Thursday, April 10, 2025

Ibibo Group Pvt Ltd. Vs. Satyendra Kumar Singh

The High Court of Delhi, in a ruling dated April 1, 2025, addressed a rectification petition filed by Ibibo Group Private Limited against Satyendra Kumar Singh and another respondent, seeking the cancellation of the trademark "GO PLUS" (registration no. 3742148) in Class 9 from the Register of Trade Marks. The case, identified as C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 251/2022, was adjudicated under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with the court granting the petitioner’s request due to the respondent’s failure to contest the claims and the petitioner’s established prior rights and goodwill in its "GOIBIBO" and related "GO-formative" marks. Justice Amit Bansal delivered the oral judgment, directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove the impugned mark, thereby reinforcing the protection of well-known trademarks against deceptive similarity and dilution.

Ibibo Group Private Limited, the petitioner, is a prominent player in India’s online travel industry, operating under the "GOIBIBO" brand. The company has built a robust presence since 2009, offering a comprehensive travel platform that facilitates bookings for flights, hotels, buses, and ancillary services like travel insurance. With a website (www.goibibo.com) registered on May 22, 2009, and operational since 2010, the petitioner has processed over 10 million bookings. Its mobile application, launched in 2013, has garnered over 16 million downloads across platforms like Google Play and Apple iStore. The company’s extensive promotional efforts span traditional print media, digital channels, and sponsorships of national and international events, resulting in significant unsolicited media coverage in leading publications. Social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram, further amplify the visibility of the "GOIBIBO" marks. Financially, the petitioner’s success is evident from its sales turnover of Rs. 135,631 lakhs and marketing expenses of Rs. 125,175 lakhs in the fiscal year 2017-18, as detailed in the petition. This commercial success has been complemented by prestigious awards and partnerships with celebrities and corporate giants, cementing the "GOIBIBO" brand’s reputation.

The petitioner’s intellectual property portfolio includes registered trademarks for "GOIBIBO" and various "GO-formative" marks—such as "GO CONTACTS," "GOCASH PLUS," "GO BIZ," "GO BUSINESS," and "GO STAYS"—across multiple classes, including Class 9 (downloadable software for travel-related services), Class 35 (business services), Class 36 (financial services), Class 39 (transport and travel), and Class 43 (accommodation services). The earliest registration for "GOIBIBO" dates to August 18, 2011, with a user claim from May 22, 2009, reflecting over a decade of continuous use. This extensive adoption and promotion have positioned "GO" as a dominant and independently recognizable element associated exclusively with the petitioner’s services in the minds of the public and trade.

The dispute originated when the petitioner identified the "GO PLUS" mark in Trade Marks Journal No. 1840, published on March 12, 2018. Filed by respondent no. 1, Satyendra Kumar Singh, on February 1, 2018, on a "proposed to be used" basis, the mark was registered on July 31, 2018, in Class 9 for "mobile and mobile accessories, charger, ear phone, battery, bluetooth, screen guard." Due to an error by its trademark agents, the petitioner missed the deadline to oppose the application before registration. Aggrieved by the registration, Ibibo Group filed the rectification petition, arguing that "GO PLUS" was deceptively similar to its "GOIBIBO" and "GO-formative" marks, likely to cause confusion, deceive consumers, and dilute its goodwill.

Procedurally, the case transitioned to the High Court following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) under the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. The IPAB had initially issued notice to the respondent on March 18, 2019, but subsequent records were incomplete. After the transfer, the High Court issued fresh notice on July 22, 2022, and confirmed service on December 15, 2022. Despite these efforts, the respondent neither appeared nor filed a reply, effectively conceding the petitioner’s averments. This non-participation shaped the court’s approach, allowing it to treat the petition’s claims as admitted under established legal principles.

Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Abhishek Kotnala and Mr. Kartikeya Tandon, advanced several key arguments. They emphasized the petitioner’s prior adoption and exclusive proprietorship of the "GOIBIBO" and "GO-formative" marks, rooted in their use since 2009. They contended that "GO PLUS" was deceptively similar, posing a risk of confusion and deception among consumers. The widespread goodwill of the "GOIBIBO" brand, they argued, extended to the "GO" element, which the public independently associated with the petitioner’s services. This association was reinforced by the petitioner’s array of "GO-formative" marks, making the registration of "GO PLUS" a threat to the distinctiveness of its trademark family. Additionally, the goods covered by the impugned mark—mobile accessories and related items—overlapped with the petitioner’s Class 9 software offerings, heightening the potential for confusion. Finally, they noted the respondent’s non-use of "GO PLUS," suggesting that cancellation would cause no prejudice.

Justice Bansal’s analysis hinged on the uncontested evidence and legal precedents. The respondent’s failure to respond left the petitioner’s claims unopposed, a circumstance the court interpreted as an admission of the averments. A side-by-side comparison of the marks revealed striking similarities: the petitioner’s portfolio included "GOIBIBO," "GO STAYS," "GO CARS," "GO BIZ," and "GOCASH PLUS," among others, while the respondent’s mark was "GO PLUS." The court identified "GO" as the essential and dominant feature, a conclusion bolstered by the respondent’s inclusion of a "GO" logo alongside "GO PLUS." This similarity, when viewed holistically, rendered "GO PLUS" deceptively akin to the petitioner’s marks.

The court drew on its ruling in Greaves Cotton Limited v. Mohammad Rafi and Ors. (2011 SCC OnLine Del 2596) to frame its assessment of deceptive similarity. It noted that infringement does not require an exact replica of a registered mark; rather, it suffices if the impugned mark resembles the plaintiff’s mark substantially, likely deceiving or confusing consumers. The judgment highlighted that savvy infringers often introduce minor variations to evade liability, but such tactics do not preclude relief if the resemblance remains significant. Here, the shared "GO" element, coupled with the petitioner’s extensive use and reputation, satisfied this threshold. The court rejected the notion that minor differences—like the addition of "PLUS"—negated the risk of confusion, especially given the petitioner’s established market presence.

Further, the court examined the overlap in goods and services. The petitioner’s Class 9 registrations covered downloadable software for travel-related digital content, loyalty schemes, and accommodation searches—offerings that intersected with the respondent’s mobile accessories, which often complement digital platforms. This proximity amplified the likelihood of consumer confusion. The petitioner’s prior use since 2009, contrasted with the respondent’s adoption in 2018 on a "proposed to be used" basis and subsequent non-use, underscored the inequity of maintaining the registration. The court found that the petitioner’s goodwill, built through years of promotion and recognition, was vulnerable to dilution by the impugned mark, even absent active use by the respondent.

Applying Sections 9, 11, and 18 of the Trade Marks Act, the court concluded that the registration of "GO PLUS" contravened legal standards. Section 9 prohibits registration of marks lacking distinctiveness, Section 11 bars marks likely to cause confusion due to similarity with earlier trademarks, and Section 18 governs the Registrar’s authority to accept applications. The continued presence of "GO PLUS" on the Register, the court reasoned, violated these provisions by threatening the petitioner’s rights and public interest. Under Section 57, which empowers rectification for entries wrongly remaining on the Register, the court found cancellation warranted.

The judgment culminated in an order allowing the petition and directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove "GO PLUS" (no. 3742148) from Class 9. The court instructed its Registry to forward the order to the Trade Marks Registry via email for compliance, disposing of all pending applications. Delivered orally on April 1, 2025, the ruling exemplifies the judiciary’s role in safeguarding trademark integrity, particularly when uncontested evidence reveals a clear threat to established rights.


Complete Citation

  • Case Name: Ibibo Group Pvt Ltd. Vs. Satyendra Kumar Singh 
  • Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
  • Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 251/2022
  • Date of Decision: April 1, 2025
  • Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal
  • Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2480

Harley-Davidson LLC Vs. Vijal Pal Dhayal


This judgment from the High Court of Delhi addresses a commercial suit filed by Harley-Davidson LLC, a renowned American company, against Vijal Pal Dhayal accused of infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks and copyrights, as well as passing off goods under a deceptively similar mark. The case, identified as CS(COMM) 609/2023, was adjudicated summarily under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), as amended for commercial disputes, due to the defendant’s failure to contest the claims despite multiple opportunities. The court granted a permanent injunction, ordered the destruction of infringing goods, and awarded damages and costs totaling Rs. 5,00,000 in favor of the plaintiff.

