Sakthi Oil Mills Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Renewal of Trademarks Beyond the Statutory Period: Judicial Recognition of Proprietors' Rights

Legal Principle:
If a trademark remains on the register and no steps have been taken for its removal, the registered proprietor may still seek renewal even after the expiration of the statutory period.

Brief Facts of the Case
The petitioner, M/S Sakthi Oil Mills, was the registered proprietor of the trademark "THENALEE," registered under Trade Mark No. 1133971 in Class 29. The mark was initially registered on September 4, 2006, and was subsequently renewed in 2012, extending its validity up to September 17, 2022.

Upon the expiry of the renewal period, the petitioner sought to renew the trademark in October 2024. However, the Registrar of Trademarks denied the renewal request, citing delay beyond the prescribed statutory period. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble High Court through a writ petition, seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the Registrar to allow the renewal.

Key Issue for Determination
The primary question before the Court was whether the petitioner is entitled to seek renewal of the trademark despite the expiration of the statutory renewal period, particularly in light of the Registrar’s failure to take steps for its removal from the register.

Reasoning and Legal Analysis
The Court undertook a thorough analysis of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, relevant judicial precedents, and the factual matrix of the case before arriving at its decision.

The Court noted that as of October 29, 2024, the impugned trademark had not been removed from the register. Since the mark was still officially recorded, the proprietor retained the right to seek renewal, as the Registrar had not exercised its authority to strike off the trademark.

The petitioner relied on the ruling in A. Abdul Karim Sahib and Sons v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, 1973 SCC OnLine Mad 390, where the Madras High Court’s Division Bench affirmed that if a mark remains on the register, the proprietor can apply for renewal even after the expiration period. The Court also referred to Jaisuryas Retail Ventures Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, 2024:MHC:3109; 2024 (100) PTC 25 (Mad), where it was reiterated that failure by the Registry to remove an expired mark enables the proprietor to invoke the right to renewal.

The respondent (Registrar of Trademarks) argued that a statutory notice (Form RG-3/13549385) was issued to the petitioner on May 26, 2022, informing them of the impending expiration. However, the Court observed that mere issuance of a notice does not amount to removal of the mark from the register. Since the Registry had failed to take active steps for striking off the trademark, the petitioner could not be deprived of the right to seek renewal.

Recognizing that renewal beyond the prescribed period could set a problematic precedent, the Court sought to balance judicial discretion with procedural discipline. The Court ruled that renewal should be permitted but subject to conditions that discourage laxity in the future.

Court’s Decision
The Hon’ble High Court allowed the writ petition and issued the following directions. The Registrar of Trademarks was directed to permit the petitioner to file a renewal application within 30 days from the date of the order. As a condition for renewal, the petitioner was required to pay ₹20,000 as costs to the Adyar Cancer Institute, Chennai, within two weeks. If the petitioner faced technical difficulties in accessing the online renewal portal, the Registrar was instructed to accept a physical renewal application to ensure procedural fairness.

Law Point Settled by the Court
This ruling reinforces several key legal principles regarding trademark renewal. If a trademark remains on the register and no formal steps for its removal have been taken, the proprietor retains the right to seek renewal, even beyond the statutory period. The Trade Marks Registry has an obligation to actively remove expired marks. Failure to do so allows the proprietor to assert the right to renewal. The issuance of an expiry notice alone does not extinguish the proprietor’s right to renewal if the mark has not been struck off from the register. Courts possess discretionary authority to permit delayed renewal, albeit with conditions to ensure compliance with statutory timelines in the future.

Conclusion
This judgment underscores the significance of proactive regulatory action by the Trade Marks Registry. It also safeguards the rights of trademark proprietors by ensuring that procedural delays by the Registry do not unduly prejudice legitimate renewal claims. While reinforcing the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines, the Court has also recognized the necessity of judicial flexibility in cases where procedural lapses occur on the part of the authorities.

Case Title:  Sakthi Oil Mills Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Date of Order: 25 February 2025

Case Number: W.P.(IPD) No.38 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Aurobindo Pharma Limited Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

The Trade Marks Registry must issue an expiry notice to the registered proprietor, before removing it from register.

Brief Facts of the Case:

The petitioner, Aurobindo Pharma Limited, had registered the trademark "ENRIL" under Trade Mark No. 636467 in Class 5. The application for registration was filed on 10 August 1994, and the registration certificate was issued on 18 July 2018. The petitioner later attempted to renew the registration, but the online system indicated that renewal was not possible due to the delay exceeding one year beyond expiry.The petitioner argued that the Trade Marks Registry failed to issue a mandatory expiry notice six months before the expiration date. Since the trademark was still shown as "registered" on the official database, the petitioner sought a Writ of Mandamus directing the Registrar to permit renewal.

Brief Issue:Whether the petitioner is entitled to renewal of the trademark despite the statutory deadline for renewal having passed, particularly in light of the alleged failure of the Registrar to serve an expiry notice.

Reasoning of the Court:The Court referred to the official trademark status as of 7 November 2024, which confirmed that the trademark had not been removed from the register.The respondent (Trade Marks Registry) failed to provide evidence that an expiry notice was properly served on the petitioner.

The Court relied on Jaisuryas Retail Ventures Private Limited v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, 2024:MHC:3109; 2024(100) PTC 25 (Mad), which held that if the Registry does not serve an expiry notice and does not remove the mark, the proprietor may seek renewal.The Court also cited P. Pandiyan v. The Registrar of Trade Marks (Order dated 13.02.2025 in W.P.(IPD) No.36 of 2024), where a similar situation arose where the registration certificate was issued after the expiry of the original term, and renewal was allowed.Since no steps had been taken to remove the trademark, the Court concluded that the petitioner could apply for renewal, subject to payment of renewal fees.

Decision:

The writ petition was allowed, and the Court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to provide access to the online portal for filing a renewal application. Alternatively, the petitioner was permitted to submit a physical renewal application with the requisite renewal fees. No costs were imposed.

Law Point Settled:

If a trademark remains on the register and no steps have been taken for its removal, renewal may be permitted even after the statutory period lapses.The Trade Marks Registry must issue an expiry notice to the registered proprietor, and failure to do so can justify discretionary relief in favor of the applicant.A proprietor can seek renewal despite delays, provided the mark has not been formally removed.

Case Title: Aurobindo Pharma Limited Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Date of Order: 25 February 2025

Case Number: W.P.(IPD) No.34 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Designo Lifestyle Solutions Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Assignee of Trademark must apply for recording the assignment within a reasonable time, but failure to do so does not extinguish renewal rights.

Brief Facts of the Case:

The petitioner, Designo Lifestyle Solutions, acquired the trademark "SO FA, SO GOOD" (Trade Mark No. 1775649, Class 99) through an assignment deed dated 30 September 2010. However, the petitioner did not apply for recording the assignment until 2024. The trademark was due for renewal on 19 January 2019, and the Trade Marks Registry issued an expiry notice on 27 January 2018 to the predecessor-in-interest, rather than the petitioner. The petitioner sought renewal in 2024, but the Registrar of Trade Marks refused on the ground that renewal was not permissible beyond a one-year delay.

Brief Issue:

Whether the petitioner was entitled to renewal of the trademark despite the expiration of the statutory renewal period and the failure to register the assignment in a timely manner.

