Thursday, November 16, 2017

LOREAL VS YOGESH JETHI




*                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%


Decided on: 3rd November, 2017

+

CS(COMM) 567/2017








M/S. L’OREAL

..... Plaintiff


Represented by:
Mr.Ajay Amitabh Suman,



Mr. Kapil Kumar Giri and



Mr. Vinay Shukla, Advocates.


versus




SHRI YOGESH JETHI & ANOTHER.
.....Defendants


Represented by:
None.




CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA

MUKTA GUPTA, J. (ORAL)

1.                 As per the plaint, the plaintiff prays for the following reliefs:

a)                For a decree of permanent injunction restraining all the defendants by themselves as also through their individual proprietors/partners, agents, representatives, distributors, assigns, heirs, successors, stockists and all others acting for and on their behalf from using, selling, soliciting, exporting, displaying, advertising or by any other mode or manner dealing in or using the impugned trade mark L’OREAL with or without the word PARIS or any other word/mark which may be identical with and/or deceptively similar word/mark to the plaintiff’s said trade mark/trade name L’OREAL in relation to their impugned goods and business of cosmetics and other related/allied products and from doing any other acts or deeds amounting to or likely to:-

i)   infringement of plaintiff’s aforesaid registered trademark
L’OREAL.




CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 1 of 10





ii)      Passing off and violation of the plaintiff’s rights in the plaintiff’s said trade mark L’OREAL.

iii)    violation of plaintiff’s proprietary rights in its trade name i.e., L’OREAL.

iv)   Infringement of plaintiff’s copyrights in its L’OREAL Label.

b)                for an order for delivery up of all the impugned finished and unfinished materials bearing the impugned and violative trade mark L’OREAL or any other word/mark which may be identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s said trade mark/trade name L’OREAL including its blocks, labels, display boards, sign boards, trade literatures and goods etc. to the plaintiff for the purposes of destruction and erasure.

c)     for a money decree for grant of damages of ₹40,00,000/-(Rupees Forty Lakh only) from and against the defendants, jointly and severally to the plaintiff.

d)  for an order for cost of proceedings.

2.                 Summons in the suit were issued to the defendants on 7th  January,

2009 and an ex-parte interim order was passed in favour of the plaintiff and

against defendants from using trade mark ‘L’OREAL PARIS’. Defendant

No. 1 entered appearance on 13th  February, 2009. Since Defendant No. 2

could not be served, he was directed to be served through publication vide order dated 5th February, 2010. Defendant no. 2 entered appearance on 27th

October, 2010. However, defendant no. 2 failed to file written statement, thus, he was proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 5th September, 2011.

3.                 Vide order dated 5th December, 2011, following issues were settled:

i.            Whether the suit has been filed by a competent person? OPP

ii.            Whether the plaintiff is the owner and proprietor of the trademark

‘L’OREAL’? OPP

iii.            Whether  the  defendants  are  guilty  of  infringing  the  registered

trademark ‘L’OREAL’ of the plaintiff? OPP





CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 2 of 10





iv.Whether the defendants are passing off their goods as that of plaintiff? OPP

v.Whether defendant no. 1 has never dealt with the goods of the plaintiff at any point of time? OPD-1

vi.            Whether the defendants are guilty of infringing the copyright of the

plaintiff in the trademark ‘L’Oreal’? OPP

vii.            Relief.

4.                   Defendant no.1 was also proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 18th

December, 2014. Thus, the plaintiff led its ex-parte evidence.

5.                 As per the plaint, plaintiff is a company duly incorporated under the laws of France. Plaintiff is engaged in the business of manufacture, distribution and sale of a wide range of hair care, skin care, toiletries and beauty products including perfumery preparations, essential oils, cosmetics, preparations for colouring and bleaching the hair, hair dyes and tints, preparations for waving and setting the hair, shampoos, hair sprays, non-medicated preparations for the care and the beauty of the hair and skin, toilet soaps, dentifrices, sun-tan preparations, personal deodorants and other allied/related products.

6.                 Plaintiff  has  been  using  the  word/mark  ‘L’OREAL’  in  stylized,

formative and label as a trade mark since about 1910-1915 in relation to the aforesaid goods and business. Plaintiff’s goods under the trademark ‘L’OREAL’ have acquired goodwill and reputation globally and in India as well. Plaintiff’s goods under the aforementioned trademark are sold in about 130 countries across the world including India.

7.                 Plaintiff’s trademark ‘L’OREAL’ as a word mark was registered in

India in class 3 in the year 1954 and was renewed subsequently from time to



CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 3 of 10





time. Apart from the aforesaid registration, plaintiff had filed various other applications for registration of its said mark in India.

8. It is the case of the plaintiff that the art work involved in various ‘L’OREAL’ stylized, formative/bearing and labels are original artistic works and plaintiff holds copyright therein. The plaintiff had been continuously promoting its distinctive mark/ trade name and the goods and business through extensive advertisements, publicity, promotion and marketing research and the plaintiff has spent enormous amount of money, effort, skill and time thereon. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the plaintiff’s trademark has acquired enviable and enduring goodwill, reputation and users. Plaintiff also enjoys trans-border reputation.

9.                 Plaintiff’s trademark has become distinctive and has acquired secondary significance with the plaintiff’s goods and business. In view of

plaintiff’s proprietary rights both statutory and common law, it’s goodwill, reputation and it’s copyright, the plaintiff has the exclusive right to the use of the trademark.

10.                Defendants are engaged in trading of cosmetics, toiletries, hair care products and other allied/related goods. Defendants have adopted and started

using the trade mark L’OREAL in relation to its products. Defendants are also using the word ‘PARIS’ along with the impugned trademark in order to give a false description to its goods.

11.              The impugned trade mark L’OREAL adopted and being used by the

defendants in relation to their impugned goods and business is identical with and deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s said trade mark/trade name L’OREAL in each and every respect including phonetically, visually, structurally, in its basic idea and in its essential features. Defendants have


CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 4 of 10





also copied the artistic features involved in the plaintiff’s trade mark and is thus infringing the plaintiff’s trade mark as also the copyright involved in its trade mark.

12.              Defendants are not the proprietor of the impugned trademark and

their adoption and use of the trademark violates the plaintiff’s trademark and thereby passing off and enabling others to pass off their goods and business as that of the plaintiff as well as diluting the plaintiff’s proprietary rights therein.

13.              In December, 2007 when the plaintiff came to know that some unknown persons and firms have illegally adopted and are using the impugned trade mark plaintiff filed a complaint under Sections 103/104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Delhi complaining violation of plaintiff’s said trademark and copyrights. Ld. ACMM directed the police to investigate the matter. Consequently FIR No. 55 dated 24th March, 2008 was registered at Police Station Economic Offences Wing under sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957. During the investigation the police on 25th March, 2008 conducted raids at the premises of defendant No. 1, where defendant No. 1 was found to be dealing in impugned goods bearing the impugned trade mark.

14.              In May 2008, plaintiff also came to know that defendant No. 2 is also dealing in impugned goods bearing impugned trade mark. Being aggrieved by the acts and conduct of defendant No. 2, plaintiff lodged FIR being FIR No. 125 dated 3rd May, 2008 at Police Station Bhyculla, Mumbai. Consequent to this FIR raids were conducted at the premises of defendant No. 2 on 3rd May, 2008 from where impugned goods bearing impugned


CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 5 of 10





trade mark were seized in large quantities. During investigations, defendant No. 2 disclosed that defendant No. 1 supplies impugned goods bearing impugned trade mark to defendant No. 2.

15.              The plaintiff led ex parte evidence and examined Mr. Nirmal Singh as PW-1. He tendered his evidence by way of an affidavit (Ex. PW-1/A) and additional affidavit (Ex. PW-1/A1). Copy of the power of attorney in his favour was exhibited as Ex. PW-1/1. Specimen of plaintiff’s

trademarks/labels were exhibited as Ex. PW-1/2 to Ex. PW-1/8. Statistics/reports showing plaintiff’s sales, growth and economic strength were exhibited as Ex. PW-1/9. Certified copy of the magazines like Cosmopolitan, Star Dust and Filmfare in which various advertisements and sales promotional literature of the plaintiff were published were exhibited as Ex. PW-1/10 (colly). Specimen of defendants trademark/label was exhibited as Ex. PW-1/12 and Ex. PW-1/13. Copy of the FIR No. 55/08 dated 24th March, 2008 registered at Police Station Economic Offences Wing along with search and seizure memo was exhibited as Ex. PW-1/14 (colly). English Translation of FIR No. 125 dated 3rd May, 2008 at Police Station Bhyculla, Mumbai was exhibited as Ex. PW-1/15. Legal Proceeding Certificates of registrations of trade mark L’OREAL were exhibited as Ex. PW-1/X (colly). Affidavit under Section 65B of the Evidence Act with respect to Ex. PW-1/9 was placed on record as Ex. PW-1/20.

16.            Specimen of plaintiff’s trademark/label is as under:













CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 6 of 10






































































CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 7 of 10

































17.            Specimen of defendant’s trademark/label is as under:


































CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 8 of 10




































18.            The evidence of the plaintiff has gone unrebutted. On the basis of the documents placed on record, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff has

established that plaintiff is the owner of the trademark ‘L’OREAL’ and is also the copyright owner in the artistic work of the stylized, formative/bearing and label ‘L’OREAL’. Plaintiff has also established that it enjoys reputation and goodwill with respect to the aforesaid trademark. Plaintiff has also been successful in demonstrating that the defendants by adopting plaintiff’s trademark ‘L’OREAL’ are infringing the trade mark of the plaintiff, copyright therein and passing off their goods as those of the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants







CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 9 of 10





19.            Since the plaintiff has not led evidence with respect to the damages

caused to them except for a court fee of ₹21,000/-, prayer (c) of the plaint is allowed partially.

20.              Consequently, the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants in terms of prayer (a) with a cost of ₹21,000/-.




(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 03, 2017
‘yo’











































CS(COMM) 567/2017                                                                                                                       Page 10 of 10

Thursday, November 2, 2017

RAJESH MEHTA & ANR VS OAKLEY INC




$~28

*                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI



+            FAO 405/2017


RAJESH MEHTA & ANR                                                                    ..... Appellants


Through:          Ms. Anuradha Salhotra and Mr. Achal

Shekhar, Advs.


versus

OAKLEY INC                                                                                                              ..... Respondent

Through:          Mr.  Sandeep  Sethi,  Sr.  Adv.  with  Mr.

S.K.Bansal, Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman,
Mr. Kapil Giri and Mr. Vinay Shukla,
Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J. MEHTA

%

O R D E R

17.10.2017
Caveat No. 906/2017



Counsel appears for the caveator.  Caveat accordingly stands discharged.

CM Nos. 37462-64/2017 (Exemptions)

Exemptions allowed subject to just exceptions.

CMs stand disposed of.

FAO 405/2017 & CM No. 37461/2017 (stay)








FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 1 of 10







1.                  This First Appeal is filed under Order 43(1)(r) CPC by the defendants in the suit impugning the order of the trial court dated 19.7.2017 which has allowed the injunction application filed by the respondent/plaintiff and has dismissed the application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC filed by the appellants/defendants. The disputes between the parties arise on account of the claim of the respondent/plaintiff to the shape of the goggles as a trademark.
2.                  The respondent/plaintiff pleaded entitlement to restrain the appellants/defendants from using shapes of two goggles which are manufactured by the respondent/plaintiff. One type of goggles is called as “OAKLEY FROGSKIN” and the other goggles are called as “OAKLEY RADARLOCK”. These two goggles of the respective parties are reproduced as under:-

































FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 2 of 10






























3.                  It is therefore seen that the right claimed by the respondent/plaintiff is with respect to the shape of the goggles which are used, manufactured and sold by the respondent/plaintiff on the ground that shapes of the goggles are its exclusive trademark ie the respondent/plaintiff has an exclusive right to use the shape of the two goggles which are being manufactured and sold by it.
4.                  At the outset, I would like to note that the subject suit is not a suit for infringement of a registered trademark. Not only the suit is not for infringement of a registered trademark, the suit is not for infringement of a registered trademark which is a word mark. The suit is also not for passing off of a trademark which is a word mark. The suit is a suit for injunction alleging passing off by the appellants/defendants of the shapes of the subject two goggles and which shapes are claimed as exclusive trademarks of the respondent/plaintiff.






FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 3 of 10





5.                  This Court has to examine the aspect of whether the shapes of the goggles of the respondent/plaintiff are so exclusive that only it has a right in such designs as a trademark, and that no other person including the appellants/defendants can use the shape of the goggles which are being used by the respondent/plaintiff.

6.                  No doubt, the definition of a trademark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and as contained in Section 2(1)(zb) of the Trade Marks Act, states that even shape of the goods can be protected as trademarks, however, it is to be seen that once shapes of any goods are claimed as a trademark, there is definitely an overlap in the claim of use of the shape as a trademark and the right to use a shape because of it being a design under the Designs Act. It is this overlap which in my opinion is such that Courts should in such cases be very cautious in granting an exclusive right to a person to use a shape if otherwise the shape could not be protected as a design under the Designs Act.

7.                  I have already reproduced the goggles of the respective parties above. Goggles or Spectacles obviously have two main parts. One part is the frame and the other part comprises of the lenses or glasses which are fixed in the frames. The issue in the present case is honestly with respect to the shapes of the frames because the glasses/lenses are fixed as per the shape of the frames in front part where the glasses/lenses are fixed, though it is additionally relevant to note that in ‘RADARLOCK’ goggles the shape of the lenses are not related to the shape of that part of the frame where the glasses are fixed.





FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 4 of 10





8.                  In my opinion, the facts of the present case so far as the designs which are known as ‘FROGSKIN’ are concerned are not such unique designs that the appellants/defendants should, by an interim injunction be totally stopped from carrying on their business. After all the appellants/defendants have specifically taken up a case that the design of “OAKLEY FROGSKIN” goggles of the respondent/plaintiff is not such a unique design and it was a design which was otherwise published and manufactured even prior to manufacture of the same by the respondent/plaintiff. In this regard I would like to note that the designs and shapes with respect to which the respondent/plaintiff claimed exclusivity on account of designs and shapes of the trademark, would not have protection under the Designs Act once the design was such a design which was affected by prior publication. Entitlement of registration to a design or shape under the Designs Act is lost if the design or shape which is sought to be got registered is affected by prior publication. If that is so under the Designs Act, then Courts while dealing with the shapes and designs as a trademark, should necessarily be extremely cautious in giving a relief which otherwise could not have been given because of the bars contained in the Designs Act. Of course I may hasten to add that this Court is not observing that shapes and designs cannot have rights in them as a trademark, but that facts of each case will have to be examined as to whether shapes or designs will be such so as to give them right as a trademark, more so in a passing off case where respective products are sold under different brand names,






FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 5 of 10





and with which aspect I will advert to hereinafter.

9.                  So far as the shape of “OAKLEY RADARLOCK” is concerned, no doubt the frame is different as also the lenses or glasses, however, surely this is a matter of trial because this Court cannot hold at this stage today that the shapes of the respondent/plaintiff’s goggles “OAKLEY RADARLOCK” are such that never such a design or shape could have ever existed with respect to spectacles or goggles prior to manufacture and sale by the respondent/plaintiff of the subject goggles. I may note that the appellants/defendants have filed in the trial court the designs of various goggles of their being in public domain prior to manufacture of subject goggles by the respondent/plaintiff, and such goggles in some parts are seen to have similarities with the functionality and shape of the goggles of the respondent/plaintiff. However, such highly disputed questions of fact cannot be decided in favour of the respondent/plaintiff at the stage of interim injunction application by grant of interim injunction to the respondent/plaintiff and thereby destroying the business of the appellants/defendants. After all, in case the respondent/plaintiff will succeed, the respondent/plaintiff will always be entitled to monetary relief of damages.

10.             In my opinion, the most important aspect to be noticed in the present case is that the subject suit is a suit based on a cause of action for passing off only and that whereas the brand name of the goggles of the respondent/plaintiff are

“OAKLEYFROGSKIN”and“OAKLEYRADARLOCK”,the







FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 6 of 10





appellants/defendants are selling their goggles under totally different trademarks of “SASA LIFESTYLE” and “SASA SPORTY”. In my opinion, use of these brand names or trademarks of “SASA LIFESTYLE” and “SASA SPORTY” with respect to the goggles being manufactured and sold by the appellants/defendants are such that there is sufficient distinction created for a reasonable consumer not to be mislead when he is purchasing goggles of the appellants/defendants that he is confused that he is in fact purchasing the goggles of the respondent/plaintiff being manufactured and sold by the respondent/plaintiff under the brand names of “OAKLEY FROGSKIN” and “OAKLEY RADARLOCK”. There is absolutely no deceptive similarity or any scope of confusion between the brand names or trademarks “SASA LIFESTYLE” and “SASA SPORTY” with “OAKLEY FROGSKIN” and “OAKLEY RADARLOCK”.

11.             Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff places great reliance upon the recent judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of

Apollo Tyres Ltd. Vs. Pioneer Trading Corporation & Anr. 2017 VII AD (Delhi) 127, and which judgment is relied upon by the respondent/plaintiff to argue that pattern and grooves of the tyres will constitute a trademark and entitlement of such manufacturer of the tyres to prevent any other manufacturer from using such pattern and grooves in the tyres which were manufactured by the other person/defendant. In the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. (supra) injunction in favour of Apollo Tyres Ltd./plaintiff was granted with respect to pattern and grooves of the





FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 7 of 10





tyres which were manufactured by the Apollo Tyres Ltd.

12.             In my opinion, there is no dispute with the proposition of law that shapes can be subject of a trademark, and which is so provided in Section 2(1)(zb) of the Trade Marks Act, however, whether a particular shape is or is not entitled to protection as a trademark, that too at an interim stage of disposal of an injunction application, will necessarily depend upon the facts of each case and this has also to be taken with the fact that cases dealt with pattern of tyres surely cannot be equated with eye wear/goggles/spectacles. Issues with respect to shapes of the pattern of the tyres cannot be an argument for being used on facts with respect to the shapes of goggles/spectacles.

13.             A very other important aspect which is required to be noted is that appellants/defendants took up a case that the subject two goggles “OAKLEY FROGSKIN” and “OAKLEY RADARLOCK” of the respondent/plaintiff are very similar to the goggles being manufactured by another company Rayban and in this regard respondent/plaintiff took up a stand that Rayban company is owned by the respondent/plaintiff and Rayban is a group company. In my opinion, this stand of the respondent/plaintiff almost completely leads to non-maintainability of the suit because if the respondent/plaintiff admitted that the shape of the goggles which are subject matter of the present suit are in similar in shapes to the goggles which are previously manufactured by Rayban, then since Rayban is not a plaintiff in the suit then possibly the suit may be completely non-maintainable because it would






FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 8 of 10





only be Rayban company who would be the owner of the shapes of the goggles as trademark and hence only Rayban would be entitled to the reliefs claimed in the present suit and not the respondent/plaintiff who did not claim to be owner of the shapes of the goggles which are owned by Rayban company. Also and admittedly the respondent/plaintiff did not plead itself to be the registered licensee of the Rayban company for manufacturing of the subject goggles for it to have locus standi to file the suit. In fact, the respondent/plaintiff claimed exclusive ownership and rights to the shapes of the two goggles on the ground that they have registered these shapes in various countries worldwide and that the respondent/plaintiff has trans-border reputation. It may be noted that in fact the respondent/plaintiff is in some manner seeking to overreach the Court because when it pleads its entitlement on account of registrations of the goggles and right on account of registrations of goggles, because such registrations in different countries worldwide which are being relied upon by the respondent/plaintiff are registration as designs and not registrations under the Trade Marks Act as trademarks.


14.             In view of the aforesaid discussion, till further orders unless varied by the Court, there shall be stay of operation of the impugned order of the trial court dated 19.7.2017 passed in TM No. 359/2016 titled as Oakley Inc. Vs. Bhargav

Mehta and Ors.

15.             I may hasten to clarify that aforesaid observations are made limited to







FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                             Page 9 of 10





passing off the interim order for today’s date and all aspects of merits will be examined when the appeal comes up for disposal on the date of hearing fixed.

16.             Notice.  Counsel for respondent/plaintiff accepts notice.

17.             Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff seeks time to file reply. Reply be filed within a period of six weeks. Rejoinder be filed within four weeks thereafter.
18.             List on 27th February, 2018.



VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J

OCTOBER 17, 2017

ib











































FAO 405/2017                                                                                                                                          Page 10 of 10

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