Harley-Davidson LLC, organized under the laws of the United States, has been a prominent name in the motorcycle industry since its inception in 1903. The company, formally incorporated as Harley-Davidson Motor Company on September 17, 1907, expanded its product line over the years to include apparel, shoes, and accessories, all marketed under the well-known “HARLEY-DAVIDSON” mark and associated logos, such as the “Bar & Shield” logo introduced in 1910 and the “Eagle Logo/Device Mark.” These trademarks have been registered globally, with over 2,200 registrations or pending applications, and have acquired significant recognition due to continuous use since the early 20th century. In India, the plaintiff began operations in August 2009 through its subsidiary, H-D Motor Company India Private Ltd., and opened its first dealership in July 2010. It later partnered with Hero MotoCorp to strengthen its presence in the Indian market. The company also operates a website, https://www.harley-davidson.in/, created on February 14, 2005, to promote and sell its products.

The plaintiff’s trademarks in India include registrations for “HARLEY-DAVIDSON,” its logos, and variants like “SCREAMIN EAGLE,” “H-D,” and “HD,” spanning multiple classes under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. For instance, registration no. 490824 for “HARLEY-DAVIDSON” in Class 25 (clothing) dates back to May 10, 1988, while registration no. 1333740 for the “Bar & Shield” logo in Class 25 was filed on January 24, 2005. These marks, along with their distinctive trade dress and artistic elements, are protected as original works under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The plaintiff’s extensive use, global sales in over 90 countries through 1,460 dealerships, and substantial promotional efforts—evidenced by sales of Rs. 488.09 crore and promotional expenses of Rs. 5.31 crore in India in 2014—have established its marks as market leaders and source identifiers exclusively associated with Harley-Davidson.

The dispute arose in July 2023 when the plaintiff’s representative discovered the defendant using a mark identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s “Eagle Logo/Device Mark” on footwear sold under the brand name “RONTEX.” An investigation revealed that the defendant was stocking, supplying, and selling these shoes, prompting the plaintiff to file the present suit. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing its trademarks and copyrights, passing off goods as those of the plaintiff, and causing dilution of its brand reputation. Additional reliefs included the delivery and destruction of infringing products, damages, and costs.

The procedural history of the case reflects the defendant’s non-participation. On October 16, 2023, the court issued summons and an ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the impugned mark. A Local Commissioner was appointed to visit the defendant’s premises, where 640 pairs of shoes bearing the infringing mark were inventoried. Despite service of summons via email and publication, and multiple extensions granted by the Joint Registrar, the defendant failed to file a written statement within the statutory 120-day period under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Consequently, on April 2, 2024, the right to file a written statement was closed, and the plaintiff moved an application (I.A. 42209/2024) under Order XIII-A and Order VIII Rule 10 CPC for a summary judgment.

The court’s analysis focused on the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the defendant’s lack of defense. The plaintiff demonstrated prior adoption and continuous use of its marks since 1903 globally and since 2009 in India, supported by trademark registrations and evidence of goodwill. The Local Commissioner’s report, unchallenged by the defendant, confirmed the presence of infringing goods, aligning with Order XXVI Rule 10(2) CPC, which allows such reports to be read into evidence if uncontested. The court compared the plaintiff’s “Eagle Logo/Device Mark” with the defendant’s mark and found them deceptively similar, noting that the defendant’s use on identical goods (footwear) could mislead consumers and dilute the plaintiff’s brand.

Applying Order XIII-A CPC, designed to expedite commercial disputes, the court assessed whether the defendant had a “real prospect” of defending the claim. Citing Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev (2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764), the court emphasized that a summary judgment is appropriate when the defendant’s prospects are not “realistic” but “fanciful,” and no compelling reason exists for a trial. Here, the defendant’s failure to file a written statement, respond to the application, or contest the interim injunction indicated an absence of defense. The court concluded that proceeding to trial was unnecessary, as the plaintiff’s evidence—trademark registrations, sales figures, and the Local Commissioner’s findings—established infringement, passing off, and copyright violation.

On the issue of reliefs, the court granted a permanent injunction in terms of prayer clauses 46(a), (b), and (c) of the plaint, restraining the defendant from using the infringing mark. It also ordered the destruction of the 640 pairs of shoes inventoried by the Local Commissioner, to be supervised by the plaintiff’s representative, as per prayer clause 46(e). For damages and costs (prayer clauses 46(g) and (h)), the plaintiff pressed for compensation, citing the defendant’s willful infringement. Referencing Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Reckitt Benckiser India Limited and Inter Ikea v. Sham Murari, the court adopted a “rough and ready calculation” approach, basing damages on the Local Commissioner’s seizure report. Considering the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s reputation, the court awarded Rs. 5,00,000, covering both damages and costs. The plaintiff did not pursue other reliefs, such as rendition of accounts.


Complete Citation

  • Case Name: Harley-Davidson LLC Vs. Vijal Pal Dhayal
  • Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
  • Case Number: CS(COMM) 609/2023 
  • Date of Decision: April 2, 2025
  • Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal
  • Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2489 

Monday, April 7, 2025

Star India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Magicwin.games

Star India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Magicwin.games & Ors.Court: High Court of Delhi Case Number: CS(COMM) 490/2024 Neutral Citation: [2025/DHC/4210] Date of Decision: April 2, 2025 Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Facts: Star India Pvt. Ltd. is a prominent broadcaster in India, holding exclusive media rights for various sports events. It operates over seventy channels across multiple languages and platforms, including their streaming service, Disney+ Hotstar. The case centers around their broadcasting rights for the "ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2024," held from June 2 to June 29, 2024.

Star India entered a Media Rights Agreement with the International Cricket Council (ICC) on August 27, 2022, granting them exclusive digital media and television broadcasting rights in India for ICC events from 2024 to 2027. Given the immense popularity of cricket in India, Star India anticipated significant revenue from streaming and broadcasting the T20 World Cup.

The defendants, identified as rogue websites, engaged in unauthorized streaming and dissemination of Star India’s content, alongside operating illegal betting and gambling services contrary to the Public Gambling Act of 1867. The defendants included various domain name registrars, internet service providers, and governmental telecommunications bodies.

Legal Proceedings: Upon filing the suit, Star India sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from further unauthorized dissemination of their content. The court issued an ex-parte ad interim injunction on May 30, 2024, prohibiting the defendants from infringing upon Star India's exclusive rights. It required domain registrars to disclose the details of the rogue websites and directed internet service providers to block access to these sites.

As the proceedings progressed, additional rogue websites were identified, leading Star India to amend its pleadings and include these new defendants. Notably, despite being duly served, defendants failed to submit a written statement or contest the claims.

Judgment: The court analyzed the merits of the case, noting that the defendants’ activities had significantly harmed Star India’s interests by infringing on its broadcast rights and diluting its content's value. The court found that, with no contest from the defendants, the allegations in the plaint were deemed admitted.

On this basis, the court issued a decree for a permanent injunction agait the defendants, preventing them from disseminating Star India's exclusive content. The plaintiff did not pursue other reliefs beyond the injunction, and the court ordered that a decree sheet be drawn up.

Chime Financial, Inc Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

The case pertains to an appeal filed by Chime Financial, Inc. against a decision by the Registrar of Trademarks, which refused the registration of Chime's trademark application. Below is the detailed summary of the appeal along with citations from the document.

Overview of the Case

  • Case Title and Reference: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 64/2024
  • Date of Decision: 2nd April 2025
  • Court: High Court of Delhi
  • Appellant: Chime Financial, Inc.
  • Respondent: The Registrar of Trade Marks
  • Judgment Author: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Background and Relevant Facts

  1. Formation and Business: Chime Financial, Inc. is a financial technology company incorporated in 2012 in the USA. It provides online banking and financial products under its trademark.
  2. Usage of Trademark: The mark has been in continuous use since March 2014 on the website www.chime.com and is associated with a mobile banking platform that boasts an active user base of over 14 million.
  3. Recognition: The company has been recognized in various prestigious lists for its contributions, such as being valued at $25 billion and ranking high in various industry accolades.

Trademark Application

  • Chime filed an application (no. 5241586) on a "proposed to be used basis" for their trademark in Classes 9, 35, 36, 41, and 42, claiming priority from a previous U.S. application filed on 27th August 2021.

Grounds for Refusal

  1. Cited Marks: The Registrar cited several existing trademarks that were reportedly phonetically and visually similar to the appellant's mark, leading to the refusal of the application based on Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. This section relates to the refusal of marks that are either identical or similar to an existing mark in relation to similar goods/services, if a likelihood of confusion exists,.
  2. Response from Chime: Chime responded to each cited mark disputing the similarities based on the dissimilarity of goods/services and consumer classes, arguing that no confusion was likely.