Reasoning of the Court

The Court noted that the trademark had not been removed from the register.

The Trade Marks Registry failed to provide evidence that the expiry notice was properly served on either the predecessor-in-interest or the petitioner.

The petitioner was indeed obligated to apply for recording the assignment in a reasonable timeframe, but this delay alone did not justify denying renewal.

Relying on Jaisuryas Retail Ventures v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, 2024:MHC:3109; 2024(100) PTC 25 (Mad), the Court held that if a trademark remains on the register and no steps for removal have been taken, renewal should be permitted with reasonable conditions.

Decision:

The Court allowed the writ petition and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to enable the petitioner to file a renewal application within 30 days, subject to payment of ₹20,000 as costs to the Adyar Cancer Institute.

Law Point Settled:

If a trademark remains on the register without removal proceedings, renewal may be allowed even after the statutory period lapses.

The Trade Marks Registry must serve expiry notices to the registered proprietor, and failure to do so can justify discretionary relief.

An assignee must apply for recording the assignment within a reasonable time, but failure to do so does not extinguish renewal rights.

Designo Lifestyle Solutions Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Date of Order: 25 February 2025

Case Number: W.P.(IPD) No.35 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs. Azure Hospitality Private Limited

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs. Azure Hospitality Private Limited :Section 33 of the Copyright Act does not bar owners from issuing licenses independently.

Case Title: Phonographic Performance Limited Vs. Azure Hospitality Private Limited & Ors.

Date of Order: March 03, 2025

Case No.: CS(COMM) 714/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1367

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Introduction: The case revolves around the alleged infringement of copyright by Azure Hospitality Private Limited and its associated entities by playing copyrighted sound recordings owned by Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) without obtaining the necessary licenses. PPL, as an assignee of public performance rights from various record labels, sought a permanent injunction and damages against Azure Hospitality for unauthorized usage of its copyrighted works.

Detailed Factual Background: PPL is a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013, and is engaged in issuing licenses for the public performance of sound recordings. PPL has been assigned public performance rights by multiple music labels, making it the exclusive entity to license such rights.

Azure Hospitality operates multiple restaurants and bars across India, including brands such as 'Mamagoto,' 'Dhaba,' and 'Sly Granny.' PPL conducted investigations at various outlets of Azure Hospitality on multiple occasions and found that the defendants were playing PPL’s copyrighted sound recordings without obtaining a license. PPL subsequently issued a cease-and-desist notice on July 20, 2022, which the defendants ignored. Further inspections on October 12, 2022, confirmed continued infringement, leading to the present lawsuit.

Detailed Procedural Background: PPL initially filed a commercial suit against Azure Hospitality before the Bombay High Court (Suit No. 29686 of 2021), but later withdrew it without liberty to refile. In the present suit, PPL sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from playing its copyrighted works without a license, along with damages. On October 14, 2022, an ex-parte ad interim injunction was granted in favor of PPL, restraining Azure Hospitality from playing the copyrighted sound recordings.

Azure Hospitality subsequently filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC, seeking vacation of the ex-parte injunction, arguing that PPL lacked standing as it was not a registered copyright society.

Issues Involved in the Case:

1. Whether PPL, as an assignee of public performance rights, had the right to license and enforce copyrights in sound recordings?

2. Whether the suit was barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) CPC due to the withdrawal of the previous suit before the Bombay High Court?

3. Whether PPL was acting as an owner or as a copyright society, and if the latter, whether it was barred from issuing licenses under Section 33 of the Copyright Act?

4. Whether Azure Hospitality’s use of PPL’s sound recordings without a license constituted copyright infringement?

5. Whether PPL's omission of the Bombay suit in its pleadings amounted to material suppression?

Detailed Submission of Parties:

Submissions on Behalf of the Plaintiff (PPL):

1. PPL, being an assignee of public performance rights, is the owner under Section 18 of the Copyright Act and has exclusive rights to issue licenses.

2. Section 33 of the Copyright Act applies to copyright societies, whereas PPL operates as an owner and can grant licenses under Section 30.

3. PPL had filed the present suit based on a fresh cause of action, arising from the continuous unauthorized use of copyrighted sound recordings, and hence, was not barred by the withdrawal of the Bombay suit.

4. Precedents such as Novex Communication v. Lemon Tree Hotels and Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Canvas Communication support the right of an owner to issue licenses and enforce copyrights.

Submissions on Behalf of the Defendants (Azure Hospitality):

1. PPL was conducting the business of issuing licenses as a copyright society without proper registration, violating Section 33 of the Copyright Act.

2. The present suit was barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) CPC due to PPL’s withdrawal of a similar suit in the Bombay High Court.

3. The interpretation in Novex Communications v. DXC Technology by the Madras High Court supported the argument that only a registered copyright society can grant licenses.

4. PPL had failed to establish irreparable injury, as any damages could be compensated monetarily.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited and Their Context:

1. Novex Communication v. Lemon Tree Hotels (2019 SCC OnLine Del 6568) – Held that an owner of copyright can issue licenses independently of a copyright society.

2. Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Canvas Communication – Reinforced that copyright owners retain licensing rights unless they have assigned them exclusively to a copyright society.

3. Novex Communications v. Trade Wings Hotel (2024 SCC OnLine Bom 252) – Affirmed that an assignee of public performance rights has ownership and can issue licenses.

4. Novex Communications v. DXC Technology (2021 SCC OnLine Mad 6266) – Contrarily held that copyright licensing can only be done by a registered copyright society.

5. Leopold Café v. Novex Communications (2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4801) – Restrained Novex from issuing licenses without disclosing agency status, but not applicable as PPL acted as an owner.

6. Entertainment Network India v. Super Cassette Industries (2008) 13 SCC 30 – Stressed balancing public interest and copyright protection but was related to compulsory licensing.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:

1. The Bombay suit withdrawal did not bar the present suit as it was based on a fresh cause of action due to ongoing infringement.

2. PPL, as an assignee of public performance rights, became the owner under Section 18 of the Copyright Act and could issue licenses under Section 30.

3. The argument that PPL needed to be a registered copyright society to issue licenses was rejected, in line with Novex v. Lemon Tree and Trade Wings judgments.

4. PPL’s failure to disclose the Bombay suit was not material suppression since it was withdrawn without liberty to refile.

5. Azure Hospitality’s continued use of copyrighted works without a license amounted to prima facie infringement under Section 51 of the Copyright Act.

6. Balance of convenience favored PPL, as an injunction would not disrupt Azure Hospitality’s core business, but continued infringement would irreparably harm PPL.

Final Decision: The court granted a permanent injunction restraining Azure Hospitality from playing PPL’s copyrighted works without a license. The interim injunction was upheld, and the defendants’ application for vacation was dismissed.

Law Settled in This Case:

• Copyright owners (including assignees) retain the right to issue licenses unless they exclusively assign them to a copyright society.

• Section 33 of the Copyright Act does not bar owners from issuing licenses independently.

• Withdrawal of a prior suit does not bar a fresh suit if based on a new or continuing cause of action.

• Playing copyrighted sound recordings in commercial establishments without a license constitutes infringement.

