Mongia Steel Limited Vs. Saluja Steel and Power Private Limited

Conditional Leave to Withdraw the Suit and Its Legal Consequences

Introduction:The case of Mongia Steel Limited Vs. Saluja Steel and Power Private Limited, decided by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi on 17 July 2025, revolves around a trademark and copyright dispute that highlights the importance of procedural compliance, conditional withdrawal of suits, and the boundaries of initiating fresh litigation. This case underscores the judiciary’s emphasis on enforcing procedural rigour to prevent the misuse of legal processes and also addresses the limitation on reinserting causes of action that were previously abandoned. The decision also explores the intersection of intellectual property law with civil procedure, particularly in the context of claims for trademark and copyright infringement.

Factual Background:Mongia Steel Limited (formerly Mongia Hi-Tech Pvt. Ltd., later Mongia Steel Pvt. Ltd., and ultimately Mongia Steel Ltd.) is a well-established company engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing various metal products, including TMT Bars, Joist, Channels, and related materials. Since its incorporation in 1995, the company claimed to have adopted and continuously used a series of trademarks and artistic works prominently featuring the word “MONGIA” and a photo device of its director, Mr. Gunwant Singh Mongia, colloquially referred to as the “Device of Sardarji”. The marks were used extensively in advertisements and had gained significant goodwill in the market.

In contrast, Saluja Steel and Power Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated in 2004 by Amarjeet Singh Saluja (brother of Mr. Gunwant Singh Mongia) and his sons. While the company initially did not manufacture TMT Bars, it later entered the market and began using the mark “SALUJA GOLD with Device of Sardarji”, including a bust photograph of Mr. Amarjeet Singh Saluja, which Mongia Steel alleged was deceptively similar to their established mark and get-up. Mongia Steel claimed this imitation led to confusion among the public and amounted to trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off.

Procedural Background: The initial suit was filed in 2015 as Title Suit No. 6 of 2015, later renumbered as Commercial Case No. 06 of 2015, before the Commercial Court, Ranchi. Originally, it was a composite suit including claims for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off. However, the plaintiff later filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which was allowed on 03.09.2015, permitting deletion of the copyright claims (Sections 51 and 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957) from the plaint.

Subsequently, Mongia Steel sought to withdraw the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC citing formal defects and inadequacies in prayer formulation. The Commercial Court granted leave to withdraw the suit via order dated 29.09.2020, imposing three explicit conditions: (i) no new or fresh cause of action should be introduced, (ii) no documents issued after the original suit date may be relied upon, and (iii) reliefs must be limited to those contemplated in Paragraph 5 of the withdrawal application.

Pursuant to this, Mongia Steel filed Commercial Case No. 63 of 2020 incorporating claims for trademark infringement, passing off, and notably, copyright infringement — the very claim it had earlier abandoned. The defendant, Saluja Steel, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on grounds of deviation from the permitted scope. The Commercial Court allowed this application and rejected the plaint on 15.03.2022, concluding that the inclusion of copyright claims constituted a new cause of action. The present appeal was filed against this rejection.

Core Dispute: The crux of the legal controversy was whether Mongia Steel, having voluntarily abandoned its copyright infringement claims in the earlier suit and having received conditional leave to file a fresh suit, could reintroduce those very claims in the new suit? The matter hinged on whether such reintroduction violated the court-imposed conditions and whether it constituted a new cause of action contrary to the bar under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC?

Discussion on Judgments:The appellant relied on the premise that the inclusion of copyright claims was part of a continuous cause of action flowing from the same transactional relationship and, thus, was not “new” in the legal sense. It was argued that the intent to seek such relief was always present but was inadequately pleaded in the earlier suit due to the inefficiency of their earlier counsel.

The respondent cited the order passed by the Commercial Court on 03.09.2015 allowing deletion of copyright claims and the withdrawal order dated 29.09.2020, emphasizing that the leave was explicitly limited and could not be used as a carte blanche to reintroduce previously deleted claims. They also pointed to the potential violation of the limitation period under Article 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963, arguing that reintroduction of copyright claims in 2020 for acts from 2014 was time-barred.

The High Court examined the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court in V. Rajendran & Anr. v. Annasamy Pandian (Dead) through LRs, (2017) 5 SCC 63, where it was held that withdrawal of a suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC requires the court’s satisfaction that the suit suffers from a formal defect or that there are other sufficient grounds, and that the leave must be limited and conditional to avoid abuse. Similarly, Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363, was referred to affirm the principle that amendments or fresh suits cannot be used to introduce time-barred claims or bypass procedural mandates.

The doctrine of “relation back” was discussed, citing Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561, but the Court clarified that this doctrine is not of universal application and can be denied where allowing such relation back would defeat substantive legal defenses, such as limitation.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Bench held that the permission to file a fresh suit was granted on clearly stipulated terms, including a prohibition against introducing new causes of action. By deleting the copyright claims through a judicial amendment order in 2015, the plaintiff had effectively confined the original suit to trademark infringement. Consequently, the subsequent inclusion of copyright claims in the fresh suit constituted a clear deviation and amounted to a new cause of action.

The Court emphasized that even if paragraph 5 of the withdrawal application broadly referenced copyright claims, the effect of the prior amendment was that such claims were no longer part of the subject matter of the suit at the time of withdrawal. Allowing reintroduction would violate not only procedural safeguards but also defeat the statutory bar of limitation, since more than three years had passed since the alleged copyright violations.

The Court also rejected the appellant’s argument that the mistake of previous counsel justified the reintroduction. It held that procedural indulgence cannot be used to evade statutory consequences or judicial orders, particularly when the party had knowingly and voluntarily opted to delete certain claims.

Final Decision:The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Commercial Court’s rejection of the plaint. It held that the inclusion of copyright infringement claims in the fresh suit violated the conditions imposed in the order dated 29.09.2020 and amounted to a fresh cause of action. Accordingly, the plaint was correctly rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. The Court also observed that allowing such procedural circumvention would create a dangerous precedent and undermine the integrity of judicial orders and the limitation framework.

Law Settled in This Case: This case affirms that when a suit is withdrawn under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC with conditions, those conditions are binding and enforceable. A party cannot, in a subsequent suit, expand the scope of reliefs or reintroduce claims previously deleted or abandoned. Courts will not permit procedural devices to circumvent limitation laws or judicial directions. The decision also reinforces that the inclusion of previously deleted claims after expiry of limitation, even under the guise of procedural correction, constitutes a barred and impermissible cause of action.

Case Title: Mongia Steel Limited vs. Saluja Steel and Power Private Limited

Date of Order: 17 July 2025

Case Number: Commercial Appeal No. 08 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2024:JHHC:26916-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Kumar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi