Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Balwinder Singh Bagary

Residential Projects, Assured Returns, and Commercial Disputes

Introduction:This case revolves around the determination of whether an investment in a residential real estate project, accompanied by buy-back arrangements and promises of assured returns, qualifies as a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru was called upon to examine whether such a transaction could be adjudicated by a Commercial Court, or whether it lay outside the domain of commercial disputes, considering the underlying nature of the property involved.

Factual Background:The respondent, Mr. Balwinder Singh Bagary, an individual of Indian origin currently residing in the United Kingdom, invested an amount of ₹2,99,47,777/- in the year 2011 into a real estate project known as “Tefilah Rose,” developed by M/S Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The investment was structured to ensure a guaranteed return of 48% over a period of 36 months, secured against specific portions of the project to match the value of the promised return. The agreements executed between the parties included buy-back provisions which allowed the investor to exit the investment upon completion of the project or upon achieving the specified return.

Procedural Background:Following disputes over repayment, the respondent instituted Commercial O.S. No.787/2022 before the LXXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, seeking recovery of approximately ₹23 crores, including principal and interest. The defendants, namely M/S Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and its Managing Director, Siddhartha Gupta, challenged the maintainability of the suit by filing I.A. No. III under Order VII Rule 10 and Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 2(1)(c)(vii) and Section 6 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. They contended that the dispute pertained to residential property and, therefore, did not fall within the scope of commercial disputes. On 28 March 2023, the Commercial Court dismissed the application, holding that the dispute qualified as a commercial dispute. The defendants thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 9689/2025 before the High Court of Karnataka challenging the dismissal of I.A. No. III.

Core Dispute:The core issue before the High Court was whether the dispute, stemming from the respondent's investment in a residential real estate project, was indeed a “commercial dispute” under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and therefore triable by the Commercial Court. The petitioners argued that since the underlying asset was residential property, the suit could not be classified as a commercial dispute merely because it involved elements of financial investment or buy-back arrangements. The respondent, on the contrary, maintained that the dispute centered on financial investment, making it a commercial dispute under the statute.

Discussion on Judgments :The petitioners relied heavily on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited v. K.S. Infraspace LLP & Anr., (2020) 15 SCC 585, where the Supreme Court held that a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) must relate to immovable property actually used exclusively in trade or commerce, and not merely property that is likely to be used or intended for such use. The petitioners contended that since the subject matter was a residential apartment project, the requirements of actual use in trade or commerce were not met.

Further, the petitioners referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Madhuram Properties v. Tata Consultancy Services Limited, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 725, where the Court held that agreements concerning immovable property meant exclusively for residential use did not fall under the scope of commercial disputes.

The petitioners also cited S.P. Velayutham v. M/S. Emaar MGF Land Limited, where following Ambalal Sarabhai, the Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the High Court to reconsider whether a suit involving real estate investment was a commercial dispute, emphasizing the importance of actual use of property in trade or commerce.

Conversely, the respondent argued that the dispute came under Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Commercial Courts Act, which covers disputes arising out of ordinary transactions of financiers, even if the property in question was residential, citing the explanation to Section 2(1)(c), which clarifies that the existence of immovable property or the nature of the property does not by itself remove the commercial character of a dispute. The respondent contended that the investment aimed at financial returns established the commercial nature of the transaction.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court examined the statutory provisions, particularly Section 2(1)(c)(i) and (vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, alongside the explanation appended thereto. The Court observed that the agreements and memoranda between the parties clearly showed an investment in residential apartments rather than in commercial property intended for use in trade or commerce. The judge emphasized that while the investment had commercial attributes—such as a guaranteed return and a buy-back clause—the underlying property was residential in character.

The judge placed significant reliance on the principle elucidated in Ambalal Sarabhai, underscoring that for a dispute to fall under Section 2(1)(c)(vii), the immovable property must be actually used exclusively in trade or commerce. The mere possibility or intention of future commercial use would not suffice. The High Court also drew support from Madhuram Properties, where the Gujarat High Court reached a similar conclusion regarding agreements involving residential property. Furthermore, the Court noted that the buy-back provision or promise of returns could not transform an otherwise residential real estate transaction into a commercial dispute.

The Court rejected the respondent's reliance on Section 2(1)(c)(i) by clarifying that even if the transaction involved financial elements, its essence remained an investment in residential property, which excluded it from the commercial jurisdiction. The judge reasoned that including such disputes within the ambit of commercial courts would dilute the legislative intent behind establishing a special forum for genuinely commercial disputes linked to trade, commerce, and industry.

Final Decision:The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioners. It quashed the order dated 28 March 2023 passed by the Commercial Court, and allowed I.A. No. III filed under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. Consequently, the plaint was directed to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before the competent civil court having jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court concluded that the dispute did not qualify as a commercial dispute under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, since the property involved was residential and not actually used exclusively in trade or commerce.

Law Settled in This Case:The case reaffirmed the principle that for a dispute to qualify as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the immovable property must be actually used exclusively in trade or commerce, and mere intention, possibility of future commercial use, or presence of buy-back clauses does not suffice. It also clarified that financial arrangements related to residential real estate projects, even when accompanied by promises of guaranteed returns, do not by themselves convert the dispute into a commercial one under the Act.

Case Title:Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs Mr. Balwinder Singh Bagary

Date of Order: 08 July 2025

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 9689/2025 (GM - CPC)

Name of Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Nagaprasanna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

SRK Max Hospital Vs. Max Healthcare Institute Ltd.

SRK Max Hospital Vs. Max Healthcare Institute Ltd. | Date of Order: 10 July 2025 | Case No.: RFA(COMM) 339/2025 | Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5556-DB | Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi | Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

The dispute arose when Max Healthcare Institute Ltd., owner of the well-known “MAX” trademarks used in healthcare services, filed CS (Comm) 475/2024 against SRK Max Hospital and others. The suit alleged infringement and sought to restrain the defendants from using the name “SRK MAX HOSPITAL” and the domain https://srkmaxhospitals.com/, claiming deceptive similarity to its registered “MAX” family of marks. On 14 October 2024, the Commercial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the impugned marks. Despite the injunction, the plaintiff produced evidence including website printouts, social media posts, and signboards showing continued use of the mark by the defendants.

Procedurally, the defendants failed to file their written statement within the stipulated time. The Commercial Court imposed costs of ₹50,000/- as a condition to take the written statement and related applications on record, which were not paid, resulting in the suit being decreed under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC on 1 May 2025. Additionally, the Court found the defendants guilty of willful disobedience of the injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC and directed them to pay ₹5 lakhs as punitive damages, failing which they would face civil imprisonment.

The core dispute centered on whether SRK Max Hospital’s use of “MAX” as part of its branding infringed Max Healthcare’s established trademarks and whether the defendants were in contempt for not complying with the interim injunction. The defendants argued they had eventually removed the infringing material, but evidence showed persistent usage even after multiple warnings.

High Court observed that while the defendants claimed steps were taken to remove the mark, these were delayed and only done after the contempt application was filed. The Court upheld the Commercial Court’s finding of contempt and the award of ₹5 lakhs as damages. Regarding the decree of injunction under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, the High Court noted the defendants’ failure to comply with procedural costs orders and dismissed their claim that they had filed within time. However, to ensure substantial justice, the Court granted the defendants a final opportunity to argue their application for condonation of delay—conditional upon paying ₹5 lakhs damages and ₹50,000/- costs within two weeks.

Ultimately, the High Court upheld the finding of contempt and the penalty, set aside the decree of injunction subject to the defendants complying with costs directions, and remanded the matter to the Commercial Court to hear the application for condonation of delay on merits. Both parties were directed to appear before the Commercial Court on 5 August 2025 without seeking adjournment.

Tips Films Limited Vs HTTPS//0GOMOVIES.COM.

Tips Films Limited Vs HTTPS//0GOMOVIES.COM.TR/ & Ors.:11.07.2025:CS(COMM) 690/2025: High Court of Delhi:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

In the case of Tips Films Limited vs HTTPS//0GOMOVIES.COM.TR/ & Ors., CS(COMM) 690/2025, decided on 11.07.2025 by the High Court of Delhi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal considered a copyright infringement suit concerning online piracy of cinematograph films. The plaintiff, Tips Films Limited, a major player in the Indian film production and distribution industry, approached the Court seeking urgent relief against 56 rogue websites allegedly involved in pirating and streaming its upcoming and existing films without authorization.

The factual background of the case reveals that Tips Films Limited is the producer of two feature films titled “Maalik” (scheduled for release on 11.07.2025) and “Sarbala Ji” (scheduled for release on 18.07.2025). The plaintiff claimed copyright ownership over these films and feared that the defendants—specifically defendants no. 1 to 56—would stream these films illegally on their websites. These websites were identified as rogue piracy platforms frequently engaged in unauthorized streaming of third-party content, including films. The plaintiff also impleaded domain name registrars (defendants no. 57 to 80), various internet service providers (defendants no. 81 to 89), the Department of Telecommunications (defendant no. 90), and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (defendant no. 91), to ensure comprehensive enforcement of the blocking orders.

The procedural background shows that the plaintiff filed applications seeking exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, permission to file additional documents, and exemption from prior notice under Section 80 CPC for government defendants, all of which were granted by the Court. The suit was filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and accompanied by an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking immediate relief to prevent the streaming and downloading of the plaintiff's films through unauthorized websites.

The core dispute in this case concerns copyright infringement and digital piracy, specifically the unauthorized streaming, hosting, and making available of the plaintiff's cinematograph films by rogue websites. The plaintiff contended that defendants no. 1 to 56 were hiding behind domain privacy services to operate anonymously, making it difficult to trace and hold them accountable. The plaintiff invoked Sections 51(a)(i), 51(a)(ii), and 51(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957, to argue that the defendants’ activities constituted clear cases of infringement. The plaintiff also relied on the precedent set in UTV Software Communication Ltd. & Anr. v. 1337x.to & Ors., CS(COMM) 724/2017, where the Delhi High Court had passed similar dynamic injunctions against rogue websites engaged in piracy.

In its discussion, the Court noted the prevalence of online piracy through anonymous and unregulated websites that infringe copyright by streaming films illegally. The Court recognized that rogue websites often obscure their ownership information using domain privacy services, making judicial enforcement more complex. To address this challenge, the Court endorsed a proactive approach, similar to the one adopted in the UTV Software case, to safeguard copyright holders’ rights.

In its decision, the Court held that a prima facie case of copyright infringement was made out in favor of the plaintiff. The balance of convenience was found to be in favor of the plaintiff, as irreparable harm would occur if the films were streamed illegally. Accordingly, the Court passed an interim injunction restraining defendants no. 1 to 56 from hosting, streaming, or communicating the plaintiff's films without authorization. The domain name registrars (defendants no. 57 to 80) were directed to lock and suspend the domain names of the infringing websites and disclose the registrants' details, including payment and contact information. The internet service providers (defendants no. 81 to 89) were directed to block access to the rogue websites. The Department of Telecommunications and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology were directed to issue blocking orders to all ISPs against the identified websites and to extend such orders to any further websites discovered by the plaintiff engaging in similar activities during the pendency of the suit.

The Court also granted liberty to the plaintiff to approach the authorities for immediate blocking of any additional infringing websites and to file affidavits informing the Court of such actions. If any non-infringing website is inadvertently blocked, it would have the right to approach the Court for relief. The case was listed for further proceedings before the Joint Registrar on 15.09.2025 for completion of pleadings and before the Court on 17.11.2025.

Srinivas Jegannathan Vs The Controller of Patents

Srinivas Jegannathan Vs The Controller of Patents: 01.07.2025: (T)CMA(PT)/38/2023 (OA/61/2014/PT/CH):High Court of Madras: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

The appellant challenged the order dated 26.03.2014 passed by the Controller of Patents, which refused Patent Application No. 122/CHE/2006 relating to a pharmaceutical composition combining ceftazidime, tazobactum, and linezolid for enhanced antibacterial activity.

The factual background of the case reveals that the appellant, Srinivas Jegannathan, filed the patent application for a combination therapy designed to treat infections caused by multi-drug-resistant bacteria, including MRSA and VRSA. The composition involves ceftazidime (a cephalosporin), linezolid (an oxazolidinone class antibiotic), and tazobactum (a beta-lactamase inhibitor). 

The appellant aimed to enhance the antimicrobial spectrum and activity by combining these agents. After filing the application, the First Examination Report (FER) was issued on 03.12.2012. The appellant responded by amending the claims on 24.09.2013 and further after a hearing held on 10.02.2014. Despite these efforts, the Controller rejected the application on 26.03.2014.

The procedural background includes multiple rounds of claim amendments by the appellant, with the last set of amended claims focusing on a drug delivery system using biodegradable polymers for sustained release of the active ingredients. The Controller rejected the application, citing lack of inventive step and reliance on prior arts D1 to D6. The appellant contended that the Controller erroneously concluded the invention was obvious without proper reasoning, leading to the present appeal.

The core dispute involves whether the combination of ceftazidime, tazobactum, and linezolid constitutes an inventive step or is obvious to a person skilled in the art (PSITA). 

The appellant argued that prior art D1 disclosed combinations of linezolid with other antibacterial agents but not with a beta-lactamase inhibitor like tazobactum. Prior art D2 combined an oxazolidinone with ampicillin and sulbactum but not cephalosporins. Prior art D3 involved clavulanate, another beta-lactamase inhibitor, but did not disclose the specific combination of the three drugs claimed. The appellant maintained that no cited prior art taught or suggested combining a cephalosporin, a beta-lactamase inhibitor, and an oxazolidinone for enhanced antibacterial efficacy. 

The respondent, however, argued that the appellant had voluntarily amended claims, and as per the decision in Genomatica Inc. v. Controller of Patents and Designs, CMA(PT)/4/2023 (Madras High Court, 19.03.2024), the Controller rightly evaluated the last amended claims, which allegedly overlapped with known compositions.

The Court’s discussion focused on the absence of a clear, reasoned finding in the Controller's order on why a skilled person would combine the three specific agents. While D1 disclosed linezolid and cephalosporins, it did not mention beta-lactamase inhibitors. D2 disclosed oxazolidinones with ampicillin and sulbactum, but not cephalosporins. 

D3 disclosed clavulanate use but not the claimed combination. The Court noted that the Controller’s conclusion—that the combination was obvious—lacked detailed reasoning or explanation of how a skilled person would arrive at the claimed invention from the prior art references. Moreover, since the appellant offered to revert to the original claims rather than the last amended ones, the objections under Section 59 of the Patents Act, 1970 regarding claim amendments and the relevance of D4 to D6 became moot.

In its decision, the Court set aside the impugned order dated 26.03.2014 and remanded the matter for reconsideration by a different officer of the Patent Office. The reconsideration was directed to proceed based on the original claims filed with the complete specification. The Court instructed that a fresh speaking order be passed within three months after providing the appellant with an opportunity of hearing. The respondent was also permitted to cite new prior art references during this reconsideration process if required. The Court clarified that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the patent application and that the remand was solely for proper examination and reasoned adjudication.

This case highlights the judicial insistence on detailed reasoning when rejecting patent applications on the ground of lack of inventive step and affirms the procedural rights of inventors during patent prosecution.

