Rieter AG Vs. Kavassery Narayanaswamy

Introduction: The present case involves a complex intellectual property dispute revolving around the infringement of industrial designs, trademarks, and patents in the textile machinery sector. Rieter AG and its group company filed a commercial civil suit before the Delhi High Court against the defendant, a Coimbatore-based supplier, alleging that the defendant infringed their proprietary rights by selling deceptively similar spare parts. The legal issue before the Court primarily focused on the question of territorial jurisdiction and whether the Delhi High Court could entertain the suit when the defendant was operating from Tamil Nadu and the alleged infringing activity was centered outside Delhi.

Factual Background: Rieter AG and Rieter India Private Limited, subsidiaries of Rieter Holding AG, instituted the suit on the basis of their intellectual property rights, including registered Indian design numbers 264773, 264774, 264775, 294194, 271521 and a registered patent bearing no. 339930. The trademark ‘SUESSEN’ was also claimed to be owned by plaintiff no. 2. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had displayed infringing products at India ITME (India International Textile Machinery Exhibition) held at Greater Noida in December 2022. Thereafter, the plaintiffs engaged an investigator who, acting through a company named Ukandin International Private Limited, initiated a purchase transaction with the defendant in April and May 2023. The products were ultimately delivered in Delhi on the basis of an invoice dated 17th May 2023, which the plaintiffs claimed established part of the cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court.

Procedural Background: The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking return of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The primary argument was that the defendant’s business was based entirely in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, and he did not carry out any business or have any place of business in Delhi. The defendant asserted that the transaction in question was a “trap” purchase fabricated by the plaintiffs’ investigator solely to confer jurisdiction upon the Delhi High Court. The plaintiffs opposed the application, relying upon the factual matrix and judicial precedent to assert that part of the cause of action arose in Delhi due to delivery of infringing goods, and that the suit was maintainable under Section 20(c) of the CPC.

Issues Involved in the Case: The principal issue before the Court was whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 20(c) of the CPC, considering that the defendant was located in Tamil Nadu and that the transaction culminating in delivery of goods in Delhi was allegedly a one-time trap purchase?Another pertinent issue was whether a trap transaction could constitute a valid part of the cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Delhi High Court in an intellectual property infringement suit?

Submissions of the Parties:The defendant submitted that the entire transaction was orchestrated by the plaintiffs with the sole motive of conferring jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court. He contended that the goods were supplied only after the plaintiffs’ investigator physically visited the defendant’s premises in Coimbatore and that the sale was conducted in Coimbatore. The subsequent delivery in Delhi was requested by the investigator and should be treated as a non-commercial, contrived transaction. He relied on the decisions in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, and Indovax Pvt. Ltd. v. Merck Animal Health, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393, to assert that trap purchases without commercial intent cannot create jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendant, by participating in the India ITME exhibition in Greater Noida and later delivering goods to Delhi under an invoice, had invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Section 20(c). She pointed out that Ukandin International Private Limited, acting as the buyer, was registered in Delhi at the time of the transaction, and the delivery address and invoice were both located in Delhi. She further relied on Machinefabrik Rieter AG v. Tex Tech Industries (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1825, a case involving the same plaintiff and similar factual background, where the Court had upheld jurisdiction on the basis of delivery of goods in Delhi.

Judgments Cited and Their Context: In Machinefabrik Rieter AG v. Tex Tech Industries (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1825, the Delhi High Court rejected a jurisdictional objection where the defendant, also based in Coimbatore, had delivered allegedly infringing goods to Delhi. The Court in that case held that the delivery of goods to Delhi constituted a valid part of the cause of action and distinguished Banyan Tree, which involved an online transaction.

In Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dealt with the question of jurisdiction in the context of online presence. The Court held that mere accessibility of a website is not sufficient; there must be an intentional targeting of customers in the forum state.

In Indovax v. Merck Animal Health, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393, the Court held that trap transactions, especially where purchases are made solely to create jurisdiction, cannot form the basis of territorial jurisdiction unless commercial activity is established.

The Court in the present case relied on Machinefabrik Rieter and distinguished Banyan Tree and Indovax on the ground that the current case involved an offline transaction resulting in a delivery of 91 commercial units of the allegedly infringing product to Delhi. The quantity and invoicing supported the inference of commercial intent.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Court observed that in determining an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Court must accept the plaint and accompanying documents as true at the preliminary stage. The plaintiffs’ case, based on delivery of goods to Delhi under an invoice, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of CPC.

He noted that the defendant’s participation in a major trade exhibition in Greater Noida, bordering Delhi, further weakened the claim that his business was confined to Tamil Nadu. The assertion of being the “world’s largest manufacturer of Lattice Apron for Compact Systems” suggested an intent to market and supply goods nationwide, including in Delhi.

The judge emphasized that delivery of goods to Delhi, supported by documentary evidence, distinguished the case from Banyan Tree, which was confined to digital interaction and from Indovax, where the transaction lacked commercial scale. Here, the supply of 91 units and provision of product samples indicated commercial intent and possible anticipation of future transactions.

He held that minor factual distinctions in agency structure or the buyer’s nature could not override the fact that goods were physically delivered to Delhi under a commercial invoice, which sufficed to establish part of the cause of action in Delhi.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC filed by the defendant, holding that the Delhi High Court did have territorial jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It found that the transaction leading to the delivery of goods in Delhi was not merely a trap but constituted a commercial transaction. The Court further clarified that questions of jurisdiction could be revisited during trial after evidence is led.The defendant’s related application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was withdrawn, and the suit was scheduled for consideration of interim injunction on a subsequent date.

Law Settled in this Case: This case reinforces the legal position that delivery of infringing goods under a commercial invoice to a location within the territorial jurisdiction of a court constitutes sufficient cause of action under Section 20(c) of the CPC. It clarifies that “trap transactions” will not defeat jurisdiction when the transaction is commercial in nature and supported by documentation. The judgment also affirms that participation in national trade exhibitions may reflect a defendant’s business outreach to broader territories, thereby undermining territorial objections based on place of business alone.Furthermore, the case distinguishes online and offline transactions in the context of jurisdiction, aligning with the reasoning in Machinefabrik Rieter, and limiting the applicability of Banyan Tree to digital commerce.

