintenance, thereby amounting to perjury. Despite these allegations, the trial court initially found the matter of perjury to be premature and refrained from initiating proceedings against her, citing the discretion reserved to the court. The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court, emphasizing the gravity of perjury as a serious offense and the need for prompt judicial intervention to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

Procedural Background: The petitioner, Dr. Praveen, approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, seeking to set aside the order passed by the Family Court, which had dismissed his application to initiate criminal proceedings for perjury. The Family Court had held that the allegation was premature, based on the principle that the discretion to act against perjury was to be exercised judiciously and only when the circumstances warranted immediate action. The petitioner contended that the delay in initiating proceedings against perjury was not justified, especially given the seriousness of the offense and the clear evidence of false affidavits. The respondents opposed the petition, asserting that the Court below rightly assessed the situation and that the discretion was rightly exercised, emphasizing the importance of not rushing into proceedings without proper proof and procedural fairness. The High Court, after hearing arguments and examining the record, scrutinized whether the Family Court’s decision was lawful and in consonance with principles of justice and judicial efficiency.

Legal Issue: The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Family Court erred in dismissing the application to initiate proceedings for perjury on the grounds of premature consideration and whether the High Court should interfere under its writ jurisdiction. Specifically, it centered around the interpretation of judicial discretion in initiating criminal proceedings for perjury, the necessity for timely action to prevent the erosion of judicial integrity, and the appropriateness of the Family Court’s assessment of the evidence and the exercise of its discretion concerning allegations of falsehood in affidavits related to maintenance applications and matrimonial proceedings.

Discussion on Judgments: The Court’s discussion heavily relied on precedents such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahila Vinod Kumari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 34, which emphasized that perjury undermines the judicial system and that courts must act more proactively. The Court also cited Swarna Singh v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 668, which highlighted the alarming proliferation of perjury in courts, describing it as a menace that needs stern and prompt judicial response. Furthermore, the Family Court had referred to decisions like B.K. GUPTA v. DAMODAR H. BAJAJ AND ORS. (2001) 9 SCC 742, which generally underscored that the exercise of discretion regarding proceedings for perjury must adhere to principles of reason and justice, not arbitrary or evasive actions. The Court analyzed these judgments in light of the facts, emphasizing that the judiciary cannot afford to treat perjury as a trivial matter and that procedural delays, especially when evidence indicates falsehoods, are detrimental to justice. The Court also looked at the decision of V.K. Gupta’s case, which acknowledged the discretion granted to courts but cautioned against deferring judicial action impeding the fight against falsehoods.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The High Court Judge reasoned that judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with established principles of justice and fairness. In this case, the Family Court’s decision to deem the application for initiating perjury proceedings as premature appeared to be based on a narrow interpretation that overlooked the tangible evidence of falsification in affidavits. The Hon’ble Judge noted the importance of adhering to the courts’ duty to prevent the evil of perjury, especially considering the societal consequences when false testimony is tolerated. They observed that merely relying on procedural delays or the absence of comprehensive proof at an initial stage should not prevent courts from taking stern action against perjury, particularly when the evidence suggests a clear intent to mislead the court. The Judge interpreted the relevant legal principles to mean that courts must act promptly and decisively to uphold the integrity of proceedings and to deter the dangerous proliferation of falsehoods. The Judge criticized the Family Court’s approach for risking a neglect of the substantive issue and opined that the delay therein was unjustified, asserting that such delay could pollute the fountain of justice by allowing fraud to persist unpunished.

Final Decision: The High Court set aside the impugned order of the Family Court and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, emphasizing that allegations of perjury are serious and should not be dismissed on technical grounds or procedural delays. The Court directed the Family Court to evaluate the evidence of falsehood explicitly and exercise its discretion in accordance with the principles of reason, justice, and judicial efficacy. 

It underscored the need for courts to act swiftly in such matters, highlighting that the integrity of the judicial process must be protected against falsehoods, which, if left unchecked, could lead to erosion of public confidence in the legal system. The Court’s decision was driven by the principles that perjury is a heinous offense and that judicial discretion, while important, must be exercised without prejudice to the fundamental goal of delivering justice.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirms that allegations of perjury are of grave concern and must be addressed with promptness and decisiveness by courts. It emphasizes that judicial discretion to initiate proceedings for perjury, while broad, must be exercised based on reason, justice, and the need to uphold the fidelity of the judicial process. The judgment clarifies that procedural delays or nominal objections should not be allowed to undermine the fight against falsehoods sworn before the court, especially when the evidence points toward clear misconduct. Courts are duty-bound to act swiftly to preserve the dignity of justice and prevent the evil of perjury from polluting the system. The case underscores that the failure to act promptly in such instances could be viewed as a dereliction of judicial duty, and therefore, courts must balance discretion with responsibility to ensure that perjury is neither tolerated nor ignored.

Case Title: Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha Date of Order: 31 August 2021 Case Number: Writ Petition No.19448 of 2015 Court: High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna S

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

T.V. Today Network Limited & Anr. Vs. Google LLC & Ors

T.V. Today Network Limited & Anr. Vs. Google LLC & Ors./20 June 2025/CS(COMM) 634/2025/High Court of Delhi at New Delhi/ Justice Prathiba M. Singh

The dispute arose when T.V. Today Network Limited, a major Indian media house running news channels like Aajtak and India Today, and Ms. Anjana Om Kashyap, its Managing Editor, discovered that an unknown person created a fake YouTube channel ‘@AnajanaomKashya’ imitating Ms. Kashyap’s name and photograph. This channel allegedly published fake videos and news clippings exploiting her reputation and the goodwill of the media house.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs filed a suit seeking urgent interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. Alongside, they sought exemption from pre-litigation mediation, filing originals and complete court fee, and requested leave to file additional documents. The Court allowed these applications, impleaded Ms. Kashyap as Plaintiff No.2, and issued summons to the defendants.