Court's Findings

  • The Court scrutinized the cited marks, concluding that they pertain to goods/services dissimilar to those of the appellant, thus there should not be a likelihood of confusion:
  • Cited marks ranged from aerospace to real estate, which were not closely related to Chime’s financial services,.
  • The Court noted that the Registrar had failed to analyze the cited marks individually and had instead made generalized assertions regarding their similarity.

Conclusion

  • The appeal was allowed, and the Court overturned the Registrar’s refusal, directing that the Registrar proceed with advertising Chime's mark within two months of the decision.
  • This judgment underscores the importance of assessing each case on its merit, particularly the uniqueness of goods/services offered under the trademarks in question.

Citation

  • Chime Financial, Inc. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 64/2024, High Court of Delhi, decided on April 2, 2025.

Saturday, April 5, 2025

BTS Research International Pty Ltd Vs. The Controller General of Patents & Designs,

Case Citation: BTS Research International Pty Ltd vs. The Controller General of Patents & Designs, Mumbai & Ors., IPDPTA 56 OF 2023, High Court at Calcutta, Judgment on: 03.04.2025, Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur.

Summary: BTS Research International Pty Ltd filed an appeal under section 117 of the Patents Act, 1970, against an order dated June 16, 2020, rejecting their patent application (no. 0041/KOLMP/2012). The invention claimed is titled “Method of generating hybrid/chimeric cells and uses thereof,” which specifically involves the creation of a tri-hybrid cell by artificially fusing three somatic cells, including at least one human cell and potentially a non-human cell (like a mouse cell). The appellant argued that this process involves significant human intervention and is not merely a biological process for producing or propagating plants or animals.

The Controller General of Patents rejected the patent application based on section 3(j) of the Patents Act, which addresses non-patentable inventions related to biological processes and living organisms. The rejection was largely premised on the argument that the hybrid cells retained attributes of their parent cells, thereby classifying the processes involved within those excluded from patentability. The order stated that the resultant hybrid cell falls under the categorization of a structural and functional unit of the organism from which the cells were taken and considered as a product of essentially biological processes.

In arguing against the rejection, the appellant contended the following:

  1. The impugned order was based on a misinterpretation of the Patents Act.
  2. Following a response to the First Examination Report (FER), a Second Examination Report (SER) should have been issued, as mandated by the law.
  3. Prior art documents cited in the examination had been acknowledged in European proceedings where the patent had been granted, yet this was ignored in the impugned order.
  4. Section 3(j) was deemed inapplicable, arguing that the application involves substantial human intervention and does not constitute an essentially biological process.

Conversely, the respondents maintained that the hybrid cells in question are derived from stem cells capable of developing into organisms and provided adequate reasoning for the applicability of section 3(j). They referenced the decision in Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. & Ors. vs. Monsanto Technology LLC & Ors., supporting their stance.

The judgment highlighted several critical points:

  • It stressed the failure of the examination authorities to issue a SER after the objections to the FER were raised, which contravenes the statutory mandates.
  • The findings from European patent proceedings and prior art documentation were not duly considered, despite their relevance to the assessment of the patent application.
  • The Court underscored that the rejection order lacked substantial reasoning regarding how the invention constituted an essential biological process, thereby misapprehending the nature of the invention as involving significant human intervention.

Ultimately, the Court found the impugned order to be flawed, unsubstantiated, and based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the sections of the Patents Act. The patent application was therefore remanded for fresh adjudication, with the direction that it be heard by a different Hearing Officer and be decided afresh while allowing the appellant to amend and submit additional documents.

Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar Vs. Assistant Registrar of Trademark

The case in question involves Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar, representing his company M/s. Pencia Biotech, who filed a writ petition (W.P.(IPD) No. 3 of 2025) against the Assistant Registrar of Trademarks and M/s. Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. The proceedings took place in the High Court of Judicature at Madras, presided over by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

Summary of Proceedings:

1. Background:

- The petitioner, Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar, applied for the trademark "LABAPEN" (Application No. 6180911) in class 5 on November 9, 2023.

- Following this, an examination report was received on December 4, 2023, and responded to on December 19, 2023. The application was subsequently accepted and published in the trademark journal on February 19, 2024.

1. Notice of Opposition:

- The petitioner was unaware that a notice of opposition (No. 1323965) was lodged against his application until he received the order that deemed his application abandoned on December 26, 2024.

- This notice of opposition was reportedly dispatched via email to the counsel for the petitioner on June 24, 2024. However, there was no evidence to confirm that the petitioner or his counsel received this email.

1. Legal Arguments:

- The petitioner argued that he was deprived of the right to respond to the notice of opposition due to not receiving it, thus leading to a violation of natural justice principles.

- The Registrar of Trademarks contended that the email was sent to the registered email address. Despite this, the counsel for the petitioner emphasized that there was no proof of receipt.

1. Reference to Precedent:

- The judge referred to a similar case (Ramya S. Moorthy v. Registrar of Trademarks), wherein it was ruled that the statutory time limit to file a counter statement should be calculated from the date of receipt of the notice of opposition, not merely from the dispatch of the email. This precedent favored the petitioner’s situation.

1. Court's Decision:

- The court allowed the writ petition, quashing the previous order that declared the application abandoned. The trademark application and the notice of opposition were restored for reconsideration.

- The petitioner was granted a month to file the counter statement in response to the notice of opposition.

1. Recommendations for Improvement:

- The judge suggested that a technical solution be implemented to ensure proof of email receipt is available, in order to prevent similar issues in the future.

Conclusion:

The ruling underscored the importance of ensuring that applicants receive due notice regarding oppositions to their trademark applications. It reinforced the principles of natural justice, ensuring that applicants have the opportunity to respond to any oppositions effectively. The decision was aimed at rectifying the oversight in the notification process that led to the initial ruling of abandonment of the trademark application.

Vignesh Kumar Sivakumar Vs. Assistant Registrar of Trademark W.P.(IPD) No. 3 of 2025, High Court of Judicature at Madras, Decided on April 3, 2025, Coram: The Honourable Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:903.

Friday, April 4, 2025

Freeelective Network Private Limited Vs. Matrimony.Com Limited

Descriptive marks require robust evidence of secondary meaning for exclusivity

The case of M/S Freeelective Network Private Limited vs. M/S Matrimony.Com Limited is a significant trademark dispute adjudicated by the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The Plaintiff, Freeelective Network Private Limited, sought to protect its registered trademark "Jodi365" against the Defendant, Matrimony.Com Limited, which launched a mobile application under the mark "Jodii." The Plaintiff alleged infringement and passing off, claiming that "Jodii" was deceptively similar to "Jodi365." The judgment, delivered on July 14, 2022, by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, explores critical trademark law principles, including the distinctiveness of composite marks, the scope of protection under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the threshold for passing off. This case study provides an in-depth analysis of the factual background, procedural history, issues, submissions, judicial reasoning, and legal outcomes.


Detailed Factual Background

The Plaintiff, M/S Freeelective Network Private Limited, incorporated in March 2010 as a subsidiary of FreeElective LLC, operates in the matchmaking and matrimonial services sector. It adopted the trademark "Jodi365" in 2009 for its flagship matchmaking platform and registered it under Class 99 (covering Classes 35, 38, and 41) on May 26, 2010, with the registration renewed until May 26, 2030. "Jodi365" was used continuously since 2009, evidenced by domain registration (Ex.P1), a mobile app launched in January 2020 with over 50,000 downloads (Ex.P7), revenue figures (e.g., Rs. 31,28,190 for 2020, Ex.P5), and advertising expenditure of Rs. 30 lakhs since December 2019 (Ex.P6). The Plaintiff claimed that "Jodi365" had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation, supported by media coverage (Ex.P8).

The Defendant, M/S Matrimony.Com Limited, a prominent player in the matrimonial services industry, operates under the registered trademark "BHARATMATRIMONY" since 1999 (Ex.D1, Ex.D2). In October 2021, it launched a Tamil-language mobile app named "Jodii" under the "BHARATMATRIMONY" umbrella (Ex.P9, Ex.D7). The Plaintiff discovered this in October 2021, alleging that "Jodii" was deceptively similar to "Jodi365" and that the Defendant’s targeted advertisements (Ex.P10) indicated mala fide intent to leverage the Plaintiff’s goodwill. A cease-and-desist notice was issued on November 2, 2021 (Ex.P12), to which the Defendant replied on November 17, 2021 (Ex.P13), asserting that "Jodi" was a descriptive term not monopolizable by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction, surrender of infringing materials, and Rs. 1 crore in damages, arguing that "Jodii" infringed its registered mark and amounted to passing off.


