Friday, December 27, 2013

U. VARADARAYA NAYAK case

COMMENT: 1.The Suit relates to infringement of Patent. The Hon’ble Court declined the injunction.

2. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court has reiterated the General Principles of Interim Injunction, which is as follow: On the question of grant of interim injunction it may be useful to recall the principles explained by the Supreme Court in Wander Limited v. Antox India Private Limited 1990 Supp (1) SCC 727 as under: "Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience lies". The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted." (Para 25).
3. Regarding the challenge of the Patent by the Defendant, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has given the following finding:
In F. Hoffmann-LA Roche v. Cipla Ltd. 159 (2009) DLT 243 a Division Bench of this Court was considering, in the context of the prayer for an interim injunction in a patent infringement action, the question whether the Defendant therein had raised "a credible challenge to the validity of the patent". The Court held out that "the Defendant resisting the grant of injunction by challenging the validity of the  patent at this stage is required to show that the patent is vulnerable and that the challenge raises a serious substantial question and a triable issue." (Para 30).

4.         Expanded Metal Company v. Bradford 214 U.S. 366 to urge that merely because the invention seems simple after it is made, it does not cease to be novel and that the person who first discovers and makes improvements is entitled to protection as an inventor.
5.




                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                        IA No. 3997 of 2012 in CS (OS) No. 523 of 2012
                                        Reserved on: November 26, 2013
                                                Decision on: December 12, 2013

U. VARADARAYA NAYAK ..... Plaintiff Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar with
Mr. Anirudha Mitra, Ms. Anur Paarcha and Ms.Essenese Obhan, Advocates.

                                                    Versus

S.K. ANAND & ORS. ..... Defendants Through: Mr. Mahender Rana, Advocate for
Defendant No. 1.

Mr. Amarjeet Singh, Mr. Hari Subramanium, Ms. Vernika Tomar and Ms. Vibha Arya, Advocates for Defendants 2 to 4.

Mr. Sanjeev Mahajan, Advocate for Defendants 5 and 6.

CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR

JUDGMENT
12.12.2013
1. This judgment disposes of the application by the Plaintiff U. Varadaraya Nayak under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 ('CPC') for interim relief.
Background facts
2. The Plaintiff has filed the above suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the Defendants from infringing Patent No. 184118 granted in his name for "a twin blade razor". At the time of filing of the suit on 28th February 2012, the Plaintiff was 68 years old and a retired school teacher living in Mangalore, Karnataka. He states that he holds a B.Sc. degree in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics and a B.Ed. in Education from Mysore University. He is stated to have been bestowed four National Awards and three International Awards for his research and innovations. He states that he has also been working as an individual inventor in the field of technologies related to solar energy, laboratory apparatus, teaching apparatus, utility devices such as shaving razors etc. for the last 29 years.
3. On 7th March 1994, the Plaintiff applied for a patent for an invention titled 'a twin blade razor'. It is stated that the grant of patent was opposed by Gillette Company, USA. After the examination of the patent as well as the opposition, the Controller of Patents ('COP'), by an order dated 9th April 2008, granted the Plaintiff the patent for the above invention. The grant of patent was recorded in the Register of Patents on 29th July 2008. The patent is valid for a period of 20 years from the date of filing. In other words, the patent is valid up to 7th March 2014.
4. It is stated that by an order dated 14th December 2007 the Deputy COP, Chennai held that the inventive feature of the Plaintiff's Patent No. 184118 was "the novel manner in which the holes are positioned in relation to the upper blade and lower blade". It was held that positioning of holes "can neither be a routine choice for the cartridge designer nor can the cartridge designer be aware of it and therefore is non-obvious...[in] the sense that it would not have occurred to any specialist in the field of razor manufacture or design, had such a specialist been asked to find a solution to the particular problem of cleaning the gap between blades (5,6)." It was held that the inventive feature of Patent No. 184118 did not occur to the opponent though it was simple.
5. The Plaintiff states that there are as many as five claims in the above Patent No. 184118. It is stated that the novelty and inventive step of the suit patent reside in the combination of the following integers/elements of the Plaintiff's razor:
"(a) A lower blade separated from an upper blade by a spacer
(b) The lower blade partly overlapped by the upper blade
(c) Holes provided on the lower blade such that each hole is partly covered by the upper blade and remains partly exposed."
The plaint
6. In para 13 of the plaint, the Plaintiff states that he wrote a letter dated 8th October 2003 to Laser Shaving (India) Pvt. Ltd. ('LSIPL') (Defendant No.2) having its offices at New Delhi, Hyderabad and Mumbai, expressing his willingness to license/assign his inventions related to shaving equipments (i.e. the then pending suit patent and granted Patent No. 181580 related to a protective case for a safety razor head). The Plaintiff states that in the said letter he had explained the inventive features of his inventions to Defendant No.2.
7. In para 14, the Plaintiff states that Mr. S.K. Anand (Defendant No.1), "is CS (OS) No. 523 of 2012 Page 3 of 28 believed to be the Chief Executive Officer ('CEO') in Harbans Lal Malhotra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant No.3)". In the same paragraph the Plaintiff avers that LSIPL (Defendant No.2), Malhotra International (P) Ltd. (Defendant No.4), Vidyut Metallics Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant No.5) and Supermax Personal Care Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant No. 6) are associated companies of the 'House of Malhotra' and involved in the activity of manufacturing and selling razors that are using the Plaintiff's patented invention, thereby infringing the patent of the Plaintiff. It is further averred that Defendants are a common economic entity. The Plaintiff states that the exact relationship between the Defendants could be ascertained after discovery in the present suit.
8. In para 15 of the plaint it is stated that following the letter of 8th October 2003, the Plaintiff on 14th October 2003 had a telephonic conversation with Mr. S.K.Anand (Defendant No.1) in respect of both the inventions related to shaving equipments. It is further stated that Defendant No.1 responded to the Plaintiff's letter dated 8th October 2003 written to Defendant No.2 and requested the Plaintiff to send him the detailed specifications of both inventions along with the correspondence related to the suit patent. The Plaintiff states that he sent a letter dated 22nd October 2003 to Defendant No.1 sending him the "complete specifications, drawings and patent certificate in respect of Patent No. 181580 and in the same letter assured him that he would be sending documents pertaining to the suit patent including the documents related to the opposition proceedings initiated by the Gillette Company, USA." It is then stated that on 23rd October 2003, the Plaintiff sent Defendant No.1 the documents pertaining to the suit patent which included provisional as well as complete specifications, drawings related thereto and all the documents and correspondences received by the Plaintiff from the Patent Office, Chennai. By a letter dated 29th October 2003, the Plaintiff requested Defendant No.1 to "reconsider his Patent No. 181580 for assignment/licensing." It is stated that when he did not hear from the Defendants, the Plaintiff sent reminder letters dated 27th December and 29th December 2003 requesting them to let the Plaintiff know if they were interested in licensing/assignment of any of his inventions.
9. In para 20 of the plaint, it is stated as under:
"20. It is only thereafter when the Plaintiff had a telephonic conversation sometime in January 2004 with Defendant No.1 that the Defendants responded that they are not interested in any of his inventions. Considering that the Defendants indicated disinterest in commercial exploitation of the invention forwarded by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff considered the matter closed and did not thereafter pursue or interact with the Defendants".
10. The plaint is silent on what happened for a period of seven years thereafter. In para 21 it is stated as under:
"21. In or around last week of December 2011, the Plaintiff was shocked to learn that the Defendants are involved in the manufacture and sale of razors that using the same technology/invention shared by the Plaintiff in 2003. The Plaintiff had in good faith treated the matter as closed and did not anticipate that the Defendants would blatantly exploit the Plaintiff's invention shared by the Plaintiff with the Defendants in good faith in 2003. It is pertinent to note that despite coming from a less privileged economic background, the Plaintiff had diligently expended his meagre resources in renewing the Patent No. 184118 from time to time spending in excess of Rs.43,000/-. The  consistency with which the Plaintiff, a retired school teacher, has maintained his rights in the suit patent speaks volumes about the faith that he reposed in the commercial viability of his invention and in the patent system of his country".
11. In para 22 of the plaint, the Plaintiff has listed out 12 infringing products manufactured by Defendants 2, 4, 5 and 6. It is not in dispute that each of the products list in para 22 is a triple blade razor. In para 25 it is stated that upon coming to know the above fact, the Plaintiff himself conducted an investigation and found that the Defendants' infringing products, using a technology identical to the one under the suit patent, were being sold in the domestic market including within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
12. In para 26 of the plaint, the Plaintiff sets out the particulars of infringement. He states that on perusal of the triple blade razors procured by the Plaintiff from the market, the Plaintiff noticed that the Defendants have unauthorisedly copied/incorporated all the essential elements and combination of elements/integers of the Plaintiff's registered patent namely: "(a) a lower blade separated from an upper blade by a spacer (b) the lower blade partly overlapped by the upper blade (c) holes provided on lower blade such that each hole is partly covered by the upper blade and remains partly exposed."
13. The Plaintiff has in his plaint relied upon a technical report obtained by him from Professor K.V. Gangadharan, National Institute of Technology, Surathkal, Mangalore, Karnataka ('NITK'). The comparison charts and tables explaining the similarities between the infringing products of the Defendants and the elements of claims of the Plaintiff in the suit patent have been set out in para 26. It is stated in para 29 that "the cause of action for the present suit arose when the Plaintiff came to know in or around last week of December 2011 that the Defendants were manufacturing and marketing the Plaintiff's 'Twin Blade Razor' using identical technology and know-how as that of the Plaintiff's patent". The cause of action is said to have further arisen in January 2012 when the Plaintiff received the report of Professor K.V. Gangadharan from NITK. Apart from praying for a permanent injunction, the Plaintiff has also claimed damages in the sum of Rs.20 lakhs and for rendition of accounts and profits earned by the Defendants and delivery up of infringing goods for destruction.
The written statement of Defendant No.1
14. Summons in the suit and notice in the application IA No. 3997 of 2012 were issued on 2nd March 2012. Defendant No.1 in his written statement filed on 16th April 3012 stated at the outset that there was no cause of action disclosed against him in the plaint. He was neither manufacturing nor selling any twin blade razor. He stated that the Plaintiff was aware that Defendant No.1 had retired from the services of Defendant No.3 way back in 1998 and was not thereafter entitled to represent Defendant No.3. Defendant No.1 denied having any telephonic conversation or correspondence with the Plaintiff in respect of the suit patent either in his personal capacity or on behalf of Defendant No.3. Defendant No.1 alleged that the Plaintiff had fabricated the correspondence to mislead the Court. He contended that he was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the proceedings.
15. Defendant No.1 pointed out that the product 'Laser3Petals' and Topaz3' have been manufactured and marketed only by Defendant No.2 and not by Defendant No.3. He further pointed out that Defendants 5 and 6 are competitors of Defendants 2, 3 and 4 and, therefore, the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties. Defendant No.1 has also listed out the prior art in the US and Canadian patents as well as some Indian patents in terms of which, according to him, the claims made by the Plaintiff in the suit patent were in public domain and, therefore, not an invention within the meaning of the Patents Act, 1970 ('PA'). Reference is made to US Patent No. 4641429 (hereafter 'US Patent '429') filed on 24th December 1984 i.e. at least nine years before the date of fling of Patent No.184118. Reference is also made to US Patent No. 3724070 (hereafter 'US Patent '070') filed on 15th March 1971 which also showed the presence of holes in the lower blade and that the holes in the lower blade were partly covered by the upper blade. Canadian Patent No. 1101652 filed on 31st October 1978 showed that the lower blade and the holes therein extended forward relative to the cutting edge of the upper blade. Reference is also made to PCT Publication No. WO 1991/19596 (hereafter 'PCT 596') published on 26th December 1991 i.e. 18 months before the filing of the suit patent which was also related to a twin blade assembly with the lower blade edge extending outward of the shaving edge of the upper blade. Since the alleged novel feature of Patent No. 184118 was anticipated by PCT 596, Patent No. 184118 was rendered invalid. Reference is also made to US Patent No. 4345374.
The written statement of Defendant Nos. 2 to4
16. A written statement was filed by Defendants 2 to 4 on 9th April 2012. They also filed a counter claim, CC No. 14 of 2012, seeking revocation of Patent No. 184118 granted in favour of the Plaintiff. Apart from reiterating that the suit patent lacked novelty and is, therefore, invalid, they stated that Defendants 2 to 4 are among the leading companies manufacturing and marketing safety razor blades for more than sixty years enjoying tremendous goodwill and reputation in the market. They contended that Claim 2 of the suit patent stipulated a mathematical theory whereby an artificial and non- constructional feature i.e. a plane drawn perpendicular to the plane surface of the lower blade, the shaving edge of the upper blade lying on the said plane, whereby the plane intersects the lower blade into the first portion and the second portion, cannot be patented under Section 3(k) of the PA. Further, Claim 3 envisaged each hole being quadrilateral and not circular or square whereas the holes in the infringing products did not contain square holes. Claim 3 of the suit patent was not workable and not capable of industrial application and, therefore, not an invention under Section 2(1) (j) of the PA. Further, there was no demonstration in the suit patent that the feature under Claim 4 i.e. the spacer strip extending from one end to the other on the longitudinal axis and tapering towards the shaving edge of the upper blade was practically feasible even as a working model. Claim 5 of the suit patent was an omnibus claim with no standing on its own.
17. Defendants 2 to 4 further pointed out that in 1984, CS (OS) No. 873 of 1984 was filed by the Gillette Company U.S.A against Defendants 3 and 4 and others for infringing Indian patents granted in favour of Gillette which pertained to a twin blade shaving system. These facts are urged to show that a complete arrangement with a lower and upper blade and with lower blade having holes was already in the public domain and, therefore, the said feature of the impugned patent could not be termed as a novelty. It was submitted that apart from the patent being revocable under Section 64(1) (e), (f) and (g) it was also revocable under Section 64(1) (j) of the PA since the Plaintiff had appropriated technology from the public domain through a copy-paste method in order to obtain an unjust enrichment on false pretentions. Inasmuch as Claim 1 was not an invention, it was not patentable under Section 64(1) (k) of the PA.
The written statement of Defendant Nos. 5 and 6