Union Bank of India Vs. Shashi Malik

Case Title: Union Bank of India Vs. Shashi Malik Case No.: RFA(COMM) 30/2023 Date of Order:  15 May 2025) Court: High Court of Delhi Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3865-DB

The Union Bank of India filed a suit against Shashi Malik for recovery of approximately ₹11,19,609.70 on account of a loan under the Pradhan Mantri Loan Scheme. The bank attempted service at two addresses but received back reports stating "no such person at the address," indicating that Shashi Malik was allegedly unserved and possibly non-existent.

Procedural Details:

The trial court dismissed the suit under Order V Rule 20 of the CPC, holding that the defendant’s residence could not be established at the given addresses and accused the bank of misuse of court process. The bank appealed against this order, challenging the dismissal.

Issue:

Whether the defendant, Shashi Malik, was genuinely present at the addresses provided, which would justify substituted service, and whether the suit against a non-existent person was valid.

Decision:

The High Court set aside the order of the trial court, noting the error in its conclusion regarding the defendant’s residence. The Court remanded the matter back to the Commercial Court for reconsideration, emphasizing the need for correct record examination. The Court also highlighted procedural lapses, such as the defective certified copy of the impugned order, and ordered that future procedures be taken with greater caution.

Prime Diamond Tech Vs Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd

Prime Diamond Tech Vs Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd. : 07.07.2025:Special Civil Application Nos. 9066 of 2025:High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad:Hon’ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

In the case of Prime Diamond Tech & Ors. vs Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., R/Special Civil Application Nos. 9066 and 9073 of 2025, decided on 07.07.2025 by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, a division bench examined a dispute involving access to confidential trade secret information in a pending commercial suit concerning copyright infringement and alleged misuse of proprietary technology in the diamond processing industry.

The factual background involves a copyright and trade secret infringement suit filed by Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd. against Prime Diamond Tech and its associated defendants. The plaintiff alleged that defendants 2 to 5, who were former employees, illegally accessed and used the plaintiff’s proprietary information relating to HPHT (High Pressure High Temperature) diamond treatment technology after joining the defendant company. 

The plaintiff claimed that these trade secrets included technical know-how, design drawings, process mechanisms, chemical compositions, and other confidential data, which were unlawfully replicated to develop competing products. To support its claim, the plaintiff submitted three sealed envelopes containing its confidential information along with the plaint and secured a court-appointed Local Commissioner to inspect the defendant’s factory premises. During the commission proceedings in May 2021, data, photographs, and files from the defendant's premises were collected and sealed.

The procedural background reveals that the trial court in Surat, while dealing with Commercial TM C.S. No. 38 of 2021, passed an order on 25.06.2025 allowing both the defendants’ applications (Exhs. 124 and 125) to access the plaintiff’s sealed confidential documents and the plaintiff’s application (Exh. 134) to access the data collected during the local commission. 

The Commercial Court had initially set up a Confidentiality Club and provided limited access to certain materials, such as photographs and videos, but had restricted broader access to highly confidential material. Dissatisfied with the 25.06.2025 order granting wider access, both parties filed special civil applications before the High Court, seeking to prevent disclosure of their respective confidential information to the other side.

The core dispute before the High Court was whether the parties in a copyright infringement suit could be permitted to access each other’s confidential trade secret data and documents, particularly when such materials were protected under claims of confidentiality and involved sensitive technical know-how. 

The defendants argued that the Court Commissioner exceeded the scope of the commission by indiscriminately copying all types of data from their systems, while the plaintiff sought access to this data to substantiate its claims of trade secret theft. Both parties objected to disclosing their respective confidential information to the rival party.

High Court analyzed the scope of confidentiality in intellectual property litigation, particularly where trade secrets are at stake. The Court noted that divulging trade secrets to rival parties would defeat the very purpose of confidentiality protections. 

It emphasized that in a copyright infringement suit, sharing trade secret data with the opposing party is antithetical to the legal safeguards surrounding proprietary information. The Court observed that the Commercial Court’s order of 25.06.2025, allowing advocates for both parties to access the confidential data without adequate reasoning, overlooked the critical issue of trade secret protection. The previous order of 26.05.2021, which had already regulated the Confidentiality Club and imposed conditions on access, was not duly considered by the trial court.

In its decision, the High Court quashed the Commercial Court’s order dated 25.06.2025 and rejected both the defendants' applications (Exhs. 124 and 125) and the plaintiff’s application (Exh. 134) for access to each other’s confidential information. The Court directed the Commercial Court to proceed with the trial expeditiously, in compliance with the Supreme Court's directions dated 09.09.2024 mandating disposal of the suit within one year. 

The High Court clarified that all pending applications and objections, including those related to the Local Commissioner’s report, should be decided by the trial court at the appropriate stage, without the present decision influencing the final outcome. It further held that neither party, nor their advocates, should be given access to the rival party’s trade secret information at this stage. The Commercial Court was left free to form its own opinion during trial, based on the evidence presented, while ensuring fairness and protection of proprietary data.

Raj Kumar Proprietor of MS Royal Pets Cart vs. Pooja Ahirwar

Title: Raj Kumar Proprietor of MS Royal Pets Cart vs. Pooja Ahirwar Proprietor of MS Aselfy Enterprises:Date of Order: 15 May 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 954/2024:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Facts:

Raj Kumar, the plaintiff, owns the trademark ‘ROYAL PETS CART’, which he began using in 2021 for pet-related products including furniture, bedding, cages, and other accessories. He filed multiple trademark applications and reported substantial sales revenue over successive years. The defendant, Pooja Ahirwar, also filed a trademark application for a deceptively similar mark ‘ROYAL PETS CART’ claiming a user date of 2020. Despite being served with legal notices, the defendant did not appear in court.

Procedural Details:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from using the same or similar marks. An affidavit of service was filed indicating service through email and WhatsApp, but the defendant did not respond or appear during proceedings. The court scheduled further hearings and issued interim relief restraining the defendant from manufacturing, marketing, selling, or offering for sale goods under the impugned trademark until the next hearing.

Issue:

Whether the defendant’s use of a mark nearly identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered and used trademark ‘ROYAL PETS CART’, is infringing upon the plaintiff’s rights, and if an injunction should be granted to prevent further misuse.

Decision:

The court held that the defendant’s mark is nearly identical/deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s mark. The court found a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff, highlighting prior use and likelihood of confusion among consumers. The court granted a temporary restraining order preventing the defendant from manufacturing, marketing, or selling goods under the impugned mark pending further proceedings and scheduled the matter for a hearing on 15 October 2025.

Pocket FM Private Limited Vs Mebigo Labs Private Limited

Pocket FM Private Limited Vs Mebigo Labs Private Limited:10.07.2025: CS(COMM) 686/2025: High Court of Delhi: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

In the case of Pocket FM Private Limited vs Mebigo Labs Private Limited, CS(COMM) 686/2025, decided on 10.07.2025 by the High Court of Delhi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee presided over a commercial intellectual property dispute. 

The plaintiff, Pocket FM Private Limited, sought permanent injunction against Mebigo Labs Private Limited (operating Kuku FM) for alleged copyright infringement, trademark passing off, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and other related claims. The plaintiff also sought urgent interim relief, exemption from pre-litigation mediation, and various ancillary orders.

The factual background of the case involves Pocket FM’s claim that it owns and operates several copyrighted audio series including “Super Yoddha,” “Insta Empire,” “Amrapali,” “Vashikaran,” and “The Immortal Warrior.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant launched and streamed five audio series—“Shivay: Brahmaand ka Yoddha,” “Jobless Ghar Jamai,” “The Legend of Amrapali,” “Avtaar,” and “Immortal Yoddha”—which are deceptively similar in titles, storylines, characters, and other creative elements to the plaintiff’s works. The plaintiff argued that this constitutes copyright infringement and passing off, resulting in loss of user traffic and revenues.