Detailed Procedural Background

The case was filed as Civil Suit (Comm. Div.) No. 122 of 2021 before the Madras High Court under Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), and Sections 27, 28, 29, 134, and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Alongside the suit, the Plaintiff filed applications O.A. Nos. 826 and 828 of 2021 and A. No. 442 of 2022 for interim relief. The court, presided over by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, reserved judgment on April 29, 2022, and pronounced it on July 14, 2022.

Both parties opted not to present oral evidence, relying on documentary submissions. The Plaintiff submitted 14 exhibits (Ex.P1 to Ex.P14), including trademark certificates, financial statements, and media clippings. The Defendant countered with 14 exhibits (Ex.D1 to Ex.D14), such as its "BHARATMATRIMONY" registration and evidence of third-party use of "Jodi." Oral arguments were advanced by Mr. R. Sathish Kumar for the Plaintiff and Mr. P.S. Raman (Senior Counsel), assisted by Mr. Arun C. Mohan, for the Defendant, supplemented by written submissions.


Issues Involved in the Case

The court framed six issues for determination:

  1. Whether the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademark "JODI365" under No. 1971072 in Class 99?
  2. Whether the Defendant’s trademark "JODII" is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s "JODI365"?

Detailed Submission of Parties

Plaintiff’s Submissions
  • Proprietorship and Use: The Plaintiff asserted ownership of "Jodi365," registered since May 26, 2010 (Ex.P2), renewed in 2020 (Ex.P3), and used since 2009 (Ex.P1). It highlighted its business metrics (Ex.P4, Ex.P5) and app downloads (Ex.P7) to establish goodwill.
  • Deceptive Similarity: "Jodii" was argued to be visually and phonetically similar to "Jodi365," with "Jodi" as the essential feature, likely to cause confusion (Section 29(3), Trade Marks Act). Targeted ads (Ex.P10) suggested the Defendant’s awareness and intent.
  • Infringement and Passing Off: The Plaintiff claimed "Jodii" infringed its registered mark and passed off its services, citing prior use and reputation. It sought a permanent injunction under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, arguing monetary relief was inadequate.
  • Damages: Rs. 1 crore was claimed, asserting that damages in such cases are hard to quantify, warranting judicial discretion.
  • Precedents: Cited Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65 for passing off and Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. AIR 2000 SC 1952 for phonetic similarity.
Defendant’s Submissions
  • Descriptive Nature: The Defendant argued that "Jodi" (meaning "pair" in Indian languages, Ex.D11) was descriptive of matrimonial services, not distinctive, and thus not protectable (Section 17, Trade Marks Act).
  • Composite Mark: The Plaintiff’s registration was for "Jodi365" as a device mark, not "Jodi" alone. "Jodii" under "BHARATMATRIMONY" (Ex.D1, Ex.D2) was visually and contextually distinct.
  • Third-Party Use: Evidence of widespread use of "Jodi" by others (Ex.D8, Ex.D9) indicated it was publici juris, negating exclusivity.
  • No Confusion: The Defendant’s established reputation and distinct trade dress precluded confusion or passing off.
  • Precedents: Relied on Consim Info Ltd. v. Google India Pvt. Ltd. 2010 (6) CTC 813 to argue that descriptive elements in composite marks lack protection.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

  1. B.K. Engineering Co. v. U.B.H.L. Enterprises (Regd), 1985 Arb LR 269
    • Context: Addressed injunctions in trademark disputes.
    • Relevance: Plaintiff cited it for protecting prior users, but it was not decisive due to distinctiveness issues.
  2. Automatic Electronic Ltd. v. R.K. Dhawan, 1999 SCC Online Del 27
    • Context: Focused on protecting established marks.
    • Relevance: Supported goodwill claims but was not applied given "Jodi"’s descriptiveness.
  3. Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65
    • Context: Defined passing off (misrepresentation, goodwill, damage).
    • Relevance: Plaintiff relied on it, but the court found no misrepresentation due to trade dress differences.
  4. Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions Pvt Ltd, 2004 (28) PTC 566 (SC)
    • Context: Recognized domain names as trademarks.
    • Relevance: Supported "Jodi365"’s distinctiveness as a composite mark, not "Jodi" alone.
  5. Central Park Estates Pvt Ltd. v. Godrej Skyline Developers Pvt Ltd, 2019 SCC Online Del 11580
    • Context: Protected "Central Park" as an essential feature.
    • Relevance: Plaintiff argued "Jodi" was essential, but the court distinguished it as "Central Park" was not descriptive.
  6. Dhariwal Industries Ltd. v. M.S.S. Food Products, AIR 2005 SC 1999
    • Context: Granted injunctions against similar marks.
    • Relevance: Not applied due to lack of distinctiveness in "Jodi."
  7. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd, AIR 2000 SC 1952
    • Context: Emphasized phonetic similarity in drug names.
    • Relevance: Plaintiff highlighted similarity, but trade dress differences prevailed.
  8. Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products Ltd, 2014 (57) PTC 617
    • Context: Protected "Marine" as distinctive.
    • Relevance: Distinguished as "Jodi" was descriptive, unlike "Marine."
  9. Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Dalmia Cement Industries Ltd, 2016 (67) PTC 314
    • Context: Limited protection for descriptive marks.
    • Relevance: Supported Defendant’s argument on "Jodi"’s descriptiveness.
  10. S.N.R. Dhall Mill v. Kaleesuwari Refinery Pvt Ltd, 2021 SCC Online Mad 1675
    • Context: Denied protection to descriptive terms.
    • Relevance: Reinforced the court’s stance on "Jodi."
  11. People Interactive (India) Pvt Ltd. v. Vivek Pahwa, MANU/MH/1661/2016
    • Context: Defined secondary meaning thresholds.
    • Relevance: Key in assessing "Jodi"’s lack of acquired distinctiveness.
  12. Consim Info Ltd. v. Google India Pvt Ltd, 2010 (6) CTC 813 & 2012 (5) LW 1
    • Context: Held "Bharat" and "Matrimony" non-distinctive in "BHARATMATRIMONY."
    • Relevance: Directly applied to deny "Jodi" protection.
  13. Matrimony.Com Ltd. v. V. Kalyan Jewellers India Ltd, MANU/TN/2685/2026
    • Context: Addressed distinctiveness standards.
    • Relevance: Supported Defendant’s position.
  14. P.M. Palani Mudaliar & Co. v. Jansons Exports, 2017 SCC Online Mad 1090
    • Context: Defined publici juris.
    • Relevance: Implicitly raised but not fully explored due to prior findings.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy’s analysis focused on distinctiveness, infringement, and passing off:

  • Issue 1: Proprietorship of "Jodi365"
    • The Plaintiff’s registration (Ex.P2) and renewal (Ex.P3) confirmed its proprietorship since May 26, 2010, valid until 2030.
  • Issues 2 & 3: Deceptive Similarity and Infringement
    • Distinctiveness: "Jodi" (meaning "pair," Ex.D11) was classified as descriptive for matrimonial services, per Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). "365" was suggestive but not decisive. The composite mark "Jodi365" acquired distinctiveness through long use (Ex.P4, Ex.P5, Ex.P8), but "Jodi" alone did not (People Interactive).
    • Secondary Meaning: Applying Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 698 F.2d 786, the court found insufficient evidence that "Jodi"’s primary meaning (pair) was overshadowed by association with the Plaintiff. Third-party use (Ex.D8, Ex.D9) reinforced its descriptiveness.
    • Section 17, Trade Marks Act: Protection extends to the whole mark, not non-distinctive elements unless they acquire secondary meaning. "Jodii" did not infringe "Jodi365" as "Jodi" lacked independent protection.
  • Issue 4: Passing Off
    • Per Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980, passing off requires misrepresentation. Despite phonetic similarity (Cadila), the distinct "BHARATMATRIMONY" branding and trade dress (mobile app visuals) negated confusion.
  • Issue 5: Damages
    • With no infringement or passing off, damages were denied. The "big fish vs. small fish" argument was emotionally compelling but legally insufficient.
  • Conclusion: "Jodi365" as a composite mark was protectable, but "Jodi"’s descriptiveness precluded relief against "Jodii."

Final Decision

The suit was dismissed on July 14, 2022. No injunction, damages, or costs were awarded, and connected applications were closed.