18. Defendants 5 and 6 filed their written statement on 11th April 2012. They submitted that there was a memorandum of understanding executed between the three sons of late Mr. Harbans Lal Malhotra on 19th August 1995. There was a settlement between the Harbans Lal Malhotra group ('HLM Group') (Defendants 2 to 4) on the one hand and Vidyut Metallics Pvt. Ltd and Supermax Personal Care Pvt. Ltd (Defendants 5 and 6) ('the Supermax Group') on the other. It is stated that the HLM Group and the Supermax Group are independent groups and competitors. The plaint failed to disclose any common dispute or common transaction to which the Supermax Group were parties. The plaint disclosed that the Plaintiff had correspondence with Defendant No.1 only. No cause of action was disclosed against the Supermax Group.
19. Defendants 5 and 6 also contended that the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. In addition to the grounds urged by Defendants 2 to 4, Defendants 5 and 6 urged that the complete specification of the suit patent "does not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention and the method by which it is to be performed, that is to say, that the description of the method or the instructions for the working of the invention, as contained in the complete specification are not by themselves sufficient to  enable a person in India possessing average skill in, and average knowledge of, the art to which the invention relates, to work the invention, or that it does not disclose the best method of performing it which was known to the applicant for the patent and for which he was entitled to claim protection and which constitutes a ground for revocation of the patent under sub-Section (h) of Section 64 of the Act." It was submitted that the grounds of revocation of the suit patent under Section 64 (1) (g), (i) and (j) are also attracted.
20. Defendants 5 and 6 raised the plea of delay and laches. It is stated that Defendant No.5 began independently manufacturing the twin blade razors with improvised computer controlled assembly machine in the year 1986. They were under the brands SuperMax SII, SuperMax Style, SuperMax Lubra and SuperMax Delux. It is stated that the research and development ('R&D') for the three blades and four blades razors commenced in 1994 and the designs were ready in 1998. Manufacturing of three blade razors commenced in 2000 and marketing soon thereafter. Four blade razors were sold since 2006. It is stated that the Plaintiff at that time was certainly "quite aware of the fact that Defendant No.5 were manufacturing and selling twin blade razors fitting the description of what the Plaintiff calls conventional razors in his patent specification." It is also submitted that the suit patent has not been worked for the last 18 years. It is contended that the Plaintiff has filed a vexatious litigation more than 12 years after the three blade razors of Defendants 5 and 6 were manufactured and introduced in the market. It is denied that the Plaintiff ever corresponded with Defendants 5 and 6. Therefore, there was no question of them having any access to his patent.
21. Defendants 5 and 6 have assailed the expert report of Professor K.V. Gangadharan of NITK. In particular, it is pointed out that his report is only based on a visual analysis of the components of each razor. It is submitted that Professor K.V. Gangadharan had only analysed the suit patent vis-à-vis the Gillette Presto razor as prior art and he had not analysed the suit patent vis-à-vis other prior art razors such as the twin blade razors manufactured by the Defendants 5 and 6 or the prior published patent documents. It is pointed out that he had not disclosed the parameters set by him to perform the alleged rinsing operation on the Gillette Presto razor and the alleged prototype working model of the suit patent; he had not mentioned the details and conditions for conducting such experiments including the test subjects; he had failed to disclose details of fluid characteristics, viscosity, composition of the slurry being in shaving debris and the co-efficient of flow which influenced the experiment and on which he had based his conclusions. It is submitted that the conclusion of Professor Gangadharan that the triple blade razor of Defendants 5 and 6 can be described as a combination of an upper twin blade razor and a lower twin blade razor was 'preposterous'.
22. In the written statements filed by Defendants 5 and 6 it is further pointed out that the only way to establish infringement was to compare a razor manufactured on the basis of the suit patent with that manufactured by Defendants 5 and 6 but no razor was in fact manufactured on the basis of the suit patent. It was pointed out that the technology and engineering design for the twin blade on one hand and three and four blade razors on the other are completely different considering the size, positioning and alignments of blades in twin, triple and quadra blades razors. It is submitted that in triple and quadra blades only about 10% of the hole is exposed whereas 90% of the hole remains covered by the upper blade and the protrusion in the holes is not because of the change in size or placement of the holes but because the size of the upper blades gradually decreases in size which leads to the holes in the lower blade getting slightly exposed without there being any change in the size and placement of holes. Importantly, it is pointed out that the lowest blade in the three and four blades have two rows of holes in comparison to one row of holes in the suit patent. The size of lower blades is bigger in three and four blades. Defendants 5 and 6 have also filed a counter-claim, CC No. 73 of 2012 seeking revocation of the suit patent.
23. The Plaintiff has filed replication to the written statements as well as written statements to the counter-claims.
24. Ms. Swathi Sukumar, learned counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Mohinder Rana, learned counsel for Defendant No.1, Mr. Amarjeet Singh, learned counsel for Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 and Mr. Sanjeev Mahajan, learned counsel for Defendants 5 and 6 have addressed arguments on the question of grant of interim relief.
General principles regarding grant of interim relief
25. On the question of grant of interim injunction it may be useful to recall the principles explained by the Supreme Court in Wander Limited v. Antox India Private Limited 1990 Supp (1) SCC 727 as under: "Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience lies". The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted."
Prima Facie Case
26. The Court first proposes to examine whether the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for the grant of an interim injunction in his favour.
27. In response to the query by the Court whether a prototype was developed from the suit patent and whether that was used for comparison with the infringing products by the expert, Ms. Sukumar, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff, initially showed a wooden model, the photographs of which have been included at pages 406 to 408 of the Plaintiff's documents. Later she produced a prototype purportedly used by the expert while preparing his examination report. She stated that he examined a Gillette blade which was available in the market and which was modified to incorporate the suit patent. The expert does not say so in his report. He states that he was given a 'working model/prototype' by the Plaintiff. He does not describe what the model was or how it was made. It will also have to be explained by the expert on what basis the Gillette Presto blade stated to have been modified to incorporate the suit patent can be compared for infringement with the products of the Supermax Group. The abstract preceding the report of the expert states that the analysis is based on visual inspection and analysis of the function of components in the devices. The expert, however, fails to notice or comment on the fact that there is more than one row of holes in the lower blade in the triple and quadra blade.
28. It was then urged by Ms. Sukumar that in a patent infringement action, the comparison is between the claim under the suit patent and the infringing product and not between the patented product and the infringing product. However, even on this basis there are several unanswered questions at this stage. The allegedly infringing products of Defendants 2 to 6 are three-blade and four-blade razors whereas the suit patent is for a twin-blade razor. Samples of blades used in the triple-blade and quadra blades have been produced in the Court. It is seen that in a triple-blade, the first blade has one row of holes, the second blade two rows of holes and the third blade, three rows of holes. The size of the first lower blade is bigger than the upper blade and the size of the second lower blade bigger than the first and so on. The shape and positioning of the holes in each of the lower blades is different. The report of the expert relied upon the Plaintiff is silent on whether the expert noticed the above features i.e. the number of rows of holes, the size, position and alignment of blades in the twin blades as compared to the triple and quadra blades. He will have to be questioned at the trial on whether the protrusion of the holes are not caused because of the change in size or placement in the holes but because of the size of the upper blades gradually decreasing when compared to the size of the lower blades. In short, the question which is yet to be convincingly answered by the Plaintiff is whether the three-blade and four-blade razors of the Defendants have been manufactured by using the suit patent.
29. In support of the plea that a triple blade or a quadra blade is merely an extension of a twin blade, and that in any event the claims in the suit patent are not confined to a twin blade razor, Ms. Sukumar relied upon the decision dated 29th April 2005 of the US Court of Appeals in The Gillette Company v. Energizer Holding Inc. The Defendants pointed out that in the said case Claim No.1 of the patent in question described the invention as relating to "particular safety razor blade having blade units with plurality of blades". In the instant case, the first paragraph of the specification of the suit patent states "this invention relates to a twin blade razor". There is no reference to 'plurality' of blades. Para 29 of the plaint states that "the cause of action for the present suit arose when the Plaintiff came to know in or around last week of December 2011 that the Defendants were manufacturing and marketing the Plaintiff's twin blade razor using identical technology and know-how as that of the Plaintiff's patent."
Vulnerability of the suit patent
30. The Court next takes up the question of vulnerability of the suit patent to a challenge as to its validity. In F. Hoffmann-LA Roche v. Cipla Ltd. 159 (2009) DLT 243 a Division Bench of this Court was considering, in the context of the prayer for an interim injunction in a patent infringement action, the question whether the Defendant therein had raised "a credible challenge to the validity of the patent". The Court held out that "the Defendant resisting the grant of injunction by challenging the validity of the  patent at this stage is required to show that the patent is vulnerable and that the challenge raises a serious substantial question and a triable issue." The Court referred to the decision dated 22nd June 2006 of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Abbot Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals Inc. where it was held that "in resisting a preliminary injunction, however, one need not make out a case of actual invalidity. Vulnerability is the issue at the preliminary injunction stage, while validity is the issue at trial. The showing of a substantial question as to invalidity thus requires less proof than the clear and convincing showing necessary to establish invalidity itself."
31. The Plaintiff has admitted that two of the three features integral to Claim 1 of the suit patent are known features through the prior art. These are: (i) One lower blade separated from the upper blade by a spacer and (ii) Lower blade partly overlapped by upper blade. This is evident from the reply filed by the Plaintiff on 28th August 2001 to the opposition by Gillette at the pre- grant stage before the Deputy COP where he states "the use of spacer means is not the novel feature or claim of my invention of Patent No.184118. The provision of apertures or holes for the passage of lather and debris in the lower leading blade as in the conventional twin blade razors wherein all the holes/apertures are wholly situated beneath the upper blade is not the claim of my invention of Patent No.184118." The use of the twin blade system i.e. providing a razor with upper trailing blade and lower leading blade is also admitted by him to be known. What the Plaintiff claims as a novel feature is providing apertures or holes in the lower blade of twin blade shaving system such that one part of each of the holes lie in the portion of the lower blade situated beneath the upper blade and the remaining part of each hole lie in the remaining portion of the lower blade situated beyond (outside) the shaving edge of the upper blade.
32. Ms. Sukumar relied on Expanded Metal Company v. Bradford 214 U.S. 366 to urge that merely because the invention seems simple after it is made, it does not cease to be novel and that the person who first discovers and makes improvements is entitled to protection as an inventor. The Defendants argue that the prior art sufficiently depicts the partial covering of the holes and that the suit patent is revocable on the grounds of both anticipation and obviousness. At this stage, the Court proposes to discuss illustratively one such prior art referred to in the report of the expert produced by the Supermax Group. The said report refers to US Patent No. '070 and concludes that it shows the existence of partially covered and partially existing holes in the blades. In response, learned counsel to the Plaintiff relies upon the fact that the Deputy COP has in the order dated 14th December 2007 observed that in US Patent No. '070 the lower blade is fully covered by the upper blade and that no portion of the slots and holes in the lower blade are situated forward of any beyond the shaving edge of the secondary blade though they may be proximate to shaving edge. However, the expert produced by the Supermax Group states in his report that US Patent No. '070 is a "prior art showing debris formation proximate to the cutting edge". These are conflicting expert opinions that need to be tested at the trial. The Court is not required to express a final view at this stage. Likewise, there is serious contestation between the parties as regards the other prior art as well, all of which need not be discussed at this stage. Suffice to say that the material placed on record by the Defendants persuades the Court to hold that they have raised a credible challenge to the validity of the suit patent in terms of Section 64 (1) PA.
33. The challenge to the suit patent is also on other grounds. It is urged that it is not clear whether any prototype was examined at the stage of grant of patent. During the hearing it was sought to be explained by the counsel for the Plaintiff that under Section 10 (3) of the PA, the COP had the discretion to ask for a product to be developed for examination and that it was possible to grant a patent even without the product being developed. The novel aspect of the suit patent is purportedly the partial covering of the holes which facilitates easy clearing of the debris when the blade is washed with running water. How this can be verified by the COP without a working model is a matter for experts to explain at the trial.
34. In response to the submission of the Defendants 2 to 6 that the suit patent lacked the requisite complete specification, Ms. Sukumar referred to the decision in Corevalve Inc. Edwards Lifesciences [2009] All ER (D) 66 and submitted that the suit patent sufficiently described how the holes in the blade are designed to achieve the desired result of cleaning the debris and any person involved in manufacturing razors would easily be able to make a workable product out of the specifications. As against this, it is urged by learned counsel for the Defendants that in the above case there was no allegation that no workable device could be produced. A device did exist but its description was such that it could not be implemented clinically. The Defendants argue that in the present case there is no specification of either the size of the holes, the placement of the holes, the number of holes and the manner of achieving the result of the debris being removed by pouring water rather than forcing tap water and that these would be the very basic specifications for making a product on the basis of the suit patent. Given the nature of the product, in the present case, it cannot be concluded, without the matter going to trial, that the specification of the suit patent is sufficient to develop the infringing products.
35. There was much argument on the question whether the fact that the patent was not worked by the Plaintiff could be a ground for revocation of the patent. The Defendants placed considerable reliance Sections 83 and 85 of the PA and on the decision in Franz Xaver Huemer v. New Yash Engineers AIR 1997 Del 79. In response, it is submitted by Ms. Sukumar that the question of non-working of a patent is relevant only in the context of compulsory licensing of the patent which in the instant case has not happened. The Court keeps open these contentions as a decision thereon is not considered necessary for deciding the question of interim relief.
36. The Court holds that while the Defendants have been able to raise a credible challenge to the validity of the suit patent, the Plaintiff has not been able to prima facie show that the Defendants 2 to 6 were, in October 2003, aware of the specification of the suit patent and made the allegedly infringing products on that basis.
The case against Defendants 2 to 6
37. The respective cases of the parties show that the Plaintiff in the first place proceeded on the presumption that the Defendants were either related to each other or were associated companies. Importantly, the Plaintiff presumed that Defendant No.1 continued to be the CEO of Defendant No.3 even as of the date of filing the suit. In the replication filed to the written statement of Defendant No.1, the Plaintiff is unable to dispute the fact that Defendant No.1 has ceased to be an employee of Defendant No.3 since 1998. Defendants 2 to 4 have placed on record a letter dated 1st April 1998 addressed by Defendant No.3 to Defendant No.1 informing him of his retirement with effect from the close of business on 30th April 1998 and documents concerning payment of his gratuity. Prima facie it does show that Defendant No.1 was no longer an employee of Defendant No.3 at the time the Plaintiff purportedly wrote him on 8th October 2003.
38. While Defendant No.1 has completely denied that the Plaintiff wrote to him on 8th October 2003 and the telephone conversation with him on 14th October 2003, the Plaintiff relies on a letter dated 18th October 2003 written by Defendant No.1 acknowledging receipt of the Plaintiff's earlier letter dated 8th October 2003. Defendant No.1 has denied receiving the letter dated 18th October 2003 as well. The Plaintiff has placed on record a copy of the said letter. It is unsigned. The Plaintiff has on 10th September 2013 filed a copy of the cover bearing a postal stamp of 2nd October 2003 of the Post Office at Mangalore. This shows the sender to be Defendant No.3. It is by ordinary post. It will be for the Plaintiff to prove at the trial on the basis of these two documents that the said unsigned letter was in fact sent by Defendant No.1 in a cover bearing the name of Defendant No.3. At this stage, it is not possible to conclude that the said unsigned letter was in fact sent by Defendant No.1. This is an important document for the Plaintiff since it purportedly links Defendant No.1 and through him the remaining Defendants. There is admittedly no correspondence between any of the other Defendants and the Plaintiff. In this background, the burden will on the Plaintiff to show at the trial that despite the fact that Defendant No.1 ceased to be an employee of Defendant No.3 with effect from 1st May 1998, he continued to act on behalf of not only to Defendants 2 to 4 but also on behalf of Defendants 5 and 6 in October 2003.
39. The case of the Plaintiff is that Defendants 2 to 6 became privy to the suit patent specifications and drawings through Defendant No.1. In support of his plea that he sent to Defendant No.1 the complete specifications and drawings of the suit patent, the Plaintiff has placed on record copies of the handwritten letter dated 23rd October 2003 addressed to Defendant No.1 as 'CEO (Mr. Anand)' at the address of Defendant No.3 and the speed post receipts. Photocopies of the subsequent handwritten letters dated 29th October 2003, 27th December 2003 and 29th December 2003, all addressed to 'CEO (Mr. Anand)' at the address of Defendant No.3 have also been filed. All of these documents have been denied by Defendant No.1. Therefore, it would be a matter for proof at trial that these letters were in fact delivered to Defendant No.1 at the address to which it was sent. The further burden on the Plaintiff would be to show that Defendant No.1 in turn handed over or conveyed the contents of these documents to the other Defendants. At the present stage, the documents placed on record do not enable the Court to come to even a prima facie conclusion that the Defendants 2 to 6 were privy to the said information.
40. The Plaintiff then relies on information received by him from BSNL pursuant to an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 ('RTI Act') about the outgoing calls from his telephone number 2231542 for the period 1st October to 30th November 2003. These show that three telephone calls were made: one on 28th October 2003, the second on 7th November 2003 and the third on 25th November 2003. The two calls on 28th October 2003 were to 03326549000, stated to be the number of Defendant No.5. The lengths of the two calls were 38 seconds and 31 seconds. There is no averment that Defendant No.1 was connected with Defendant No.5. Three calls were to Mobile No. 9831047909. It will be a matter for evidence as to whether this mobile number pertains to any of the Defendants. In any event, the telephonic conversations that the Plaintiff is said to have had as averred in para 15 of the plaint on 14th October 2003 does not appear to be established by the above call details. There is no outgoing call from the Plaintiff's number on 14th October 2003. In the plaint there is no reference to outgoing calls on 28th October 2003, 7th November 2003 and 25th November 2003. As regards the purported telephonic conversation with Defendant No.1 in January 2004, the Plaintiff relies on the call details obtained from the Dakshina Kannada District of BSNL which shows one call made on 12th January 2004 to Mobile No. 98310479091 for a brief duration. These details by themselves do not enable the Court to conclude even prima facie that the conversation pertained to the suit patent.
41. These are the prima facie conclusions of the Court. Certainly, the Plaintiff would have to discharge the burden of proving the facts as pleaded by him in the plaint. For the present purpose, however, the Plaintiff has not been able to even prima facie show that Defendants 2 to 6 would have known of the suit patent as a result of the Plaintiff's alleged correspondence and telephone conversations with Defendant No.1 in October 2003 and January 2004 and despite the latter having ceased to be an employee of Defendant No.3 since 1st May, 1998.
Delay and laches
42. The Court next examines the question of delay and laches. It has been explained by the Supreme Court in Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90 that mere delay in bringing an action is not sufficient to defeat the grant of injunction. However, it would have to be shown that the Defendants were dishonest in adopting the suit patent to manufacture the infringing product. As already observed, the Plaintiff has not been able to show that the Defendants 2 to 6 actually knew of the suit patent in October 2003 itself.
43 Ms. Sukumar referred to the decision in IXYS v. Advance Power Technology 321 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2004) to urge that since Defendants declined to obtain a licence from the Plaintiff, any delay on the part of the Plaintiff in filing the suit cannot be held against him since he was under a bona fide belief that Defendants would honour their decision not to use the suit patent. As already concluded, the Plaintiff has not been able to prima facie show that he ever corresponded with Defendants 2 to 6 and that they communicated to him their disinclination to obtain a licence for the suit patent.
44. The explanation that the Plaintiff gives for waiting till May 2012 to file the present suit is not very convincing. It is difficult to believe that a person who holds patents for several inventions, and has succeeded, in 2008, in obtaining a patent for a twin blade razor after pre-grant opposition, was not aware of similar products in the market till December 2011. The case of the Supermax Group is that they entered the market with the triple and quadra blades in 2000 and 2006 respectively. Their products have been sold throughout the country and abroad. The Supermax Group are proprietors of the trademarks SuperMax SII, SuperMax Style etc. since 1990 and SuperMax Sensation and SuperMax Lubra since 2000 and 2001 respectively. Defendants 2 to 4 have also shown that they are manufacturing their products pursuant to the patent granted in their favour which has not been challenged till date.
45. In the circumstances, the Court is of the view that the Plaintiff has not been able to sufficiently explain the delay in approaching this Court for the grant of interim injunction.
Balance of convenience and hardship
46. The Court next examines the factors of balance of convenience and irreparable hardship. Defendants 2 to 4 and 5 and 6 have produced the sales figures of their products which run into several crores annually. They submit that the grant of an interim injunction would effectively mean shutting down their business. Whereas the Defendants 2 to 6 would be in a position to compensate the Plaintiff if he ultimately succeeds, the Plaintiff would be in no position to compensate the monetary losses likely to be suffered by the Defendants 2 to 6 if ultimately he does not succeed. On the other hand, it is urged by Ms. Sukumar that since the suit patent expires in March 2014, the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the interim injunction is not granted. It is submitted that if the Court fails to issue an injunction, the Defendant would continue to use the products as if they have a licence for the suit patent and this would set an undesirable precedent for the other potential infringers apart from rendering the Plaintiff's prayer for a permanent injunction infructuous. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court inZenit Metaplast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 10 SCC 388.
47. Para 23 of the decision in Zenit Metaplast Pvt. Ltd. reads as under: "23. Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the Plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial". (emphasis supplied)
48. The Plaintiff has not been able to dispute the sales figures of the triple blade and quadra blades since 2000 and 2006 respectively. The documents placed on record by the Defendants 2 to 4 and 5 and 6 show the sales figure for triple blades for the year ending 31st March 2010 was Rs.17,75,38,729 and for the quadra blades it was Rs.2,75,25,184.The Plaintiff filed the suit in December 2012 despite obtaining the patent registration in 2008. If at this stage an interim injunction is granted, the business of the Defendants 2 to 6 in the allegedly infringing products which commenced since 2000 and 2006 would undoubtedly be adversely affected. Also, in that event, the losses of the Defendants 2 to 6 cannot be expected to be adequately compensated by the Plaintiff if he ultimately does not succeed in the suit. In the period during which the Plaintiff has delayed the filing of the suit for infringement, the businesses of the Defendants 2 to 6 have grown significantly. This would be a factor that has to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance
CS (OS) No. 523 of 2012 Page 26 of 28 of convenience lies. In American Cyanamid Company v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316 it was observed as under:
"the governing principle is that the Court should first consider whether, if the Plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunction, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of the Defendant's continuing to do what was sought to be en joined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the Defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the Plaintiff's claim appeared to be at that stage. If, on the other hand, damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the Plaintiff in the event of his succeeding at the trial, the Court should then consider whether, on the contrary hypothesis that the Defendant were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to do that which was sought to be enjoined, he would be adequately compensated under the Plaintiff's undertaking as to damages for the loss he would have sustained by being prevented from doing so between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable under such an undertaking would be an adequate remedy and the Plaintiff would be in a financial position to pay them, there would be no reason upon this ground to refuse an interlocutory injunction."
49. The Court concludes that the balance of convenience in declining the interim relief sought by the Plaintiff is in favour of the Defendants. However, the Defendants 2 to 6 are directed to maintain full accounts of the sales of the respective products listed in para 22 of the plaint as reflected in the audited accounts from the date of filing of the suit and shall produce those accounts at the trial. If the Plaintiff succeeds in the suit, the damages payable to him would be determined on that basis.
50. It is clarified that nothing said in this order will affect the final decision in the suit.
Conclusion
51. IA No. 3997 of 2012 is dismissed with the above directions and observations with no order as to costs.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
DECEMBER 12, 2013


Friday, October 11, 2013

Patents (Applications and Appeals to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Amendment Rules, 2013.





NOTIFICATION Dated 16th May, 2013

Whereas certain draft rules were published, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 159 of the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970), in Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II Section 3, Sub-Section (i) dated 21st January, 2013, vide notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry(Department of industrial Policy and Promotion) number G.S.R.29(E) dated 21st January, 2013 inviting objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be affected thereby before the expiry of forty five days from the date on which copies of the Official Gazette containing the notification were made available to the public;

And whereas, the copies of the Official Gazette containing the said notification were made available tothe public on 21st January, 2013;
And whereas, no objection and suggestions were received by the Central Government;
Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 159 of the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules further to amend the Patents(Appeals and Applications to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Rules, 2011 namely:
 

1. Short title and commencement.-(1) These rules may be called the Patents (Applications and Appeals to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Amendment Rules, 2013.
(2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.

2. In the Patents (Applications and Appeals to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Rules, 2011,

(a) in the First Schedule,
(i) for Form 2, the following Form shall be substituted, namely:


"FORM 1
[See rule 2]
BEFORE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARDAPPLICATIONFOR REVOCATION ORA No. Date Seal

(In the matter of ---------------------------)

  1. Name of Applicant :


  2. Address :


  3. Name of Counsel and address :


  4. Name(s) of Respondent (s) with address : [In case of foreign respondent(s), the address for service in India, if any, may be furnished]


  5. Relief claimed and relevant Sections :


  6. Particulars of parallel or collateral proceedings :


  7. In application for revocation of Patent : (details of impugned patent -date of grant,title of patent complete specification)


  8. Facts of case : (set out facts in brief along with the evidence andthe documents relied on)


  9. Grounds on which relief is Sought for (in brief) :


  10. Details of fees :


  11. Prayer :
 
12. Affidavit as below, in support thereof :



Dated this …………. Day of ………….Place ………….. Signature of applicant

List of documents:
The proof affidavit along with the documents shall be filed.

[For example,
Annexure-1:Copy of Certificate/order obtained bythe respondent in respect of impugned patent.
Annexure-2 and so on:Other documents.]

AFFIDAVITBEFORE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
 

                                                      Case No.

  
(In the matter of ----------)



C ause title: … Applicant vs. ...Respondent

Shri -----------------------son of --------------------aged at -------residing at -----------------------------------------------------------do solemnly affirm and declare as under:-Xxx Xxx Deponent

Verification

I…………………………………………….. (name of deponent/of …………………………. Nationality, resident of ………………….…………………………………….) do hereby verify that the contents of paras …………. to …………. are trueto my/our personal knowledge and paras …………. to ........... are believed to be true on legal advice and that I/we have not suppressed any material fact. Dated this …………….. day of ......... Place …………. Signature of the Deponent";

(ii) for Form-2, the following Form shall be substituted, namely:
 

"FORM 2
 
 
[See rule 2]

BEFORE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
APPEAL
O.A. No. Date Seal

(Appeal arising out of ----------------------) …….. Cause title:
….Appellant/(rank of party before the Registry, if any)vs.….Respondent/(rank of party before the Registry, if any)

The appellant above named, prefers the appeal under section 117A, against the order dated…………… forthe following among other grounds:

(a)

(b


  1. (c)


  2. (d)
 


d
  
Limitation:For the above reasons, it is prayed ……Affidavit, as below, in support thereof:Dated this ……… Day of …………..Place
Signature
IPAB



(In the matter of ------------) Cause title: ... Appellant vs. ...Respondent

Shri ----------------------son of ----------------------------aged at -----------residing at-----------------------------do solemnly affirm and declare as under:-Xxx Xxx Deponent

Verification

I ……………………………………. (name of deponent/of ………………………. Nationality, resident of ……………….) do hereby verify that the contents of paras ……….. to ………… are true to my/our personal knowledge and paras………… to ……….. are believed to be true on legal advice and that I/we have not suppressed any material fact. Dated this …………. day of ……… Place Signature of the Deponent";

(iii) for Form-3, the following Form shall be substituted, namely:


"FORM 3
[See rule 2]BEFORE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD(Application for condoning the delay in filing Appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970)
M.P.No. Date Seal (In the matter of --------------------------)


  1. Name of Petitioner/Appellant :


  2. Address :


  3. Name of Counsel and address :


  4. Name(s) of Respondent (s) with address : [In case of foreign respondent(s), the addressfor service in India, if any, may be furnished]


  5. Period of delay :


  6. Grounds. :
 


…/4



7. Prayer

:


Affidavit, as below, in support thereof



Dated this……………. Day of …………Place ……………..





Signature of the petitioner


AFFIDAVIT







BEFORE THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD


Case No.
 
(In the matter of ---------) Cause title: ... Appellantvs. ...Respondent


Shri ----------------------son of ----------------------------aged at ------------residing at ----------------------------------do solemnly affirm and declare as under:-

Xxx Xxx

Deponent

Verification

I ………………………………….. (name of deponent/of ………………… Nationality, resident of ……………………) dohereby verify that the contents of paras ………. to ………… are true to my/our personal knowledge and paras…………. to …………. are believed to be true on legal advice and that I/we have not suppressed any material fact.

Dated this …………. day of ………..Place ……………..

Signature of the Deponent";

(b) For the Second Schedule, the following Schedule shall be substituted, namely:


"The Second Schedule
[See rule 4]


Fees
 


S.

Description


Fees

Corresponding Form Number

No.


For natural person

For other than natural person either along or jointly with natural persons

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1

Application for revocation/rectification

Rs.5000/-

Rs.10000/

Form-1

2

For filing Appeal

Rs.5000/-

Rs.10000/

Form-2

3

Petition for condonation of delay

Rs.2500/-per month or part thereof

Rs.5000/-per month or part thereof

Form-3".



Sd/
(D.V. Prasad) Jt. Secy.




G.S.R.312(E)No.F.7/11/2012-IPR-I/IPABIssued by:Ministry of Commerce and Industry(Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion)New Delhi
 
 
 
Note.-The principal rules were published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section (i) vide notification number G.S.R.209(E), dated the 11th March, 2011.



** ** **
 
 
 

AAJ TAK JUDGMENT

COMMENT: In this Judgment, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has laid down the following important proposition.

1.         The dissemination of news and news reporting would be covered under Classes 38 and 41. It cannot, therefore, be said that the publishing of a newspaper by the Defendants is in a class of goods and services different from that for which Plaintiffs hold the trade mark registration. (Para 23)

2.         Even if Classes 38 and 41 are held not to cover newspapers, the publishing of newspapers is an allied and cognate activity similar to the goods and services for which the word mark 'Aaj Tak' has been registered in favour of the Plaintiffs. The adoption and use of such mark by the Defendants would undoubtedly cause confusion in the minds of the public and it is likely that the public will associate the activity of the Defendants with the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 29 (2) (b) of the TM act are also satisfied. (Para No.25).

3.        The PRB Act is concerned with registration for the purposes of publication. The PRB Act does not deal with various aspects of trade marks, the rights of a trade mark owner and remedies for infringement. (Para 31).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
CS (OS) No. 1085 of 2005
Reserved on: September 12, 2013
Decision on: October 7, 2013
T.V. TODAY NETWORK LTD. & ANR. ..... Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Saurabh Srivastava with Ms. Shilpa Gupta, Advocates.
versus
KESARI SINGH GUJJAR & ORS. ..... Defendants Through: Mr. Y.D. Nagar, Advocate.
CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
JUDGMENT
7.10.2013
1. This is a suit filed by TV Today Network Ltd. (Plaintiff No.1) and Living Media India Ltd. (Plaintiff No.2) against the Chief Editor and Editor (Defendants 1 and 2 respectively) of United Group of Media (Defendant No.3), Mr. Uttam Prakash (Defendant No.4), and M/s. Roshan Offset (Defendant No.5) for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from passing off of their publications and for delivery up of all products of the Defendants and for rendition of accounts and damages.
2. After the filing of the suit in August 2005, the Plaintiff No.2 obtained registration for the trade mark 'Aaj Tak'. Accordingly, by an order dated 17th May 2006, the Plaintiffs were permitted to amend the plaint to seek the relief of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from infringing the Plaintiffs' registered trade mark 'Aaj Tak'.
3. The Plaintiffs are companies having registered office in New Delhi. They state that Plaintiff No.2 is the publisher of several reputed news publications including 'India Today', 'Business Today', 'Computers Today' and 'Readers Digest'. From the year 1987, it has also been engaged in producing TV news programmes. In 1995, it decided to commence a news programme in Hindi under the name of 'Aaj Tak' and was granted registration for the said trade mark in classes 38 and 41. It also applied for registration of the trade mark in Classes 9 and 16 of the Schedule to the Trade Marks Rules. Plaintiff No.2 also acquired trademark registration in respect of the marks 'Subha Aaj Tak', 'Khel Aaj Tak' and 'Saptahik Aaj Tak' in Class 9. Copies of the trade marks registration certificates have been filed along with the plaint.
4. In 2000, Plaintiff No.2 launched a 24-hour news channel under the name 'Aaj Tak'. Plaintiff No.1 was established by Plaintiff No.2 as a new corporate entity for managing and administering the 'Aaj Tak' news channel. Plaintiff No.2 also licensed the use of the word, logo and trade mark/trade name 'Aaj Tak' to Plaintiff No.1. The Plaintiffs state that 'Aaj Tak' is a household name in India and several other countries where the TV signals of the 'Aaj Tak' channel are beamed. The trade mark/service mark 'Aaj Tak' has therefore been continuously and uninterruptedly used by the Plaintiffs since 1995. The Plaintiffs states that the news channel has won several awards and citations. It is stated that the trader mark/service mark 'Aaj Tak' is an arbitrary, unique combination/collection of two words in Hindi language thereby making the mark a highly distinctive one. Members of the public associate the mark only with the Plaintiffs. It is stated that Plaintiff No.1 has become the exclusive perpetual licensee of trade mark/logo 'Aaj Tak'. It is stated that 'Aaj Tak' is a well known trade mark within the meaning of Section 2(1) (zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 ('TM Act'). The Plaintiffs state that trade mark/service mark 'Aaj Tak' enjoys tremendous goodwill and reputation on account of the high quality of programming. It is stated that as on the week commencing 30th April 2005, 'Aaj Tak' had a total viewership of 19.4 million at an all-India level pointing to a market share of 25.5%. The expenses incurred by the Plaintiff No.1 in promoting the mark for the years 2000-01 to 2004-05 have been set out in para 6. The turnover figures for the same period have been set out in Para 7. For the year 2004-05 the turnover was Rs.1390.68 lakhs.
5. In addition to the above the Plaintiff has also domain name 'www.aajtak.com' to provide news through the internet and on which website the said mark and logo are depicted. The Plaintiffs own other domain names: www.aajtak.in, www.aajtak.co.in, www.aajtak.firm.in, www.aajtak.gen.in, www.aajtak.org.in, www.aajtak.net.in, and www.aajtak.ind.in.
6. It is stated that in 2005, the Plaintiffs discovered that the Defendants were publishing a Hindi newspaper depicting under the same word mark 'Aaj Tak'. The Defendants had also registered an email address aajtakindia@rediffmail.com. The newspaper was a weekly being sold free in Delhi and Noida. The mark of the Defendants was phonetically, identically and visually similar to that of the Plaintiffs. It is stated that the Defendants used a style similar to that of the Plaintiffs in representing their mark in various advertisements. It is stated that the Defendants were misleading the public into believing that the Defendants were connected/affiliated to or licensed by the Plaintiffs to publish the impugned publications. Thus, the Defendants were illegally encashing on the reputation and goodwill of the Plaintiffs.
7. The Plaintiffs deputed an investigator to visit premises of the Defendants. A correspondent of the Defendants' newspaper informed the investigator that the newspaper 'Aaj Tak' is a weekly publication and also gave the investigator a rate list for booking advertisements in the newspaper. The visiting card of the correspondent and the rate list has been included in the documents filed with the plaint. It is stated by the Plaintiffs that the Defendants are deceiving the public into thinking that the Plaintiffs have started another newspaper under the name 'Aaj Tak'. The Defendants are also exploiting the goodwill and reputation of the mark by inviting advertisements to be placed in the newspaper. Further the Defendants are inviting applications from persons desirous of becoming 'Aaj Tak' models.
8. While directing summons to issue in the suit on 9th August 2005, the Court restrained the Defendants from making use of the mark 'Aaj Tak' or any deceptive variant thereof in respect of the Defendants' publications or in any manner till the order was modified, varied or vacated. That order has continued during the pendency of the suit.
9. In their written statement filed on behalf of all the Defendants, it is stated that the Defendants have been publishing the newspaper for ten years. The newspaper bears Registration No. 64796/96 having been registered in the office of the Registrar of Newspapers, under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The copy of the certificate has been included in the documents filed with the written statement. It is next contended that the Plaintiffs were aware of the existence of newspaper since 1996 and, therefore, the suit was liable to be rejected both on the ground of latches and acquiescence. A reference is made to Section 33 of the TM Act. It is stated that newspapers fall in a different and distinct class of goods and service different from that in respect of which the trade mark registration is held by the Plaintiffs. The Defendants claim that it has an increasing number of members/subscribers since 1996. As on the date of filing the written statement, i.e. on 9th September 2005, there were around 5000 members/subscribers for the Defendants' newspaper. It is further stated that Defendant No.3 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in accordance with its aims and objects and brought out the newspaper 'Aaj Tak' published in Hindi. The financial statement of Defendant No.3 for the years 2002 and 2004 has been enclosed. It is stated that newspaper is sold at a nominal rate of Rs.2 to cover the cost of publication and, therefore, is a social venture. It is denied that the Defendants are copying the trade mark of the Plaintiffs in any manner. It is denied that any investigator of the Plaintiffs visited the premises of the Defendants and met a correspondent of the Defendants' newspaper Mr. Manish Kumar or that he gave his visiting card or the rate list for advertisements. It is denied that 'Aaj Tak' is an arbitrary and unique mark. It is further submitted that the Defendants' newspaper is governed by the Press and Registration of Books Act ('PRB Act') whereas the Plaintiffs are running a TV channel. Therefore, the Defendants were exercising their legal rights to publish the newspaper. It is submitted that in common parlance, in respect of news, it is generally said: 'Kya Hai Aaj Tak Ki Kabhar' and from those words the words 'Aaj Tak' was appropriately used for the Defendants' newspaper in Hindi. The Defendants claim to have eminent subscribers and, therefore, no cause of action for a suit for infringement or passing off has arisen.
10. A replication was filed by the Plaintiffs on 9th November 2005 wherein, apart from reiterating the averments in the plaint, it is pointed out that PRB Act was for regulating newspapers and cannot override the TM Act, 1999 which is special enactment. As long as the Plaintiffs hold registration for the trade mark/service mark 'Aaj Tak' there was no provision in the PRB Act permitting the Defendants to infringe or pass off the Plaintiffs' registered trade mark.
11. By an order dated 8th February 2006, the Plaintiff was directed to file an affidavit to explain whether it had approached the Registrar of Newspapers for deregistration of the Defendants' publication. An affidavit was filed by the Plaintiffs on 17th February 2006 answering the said question in the negative. The Defendants were directed by the same order to disclose on affidavit as to what the circulation of the news paper was when it started and what its present circulation was. An affidavit dated 20th February 2006 was filed stating that the Registrar of Newspapers granted registration of Defendants' newspaper under the PRB Act after verification on 15th December 1995. It was stated in Para 4 of the said affidavit that the circulation of the Defendants publication had gone down. At the time of inception in 1996-97 the circulation of the Defendants' newspaper was 17,000 and in terms of the Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for 2005 it had gone done to 2000. It is further claimed that immediately before the filing of the suit the circulation was 5,000 on account of "improvement in the newspaper such as size, colour, printing, and increase in number of pages, printing quality".
12. IA No. 7855 of 2005 was filed by the Defendants under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC for vacating the interim order of stay. Both IA No. 6052 of 2005 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and the aforementioned IA No. 7855 of 2005 were heard together. A detailed order was passed by the Court on 19th May 2008 affirming the injunction granted by the Court on 9th August 2005.
13. On 21st August 2008, the following issues were framed by the Court:
"(1) Does the Plaintiff prove entitlement to injunctive relief, as claimed, based on ownership of the registered trade mark 'Aaj Tak'? OPP
(2) Does the Plaintiff prove the Defendant's use of the mark or words 'Aaj Tak' amounts to infringement and/or passing off? OPP
(3) Does the Defendant prove its entitlement to use the word 'Aaj Tak' on the basis of registration under the registered Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867? OPD
(4) Is the Plaintiff entitled to damages and/or rendition of accounts, as claimed? OPP
(5) Relief."
14. On behalf of the Plaintiffs Mr. Ashok Kumar Vermani, their duly authorised signatory filed an affidavit dated 13th January 2009 of examination-in-chief. The board resolution authorizing him to act on behalf of the Plaintiffs was marked as Exhibit P-1. The trade mark registration certificates were marked as Exhibit P-2. The advertisements of the Plaintiffs' mark published in various newspapers in 1995 were marked Exhibit P-3. Documents pertaining to the goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiffs news channel 'Aaj Tak' were marked as Exhibit P-4. The visiting card of Mr. Manish Kumar, the correspondent of the Defendants whom the Plaintiffs' investigator met was marked as Exhibit P-5. The affidavit reiterated the averments in the plaint.
15. Further, for the Plaintiffs, an affidavit dated 8th December 2011of Ms. Divisha Bopana, the authorised signatory of Plaintiff No.2, was filed. The statement of Ms. Divisha Bopana as PW-1 was recorded on 21st May 2012. She was cross-examined on 23rd November 2012.
16. On 29th September 2008, the Defendants had filed a list of 15 witnesses. However, on 11th February 2013, a statement was made by learned counsel for the Defendants that the Defendants had no evidence to lead in the case. On the same date, Ms. Divisha Bopana was recalled for further cross-examination. She confirmed that the resolutions dated 17th March and 27th July 2005 do not show her name as the authorised representative of the Plaintiff No.2.
17. Mr. Saurabh Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the Plaintiffs submitted that this was a case of infringement of the registered trade mark of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants contention that the PRB Act permitted the Defendants to publish their newspaper using an identical mark was no answer to the infringement in terms of the TM Act. He submitted that 'Aaj Tak' was an arbitrary and distinct mark and the Plaintiffs are the prior users thereof. He contended that the field and activity of Defendants viz., publishing newspapers was closely related to the principal activity of the Plaintiffs viz., news broadcasting, and that was causing a high degree of confusion in the minds of the public. According to him, there was a clear infringement of the registered mark of the plaintiffs in terms of Section 29 of the TM Act. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Playboy Enterprises v. Bharat Malik 2001 PTC 328 (Del), Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar 15 DLT (1979) 269, Ziff-Davis Inc. v. Dr. D.K. Jain 1998 PTC (18), Novartis AG v. Wanbury Ltd. 2005 (31) PTC 75 (Del) and Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co. 1997 PTC (17). He further pointed out that as the Defendants failed to avail of the opportunity of leading evidence the Plaintiffs' case was virtually uncontested. He relied upon the decisions inSwaran Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 1 SCC 240 and Mohd. Naved v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation 2004 (1) MPHT 16.
18. Mr. Srivasatava referred to Rule 22(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002 ('TM Rules') which stated that the goods and services specified in the Fourth Schedule only provided a means by which the general content of the numbered international classes could be quickly identified and that reference had to be made to the alphabetical index of goods and services for determining the classification of particular goods and services. According to him, therefore, news report services were in Class 41 and television broadcasting and news agency under Class 38 as per the international classification of goods and services. According to him, by this classification, the Plaintiffs could be said to be holding registration for the above goods and services as well.
19. Appearing for the Defendants Mr. Y.D. Nagar, learned counsel, submitted that the Defendants had a right to publish their newspaper as part of their right to freedom of speech and expression. He placed reliance on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Times Publishing House Limited v. Financial Times Limited 1995 (1) Kar LJ 219 and submitted that the PRB Act is a special law which not only provided for publishing and printing of newspapers but safeguarded the title of the newspaper. According to him, the registration of the Defendants' newspaper under the PRB Act was obtained much prior to the application made by the Plaintiffs for registration of the trade mark in relation to the news channel. He also placed reliance on the decision in Competition Review (P) Ltd. v. N.N. Ojha 1996 PTC (16) to submit that 'Aaj Tak' was a generic term and the Plaintiffs could not claim exclusive use to the said words. According to Mr. Nagar, it was unlikely that the subscriber to the Defendants' newspaper would be confused into thinking that it emanated from Plaintiffs. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Ram Kumar Jalan v. R.J. Wood & Co. Ltd. (28) AIR 1941 Lahore 262, J.K. Kapoor v. Micronix India 1994 Supp (3) SCC 215, Parry and Co. Ltd. v. Perry & Co. AIR 1963 Madras 460, SBL Ltd. v. Himalaya Drug Co. 1997 PTC (17) (DB), Rupee Gains Tele-Times Private Ltd. v. Rupee Times 1995 PTC (15) and Johnson and Johnson v. Christine Hoden India (P) Ltd. AIR 1988 Delhi 249. The thrust of the submissions of Mr. Nagar was that since the Plaintiffs held registration for their trade mark in a different class of goods and services and since in any event the Defendants hold valid registration for their newspaper under the PRB Act, no case for infringement could lie against the Defendants. He further submitted that the suit was barred by delay and acquiescence.
20. The Plaintiffs admittedly hold registration for the mark 'Aaj Tak'. Placed on record are the relevant trade mark registration certificates as Exhibit P-2 (collectively). Registration No. 1242921 has been granted in favour of Living Media India Limited for the word mark 'Aaj Tak' in Class 41.The registration has been issued on 7th October 2005. It has been indicated that the mark has been used since 1st June 1995. The Class 41 certificate describes the goods and services as "Education, Providing of Training, Entertainment, Sporting and Cultural Activities". Registration No. 1242922 has been issued on 23rd November 2005 in favour of Plaintiff No.2 for the word mark 'Aaj Tak' in Class 38 with use claimed since 30th June 1995. The Class 38 certificate describes the goods and services as "Telecommunication included in class 38".
21. Section 28(1) of the TM Act, 1999 states that the valid registration of a trade mark shall give to the registered proprietor "the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods and services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided by the Act". There is no doubt, therefore, that in the present case the Plaintiffs hold the valid registration of the trade mark 'Aaj Tak' in Classes 38 and 41. The certificates relate back to the date of making of the application. They also constitute prima facie evidence of the date from which the use is claimed. Significantly, in both these certificates the use has been claimed from 1st June and 30th June 1995 respectively which are prior to the dates on which the Defendants applied for registration of the newspaper using the same word mark 'Aaj Tak'.
22. Section 7(1) of the TM Act, 1995 states that the Registrar shall classify goods and services "as far as may be in accordance with International Classification of Goods and Services for the purposes of the registration of the trade marks". This has to be read with Rule 22 of the TM Rules which reads as under:
"22(1) For the purposes of the registration of trademarks, goods and services shall be classified in the manner specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(2) The goods and services specified in the Fourth Schedule only provide a means by which the general content of numbered international classes can be quickly identified. It corresponds to the major content of each class and are not intended to be exhaustive in accordance with the international classification of goods and services. For determining the classification of particular goods and services and for full disclosure of the content of international classification, the applicant may refer to the alphabetical index of goods and services, if any, published by the Registrar under Section 8 or the current edition of the international classification of goods and services for the purpose of registration of trade mark published by the World International Property Organisation or subsequent edition as may be published.
(3) The Registrar shall identify and include in the alphabetical index of classification of goods and services, as far as practicable, goods or services of Indian origin".
23. The Fourth Schedule to Rule 22 gives a detailed description of each of the classes of goods. For the purposes of the present case both Classes 38 and 41 fall under the sub-heading 'Services' in the Fourth Schedule to the TM Rules. Class 38 is "Telecommunications" and Class 41 is "Education; providing of training; entertainment; sporting and cultural activities". The International Classification of Goods and Services (Nice Classification) (9th Edition) issued in Geneva in 2006 gives the further sub-classifications of the broad classification of the goods. Under Class 38, sub-classification '380012' concerns "news agencies/wire services". Sub-classification '380005' concerns "television broadcasting". Under Class 41, the relevant sub- classifications are '4110103' "news reporters services", '410026' "production of radio and television programmes" and '410016' "publication of texts, other than publicity texts". It is, therefore, seen that the dissemination of news and news reporting would be covered under Classes 38 and 41. It cannot, therefore, be said that the publishing of a newspaper by the Defendants is in a class of goods and services different from that for which Plaintiffs hold the trade mark registration.
24. Turning to Section 29 (1) of the TM Act it is seen that infringement can result when a person not being a registered proprietor uses in the course of its trade a mark "which is identical with or deceptively similar to the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark." In the present case it is seen that the Defendants are using an identical trade mark i.e. 'Aaj Tak'. A perusal of the sample newspaper of the Defendants depicting the infringing mark shows that the word mark 'Aaj Tak' is identical to the registered word mark of the Plaintiffs. Further, the visiting card of Mr. Manish Kumar, correspondent of the Defendants' newspaper shows the words 'Aaj Tak' with the word 'Aaj' above the word 'Tak'. This is identical to the Plaintiffs' depiction of their mark. Even the depiction of the name of their newspaper in an advertisement in the newspaper inviting enquiries for placing advertisement depicts the mark in a manner identical to the depiction of the Plaintiffs' mark i.e. the word 'Aaj' shown above the word 'Tak'. It also shows the address of the Defendants.
25. Even if Classes 38 and 41 are held not to cover newspapers, the publishing of newspapers is an allied and cognate activity similar to the goods and services for which the word mark 'Aaj Tak' has been registered in favour of the Plaintiffs. The adoption and use of such mark by the Defendants would undoubtedly cause confusion in the minds of the public and it is likely that the public will associate the activity of the Defendants with the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 29 (2) (b) of the TM act are also satisfied.
26. Under Section 29 (4) of the TM Act, where the registered mark is shown to have a reputation in India and the use of the impugned mark by the Defendant results in taking unfair advantage of the registered mark or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of such registered mark there is no need for the owner of the registered trade mark to demonstrate the likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. As far as the present case is concerned, the uncontroverted evidence of the Plaintiffs clearly establishes that the Plaintiff No.2 is assignee and Plaintiff No.1 is the registered proprietor of the word mark 'Aaj Tak'. Secondly, the registrations are in respect of services under Classes 38 and 41 of the Fourth Schedule to the TM Rules. By virtue of Rule 22(2) of the TM Rules read with the Fourth Schedule these classes cover news reporting and dissemination of news as well. Thirdly, the Defendants are not the registered proprietor of the trade mark 'Aaj Tak'. The impugned mark 'Aaj Tak' adopted by the Defendants is identical to the registered mark 'Aaj Tak' phonetically, structurally and visually. The statements made on affidavits by the Plaintiffs regarding the reputation enjoyed by the registered mark in India and worldwide and the demonstrable exploitation of that mark by the Defendants by inviting applications for 'Aaj Tak Models 'and for advertisements by issuing tariff rates remains uncontroverted. It has been satisfactorily proved by the Plaintiffs that that the adoption and use of the impugned mark by the Defendants will cause detriment to the distinctive character and repute of the registered mark of the Plaintiffs. It is also been shown that the Defendants have by such use taken unfair advantage of the goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiffs' mark. There is nothing in the cross-examination of Plaintiffs' witnesses which disproves their case.
27. Significantly, the Defendants have not led any evidence whatsoever to counter the evidence of the Plaintiffs. As explained in A.Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136 and Mohd. Naved v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, the failure by the Defendants to examine themselves and to submit themselves to cross- examination as witnesses would result in discrediting the truth of their case.
28. To summarise, the Court is of the view that the Plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate that there has been an infringement of the Plaintiffs' registered trade mark in terms of Section 29(1) and 29 (2) (b) of the TM Act. Further by the material brought on record, the Plaintiffs have been able to demonstrate that the trade mark 'Aaj Tak' has a distinctive character and reputation in India and that the Defendants have sought to take unfair advantage of the reputation and goodwill of the Plaintiffs' mark and that such use is detrimental to the distinctive character and reputation of the registered trade mark thus attracting infringement in terms of Section 29(4) of the TM Act.
29.1 Since considerable reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the Defendants on the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Times Publishing House Ltd., the Court proposes to discuss the said decision at some length. The facts in the said case were that the Plaintiff Financial Times Limited ('FTL') filed a suit in the civil court in Bangalore against Times Publishing House Ltd. ('TPHL') alleging infringement of its trade mark 'Financial Times' by TPHL. Admittedly, FTL held registration for the mark 'Financial Times'. An interim injunction was granted by the civil court restraining TPHL from printing and publishing 'The Financial Times'. TPHL was publishing 'The Economic Times' and offering 'The Financial Times' on a complementary basis along with 'The Economic Times' by printing it on a light pink paper which was similar to the colour of 'The Financial Times' as published by FTL. TPHL contended that it was registered under the PRB Act and that printing of newspaper was exclusively governed by PRB Act and, therefore, the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 ('TMM Act') was not applicable. TPHL further contended that it was legitimately publishing 'The Financial Times' as a weekly newspaper after getting the necessary declaration from the RNI. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court relied upon the decision of this Court in M.K.Agarwal v. Union of India 53 (1994) DLT 751 where it was observed that the PRB Act being a special enactment prevailed when it comes to registration of newspapers and that when a conflict arose between the two enactments it could be resolved on the basis of well settled principles of interpretation of statutes.
29.2 The Karnataka High Court, which was considering the above question at the interlocutory stage, concluded that the PRB Act not only provided for printing and publishing newspapers but safeguarded the title of newspapers. Since TPHL had applied for, obtained registration of the title and thereafter used it, no malafides could be attributed to TPHL.
29.3 The second factor that weighed with the High Court was that there was a variation in the number of pages, news items, articles and the price of 'The Financial Times' published by FTL. Its circulation was only 231 copies and was available to selected members/contributories. It was held that without a PRB Act registration, there was no right to publish a newspaper in India. In those circumstances it was held that there was no possibility of deception since the readers were literate and could recognise the differences between two newspapers. More importantly, the PRB Act at the relevant time restricted publication of a newspaper by non- residents. In the circumstances, the hardship that would be caused to TPHL would be greater if the injunction was grated in favour of FTL. It was held that the trial court committed an error in holding that the TMM Act alone would govern the publication of newspapers.
30. The above decision is distinguishable on facts for more than one reason. In the first place it was a decision at the interlocutory stage of the matter and the fact that weighed to the Division Bench was that the newspaper published by FTL hardly had any circulation in India. Secondly, being a foreign entity it could not seek registration under the PRB Act. Thirdly, TPHL had a large circulation and was holding registration under the PRB Act and was in the business of publication of newspapers for long. Fourthly, as far as the present case is concerned, the Plaintiffs have been able to show that they have been in the business of disseminating news since 1995. The use claimed in both trade mark registration certificates is from June 1995. Admittedly, this is prior to the date on which the Defendants applied for and obtained registration of its title under the PRB Act. No parallel can therefore be drawn between the facts in the Times Publishing House Limited case and the instant case.
31. As explained in the decision of this Court in Playboy Enterprises, the PRB Act is concerned with registration for the purposes of publication. The PRB Act does not deal with various aspects of trade marks, the rights of a trade mark owner and remedies for infringement. The Times Publishing House Limited decision was rendered at a time when the TM Act had not been enacted. Under Section 7 of the TM Act read with Rule 22 and the Fourth Schedule of TM Act, it is clear that the classification of goods and services under the TM Act read with the TM Rules is of a wider nature. Further under Section 29 (4) of the TM Act there is an express protection afforded to well-known marks, and marks that are shown to have a reputation in India, even where they are in respect of goods and services different from those in respect of which the infringer has adopted and used an identical or similar mark. Therefore, even in law it is possible that the decision in the Times Publishing House Limited case may have been different had the above provisions existed at the time it was rendered. This Court is therefore of the view that the decision in the Times Publishing House Limited does not help the case of the Defendants.
32. Turning to the question of damages, the Court is of the view that in the circumstances of the case, the Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for punitive damages against the Defendants. In Time Incorporated v. Lokesh Srivastava 2005 (30) PTC 3 (Del) the Court awarded the Plaintiff Rs. 5 lakhs as punitive damages after holding that "a large number of readers of the defendants' Magazine 'TIME ASIA SANSKARAN' also have suffered by purchasing the defendants' Magazines under an impression that the same are from the reputed publishing house of the plaintiff company."
The Court explained:
"the award of compensatory damages to a plaintiff is aimed at compensating him for the loss suffered by him whereas punitive damages are aimed at deterring a wrong doer and the like minded from indulging in such unlawful activities.... The punitive damages are founded on the philosophy of corrective justice and as such, in appropriate cases these must be awarded to give a signal to the wrong doers that law does not take a breach merely as a matter between rival parties but feels concerned about those also who are not party to the lis but suffer on account of the breach."
33. Consequently, the Court is of the view that in the instant case, the Defendants should be asked to pay the Plaintiffs punitive damages in the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to act as a deterrent against the Defendants infringing the registered mark of the Plaintiffs.
34. The Court answers the issues framed as under:
Issue No.1: Does the Plaintiff prove entitlement to injunctive relief,as claimed, based on ownership of the registered trade mark 'Aaj Tak'?
The above issue is answered in the affirmative by holding that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction, as claimed, against the Defendants and their agents, employees and servants, jointly and severally, based on the Plaintiffs' ownership of the registered trade mark 'Aaj Tak'.
Issue No.2: Does the Plaintiff prove the Defendant's use of the mark or words 'Aaj Tak' amounts to infringement and/or passing off?
The above issue is answered in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants holding that the Defendants' use of the impugned mark and word mark 'Aaj Tak' amounts to infringement and/or passing off of the Plaintiffs' registered trade mark.
Issue No.3: Does the Defendant prove its entitlement to use the word 'Aaj Tak' on the basis of registration under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867?
The above issue is answered in the negative against the Defendants by holding that the Defendants have failed to prove their entitlement to the use of word mark 'Aaj Tak' on the basis of the registration under the PRB Act.
Issue No.4: Is the Plaintiff entitled to damages and/or rendition of accounts, as claimed?
The Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs from the Defendants, jointly and severally. The Plaintiffs are also awarded costs of Rs.25,000 against the Defendants.
35. The suit is decreed in the above terms. Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
OCTOBER 7, 2013


Featured Post

WHETHER THE REGISTRAR OF TRADEMARK IS REQUIRED TO BE SUMMONED IN A CIVIL SUIT TRIAL PROCEEDING

WHETHER THE REGISTRAR OF TRADEMARK IS REQUIRED TO BE SUMMONED IN A CIVIL SUIT TRIAL PROCEEDING IN ORDER TO PROVE THE TRADEMARK  REGISTRA...

My Blog List

IPR UPDATE BY ADVOCATE AJAY AMITABH SUMAN

IPR UPDATE BY ADVOCATE AJAY AMITABH SUMAN

Search This Blog