The Court discussed the evident difference between the authentic YouTube channel of Plaintiff No.2 and the fake channel, noting the deliberate omission of the letter ‘p’ in ‘Kashyap’ as indicative of bad faith. It observed that proliferation of such fake pages harms personality rights, risks dissemination of misinformation, and unlawfully exploits the plaintiffs’ goodwill for commercial gain.

The Court directed Google LLC to remove the infringing YouTube channel within 48 hours, disclose subscriber information of the creator within two weeks, and provide an account of revenues generated by the channel within four weeks. Further, it directed prompt removal of any similarly fake channels identified by the plaintiffs and scheduled the matter for further hearing.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.

ITC Limited Vs. Pravin Kumar & Ors.

Descriptive Terms, Distinctive Rights

Introduction:This case presented before the Calcutta High Court is a comprehensive intellectual property dispute involving allegations of trademark infringement, copyright infringement, passing off, and trafficking in trademark rights. The plaintiff, ITC Limited, a dominant and long-standing player in the Indian tobacco industry, alleged that the defendants, including Pravin Kumar and associated entities, were engaged in manufacturing and distributing counterfeit cigarettes under the brand name “GOLD STAG” that bore deceptive similarity to ITC’s well-known cigarette brand “GOLD FLAKE.” The central legal question revolved around the extent to which a company can claim proprietary rights over a composite mark containing a laudatory expression like “GOLD” and whether the defendants’ packaging constituted infringement or passing off.

Factual Background:ITC Limited is a multinational conglomerate with a substantial presence in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes in India under the brand “GOLD FLAKE,” a trademark that it has allegedly used uninterruptedly since 1905. The plaintiff possesses numerous trademark and copyright registrations in India for marks such as “GOLD FLAKE Hallmark,” “GOLD FLAKE Ultima,” “GOLD FLAKE Century,” and “GOLD FLAKE Super Star.” The petitioner claims that the “GOLD FLAKE” mark and its associated trade dress, including the red and gold color combination, device marks, and packaging format, have become distinctive identifiers of its products.

In late 2024, ITC discovered the marketing and sale of cigarettes under the brand “IJM GOLD STAG” by the defendants. The packaging of “GOLD STAG” cigarettes bore a striking resemblance to that of “GOLD FLAKE,” employing similar colors, layout, typography, and even similar roundel devices. ITC contended that the use of the word “GOLD” and the replication of packaging elements by the defendants constituted infringement of their registered trademarks and copyright, passing off, and intentional counterfeiting.

Procedural Background:Upon discovery of the infringing activity, ITC filed the suit on 28 January 2025 under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The High Court initially passed an ad-interim order on 6 February 2025 and appointed Special Officers for site inspections. The defendants filed applications under GA-COM/2/2025 for vacating the interim injunction, and under GA-COM/4/2025 for revocation of dispensation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act on the ground that pre-institution mediation was bypassed without just cause. All applications were heard analogously.

Legal Issue:The primary legal issues before the court were whether the defendants' use of the mark “GOLD STAG” and its associated packaging infringed upon ITC’s registered trademarks and copyrighted artistic work and whether the plaintiff’s claim of urgency justified bypassing the mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Ancillary issues involved whether the use of the word “GOLD” could be monopolized and whether the defendants’ registration of “GOLD STAG” provided them any protection against such infringement claims?

Discussion on Judgments:In support of its arguments, the plaintiff relied on multiple judicial precedents that recognized the distinctiveness of the “GOLD FLAKE” mark and the protection available under both trademark and copyright laws for packaging and trade dress.

In ITC Limited v. Golden Tobacco Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 2437, the Madras High Court acknowledged the long-standing reputation of “GOLD FLAKE” and restrained the use of similar marks. Similarly, in ITC Ltd. v. NTC Industries Ltd., 2015 (64) PTC 244 (Bom), the Bombay High Court granted injunctive relief to ITC against the use of deceptively similar marks by rival businesses. The Calcutta High Court itself had previously restrained parties from using variants like “GOLD STEP,” “GOLD FROST,” “GOLD FLICKER,” and “GOLD VIMAL” in various suits such as CS(COMM) No. 124/2024 and CS(COMM) No. 60/2024, recognizing the deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion.

The court also cited the landmark decision in Parakh Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. v. Baroma Agro Product, (2018) 16 SCC 632, which emphasized that claims of secondary meaning and exclusivity over common or descriptive terms require careful scrutiny.

For assessing the maintainability of suit without pre-institution mediation, the court referred to Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, and Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382. These decisions collectively held that mediation is mandatory unless the suit seeks urgent interim relief and the urgency is not falsely pleaded. The court emphasized that it is for the court, not the plaintiff, to determine the urgency’s authenticity.