Law Settled in This Case

  1. Composite Marks: Under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, protection applies to the entire mark, not non-distinctive elements unless they acquire secondary meaning.
  2. Descriptive Terms: Descriptive marks require robust evidence of secondary meaning for exclusivity (Abercrombie, Zatarains).
  3. Passing Off: Phonetic similarity alone does not establish passing off; overall trade dress and context are critical (Durga Dutt Sharma).

Case Details

  • Case Title: Freeelective Network Private Limited Vs. Matrimony.Com Limited
  • Date of Order: July 14, 2022
  • Case No.: Civil Suit (Comm. Div.) No. 122 of 2021
  • Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras
  • Name of Judge: Hon'ble Shri Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Thursday, April 3, 2025

Mahaluxmi Rubber Udyog Vs MRF Limited

Conditional injunctions require courts to assess compliance with specific directives, not extraneous formalities

Introduction

In the bustling world of commercial litigation, where brand identity is fiercely guarded, the Madras High Court’s Commercial Appellate Division delivered a pivotal ruling on July 8, 2024, in Mahaluxmi Rubber Udyog vs MRF Ltd. and Anr. This case pits MRF Limited, a titan in the tyre industry, against Mahaluxmi Rubber Udyog, a contender accused of mimicking MRF’s trade dress, plunging the parties into a legal skirmish over trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violations. The Division Bench, overturned a lower court’s blanket injunction, spotlighting procedural fairness and the nuances of conditional orders. This judgment not only reshapes the immediate dispute but also offers a masterclass in balancing trademark protection with equitable process, leaving a lasting imprint on India’s commercial jurisprudence.

Detailed Factual Background

MRF Limited, the plaintiff and first respondent, is a household name in India, renowned for its tyres and allied products, including tyre tubes. With a trademark portfolio boasting registrations like “MRF” and “MRF Connected Letter Device” under Class 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, MRF has cultivated a distinctive identity through decades of use. The dispute centers on its tyre tube packaging—a registered trade dress featuring a specific colour scheme, layout, and get-up—which MRF claims as a cornerstone of its brand equity. In October 2023, MRF discovered that Mahaluxmi Rubber Udyog, the appellant and first defendant, alongside Amman Enterprises, the second defendant, were marketing tyre tubes under the mark “MRU” with a packaging eerily similar to MRF’s. Alleging infringement, passing off, and copyright violation, MRF contended that this mimicry diluted its goodwill and confused consumers.

Mahaluxmi, represented by partner Sunny Jhamb, countered that its “MRU” word mark was distinct and defensible on merits, though it conceded similarities in packaging aesthetics. Amman Enterprises, a Chennai-based entity, remained a silent player, neither filing a written statement nor actively engaging in the appellate proceedings. MRF’s plaint, dated January 23, 2024, sought a sweeping array of reliefs: injunctions against trademark infringement, trade dress misuse, and artwork reproduction; a declaration of “MRF” as a well-known trademark; damages of Rs. 50 lakhs; and delivery of offending materials. The stage was set for a showdown over intellectual property rights in the tyre tube market.

Detailed Procedural Background

MRF filed C.S. (Comm. Div.) No. 53 of 2024 before the Commercial Division of the Madras High Court, instituted on March 1, 2024. Alongside, it lodged five original applications (O.A. Nos. 168-172 of 2024) for interim injunctions, listed on March 5, 2024. Justice Abdul Quddhose ordered notice to the defendants, returnable by March 26, 2024, without granting ex parte relief, citing MRF’s delayed action since discovering the infringement in October 2023. On March 26, Mahaluxmi appeared, and its counsel proposed altering the packaging’s colour scheme and get-up, though not the “MRU” mark. The court issued a conditional order: Mahaluxmi had until April 12, 2024, to comply, failing which injunctions in all five applications would activate, restricted to colour scheme and get-up, not the word mark.

Mahaluxmi filed a memo on April 12, 2024, with three annexures (A, B, C) showcasing revised packaging, claiming compliance. On April 16, 2024, before a different judge, Justice R. Vijaymurugan, the applications were revisited. MRF argued non-compliance, and the court, noting no counter affidavit from Mahaluxmi or Amman, rejected the memo as insufficient and allowed all five applications, imposing a broader injunction including the “MRU” mark. Aggrieved, Mahaluxmi filed five Original Side Appeals (O.S.A. (CAD) Nos. 68-72 of 2024) on June 14, 2024, under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, challenging the April 16 order. The Division Bench heard the appeals on July 8, 2024, with MRF’s caveat counsel present, and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case raised several pivotal issues:Did the Commercial Division err in rejecting Mahaluxmi’s compliance memo without assessing its adherence to the March 26, 2024, conditional order?Was the April 16, 2024, blanket injunction, extending to the “MRU” word mark, justified absent a specific finding of non-compliance?

Detailed Submission of Parties

Mahaluxmi argued that the April 16, 2024, order was procedurally flawed. They accepted the March 26 order’s mandate to alter packaging and submitted a memo with revised designs (Annexures A, B, C) by April 12, 2024, asserting full compliance. Mahaluxmi emphasized that the lower court should have evaluated this memo against the conditional order’s terms, not dismissed it for lacking a counter affidavit. They contended that the broader injunction, covering the “MRU” mark, exceeded the March 26 order’s scope, which explicitly excluded the word mark. Mahaluxmi sought remand for a fair compliance assessment, preserving their right to contest the “MRU” mark’s validity in the main suit.

MRF defended the April 16 order, arguing that Mahaluxmi’s memo was inadequate without a counter affidavit denying infringement facts. They asserted that the revised packaging still mimicked MRF’s trade dress, risking consumer confusion and goodwill dilution. MRF highlighted its registered trademarks and long-standing reputation, urging the court to uphold the injunctions to protect its intellectual property. They implied that Mahaluxmi’s failure to formally counter justified the broader relief, though they did not directly address the conditional order’s limited scope.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

The Division Bench referenced a single prior ruling, though indirectly shaping its reasoning:Order dated 19.10.2022 in O.A. No. 651 of 2022 in C.S. (Comm. Div.) No. 205 of 2022 (Madras High Court) - Cited in paragraph 31, this order addressed Clause 14 of the Letters Patent, requiring notice to defendants before combining causes of action. The court applied it to A.No. 1233 of 2024 (MRF’s application to join causes), reinforcing procedural fairness but not directly impacting the injunction dispute. It underscored the need for defendant input, paralleling Mahaluxmi’s right to a compliance review.

The “Parle Principle,” derived from Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore (AIR 1972 SC 1359), though not cited, was implicitly invoked in paragraph 29, urging comparison of packaging through the lens of an average consumer’s imperfect recollection—a standard for assessing trade dress similarity.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The court framed the March 26 order as a “conditional futuristic injunction,” obligating Mahaluxmi to alter its packaging by April 12, 2024, or face injunctions limited to colour scheme and get-up. Mahaluxmi’s memo, filed on deadline with revised designs, signaled intent to comply, yet the Commercial Division bypassed this effort, fixating on the absence of a counter affidavit. Sundar J. deemed this a failure of “legal drill”—the court should have assessed whether Annexures A, B, and C met the March 26 mandate, applying the Parle Principle to gauge consumer confusion.

The broader injunction, encompassing the “MRU” mark, defied the March 26 order’s explicit carve-out, which Mahaluxmi had accepted with “legal quietus.” The Bench criticized the lower court’s mechanical approach, noting that rejecting the memo without scrutiny undermined fairness, especially since Mahaluxmi filed a written statement in the suit. The court preserved Amman’s rights, unaffected by the appeals, and left open the “well-known trademark” declaration issue under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, pending a separate Division Bench reference.

Sundar J. balanced trademark protection with procedural equity, remanding the applications for a de novo review. He emphasized that compliance, not denial of facts, was the March 26 order’s crux, rendering the counter affidavit requirement secondary. The Bench’s directive to expedite this exercise reflected the Commercial Courts Act’s efficiency ethos, while safeguarding all parties’ substantive rights.

Final Decision

On July 8, 2024, the Division Bench allowed O.S.A. (CAD) Nos. 68-72 of 2024, setting aside the April 16, 2024, common order in O.A. Nos. 168-172 of 2024. The applications were remitted to the Commercial Division for fresh disposal, with instructions to evaluate Mahaluxmi’s April 12, 2024, memo against the March 26, 2024, order. The court refrained from opining on merits, preserving all parties’ contentions, including Amman’s, and directed an expeditious resolution. C.M.P. No. 13587 of 2024 (under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC) was closed, deferring document admissibility to trial.

Law Settled in This Case

This judgment clarified key principles:

  1. Conditional injunctions require courts to assess compliance with specific directives, not extraneous formalities like counter affidavits, unless mandated.
  2. The scope of interim relief must align with prior orders, preventing overreach absent fresh findings.
  3. The Parle Principle guides trade dress disputes, necessitating consumer-centric comparison of get-up and layout.
  4. Commercial Courts must balance swift justice with procedural fairness, remanding matters where legal drill is skipped.
  • Case Title: Mahaluxmi Rubber Udyog Vs MRF Limited 
  • Date of Order: July 8, 2024
  • Case No.: O.S.A. (CAD) Nos. 68, 69, 70, 71 & 72 of 2024
  • Neutral Citation: 2024:MHC:2722, 
  • Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras (Commercial Appellate Division)
  • Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Sundar and Hon’ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Vs General Mills Marketing Inc.

Price differences and consumer sophistication do not necessarily negate confusion

Introduction

In the realm of intellectual property law, trademarks serve as the lifeblood of brand identity, encapsulating a company’s reputation, goodwill, and consumer trust. The case of M/S. South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs General Mills Marketing Inc. & Anr., decided by the High Court of Delhi on October 13, 2014, exemplifies the intricate dance of trademark protection, where the line between inspiration and infringement is often razor-thin. This legal skirmish pitted General Mills Marketing Inc., the purveyor of the globally renowned ice cream brand “Häagen-Dazs,” against South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd., a regional player marketing its frozen desserts under the mark “D’Daazs.” At its core, this case delves into the principles of trademark similarity, consumer confusion, and the delicate balance between protecting established brands and fostering market competition. The High Court’s judgment not only resolved a commercial dispute but also enriched India’s trademark jurisprudence with nuanced insights into composite marks, phonetic similarity, and the irrelevance of price disparities in assessing infringement.

Detailed Factual Background

General Mills Marketing Inc., a Delaware-based corporation, is a titan in the global food industry, boasting a portfolio of over a hundred consumer brands sold across more than a hundred countries. Among its crown jewels is “Häagen-Dazs,” a trademark it claims as an arbitrary, coined term devoid of any dictionary meaning, used for premium ice creams and frozen desserts. The mark, registered in India since January 21, 1993, under Class 30 (covering ice cream, ices, sherbet, sorbet, and frozen confections), and later in 2008 under Classes 29, 30, and 42, had been introduced to the Indian market in 2007. General Mills asserted that “Häagen-Dazs” enjoyed a distinctive reputation, bolstered by its unique Danish-sounding phonetics and premium positioning.

On the other side stood M/S. South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd., an Indian company that had been producing and selling ice creams and frozen desserts under the mark “D’Daazs” since 2009, primarily in South India. The company claimed that “D’Daazs” was derived from the name of Late Dwarka Das, the father of one of its founder directors, lending it a personal and sentimental origin. Unlike the premium-priced “Häagen-Dazs,” South India Beverages positioned “D’Daazs” as an affordable option, targeting a broader consumer base. The phonetic and visual similarity between “D’Daazs” and the “Dazs” component of “Häagen-Dazs” sparked the dispute, with General Mills alleging trademark infringement and seeking to protect its brand equity.

Detailed Procedural Background

The legal battle commenced when General Mills Marketing Inc. filed a suit in the High Court of Delhi, accompanied by an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking an interim injunction to restrain South India Beverages from using the mark “D’Daazs” or any deceptively similar variant. On July 23, 2014, a Single Judge of the High Court granted the interim injunction, finding a prima facie case of infringement due to the likelihood of consumer confusion between “Häagen-Dazs” and “D’Daazs.” Aggrieved by this order, South India Beverages appealed to a Division Bench comprising Justice Pradeep Nandrajog and Justice Mukta Gupta, filing FAO (OS) 389/2014. The appeal was argued extensively, with judgment reserved on September 11, 2014, and pronounced on October 13, 2014. The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge’s order, dismissing the appeal but granting a 30-day grace period for South India Beverages to transition away from the infringing mark.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case revolved around several pivotal issues in trademark law: Whether the mark “D’Daazs” was deceptively similar to “Häagen-Dazs,” creating a likelihood of confusion among consumers?Whether the principle of “anti-dissection” precluded a comparison of individual elements (e.g., “Dazs” vs. “D’Daazs”) in a composite mark like “Häagen-Dazs.”?

Detailed Submission of Parties

General Mills Marketing Inc argued that “Häagen-Dazs” was a distinctive, arbitrary mark with no linguistic meaning, entitled to robust protection. They contended that “D’Daazs” was phonetically and visually similar to “Dazs,” a significant component of their mark, and that such similarity could confuse consumers, diluting their brand equity. General Mills emphasized that “Dazs” was not a non-dominant element, citing their separate application for its registration on October 22, 2012, as evidence of its independent significance. They dismissed South India Beverages’ defenses of price disparity and distinct packaging, asserting that ice cream, as a widely consumed product, attracted buyers of varying discernment, including children, who were unlikely to notice such differences.

South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. countered that “Häagen-Dazs” should be protected as an indivisible whole under the “anti-dissection” rule, not dissected into “Haagen” and “Dazs” for comparison. They argued that “Haagen” was the dominant element, rendering “Dazs” secondary and insufficient to sustain an infringement claim. The company highlighted the personal origin of “D’Daazs” from “Dwarka Das,” denying any intent to mimic “Häagen-Dazs.” They further contended that their lower-priced product catered to a different market segment, and that sophisticated consumers of “Häagen-Dazs” would not confuse it with “D’Daazs,” especially given distinct packaging styles.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

The court’s analysis drew heavily on a rich tapestry of Indian and international precedents, each cited to illuminate specific facets of trademark law:

  1. Frisch’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Shoney’s Inc., 1261 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1987) - Cited by the court to outline the four-pronged test for granting a preliminary injunction: likelihood of success on merits, irreparable injury, harm to third parties, and public interest. The court used this framework to assess the Single Judge’s discretion, emphasizing the “abuse of discretion” standard for appellate review.
  2. Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetan Bhai Shah & Anr., (2002) 3 SCC 65 - General Mills relied on this Supreme Court ruling to argue that a competitor’s use of a similar name injures the goodwill of the original owner, regardless of fraudulent intent. The court agreed, underscoring the protection of consumer trust and market fairness.
  3. Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1993) - South India Beverages invoked this case to support the “anti-dissection” rule, arguing that “Häagen-Dazs” must be viewed holistically. The court acknowledged this principle but clarified that it does not preclude identifying dominant elements as a preliminary step.
  4. Shen Mfg. Co. v. The Ritz Hotel, 393 F.3d 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2004) - Cited by the court to reinforce the “anti-dissection” rule’s application, where “Putting on the Ritz” was distinguished from “Ritz” based on overall impression, supporting a holistic yet nuanced analysis of “Häagen-Dazs.”
  5. Stiefel Laboratories v. Ajanta Pharma Ltd., 211 (2014) DLT 296 - General Mills referenced this Delhi High Court decision, which approved McCarthy’s treatise on the “anti-dissection” rule, to argue that “Dazs” retained significance within “Häagen-Dazs.” The court adopted this view, balancing holistic comparison with element-specific analysis.
  6. Re Chatam Int’l, Inc., 380 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) - The court cited this to illustrate that “Gaspar” dominated both “Gaspar’s Ale” and “Jose Gaspar Gold,” yet examined the marks wholly, supporting its finding that “Dazs” was not subordinate to “Haagen.”
  7. Eaton Allen Corp. v. Paco Impressions Corp., 405 F. Supp. 530 (1975) - General Mills used this to argue that appropriating part of a mark (“Super” and “Type” from “Super-Ko-Rec-Type”) constitutes infringement. The court agreed, rejecting South India Beverages’ claim that “D’Daazs” did not fully mimic “Häagen-Dazs.”
  8. Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing and Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog Mill, 2010 (44) PTC 293 (Del) - Cited by General Mills to assert that arbitrary marks like “Häagen-Dazs” deserve heightened protection, a principle the court upheld given the mark’s coined nature.
  9. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 1952 - General Mills relied on this Supreme Court ruling to emphasize phonetic similarity’s relevance, despite visual differences. The court found “Dazs” and “D’Daazs” phonetically akin, enhancing confusion likelihood.
  10. K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Sri. Ambal & Co. & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 146 - The court cited this to affirm that resemblance must be judged by both sight and sound, reinforcing the phonetic similarity between “Dazs” and “D’Daazs.”
  11. Amar Singh Chawal Wala v. Shree Vardhman Rice & Genl. Mills, (40) PTC 417 (Del.) (DB) - General Mills invoked this to highlight phonetic confusion between “Qilla” variants, akin to “Dazs” and “D’Daazs.” The court agreed, noting the risk to ice cream buyers.
  12. Enercon v. OHIM, Case No. C-204/10P (CJEU, 8th Chamber, Nov. 23, 2010) - The court referenced this European ruling, where “Transformers” and “Energon” were both dominant, to reject South India Beverages’ claim that “Haagen” alone dominated “Häagen-Dazs.”
  13. Universal Motor Oils Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 809 F. Supp. 816 (1992) - Cited by the court to note that a strong common element increases confusion likelihood, supporting the prominence of “Dazs.”
  14. Ireo Pvt. Ltd. v. Genesis Infratech Pvt. Ltd., 208 (2014) DLT 612 - General Mills used this to counter the price-difference defense, which the court upheld, finding it irrelevant for ice cream consumers.
  15. N.R. Dongre & Ors. v. Whirlpool Corporation & Anr., (1996) 5 SCC 714 - The court cited this Supreme Court decision to dismiss price disparity as a defense, noting potential reputation loss to “Häagen-Dazs.”
  16. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707 (1973) - Cited to refute South India Beverages’ claim that sophisticated buyers avoid confusion, with the court noting subliminal confusion risks.
  17. General Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2006) - The court used this to argue that inexpensive items like ice cream warrant less consumer care, heightening confusion risk.
  18. Beer Nuts Inc. v. Clover Clubs Food Co., 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983) - Cited to emphasize marketplace perception over side-by-side comparison, supporting the court’s focus on consumer impression.
  19. Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satyadeo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449 - The court relied on this Supreme Court precedent to assess confusion from the perspective of an unwary purchaser with imperfect recollection.
  20. Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980 - General Mills cited this to argue that packaging differences do not negate infringement of essential features, a view the court endorsed.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The Court embarked on a meticulous analysis rooted in trademark law’s dual purpose: protecting consumer clarity and rewarding brand innovation. The court began by affirming the “anti-dissection” rule, which mandates viewing composite marks like “Häagen-Dazs” as a whole, as seen in Fruit of the Loom and Shen Mfg. Co. However, it clarified, drawing from Stiefel Laboratories and Re Chatam, that this does not preclude identifying dominant elements as a preliminary step. Rejecting South India Beverages’ argument that “Haagen” alone dominated, the court found no evidence to diminish “Dazs”’s significance, especially given General Mills’ separate registration application for “Dazs.”