The procedural background reveals that the plaintiff filed the suit in July 2025 after claiming to have discovered the infringing content in June 2025. However, the defendant pointed out that the impugned series had been on air since as early as July 2024, with the latest episodes being released in May 2025. The parties had a prior history of intellectual property litigation, with Pocket FM previously instituting CS(COMM) 875/2024 and CS(COMM) 585/2025 against the same defendant for similar issues. The plaintiff sought urgent interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, claiming continuous losses due to redirection of user traffic to the defendant’s platform.

The core dispute centers on whether the defendant’s series on Kuku FM amount to copyright infringement and passing off of the plaintiff’s original series. The plaintiff contended that the defendant not only copied titles but also substantially copied content, character traits, and storylines, creating confusion in the minds of the audience. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant is a habitual offender with a pattern of similar infringements. The defendant argued that the suit was filed with mala fide intent to obstruct competition and that the plaintiff had delayed approaching the Court despite being aware of the broadcasts since 2024.

The Court ,considering that the plaintiff was engaged in other similar lawsuits during this period, the Court found it appropriate to issue notice on the interim injunction application but declined to grant an immediate ad-interim injunction without hearing the defendant fully. 

However, the Court restrained the defendant from releasing any new episodes of the five impugned series until the next date of hearing. The matter was listed for further consideration

Oramed Ltd. Vs The Controller General of Patents:

Oramed Ltd. Vs The Controller General of Patents:04.07.2025:IPDPTA/8/2022: High Court at Calcutta : Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

The appeal challenged the order dated 5th June 2020, passed in Patent Application No. 3996/KOLNP/2010, which had refused grant of a patent for Oramed’s oral insulin composition.

The facts of the case revolve around Oramed Ltd.'s invention concerning an oral pharmaceutical composition aimed at administering insulin without injection. The invention comprises a protein (insulin), two protease inhibitors—Aprotinin and SBTI (Soybean Trypsin Inhibitor)—along with optional components like EDTA and Omega-3 fatty acids. The claimed invention addresses the challenges of injectable insulin, such as lipodystrophy, hypoglycemia, and lack of fine metabolic control, and seeks to enable oral insulin delivery by preventing enzymatic breakdown of insulin in the gastrointestinal tract.

The procedural background traces back to Oramed’s patent journey starting from its US priority application filed on 26th March 2008, followed by a PCT application on 26th February 2009, and subsequent national phase entry in India on 25th October 2010. After the request for examination in 2012, a First Examination Report (FER) was issued on 22nd December 2015. Oramed responded and participated in hearings; however, the Deputy Controller of Patents refused the application on 18th April 2017, citing lack of inventive step. The refusal order was challenged in a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court due to the non-functioning of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). On 18th June 2019, the High Court remanded the matter back to the Patent Office for reconsideration. Despite fresh hearings in 2019, the Deputy Controller passed a similar refusal order on 5th June 2020, leading to the present appeal.

The core dispute centers around whether the claimed invention involved an inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act and whether the composition was excluded under Section 3(e) as a mere admixture of known substances. The appellant contended that the Deputy Controller failed to consider the expert evidence and scientific data submitted, especially regarding the enhanced bioavailability and surprising synergistic effects of the invention.

The appellant also argued that the Deputy Controller shifted the reasoning without due notice by initially referring to prior arts D1 to D4 in the hearing notice but basing the final decision solely on D1 and D4, ignoring D2 and D3. This deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to respond.

In its discussion, the Court noted the procedural lapses in the patent office’s order. The Court relied on Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp. Ltd. vs The Controller of Patents and Designs (Unreported decision dated 13.06.2023, AID No. 20 of 2022), which held that if multiple prior arts are to be combined for assessing obviousness, there must be a common thread linking the claims to those prior arts. 

The mosaicing of prior arts without a clear rationale is impermissible. The Court also cited Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Aloys Wobben (ORA/08/2009/PT/CH, Order No. 123 of 2013, dated 13.06.2013), where it was held that mere existence of individual components in prior art does not automatically lead to a conclusion of obviousness unless a clear and obvious path connects the prior art to the invention.

The Court found that the Deputy Controller failed to consider expert affidavits, including that of Miriam Kidron, who was not only the inventor of the present invention but also the inventor of cited prior art D1. The order also incorrectly applied the principles of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act—relating to therapeutic efficacy—while adjudicating under Section 3(e), which concerns mere admixtures. This conflation of legal provisions was deemed a serious error.

The Court reasoned that the Deputy Controller’s omission of relevant scientific data, failure to consider granted patents in other jurisdictions, and misapplication of statutory provisions vitiated the decision-making process. The impugned order neither reflected a fair assessment of inventive step nor properly addressed the evidence presented.

In its decision, the Court set aside the order dated 5th June 2020 and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by a different Deputy Controller. The Court directed that all materials, including expert affidavits and technical data, be duly considered. The Controller was instructed to furnish detailed reasons for any inferences drawn while adjudicating the matter afresh.

Mohan Meaking Limited Vs Eston Roman Brewery

Mohan Meaking Limited Vs Eston Roman Brewery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd.: 09.07.2025: Commercial Suit No. 07 of 2025: High Court of Himachal Pradesh:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel

The plaintiff, Mohan Meaking Limited, is one of India’s premier liquor companies, famously known for its "Old Monk" products. It holds a registered trademark for "Old Monk Coffee," registered on 09.06.2022 and valid until 22.11.2031. The defendant, Eston Roman Brewery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated in July 2023, recently started manufacturing and selling a coffee-flavored rum under the brand name "Old Mist."

The procedural background of the case began when the plaintiff discovered in June 2025 that the defendant had started selling its "Old Mist" product in Goa. Claiming that the defendant's product closely resembled the "Old Monk Coffee" product in both name and packaging, the plaintiff filed a commercial suit and an application for interim relief (OMP No. 940 of 2025). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was attempting to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff, leveraging the enormous goodwill associated with the "Old Monk" brand, which the plaintiff claims makes it the third-largest rum manufacturer in the world.

The core dispute revolves around whether the defendant’s use of the mark "Old Mist" for its coffee-flavored rum constitutes trademark infringement and passing off, given the plaintiff's prior rights in "Old Monk Coffee." The plaintiff argued that the similarities in the trade dress, labeling, and phonetic structure between "Old Monk Coffee" and "Old Mist" are likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers, potentially leading them to believe that the defendant’s product is associated with or endorsed by the plaintiff.

The Court examined the products, labels, and bottled goods of both parties during the hearing. After a close perusal, it observed that the defendant's product packaging and labeling bore a significant resemblance to that of the plaintiff. The Court noted that the plaintiff's trademark was registered while the defendant had no such registration for "Old Mist." It also acknowledged the plaintiff's status as an established and reputed manufacturer in the liquor industry, while the defendant had only recently entered the market.

In its decision, the Court found that a prima facie case of trademark infringement was made out in favor of the plaintiff. The Court concluded that the defendant's actions were likely to cause confusion among consumers and result in passing off, thereby damaging the plaintiff's goodwill and causing irreparable loss. The balance of convenience, the Court held, was clearly in favor of the plaintiff. Consequently, the Court passed an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant, its representatives, distributors, and employees from selling or distributing the infringing product, namely "Old Mist Coffee Rum," until further orders. The injunction is subject to compliance with Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Maulana Arshad Madani Vs Union of India

Cinema, Censorship, and Communal Harmony

Introduction:The case of Maulana Arshad Madani vs Union of India & Ors, decided by the Delhi High Court on 10th July 2025, delves into the complex intersection between freedom of expression, public order, and the regulatory mechanisms governing film certification in India. This Public Interest Litigation (PIL) challenged the certification of the film “Udaipur Files” by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The petitioner contended that the film promoted communal disharmony and vilification of a specific community, thereby violating statutory principles and constitutional values. The case raises important questions about the limits of creative freedom, the regulatory framework for film certification, and the remedies available to an aggrieved party post-certification.