On the procedural side, the court relied on Autodesk Inc. v. A.V.T. Shankardass, (2008) 105 DRJ 188, and Time Warner Entertainment v. RPG Netcom, 2007 (34) PTC 668 (Del), to uphold the procedural validity of executing search-and-seizure orders before formal service under Order 39 Rule 3 CPC, especially when the object is to prevent the destruction of evidence.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur held that the plaintiff made out a strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. The court accepted that the plaintiff’s mark “GOLD FLAKE” had acquired distinctiveness through continuous and extensive use over decades. While acknowledging that “GOLD” is a laudatory term, the court emphasized that the overall packaging, trade dress, and visual similarities could not be ignored. The red and gold color scheme, the use of similar roundel devices, and the layout of product elements gave the impugned product an appearance deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff’s.

The judge rejected the defendant’s argument that ITC had no exclusive right over the word “GOLD” alone, stating that while “GOLD” per se may be descriptive or laudatory, its use in conjunction with deceptive packaging and overall presentation constituted actionable infringement and passing off.

On the issue of bypassing Section 12A, the court held that ITC had pleaded sufficient urgency. There was no evidence that ITC had prior knowledge of the infringing acts before December 2024. The court also noted the complex corporate structure and concealed relationships among the defendants which justified ITC’s prompt approach to court. The court distinguished this case from others where urgency was found to be a guise.

Additionally, the court found the licensing agreements submitted by the defendants to be suspect, noting discrepancies in the documents and the absence of valid assignments or written authorizations as mandated under Sections 30 and 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Final Decision:The Calcutta High Court upheld the ad-interim injunction previously granted and allowed ITC’s application for interim relief. It dismissed the applications by the defendants seeking to vacate the injunction and revoke the dispensation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. The court restrained the defendants from using the impugned mark “GOLD STAG” or any deceptively similar trade dress, packaging, or devices in relation to cigarettes. The court also noted that the acts of the defendants warranted further scrutiny at trial to examine claims of counterfeiting and trafficking.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that even descriptive or laudatory components of a composite trademark may attain distinctiveness when used extensively over a long period, and such acquired distinctiveness can be protected under trademark and copyright laws. The judgment clarifies that trade dress and packaging play a crucial role in consumer perception and can independently ground claims of infringement and passing off. Furthermore, the court reiterated that bypassing the requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is permissible only when genuine urgency exists, and the courts are the ultimate arbiters of such urgency.

Case Title: ITC Limited v. Pravin Kumar & Ors.:Date of Order: 20 June 2025:Case Number: IP-COM/12/2025:Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta, Original Side (IPR Division):Name of Judge: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Satya Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd

Case Title: Satya Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd.: Date of Order:7th February, 2013:Case Number:CS(OS) 1213/2011:2013:DHC:653:High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Facts:

The plaintiffs, comprising companies under the "Satya Group," claimed long-standing use of the trademark "SATYA" in connection with their real estate and infrastructure businesses since 1986. They alleged that the defendant, Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd., incorporated in 2009, had adopted the mark "SATYA" in its name with the intent to misappropriate the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs and cause confusion among consumers.

The plaintiffs had registered trademarks for "SATYA," "SATYA & Logo," and other variants under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and had invested substantially in building brand recognition. They filed the suit seeking a permanent injunction, delivery of infringing materials, rendition of accounts, and damages.

Procedural History:

The defendant did not appear despite service of summons.

The court proceeded ex parte against the defendant.

Plaintiffs, through counsel, elected to pursue only the relief of permanent injunction, foregoing damages and other reliefs for expediency.

Issues:

Whether the use of the mark “SATYA” by the defendant in its corporate name constituted infringement of the plaintiffs’ registered trademark and amounted to passing off.

Decision:

The High Court:

Held that the plaintiffs had established long-standing, continuous, and registered use of the "SATYA" mark in relation to real estate and related services.

Found that the defendant's use of "SATYA" in its corporate name was likely to cause confusion and mislead the public into believing an association with the plaintiffs.

Observed that such use amounted to infringement of trademark rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from using the name “Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd.” or any deceptively similar name or mark.

Provided a three-month period for the defendant to comply before the injunction would take effect.

Directed that a copy of the judgment be served on the Registrar of Companies to initiate rectification of the defendant’s name if necessary.

Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India

Article 226 Invoked to Rectify Trademark Registry Irregularities

Introduction:This case highlights serious procedural lapses in the functioning of the Trade Marks Registry and the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, Kamdhenu Limited, approached the High Court through five writ petitions, challenging the perfunctory and irregular acceptance of certain trademark applications that had allegedly ignored the petitioner’s prior rights and bypassed the statutory mandates under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Trade Mark Rules, 2017. The Court, in an unprecedented move, exercised its suo motu jurisdiction to rectify administrative irregularities that had broader implications on public confidence in the trademark registration system.

Factual Background:Kamdhenu Limited is a well-established entity with several registered trademarks to its name. The dispute arose when five trademark applications—bearing application numbers 6890699, 6845025, 6845771, 6890704, and 6742246—were hastily accepted by the Trade Marks Registry on the same date they were filed. The petitioner discovered that these applications were processed and accepted within minutes without proper examination, and shockingly, without reference to the petitioner’s prior existing trademarks, despite their valid registration status.

A glaring omission in the search reports generated by the Registry was that 16 of the petitioner’s valid trademarks were not reflected, raising concerns of non-compliance with Rule 33 of the Trade Mark Rules and Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act. These circumstances suggested a breakdown in due diligence and adherence to statutory obligations by the Registry and its officers.

Procedural Background:The matter first came up before the High Court on 9th May 2025, when the Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the records and explanations furnished by the Registry. The Court found the omissions in the search reports troubling and called upon the relevant officers—Examiners of Trade Marks, as well as the Registrar—to appear and assist the Court. Subsequently, on 15th May 2025, the officers demonstrated the software and processes used to generate search reports. Following this, the Registrar of Trade Marks voluntarily submitted a short affidavit admitting procedural failures and stating that administrative action had been initiated against the concerned Examiners. The Registrar also offered to withdraw the earlier acceptance orders and undertake a fresh examination of the applications.

Legal Issue:The diputed question was whether the acceptance of the five trademark applications by the Trade Marks Registry, in apparent disregard of prior existing marks and statutory procedures, could be sustained under law and whether the High Court could intervene under Article 226 in the absence of the petitioner having availed of alternate statutory remedies.

Discussion on Judgments:To support the writ petitions, the petitioner relied on Jai Bhagwan Gupta v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Ors., 2020:DHC:1532, where the Court emphasized the necessity for a reasoned order and clear application of mind by the Registrar while accepting a mark under Section 20(1) of the Act. It was held that such acceptance cannot be mechanical and must reflect proper scrutiny.

The petitioner also referred to Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. & Anr. vs. D. N. Bahari Trading, 2024:DHC:2868, where a Co-ordinate Bench held that compliance with Rule 33 of the Trade Mark Rules is mandatory. Though the respondent contested the relevance of this case by stating it related to a rectification petition and not a writ petition, the Court found the principles applicable given the similar factual matrix.

The respondents, particularly Respondent No. 4, cited T.K. Lathika Vs. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas, (1999) 6 SCC 632 to argue that the Court should not bypass the issue of maintainability and should allow opposition proceedings to take their course. They also relied on Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. & Anr. vs. Registrar of Trademarks & Ors., 2023:DHC:2066 to suggest that judicial restraint should be exercised where the statutory process is available.

However, the Court emphasized the exceptionality of the present facts and drew support from Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. vs. Chhabil Das Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, and State of H.P. & Ors. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499, to reaffirm the principle that the bar on writ jurisdiction in the face of alternate remedies is not absolute but a rule of prudence and policy.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:  The court noticed that it was not just about isolated errors, but a systemic administrative failure that shook the very integrity of the trademark registration process. The Court noted that the speed and uniformity with which the applications were processed and accepted on the same day, without due scrutiny, indicated a failure to comply with Rule 33 and Section 11 of the Act.

The Court also appreciated the Registrar's candid admission of error and swift initiation of departmental action. However, recognizing that such failures could have far-reaching consequences and erode public faith in the statutory regime, the Court felt compelled to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to prevent further miscarriage of justice.

While acknowledging that the petitioner had not yet initiated opposition proceedings and that the time for doing so was still available, the Court found that the blatant procedural lapses warranted judicial intervention. The judge emphasized that the object was not to preempt statutory remedies but to correct a grave wrong that could affect the credibility of a public institution.

Final Decision:The Court disposed of the writ petitions by remanding all five trademark applications back to the Registrar of Trade Marks for de novo adjudication in accordance with law. The Court directed the Registrar to give appropriate notice to all concerned parties and ensure that future proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Trade Marks Act and Rules. The Registry was also instructed to initiate necessary administrative steps as per the Court’s earlier orders.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that High Courts can and should invoke their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 when there is a demonstrable failure of statutory duties by public authorities, even if alternate remedies are available. It also affirms that the Trade Marks Registry must adhere strictly to Rule 33 of the Trade Mark Rules and Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, and cannot mechanically process applications without a thorough examination. Administrative convenience or speed cannot override legal compliance and procedural fairness.

Case Title:Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India :Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 29-33/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India

Case Title:Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India :Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 29-33/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

The petitioner, Kamdhenu Limited, filed a batch of writ petitions challenging the manner in which the Trade Marks Registry processed and accepted five trademark applications. The challenge was based on serious procedural lapses, including non-compliance with Rule 33 of the Trademark Rules and Section 11 of the Trademarks Act. It was alleged that the Registry ignored existing prior registrations of the petitioner and accepted the impugned applications within minutes on the same day of filing, without due examination.

The dispute centered on whether the acceptance of the impugned trademark applications by the Registrar of Trade Marks was legally valid when the process showed signs of procedural irregularities, including suspicious haste and lack of a proper search report reflecting the petitioner’s prior trademarks.

The Judge found that the circumstances indicated a clear administrative lapse and failure of statutory duties by the Registry. The Court acknowledged that although alternate statutory remedies were available, the exceptional facts warranted exercise of the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the Registrar of Trade Marks had already admitted errors and initiated departmental action against the concerned examiners.

In its decision, the Court exercised suo motu powers to remand all five trademark applications for fresh adjudication. It directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to conduct a de novo examination of the applications in accordance with law, after giving due notice to all parties. The petitions were accordingly disposed of without delving into the merits of each application.

RPG Enterprises Limited Vs. RPG Nirman Private Limited:

Case Title: RPG Enterprises Limited Vs. RPG Nirman Private Limited:Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 532/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The plaintiff, RPG Enterprises Limited, filed a suit seeking permanent injunction against the defendants for trademark infringement, passing off, and related reliefs. The plaintiff asserted rights over the well-known trademark ‘RPG’, which has been in use since 1979 and registered since 1999, derived from the name of its founder Rama Prasad Goenka. The plaintiff pointed out that the defendants were using the identical mark ‘RPG’ despite an earlier rectification order dated 8th January 2025, whereby the registration of the defendant’s trademark had been cancelled on the grounds of bad faith and dishonesty.

The dispute concerned the unauthorized and continued use of the ‘RPG’ mark by the defendants, who were found to be operating from the same address and managed by the same individual. The plaintiff argued that such use was not only dishonest but also caused confusion and amounted to misuse of the goodwill attached to the well-known mark ‘RPG’.

The Judge held that a prima facie case had been established in favour of the plaintiff. The Court found that the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiff and that irreparable harm would be caused if the defendants were allowed to continue using the mark. The Court also observed that public interest would be harmed due to the likelihood of confusion caused by the deceptively similar marks.

The Court granted an interim injunction, restraining the defendants from using the mark ‘RPG’ or any ‘RPG’-formative marks in relation to their services, until the next date of hearing.

Paris Foods and Chemical Industries Vs. Martbaan

Case Title: Paris Foods and Chemical Industries Vs. Martbaan:Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: CM(M)-IPD 20/2024:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

The petitioner challenged an order passed by the District Judge in a commercial suit for trademark infringement, where the trial court had permitted the respondent to place on record additional documents belatedly. These documents, including certain invoices, were allowed without notice to the petitioner and without any explanation from the respondent for the delay in filing them along with the original or amended plaint.

The dispute before the High Court involved the validity of the trial court’s order that accepted late documents without prior notice or opportunity to respond, allegedly in violation of the Commercial Courts Act and the Civil Procedure Code provisions, particularly Order XI Rule 1. The petitioner argued that allowing such documents without leave of the court and without just cause contravened procedural norms and relied on multiple precedents to support this claim.

The Judge held that the order passed by the District Judge was legally sustainable as it was a conditional order requiring the respondent to pay costs of ₹10,000 and also granted the petitioner liberty to file rebuttal documents. The Court noted that the petitioner had already accepted the cost amount, and by doing so, effectively acquiesced to the order and waived the right to challenge it. It reiterated the settled principle that parties cannot approbate and reprobate and cited various precedents confirming that accepting costs amounts to accepting the order.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no error in the District Judge’s decision and that the petitioner, having accepted the benefits under the impugned order, could not subsequently challenge it.

Rakesh Kumar Mittal Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Case Title: Rakesh Kumar Mittal Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: 27th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 40/2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4432:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

The petitioner applied for registration of the trademark MILTON in Class 9, which was granted on 30th May 2003 and was due for renewal on 6th May 2004. The trademark was removed from the Register due to non-renewal, as notified in the Trade Marks Journal dated 16th October 2010. The petitioner later discovered via an RTI response that the Registrar had not issued the mandatory Form O-3 notice before removing the mark, as required under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 64(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002.

The dispute revolved around whether the removal of the registered trademark from the Register was valid when the Registrar had failed to issue the statutory notice informing the proprietor of the impending expiration and renewal conditions. The petitioner contended that without such notice, he had no knowledge of the expiry and hence could not file for renewal.

The Judge analyzed Section 25(3) and Rule 64(1), affirming that the issuance of Form O-3 notice is a mandatory precondition for the removal of a registered trademark. Citing binding precedents including Union of India v. Malhotra Book Depot (2013 SCC OnLine Del 828) and Cipla Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1270), the Court held that failure to serve the notice rendered the removal illegal. The Court emphasized that statutory procedures must be followed step by step and that skipping mandatory steps vitiates the legality of administrative action.

The Court held the removal of the petitioner’s trademark MILTON from the Register to be unlawful and directed its restoration. It also directed that, upon filing appropriate applications and completing formalities, the trademark must be renewed for the periods 2004–2014, 2014–2024, and 2024–2034, and renewal certificates be issued accordingly.

Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Introduction:This case concerns the legal complexities arising from a trademark ownership dispute between former partners of a business. The matter delves into issues surrounding the alteration of the registered address of a trademark, the validity of administrative orders passed by the Trade Marks Registry, and the procedural integrity of such modifications. The High Court of Delhi was approached through a writ petition by the registered proprietor of the trademark “AMBIKA,” seeking rectification of the address entry in the trademark register which had been unilaterally changed at the instance of a former partner.

Factual Background:Ambika Industrial Corporation, the petitioner firm, is a longstanding user and registered proprietor of the trademark “AMBIKA” in relation to cycles and their parts. The mark has been in use since 1981, with multiple registrations filed under various classes, particularly Classes 12, 28, and 35. The dispute arises from the involvement of Respondent No. 2, Rakesh Kumar, who was formerly a partner of the petitioner firm. He retired from the firm through a retirement deed dated 1st April 1987, relinquishing all his rights, title, and interest in the firm. Despite this retirement, Respondent No. 2 later attempted to interfere with the records of the Trade Marks Registry concerning the trademark “AMBIKA.”

The petitioner firm had obtained registration of the trademark under application number 381350. A TM-24 form was submitted on 30th April 1998, requesting entry of subsequent proprietors, which was allowed by the Registry on 30th November 2006. Subsequently, the petitioner firm also instituted a civil suit, CS(COMM) 63/2018, against Ambika Exports Pvt. Ltd., a company wherein Respondent No. 2 is a director. An ad-interim injunction was passed by the Delhi High Court restraining the use of “AMBIKA” or deceptively similar marks by the respondent’s entity.