The phonetic similarity between “Dazs” and “D’Daazs” was a linchpin, supported by Cadila Health Care and K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar, which prioritize sound alongside sight. The court noted “Häagen-Dazs”’s arbitrary nature, per Kirorimal Kashiram, enhancing its protectability. Applying Justice Parker’s “Rules of Comparison” from Stiefel Laboratories, the court assessed the marks through the lens of an average ice cream buyer—often impulsive and including children—finding a high confusion risk, as echoed in Amar Singh Chawal Wala.

South India Beverages’ price-difference defense was dismantled with reference to Ireo Pvt. Ltd., N.R. Dongre, and Grotrian, which collectively hold that even sophisticated consumers can be misled, particularly for accessible products like ice cream. The court dismissed packaging distinctions, citing Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma, emphasizing that essential mark similarity trumps ancillary differences. The Beer Nuts and General Motors rulings reinforced that inexpensive, impulse-buy items heighten confusion likelihood due to lower consumer scrutiny.

The court’s appellate restraint, guided by Frisch’s Restaurant, upheld the Single Judge’s discretion, finding a strong likelihood of success, irreparable harm to General Mills’ goodwill, and public interest in preventing confusion. Balancing equities, it granted a 30-day transition period, reflecting pragmatic justice.

Final Decision

The Division Bench dismissed South India Beverages’ appeal, affirming the interim injunction against using “D’Daazs” or any similar mark. The injunction’s operation was deferred for 30 days from October 13, 2014, allowing the appellant to exhaust existing packaging and adapt. No costs were awarded.

Law Settled in This Case

This judgment crystallized several principles in Indian trademark law:Composite marks must be assessed holistically, but dominant elements can be identified without violating the “anti-dissection” rule.Phonetic similarity is a critical factor in determining deceptive similarity, especially for arbitrary marks.Price differences and consumer sophistication do not necessarily negate confusion, particularly for widely consumed, inexpensive goods.

  • Case Title: South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Vs General Mills Marketing Inc. 
  • Date of Order: October 13, 2014
  • Case No.: FAO (OS) 389/2014
  • Neutral Citation: 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953
  • Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
  • Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pradeep Nandrajog and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mukta Gupta

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sohan Lal Nem Chand Jain Vs. Trident Group

It is the Holistic similarity and not the dissection, which governs Trademark confusion

Introduction

In the intricate tapestry of intellectual property law, the case of M/S Sohan Lal Nem Chand Jain vs. Trident Group & Others, decided on October 3, 2011, by the Delhi High Court, stands as a compelling narrative of trademark protection, prior use, and the delicate balance between commercial giants and established players. This dispute revolves around the iconic "LOTUS" trademark, a symbol synonymous with quality stationery for over six decades under the plaintiff’s stewardship, challenged by the defendants’ bold foray into the copier paper market. Justice G.S. Sistani’s ruling navigates the murky waters of infringement, passing off, and acquiescence, delivering a verdict that reinforces statutory rights over equitable defenses in trademark law. This case study unravels the layers of this legal showdown, offering a deep dive into the clash of goodwill, reputation, and market identity in India’s bustling stationery sector.

Detailed Factual Background

The plaintiff, M/S Sohan Lal Nem Chand Jain, a partnership firm incorporated in 1947 under the Partnership Act, 1932, has been a stalwart in the stationery industry, manufacturing and marketing an array of paper products under the "LOTUS" trademark. From exercise books to computer paper, the plaintiff’s portfolio spans school and office stationery, earning it a reputation as one of India’s most cherished brands. The "LOTUS" mark, registered under Class 16 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, since 1965 and renewed in 2003, covers a broad spectrum of stationery items, including printing materials, notebooks, and writing pads. With a distribution network spanning 15 states and tie-ups with major retail chains like Pantaloon and Office 1 Super Stores, the plaintiff’s sales soared from Rs. 22.5 lakhs in 1990-91 to over Rs. 10 crores by 2008-09, bolstered by significant advertising investments totaling over Rs. 40 lakhs between 2000 and 2009. This long, continuous, and uninterrupted use since 1965 cemented "LOTUS" as a hallmark of quality and reliability.

The defendants, collectively referred to as the Trident Group, comprise a formidable industrial conglomerate with an annual turnover exceeding Rs. 2500 crores. Known globally for textiles, chemicals, and power generation, Trident diversified into paper manufacturing, launching "LOTUS" branded premium copier paper in March 2010. The group, including its flagship entity Trident Limited, had previously adopted "LOTUS" for textile products like terry towels since 2008 and named several sister companies—Lotus Infrabuild Ltd., Lotus Integrated Tex Park Ltd., and Lotus Processors Pvt. Ltd.—with the same moniker since 2006. Claiming a bona fide extension of this usage, Trident applied for "LOTUS" registration under Class 16 in September 2008, achieving sales of over Rs. 1 crore within a month of the copier paper launch. However, this move ignited the plaintiff’s ire, who alleged that Trident’s adoption infringed its registered trademark, diluted its goodwill, and misled consumers in the stationery market.

The conflict surfaced in April 2010 when the plaintiff discovered Trident’s flyer announcing the "LOTUS" copier paper launch, corroborated by a letter to the National Stock Exchange dated March 19, 2010. The plaintiff’s investigation confirmed Trident’s use of an identical mark on a product sold through overlapping trade channels, prompting a legal challenge to protect its 62-year legacy.

Detailed Procedural Background

The plaintiff initiated CS(OS) 796/2010 before the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction against trademark infringement, passing off, unfair competition, damages, and a mandatory injunction. Concurrently, it filed I.A. No. 5388/2010 under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC for an interim injunction. On April 27, 2010, Justice G.S. Sistani issued an ex parte interim order restraining the defendants from using "LOTUS" or any deceptively similar mark on photocopier or stationery items. The defendants responded with I.A. Nos. 6365/2010 and 13435/2010 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC, seeking vacation of the interim order, arguing prior use and distinct product lines.