• A copyright owner need not be a registered copyright society to enforce its rights or issue licenses.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Shrinath Travel Agency Private Limited Vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma

Prior Trademark user prevail over later Trademark registration

Case Title: Shrinath Travel Agency Private Limited Vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma & Anr.

Date of Order: 17 February 2025

Case Number: R/Rectification Application No. 25 of 2023

Neutral Citation: C/RA/25/2023

Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Judge: Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Mauna M. Bhatt

Brief Facts of the Case

The petitioner, Shrinath Travel Agency Private Limited, filed a rectification application seeking to cancel the trademark registration of respondent no.1, Ajay Kumar Sharma, on the grounds of deceptive similarity to its own registered mark. The petitioner has been using the trademark "Shrinath" since 1978 in the travel and transport industry and holds multiple registrations incorporating the word "Shrinath."

Despite the petitioner’s long-standing use, it was discovered that respondent no.1 had obtained registration of a similar mark in 2021 and had been using it since 2014. The petitioner argued that the respondent’s mark was phonetically, visually, and conceptually identical to its own and that its continued existence on the register would mislead consumers. The petitioner also cited a prior Delhi High Court judgment dated 6 November 2023, which granted an injunction against the respondent’s use of the mark.

The respondent contended that it had been using the trademark since 2014 and had complied with all procedural requirements for registration. It argued that the petitioner had not opposed the registration when it was advertised and that the rectification application was filed belatedly.

Brief Issue

The primary issue before the court was whether the trademark registered by respondent no.1 should be rectified and removed from the register on the grounds of prior use and deceptive similarity with the petitioner’s mark.

Reasoning of the Court

The court observed that the petitioner was the prior user and registered proprietor of the trademark "Shrinath" since 1978. The Delhi High Court had already recognized the deceptive similarity between "Shrinath" and "Shreenath," ruling that even minor differences in spelling did not eliminate the likelihood of confusion.

It was noted that respondent no.1 had failed to appear before the Delhi High Court and had disregarded the injunction order. The Gujarat High Court emphasized that the continued registration of respondent no.1’s mark would mislead consumers and harm the petitioner’s established goodwill.

The court rejected the respondent’s argument that the rectification application was delayed, holding that trademark rights are based on priority of use, not just registration. It further clarified that the failure to oppose the mark at the advertisement stage did not prevent the petitioner from seeking rectification under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Decision of the Court

The court allowed the rectification application and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to strike off and delete the registration of the respondent’s mark. It held that the respondent’s mark was deceptively similar to the petitioner’s prior registered mark and that its continued existence would be against public interest.

Law Points Settled

The case reaffirmed that prior user rights prevail over later registration, emphasizing that a trademark proprietor who has been using the mark for a long period can seek rectification of a deceptively similar later-registered mark. The court also held that deceptive similarity includes phonetic and visual resemblance, making it clear that even slight variations in spelling, such as "Shrinath" vs. "Shreenath," do not prevent a finding of infringement if the marks create consumer confusion.

It was further held that rectification is not barred by delay, as failure to oppose a trademark at the advertisement stage does not preclude rectification under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The court emphasized that non-appearance and violation of injunctions can strengthen rectification claims, as a party’s failure to defend its case in prior injunction proceedings may weaken its position in subsequent rectification applications.

The court also made it clear that consumer confusion is sufficient to order cancellation, as the existence of two similar marks in the same industry is likely to mislead the public, justifying removal of the impugned mark.

This decision reaffirms the importance of protecting prior trademark users from deceptive later registrations and strengthens the doctrine that mere registration does not confer superior rights over a longstanding user.

UPL Limited Vs. Union of India

Strict adherence to procedural timelines under the Patents Act and Rules is essential

Brief Facts of the Case:

The petitioner, UPL Limited, filed a patent application, which was duly published under Section 14 of the Patents Act, 1970. A pre-grant opposition was filed by respondent no.5, and the hearing was concluded on 13 October 2023, with written submissions filed on 28 November 2023. Subsequently, on 30 November 2023, respondent no.6 filed a second pre-grant opposition on similar grounds, citing largely the same prior arts as respondent no.5. The Controller issued a notice on 1 August 2024, adjourning the hearing scheduled for 22 August 2024, without providing prima facie reasons as required under Rule 55 of the Patents Rules, 2003 (as amended).The petitioner contended that the second pre-grant opposition was a delay tactic and that the Controller failed to follow procedural mandates under the Act and Rules. The respondents argued that the petitioner had sought repeated adjournments, contributing to unnecessary delays. The Controller’s office assured the court that the proceedings would be concluded expeditiously.

Brief Issue: 

The primary issue before the court was whether the adjournment of the hearing for the second pre-grant opposition was lawful and whether the Controller followed the procedural requirements under Rule 55 of the Patents Rules, 2003.

Reasoning of the Court: 

The court noted that the Patents Act and the Rules prescribe strict timelines for hearing and disposing of patent applications. The adjournment granted by the Controller without assigning reasons violated the legislative intent of preventing unnecessary delays. The first pre-grant opposition had been concluded in November 2023, and delaying the final decision on account of a second opposition was unjustified. The second pre-grant opposition raised largely the same issues as the first, yet the Controller failed to record prima facie reasons for allowing or rejecting it, as required under Rule 55(3). The multiple adjournments granted in a mechanical manner violated the principles of natural justice and fairness, affecting the integrity of the decision-making process. The Controller’s inaction in providing prima facie reasons demonstrated an infraction of procedural mandates under the Patents Act.

Decision of the Court:

The court directed the respondent authorities to assign the matter to a different Controller, ensuring impartiality in decision-making. The first pre-grant opposition, filed by respondent no.5, would be reconsidered afresh from the hearing stage, without applying Rule 55(3). The second pre-grant opposition, filed by respondent no.6, must be examined strictly under Rule 55(3), requiring prima facie reasons for its acceptance or rejection. The entire exercise must be concluded within eight weeks without granting unnecessary adjournments. The court clarified that it did not adjudicate on the merits of the case, leaving all substantive issues open for consideration by the Controller. The writ petition was accordingly allowed.

Law Points Settled: 

Strict adherence to procedural timelines under the Patents Act and Rules is essential to prevent undue delays in patent applications. Adjournments cannot be granted mechanically, as they defeat the legislative intent of expeditious disposal. Under Rule 55(3), the Controller must record specific reasons for accepting or rejecting a pre-grant opposition. Repeated adjournments without justification can violate the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, warranting judicial intervention. If procedural lapses are found, courts can direct reassignment to another Controller to ensure fairness and impartiality. This decision reinforces the principle that patent opposition proceedings must be conducted fairly and expeditiously, without undue procedural delays.

Case Title: UPL Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Date of Order: 25 February 2025

Case Number: WPA-IPD 2 of 2024 (Old No. WPA 28484 of 2024)

Court: High Court at Calcutta 

Judge: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Metravi Instruments Private Limited Vs. Dhanbad Lab Instruments India Private Limited

Minor alterations in a trademark do not remove the deceptive similarity

Case Title: Metravi Instruments Private Limited Vs. Dhanbad Lab Instruments India Private Limited

Date of Order: 25 February 2025

Case Number: IP-COM/7/2024

Judge: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Brief Facts of the Case

The petitioner, Metravi Instruments Private Limited, has been using the trademark METRAVI since 1 July 1998 and officially registered it on 1 April 1998 under Class 9. The mark was assigned to the petitioner in 2015. The respondent, Dhanbad Lab Instruments India Private Limited, was incorporated in 2016 and is engaged in a similar business.