Procedural Background:The controversy arose when Respondent No. 2 filed a Form TM-34 on 23rd September 2013, seeking change of address of the registered proprietor of the trademark to his own address at 110-R, Modern Town, Ludhiana. The Trade Marks Registry allowed this request through an order dated 13th July 2018. The petitioner firm, on discovering this development through an RTI application, filed a review petition against the said order. Although a hearing was initially scheduled, it was adjourned on the request of Respondent No. 2 and never rescheduled, despite multiple reminders from the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking restoration of the original address in the register of trademarks.

Legal Issue:The core legal issue before the Court was whether the Trade Marks Registry acted lawfully and within its jurisdiction in allowing the change of address of the registered proprietor of a trademark on the basis of an application by a person who was no longer associated with the proprietor firm?

Discussion on Judgments:No external judicial precedents or case laws were cited by either party or referred to by the Court in the present matter. The case was determined purely on the basis of the factual matrix, administrative conduct of the Trade Marks Registry, and the proprietary status as per the Register of Trade Marks.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court observed that the petitioner firm continues to be the registered proprietor of the trademark “AMBIKA.” It was not in dispute that Respondent No. 2 had retired from the firm in 1987. Despite the respondent's claim to co-ownership, that dispute was pending adjudication in a civil suit and did not justify a unilateral change in the registered address by the Trade Marks Registry. The Court noted that the order passed by the Registry did not provide any rationale or legal basis for the address change, especially when it was initiated by someone with no legal authority in the firm. The Court held that such a change without notice to the registered proprietor and without any inquiry into the validity of the request was both procedurally and substantively unjustified.

Final Decision:The Court quashed the impugned order dated 13th July 2018 passed by the Trade Marks Registry and directed restoration of the registered address of the trademark “AMBIKA” to its position prior to the said order. To maintain fairness and transparency, the Court also directed that all future communications regarding the trademark by the Registry be marked to both the petitioner firm and Respondent No. 2. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with directions for compliance to be conveyed to the Trade Marks Registry.

Law Settled in This Case:The case affirms that any administrative change in the Trade Marks Register, particularly relating to address or ownership of a registered trademark, must be based on proper authority, transparency, and rationale. Unauthorized and unilateral actions by third parties without proper notice or standing cannot form the basis of valid alterations in the official records maintained by the Trade Marks Registry. Furthermore, mere pending civil disputes regarding ownership do not empower a former partner to act as a proprietor for administrative purposes unless judicially recognized.

Case Title: Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: 26th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 35/2022:Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:4865:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Case Title: Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: 26th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 35/2022:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4865:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The petitioner firm, Ambika Industrial Corporation, is the registered proprietor of the trademark "AMBIKA". Respondent No. 2, a former partner of the petitioner firm who had retired in 1987, filed a Form TM-34 seeking change of address of the registered proprietor to his own address. The Registrar of Trade Marks allowed this request by an order dated 13th July 2018. The petitioner challenged this order, asserting that the respondent had no right to request such a change after retirement, and that the Registry acted without justification.

The dispute centered on whether the Registry was justified in altering the registered address of the trademark on the basis of a request from a person who was no longer associated with the registered proprietor.

The Judge observed that the petitioner firm remains the registered proprietor of the mark and that the impugned order lacked any reasoning or legal basis for the address change. Without entering into the merits of the parties’ partnership dispute, which is already pending in civil court, the Court held that the change of address could not be sustained.

The Court quashed the Registrar’s order dated 13th July 2018 and directed restoration of the trademark's registered address as it stood prior to the said order. It further directed that all communications from the Registry should be marked to both the petitioner firm and respondent No. 2.

Aktiebolaget Volvo Vs. Mantis Technologies Pvt. Ltd

Case Title: Aktiebolaget Volvo Vs. Mantis Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Case Number: CS(COMM) 199/2020 Date of Order: May 13, 2025 Court: High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3938

Fact:

Aktiebolaget Volvo (and its associated entities) filed a suit against Mantis Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other defendants, alleging infringement of its well-known "VOLVO" trademark, which is extensively recognized and registered in India. The plaintiffs operate in the automotive and transportation sectors, providing commercial vehicles and related services globally and in India, and have invested heavily in promoting their "VOLVO" brand. The defendants, engaged in the travel and bus services industry, used the "VOLVO" mark without authorization, creating confusion and infringing on the plaintiffs' rights.

Procedural Details:

• The original suit was filed seeking an injunction to restrain infringement and passing off.
• The court initially granted ex-parte ad interim injunctions restraining certain defendants from using the "VOLVO" mark.
• Multiple defendants were served, and some were deleted or made ex parte during the proceedings.
• The court referred parties for mediation, and some defendants settled.
• Several defendants, including defendant no.7, did not appear, and the court proceeded ex parte against them.
• The court ultimately decided the case on merits, addressing damages, infringement, and the defendants' conduct.

Issue:

Whether the defendants' use of the "VOLVO" trademark amounts to infringement and passing off, considering the well-known and registered status of the "VOLVO" mark, and whether the defendants' conduct was deliberate and mala fide, warranting damages and injunctions.

Decision:

• The court found that the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' "VOLVO" trademark and had deliberately evaded court proceedings.
• Defendants no.5, 6, 7, and 8 were noted for continued profit-making despite service and orders.
• Damages and injunctions were granted against infringing defendants.
• The court disposed of pending applications and directed the decree sheet to be drawn up, closing all remaining claims and proceedings.