The matter escalated to a Division Bench, which modified the interim order, allowing the defendants to sell existing stock while directing the single judge to adjudicate the interim applications expeditiously. On October 3, 2011, Justice Sistani heard I.A. Nos. 5388/2010 (plaintiff’s injunction application), 6365/2010, and 13435/2010 (defendants’ vacation applications) together, delivering a common order. The court reviewed extensive pleadings, documents, and precedents, culminating in a decision that upheld the plaintiff’s statutory rights, confirming the interim injunction and dismissing the defendants’ applications.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case posed several critical questions for adjudication. First, whether the defendants’ use of "LOTUS" on copier paper infringed the plaintiff’s registered trademark under Class 16, given the overlap in goods and trade channels? Second, whether the plaintiff’s long-standing use since 1965 established prior rights, outweighing the defendants’ claim of bona fide adoption since 2006? Third, whether the defendants’ use constituted passing off by leveraging the plaintiff’s goodwill and causing consumer confusion. Fourth, whether the plaintiff’s alleged acquiescence, due to prior business dealings with Trident, barred injunctive relief. Finally, whether differences in product specifics (copier paper vs. notebooks) and packaging negated the likelihood of deception, justifying the defendants’ continued use.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The plaintiff, represented by Mr. Vijay Pal Dalmia and Mr. Vikas Mishra, anchored its case on its status as the registered proprietor of "LOTUS" since 1965, asserting exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act. Counsel emphasized the mark’s distinctiveness, earned through 62 years of uninterrupted use, extensive sales, and advertising, making it a well-known trademark under Section 2(1)(zg). They argued that Trident’s identical "LOTUS" mark on copier paper, a cognate good under Class 16, infringed their rights under Section 29, as it was sold through identical trade channels—stationery shops and retail chains—catering to overlapping customers. Citing Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (AIR 1963 SC 449), they contended that marks must be judged holistically for similarity, not dissected, and that phonetic and visual identity with "LOTUS" would confuse an unwary purchaser of average intelligence, as per Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co. (AIR 1972 SC 1359). The plaintiff dismissed Trident’s size and turnover as irrelevant, asserting equal protection under the law, and refuted acquiescence by highlighting prompt action post-2010 launch.

The defendants, led by Senior Counsel Mr. Pinaki Mishra and Ms. Anushree Tripathi, mounted a robust defense. They portrayed Trident as a Rs. 2500-crore conglomerate with a global footprint, negating any need to piggyback on the plaintiff’s modest Rs. 10-crore goodwill. They claimed prior use of "LOTUS" since 2006 for textiles and sister entities, with the 2010 copier paper launch as a natural extension, supported by a 2008 trademark application. Citing Vishnudas Trading v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. (1997 (4) SCC 201), they argued that copier paper was distinct from the plaintiff’s notebooks, precluding monopoly over all Class 16 goods. They highlighted packaging differences—featuring "TRIDENT" and "Premium Copier Paper"—and distinct customer segments (corporate vs. students), relying on Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Ltd. (FAO(OS) 352/2010) to assert no confusion. Finally, they invoked acquiescence under Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association ((2008) 10 SCC 723), alleging the plaintiff’s knowledge of their "LOTUS" use via prior paper purchases, and argued "LOTUS" was a common word, per a trademark search report, denying exclusivity.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

The plaintiff leaned on seminal precedents to fortify its claim. In Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta (AIR 1963 SC 449), the Supreme Court held that overall similarity between "Amritdhara" and "Lakshmandhara" for medicinal goods likely deceived unwary purchasers, emphasizing a holistic comparison from an average consumer’s perspective (paras 7-13). This supported the plaintiff’s contention that "LOTUS" identity risked confusion. Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co. (AIR 1972 SC 1359) reinforced this, noting that broad features, not minute differences, determine deceptive similarity, apt for arguing that packaging variations were insufficient (paras 8-9). Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. ((2001) 5 SCC 73) outlined factors like mark nature and customer class for passing off (para 42), aligning with the plaintiff’s evidence of identical goods and trade channels. Swaran Singh Trading v. Usha Industries (AIR 1986 Delhi 343) underscored that statutory trademark rights persist despite delay unless abandoned (para 7), countering the defendants’ acquiescence plea.

The defendants countered with precedents favoring their stance. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association ((2008) 10 SCC 723) defined acquiescence as knowingly allowing rights invasion, barring relief if prejudicial (paras 46-47), supporting their claim of the plaintiff’s inaction since 2006. Vishnudas Trading v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. (1997 (4) SCC 201) limited trademark monopoly to specific goods actually traded, justifying their copier paper use (paras 44-47). Osram Gesellschaft Mit Beschrankter Haftung v. Shyam Sunder (2002 (25) PTC 198 (Del)) echoed this, denying monopoly over all Class 11 goods (paras 11, 13), akin to their Class 16 argument. Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Ltd. (FAO(OS) 352/2010) held distinct packaging precluded confusion despite identical goods (para 7), bolstering their trade dress defense. Allied Blenders and Distillers v. Paul John (2008 (38) PTC 568 (Del)) denied injunction due to delay (paras 1, 6, 18), reinforcing their equitable stance.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice G.S. Sistani’s reasoning hinged on statutory trademark rights and prior use, methodically dismantling the defendants’ defenses. He affirmed the plaintiff’s registrations of "LOTUS" in Class 16 (1965 for exercise books, 2003 for broader stationery), supported by bills from 2004 showing sales of computer and copier paper, establishing prior use since 1965. The defendants’ adoption of "LOTUS" for copier paper in 2010, despite earlier textile use since 2006, was deemed subsequent, as their pre-2010 activities were unrelated to Class 16 goods. This temporal priority underpinned the plaintiff’s statutory rights under Section 28, granting exclusive use and relief against infringement per Section 29.

Addressing infringement, Sistani found "LOTUS" identical in both marks, applied to cognate goods—stationery and copier paper—sold through common channels (stationery shops) to overlapping customers. Rejecting the defendants’ distinction between copier paper and notebooks, he cited Amritdhara and Parle, emphasizing that holistic similarity, not dissection, governs confusion. The average consumer, with imperfect recollection, would likely mistake Trident’s product for the plaintiff’s, especially given shared trade counters and the mark’s phonetic and visual identity. The defendants’ packaging additions ("TRIDENT," "Premium Copier Paper") were dismissed as insufficient to alter the core "LOTUS" impression, per Pianotist Co.’s Application (1906) 23 R.P.C. 774).

On acquiescence, Sistani distinguished Khoday and Allied Blenders, noting the defendants’ pre-2010 use was for unrelated textiles, not stationery, and the plaintiff acted promptly post-2010 launch. The plaintiff’s paper purchases from Trident did not imply consent to Class 16 use, and statutory rights under Section 28, reinforced by Swaran Singh and Hindustan Pencils (AIR 1990 Delhi 19), trumped delay-based defenses absent fraud or abandonment. The defendants’ size and turnover were deemed irrelevant against the plaintiff’s equal legal standing, and their claim of "LOTUS" as a common word was self-defeating, given their own registration attempts, per Ozone Spa Pvt. Ltd. (2010 (42) PTC 469 (Delhi)).

Sistani concluded that "LOTUS" was a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg), meriting protection even for dissimilar goods under Section 29(4), though here the goods were allied. The plaintiff’s goodwill, built over decades, outweighed the defendants’ recent commercial success, justifying injunctive relief to prevent dilution and deception.

Final Decision

On October 3, 2011, Justice Sistani allowed I.A. No. 5388/2010, confirming the interim injunction of April 27, 2010, restraining the defendants from using "LOTUS" or any deceptively similar mark on photocopier or stationery items. I.A. Nos. 6365/2010 and 13435/2010 were dismissed, upholding the plaintiff’s trademark rights pending the suit’s final adjudication. The court clarified that observations were prima facie, not affecting the merits, and scheduled further proceedings for December 21, 2011, before the Joint Registrar.

Law Settled in This Case

This judgment crystallized several principles in Indian trademark law. It affirmed that statutory rights under Section 28 confer exclusive use to a registered proprietor, prevailing over equitable defenses like acquiescence unless abandonment is proven. It clarified that prior use establishes primacy, and identical marks on cognate goods sold through common channels prima facie constitute infringement under Section 29, assessed holistically per Amritdhara and Parle. The decision underscored that a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg) enjoys broad protection, and commercial scale does not justify dilution of a smaller entity’s goodwill. Finally, it held that acquiescence requires specific knowledge and prejudice in the relevant goods’ domain, not unrelated fields.

Case Title: Sohan Lal Nem Chand Jain Vs. Trident Group
Date of Order: October 3, 2011
Case No.: CS(OS) 796/2010 
Neutral Citation: (2012) 49 PTC 105 (Del)
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sistani

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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