Case Title: Rieter AG and Anr. Vs. Kavassery Narayanaswamy Venkatasubramanian:Date of Order: 13th May, 2025:Case No.: CS(COMM) 729/2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3937:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Newgen Software Technologies Limited Vs. Newgen IT Technologies Limited

Case Title: Newgen Software Technologies Limited Vs. Newgen IT Technologies Limited Case Number: FAO (COMM) 73/2025 Date of Order: 12.06.2025: Court: Delhi High Court Judge: 2025:DHC:4964-DB: Navin Chawla and Harish Viadyanathan

Brief Facts

The respondent, Newgen Software Technologies Limited, filed a suit alleging that the appellant, Newgen IT Technologies Limited, infringed its trademark “Newgen” by adopting a confusingly similar mark and name after their prior business relationship. The respondent sought interim and permanent injunctions to restrain the appellant from using similar marks.

Discussion by the Judge

The court examined the similarity of the trademarks and the prior relationship between the parties. It noted that the dominant element “Newgen” was common to both marks, and the likelihood of confusion among the public was high. The court observed that the appellant's adoption of the “Newgen” mark appeared not to be entirely bona fide and was connected with their prior relationship and use of the mark. The court also considered the likelihood of public confusion, the balance of convenience, and irreparable harm to the respondent’s reputation.

Decision

The court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favor of the respondent on 27th February 2025, which was later made absolute on 5th March 2025, confirming the restraining order against the appellant from using the “Newgen” mark. The appellant’s application to modify or vacate the injunction was dismissed, and the appeals challenging these orders were also rejected.

National Fire Protection Association Vs Swets Information Services

National Fire Protection Association Vs Swets Information Services Pvt. Ltd.: Delhi High Court: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee:CS(COMM) 987/2018:May 15, 2025:2025:DHC:3771

Fact:

The dispute involves a suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff, National Fire Protection Association, Inc., against the defendant Swets Information Services Pvt. Ltd. and others. The defendant, Swets Information, filed their written statement on August 8, 2018, but the statement was missing an affidavit of admission/denial of the plaintiff’s documents, which is a requirement under the applicable rules.

Procedural Details:

The defendant’s written statement was filed within the statutory period but lacked the mandatory affidavit.The Court issued an "Urgent Notice" in August 2022, drawing attention to documents lying under objection at the filing counter.The defendant relied on the case history available online, believing that the written statement was free of objections.Despite the initial filing, the absence of the affidavit of admission/denial led the Court’s Joint Registrar to order that the written statement be taken off the record, effective September 2, 2023, after a long delay in curing the defect.The defendant appealed against this order, challenging the removal of their written statement.

Issue:

Whether the omission of the affidavit of admission/denial at the time of filing the written statement invalidates the filing and whether the Court’s order to remove the written statement was justified, considering the defendant’s belief that no objection was indicated on the official record.

Decision:

The Court upheld the order of removal, finding that the defendant did not cure the defect within the prescribed time, and the omission was a procedural lapse attributable to the defendant. The Court dismissed the appeal as frivolous, ruling that the procedural non-compliance warranted the removal of the written statement. The costs of Rs. 25,000 were ordered to be paid to the Army Central Welfare Fund, and the case was listed for further proceeding in July 2025.

TikTok Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Case Title: TikTok Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Date of Order: June 10, 2025 Case Number: Commercial Miscellaneous Petition No. 10 of 2024 Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:8466 Name of Court: Bombay High Court, Commercial Division Name of Judge: Manish Pitale, J.

Very Brief Facts:

TikTok Limited, a company operating a popular social media app, sought to have its trademark "TikTok" recognized as a well-known mark under Indian law. The Registrar of Trade Marks refused this request, citing reasons related to the ban imposed by the Indian government on TikTok and concerns over sovereignty, integrity, and public order.

Discussion by the Judge:

The court examined whether the Registrar properly considered the statutory provisions and relevant factors under Section 11(6) of the Trade Marks Act. The court observed that the Registrar’s refusal was primarily based on the ban on TikTok, which is a relevant fact under law, and that the factors for recognizing a well-known mark are not exhaustive. The court also noted that the ban was a transient situation and should not be the sole basis for refusal. The court found that the Registrar had taken into account relevant facts and that there was no error in the order.

Decision:

The court dismissed the petition, affirming that the Registrar's decision was justified given the relevant considerations, including the government ban and public order concerns.

Sadhguru Jagdish Vasudev Vs. Igor Isakov

Case Title: Sadhguru Jagdish Vasudev Vs. Igor Isakov & Ors. Date of Order: 30th May 2025 Case Number: CS(COMM) 578/2025 Name of Court: Delhi High Court Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Facts: The plaintiffs, including Sadhguru, are prominent spiritual personalities known internationally. They allege that defendants are infringing on their personality rights through the use of deep fake technology and unauthorized online content. They seek temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent further infringement and request action against the infringing online content.

Discussion by the Judge: The Court considered the plaintiffs’ evidence of personality rights infringement, including the employment of modern technology to modify images, voices, and videos for commercial gains. The Court acknowledged the need for urgent relief and directed the defendants to disable infringing accounts, disclose their identities, and facilitate blocking or takedown of infringing content.

Decision: The Court granted interim relief, including directions to suspend certain YouTube accounts and social media pages. It also allowed the plaintiffs to approach platforms for takedown within a specified timeframe and permitted filing additional documents and evidence. 

The Role of Obiter Dictum in Indian Judicial Hierarchy

Introduction: The Indian legal system, like other common law jurisdictions, operates on the doctrine of precedent to ensure consistency and predictability in judicial decisions. At the core of this doctrine lies the distinction between ratio decidendi, the legal principle that forms the basis of a decision, and obiter dictum, statements made by judges that are incidental to the main issue and not essential to the outcome of the case. While the former holds the force of binding precedent, the latter carries no binding authority but may be persuasive in nature.

In practice, however, determining whether a particular statement made by a higher bench is ratio or obiter can be contentious. This dilemma becomes especially significant when Single Judges are tasked with interpreting statements made by Division Benches. The Delhi High Court’s recent decision in Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025, decided on March 27, 2025, by Hon’ble Single Judge, Delhi High Court, shed light on the question of whether a Single Judge is bound by an obiter dictum of a Division Bench of the same High Court. The case revolved around the application of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 in trademark infringement and passing off proceedings.

Factual Background and Procedural History:

The dispute between Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioner) and Lakha Ram Sharma, the proprietor of Kundan Cable India (the respondent), centered on the use of the trademark "KUNDAN" and its variants, including "KUNDAN CAB" and "KUNDAN CABLE." Both parties operated in the electrical goods industry, and each claimed the exclusive right to the trademark based on prior adoption.

The petitioner asserted that its predecessor had adopted the mark in 1975 and had continuously used it. The respondent, on the other hand, claimed to have adopted and used the mark earlier, leading to a series of protracted legal disputes. Multiple suits were filed between 1994 and 2006, including passing off and infringement actions. These suits were consolidated, and the case went through various procedural developments.

In January 2025, the respondent sought a stay on all the suits under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, citing the pendency of rectification proceedings before the Madras High Court. The Trial Court granted a stay on all suits (except TM No. 931/2016) on January 18, 2025, relying on the Division Bench decision in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652.

Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking judicial review. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Balar Marketing is significant for its clarity in defining the limits of obiter dictum and its binding effect.

Core Legal Issue

The principal legal issue in this case was whether the Trial Court was justified in staying the passing off suits under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act based on the observations made in Amrish Aggarwal? The subsidiary question was whether the remarks made by the Division Bench regarding the stay of passing off suits were obiter dictum or binding precedent?

Submissions by the Parties

The petitioner contended that the reference to passing off suits in paragraph 44 of Amrish Aggarwal was a mere obiter dictum. The Division Bench in that case was primarily addressing procedural issues concerning the stay of infringement suits during the pendency of rectification proceedings, not passing off actions. The petitioner relied heavily on the judgment in Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del.) (DB), where the Division Bench had explicitly ruled that passing off suits are not subject to stay under Section 124. This principle, according to the petitioner, should not be disturbed by an incidental remark in Amrish Aggarwal.

The respondent, on the other hand, argued that even obiter dicta from a Division Bench of the High Court must be followed by a Single Judge to ensure judicial consistency. To support this view, the respondent cited cases such as Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman, 2002 (2) Mah L.J. 115 and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957, in which it was held that even remarks made in passing by a Division Bench could be binding, especially when they did not contradict established law.

Contextual Interpretation of Amrish Aggarwal Case:

The Hon’ble Single first examined the context of the Amrish Aggarwal case. The Division Bench in that case was primarily concerned with procedural issues arising out of the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and whether rectification proceedings triggered a stay under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act. The primary issue in Amrish Aggarwal was not related to passing off suits, but rather the procedural question of whether infringement actions could be stayed during the pendency of rectification proceedings. The Division Bench’s reference to passing off suits was made incidentally in paragraph 44, without any extensive legal reasoning or argumentation. Therefore, Justice Bansal concluded that the remark was not part of the ratio decidendi and should be treated as obiter dictum.

No Express Overruling of Binding Precedent (Puma Stationer):

The Hon’ble Single Judge, Delhi High Court noted that the Division Bench in Amrish Aggarwal had relied on Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del.) (DB), which had clearly held that passing off actions are not subject to stay under Section 124. The Division Bench in Amrish Aggarwal did not overrule or even address this binding precedent, further supporting the conclusion that the reference to passing off suits was incidental and lacked any binding authority.

Application of Supreme Court Precedents on Obiter Dictum:

Justice Bansal drew upon established Supreme Court principles that clarify the nature and scope of obiter dictum. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, the Supreme Court held that only the ratio decidendi of a judgment is binding, and obiter dictum, or incidental remarks, are not enforceable in subsequent cases. Similarly, in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, the Supreme Court emphasized that casual observations or statements made without a thorough examination of the issue do not form part of the binding law.

The Hon’ble Single Judge also referred to the case of Gudri v. Ram Kishun, AIR 1984 All 100, where it was held that even stray or inadvertent remarks made by a Full Bench, if inconsistent with settled law, do not bind lower courts. This case further reinforced the position that obiter dictum, even when expressed by larger benches, cannot override established legal principles.

Lack of Detailed Legal Reasoning in Amrish Aggarwal on Passing Off

The Division Bench in Amrish Aggarwal made no reference to key statutory provisions such as Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, which expressly preserves common law rights in passing off actions, independent of the statutory registration status. Moreover, the Division Bench did not cite or discuss previous case law that dealt directly with the application of Section 124 to passing off claims. The lack of legal reasoning and analysis led Justice Bansal to conclude that the reference to passing off suits was inadvertent and non-binding.

Distinction from Other Cases Cited by the Respondent

Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the respondent, such as Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Ltd., where the observations made by the higher benches were integral to the judicial reasoning and central to the legal issues at hand. In contrast, the reference to passing off in Amrish Aggarwal was not framed as an issue for determination and did not involve a detailed examination of the law.

Decision and Legal Principle Clarified:

In light of the above analysis, the Court held that the Trial Court had misapplied the judgment in Amrish Aggarwal by staying the passing off suits. Paragraph 44 of the judgment was not part of the ratio decidendi, and as such, the Single Judge was not bound to follow it. Justice Bansal emphasized that a Single Judge is not bound by an obiter dictum of a Division Bench of the same High Court, particularly when it contradicts established precedent and lacks legal reasoning.Accordingly, the Court set aside the stay order dated January 18, 2025, and directed that all the pending suits—TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, and 932/2016—proceed to trial along with TM No. 931/2016.

Author’s Comment:A Call for Doctrinal Coherence and Resolution by Larger Bench

The decision in Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma reaffirms a crucial tenet of the doctrine of precedent: that only the ratio decidendi of a judgment possesses binding force, whereas obiter dicta, even if emanating from a Division Bench, lack precedential authority if they are unreasoned or conflict with established legal principles. Justice Amit Bansal's judgment emphasizes the necessity of maintaining doctrinal clarity to prevent the misapplication of incidental judicial remarks as binding law. This ruling serves to uphold the autonomy of common law rights—particularly the right of passing off—while also delimiting the scope of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which concerns the stay of infringement suits pending rectification proceedings.

However, a critical unresolved issue lingers at the intersection of judicial interpretation and precedential conflict. In the earlier Division Bench decision of Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., the Court stayed the trademark infringement suit under Section 124 but permitted the passing off action to continue. Contrastingly, in the subsequent Amrish Aggarwal v. Venus Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. (DB), the Division Bench—after noting the petitioner’s reliance on Puma (see para 34)—expressly rejected that reasoning (see para 53) and held (at paras 2 and 44) that both infringement and passing off claims must await the outcome of rectification proceedings.

This divergence reveals an apparent conflict between two Division Bench decisions. In such cases, as established in Christian Louboutin v. Abu Baker, 2019 (78) PTC 262 (Del) (DB), paras 32 and 35, when two coordinate Bench decisions conflict, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for authoritative resolution. The Balar Marketing judgment, however, sidesteps this necessity by characterizing the relevant observations in Amrish Aggarwal as obiter, thereby preserving the Puma precedent.

This interpretive strategy is complicated further by the earlier Single Judge decision in Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Prasad & Anr. [2018:DHC:53] @Para 23,24, where the Court concluded that Puma’s observations regarding the continuation of passing off actions did not constitute binding precedent. The judgment reasoned that since the Division Bench in Puma did not fully adjudicate the issue with reasoned analysis, its observations were not authoritative.

This leads to a paradox: in Abbott, the Single Judge declined to treat Puma as binding, while in Balar, a subsequent Single Judge relied on Puma while dismissing Amrish Aggarwal as mere obiter. In both instances, the judges attempted to reconcile conflicting DB judgments through the lens of ratio vs obiter, yet arrived at opposing conclusions regarding which precedent to follow.

The resulting jurisprudential inconsistency underscores the urgent need for clarity. When two Division Bench judgments express diametrically opposed views on the procedural bifurcation of infringement and passing off under Section 124, reliance on interpretive discretion at the Single Judge level only perpetuates confusion. A definitive pronouncement by a Larger Bench is essential to restore uniformity and doctrinal stability.Until such clarity is provided, judicial uncertainty will persist, potentially undermining the predictability and coherence that the doctrine of precedent is designed to secure.

Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025, decided on March 27, 2025/Delhi High Court, Hon'ble Justice Shri Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited Vs Registrar of Trade Marks

Introduction: This case pertains to the registrability of the phrase “ONE FOR ALL” as a trademark in respect of educational books under Class 16. The appellant, Oswaal Books and Learnings Pvt. Ltd., challenged the refusal of its application by the Registrar of Trade Marks on the ground that the mark lacked distinctive character as per Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The High Court of Delhi, in appeal, considered whether the slogan had acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning sufficient for registration.

Factual Background:Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited is engaged in publishing help books for a variety of academic boards like CBSE, ICSE, ISC, Karnataka Board, and national-level examinations including NEET, JEE, CAT, CLAT, and RRB-NTPC. On October 20, 2020, the appellant applied to register the mark “ONE FOR ALL” under Class 16, claiming usage from August 20, 2020. The phrase was used as a tagline accompanying the “OSWAAL BOOKS” brand to indicate its books’ comprehensive utility for all educational boards and exams. Despite extensive marketing, including online sales through Amazon and Flipkart, and a promotional spend of over ₹96 lakhs, the application was rejected by the Registrar.

Procedural Background: The Registrar issued an examination report objecting to the mark under Section 9(1)(a) for lacking distinctiveness and requested supporting documents, including a user affidavit. The appellant responded with evidence, written submissions, and appeared in a hearing. However, on December 14, 2023, the Senior Examiner refused the application, holding that “ONE FOR ALL” was composed of common words and lacked inherent or acquired distinctiveness. The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.

Legal Issue:The core legal issue was whether the mark “ONE FOR ALL” possessed inherent distinctiveness or had acquired a secondary meaning through usage, thereby qualifying for registration under the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Trade Marks Act.

Discussion on Judgments:The appellant relied on Evergreen Sweet House v. Ever Green and Others, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1665, to argue that arbitrary combinations of common words can be registrable without proof of secondary meaning if they are unrelated to the product's nature. It also cited Telecare Network India Pvt. Ltd. v. Asus Technology Pvt. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8739, for the proposition that even suggestive marks are inherently distinctive.

However, the Court found those judgments inapplicable. It referred to Ilua Sole Proprietorship v. Asian Hobby Crafts LLP, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8299, which reiterated that generic or descriptive words cannot be monopolized unless they acquire a secondary meaning. The Court also cited Institute of Directors v. Worlddevcorp Technology and Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7841, to reinforce that common English expressions like “ONE FOR ALL” fall within the bar of Section 9(1)(a) unless distinctiveness is proved.

The Court further drew from McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (5th Ed.), which explains that slogans that merely convey an informational or promotional message rather than indicating the source of goods are not registrable as trademarks. Examples included “Drive Safely” and “Proudly Made in USA”, which were not considered capable of distinguishing goods.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Hon'ble Judge:The Court examined the evidence provided by the appellant to substantiate the acquired distinctiveness of the phrase “ONE FOR ALL”. The CA certificates and invoices submitted by the appellant were found inadequate, as they either related generally to “OSWAAL BOOKS” or made only scant reference to the slogan. The promotional materials did not show consistent and prominent standalone use of “ONE FOR ALL” as a source identifier.

The Court found that the phrase had been used primarily alongside the main mark “OSWAAL BOOKS” and had not developed an independent commercial identity. It also noted that the earliest evidence of public usage, such as YouTube reviews, dated only to mid-2022, not supporting the claimed usage from 2020.

Further, the phrase “ONE FOR ALL” was held to be descriptive in context. Given that the books were intended for a wide range of exams and boards, the phrase merely conveyed that the books catered to everyone. Thus, it functioned as a marketing slogan rather than a distinctive identifier of trade origin.

The Court acknowledged the cultural familiarity of the phrase through its association with Alexandre Dumas’ The Three Musketeers, reinforcing its commonality and generic appeal.

Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Registrar's decision refusing registration of the mark “ONE FOR ALL”. It held that the phrase lacked inherent distinctiveness, and the appellant had failed to demonstrate secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness through evidence. Mere promotional expenditure and limited use were insufficient to override the statutory bar under Section 9(1)(a).

Law Settled in This Case: This case reinforces the principle that common phrases or slogans are inherently non-distinctive and must meet a high threshold to qualify for trademark registration. Mere usage in advertising or in conjunction with a primary trademark does not establish secondary meaning. A slogan like “ONE FOR ALL” that directly describes the utility of a product cannot be monopolized unless it is shown to have acquired distinctiveness through sustained, exclusive, and recognizable use. The burden of proving secondary meaning lies firmly on the applicant, and generic or laudatory phrases, even if cleverly marketed, are not inherently registrable.

Case Title: Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: May 28, 2025:Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 19/2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4519:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Calvin Klein Trademark Trust & Anr.Vs Guru Nanak International

Case Title:Calvin Klein Trademark Trust & Anr.Vs  Guru Nanak International & Ors.:Date of Order:December 8, 2023  :Case No.: CS(COMM) 75/2020  :Neutral Citation:2019:DHC:2185  :Name of Court:Delhi High Court  :Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Prathiba M. Singh  

Facts::The plaintiffs, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust and Tommy Hilfiger Europe B.V., filed a suit against the defendants, including M/s Sazia Garments, for the unauthorized sale of counterfeit products using their registered trademarks 'Calvin Klein,' 'CK,' and 'TOMMY HILFIGER.' The defendants were found to be engaged in manufacturing and selling counterfeit clothing items, as evidenced by a local commissioner's report which documented the presence of counterfeit goods and manufacturing equipment at the defendant's premises.

Legal Issue:The primary legal issue revolved around the infringement of registered trademarks and the appropriate remedies, including the award of damages and injunctions against the defendants for their activities.

Reasoning:The court reasoned that the extensive evidence provided by the plaintiffs, including the local commissioner’s findings of counterfeit products and absence of the defendant's response during proceedings, justified the conclusion that the defendants intentionally infringed on the plaintiffs' trademarks. Emphasis was placed on the settled legal position that a local commissioner's report can be admitted as evidence in the absence of any objection. The court cited previous judgments that reiterate the principles for awarding damages in trademark infringement cases, particularly when the infringement involved deliberate and calculated actions.

To calculate the quantum of damages, the court considered several factors, including:

Extent of Infringement: The court assessed the quantity of counterfeit goods seized from the defendant's premises, which demonstrated the scale of infringement.

Defendant's Conduct:The court noted that the defendant's actions were deliberate, with an intent to exploit the plaintiffs' brand reputation, leading to significant economic impact on the plaintiffs.

Precedent Cases: The court referenced prior cases to establish a benchmark for damages in similar circumstances. Existing standards for compensatory damages and the severity of the infringement guided the amount awarded.

Potential Losses to Plaintiffs: The court evaluated the loss of goodwill and potential sales experienced by the plaintiffs due to the unauthorized sale of counterfeit goods, which contributed to the assessment of monetary compensation.

Decision:The court decreed a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the plaintiffs' trademarks. It awarded damages amounting to Rs. 10 lakhs along with costs of Rs. 1 lakh to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were permitted to seize and destroy the counterfeit goods found at the defendants' premises, or alternatively, donate the goods after removing the counterfeit labels. 

Procter & Gamble Hygiene and Health Care Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

Introduction: This case revolves around the legal challenge posed by Procter & Gamble Hygiene and Health Care Ltd. (hereafter "P&G") against an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate directing the registration of an FIR based on a complaint alleging intellectual property infringement and misappropriation of patented technology. The core issue concerns the interplay between patent rights, the jurisdiction of the magistrate under criminal law, and the scope of judicial review in FIR registration. 

Factual Background: Procter & Gamble developed and patented a specialized textile dyeing process involving neem and holy basil extracts, which was tested and recognized for its anti-viral, anti-microbial, and other beneficial properties. The informant, a techno-innovator entrepreneur, claimed to have conceived this innovative process and secured a patent in India for it. He alleged that P&G, a multinational corporate with its headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, clandestinely used and commercialized his patented technology to manufacture herbal-infused sanitary napkins—specifically a product named "Whisper Ultra Clean"—without proper authorization. The informant contended that P&G stole his patented idea, which had been shared with them under a partnership proposal that was later rejected. He filed a criminal complaint under Sections 120B, 415, 420, and 405 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), emphasizing that P&G’s actions constituted criminal breach of trust and cheating.

Procedural Background: The informant approached the court under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), seeking a direction to the police to register a formal FIR against P&G. The trial court, after examining the complaint, issued a detailed order on 30 December 2023, holding that the allegations in the complaint prima facie fulfilled the criteria of criminal offences and directing the Station House Officer (SHO) to register an FIR accordingly. However, the petitioners (P&G) challenged this order by filing a petition to quash the FIR registration in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The petition argued that the order was mechanical, lacked proper jurisdiction, and violated principles of fair investigation, as the petitioners’ proprietary process was different and they had not committed any criminal offence.

Legal Issue: The critical legal issues in this case concern whether the magistrate's order to register an FIR, based on the complaint, was justified and whether the court should interfere with such an order at this preliminary stage? Specifically, the questions are: Whether the complaint, which alleged intellectual property theft and criminal breaches, was sufficient to warrant the registration of an FIR under the relevant sections of IPC; and whether under the principles laid down in precedent cases, the High Court could exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of CrPC to quash the FIR without a detailed investigation?

Discussion on Judgments:  The parties cited various judgments to substantiate their arguments. The informant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahmood Ali v. State of UP [(2023) SCC OnLine SC 950], supporting the proposition that allegations in a complaint—if prima facie truthful—are sufficient for FIR registration, and the court’s role is limited to a preliminary scrutiny. The defense highlighted the decision in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) SCC 305], which emphasizes that the court should not interfere at an early stage unless the allegations are manifestly false or frivolous. They also referred to the principles laid in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], which elaborates categories of cases where FIRs could be quashed, mainly when allegations are baseless or non-cognizable. Furthermore, the court considered the judgment in Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [(1964) SCR 336], which underscores the importance of respecting the investigative process unless there's a clear abuse of process.In the case at hand, the Supreme Court’s decision in B.N. John v. State of U.P. [(2025) SCC OnLine SC 7] was also relevant, as it clarifies that courts should avoid premature quashing of FIRs unless the allegations are clearly unfounded.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Hon’ble Judge reasoned that the legal principles clearly state that the registration of an FIR is primarily a matter for the police and should not be disturbed lightly by the courts at an initial stage. The court acknowledged the allegations relating to intellectual property theft and the misconception that criminal breach of trust could be established merely on the basis of patent infringement. However, the judge emphasized that such allegations are inherently factual in nature and require detailed investigation rather than judicial invalidation at the stage of FIR registration. The court analyzed the various judgments cited and noted that the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the power to quash criminal proceedings should be exercised with caution, and only in cases where the facts are absolutely clear that no offence has been committed. The judge observed that the complaint did prima facie suggest a cognizable offence and that the order of the magistrate, directing the police to register the FIR, was within the bounds of legal propriety. The court further noted that the allegations involved complex questions of patent law and commercial disputes, which are better suited for investigation rather than preemptive judicial intervention.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition filed by P&G, upholding the order of the magistrate directing the police to register the FIR. It held that at this juncture, the court should not interfere with the police’s discretion in registering the FIR, especially given the prima facie nature of the allegations. The court emphasized the importance of thorough investigation and clarified that the petitioners would be entitled to raise their defenses during the trial, rather than at the FIR stage. The order of registration of the FIR was thus confirmed, allowing the investigation to proceed without prejudgment.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirmed the principle that FIR registration is a sensitive area, and courts should not quash FIRs at an initial stage if there is any prima facie basis for allegations, especially in matters involving complex issues such as intellectual property rights. The decision reinforced the guideline that courts should exercise their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC sparingly and only when allegations are utterly baseless or frivolous. It also underscored that the scope of judicial review in FIR matters is limited and that the primary responsibility for determining the veracity of allegations resides with the police and criminal trial process.

Case Title: Procter & Gamble Hygiene and Health Care Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others Date of Order: 28 May 2025 Case Number: Cr. MMO No. 266 of 2024 Neutral Citation: 2025:HHC:16349 Name of Court: High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ankur Warikoo Vs. John Doe

Ankur Warikoo Vs. John Doe:May 26, 2025:CS(COMM) 514/2025:ourt: Delhi High Court:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal 

Brief Facts: The plaintiffs, including celebrity entrepreneur and author Ankur Warikoo, allege that unknown defendants and social media platforms circulated deep fake and fabricated content falsely depicting the plaintiffs, especially Warikoo, promoting fake investment schemes and misusing his persona and trademarks. The content is malicious, unauthorized, and harms the plaintiffs' reputation and business.

Decision/Order: The Court granted interim relief, including directions to restrain defendants from illegal exploitation of the plaintiffs’ persona, images, and trademarks, and issued notices to the defendants. The Court also permitted some procedural exemptions for the plaintiffs and scheduled further proceedings. The court emphasized the need to prevent further circulation of the deep fake content and protected the plaintiffs' rights against misuse and infringement.

Law Settled: The Court reaffirmed protections under intellectual property rights, personality rights, and the importance of restraining the circulation of deep fake and defamatory content through interim measures under Indian civil procedure and relevant laws governing trademarks, personality rights, and online misconduct.

Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited Vs. Union of India

Introduction: The case of  Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Anr., decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, raised critical questions surrounding the applicability and enforcement of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which mandates pre-institution mediation in commercial disputes where no urgent interim relief is sought. The matter drew significant attention as it juxtaposed statutory mandates with practical impediments concerning legal infrastructure and judicial discretion. The ruling serves as an authoritative interpretation of procedural law and sets a precedent on the prospective application of mandatory mediation requirements.

Detailed Factual Background: The Union of India filed Money Suit No. 28 of 2019 on 09.08.2019 before the Commercial Court, Alipore, against M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited seeking recovery of Rs. 8,73,36,976 towards differential freight and penalty. Notably, the suit did not seek any urgent interim relief. The cause of action arose from allegations that the appellant had wrongfully claimed concessional freight rates under specific rate circulars.

Upon the institution of the suit, the appellant, as defendant, submitted its written statement on 20.12.2019. Subsequently, the appellant contended that the suit was instituted in violation of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018. It was argued that the mandatory requirement of attempting pre-litigation mediation had been bypassed, thus rendering the suit institutionally defective.

Detailed Procedural Background:On 30.09.2020, the appellant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, read with Section 12A of the 2015 Act, seeking rejection of the plaint. The application was dismissed by the Commercial Court on 21.12.2020, holding that although Section 12A was mandatory, its enforcement in the given facts would delay justice and the suit was already in its early stages. The Commercial Court observed that due to the absence of an effective infrastructure for commercial mediation and lack of a notified standard operating procedure at the time of suit filing, strict enforcement of Section 12A would be inequitable. However, the court ordered the parties to proceed with post-institution mediation and appointed a mediator.

The appellant challenged this order before the Calcutta High Court. The High Court upheld the Commercial Court’s decision with slight modifications, including directing the parties to approach the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) as per the SOP notified on 11.12.2020. The High Court directed that the suit be kept in abeyance for a period of seven months or until the receipt of the mediation report.

Aggrieved, the appellant preferred a civil appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, challenging the legality of the High Court’s order, reiterating that the non-compliance with Section 12A of the Act should have resulted in outright rejection of the plaint.

Issues Involved in the Case: The principal issues that arose in this case were whether the suit filed by the Union of India was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC for non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and whether the prospective declaration of the mandatory nature of Section 12A in Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd. [(2022) 10 SCC 1] applied to suits instituted prior to 20.08.2022.

Detailed Submissions of Parties: The appellant contended that the decision in Patil Automation conclusively declared Section 12A mandatory and that any suit instituted without prior mediation, where no urgent interim relief is sought, must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. He argued that the legislative intent was clear and emphasized that the stage of litigation or infrastructural constraints could not override the statutory mandate. He further contended that even under the doctrine of prospective overruling, the declaration of law relates back to the date of the enactment. Hence, the suit being in a nascent stage should not be distinguished from a newly filed one and must be dismissed.

The Union of India contended that no error had been committed by the lower courts. She acknowledged the mandatory nature of Section 12A but emphasized that the doctrine of impossibility applied due to the absence of a mediation framework at the time of suit filing. She submitted that SOPs were notified only on 11.12.2020, long after the suit was instituted. Thus, the Union could not be expected to comply with mediation requirements in an environment devoid of supporting infrastructure. She invoked the equitable maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, supported by the Supreme Court decision in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:

The pivotal judgment cited was Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, wherein the Supreme Court held that Section 12A is mandatory in nature and suits instituted without adhering to it must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. However, the Court also granted prospective effect to this declaration from 20.08.2022 to safeguard pending matters and avoid unjust consequences. The Court clarified that rejection would not apply to suits instituted prior to the said date unless they met specific exceptions.

The appellant also cited I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643, to argue that the court's declaration of law must be understood as discovering the correct law, hence retroactive in nature. The principle from Spectrum Plus Ltd., In re: (2005) 3 WLR 58 (House of Lords) was invoked to explain forms of prospective overruling and the implications of judicial declarations affecting past transactions.

The respondent relied on Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey (1987) 4 SCC 398, to support the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, asserting that law cannot compel performance where performance is not feasible due to infrastructural limitations.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

The court reiterated that Section 12A is mandatory as per Patil Automation but emphasized that the declaration of mandatory compliance was given prospective effect. The Court emphasized that at the time the Union of India filed the suit in 2019, the required mediation infrastructure, including trained mediators and SOPs, was not in place in West Bengal. Hence, expecting compliance with Section 12A in such circumstances would amount to imposing an impossible requirement, violating equitable principles.

The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on the retrospective application of judicial declarations, noting that Patil Automation clearly limited its applicability to post-20.08.2022 suits. The court distinguished between declaration of law and operational consequences, thereby reinforcing the importance of judicial discretion in applying procedural norms.

Justice Pardiwala also clarified the scope and intent of Section 12A, observing that it seeks to reduce the burden on courts and promote mediation as an efficient dispute resolution method. However, the Court affirmed that procedural mandates cannot override substantive justice, especially when external circumstances render compliance impracticable.

Final Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd. and upheld the High Court’s order to keep the suit in abeyance and proceed with pre-institution mediation through the DLSA. It confirmed that the plaint should not be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the institution of the suit predated the declaration in Patil Automation and fell outside its purview.

Law Settled in this Case:The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is mandatory. However, it also established that its strict enforcement through rejection of plaints under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC shall apply only prospectively from 20.08.2022, as held in Patil Automation. Additionally, where infrastructural mechanisms for pre-institution mediation were absent, courts must apply equitable considerations before penalizing litigants for non-compliance. The decision further reinforced that courts possess discretion to avoid procedural rigidity when it contradicts the principles of substantive justice.

Case Title: Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited Vs. Union of India 

Date of Order: 15.05.2025

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 6846 of 2025 

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 696

Court: Supreme Court of India

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Andreas Gutzeit Vs. Controller General of Patents

Andreas Gutzeit Vs. Controller General of Patents:High Court at Calcutta: Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur:15 May 2025: IPDPTA/7/2024

 

Facts:

The appellant, Andreas Gutzeit, filed an application for a patent titled "Blood Flow Control System and Method for In-vivo Imaging and Other Application" on January 1, 2016, based on an international application (PCT/CH2014/000151) claiming priority from Switzerland. The invention pertains to controlling blood flow during medical imaging, notably by using a respiratory resistance device to enhance image quality during procedures like CT scans.

Procedural Detail:

The Controller of Patents rejected the patent application on the grounds of non-compliance with Section 59 of the Patents Act, 1970, specifically regarding amendments to the claims that were alleged to broaden the scope of original claims or change the nature of the claims (method to system claim). The appellant challenged this rejection through an appeal before the Calcutta High Court.

Issue:

The core issue was whether the amendments made to the patent application, particularly the change from method claims to system claims, were permissible under Section 59 of the Patents Act, 1970, and whether the Controller’s rejection was justified?

Decision:

The Court held that the amendments, which broadened or altered the scope of the claims, were not permissible under the relevant statutory provisions. The Court set aside the impugned order, remanding the matter back to the Controller for fresh decision in accordance with law, ensuring proper opportunity for hearing. The Court emphasized that amendments should not expand the scope of claims beyond the original disclosure.

Dell International Services India Private Limited Vs Adeel Feroze

Case Title: Dell International Services India Private Limited Vs Adeel Feroze & Ors.  :Date of Order:July 2, 2024  :Case No.:W.P.(C) 4733/2024  :Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1234  :Name of Court: High Court of Delhi : Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Subramonium Prasad  

Facts:  The case emerged from a Consumer Complaint Case No. 113/2022 filed against Dell International Services by Respondent Adeel Feroze. Following the issuance of a summons by the District Commission, which the Petitioner received on December 23, 2022, Dell contended that the documents received were incomplete. On January 31, 2023, the Petitioner submitted its written statement, which was rejected by the District Commission due to the delay in filing. Notably, WhatsApp conversations were presented by the Petitioner, alleging that the complete set of documents was not received.

Legal Issue:The key legal issue was whether the delay in the submission of the written statement could be condoned, and whether the District Commission's reliance on WhatsApp communications as evidence for the alleged incomplete documentation was appropriate? 

Reasoning:The High Court scrutinized the findings of the District Commission, which concluded that the complete set of documents had indeed been delivered to the Petitioner along with the summons on December 23, 2022. 

The Court found that the claims made through the WhatsApp communications did not suffice as evidence to validate the Petitioner's position. 

Furthermore, it emphasized that a valid rationale for the delay had not been presented, as there was clear documentation contradicting the assertion of incomplete delivery. The Court reaffirmed that it respects the decisions made by lower authorities, intervening only if those decisions reflect arbitrariness or jurisdictional errors.

Decision: The High Court dismissed W.P.(C) 4733/2024, along with any pending applications. The Court upheld the District Commission's conclusions regarding the inability of the Petitioner to substantiate the claim of not receiving a complete document set and found no merit in the argument based on WhatsApp evidence.

Hals Foods Kitchen Vs. Pithiya Jitendrakumar

Case Title: Hals Foods Kitchen Vs. Pithiya Jitendrakumar Case No.: C/AO/104/2024 Date of Order: 25th April 2025) Court: High Court of Gujarat  Judge: Nikhil S. Kariel, J.

Fact:

The dispute arises over the intellectual property rights related to the trademark and artistic work "TAAM JHAAM." The respondent, Pithiya Jitendrakumar (Jahal Enterprise), claims prior creation and use of the artistic work and trademark, alleging infringement by the appellant, Hals Foods Kitchen, which intended to use similar branding. The respondent filed a suit seeking injunction, damages, and account of profits, asserting that they are the original creator and owner of the mark and artwork.

Procedural Detail:

The trial court initially granted an interim injunction in favor of the respondent. The appellant filed an appeal challenging this order. The court considered the application of trademark law and copyright law, examining the likelihood of deception, prior use, and registration applications. The appellate court reviewed whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in granting the injunction, focusing on the prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

Issue:

The main issue was whether the respondent had established a prima facie case of prior ownership and infringement over the "TAAM JHAAM" mark and artwork, warranting interim relief, and whether the appellate court should interfere with the trial court’s discretionary order?

Decision:

The court upheld the trial court’s decision to grant the interim injunction, concluding that the respondent made out a prima facie case based on evidence of prior use, creation of artwork, and similarity of logos. The court noted that the appellant's claims of prior use and independence of creation were unsubstantiated, and that the balance of convenience and risk of deception favored continued injunction. The appellate court disposed of the appeal, affirming the trial court’s order, and disposed of related civil applications.

References:

• The judgment emphasizes that the appellate court should not reassess the material unless the trial court’s exercise of discretion was unreasonable,.
• The court noted the importance of establishing a prima facie case through evidence of prior use, artistic creation, and likelihood of deception,.

IndiaMART Intermesh Ltd. Vs. PUMA SE

Case Title: IndiaMART Intermesh Ltd. Vs. PUMA SE Date of Order: June 2, 2025 Case Number: FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4819-DB Court Name: High Court of Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakru and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Tara Vitasta Ganju

Brief Facts: PUMA SE filed a suit claiming that IndiaMART’s platform facilitated the sale of counterfeit PUMA products by allowing sellers to describe their goods using PUMA’s trademarks. PUMA sought injunctions to prevent IndiaMART from using the trademark in the search options and from hosting infringing listings.

Discussion by Judge: The court observed that IndiaMART’s use of the PUMA trademark in its drop-down menu was the primary issue. It found that IndiaMART’s actions, under the business model, amounted to infringement under the Trade Marks Act. The court noted the platform’s role in facilitating the sale of counterfeit goods and restrictions under relevant laws, including the IT Act, regarding safe harbor protections. The court balanced the need to protect trademark rights against IndiaMART’s functions as an intermediary, ultimately deciding that IndiaMART must remove infringing listings and not use the trademark as a search term, but it could continue to offer branded options with reasonable efforts.

Decision: The court restrained IndiaMART from offering the PUMA trademark in its search options and directed it to remove infringing listings. However, the court set aside the order prohibiting IndiaMART from offering PUMA as a dropdown option, considering the balance of interests.

Trodat GMBH Vs Addprint India Enterprises

Case Title: Trodat GMBH Vs Addprint India Enterprises. Date of Order: May 20, 2025 Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 93/2025 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4270-DB, High Court of Delhi Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Brief Facts: The appellant (TRODAT GmbH) filed a suit challenging the respondent’s new self-inking stamp design, claiming infringement of their registered designs for similar stamps.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, confirming the impugned order which permitted the respondent to use their proposed design, finding no infringement after examining the features from the perspective of an 'informed eye.'

Law Settled: The case clarified that in design infringement disputes, the standard of comparison is that of an 'informed user' or 'instructed eye,' not an average consumer, and that courts should respect the discretionary powers of the trial court unless arbitrariness or perversity is shown.

Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S & D Hospitality

Case Title: Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S & D Hospitality Case Number: CS(COMM) 111/2017 Date of Order: 3rd January 2018 Court: High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mukta Gupta Neutral Citation: 2018:DHC:14

Brief Facts:

The plaintiff, a company operating ‘SOCIAL’ cafes across India, owns registered trademarks and has developed a distinctive branding concept involving prefixing ‘SOCIAL’ with specific locations. The defendant was operating restaurants in Hyderabad using the mark ‘SOCIAL MONKEY’ and ‘STONE WATER’, allegedly infringing upon the plaintiff’s marks and branding. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s use caused confusion, passing off, and damage to their reputation.

Legal Issues & Decision:

• The court considered whether territorial jurisdiction exists since part of the cause of action arose in Delhi through online promotion and targeted advertising.
• It held that actionable aggression involves purposeful availment of the forum’s jurisdiction, especially via online activities. Mere online presence isn’t enough unless the defendant purposefully directs activities to the forum.
• The court found that the defendant's online advertisements and targeted promotions in Delhi established a sufficient connection, granting jurisdiction.
• The plaintiff’s claims of passing off, trademark infringement, and dilution were scrutinized, and the court allowed the suit to proceed based on the territorial jurisdiction being established via online activity.

Law Settled:

• The case clarifies the scope of jurisdiction issues in internet-related disputes, emphasizing purposeful availment and targeted activity over passive website access.
• It affirms that online promotion with targeted intent can establish jurisdiction for passing off and infringement actions in India.

KG Marketing India Vs Rashi Santosh Soni

Case Title: KG Marketing India Vs Rashi Santosh Soni & Others Date of Order: August 23, 2024 Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 16/2024 Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:6385-DB: Name of Court: Delhi High Court Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon'ble Mr. Sachin Datta

Brief Facts: KG Marketing India alleged that Rashi Santosh Soni produced forged documents to claim prior use of the trademark "SURYA," which was used to seek interim relief. The court found that the documents filed by the appellant were fabricated and supported the respondent's contention that the appellant filed false statements and forged evidence to secure interim injunctions.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and imposed a cost of ₹2,00,000 on the appellant for unjustifiable use of judicial time. The court directed the appellant to deposit the amount with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks. 

Law Settled: The case reaffirmed that filing forged documents and false statements can lead to initiation of proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC, and such conduct is punishable. The court emphasized the importance of truthful disclosure and upheld the court's authority to impose costs and direct lodging of criminal complaints in cases involving fabrication and forgery.

Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha

Case Title: Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha Date of Order: 31 August 2021 Case Number: Writ Petition No.19448 of 2015 Court: High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna S. Dixit

Brief Facts: Dr. Praveen sought to annul his marriage with Dr. Arpitha, who filed for maintenance and litigation costs, which were rejected. The case involves allegations of perjury, false statements, and the conduct of both parties in ongoing matrimonial and related proceedings.

Decision: The Court set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, holding that the earlier rejection was premature and lacked proper examination of perjury and related issues. The court emphasized the importance of prompt action against perjury to preserve judicial integrity.

Law Settled:

• Perjury is a serious offense, and courts must act effectively and promptly to prevent and penalize it,,.
• The discretion to initiate proceedings for perjury lies with the Court, but such discretion must be exercised in accordance with rules of reason and justice,.
• Delay in addressing allegations of perjury can pollute the judicial process, and courts should discourage falsehoods in testimonies

Star India Pvt Ltd Vs. IPTV Smarters

Case Title: Star India Pvt Ltd Vs. IPTV Smarters Pro & Others Date of Order: May 29, 2025 Case Number: CS(COMM) 108/2025 Court: Delhi High Court Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee 

 Facts: Star India sought a permanent injunction against IPTV Smarters and others for illegally streaming their content. The court had previously granted interim relief, including blocking infringing websites and mobile applications. The plaintiff requested real-time blocking of new infringing platforms, especially before upcoming major sporting events.

  Decision: The court extended the interim relief to enable real-time blocking of newly discovered rogue websites and apps until July 3, 2025, emphasizing the need for swift action to prevent piracy during live events.

Legal Principle: The court recognized the importance of real-time relief in cases of online infringement and allowed extending blocking measures to include rogue mobile applications and associated domains to protect intellectual property rights effectively during time-sensitive events.