Penguin Books Ltd. Vs India Book Distributors

Protecting Foreign Literary Works in India

Introduction: This case involves a dispute between the publisher of a copyrighted book, Penguin Books Ltd., and a distributor and printers in India regarding allegations of copyright infringement. The core issue is whether the defendants illegally reproduced and distributed a book titled "Spycatcher" without proper authorization.

Detailed Factual Background:The plaintiff in the case, Penguin Books Ltd., is a reputed UK-based publishing house and the owner of the copyright for the book "Spycatcher", authored by Peter Wright. The book is an autobiographical account of Wright's time as an MI5 agent and details covert operations of the British intelligence services. Due to its sensitive and controversial content, the UK government attempted to block its publication and distribution domestically.

Despite legal efforts in the UK to restrain publication, Penguin Books Ltd. discovered that copies of the book had begun to surface in India. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, namely India Book Distributors and associated entities, had printed and circulated the book in India without obtaining any authorization from the rightful copyright owner. Penguin Books claimed exclusive rights to the book and asserted that no Indian distributor had been granted any rights to publish or sell the work. Therefore, the plaintiff initiated legal proceedings alleging copyright infringement under Indian law.

Detailed Procedural Background: The matter was brought before the High Court of Bombay. Penguin Books Ltd. sought an interim injunction against the defendants to restrain them from printing, publishing, or distributing the infringing copies. The defendants responded by denying any wrongdoing, asserting that they had either lawfully obtained copies or were merely distributing what they believed to be legitimate publications sourced from abroad.The learned single judge, where the suit was instituted, refused the injunction. From his order of refusal Penguins appeal to this court.

Issues Involved in the Case: The primary legal issues raised in this case were:Whether the plaintiff, Penguin Books Ltd., held a valid copyright over the book Spycatcher in India?Whether the defendants violated the Copyright Act, 1957 by distributing or reproducing the book without the plaintiff’s authorization.

Detailed Submissions of Parties: The plaintiff submitted that it held exclusive rights to the book Spycatcher, and offered evidence of unauthorized sale and distribution by the defendants. They emphasized the ongoing litigation in the UK and the importance of preserving their rights internationally, including in India. They argued that allowing distribution in India would amount to a violation of international copyright norms and significantly undermine their commercial and intellectual property interests.

To support their position, the plaintiff cited several landmark cases, including R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118, which laid down the principles for establishing copyright infringement, and Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1, which discussed the standard of originality required for copyright protection under Indian law.

The defendants, on the other hand, denied that they had printed the book. They claimed to have lawfully procured copies from foreign sources and asserted that they were not liable for infringement. They argued that resale of lawfully purchased books, even if imported, did not constitute an infringement under Indian law. Furthermore, they contended that an Indian court should not be influenced by an ongoing UK case and that the content of the book, regardless of its sensitivity, was a matter of public interest.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations:The court closely analyzed the case of R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118, which held that copyright infringement occurs when there is substantial copying of the expression of an idea and not merely the idea itself. This case was invoked by the plaintiff to argue that unauthorized publication and sale of even part of the book without permission amounted to clear infringement.

The case of Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1, was cited to reinforce that Indian law grants copyright protection to all original literary works, irrespective of whether they were published in India. The court found this reasoning applicable in the present case, supporting the plaintiff’s claim of ownership and protection under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.

The court also took judicial notice of the proceedings in the UK where the British Government had tried to stop the publication of Spycatcher. Although this was not directly binding, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s rights had been recognized by courts in other jurisdictions and should not be lightly disregarded in India.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis by the Judge: Justice Lentin observed that there was sufficient prima facie evidence demonstrating that Penguin Books Ltd. was the copyright holder of Spycatcher. The defendants had failed to offer credible documentation or proof to establish that they had lawfully acquired the right to distribute or publish the book in India. The court emphasized that even if the books were obtained through overseas purchases, the unauthorized distribution in India still constituted infringement under Indian copyright laws.

The court noted that the plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm if the defendants were allowed to continue distribution, especially considering the limited commercial window available due to the book's controversial nature. It was also found that the balance of convenience tilted in favor of the plaintiff. The judge further reasoned that public interest could not override private legal rights, especially when those rights were protected by statute.

Final Decision:The High Court of Bombay granted an interim injunction in favor of Penguin Books Ltd. The court restrained the defendants from printing, publishing, selling, distributing, or in any other manner disposing of any copies of Spycatcher pending the final disposal of the suit.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirmed that Indian copyright law protects the rights of foreign copyright holders, even if the work has not been published in India. Unauthorized distribution of copyrighted work, including imported copies, without permission amounts to infringement. Indian courts can enforce such rights and grant relief, including injunctions, irrespective of ongoing international disputes or foreign court orders. This ruling underscores the territorial integrity and application of the Copyright Act, 1957 within India.

Case Title: Penguin Books Ltd. Vs India Book Distributors & Ors.:Date of Order: 1 August 1984:Citation: AIR1985DELHI29, 26(1984)DLT316:Court: High Court of Delhi:Presiding Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Avadh Bihari Rohtagi

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

SML Limited Vs. Mohan & Company & Anr.

Interim Relief and Presumption of Validity in Patent Law

Introduction:This case involves a significant dispute in the field of intellectual property law, particularly relating to patent infringement in the agricultural sector. The litigation centers on Indian Patent No. 282092, concerning a novel agricultural composition. The plaintiff, SML Limited, a research-driven agrochemical company, approached the High Court of Himachal Pradesh alleging patent infringement by the defendants, Mohan & Company and Safex Chemicals India Ltd., over a competing fertilizer product branded as "Aladdin." The plaintiff sought interim injunctive relief pending final adjudication. The case illustrates critical questions of patent validity, inventive step, public interest under regulatory frameworks, and the balance of convenience in granting interim relief in infringement suits.