Factual Background:The petitioner, Maulana Arshad Madani, approached the Delhi High Court asserting that the film “Udaipur Files” was granted certification for public exhibition by the CBFC on 20th June 2025. Following the certification, the producers of the film released its teaser/trailer on social media platforms on 26th June 2025. The teaser contained several portions that were allegedly not certified or were part of the scenes directed to be excised by the CBFC. This prompted the CBFC to issue a Show Cause Notice to the producer on 1st July 2025, citing violation of Rule 27 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024. The producer responded to the notice on 2nd July 2025, admitting that an uncensored teaser was uploaded due to contractual obligations and promotional commitments.

The petitioner argued that the film, even after the cuts ordered by the CBFC, continued to depict a particular religious community in a negative and violent light, suggesting their involvement in terrorist activities and communal violence. The petitioner alleged that this portrayal could incite hatred, disrupt public order, and compromise communal harmony. The grievance was not limited to the teaser but extended to the entire thematic presentation of the film, which, according to the petitioner, was designed to vilify an entire community.

Procedural Background:The writ petition, W.P.(C) 9362/2025, was filed before the Delhi High Court seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the film’s certification and to restrain its release. On 9th July 2025, the Court directed that a special screening of the film and its trailer be arranged for the counsels of all parties to enable them to make informed submissions. The screening was conducted, and both the petitioner and the respondents submitted notes to the Court summarizing their observations.

During the hearing, the respondents urged the Court to defer the matter, citing the pendency of a writ petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, where similar issues were allegedly raised. The respondents also referred to media reports suggesting that the Supreme Court had permitted the film’s release. However, the petitioner contested this by pointing out that the Supreme Court merely declined to grant an urgent hearing and no written order permitting release was passed. The Delhi High Court rejected the request to defer the proceedings, noting the absence of any binding order from the Supreme Court staying the proceedings or directing the release of the film.

Core Dispute:The central issue before the Court was whether the certification granted by the CBFC to the film “Udaipur Files” violated the principles enshrined in Section 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, and the statutory guidelines notified by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting on 6th December 1991. The petitioner contended that the film propagated communal hatred and could incite violence, making its release a threat to public order and contrary to the constitutional mandate of promoting fraternity and unity. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the CBFC, comprising experts in film making, had already directed 55 cuts to address concerns and that the film, in its certified form, did not warrant judicial interference.

Discussion on Judgments:The respondents relied on several precedents to argue against judicial interference in matters of film certification. The case of S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574, was cited to emphasize the principle that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed unless the situation created by such expression is bound to lead to public disorder, and even then, the anticipated danger must not be remote or conjectural.

In Prakash Jha Productions & Anr. v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 372, the Supreme Court held that once a film is certified by the CBFC, interference by courts should be limited and must consider the expertise of the Board in matters of art and expression.

The decision in Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd. & Others v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 1 SCC 761, reiterated the principle that public exhibition of certified films cannot be obstructed except under extraordinary circumstances or unless the certification is stayed or set aside by a competent authority.

The petitioner, however, relied on Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court distinguished between hate speech and free speech, holding that the constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) does not extend to expressions that incite violence or hatred against a community.

The respondents also referred to the Bombay High Court decision in Hiten Dhirajlal Mehta v. Bhansali Productions, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 372, where it was held that once a film is certified, the appropriate remedy lies either in a challenge under Article 226 or by approaching the Central Government under Section 6 of the Cinematograph Act. The Court in that case discouraged any attempt by private individuals or groups to obstruct the release of certified films through extra-legal measures.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court analyzed the statutory scheme of the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The Court noted that Section 5A empowers the CBFC to grant certification, while Section 5B lays down prohibitions where certification is not permissible, including instances where a film may threaten public order, incite an offence, or defame a particular group.

The Court emphasized that the guidelines issued by the Government of India on 6th December 1991 are binding on the CBFC and must be scrupulously followed. These guidelines require the Board to ensure that films do not contain content that vilifies a community, promotes communal hatred, or offends human sensibilities.

The Bench also discussed the scope of Section 6 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, particularly after its amendment in 2023. The amended provision empowers the Central Government to suspend or revoke a film’s certification, declare it uncertified, or alter its certification category. The Court observed that although the phrase “of its own motion” was omitted in the amended Section 6, the Central Government could still exercise revisional jurisdiction both suo motu and upon receiving complaints from aggrieved persons.

Taking note of the statutory remedies available under Section 6, the Court held that the petitioner ought to have first approached the Central Government before invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. However, considering the seriousness of the allegations regarding potential communal disharmony, the Court permitted the petitioner to approach the Central Government under Section 6 within a stipulated timeline.

The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s argument that the overall thematic expression of the film, despite the cuts, was likely to incite hatred and violate the guidelines issued under the Act. However, since the statutory framework provided an alternative remedy with adequate powers vested in the Central Government, the Court decided not to adjudicate the merits directly at this stage.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition with the direction that the petitioner may approach the Central Government by filing a revision under Section 6 of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, by 14th July 2025. The Court further directed that if the petitioner makes an application for interim relief, including the suspension of the film’s exhibition, the Central Government shall decide the same within one week after giving an opportunity of hearing to the producer of the film.

As an interim measure, the Court stayed the release of the film “Udaipur Files” until the Central Government decides on the application for interim relief. The Court also noted the pending action by the CBFC against the producer for violating Rule 27 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024, by releasing an uncertified teaser and directed that appropriate legal action in that regard be taken as per law.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that judicial review of CBFC certification is available under Article 226 of the Constitution, but where statutory remedies exist, such as revision under Section 6 of the Cinematograph Act, they must ordinarily be exhausted first. The judgment clarifies that the Central Government retains revisional powers even after the 2023 amendment of Section 6, which can be invoked by an aggrieved party post-certification.

The case also reiterates the binding nature of the 1991 guidelines on film certification and underscores the obligation of the CBFC to evaluate the film in its entirety, considering its overall impact on public order, morality, and communal harmony. Additionally, it highlights the delicate balance between freedom of expression and protection against hate speech in the context of artistic works like films

Case Title: Maulana Arshad Madani Vs Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 10.07.2025

Case Number: W.P.(C) 9362/2025

Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:5466-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon'ble the Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anish Dayal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

LT Foods Limited Vs Murli Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd.

LT Foods Limited Vs Murli Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd.:CS(COMM) 574/2025:09.07.2025:High Court of Delhi : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

In this case, the plaintiff, LT Foods Limited, approached the Delhi High Court seeking protection of its registered trademarks ‘DAAWAT’ and ‘DAWAT’, alleging infringement and passing off by the defendant, Murli Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. The plaintiff is a leading global rice and rice-based food products manufacturer with more than 70 years of presence in the market. The marks in question were originally adopted by the plaintiff's predecessor, Lal Chand Tirath Ram Rice Mills, in 1985. LT Foods Limited took over this business in 1999 and claims continuous use of the marks since then. The plaintiff holds multiple trademark registrations for ‘DAAWAT’ and ‘DAWAT’, including Indian registrations dating back to 1987 and international registrations.

The core dispute arose when LT Foods discovered in May 2025 that Murli Flour Mills was selling ‘Jeera’ (cumin seeds) under the mark ‘DAWAT’. A cease and desist notice was sent to the defendant on 10th May 2025, to which the defendant responded on 15th May 2025, refusing to stop the use of the mark and asserting that their goods were different from those of the plaintiff. LT Foods alleged that the defendant’s adoption of an identical mark in a similar curvaceous style was intended to create confusion among consumers and wrongfully benefit from the goodwill associated with the plaintiff’s brand.

The Court observed that the plaintiff’s trademarks had already been recognized as well-known by a coordinate bench in 2022 and declared well-known by the Registrar of Trademarks in 2024. A prima facie case of trademark infringement and passing off was made out against the defendant. Since the defendant failed to appear despite service, the Court proceeded to consider the interim relief.

The Court held that there was clear evidence of the defendant copying the plaintiff’s mark in both text and stylization, leading to a likelihood of consumer confusion. The balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, and irreparable injury would result if the defendant were allowed to continue using the impugned mark. Public interest was also implicated, as consumers might be misled into believing there was a connection between the defendant’s goods and the plaintiff’s products.

Consequently, the Court issued an interim injunction restraining Murli Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd., along with its directors, officers, agents, vendors, and dealers, from producing, selling, advertising, promoting, or exporting any product bearing the mark ‘DAWAT’ or any deceptively similar variant. 

Inder Raj Sahni Vs Neha Herbal

Introduction: This case study examines a trademark dispute adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi, centered on the use of the trademark "NEHA" by two entities operating in the personal care sector. The plaintiffs, Vikas Gupta and Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd., claimed prior adoption and registration of the "NEHA" mark for henna and allied herbal products, alleging that the defendant, Inder Raj Sahni of M/s Sahni Cosmetics, infringed their trademark and engaged in passing off by using the same mark for face creams. The defendant countered with claims of prior use since 1990 and sought cancellation of the plaintiffs’ trademark registrations.

Detailed Factual Background

The dispute revolves around the trademark "NEHA," a common Indian forename, used by both parties in the personal care industry. Vikas Gupta, Plaintiff No. 1, claimed to have adopted the mark in 1992, inspired by his sister’s name, for henna (mehandi) powder and ubtan (face packs) under his proprietorship, M/s Neha Enterprises. In 2007, he incorporated Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. (Plaintiff No. 2), which took over the business in 2012 via an assignment deed dated May 1, 2012. The plaintiffs expanded their product line to include mehandi cones, hair dyes, and other herbal products, securing trademark registrations for "NEHA" (Registration No. 1198061, dated May 12, 2003) and "NEHA HERBALS" (Registration No. 3752588, dated February 13, 2018) in Class 3, covering henna and related goods. They also applied for a device mark "Neha" (Application No. 4182573, dated May 21, 2019) for creams and other cosmetics on a proposed-to-be-used basis, which remained pending.

The defendant, Inder Raj Sahni, sole proprietor of M/s Sahni Cosmetics, claimed to have adopted the "NEHA" mark in 1990 for creams, asserting honest and concurrent use. He supported his claim with a 1990 manufacturing license and invoices demonstrating continuous use. The defendant’s attempts to register the "NEHA" mark (Applications No. 1462077 and 2153566) were refused or abandoned due to objections under Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and non-compliance with examination reports. The plaintiffs initiated legal action in May 2019 after discovering cold creams bearing the "NEHA" mark sold by a retailer in Sadar Bazar, Delhi, alleging trademark infringement and passing off. The defendant countered that the plaintiffs were aware of his use since 2003 through a common wholesaler and accused them of delay and acquiescence, arguing that their suit was an opportunistic attempt to enter the creams market.

Detailed Procedural Background: The dispute unfolded through multiple legal proceedings, which were eventually consolidated. The plaintiffs filed a suit, CS(COMM) 1833/2019 (later renumbered as CS(COMM) 207/2023), before the District Court, seeking a permanent injunction against the defendant’s use of the "NEHA" mark, along with reliefs for passing off, delivery up, and rendition of accounts. On August 23, 2019, an Additional District Judge granted an ex-parte ad interim injunction, which was vacated on November 1, 2019, after the defendant’s application. The plaintiffs’ appeal (FAO (COMM) 144/2021) and review petition (No. 176/2021) were dismissed by the Delhi High Court on October 4, 2021, and December 16, 2021, respectively. The plaintiffs then approached the Supreme Court via SLP(C) No. 2493-2494/2022, which, on February 28, 2022 (amended April 4, 2022), directed the Trial Court to expedite the suit within 12 months, uninfluenced by prior interim orders.

Parallelly, the defendant filed two cancellation petitions, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 355/2021 and C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 455/2022, before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), seeking removal of the plaintiffs’ "NEHA" and "NEHA HERBALS" registrations. Following the IPAB’s abolition in April 2021, these petitions were transferred to the Delhi High Court. On March 22, 2023, the High Court, with the parties’ consent, transferred the suit to itself and tagged it with the cancellation petitions, agreeing that evidence in the suit would apply to the cancellation proceedings. On April 17, 2023, the Supreme Court noted the transfer and directed the High Court to dispose of all proceedings within six months. On January 3, 2024, the parties agreed to hear the suit and cancellation petitions together, leading to a consolidated hearing and a common judgment delivered on May 19, 2025.

Issues Involved in the Case: The court framed the following issues on September 21, 2020, to resolve the dispute: Whether Plaintiff No. 1 is the proprietor of the trademark "NEHA" for the goods mentioned in the plaint? Whether the plaintiff has been in continuous use of the mark since 1992 or any other date thereafter? Whether the defendant is a prior user and adopter of the trademark "NEHA," and if so, its effect? Whether the plaintiff is guilty of concealment and suppression as alleged by the defendant? Whether the suit is barred by delay, laches, and acquiescence? Whether the plaintiff’s registration of the trademark "NEHA" is invalid and deserves cancellation? Whether the defendant’s use of the "NEHA" mark is likely to cause confusion or deception, leading to passing off? Whether the defendant’s use of the "NEHA" mark infringes the plaintiff’s registered trademark?

Plaintiffs’ Submissions: The plaintiffs argued that Vikas Gupta adopted the "NEHA" mark in 1992 and used it continuously for henna and allied products, establishing proprietary rights. They relied on trademark registrations (Nos. 1198061 and 3752588) and an assignment deed dated May 21, 2019, transferring rights from Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. to Vikas Gupta, followed by a license back to the company. The plaintiffs contended that their prior use and registration conferred exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and that the defendant’s use of "NEHA" for creams infringed their mark under Sections 29(2)(a) and 29(4). They argued that the similarity of goods (both in Class 3), overlapping trade channels, and consumer base created a likelihood of confusion, supporting their passing off claim. The plaintiffs dismissed the defendant’s prior use claim, noting his failed registration attempts and lack of registration, and argued that their delay in filing the suit was due to discovering the defendant’s use only in May 2019. They opposed the cancellation petitions, asserting the validity of their registrations and continuous use since 1992.

Defendant’s Submissions: The defendant claimed prior adoption of the "NEHA" mark in 1990 for creams, supported by a manufacturing license and invoices. He invoked honest concurrent use and prior use under trademark law, arguing that his long-standing use predated the plaintiffs’ adoption. The defendant challenged the plaintiffs’ continuous use, alleging non-compliance with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, for lacking a manufacturing license from 1992 to 2010. He accused the plaintiffs of acquiescence, claiming they were aware of his use since 2003 through a common wholesaler but initiated litigation only in 2019 to opportunistically enter the creams market. The defendant questioned the plaintiffs’ proprietorship, citing the timing and nominal consideration (INR 1,000) of the 2019 assignment deed, and sought cancellation of the plaintiffs’ registrations under Sections 47 and 57, arguing non-use, false claims, and lack of distinctiveness of the mark "NEHA" as a common name.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context: The court relied on several precedents to adjudicate the issues, each cited in specific contexts to elucidate trademark principles:

1. Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 183: Cited in the context of Issue No. 8 (infringement), this Supreme Court decision addressed the use of the common name "NANDHINI"/"NANDINI" for different goods within the same class. The court held that registration in one class does not confer exclusive rights over all goods in that class, especially for non-distinctive marks. In this case, it supported the finding that the plaintiffs’ registration for henna did not extend to creams, given the functional dissimilarity and lack of evidence of brand spillover.
2. Osram Gesellschaft Mit Beschrankter Haftung v. Shyam Sunder, 2002 SCC Online Del 423:  Delhi High Court decision clarified that a registered trademark holder cannot claim monopoly over all goods in a class based on a single product. The court applied this to hold that the plaintiffs’ goodwill in henna did not extend to creams, as the goods were distinct in function and trade channels.
3. Renessaince Hotel Holdings Incorporated v. B. Vijaya Sai, 2001 SCC Online Del 1051: For Section 29(4) infringement, this case outlined the three cumulative requirements for infringement involving dissimilar goods: identical/similar mark, reputation in India, and unfair advantage or detriment. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove reputation in creams, rendering Section 29(4) inapplicable.
4. Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc., 1990 (1) All ER 873 (HL): Referenced in Issue No. 7 (passing off), this House of Lords decision established the classic trinity test for passing off: goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The court applied this test to assess whether the defendant’s use of "NEHA" for creams misrepresented an association with the plaintiffs’ henna products, concluding it did not.
5. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73: Supreme Court case provided factors for determining deceptive similarity in passing off, emphasizing the nature, character, and trade channels of goods. The court used this to evaluate the likelihood of confusion, finding that the distinct packaging and product functions negated confusion.
6. Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 1965 (1) SCR 737: Supreme Court decision distinguished trademark infringement (statutory) from passing off (common law), emphasizing that passing off protects goodwill from misrepresentation. The court applied this to assess the plaintiffs’ passing off claim, focusing on misrepresentation.
7. Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 SCC Online Del 3806:  Delhi High Court decision held that overlapping trade channels and consumer bases alone do not establish confusion if packaging is distinct. The court used this to conclude that the plaintiffs’ green packaging for henna versus the defendant’s distinct cream packaging reduced confusion.
8. Colgate Palmolive Company v. Anchor Health and Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd., 2003 SCC Online Del 1005: Delhi High Court case emphasized that passing off depends on overall presentation, not exact similarity. The court applied this to find that the distinct trade dress of the parties’ products negated misrepresentation.
9. People Interactive (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Vivek Pahwa, 2016 SCC Online Bom 7351: Bombay High Court decision held that common names or dictionary words have a narrower scope of protection. The court used this to reason that "NEHA," a common forename, required strong secondary meaning for broad protection, which the plaintiffs failed to prove.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: On Issue No. 1 (proprietorship), the court confirmed Vikas Gupta’s proprietorship of the "NEHA" and "NEHA HERBALS" marks based on registrations (Nos. 1198061 and 3752588) and assignment deeds, supported by certified records (Ex. PW-3/1 and PW-3/2). The defendant’s challenge to the 2019 assignment’s timing and nominal consideration (INR 1,000) was dismissed, as the court found the transaction valid despite Vikas Gupta’s inability to recall board resolution details, deeming such questions relevant but not fatal.

For Issue No. 2 (continuous use), the court found that the plaintiffs established use since 1992 through invoices, advertisements, and witness testimonies, rejecting the defendant’s claim of non-compliance with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act due to insufficient evidence. On Issue No. 3 (defendant’s prior use), the court held that the defendant failed to prove use since 1990, as his invoices and license lacked specificity, and his registration attempts were unsuccessful. Issue No. 4 (concealment) was decided against the defendant, as no material misstatement by the plaintiffs was proven. Issue No. 5 (delay and acquiescence) was also rejected, as the court found no evidence that the plaintiffs were aware of the defendant’s use before 2019, negating acquiescence.

On Issue No. 6 (validity of registration), the court upheld the plaintiffs’ registrations, finding no grounds under Sections 47 (non-use) or 57 (rectification) for cancellation, as the plaintiffs demonstrated continuous use and no false claims. Issue No. 8 (infringement) was decided against the plaintiffs. The court analyzed Section 29(2)(a), which requires similarity of goods and likelihood of confusion, and found that henna and creams were functionally dissimilar despite being in Class 3. Citing Nandhini Deluxe and Osram, the court held that registration does not confer class-wide monopoly, and the plaintiffs’ goodwill was limited to henna. For Section 29(4) (dissimilar goods), the court, referencing Renessaince Hotel, found no evidence of the plaintiffs’ reputation in creams or detriment to their mark, rendering the claim untenable.

Issue No. 7 (passing off) was central to the plaintiffs’ case. Applying the trinity test from Reckitt & Colman, the court assessed goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The plaintiffs established goodwill in henna but not in creams, as their application for creams was proposed-to-be-used, and no evidence showed brand extension. On misrepresentation, the court, citing Cadila, Marico, and Colgate, found no likelihood of confusion due to distinct packaging (green for plaintiffs’ henna, different colors for defendant’s creams) and functional differences. The court noted the defendant’s admission of overlapping trade channels but held it insufficient without evidence of confusion, such as market surveys. Referencing People Interactive, the court emphasized that "NEHA," a common name, required secondary meaning for broad protection, which was absent. Thus, no misrepresentation or damage was proven, defeating the passing off claim.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit (CS(COMM) 207/2023), finding no trademark infringement or passing off by the defendant’s use of "NEHA" for creams. The defendant’s cancellation petitions (C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 355/2021 and 455/2022) were also dismissed, upholding the plaintiffs’ registrations. No costs were awarded, and a decree was directed accordingly.

Law Settled in the Case: This case reinforces several trademark law principles:

1. Scope of Registered Marks: Registration in a class does not confer exclusive rights over all goods in that class, especially for common names (Nandhini Deluxe, Osram).
2. Functional Dissimilarity: Goods within the same class may be dissimilar in function, negating infringement under Section 29(2)(a) unless confusion is proven.
3. Section 29(4) Infringement: Claims for dissimilar goods require proof of reputation, unfair advantage, or detriment, with a high evidentiary threshold (Renessaince Hotel).
4. Passing Off Requirements: A passing off claim requires goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. Common names need strong secondary meaning for broad protection (Reckitt & Colman, People Interactive).
5. Distinct Packaging: Distinct trade dress and packaging can negate confusion despite overlapping trade channels (Marico, Colgate).
6. Cancellation of Registration: Cancellation under Sections 47 or 57 requires clear evidence of non-use or invalidity, which the defendant failed to provide.
7. Prior Use and Acquiescence: Claims of prior use must be substantiated with cogent evidence, and acquiescence requires proof of knowledge and inaction.

Case Title: Inder Raj Sahni Vs. Neha Herbals Pvt. Ltd. :Date of Order: May 19, 2025:Case No.: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 355/2021, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 455/2022, CS(COMM) 207/2023: Neutral Citation: 2025:5HC:4037:High Court of Delhi: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Narula

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mold Tek Packaging Limited vs Pronton Plast Pack Pvt. Ltd.

Product-to-Patent Mapping and Patent Validity

Introduction: In the domain of container packaging, the protection of tamper-evident and tamper-proof technologies has become crucial, particularly for food-grade plastic containers. The case of Mold Tek Packaging Limited vs Pronton Plast Pack Pvt. Ltd. examines the nuanced issues of patent infringement, validity, prior art relevance, and the threshold for granting interim relief in intellectual property disputes. This case also sheds light on the standards governing the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in patent disputes.

Factual Background: Mold Tek Packaging Limited is engaged in the manufacture and sale of plastic packaging containers and holds two Indian patents: IN 401417 and IN 298724. Patent IN 401417 relates to a "Tamper-Evident Leak Proof Pail Closure System," which consists of a lid that incorporates lugs along its periphery. These lugs allow the lid to be affixed to a container in a manner that prevents its removal without breaking a tear band, thereby making any tampering evident. Patent IN 298724 relates to "A Tamper-Proof Lid Having Spout for Containers and Process for Its Manufacture." The innovation in IN 298724 includes a spout that allows partial discharge of contents without removing the lid entirely. Both patents are intended for containers used in the storage and transport of food items.

Mold Tek alleged that Pronton Plast Pack Pvt. Ltd. was manufacturing and selling products that were functionally and structurally similar to Mold Tek's patented lids, thus infringing both patents. Photographic comparisons were made, and physical samples were presented in court to demonstrate the similarity between the products.

Procedural Background: Mold Tek instituted CS (Comm) 668/2023 before the learned District Judge (Commercial), Patiala House Courts, seeking an injunction against Pronton Plast for infringing its patents. Along with the suit, Mold Tek filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking ad interim relief. On 20th December 2023, the Commercial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restraining Pronton Plast from manufacturing, marketing, selling, or dealing with any products that allegedly infringed Mold Tek's patents IN 401417 and IN 298724.

Pronton Plast responded by filing an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC to vacate the injunction, contending that their product was significantly different and did not infringe the suit patents. They also argued that Mold Tek's patents lacked novelty due to prior art disclosures, and there was suppression of material facts regarding earlier patents, particularly IN 276, which had lapsed.

By order dated 2nd May 2024, the learned Commercial Court vacated the interim injunction, accepting Pronton Plast's arguments about prior art and serious triable issues concerning the validity of the patents. Mold Tek then filed an appeal under Section 13A of the Commercial Courts Act read with Order XLIII of the CPC, challenging the order dated 2nd May 2024 before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

Core Dispute: The central issue in this case is twofold: first, whether Pronton Plast's products infringe Mold Tek's patents IN 401417 and IN 298724; and second, whether the respondent has raised a credible challenge to the validity of Mold Tek’s patents sufficient to warrant vacation of the interim injunction? The dispute also involves procedural questions concerning the standard of review applicable in interim patent litigation, the requirement for product-to-patent mapping versus product-to-product comparison, and the burden of proof in cases where prior art is cited as a defence.

Discussion on Judgments: Several judicial precedents were cited by the parties to support their respective claims.

The respondent relied heavily on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., ILR 2009 Supp (2) Del 551, where the Delhi High Court held that in patent infringement suits, the tenability of the defendant's challenge to patent validity is relevant at the interlocutory stage. If a credible challenge to the validity is raised, interim injunctions may be refused.

The case of Glaverbel S.A. v. Dave Rose & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 308, was cited to emphasize that where there is a disputed question of fact relating to infringement, interim relief should not be granted, and such questions should be adjudicated at trial.

In Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, (1979) 2 SCC 511, the Supreme Court held that to be patentable, an invention must involve an inventive step beyond mere workshop improvement or a simple combination of known elements. This judgment was cited to support the argument that Mold Tek's patents were mere improvements and lacked the required novelty.

The issue of clean hands and suppression of material facts was highlighted through S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, AIR 1994 SC 853, where the Supreme Court held that a person approaching the court must do so with full disclosure of all material facts.

In Aura Synergy India Ltd. v. New Age False Ceiling Co. Pvt. Ltd., (2016) 65 PTC 483, and its subsequent approval by the Division Bench in (2017) 72 PTC 95 (DB), the Delhi High Court emphasized that suppression of material facts can disqualify a plaintiff from seeking interim relief in intellectual property disputes.

The respondent also referred to Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, where the Supreme Court held that equitable relief like injunction is discretionary, and the conduct of the party seeking such relief is material.

For assessing infringement, the appellant relied on Sotefin S.A. v. Indraprastha Cancer Society, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6649, which clarified that patent infringement analysis requires comparing the defendant's product with the claims of the patent, not merely the products in question.

The general principles regarding the credible challenge standard were discussed in Strix Ltd. v. Maharaja Appliances Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2825, where the Delhi High Court held that a defendant must produce some acceptable scientific material supported by expert evidence to make out a credible challenge to a patent's validity.

Additionally, the appellant cited Kudos Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1439, to argue that a credible challenge must be more than a mere possibility of invalidity; it must present a prima facie case that would merit favourable consideration at trial.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court found that the Commercial Court's order dated 2nd May 2024 suffered from significant legal infirmities. The Court held that the Commercial Court failed to properly analyze the issue of infringement. The correct method of analysis requires a product-to-patent mapping, wherein the features of the allegedly infringing product are compared with the claims in the suit patents, not merely with the plaintiff’s product. The Commercial Court’s approach of comparing products without reference to patent claims was held to be erroneous.

The Court further held that in patent litigation, if the defendant raises a defence under Section 107 of the Patents Act, the burden lies on the defendant to establish a credible challenge to the patent's validity. This onus does not shift to the plaintiff merely because the plaintiff describes its invention as an improvement over prior art. The Commercial Court’s reasoning that Mold Tek bore the burden to establish novelty before the trial was fundamentally flawed.

Regarding prior art, the Court noted that the Commercial Court did not conduct a proper analysis of whether the cited prior arts anticipated or rendered the suit patents obvious. Specifically, while Pronton Plast cited IN 276 and IN 288127 as prior arts, the Commercial Court did not perform a claim-by-claim analysis to determine whether the suit patents were actually anticipated or obvious.

The Division Bench also rejected the respondent’s submission that the initial ex parte injunction should be revisited in this appeal, holding that since the respondent had chosen to proceed under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC rather than file an appeal against the ex parte injunction, the High Court could not review the 20th December 2023 order in this appeal.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 2nd May 2024 passed by the learned Commercial Court. The matter was remanded back for de novo consideration of the application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC. The Commercial Court was directed to reconsider the issues of infringement and validity challenge afresh, applying correct legal principles, particularly the product-to-patent comparison method and the proper allocation of burden of proof.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirms that in patent infringement suits, the test for infringement requires a product-to-patent mapping, not product-to-product comparison. The burden of proof in establishing a credible challenge to a patent’s validity under Section 107 of the Patents Act lies entirely on the defendant. The mere existence of prior art is not sufficient to defeat interim relief unless it is demonstrated that the patented invention lacks novelty or is obvious in light of the prior art. Additionally, procedural fairness and equitable considerations must be balanced with substantive patent law principles when courts consider interim injunctions in intellectual property disputes.

Case Title: Mold Tek Packaging Limited vs Pronton Plast Pack Pvt. Ltd.

Date of Order: 11th July 2025

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 114/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5549:DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mr. Piruz Khambatta & Anr. Vs. Franchise India Brands Limited

Case Title: Mr. Piruz Khambatta & Anr. Vs. Franchise India Brands Limited & Anr.:Date of Order: 9th May 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 454/2025:High Court of Delhi: Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Facts:

The plaintiffs, Mr. Piruz Khambatta and the associated company, are the owners of the registered trade mark "RASNA" and related artistic works. They alleged that the defendants, Franchise India Brands Limited and its subsidiary M/s. Ichakdana Food Services LLP, engaged in infringing upon their registered trademarks by operating "Rasna Buzz" outlets and promoting infringing content on social media, despite being asked to cease such activities. The defendants had previously entered into licensing agreements and had undertaken to open numerous outlets but continued infringing activities.

Procedural Details:

• The plaintiffs filed a suit claiming infringement of trademarks and seeking permanent injunction.
• They moved an application for ex-parte interim injunction and exemption from pre-litigation mediation.
• The court considered various pending procedural applications regarding court fees, filing additional documents, and extending timelines.
• The court granted exemption from pre-litigation mediation given relevant legal precedents.
• The court directed the defendants to respond via notices, with future dates scheduled for submissions and hearings.

Issues:

• Whether the defendants have infringed upon the plaintiffs' registered trademarks.
• Whether an interim injunction should be granted to prevent further infringement.
• Whether the plaintiffs are exempted from pre-litigation mediation as per statutory and judicial precedents.

Decision:

The Court, after hearing the parties and considering the legal provisions and precedents,:

• Granted the plaintiff ex parte injunction in favour of the plaintiff.