In January 2024, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had obtained registration for the mark "METERIVA" under Class 9 for similar products. The petitioner alleged that METERIVA was phonetically, visually, and structurally similar to METRAVI, leading to potential consumer confusion. The respondent had prior business dealings with the petitioner and had previously purchased its products.

Brief Issue

The issue before the court was whether the respondent’s trademark "METERIVA" is deceptively similar to the petitioner’s registered mark "METRAVI", amounting to passing off.

Reasoning of the Court

The court examined the phonetic and visual similarity between the marks. It held that "METERIVA" and "METRAVI" have only an interchange of letters, creating a high likelihood of confusion. A consumer may mispronounce or misread the marks due to their resemblance.

On the issue of misrepresentation and passing off, the court observed that the respondent had prior knowledge of the petitioner’s mark and still chose to use a similar name. The similar trade dress and same business field increased the likelihood of confusion. The respondent’s choice of the mark was intentional and deceptive, aiming to ride on the goodwill of the petitioner.

The court further analyzed the risk of consumer confusion. Relying on Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73, the court emphasized that even slight phonetic and visual similarity can lead to confusion in the minds of consumers.

On the balance of convenience, the court held that the petitioner, as the prior user, had a stronger case. The respondent’s justification for choosing "METERIVA" was unconvincing.

Decision of the Court

The court confirmed the interim order of 8 April 2024 and allowed the petitioner’s request for an injunction. The respondent was restrained from using the mark "METERIVA". The respondent’s application to vacate the injunction was dismissed.

Law Points Settled

The case reaffirmed the phonetic and visual similarity test, emphasizing that even minor alterations in a trademark do not remove the deceptive similarity if consumer confusion is likely. It reinforced the doctrine of passing off, stating that if a new mark is adopted in bad faith and causes confusion, injunction relief can be granted without the need for further evidence of actual deception.

The court upheld the protection of prior users, establishing that a prior user’s goodwill and reputation must be safeguarded from misrepresentation by later entrants in the market.

C. Cunniah And Co. Vs. Balraj And Co.

C. Cunniah And Co. Vs. Balraj And Co.:Test for copyright infringement is substantial reproduction or a colorable imitation 

Case Title: C. Cunniah And Co. Vs. Balraj And Co.

Date of Order: February 4, 1959

Citation: AIR 1961 MAD 111

Name of Court: Madras High Court

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Ganapatia Pillai

Introduction:

This case is a landmark decision in Indian copyright law concerning artistic works. It deals with the issue of copyright infringement in relation to the pictorial representation of a deity. The case primarily revolves around whether the respondents' picture, "Bala Murugan," was a copy or a colorable imitation of the appellants' picture, "Mayura Priya," in which they claimed copyright. The High Court of Madras analyzed the originality of artistic works, the elements required for copyright protection, and the standard for determining whether a work constitutes an infringement of copyright.

Factual Background:

The appellants, C. Cunniah And Co., were engaged in the business of selling pictures and picture frames in Madras City. In 1932, an artist named T. M. Subramaniam created a picture titled "Mayura Priya," which depicted Lord Balasubramanya. On July 13, 1938, he assigned the copyright of this picture to the appellant firm. The appellants began producing and selling printed copies of the picture from 1940. However, sales were temporarily halted between 1946 and 1950 due to wartime scarcity of printing materials, but resumed in 1950. In 1952, the appellants registered the picture under the Trade Marks Act.

The dispute arose when the appellants discovered that the respondents, Balraj And Co., were selling a similar picture titled "Bala Murugan." The appellants alleged that "Bala Murugan" was a colorable imitation of "Mayura Priya" and issued a legal notice to the respondents to cease production and sale of the picture. The respondents refused to comply, leading the appellants to file a suit seeking an injunction to restrain the respondents from printing and selling "Bala Murugan," damages for copyright infringement, an account of profits, and seizure of unsold copies of the infringing work.

Procedural Background:

The appellants initiated a suit for injunction, damages, and an account of profits on the grounds of copyright infringement. The respondents contended that their picture was an independent creation by an artist named D.W.1 and was not copied from "Mayura Priya." They also argued that the appellants could not claim copyright over "Mayura Priya" because it depicted a commonly known religious subject. During the trial, the appellants dropped their claim of trademark infringement since "Mayura Priya" was not used as a trademark for any class of goods.

The learned Single Judge, Ramaswami J., ruled that while the appellants held copyright in "Mayura Priya," the respondents had not infringed upon it. The suit was dismissed, prompting the appellants to file an appeal before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court.

Issues Involved in the Case:

The main issue before the court was whether the respondents’ picture "Bala Murugan" was a reproduction or colorable imitation of the appellants' picture "Mayura Priya," thereby constituting copyright infringement. Another issue was whether an artistic work depicting a common religious subject could be granted copyright protection.

Submission of Parties:

The appellants argued that their picture "Mayura Priya" was an original artistic work that involved skill and labor in its execution. They asserted that "Bala Murugan" was not an independent creation but a reversed copy of "Mayura Priya," incorporating nearly identical facial features, ornaments, and background elements. The appellants presented expert photographic evidence demonstrating the similarity between the two pictures, contending that the respondents had merely altered minor details to disguise their copying.

The respondents maintained that their picture was an independent work created by an artist based on conventional ideas of Lord Balasubramanya. They highlighted certain differences between the two pictures, such as variations in posture, orientation of the peacock, facial expressions, and background elements. They contended that similarities were inevitable given the common religious theme, and thus, their work did not amount to infringement.

Discussion on Judgments and Citations:

The court referred to several precedents on copyright law. In Hanfsataengl v. W. H. Smith & Sons (1905) 1 Ch. 519, Kekewich J. defined a "copy" as something that comes so close to the original that it suggests the original work to any person viewing it. Applying this test, the court examined the visual resemblance between "Mayura Priya" and "Bala Murugan."

The court also cited Corelli v. Gray (1913) 29 T.L.R. 570, which laid down four hypotheses under which similarities between two works could arise: mere chance, both works being derived from a common source, the plaintiff’s work being copied from the defendant’s, or vice versa. The court found that the only reasonable inference in this case was that the respondents' picture was derived from the appellants' work.

The court relied on Hanfstaengl v. Baines and Co. (1895) A.C. 20, where the House of Lords observed that intelligent copying often involves minor alterations to disguise infringement. The court noted that the respondents had made slight modifications, such as changing the deity’s hand gestures and reversing the image, but these changes were not sufficient to constitute an independent creation.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:

The court found that the respondents’ picture "Bala Murugan" was a substantial reproduction of "Mayura Priya." While acknowledging some differences in details, the court emphasized that copyright law protects the original expression of an idea rather than the idea itself. The most distinctive and prominent elements of "Mayura Priya," including the facial features of the deity, the ornaments, the posture, and the overall composition, had been directly copied in "Bala Murugan."

The court rejected the respondents' argument that a common religious theme precludes copyright protection, clarifying that while the subject matter itself may not be protected, an artist’s original expression of that subject is eligible for copyright. The photographic evidence provided by the appellants demonstrated that "Bala Murugan" was a reversed copy of "Mayura Priya," created by mechanically reproducing significant portions of the original image.

Based on these findings, the court held that "Bala Murugan" constituted a colorable imitation of "Mayura Priya," amounting to copyright infringement.

Final Decision:

The High Court of Madras overturned the decision of the Single Judge and ruled in favor of the appellants. The court granted a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from printing and selling "Bala Murugan." The appellants were also awarded damages of Rs. 500, as agreed upon by both parties, in lieu of an account of profits.

Law Settled in the Case:

Copyright protection extends to artistic works even if they depict common religious subjects, provided that the work is an original expression requiring skill and labor. The test for copyright infringement is whether a work is a substantial reproduction or a colorable imitation of the original. Minor alterations and changes in details do not absolve a work from being an infringing copy if substantial similarities exist. Visual resemblance and overall impression play a crucial role in determining infringement. Copyright law protects the manner in which an idea is expressed rather than the idea itself. An infringing work does not need to be an exact copy; it is sufficient if a substantial part of the original work has been copied.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam Vs. Hindustan Metal Industries

Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam Vs. Hindustan Metal Industries:Minor variation or modification of an existing method does not qualify as an invention

Case Title: Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam Vs. Hindustan Metal Industries

Date of Order: December 13, 1978

Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 1630-1631 of 1969

Neutral Citation: AIR 1982 SUPREME COURT 1444, 1979 ALL. L. J. 290, (1979) 2 SCR 757 (SC), 1979 (2) SCC 511, (1979) 1 SCWR 337

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Sarkaria

Introduction:

This case deals with the fundamental principles of patent law, particularly the requirement of novelty and inventive step. The Supreme Court of India examined whether the method of manufacturing utensils patented by Hindustan Metal Industries was truly novel and involved an inventive step or was merely a modification of an existing method. The case serves as a significant precedent on the revocation of patents that lack originality and inventive merit.

Factual Background:

Both the appellant, Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam, and the respondent, Hindustan Metal Industries, were engaged in the business of manufacturing utensils in Mirzapur. In 1951, a partner of Hindustan Metal Industries claimed to have invented a method and device for manufacturing utensils that introduced improvements in safety, convenience, speed, and finish. The conventional method posed a risk as utensils would often fly off the headstock. The respondent filed for a patent, which was granted with effect from December 13, 1951. Subsequently, upon learning that the appellant was using the same method, Hindustan Metal Industries served a notice and later filed a suit for a permanent injunction against Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam to restrain them from infringing the patented method.

Detailed Description of Subject Matter of the Patent:

The patented invention related to "a method of mounting and holding metallic utensils on a lathe for turning before polishing" [It was a process Patent]. The primary components of the invention included a shaft or spindle carrying an adapter to hold the utensil, a pressure spindle that applied force to keep the utensil in place, and a bracket for support. The patent specifications described the method as a safer alternative to conventional techniques, which required using adhesives or direct chuck attachment that posed a risk of utensils detaching during the turning process.

Procedural Background:

Hindustan Metal Industries filed a suit for a permanent injunction and damages against the appellant for allegedly infringing its patented method. The appellant denied the claims and filed a counterclaim under Section 26 of the Indian Patent and Designs Act, 1911, seeking revocation of the patent on the grounds that the method lacked novelty and did not involve any inventive step. The case was transferred to the High Court, where a Single Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s suit and revoked the patent. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the decision and upheld the validity of the patent. The appellant then challenged the High Court’s decision before the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved in the Case:

The key issues before the Supreme Court were whether the patented method constituted a manner of new manufacture or improvement and whether it involved an inventive step in light of prior knowledge and practices?

Submission of Parties:

The appellant argued that the method patented by the respondent was neither a new manufacture nor an improvement but merely a minor modification of existing techniques. They contended that similar methods had been in use long before the patent date, and the respondent’s alleged invention did not involve any significant ingenuity or innovation.

The respondent countered that the method was novel as it introduced a safer and more efficient way of manufacturing utensils. They contended that the method was not publicly known before the date of the patent and involved an inventive step that justified the grant of the patent.

Discussion on Judgments and Citations:

The Supreme Court relied on several precedents to determine the validity of the patent. The Court referred to Rickman v. Thierry (1896) 14 Pat. Ca. 105, which emphasized that novelty in application alone is not sufficient; an invention must involve ingenuity in its mode of application. The Court also cited Blackey v. Latham (1888) 6 Pat. Ca. 184, where it was held that an invention must demonstrate a level of originality beyond common craftsmanship.

Additionally, the Court referred to Harwood v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1864-65) XI HLC 654, where it was established that a mere adaptation of an old contrivance without novelty or an inventive step does not warrant a patent. Another key case cited was Rado v. John Tye & Sons Ltd., 1967 RPC 297, which provided the test for obviousness—whether the alleged discovery lies outside the expected knowledge of a skilled craftsman.

The Detailed Analysis of Court:

The Supreme Court held that "for an invention to be patentable, it must satisfy two key criteria: it must be new, and it must involve an inventive step". The Court found that the respondent’s method was merely an application of an old technique with minor modifications.

The Court observed that prior to the patent, the technique of using a lathe with a headstock and tailstock for shaping utensils was already in common use. The addition of a pressure spindle, which was claimed as an innovation, was found to be a minor improvement rather than an invention. The Court also noted that the respondent’s own claims did not assert any significant novelty, as they stated that the pressure spindle could be either pointed or blunt, which indicated that no substantial innovation had been made.examined the definition of manufacture and held that "for a process or method to qualify as a manner of new manufacture, it must lead to a distinct and substantial improvement over existing methods". The respondent’s method failed this test as it was merely an adaptation of pre-existing techniques.

Regarding novelty, the Court reiterated that prior public knowledge or use of the patented method before the filing date of the patent negates its novelty. The evidence presented showed that similar manufacturing processes had been in use before the respondent’s patent, making the invention unpatentable.

On the issue of inventive step, the Court applied the test of whether a person skilled in the relevant field would consider the invention an obvious extension of prior knowledge. Since the patented method did not demonstrate ingenuity beyond the common skill of a craftsman, it lacked an inventive step.

The Court also provided guidance on how a patent specification should be interpreted. It emphasized that the correct way to construe a patent is to first read the description of the invention to understand its scope and purpose, and then examine the claims to determine the extent of the exclusive right being claimed. The patentee cannot claim more than what has been specifically described in the complete specification.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and restored the order of the Single Judge revoking the patent. The Court held that the patented method did not involve an inventive step and was merely a workshop improvement that did not warrant the grant of a patent. Consequently, the patent was invalidated.

Law Settled in the Case:

A patent is granted only for an invention that demonstrates novelty and an inventive step. Minor variation or modification of an existing method does not qualify as an invention. A combination of old elements must result in a new product or a significant improvement to be patentable. Grant of a patent does not guarantee its validity; it can be challenged and revoked if it lacks novelty or an inventive step. The test for obviousness requires determining whether a skilled craftsman, without knowledge of the patented invention, would have arrived at the same solution. If the alleged invention was publicly known or used before the date of the patent, it lacks novelty and cannot be patented.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Disposafe Health & Life Limited & Ors. vs. Rajiv Nath & Anr.

Portmanteau words could be protected as trademarks

Case Title: Disposafe Health & Life Limited & Ors. vs. Rajiv Nath & Anr.

Date of Order: February 28, 2025

Case Number: FAO(OS)(COMM) 272/2018

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1326:DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Yashwant Varma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prateek Jalan

Brief Facts of the Case:

The dispute pertains to trademark rights over the name “DISPOSAFE.” The appellants, Disposafe Health & Life Limited, claimed prior use of the trademark “DISPOSAFE” for disposable medical devices. They alleged that the respondents, Rajiv Nath & Anr., attempted to register and use the same mark, leading to confusion and dilution of their brand identity. The learned Single Judge initially refused to grant an injunction in favor of the appellants and instead granted an injunction against them, preventing them from using the "DISPOCANN" and other "DISPO" formative marks. The appellants challenged this decision before the Division Bench.

Brief Issues:

The primary issue was whether the appellants were entitled to an injunction against the respondents to restrain them from using the “DISPOSAFE” trademark. Another issue was whether the respondents had any legitimate claim over the mark or if their use constituted passing off.

Reasoning of the Court:

The Division Bench observed that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the appellants' claim for an injunction against the respondents while focusing on the respondents’ claim. The court found that the appellants had provided evidence of prior use of the “DISPOSAFE” trademark, including incorporation certificates, sales figures, invoices, and product packaging. The respondents, on the other hand, had not commenced marketing under the name "DISPOSAFE" and their claim of prior use was found to be weak. The court emphasized that portmanteau words could be protected as trademarks and that the respondents’ application for registration of “DISPOSAFE” indicated an acknowledgment of its distinctiveness.

Decision:

The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge, and granted an injunction restraining the respondents from using the trademark “DISPOSAFE” or any deceptively similar mark in relation to medical disposable devices until the disposal of the suit.

Law Point Settled:

An injunction can be granted in favor of a party that establishes prior use of a trademark, even if the mark consists of a combination of descriptive elements. Portmanteau words can be protected as trademarks if they acquire distinctiveness. A court must ensure that both parties' claims are fairly considered when granting or denying injunctions. A party that has not commenced marketing under a disputed trademark may not claim rights superior to an established user.

Adyar Gate Hotels Limited Vs. ITC Limited

Role of Delay in Grant of Ex Parte Ad Interim Injunction

Case Title: Adyar Gate Hotels Limited Vs. ITC Limited & Anr.

Date of Order: February 24, 2025

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 32/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1277:DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Shalinder Kaur

Brief Facts of the Case:

The dispute arises from the use of the trademark “Dakshin” in the restaurant business. The appellant, Adyar Gate Hotels Limited, entered into an agreement in 1985 with ITC Limited, under which ITC operated a hotel under the name “Welcomgroup Park Sheraton.” The appellant claimed that it conceived and planned the “Dakshin” restaurant in 1989. However, after the agreement between the parties lapsed in 2015, ITC Limited filed a suit claiming exclusive rights over the “Dakshin” trademark, seeking to restrain Adyar Gate Hotels Limited from using the mark. The Single Judge passed an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favor of ITC Limited, restraining the appellant from using the mark.

Brief Issues:

The first issue was whether the Single Judge was justified in granting an ex-parte ad-interim injunction without notice. The second issue was whether the appellant, having used the mark independently since 2015, had acquired rights to use it. The third issue was whether ITC Limited, as the registered owner of the “Dakshin” trademark, had an exclusive right over its use. The fourth issue was whether the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi courts was valid for this suit.

Reasoning of the Court:

The Division Bench observed that while a Single Judge has discretion to grant an ex-parte injunction, it must be exercised within the framework of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the CPC, which requires that notice should generally be given unless delay would defeat the object of the injunction. The court noted that the appellant had been using the mark since 2015, including in collaboration with a competitor of ITC. It also observed that ITC had not previously challenged this usage. Additionally, the appellant had its own trademark registration, which ITC had not challenged. Furthermore, the appellant did not receive proper notice of the suit, which ITC had only sent via email, leading to an unfair ex-parte order.

The court found that the Single Judge failed to consider these crucial factors before issuing an ex-parte injunction and that the order was unjustified under the circumstances.

Decision:

The Division Bench set aside the ex-parte ad-interim injunction issued by the Single Judge and directed the appellant to file its response within one week. The court instructed that the interim injunction application be heard on its merits after due process.

Law Point Settled:

Ex-parte ad-interim injunctions should be granted only in exceptional cases where delay would defeat justice, as per Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC. A party that has been using a trademark for a significant period should be given an opportunity to present its case before being restrained. The burden lies on the plaintiff (ITC) to justify the urgency for an ex-parte injunction rather than proceeding directly with such relief. Proper service and notice must be ensured before obtaining an injunction.

Christian Louboutin SAS Vs. Abubaker

Christian Louboutin SAS Vs. Abubaker :Where a Single Judge or Division Bench finds prior rulings incorrect, it must refer the matter to a larger Bench

Case Title: Christian Louboutin SAS vs. Abubaker & Ors.

Date of Order: April 11, 2019

Case No.: RFA (OS)(COMM) 13/2018 & CM 29064/2018

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice S. Muralidhar and Justice I.S. Mehta

Introduction:

This case highlights an important legal principle concerning judicial discipline and the necessity for consistency in judicial rulings. 

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, while adjudicating upon a trademark infringement dispute, emphasized that a court cannot disregard binding precedents from co-ordinate benches and must refer matters to a larger bench in case of disagreement. 

The case arose when a Single Judge dismissed a trademark infringement suit at the initial stage without issuing summons, despite prior co-ordinate bench rulings that recognized the validity of the plaintiff's trademark. The appellate court set aside the order, reaffirming that judicial consistency must be maintained, and any deviation from settled law requires reference to a larger bench.

Factual Background:

Christian Louboutin SAS, a French company, owns the "RED SOLE" trademark, which is internationally recognized. The plaintiff's trademark is registered under Class 25, covering shoes (except orthopedic footwear), with the limitation that it applies to the specific shade of red (Pantone No. 18.1663TP) on the outsole of the shoe. The plaintiff conducted a market survey in April 2018 and discovered that the defendants were selling ladies' shoes with a similar red sole, thereby infringing upon its trademark. A private investigator's report indicated that the defendants were engaged in counterfeiting activities. The plaintiff argued that its trademark had trans-border reputation and was widely known in India even before its formal launch in the country.

Procedural Background:

The plaintiff filed a commercial suit (CS (COMM) No. 890 of 2018) seeking a permanent injunction against the defendants for trademark infringement, passing off, unfair competition, dilution, and tarnishment. The plaintiff also filed an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC to restrain the defendants from manufacturing and selling footwear bearing the "RED SOLE" trademark. A separate application was filed for appointing a Local Commissioner to visit the defendants' premises and seize the infringing goods. The Single Judge, after hearing the plaintiff, reserved orders and subsequently dismissed the suit on May 25, 2018, without issuing summons to the defendants.

Issues Involved in the Case:

Whether a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction against trademark infringement can be dismissed at the first hearing under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that a single color cannot be registered as a trademark. Whether the learned Single Judge was correct in disagreeing with prior co-ordinate bench judgments without referring the matter to a larger bench.

Submission of Parties:

The plaintiff, Christian Louboutin SAS, argued that the "RED SOLE" trademark is a registered device mark with distinctive character and acquired reputation. The defendants' sale of red-soled shoes constitutes infringement, passing off, and unfair competition. The Single Judge erred in dismissing the suit without issuing summons, violating principles of natural justice. The earlier judgments in Deere & Company v. Malkit Singh and Christian Louboutin SAS v. Pawan Kumar upheld the protection of single-color trademarks.

The defendants, Abubaker & Ors., contended that a single color cannot be registered as a trademark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 30(2)(a) of the Act allows the use of a registered trademark in a descriptive manner. The plaintiff cannot claim exclusivity over the red color in footwear. The dismissal of the suit was justified since no valid cause of action was made out.

Discussion on Judgments and Citations:

The Single Judge dismissed the suit relying on Section 2(m) and 2(zb) of the Trade Marks Act, holding that a single color does not qualify as a trademark. The judgment of the Single Judge was inconsistent with Deere & Company v. Malkit Singh (April 23, 2018), which upheld single color trademark protection, and Christian Louboutin SAS v. Pawan Kumar (December 12, 2017), which recognized "RED SOLE" as a well-known trademark. The Single Judge referred to Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533 and N. Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala (2004) 13 SCC 217 but failed to consider the legal presumption in favor of registered trademarks. The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge should have referred the matter to a larger bench instead of disregarding binding precedent.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:

A commercial suit for trademark infringement cannot be dismissed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC at the first hearing without the defendants entering appearance. The plaintiff's registered trademark enjoys a presumption of validity under Section 31 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 30(2)(a) provides a defense to infringement, but it must be raised by the defendants and cannot be used by the court suo moto. The earlier judgments in favor of single-color trademarks should have been followed or referred to a larger bench for reconsideration. Dismissing a suit without issuing summons was improper and contrary to the principles of natural justice. A court cannot disregard binding precedents from co-ordinate benches and must refer matters to a larger bench in case of disagreement.

The Division Bench specifically emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis requires lower and co-ordinate benches to adhere to settled legal principles unless referred to a larger bench. The court cited Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal AIR 1960 SC 936, which mandates that where a Single Judge or Division Bench finds prior rulings incorrect, it must refer the matter to a larger bench rather than overriding established precedents. 

In this case, the Single Judge failed to follow the legal precedents laid down in earlier judgments, leading to a miscarriage of justice and necessitating intervention by the appellate court.

Final Decision:

The Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge. The suit (CS (COMM) No. 890 of 2018) was restored for reconsideration. The case was remanded to the learned Single Judge for adjudication after issuing summons to the defendants. The court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and directed the matter to be heard afresh.

Law Settled in the Case:

A commercial suit for trademark infringement cannot be dismissed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC at the first hearing without the defendants entering appearance. The presumption of validity of a registered trademark under Section 31 of the Trade Marks Act must be given due consideration. 

A court cannot disregard binding precedents from co-ordinate benches and must refer matters to a larger bench in case of disagreement. Section 30(2)(a) of the Trade Marks Act is a defense that must be raised by the defendants, not invoked suo moto by the court. 

Dismissing a suit without issuing summons violates principles of natural justice and is contrary to procedural law.

Disclaimer:

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Saregama India Ltd.

Case Title: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Saregama India Ltd.

Date of Order: 28th February, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1674/2016

Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:1316

Court Name: Delhi High Court

Hon'ble Judge: Justice Amit Bansal

Brief Facts of the Case:

The plaintiff, Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, Saregama India Ltd., from infringing its copyright in sound recordings incorporated in 29 cinematograph films. The plaintiff attempted to introduce additional documents and an additional affidavit of evidence after eight years of litigation, seeking to lead secondary evidence for proving its ownership of the disputed works.

Issues Before the Court:

Whether the plaintiff should be granted leave under Order XI Rule 1(5) of the CPC to place additional documents on record at such a belated stage. Whether the plaintiff had made out a case for leading secondary evidence under Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Whether the plaintiff’s delay in filing these documents prejudiced the defendant's case.

Court’s Reasoning:

The plaintiff was aware since 2017 that it only had copies of the documents, not the originals. The need to lead secondary evidence arose in March 2019, when key documents were de-exhibited. Despite this, the plaintiff waited until November 2024 to send letters requesting the original documents and then filed an application to introduce them. The court found this delay inexcusable and held that the plaintiff had failed to exercise due diligence.

Under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, a party seeking to lead secondary evidence must prove why the originals are unavailable. The plaintiff did not establish that the originals were lost or destroyed. The court referred to Jai Prakash Aggarwal v. State & Ors., where it was held that secondary evidence cannot be permitted unless a proper foundation is laid.

The plaintiff's application was seen as an attempt to improve its case by introducing new evidence at the last moment. The delay had already prolonged the trial since 2016, which was against the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which mandates expeditious disposal. The court cited Nitin Gupta v. Texmaco Infrastructure & Holding Ltd., emphasizing the need to enforce strict timelines in commercial suits.

Decision:

The application was dismissed with costs of ₹25,000, payable by the plaintiff to the defendant within two weeks. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to place additional documents on record or introduce an additional affidavit of evidence. 

Law Point Settled:

Strict compliance with Order XI Rule 1(5) CPC in commercial suits—parties cannot introduce additional documents at a belated stage without valid justification. Secondary evidence under Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act requires a clear foundation proving the loss or unavailability of the originals. Delays in commercial litigation that are caused by a party's lack of diligence will not be condoned, as they violate the objective of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, to ensure speedy disposal of cases.

National Insurance Co. Ltd Vs Pranay Sethi

National Insurance Co. Ltd Vs Pranay Sethi: In case of conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength, the earlier decision must be followed.

Case Title: National Insurance Co. Ltd Vs Pranay Sethi

Date of Order: 31 October 2017

Case No.: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25590 of 2014

Neutral Citation: AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 5157

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Dipak Misra, Ashok Bhushan, D.Y. Chandrachud, A.M. Khanwilkar, A.K. Sikri, H.J.

Introduction:

The case of National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Pranay Sethi is a landmark judgment in motor accident compensation claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It addresses the computation of compensation, particularly regarding future prospects, selection of multipliers, and compensation under conventional heads. The judgment provides much-needed clarity and uniformity in awarding just compensation.

Factual Background:

The case arose from a motor vehicle accident leading to the death of an individual. The claimants, being the legal heirs of the deceased, sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The controversy revolved around the determination of future prospects for the deceased, particularly when the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary. The issue was whether a certain percentage should be added to the actual income to account for future earnings growth.

Procedural Background:

The claimants initially filed for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), which awarded compensation based on previous Supreme Court decisions. The insurance company challenged this before the High Court, which upheld the Tribunal's award. Dissatisfied with the decision, the insurance company appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present case.

Issues Involved in the Case:

Whether the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act should be strictly applied in all cases. Whether future prospects should be considered while determining the multiplicand in motor accident compensation claims. Whether self-employed individuals or those with a fixed salary should be granted an addition to their income for future prospects. The quantum of compensation under conventional heads such as loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. How conflicting judgments on the issue of future prospects should be resolved. Whether, in the case of conflicting opinions, the earlier judgment must be followed.

Submission of Parties:

The petitioner, National Insurance Co. Ltd, argued that the claimants were not entitled to any future prospects if the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary. They contended that any addition would lead to speculation and over-compensation. The respondents, legal heirs of Pranay Sethi, contended that future prospects should be included to ensure just compensation, as the deceased would have likely earned more in the future. They argued that denying future prospects to self-employed persons was discriminatory.

Discussion on Judgments Cited:

Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121 laid down guidelines for selecting the multiplier based on the age of the deceased. Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 65 emphasized the application of a structured formula for compensation. Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh (2013) 9 SCC 54 allowed for future prospects in all cases, including self-employed persons. Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2012) 6 SCC 421 suggested that even self-employed persons may have increased earnings over time. Trilok Chandra v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 362 addressed issues in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act regarding multipliers.

How the Court Dealt with Conflicting Judgments?

The Supreme Court acknowledged the conflict between the rulings in Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari, Rajesh, and Santosh Devi regarding the issue of future prospects. It clarified that Sarla Verma and Reshma Kumari were binding precedents and that the decision in Rajesh had erred in expanding future prospects indiscriminately. The Court held that future prospects should be standardized, with specific percentages assigned based on the age of the deceased. It resolved the conflicting judgments by setting uniform guidelines and emphasizing judicial discipline, ensuring consistency in future motor accident compensation cases.

How the Court Returned the Finding That in Case of Conflicting Opinions, the Earlier Judgment Must Be Followed:

The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of judicial discipline and adherence to precedent. It ruled that in cases of conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength, the earlier judgment must be followed. The Court cited State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer (2003) 5 SCC 448, which held that an earlier decision cannot be ignored by a later Bench of the same strength unless overruled by a larger Bench. The Court reaffirmed that the decisions in Sarla Verma and Reshma Kumari had already laid down settled law, and Rajesh had incorrectly deviated from these principles. Hence, Sarla Verma and Reshma Kumari were followed as binding precedents, ensuring consistency in judicial rulings.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:

The Supreme Court clarified that future prospects should be considered even for self-employed individuals. The Court held that income should be increased by 40% if the deceased was below 40 years, 25% if between 40 and 50 years, and 10% if between 50 and 60 years. A structured approach was recommended to ensure uniformity in awarding compensation. The Court ruled that loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses should be awarded at Rs. 15,000, Rs. 40,000, and Rs. 15,000 respectively, with a 10% increase every three years.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court affirmed the inclusion of future prospects in compensation calculations and provided a structured framework for computing just compensation. It established specific percentages for different age groups and revised the compensation under conventional heads.

Key Takeaways and Law Settled:

Future prospects must be considered for both salaried and self-employed individuals. Standardized future prospects additions: 40% for those below 40 years, 25% for those between 40-50 years, and 10% for those between 50-60 years. Standardized deductions for personal and living expenses must follow Sarla Verma guidelines. Compensation under conventional heads must be periodically revised, increasing by 10% every three years. The age of the deceased is the basis for applying the multiplier. In case of conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength, the earlier decision must be followed. The decision ensures uniformity and fairness in compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

UPL Limited Vs. Astec Life Sciences Limited

Case Title:UPL Limited Vs. Astec Life Sciences Limited & Anr

Date of Order:20th February 2025

Case Number:IPDPTA/2/2024

Name of the Court:High Court at Calcutta

Name of the Hon’ble Judge:Hon’ble Justice Shri Ravi Krishan Kapur

Brief Facts:

UPL Limited filed an appeal against an order dated 9th March 2024, which had allowed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, 1970.

The appellant (UPL Limited) contended that the impugned order suffered from gross violations of natural justice and fairness.

The primary allegation was that the order verbatim reproduced portions of the Note of Submissions filed by the private respondent, including typographical errors and page numbers, suggesting a lack of independent application of mind by the adjudicatory authority.

Issue:

The issue before the court was whether the impugned order was legally sustainable or if it should be set aside for violation of due process.

.

Reasoning of the Court:

Violation of Natural Justice:The court noted that the impugned order was passed without proper reasoning and failed to demonstrate independent application of mind. The order merely replicated the submissions of the respondent, including errors, which rendered it a "travesty of justice."

Role of the Controller under the Patents Act:

The court emphasized that decisions under Sections 14, 15, and 25(1) of the Patents Act must be made with due consideration.The Controller must properly explain objections and allow applicants an opportunity to respond. The First Examination Report (FER) and Second Examination Report (SER) should be communicated clearly to the applicant.

Requirement of Reasoned Orders:

Orders must contain reasons and justify conclusions rather than merely reproducing submissions.Mechanical reproduction of submissions without critical analysis is a violation of natural justice and due process.

Decision of the Court:

The impugned order was set aside as it was found to be unsustainable in law.The matter was remanded to a different officer for fresh adjudication within eight weeks from the date of communication of the order.The court clarified that it had not adjudicated on the merits of the case and left all points open for the Controller to decide.

Law Point Settled in this case:

Patent opposition proceedings must adhere to the principles of natural justice.Orders under the Patents Act must be reasoned and reflect independent application of mind.A mechanical reproduction of submissions, without critical evaluation, renders an order legally unsustainable.The adjudicatory process in patent matters must be fair, transparent, and conducted within the prescribed timelines.

Saranya Parthiban Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Case Title: Saranya Parthiban Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Date of Order: 27.02.2025

Case Number: C.M.A. (TM) No.4 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Hon’ble Judge: Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Brief Facts & Issue:

The appellant, Saranya Parthiban, applied for registration of the word mark "RAW SKINN" under Class 3 for various cosmetic and skincare products.

The application (No. 5150499) was filed on 27.09.2021, asserting use since 17.08.2021.

The Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the application on 19.12.2023, citing Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, stating that the mark was descriptive and merely designated the characteristics of the goods.

The appellant argued that the mark was arbitrary or suggestive, not descriptive, and relied on tax invoices to show usage.

The respondent contended that "RAW SKINN" was intended for products used on human skin and was therefore descriptive.

Reasoning:

The High Court examined whether the mark "RAW SKINN" was descriptive or suggestive.

It noted that no conflicting mark was cited in the examination report.

The court held that trademark classification must be done in context with the goods it applies to.

While the mark was not purely arbitrary, the court found that it was suggestive rather than descriptive.

The Registrar’s order lacked proper reasoning, as it did not discuss or address the appellant’s contentions and supporting judgments.

Decision:

The impugned order dated 19.12.2023 was set aside.

The court directed that the trademark application proceed to advertisement.

It clarified that this decision would not bind any future opponents who might challenge the application.

Law Point Held:

A trademark cannot be rejected as descriptive without a detailed reasoning process considering its placement in the distinctiveness spectrum.

The suggestive nature of a mark, as opposed to descriptiveness, allows it to proceed for advertisement.

Failure to discuss applicant's contentions and provide a reasoned order can lead to judicial interference and setting aside of the rejection.

This case reinforces the principle that mere perception of descriptiveness is insufficient to reject a trademark; the Registrar must provide a well-reasoned order.