Factual Background:SML Limited is the assignee and lawful proprietor of Indian Patent No. 282092, granted on March 30, 2017, for a fertilizer composition comprising sulfur, zinc oxide, and an agrochemically acceptable excipient in specific micronized granular form. The plaintiff launched its product under the brand name “Techno Z” in August 2018. The patent was subjected to pre-grant and post-grant oppositions, both of which were dismissed after full consideration by the Indian Patent Office.

In 2023, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants were marketing a similar product under the name “Aladdin,” which allegedly fell within the scope of Claims 11 and 12 of the suit patent. The composition, structure, and particle size of the product were alleged to be substantially identical to those protected under the patent.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction along with an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking interim injunction to restrain the defendants from continuing the manufacture, sale, and distribution of the infringing product. An ex parte interim injunction was granted on July 24, 2023. The defendants challenged the injunction through a commercial appeal, which was dismissed on the grounds of delay. Subsequently, the High Court heard detailed arguments from both sides and reserved judgment on the interim application on April 25, 2025.

Legal Issue:The primary legal issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interim injunction against the defendants for the alleged infringement of Indian Patent No. 282092. The question further involved whether the defendants had raised a credible challenge to the validity of the patent under Sections 3(d), 2(1)(ja), and 64 of the Patents Act, 1970, and whether public interest considerations under the Fertilizer Control Order (FCO) could override proprietary patent rights.

Discussion on Judgments:The plaintiff placed heavy reliance on Novartis AG & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6430, where the Delhi High Court held that a patentee enjoys exclusive monopoly over the patented invention and is entitled to seek protection under Section 48 of the Patents Act. The Court emphasized that even at the interim stage, the statutory rights of a patent holder must be protected in the absence of a strong challenge to the validity of the patent.

Another case cited was Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. & Ors. v. J.D. Joshi, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 10109, where the Court held that old and unopposed patents enjoy a presumption of validity and interim relief should ordinarily be granted unless a strong prima facie challenge is made.

To support its claim of credibility in patent enforcement, the plaintiff referred to Strix Ltd. v. Maharaja Appliances Ltd., MIPR 2010 (1) 0181, where it was held that a defendant must present acceptable scientific material supported by expert evidence to raise a credible challenge to validity.

The defendants relied on Dhanpat Seth & Ors. v. Nil Kamal Plastic Crates Ltd., 2007 SCC OnLine HP 33, where the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that mere grant of a patent does not automatically entitle the patentee to an injunction. Section 107 of the Patents Act allows a defendant to challenge the validity of a patent even in an infringement suit.

They also cited F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Del 382, where the Delhi High Court held that the six-year rule for old patents is only a cautionary principle, and the patentee must still demonstrate prima facie strength in its case.

The defendants further relied on Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5340, to argue that claims lacking inventive step or falling within prior art should not be protected under an interim injunction. They asserted that their product followed government-mandated FCO standards, and that the plaintiff's patent simply mimicked these existing public standards.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Court analyzed the pleadings, scientific material, expert affidavits, and comparative composition data presented. The Court observed that the plaintiff had not only secured a statutory patent but had also successfully defended it in both pre- and post-grant opposition proceedings. The patent had remained unchallenged for over 14 years.

The Court noted that Claims 11 and 12 of the suit patent clearly described a fertilizer composition with specific ranges for sulfur, zinc oxide, and particle size, and the expert report from Dr. Phool Kumar Patanjali demonstrated that the defendants’ product “Aladdin” fell within these technical specifications. The Court found that the defendants had not submitted any rebuttal expert testimony or substantial material to credibly challenge the novelty or inventive step of the patent.

While the defendants argued that the product complied with FCO standards and involved bentonite as an excipient, the Court held that FCO compliance could not justify infringement of a patent. The regulatory framework under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, does not supersede proprietary rights granted under the Patents Act. The Court was also unconvinced by the defendants’ jurisdictional objections, finding that sales within the State had been established.

Importantly, the Court held that public interest would not be served by allowing unlicensed use of patented technology, especially when the patentee had invested in significant R&D efforts and the patent had survived statutory scrutiny.

Final Decision:The High Court granted the interim injunction, restraining the defendants from manufacturing, using, selling, offering for sale, importing, or exporting the infringing product “Aladdin” or any product covered under Indian Patent No. 282092 until further orders. The Court upheld the statutory exclusivity conferred by the patent and found that the balance of convenience, irreparable harm, and prima facie case all lay in favor of the plaintiff.

Law Settled in This Case:The judgment reaffirmed that the grant of an Indian patent, especially one that has stood the test of opposition and been in force for a significant duration, enjoys a presumption of validity. A defendant challenging such a patent in interim proceedings must raise a credible and scientifically supported challenge. The case establishes that statutory compliance with FCO regulations does not immunize an infringing product from patent enforcement. Furthermore, the Court clarified that interim injunctions in patent cases must balance statutory rights, prima facie infringement, and the public interest without deferring entirely to regulatory standards under different legislation.

Case Title: SML Limited Vs. Mohan & Company & Anr.:Date of Order: 6 June 2025:Case Number: OMP No. 320 of 2023 in COMS No. 6 of 2023:Neutral Citation: 2025:HHC:18160:Name of Court: High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi