Mex Switchgears Pvt. Ltd Vs Omex Cables Industries

Common elements alone do not suffice unless they dominate the mark’s identity and deceive.

Introduction

In the dynamic arena of trademark law, the case of Mex Switchgears Pvt. Ltd vs Omex Cables Industries & Anr., decided on July 17, 2017, by the Delhi High Court, emerges as a gripping tale of brand identity, consumer perception, and the perils of delay. This legal skirmish pits Mex Switchgears, a veteran in the electrical goods sector with its registered "MEX" trademark, against Omex Cables Industries, a challenger wielding the "OMEXGOLD" mark. Delhi High Court ruling delves into the nuances of phonetic similarity, deceptive confusion, and the equitable defense of laches, ultimately underscoring the judiciary’s stringent stance on timely enforcement of trademark rights. This case study dissects the battle, revealing how statutory protections and procedural diligence shape the contours of intellectual property disputes in India’s competitive marketplace.

Detailed Factual Background

Mex Switchgears Pvt. Ltd., incorporated in 1979, traces its roots to a legacy beginning in 1960, when its predecessor first adopted the "MEX" trademark for electrical goods like switchgears, ignition switches, capacitors, and meters. Over the decades, the mark expanded to cover cognate products such as CFL bulbs, fuses, wires, and cables, earning a formidable reputation for quality. Registered under Classes 7, 9, and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, "MEX" became synonymous with Mex Switchgears, an integral part of its corporate identity. The company boasted impressive sales—evidenced by figures escalating from modest beginnings to substantial market presence—and invested heavily in advertising, spending over several lakhs annually to cement its brand equity. Certified by government bodies and endorsed by a loyal customer base, Mex Switchgears positioned "MEX" as a distinctive mark exclusively tied to its offerings, a claim bolstered by its successful oppositions to similar marks like "MAX" in prior legal battles.

In contrast, Omex Cables Industries entered the fray with its "OMEXGOLD" trademark, which it claimed to have used since 1995 for cables and related products. Alongside its authorized dealer, the second defendant, Omex sought to register "OMEXGOLD" in 2006 under Class 9, triggering an opposition from Mex Switchgears that remained pending as of 2017. Omex asserted a robust market presence, citing sales records from 2003-2004 and a reputation built on quality, arguing that its mark bore no intent to deceive or encroach on Mex’s goodwill. The conflict erupted when Mex discovered Omex’s use of "OMEX" in 2015, alleging that the phonetic and structural similarity to "MEX" threatened confusion among consumers, especially given the overlap in goods—electrical wires and cables—and trade channels. Mex contended that Omex’s adoption was a calculated move to ride on its established reputation, while Omex countered that "MEX" was a common term, incapable of exclusive appropriation.

Detailed Procedural Background

Mex Switchgears filed CS(OS) 2247/2015 before the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction against Omex Cables Industries and its dealer for trademark infringement, passing off, and damages, alongside an interim injunction via I.A. 15312/2015 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. The suit, initiated in 2015, accused Omex of violating Mex’s registered "MEX" trademark rights through the "OMEXGOLD" mark and its trade name. Omex contested the interim application, denying infringement and asserting prior use since 1995, while alleging Mex’s concealment of its 2006 opposition to Omex’s registration bid as evidence of unclean hands. The court’s focus rested on the interim relief, assessing Mex’s prima facie case, balance of convenience, and the impact of delay, culminating in a decision that dismissed the injunction plea and set the suit for further proceedings before the Roster Bench on July 20, 2017.

Issues Involved in the Case

The dispute crystallized around several pivotal questions. Did Omex’s "OMEXGOLD" mark infringe Mex’s registered "MEX" trademark under Section 29 by being phonetically, visually, or structurally similar, especially for allied goods? Could Mex claim exclusive rights over "MEX," or was it a generic term diluted by widespread use? Did Omex’s adoption amount to passing off by leveraging Mex’s goodwill and confusing consumers? Was Mex’s delay in filing the suit—despite awareness of Omex’s 2006 registration attempt—fatal to its claim for interim relief under the doctrines of laches and acquiescence? Finally, did the balance of convenience favor restraining Omex’s established market presence over protecting Mex’s trademark rights pending trial?

Detailed Submission of Parties

Mex Switchgears, anchored its case on its registered ownership of "MEX" since 1960, asserting statutory exclusivity under Section 28. Counsel argued that "MEX" was distinctive, integral to its corporate identity, and widely recognized, with sales and advertising figures underscoring its goodwill. They contended that "OMEXGOLD" was deceptively similar—phonetically ("MEX" vs. "OMEX") and structurally—likely to mislead average consumers, per precedents like IZUK Chemical Works v. Babu Ram (2007 (35) PTC 28 (Del)). Mex emphasized that both parties dealt in electrical goods through overlapping channels, amplifying confusion risks, and dismissed the "GOLD" suffix as irrelevant. Citing prior victories against "MAX" marks and its pending opposition to "OMEXGOLD," Mex denied acquiescence, arguing that passing off was a recurring cause of action unaffected by delay, as held in Pankaj Goel v. Dabur India Ltd. (2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del.)). They sought an interim injunction, claiming irreparable harm to their reputation without it.

Omex Cables countered that "OMEXGOLD" had been in use since 1995, predating Mex’s 2015 suit by two decades, and that Mex’s 2006 opposition proved prior awareness, rendering the suit tardy. Counsel argued no similarity existed—visually, phonetically, or structurally—between "MEX" and "OMEXGOLD," citing Kewal Krishan Kumar v. Kaushal Roller Flour Mills (PTC (Suppl) (1) 217 (Del)) to assert that common elements like "MEX" did not inherently confuse. Omex highlighted its distinct trade name and packaging, its honest adoption, and a thriving market reputation, evidenced by sales records. They accused Mex of concealing facts and argued that "MEX" was a common term, not exclusively Mex’s, while invoking delay and laches as bars to discretionary relief, per Shri Gopal Engineering v. POMX Laboratory (AIR 1992 Delhi 302).

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

Mex relied on a robust array of precedents. In IZUK Chemical Works v. Babu Ram Dharam Prakash (2007 (35) PTC 28 (Del)), the Delhi High Court held "MOONSTAR" and "SUPERSTAR" deceptively similar due to the shared "STAR" element, emphasizing phonetic similarity and average consumer perception (paras 14-19). Mex used this to argue that "MEX" within "OMEX" risked confusion. Thomas Bear and Sons (India) Ltd. v. Prayag Narain (AIR 1935 Allahabad 7), cited within IZUK (para 14), established that deception probability hinges on the average buyer’s ordinary caution, reinforcing Mex’s consumer confusion claim. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. Hind Cycles Limited (ILR 1973 I Delhi 393), cited in IZUK (para 15), clarified that essential features, not minute details, determine similarity, supporting Mex’s focus on "MEX" as the core element. Devi Pesticides Pvt. Ltd. v. Shiv Agro Chemicals Industries (2006 (32) PTC 434 (Madras) (DB)), cited in IZUK (para 18), found "BOOM" in "SUPERBOOM" infringing due to phonetic overlap, paralleling Mex’s "MEX"-"OMEX" argument. K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Sri Ambal & Co. (AIR 1970 SC 146) deemed "Ambal" and "Andal" phonetically similar, denying registration (para 13), a principle Mex applied to "MEX" and "OMEX." Encore Electronics Ltd. v. Anchor Electronics and Electricals Pvt. Ltd. (2007 (35) PTC 714 (Bom)) upheld phonetic similarity between "Encore" and "Anchor," granting an injunction (para 11), while Pankaj Goel v. Dabur India Ltd. (2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del) (DB)) found "HAJMOLA" and "RASMOLA" confusing due to "MOLA," dismissing delay as a bar in passing off cases (para 24), bolstering Mex’s stance.

Omex countered with Kewal Krishan Kumar v. Kaushal Roller Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd. (PTC (Suppl) (1) 217 (Del)), where "SHAKTI BHOG" and "MAHA SHAKTI BRAND" were held dissimilar despite the shared "SHAKTI," as they lacked phonetic or visual confusion (paras 14-17). Omex argued "MEX" and "OMEXGOLD" followed suit. Coca Cola Company of Canada Ltd. v. Pepsi Cola (1942 (59) RPC 127), cited in Kewal (para 16), distinguished "Coca" and "Pepsi" as the key identifiers over "Cola," suggesting "OMEX" differentiated from "MEX." Shri Gopal Engineering & Chemical Works v. M/s POMX Laboratory (AIR 1992 Delhi 302) denied interim relief due to a 15-month delay (para 11), a precedent Omex wielded against Mex’s nine-year gap since 2006. Warner Bros Entertainment Inc. v. Harinder Kohli (2008 (38) PTC 185 (Del)) similarly rejected interim relief for delay (para 8), reinforcing Omex’s laches defense.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Delhi High Court analysis pivoted on trademark similarity and procedural equity. The Court acknowledged Mex’s registered rights under Section 28, granting exclusivity, and Section 29, defining infringement via identical or deceptively similar marks likely to confuse. The core question was whether "OMEXGOLD" infringed "MEX" phonetically, visually, or structurally. Examining the marks, she found no visual similarity—Mex’s logo and Omex’s stylized "OMEXGOLD" differed markedly—and noted distinct trade names ("Mex Switchgears Pvt. Ltd." vs. "Omex Cable Industries"). Phonetically, she leaned on Kewal Krishan Kumar, concluding that "MEX" and "OMEX" did not sound sufficiently alike to confuse an average buyer, with "O" and "GOLD" diluting any resemblance. Structurally, the addition of "GOLD" and Omex’s unique branding further distanced the marks, undermining Mex’s deception claim.

On infringement, Court held that mere use of "MEX" within "OMEX" did not suffice unless it replicated the essential feature with confusing similarity, per IZUK and Atlas Cycle. Unlike cases like "Hajmola" vs. "Rasmola," where "MOLA" was distinctive, "MEX" lacked such striking overlap with "OMEXGOLD." She distinguished Mex’s cited precedents—where phonetic pairs like "Andal-Ambal" or "Encore-Anchor" were near-identical—from the present case, aligning instead with Kewal’s finding of dissimilarity despite a common element. No evidence showed consumer confusion, and Omex’s established use since at least 2006 suggested independent goodwill.

The court emphasized delay. Mex’s 2006 opposition to Omex’s registration bid proved awareness, yet it waited until 2015 to sue, a nine-year gap unexplained beyond vague assertions of market absence. Citing Shri Gopal Engineering and Warner Bros, she ruled this delay fatal to interim relief, especially given Mex’s concealment of the 2006 opposition in its plaint, breaching clean hands. Applying Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (1991 PTC-1), she weighed convenience, finding Omex’s market presence since 2003-2004 outweighed Mex’s belated enforcement, dismissing the injunction plea.

Final Decision

On July 17, 2017, Justice Sharma dismissed I.A. 15312/2015, denying Mex Switchgears an interim injunction against Omex Cables Industries’ use of "OMEXGOLD." The court found no prima facie infringement or passing off, citing dissimilarity and Mex’s delay, and directed CS(OS) 2247/2015 to the Roster Bench for July 20, 2017, for further adjudication, noting her findings were preliminary.

Law Settled in This Case

The judgment reinforced that trademark infringement under Section 29 requires clear phonetic, visual, or structural similarity causing likely confusion, assessed from an average consumer’s imperfect recollection, not side-by-side comparison. It clarified that common elements alone do not suffice unless they dominate the mark’s identity and deceive. The decision entrenched delay and laches as potent bars to interim relief in trademark disputes, emphasizing timely action and full disclosure. It also underscored that passing off, while a recurring cause, does not override equitable defenses absent fraud, balancing statutory rights with procedural fairness.

• Case Title: Mex Switchgears Pvt. Ltd vs Omex Cables Industries & Anr.
• Date of Order: July 17, 2017
• Case No.: CS(OS) 2247/2015
• Neutral Citation:  (2017) 71 PTC 465 (Del)
• Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
• Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Deepa Sharma

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Abdul Rasul Nurallah Virjee Vs. Regal Footwear

Acquiescence requires positive acts, not mere delay

Introduction:

In the bustling world of commerce, where brands battle for supremacy, the case of Abdul Rasul Nurallah Virjee and Another vs. Regal Footwear stands as a testament to the fierce protection of intellectual property rights. Decided on January 2, 2023, by the Bombay High Court, this legal skirmish revolves around the trademark "REGAL," a name synonymous with footwear for over half a century. The plaintiffs, claiming proprietorship since 1954, sought to restrain the defendant from using an identical mark, alleging infringement and passing off. The defendant countered with claims of prior use since 1963 and defenses of honest concurrent use and acquiescence. This case study delves into the intricate details of this trademark dispute, unraveling the factual tapestry, procedural journey, legal issues, arguments, judicial reasoning, and the final verdict that shaped the outcome.

Detailed Factual Background:

The plaintiffs, Abdul Rasul Nurallah Virjee and Jalalluddin Nurallah Virjee, asserted their lineage to the "REGAL" trademark, tracing its use back to 1954 through their predecessor, M/s. Regal Footwear. They secured registration under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with Registration No. 284961 in Class 25 for footwear (dated December 27, 1972) and Registration No. 1278782 in Class 42 for retailing services (dated April 15, 2004), both claiming use since 1954. Their business spanned manufacturing, distribution, and retail across India and exports to countries like the USA, Italy, and UAE, boasting sales of Rs. 425.54 crore from 1954 to 2017 and advertisement expenses of Rs. 7.88 crore. Evidence included sales invoices, income tax assessments, and advertisements from 1955 onwards, showcasing a robust commercial presence.

The defendant, Regal Footwear, a partnership firm based in Pune, claimed adoption of the "REGAL" mark on April 21, 1963, by its founder, Habib Dharmashi Shivani. Operating from 26, M.G. Road, Pune, since 1963, the defendant relied on a leave and license agreement from 1961, a shop license from 1963, and subsequent renewals to assert continuous use. A fire in 1999 allegedly destroyed early records, but the defendant produced post-1999 documents, including sales figures from 2005-2017 and a 2010 advertisement, to support its claim. The defendant expanded with new outlets in 2017 and 2018, prompting the plaintiffs’ legal action.

Tensions escalated when the plaintiffs opposed the defendant’s 2006 trademark application (No. 1422577) in 2008, which was rejected by the Trade Marks Registry in 2020, affirming the plaintiffs’ prior use. Consumer complaints in 2019 about product quality from the defendant’s stores, mistaken as the plaintiffs’, further fueled the dispute.

Detailed Procedural Background

The legal saga began with the plaintiffs filing Commercial IPR Suit No. 630 of 2017 in the Bombay High Court’s Commercial Division, accompanied by Notice of Motion No. 516 of 2017, seeking an interim injunction against the defendant’s use of "REGAL." An ad-interim order on July 24, 2017, directed the defendant to file a reply, with no immediate relief granted, and the defendant agreed not to claim equities from new shops. The plaintiffs’ appeal (Commercial Appeal (L) No. 54 of 2017) was dismissed, maintaining the status quo.

A second Notice of Motion (No. 1841 of 2018) addressed the defendant’s third shop opening, with the court allowing it on September 4, 2018, without equity claims, requiring four weeks’ notice for further expansions. The notices were heard together, with judgment reserved on August 30, 2022, and pronounced on January 2, 2023, by Justice R.I. Chagla.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case hinged on several pivotal issues: whether the defendant infringed the plaintiffs’ registered "REGAL" trademark; whether the defendant’s use constituted passing off; whether the defendant could claim prior continuous use under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999; whether honest concurrent use was a valid defense to infringement; whether the plaintiffs acquiesced to the defendant’s use; and whether the plaintiffs’ alleged suppression of facts disentitled them to relief.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The plaintiffs, argued that their registered trademarks (Nos. 284961 and 1278782) with use since 1954 granted them exclusive rights. They presented extensive evidence—advertisements from 1955, income tax orders from 1956-1998, and invoices—to prove continuous use and goodwill. Kadam asserted that the defendant’s identical mark on identical goods/services infringed their rights under Section 29, with no statutory challenge to their registrations. He dismissed the defendant’s Section 34 defense, noting their 1963 use postdated 1954, and argued that honest concurrent use was not a defense under the 1999 Act, citing KEI Industries Ltd. v. Raman Kwatra and Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationary Products. On acquiescence, he relied on Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines and Torrent Pharmaceuticals v. Wockhardt Pharma, requiring positive acts, not mere delay, which the plaintiffs negated by opposing the defendant’s 2008 application.

The defendantcountered that the plaintiffs suppressed knowledge of the defendant’s use since 1984 and 2004, citing nearby shops and a 1984 cease-and-desist notice, rendering their 2008 awareness claim false. They claimed prior use since 1963, supported by a 1963 license, tax records, and photographs, attributing gaps to the 1999 fire. Saraf argued honest concurrent use and acquiescence, citing Essel Propack v. Essel Kitchenware and Unichem Laboratories v. Eris Lifesciences, asserting the plaintiffs’ inaction for decades implied consent. He challenged the plaintiffs’ goodwill and confusion evidence as fabricated, urging denial of interim relief due to disputed facts requiring trial.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

The plaintiffs cited Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd. v. Royal Orchid Hotels (2011 BOM CR 416) to argue that Section 34 requires continuous use predating the plaintiff’s use or registration, which the defendant failed to prove. Consolidated Foods Corporation v. Brandon and Co. (1961 (66) BOM L.R. 320) supported their claim of superior title via prior adoption. Satyam Infoway v. Siffynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (2004 6 SCC 145) reinforced this principle. KEI Industries Ltd. v. Raman Kwatra (Del HC CS (COMM) 9/2021) and Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationary Products (AIR 1990 Del 19) negated honest concurrent use as a defense, a stance echoed in Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Sami Khatib (2011 (47) PTC 69 (Bom) (DB)), Winthrop Products Inc. v. Eupharma Laboratories (1998 (18) PTC 213), and Kirloskar Diesel Recon Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd. (1997 17 PTC 469). Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (1994 2 SCC 448) and Torrent Pharmaceuticals v. Wockhardt Pharma (Comm Appeal No. 125 of 2017, Bombay HC, dated November 17, 2017) clarified acquiescence requires positive acts, upheld by Wockhardt Ltd. v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. ((2018) 18 SCC 346). Schering Corp. v. Kilitch Co. (1994 IPLR 1) and Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004 3 SCC 90) dismissed delay as a defense, while Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001 5 SCC 73) applied the comparable strength test.

The defendant relied on Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. Karma Veer Shankarrao Kale Shahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. (2018 (3) MH.L.J. 746) and Essel Propack v. Essel Kitchenware ((2016) 3 BCR 466) to argue suppression disentitled relief. Shri Gopal Engineering and Chemical Works v. Promx Laboratory (DRJ 1992 (22)) and Warner Bros Entertainment Ltd. v. Harinder Kohli (ILR 2009 I DEL 722) supported this. Yonex Kabushiki Kaisha v. Philips International ((2007) 35 PTC 345) backed acquiescence via delay, though later questioned. Gujarat Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. ((1995) 5 SCC 545) and Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. ((1990) Supp SCC 727) balanced interim relief considerations.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The court meticulously dissected the case. The court first addressed the defendant’s suppression claim, finding the plaintiffs’ 2008 knowledge assertion contextual to the trademark application, not absolute ignorance, and deemed pre-2008 knowledge (e.g., 2006) immaterial given the 2017 suit filing, citing Midas Hygiene. The 1984 shop claim was dismissed due to lack of evidence and the partner’s 1976 retirement, negating imputed knowledge.

On prior use, the court found the plaintiffs’ 1954 use substantiated by advertisements, signed tax orders, and invoices, outweighing the defendant’s 1963 claim, supported only by a license and sparse records, undermined by the fire excuse and selective pre-1999 evidence. Section 34 required pre-1954 use, which the defendant failed to prove, per Kamat Hotels.

Honest concurrent use was rejected as a defense, aligning with KEI Industries and Hindustan Pencils, noting Section 12’s limited scope and the defendant’s implausible 1963 adoption story, contradicted by the license agreement and lacking firsthand evidence. Commercial dishonesty was inferred from the defendant’s use of the ® symbol and similar font post-2008 opposition.

Acquiescence failed the Power Control test, requiring positive acts, not mere delay, reinforced by Torrent Pharmaceuticals. The 2008 opposition was a negative act, and no encouraging conduct was shown. The defendant’s reliance on Essel Propack was overruled by Torrent.

Infringement and passing off were upheld due to identical marks, the plaintiffs’ prior use, goodwill, and consumer confusion evidence. The comparable strength test (Cadila Health Care) favored the plaintiffs, with irreparable harm outweighing the defendant’s loss, mitigated by its post-suit expansions on a no-equity basis.

Final Decision

The court granted the interim injunction in Notice of Motion No. 516 of 2017, restraining the defendant from using "REGAL" in footwear trade or retail, making it absolute in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). Notice of Motion No. 1841 of 2018 was disposed of as redundant. A four-week stay was granted, acknowledging the defendant’s long operation.

Law Settled in This Case

This case reaffirmed that prior use and registration confer superior trademark rights under Section 34, honest concurrent use is not a defense to infringement under the 1999 Act, and acquiescence requires positive acts, not mere delay, per Power Control and Torrent Pharmaceuticals. Suppression claims must materially affect the case to bar relief, and the comparable strength test guides interim relief.

Case Title: Abdul Rasul Nurallah Virjee Vs. Regal Footwear
Date of Order: January 2, 2023
Case No.: Commercial IPR Suit No. 630 of 2017
Neutral Citation: Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Name of Judge: Justice R.I. Chagla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Glanbia Performance Nutrition Limited Vs Hercules Nutra Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction

In the realm of intellectual property, trademarks serve as the lifeblood of brand identity, distinguishing one entity’s goods from another in the marketplace. The case of Glanbia Performance Nutrition Limited vs Hercules Nutra Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi on April 2, 2025, exemplifies a classic trademark dispute where the prior use, goodwill, and deceptive similarity of marks collide. This legal showdown pits Glanbia Performance Nutrition Limited, an Ireland-based nutritional giant, against Hercules Nutra Pvt. Ltd., an Indian company, over the use of the “ON” mark with a swoosh arrow device in the nutraceutical industry. The judgment not only resolves a contentious cancellation petition but also underscores the sanctity of prior adoption and the perils of dishonest imitation in trademark law.

Detailed Factual Background

Glanbia Performance Nutrition Limited, incorporated in Ireland in January 1948, has been a prominent player in the nutritional products sector since 1986. Operating under its flagship brand “Optimum Nutrition,” abbreviated as “ON” with a distinctive swoosh arrow, Glanbia has built a global reputation over 35 years. The company began using the “ON” mark internationally in 1986 and introduced its products in India through distributors as early as 2000, with consistent sales since 2003. Glanbia secured trademark registration for the “ON” mark with the swoosh in India on July 12, 2007, under Class 5 (pharmaceuticals and dietary supplements), claiming use since February 1, 2003. The company also holds registrations for related marks like “OPTIMUM” and “OPTIMUM NUTRITION” in India and various jurisdictions such as the USA, Canada, and Singapore.

In contrast, Hercules Nutra Pvt. Ltd., the respondent, obtained registration for a similar “ON” mark with a swoosh-like device under Class 5, bearing registration number 1763297. Hercules claimed use of this mark since May 19, 2002, asserting that it inherited the mark from its predecessor-in-title, USA Drugs Pvt. Ltd., via an assignment deed dated September 1, 2020. Glanbia discovered Hercules selling nutraceutical products identical to its own—such as whey protein—on platforms like Amazon India and operating a website (www.onnutrition.co.in) that echoed Glanbia’s branding. After a cease-and-desist notice issued on May 19, 2022, was met with denial from Hercules, Glanbia filed a cancellation petition on September 7, 2023, seeking removal of Hercules’ mark from the trademark register.

Detailed Procedural Background

The case unfolded before the High Court of Delhi under the Intellectual Property Division as C.O. (COMM. IPD-TM) 229/2023. Glanbia sought cancellation of Hercules’ trademark under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alleging that the registration contravened Sections 11 (likelihood of confusion) and 18 (application requirements). The petition was argued orally before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal on April 2, 2025. Glanbia was represented by Senior Advocate Mr. Satvik Varma, assisted by Ms. Sugandha Bh, Mr. Shantanu Parmar, and Mr. Balram, while Hercules was represented by Mr. Nishant Mahtta and Mr. S. Nithin. Both parties submitted extensive documentary evidence, including invoices, catalogues, website analytics, and promotional materials, to substantiate their claims of prior use and goodwill.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case hinged on several pivotal issues: (1) Whether Glanbia was the prior user of the “ON” mark with the swoosh arrow in India; (2) Whether Hercules’ mark was deceptively similar to Glanbia’s, causing confusion in the market; (3) Whether Hercules’ adoption of the mark was dishonest, intended to trade on Glanbia’s goodwill; and (4) Whether Hercules’ registration warranted cancellation under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Detailed Submission of Parties

Glanbia’s counsel, Mr. Satvik Varma, argued that Glanbia was the prior adopter of the “ON” mark, having used it globally since 1986 and in India since 2003, with registration secured in 2007. He emphasized Glanbia’s extensive goodwill, evidenced by invoices from 2000-2003, archived distributor websites from 2003, and analytics showing Indian traffic to www.optimumnutrition.com from 2007-2021. Varma contended that Hercules’ mark was identical in design and product class, falsely claiming use since 2002, while its earliest credible evidence was from 2006. He accused Hercules of copying the swoosh arrow to deceive consumers and ride on Glanbia’s reputation.

Hercules’ counsel, Mr. Nishant Mahtta, countered that their “ON” mark was distinct, featuring a ring rather than a swoosh, and that Hercules was the prior user through its predecessor, USA Drugs Pvt. Ltd., since 2002. He relied on an assignment deed from 2020 and invoices from 2006 onward to establish continuity of use. Mahtta argued that the marks were visually dissimilar and that Hercules’ explanation—“ON” as an abbreviation for “organism with nutrients”—justified its independent adoption.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context

While the judgment does not explicitly cite case law, the legal principles applied reflect established precedents in Indian trademark jurisprudence. Glanbia’s arguments align with N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation (1996) 5 SCC 714, where the Supreme Court upheld the rights of a prior user with trans-border reputation, even against a registered proprietor. The emphasis on deceptive similarity echoes Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories AIR 1965 SC 980, which established that marks must be compared as a whole for visual and phonetic similarity. Hercules’ reliance on prior use through assignment draws from Consolidated Foods Corporation v. Brandon & Co. Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1965 Bom 35, where assignment was recognized as a valid transfer of rights, though subject to proof of use. The court’s rejection of Hercules’ explanation as an afterthought mirrors Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta AIR 1963 SC 449, where vague justifications for mark adoption were dismissed.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Amit Bansal meticulously analyzed the evidence and arguments. He first established Glanbia’s prior use, noting its registration from July 12, 2007, with a user claim from February 1, 2003, supported by invoices from 2000-2003 and catalogues linking product codes to the “ON” mark. The archived website evidence from 2003 and analytics from 2007-2021 reinforced Glanbia’s market presence and goodwill in India. In contrast, Hercules’ earliest invoice was from 2006, with gaps in documentation (no invoices from 2007-2008 or 2016-2019) and no depiction of the mark on products. The court found Hercules’ 2006 invoice from “Canadian Corp.” unreliable due to missing details like VAT and batch numbers, and its FSSAI license from 2020 further undermined its 2002 user claim.

Comparing the marks, Justice Bansal rejected Hercules’ claim of a “ring” design, finding the swoosh arrow deceptively similar to Glanbia’s. He noted that “ON” dominated Hercules’ mark, with “NUTRITION” and “GOLD” in smaller font, amplifying the likelihood of confusion. The judge dismissed Hercules’ “organism with nutrients” explanation as an afterthought, absent from its cease-and-desist reply, indicating dishonest adoption. Given the identical goods (nutritional supplements), the court concluded that Hercules’ mark violated public interest by creating confusion and traded on Glanbia’s goodwill, contravening Sections 11 and 18 of the Trade Marks Act, thus justifying cancellation under Section 57.

Final Decision

The court allowed Glanbia’s petition, directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove Hercules’ mark (registration no. 1763297) from the register. The Registry was instructed to comply via email notification of the order.

Law Settled in This Case

This case reaffirms that prior use and goodwill trump subsequent registration in trademark disputes, particularly when the later mark is deceptively similar and dishonestly adopted. It underscores the importance of credible evidence in proving user claims and the judiciary’s role in protecting consumers from market confusion under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Case Title: Glanbia Performance Nutrition Limited Vs Hercules Nutra Pvt. Ltd.

Date of Order: April 2, 2025

Case No.: C.O. (COMM. IPD-TM) 229/2023

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mars Incorporated Vs. Registrar of Trademarks

In a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal of the Delhi High Court on 2nd April 2025, the appeal titled Mars Incorporated v. Registrar of Trademarks & Ors., registered as C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 88/2024, presented a detailed examination of procedural compliance within the Indian trademark opposition regime. The appellant, Mars Incorporated, a globally renowned American multinational, contested the abandonment of its trademark application under Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The appeal culminated in a decision that clarified the standard of “service” under Section 21 and Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

Mars Incorporated, the appellant, is the proprietor of several globally recognised brands including MARS, SNICKERS, MILKY WAY, BOUNTY, TWIX, GALAXY, PEDIGREE, WHISKAS, and M&M’s. The dispute in question related to its trademark application no. 4083355 in Class 30, filed on 11th February 2019. The mark was published in the Trade Marks Journal on 13th September 2021, and was thereafter opposed by two parties: respondent no. 2 and respondent no. 3. The Registrar of Trademarks, via despatches dated 7th March 2022, allegedly served the Notice of Opposition on Mars.

On 6th February 2023, the Registry published a list of trademark applications deemed to have been abandoned, which included the appellant’s mark, on grounds that no counter-statement had been filed in response to the opposition. Mars contended that it had not received any Notice of Opposition, and hence, the statutory two-month window for filing a counter-statement under Section 21(2) of the Act never commenced.

To address the procedural mishap, Mars submitted affidavits from its legal representatives and agents asserting that no communication—either by email, post, or courier—had been received. It then filed a review petition dated 5th September 2023, which was dismissed by the Registrar via order dated 25th October 2024, thereby confirming the abandonment. Mars challenged this order through the instant appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.

During the proceedings, the appellant’s counsel, Mr. Pravin Anand, argued that the Registrar erred in mechanically deeming the application abandoned without verifying actual service of the Notice of Opposition. Relying on judicial precedents including Rishabh Jain v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7990; Purushottam Singhal v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1641; and Samsudeen A v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6309, he contended that without verifiable proof of service, the mandatory timeline under Section 21(2) does not begin to run.

The learned Central Government Standing Counsel, Ms. Nidhi Raman, appearing for respondent no. 1, the Trademark Registry, submitted that while email was sent on 7th March 2022, there was no record of delivery acknowledgement. Respondent no. 3, however, argued that the notice was emailed to the official address listed in the trademark application and that service should be deemed complete under Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules.

The crux of the matter revolved around the interpretation of Rule 18 vis-à-vis Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act. Section 21(2) mandates that the Registrar serve the opposition notice on the applicant, who must then file a counter-statement within two months of receipt. Rule 18(2), however, states that service is “deemed” to have been completed at the time of sending the email. This discrepancy gives rise to an interpretational conflict: while the Act predicates the response period on actual receipt, the Rules suggest that mere dispatch suffices.

Justice Amit Bansal, after examining the statutory language, found that Rule 18 cannot override the express language of the parent statute. Referring with approval to the Madras High Court’s reasoning in Samsudeen A, he held that Rule 18 must be interpreted purposively to harmonise with Section 21(2), thereby requiring proof of actual receipt or constructive receipt for the abandonment to be valid.

The Court also noted that the impugned order of the Registrar did not adequately consider the affidavits produced by the appellant, nor did it provide any evidence of service beyond an email dispatch record. In fact, the Registrar’s own reasoning confirmed acknowledgment of service only on the part of the opponents and not the applicant. The absence of any delivery failure report does not amount to conclusive proof of service. Hence, the application could not have been legally abandoned under Section 21(2).

The decision of the Court, therefore, set aside the impugned abandonment order dated 25th October 2024 and remanded the matter to the Trademark Registry. The Registry was directed to re-serve the Notice of Opposition to Mars’ legal counsel within two weeks, and Mars was granted the opportunity to file its counter-statement as per statutory timelines.

The decision reaffirms the foundational procedural principle that abandonment of rights cannot occur without demonstrable and effective service. It emphasises that procedural rules must yield to the substantive requirement of ensuring fair opportunity and due process to trademark applicants.

This case significantly contributes to Indian trademark jurisprudence by resolving the interpretational tension between Section 21(2) of the Act and Rule 18 of the Rules, reinforcing that the statutory period for filing counter-statements must begin only upon actual receipt, not presumptive service. This interpretation will likely have a far-reaching impact on a host of trademark opposition proceedings, many of which have faced administrative setbacks due to procedural lapses or unverified email service.

In conclusion, the Delhi High Court has not only upheld the principles of natural justice and due process but has also provided judicial clarity on an increasingly relevant procedural ambiguity. The ruling strikes a balance between administrative efficiency and procedural fairness in trademark adjudication, restoring confidence in the opposition process for international and domestic applicants alike.

Neutral Citation: Mars Incorporated v. Registrar of Trademarks & Ors., 2025:DHC:2463

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Date of Judgment: 2nd April 2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 88/2024

Relevant Statutes: Trade Marks Act, 1999 – Section 21(2); Trade Marks Rules, 2017 – Rule 18

Citations Relied Upon:

• Rishabh Jain v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7990

• Purushottam Singhal v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1641

• Samsudeen A v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6309

Peak XV Partners Advisors India LLP

In a recent decision dated 26th March 2025, the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal of the Delhi High Court delivered a comprehensive judgment in CS (COMM) 71/2024, wherein the plaintiffs, Peak XV Partners Advisors India LLP and Peak XV Partners Operations LLC, successfully secured a decree of permanent injunction against unidentified fraudsters operating under the pseudonym “John Doe.” The defendants were found to be misappropriating the plaintiffs’ trademark and brand identity for fraudulent financial activities. This case reaffirms the principles of trademark protection in the digital domain and the readiness of courts to act decisively against identity theft and cyber impersonation under the law of passing off.

The plaintiffs, Peak XV Partners Advisors India LLP and its Mauritius-based affiliate, Peak XV Partners Operations LLC, are successors to Sequoia Capital India LLP and Sequoia Capital India Operations II LLC respectively. Having rebranded themselves as “PEAK XV PARTNERS” in June 2023, the plaintiffs are among the most prominent venture capital and investment advisory firms operating in India and Southeast Asia. The firm provides capital and advisory services to startups across diverse sectors including AI, fintech, climate-tech, and health-tech. The plaintiffs have played a vital role in India’s startup ecosystem, advising funds that have invested in over 400 startups and facilitating over 19 IPOs and M&A transactions.

In June 2023, the plaintiffs publicly adopted the brand “PEAK XV PARTNERS” following a global restructuring of Sequoia Capital. The new brand, inspired by the early surveyor name for Mount Everest, symbolizes the company's pursuit of excellence and high aspirations. Since the rebranding, the plaintiffs have made extensive efforts to promote the brand across websites, social media platforms, and media coverage. Trademark registration applications were filed, and domain names were secured including the primary domain www.peakxv.com. The plaintiffs also maintain a strong digital presence through platforms like Twitter (X) and Instagram.

In December 2023, the plaintiffs became aware of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by unknown parties through the domain https://pakxv.ioyppp.com/ and a mobile application named “PAK XV.” The perpetrators operated under the pretext of being affiliated with “PEAK XV PARTNERS” and used deceptively similar trade dress, trademarks, and visual elements to mislead users. These elements included the reproduction of branding, content, colour schemes, and promotional materials originally developed by the plaintiffs. They offered fictitious investment schemes under headings like “Pakxv-VCS: 102” and “VIPs,” which included unrealistic promises of financial returns.

The impersonators also created groups on messaging platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram named “Peak XV 1026” and “Peak XV Group,” impersonating senior personnel of the plaintiffs including Mr. Shailendra Singh and Mr. Rajan Anandan. Using these channels, the fraudsters solicited money from the public and created an illusion of legitimacy and association with the plaintiffs. The impersonation extended to the use of a mobile number (+91 8271422399), prompting the plaintiffs to involve telecom companies and request suspension of services.

Legal notices were issued to various digital intermediaries, including Meta (WhatsApp), Telegram, and Google. These platforms responded to takedown requests and removed the offending content. A suit was then filed before the Delhi High Court seeking an ex parte injunction and ancillary reliefs against John Doe (defendant no.1) and associated service providers and registrars.

On 24th January 2024, the Court granted an ex parte interim injunction in favour of the plaintiffs, restraining the defendants from using the trademarks “PEAK XV” or “PEAK XV PARTNERS,” whether through websites, apps, or messaging services. The Court also directed removal and blocking of all related URLs and accounts. Further, IndusInd Bank was ordered to freeze UPI IDs associated with the fraudulent transactions.

By 18th March 2025, several defendants including Google, Telegram, Meta Platforms, and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, were found to have complied with the Court’s orders and were removed from the array of parties. However, the domain name registrar and telecom provider (Bharti Airtel) remained as defendants due to non-compliance or pending action. Defendants no.1 and 2, including the unknown impersonators and the domain name registrar, were proceeded against ex parte due to non-appearance despite service.

Justice Bansal analysed the material on record, including the detailed pleadings and evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. Noting the lack of written statements or affidavits in response from the defendants, the Court held that all averments in the plaint stood admitted under Order VIII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court found that the plaintiffs held prior rights in the mark “PEAK XV PARTNERS” and had successfully demonstrated substantial goodwill and public recognition attached to the mark. The impugned use of a deceptively similar mark was held to be intended to deceive and mislead the public into believing an association with the plaintiffs.

The Court concluded that the actions of the defendant no.1 amounted to passing off, by creating a false impression of affiliation with the plaintiffs and capitalizing on their goodwill. The use of WhatsApp and Telegram groups, unauthorized reproduction of website content, and impersonation of the plaintiff’s directors were all considered aggravating factors indicating deliberate deception and mala fide intent.

In light of the above, the Court passed a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the plaintiffs’ name or trademarks without authorisation. Additionally, Bharti Airtel was directed to suspend the mobile number used for fraudulent activities and disclose the Know Your Customer (KYC) details of the registrant. The plaintiffs did not press for other remaining reliefs.

This judgment is a significant addition to the jurisprudence surrounding trademark protection and digital enforcement against anonymous cyber fraud. It reinforces the principle that identity theft and impersonation in the digital space, especially when combined with false commercial representations, are actionable under the tort of passing off. It also underscores the proactive role that courts can play in extending interim and final injunctive reliefs to protect legitimate brand owners from online fraud.

Importantly, this case demonstrates the efficacy of the “John Doe” remedy in the Indian legal system, allowing trademark owners to secure urgent relief even when the identity of the infringer is initially unknown. It also illustrates the collaborative role that intermediaries—ranging from domain registrars to social media platforms—must play in curbing online infringement and financial fraud.

In conclusion, Peak XV Partners v. John Doe is a judicial affirmation of the enforceability of intellectual property rights in the digital age and provides a template for victims of cyber impersonation and brand fraud to seek effective legal recourse.

Neutral Citation: Peak XV Partners Advisors India LLP Vs John Doe & Ors., 

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Date of Judgment: 26th March 2025:CS(COMM) 71/202

Citation:2025:DHC:2918

Mankind Pharma Ltd. Vs. Preet Kamal Grewal

In a significant ruling rendered on 2nd April 2025, the Delhi High Court, through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee, delivered judgment in C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 279/2022, titled Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Preet Kamal Grewal and Anr., resolving a long-standing trademark dispute under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The case concerns the petitioner Mankind Pharma Ltd.'s effort to protect the sanctity and exclusivity of its well-known “MANKIND” and “KIND” family of trademarks, specifically challenging the registration of the mark “KINDPAN” held by the first respondent, Preet Kamal Grewal.

Mankind Pharma Ltd., a leading pharmaceutical company, had filed the present petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, seeking the removal of the impugned mark “KINDPAN” (Trademark Application No. 2795896 in Class 5) registered in the name of respondent no. 1. The petitioner asserted long-standing, continuous, and exclusive use of its “MANKIND” mark since 1986, dating back to its predecessor-in-interest. The petitioner also substantiated its case with documentary evidence including numerous trademark registrations containing the suffix “KIND,” extensive turnover and prescription data, and prior legal proceedings undertaken to defend its rights.

Mankind Pharma's trademark “MANKIND” is registered across all 45 classes of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and it holds more than 300 trademarks featuring the suffix “KIND.” These include brands such as “NUEKIND,” “CANDIKIND,” “ADDKIND,” and others. The mark “MANKIND” has been officially recognised as a “well-known trademark” as per Section 2(1)(zg) of the Act in Journal No. 1978 dated 14.12.2020. Relying on audited financial records, the petitioner submitted that its “KIND” brands alone had crossed Rs. 1300 Crores in turnover for the year 2018, and the total turnover of the company had risen to over Rs. 4794 Crores by the financial year 2019-20.

Respondent no. 1, a Ludhiana-based proprietorship concern under the name “Sanavita Medicare,” had applied for the trademark “KINDPAN” on a “proposed to be used” basis in 2014, well after the petitioner had secured registration of the mark “KIND” (Registration No. 2457970 dated 10.01.2013 in Class 5). The mark was allowed registration by the Trademark Registry despite the prior registration of an identical mark in the same class by Mankind Pharma. This prompted the petitioner to file the present rectification petition initially before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), which stood transferred to the Delhi High Court post the dissolution of the IPAB.

The first respondent did not appear in the matter and was proceeded ex-parte by the Court via its order dated 11.12.2023. Respondent no. 2, the Trademark Registry, although represented through counsel, failed to file a reply. Consequently, all unrebutted averments of the petitioner were deemed admitted.

The petitioner’s case was built around the doctrine of a “family of marks.” It was argued that the suffix “KIND” had acquired distinctiveness and secondary meaning owing to long-standing, uninterrupted, and widespread use in connection with its pharmaceutical products. Counsel for Mankind relied on several precedents including:

• Mankind Pharma Limited v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6914, where the petitioner’s use of “KIND” family marks was recognised as arbitrary and fanciful, meriting strong protection.

• Caterpillar Inc. v. Mehtab Ahmed & Ors., 2002 SCC OnLine Del 865 and Bata India Ltd. v. Chawla Boot House, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8147, which affirmed the proprietary nature of distinctive trademark elements.

• Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing and Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2933, where long and exclusive use gave rise to inherent distinctiveness.

• Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Arvind Kumar Trading, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2265, wherein the court observed that even marginal alterations to “KIND” suffix marks could lead to consumer confusion due to the strength of the family of marks.

• Mankind Pharma Limited v. Novakind Bio Sciences Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4806, holding “NOVAKIND” deceptively similar to “MANKIND.”

The petitioner also cited Shree Vardhman Rice and General Mills v. Amar Singh Chawalwala, (2009) 10 SCC 257, and Amar Singh Chawal Wala v. Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl. Mills, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1690, for reinforcing the principle that even partial copying of dominant elements of a well-known mark is not permissible.

In analysing the matter, the Court reaffirmed that the suffix “KIND” in the pharmaceutical sector was neither descriptive nor generic. It was rather a distinctive and fanciful component that had come to be associated exclusively with the petitioner due to longstanding use and aggressive brand protection. The Court further observed that the conduct of the respondent no. 1 in applying for a similar mark in the same class, despite knowledge of the petitioner’s pre-existing mark, demonstrated mala fides and a clear intent to capitalise on the reputation and goodwill of the petitioner.

Significantly, the Court endorsed the petitioner’s reliance on McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Thomson West, 2006), which asserts that infringement may arise not only from exact copying but also from use that confuses the public by creating an impression of association with a well-known family of marks.

The Court held that the registration of “KINDPAN” violated Sections 11(1) and 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibit registration of marks that are confusingly similar to earlier marks and likely to cause dilution of their distinctiveness. It was also held that the petitioner qualifies as a “person aggrieved” under Section 57(2) of the Act, thereby entitling it to seek rectification.

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court allowed the petition, directing the Trademark Registry to remove the impugned mark “KINDPAN” (Registration No. 2795896) from the Register of Trademarks.

Conclusion: This judgment significantly reinforces the strength of trademark protection accorded to families of marks, particularly in specialised and sensitive sectors such as pharmaceuticals. The Court’s detailed recognition of secondary meaning, established goodwill, and the importance of source identification underscores a growing judicial inclination toward safeguarding brand integrity. The ruling reiterates the principle that deceptively similar marks, even when only partially overlapping, can lead to confusion and dilution, especially when they attempt to capitalise on established commercial reputation.

Neutral Citation: Mankind Pharma Ltd. Vs. Preet Kamal Grewal 

Court: High Court of Delhi

Date of Judgment: 2nd April 2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 279/2022

Neutal Citation:2025:DHC:2231

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Citation References:

• Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6914

• Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Arvind Kumar Trading, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2265

• Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Novakind Bio Sciences Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4806

• Caterpillar Inc. v. Mehtab Ahmed, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 865

• Bata India Ltd. v. Chawla Boot House, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8147

• Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2933

• Shree Vardhman Rice and General Mills v. Amar Singh Chawalwala, (2009) 10 SCC 257

• Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Themis Medicare Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1087

Imax Healthcare Private Limited Vs Max Healthcare Institute Limited

The High Court of Delhi, in a decision dated March 26, 2025, addressed an appeal filed by Imax Healthcare Private Limited and another appellant against an order of the District Judge (Commercial) dated December 19, 2024, which granted an interim injunction to Max Healthcare Institute Limited under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The case, registered as FAO (COMM) 60/2025, stemmed from a trademark dispute in CS (Comm) 247/2024, where Max Healthcare, the respondent, alleged infringement of its registered "MAX" trademarks by the appellants’ use of "IMAX" in healthcare services. The Division Bench, presided over by Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul, set aside the impugned order, finding that the Commercial Court had misinterpreted an earlier High Court directive and failed to evaluate the merits of the injunction application. The matter was remanded for a fresh, expeditious decision, highlighting procedural rigor and the judiciary’s role in ensuring reasoned adjudication.

Max Healthcare Institute Limited, a well-established entity in India’s healthcare sector, has operated under the "MAX" brand for over two decades, securing multiple trademark registrations for composite marks incorporating "MAX" in relation to hospital and healthcare services. The respondent’s marks, including "MAX HEALTHCARE," "MAX HOSPITAL," and others, have been judicially recognized as "well-known" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a status affirmed in prior litigation, notably CS (COMM) 603/23, where a revenue of Rs. 185,446 lakhs in 2021 underscored its market prominence. This recognition was further reinforced in Max Healthcare Institute Ltd. v. Sahrudya Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine Del 9036), where the High Court upheld the deceptive similarity of "MAXCURE" to "MAX," granting an injunction. Max Healthcare has a history of vigilantly protecting its intellectual property, securing over 21 injunctions against third parties using similar marks, such as "Max Care Hospitals" across various cities.

The dispute with Imax Healthcare Private Limited emerged when Max Healthcare filed a suit alleging that the appellants’ use of "IMAX" infringed its registered trademarks and misled the public into associating Imax’s services with its own. Accompanying the suit was an application for an interlocutory injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. On May 15, 2024, the Commercial Court initially rejected this application, reasoning that Max Healthcare’s registrations were for composite marks rather than the standalone word "MAX," and that the appellants’ operations in Tamil Nadu, where Max had no presence, precluded confusion. The court also noted structural differences—Max being a limited company and Imax a private limited company—as mitigating deception risks. Dissatisfied, Max Healthcare appealed to the High Court in FAO (Comm) 117/2024.

On September 25, 2024, the Division Bench allowed the appeal, setting aside the May 15 order. It criticized the Commercial Court’s reasoning, rejecting the relevance of corporate structure to trademark infringement and dismissing the territorial argument in light of Max’s online presence and allegations of affected sales nationwide. The court also clarified that the discretionary nature of injunctions did not permit arbitrary denial when a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury were established. Quoting extensively from Sahrudya Healthcare and the decree in CS (COMM) 603/23, the Bench underscored "MAX" as a prominent, non-generic mark in healthcare, likely to cause confusion when adopted by others in the same field. The matter was remanded to the Commercial Court for a fresh decision, with all merits-based contentions left open.

The impugned order of December 19, 2024, arose from this remand. The Commercial Court, now presided by a different judge, granted the injunction, restraining Imax Healthcare, its affiliates, and agents from using "IMAX" or any phonetically or visually similar mark until the suit’s disposal. However, the court’s reasoning was sparse, relying heavily on the High Court’s September 25 observations rather than independently assessing the merits. It noted the appellants’ argument that other registered marks like "IMAXX HAIR" and "Pathmax" coexisted with "MAX," but dismissed it as already addressed by the High Court, concluding that further deliberation was unnecessary. The court interpreted the prior judgment as mandating an injunction to "implement" its observations, a stance that prompted the present appeal by Imax Healthcare.

In FAO (COMM) 60/2025, the Division Bench found this approach fundamentally flawed. Justice C. Hari Shankar, authoring the oral order, emphasized that the September 25 judgment did not foreclose the issue or dictate an outcome. Instead, it had revived the injunction application for a de novo consideration "in accordance with law," preserving both parties’ rights to argue their case. The Commercial Court’s cursory order, devoid of substantive analysis, misconstrued this directive as a command to grant relief, neglecting its duty to evaluate factors like prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. The Bench expressed dismay at this misapplication, noting that the lower court had treated the High Court’s critique of the earlier refusal as a conclusive endorsement of Max Healthcare’s claims.

The appellants’ counsel, Mr. Parish Mishra, reiterated the coexistence of other "MAX"-based trademarks, suggesting Max Healthcare could not claim exclusivity. Conversely, Ms. Abhilasha Nautiyal, representing Max Healthcare, accused the appellants of submitting fabricated evidence, including a pre-COVID bill for a COVID test kit, and relying on material not presented earlier. The Bench refrained from opining on these submissions, leaving them for the Commercial Court to address. It stressed that a fresh adjudication must consider all contentions, including these allegations, to ensure a fair and reasoned outcome.

Setting aside the December 19 order, the High Court directed both parties to appear before the Commercial Court on April 3, 2025, for a re-evaluation of the injunction application. It urged the lower court to decide expeditiously—preferably within two weeks—uninfluenced by the impugned order’s conclusions. To streamline proceedings, both sides undertook not to seek adjournments, and the Bench requested the Commercial Court to defer a related contempt petition until the injunction issue was resolved. The order reserved the parties’ rights to challenge any future decision, maintaining procedural flexibility while emphasizing judicial efficiency.

The judgment reflects broader themes in trademark law and judicial oversight. It reaffirms that "MAX," as a prominent element in Max Healthcare’s marks, warrants protection against deceptive similarity, especially in healthcare, where consumer confusion carries significant consequences. The Bench’s reliance on prior rulings like Sahrudya Healthcare underscores the psychological reality of brand recognition—patients associate "MAX" with Max Healthcare, not its full composite marks or logos, particularly in urgent medical contexts. The decision also critiques territorial limitations in a digital and corporatized healthcare landscape, aligning with trends like medical tourism that transcend regional boundaries.

Procedurally, the ruling highlights the High Court’s supervisory role in ensuring lower courts adhere to remand directives. The Commercial Court’s failure to engage with merits—despite clear instructions—prompted a stern reminder of judicial responsibility. The Bench’s hope for future circumspection from the District Judge signals a call for diligence in exercising discretionary powers, reinforcing that such discretion must be reasoned, not arbitrary. By remanding the case with specific timelines, the court balanced fairness with the urgency inherent in commercial disputes.

In conclusion, the March 26, 2025, order in FAO (COMM) 60/2025 exemplifies the judiciary’s commitment to protecting well-known trademarks while upholding procedural integrity. It leaves the substantive dispute unresolved, entrusting the Commercial Court with a fresh opportunity to weigh evidence and arguments, ensuring that the outcome—whatever it may be—rests on a solid legal foundation.

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Complete Citation

• Case Name: Imax Healthcare Private Limited  Vs Max Healthcare Institute Limited
• Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
• Case Number: FAO (COMM) 60/2025 
• Date of Decision: March 26, 2025
• Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul
• Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2206

Full Citation:

Ibibo Group Pvt Ltd. Vs. Satyendra Kumar Singh

The High Court of Delhi, in a ruling dated April 1, 2025, addressed a rectification petition filed by Ibibo Group Private Limited against Satyendra Kumar Singh and another respondent, seeking the cancellation of the trademark "GO PLUS" (registration no. 3742148) in Class 9 from the Register of Trade Marks. The case, identified as C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 251/2022, was adjudicated under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with the court granting the petitioner’s request due to the respondent’s failure to contest the claims and the petitioner’s established prior rights and goodwill in its "GOIBIBO" and related "GO-formative" marks. Justice Amit Bansal delivered the oral judgment, directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove the impugned mark, thereby reinforcing the protection of well-known trademarks against deceptive similarity and dilution.

Ibibo Group Private Limited, the petitioner, is a prominent player in India’s online travel industry, operating under the "GOIBIBO" brand. The company has built a robust presence since 2009, offering a comprehensive travel platform that facilitates bookings for flights, hotels, buses, and ancillary services like travel insurance. With a website (www.goibibo.com) registered on May 22, 2009, and operational since 2010, the petitioner has processed over 10 million bookings. Its mobile application, launched in 2013, has garnered over 16 million downloads across platforms like Google Play and Apple iStore. The company’s extensive promotional efforts span traditional print media, digital channels, and sponsorships of national and international events, resulting in significant unsolicited media coverage in leading publications. Social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram, further amplify the visibility of the "GOIBIBO" marks. Financially, the petitioner’s success is evident from its sales turnover of Rs. 135,631 lakhs and marketing expenses of Rs. 125,175 lakhs in the fiscal year 2017-18, as detailed in the petition. This commercial success has been complemented by prestigious awards and partnerships with celebrities and corporate giants, cementing the "GOIBIBO" brand’s reputation.

The petitioner’s intellectual property portfolio includes registered trademarks for "GOIBIBO" and various "GO-formative" marks—such as "GO CONTACTS," "GOCASH PLUS," "GO BIZ," "GO BUSINESS," and "GO STAYS"—across multiple classes, including Class 9 (downloadable software for travel-related services), Class 35 (business services), Class 36 (financial services), Class 39 (transport and travel), and Class 43 (accommodation services). The earliest registration for "GOIBIBO" dates to August 18, 2011, with a user claim from May 22, 2009, reflecting over a decade of continuous use. This extensive adoption and promotion have positioned "GO" as a dominant and independently recognizable element associated exclusively with the petitioner’s services in the minds of the public and trade.

The dispute originated when the petitioner identified the "GO PLUS" mark in Trade Marks Journal No. 1840, published on March 12, 2018. Filed by respondent no. 1, Satyendra Kumar Singh, on February 1, 2018, on a "proposed to be used" basis, the mark was registered on July 31, 2018, in Class 9 for "mobile and mobile accessories, charger, ear phone, battery, bluetooth, screen guard." Due to an error by its trademark agents, the petitioner missed the deadline to oppose the application before registration. Aggrieved by the registration, Ibibo Group filed the rectification petition, arguing that "GO PLUS" was deceptively similar to its "GOIBIBO" and "GO-formative" marks, likely to cause confusion, deceive consumers, and dilute its goodwill.

Procedurally, the case transitioned to the High Court following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) under the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. The IPAB had initially issued notice to the respondent on March 18, 2019, but subsequent records were incomplete. After the transfer, the High Court issued fresh notice on July 22, 2022, and confirmed service on December 15, 2022. Despite these efforts, the respondent neither appeared nor filed a reply, effectively conceding the petitioner’s averments. This non-participation shaped the court’s approach, allowing it to treat the petition’s claims as admitted under established legal principles.

Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Abhishek Kotnala and Mr. Kartikeya Tandon, advanced several key arguments. They emphasized the petitioner’s prior adoption and exclusive proprietorship of the "GOIBIBO" and "GO-formative" marks, rooted in their use since 2009. They contended that "GO PLUS" was deceptively similar, posing a risk of confusion and deception among consumers. The widespread goodwill of the "GOIBIBO" brand, they argued, extended to the "GO" element, which the public independently associated with the petitioner’s services. This association was reinforced by the petitioner’s array of "GO-formative" marks, making the registration of "GO PLUS" a threat to the distinctiveness of its trademark family. Additionally, the goods covered by the impugned mark—mobile accessories and related items—overlapped with the petitioner’s Class 9 software offerings, heightening the potential for confusion. Finally, they noted the respondent’s non-use of "GO PLUS," suggesting that cancellation would cause no prejudice.

Justice Bansal’s analysis hinged on the uncontested evidence and legal precedents. The respondent’s failure to respond left the petitioner’s claims unopposed, a circumstance the court interpreted as an admission of the averments. A side-by-side comparison of the marks revealed striking similarities: the petitioner’s portfolio included "GOIBIBO," "GO STAYS," "GO CARS," "GO BIZ," and "GOCASH PLUS," among others, while the respondent’s mark was "GO PLUS." The court identified "GO" as the essential and dominant feature, a conclusion bolstered by the respondent’s inclusion of a "GO" logo alongside "GO PLUS." This similarity, when viewed holistically, rendered "GO PLUS" deceptively akin to the petitioner’s marks.

The court drew on its ruling in Greaves Cotton Limited v. Mohammad Rafi and Ors. (2011 SCC OnLine Del 2596) to frame its assessment of deceptive similarity. It noted that infringement does not require an exact replica of a registered mark; rather, it suffices if the impugned mark resembles the plaintiff’s mark substantially, likely deceiving or confusing consumers. The judgment highlighted that savvy infringers often introduce minor variations to evade liability, but such tactics do not preclude relief if the resemblance remains significant. Here, the shared "GO" element, coupled with the petitioner’s extensive use and reputation, satisfied this threshold. The court rejected the notion that minor differences—like the addition of "PLUS"—negated the risk of confusion, especially given the petitioner’s established market presence.

Further, the court examined the overlap in goods and services. The petitioner’s Class 9 registrations covered downloadable software for travel-related digital content, loyalty schemes, and accommodation searches—offerings that intersected with the respondent’s mobile accessories, which often complement digital platforms. This proximity amplified the likelihood of consumer confusion. The petitioner’s prior use since 2009, contrasted with the respondent’s adoption in 2018 on a "proposed to be used" basis and subsequent non-use, underscored the inequity of maintaining the registration. The court found that the petitioner’s goodwill, built through years of promotion and recognition, was vulnerable to dilution by the impugned mark, even absent active use by the respondent.

Applying Sections 9, 11, and 18 of the Trade Marks Act, the court concluded that the registration of "GO PLUS" contravened legal standards. Section 9 prohibits registration of marks lacking distinctiveness, Section 11 bars marks likely to cause confusion due to similarity with earlier trademarks, and Section 18 governs the Registrar’s authority to accept applications. The continued presence of "GO PLUS" on the Register, the court reasoned, violated these provisions by threatening the petitioner’s rights and public interest. Under Section 57, which empowers rectification for entries wrongly remaining on the Register, the court found cancellation warranted.

The judgment culminated in an order allowing the petition and directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove "GO PLUS" (no. 3742148) from Class 9. The court instructed its Registry to forward the order to the Trade Marks Registry via email for compliance, disposing of all pending applications. Delivered orally on April 1, 2025, the ruling exemplifies the judiciary’s role in safeguarding trademark integrity, particularly when uncontested evidence reveals a clear threat to established rights.

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Complete Citation

• Case Name: Ibibo Group Pvt Ltd. Vs. Satyendra Kumar Singh 
• Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
• Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 251/2022
• Date of Decision: April 1, 2025
• Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal
• Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2480

Harley-Davidson LLC Vs. Vijal Pal Dhayal

This judgment from the High Court of Delhi addresses a commercial suit filed by Harley-Davidson LLC, a renowned American company, against Vijal Pal Dhayal accused of infringing the plaintiff’s trademarks and copyrights, as well as passing off goods under a deceptively similar mark. The case, identified as CS(COMM) 609/2023, was adjudicated summarily under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), as amended for commercial disputes, due to the defendant’s failure to contest the claims despite multiple opportunities. The court granted a permanent injunction, ordered the destruction of infringing goods, and awarded damages and costs totaling Rs. 5,00,000 in favor of the plaintiff.

Harley-Davidson LLC, organized under the laws of the United States, has been a prominent name in the motorcycle industry since its inception in 1903. The company, formally incorporated as Harley-Davidson Motor Company on September 17, 1907, expanded its product line over the years to include apparel, shoes, and accessories, all marketed under the well-known “HARLEY-DAVIDSON” mark and associated logos, such as the “Bar & Shield” logo introduced in 1910 and the “Eagle Logo/Device Mark.” These trademarks have been registered globally, with over 2,200 registrations or pending applications, and have acquired significant recognition due to continuous use since the early 20th century. In India, the plaintiff began operations in August 2009 through its subsidiary, H-D Motor Company India Private Ltd., and opened its first dealership in July 2010. It later partnered with Hero MotoCorp to strengthen its presence in the Indian market. The company also operates a website, https://www.harley-davidson.in/, created on February 14, 2005, to promote and sell its products.

The plaintiff’s trademarks in India include registrations for “HARLEY-DAVIDSON,” its logos, and variants like “SCREAMIN EAGLE,” “H-D,” and “HD,” spanning multiple classes under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. For instance, registration no. 490824 for “HARLEY-DAVIDSON” in Class 25 (clothing) dates back to May 10, 1988, while registration no. 1333740 for the “Bar & Shield” logo in Class 25 was filed on January 24, 2005. These marks, along with their distinctive trade dress and artistic elements, are protected as original works under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The plaintiff’s extensive use, global sales in over 90 countries through 1,460 dealerships, and substantial promotional efforts—evidenced by sales of Rs. 488.09 crore and promotional expenses of Rs. 5.31 crore in India in 2014—have established its marks as market leaders and source identifiers exclusively associated with Harley-Davidson.

The dispute arose in July 2023 when the plaintiff’s representative discovered the defendant using a mark identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s “Eagle Logo/Device Mark” on footwear sold under the brand name “RONTEX.” An investigation revealed that the defendant was stocking, supplying, and selling these shoes, prompting the plaintiff to file the present suit. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing its trademarks and copyrights, passing off goods as those of the plaintiff, and causing dilution of its brand reputation. Additional reliefs included the delivery and destruction of infringing products, damages, and costs.

The procedural history of the case reflects the defendant’s non-participation. On October 16, 2023, the court issued summons and an ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the impugned mark. A Local Commissioner was appointed to visit the defendant’s premises, where 640 pairs of shoes bearing the infringing mark were inventoried. Despite service of summons via email and publication, and multiple extensions granted by the Joint Registrar, the defendant failed to file a written statement within the statutory 120-day period under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Consequently, on April 2, 2024, the right to file a written statement was closed, and the plaintiff moved an application (I.A. 42209/2024) under Order XIII-A and Order VIII Rule 10 CPC for a summary judgment.

The court’s analysis focused on the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the defendant’s lack of defense. The plaintiff demonstrated prior adoption and continuous use of its marks since 1903 globally and since 2009 in India, supported by trademark registrations and evidence of goodwill. The Local Commissioner’s report, unchallenged by the defendant, confirmed the presence of infringing goods, aligning with Order XXVI Rule 10(2) CPC, which allows such reports to be read into evidence if uncontested. The court compared the plaintiff’s “Eagle Logo/Device Mark” with the defendant’s mark and found them deceptively similar, noting that the defendant’s use on identical goods (footwear) could mislead consumers and dilute the plaintiff’s brand.

Applying Order XIII-A CPC, designed to expedite commercial disputes, the court assessed whether the defendant had a “real prospect” of defending the claim. Citing Su-Kam Power Systems Ltd. v. Kunwer Sachdev (2019 SCC OnLine Del 10764), the court emphasized that a summary judgment is appropriate when the defendant’s prospects are not “realistic” but “fanciful,” and no compelling reason exists for a trial. Here, the defendant’s failure to file a written statement, respond to the application, or contest the interim injunction indicated an absence of defense. The court concluded that proceeding to trial was unnecessary, as the plaintiff’s evidence—trademark registrations, sales figures, and the Local Commissioner’s findings—established infringement, passing off, and copyright violation.

On the issue of reliefs, the court granted a permanent injunction in terms of prayer clauses 46(a), (b), and (c) of the plaint, restraining the defendant from using the infringing mark. It also ordered the destruction of the 640 pairs of shoes inventoried by the Local Commissioner, to be supervised by the plaintiff’s representative, as per prayer clause 46(e). For damages and costs (prayer clauses 46(g) and (h)), the plaintiff pressed for compensation, citing the defendant’s willful infringement. Referencing Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Reckitt Benckiser India Limited and Inter Ikea v. Sham Murari, the court adopted a “rough and ready calculation” approach, basing damages on the Local Commissioner’s seizure report. Considering the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s reputation, the court awarded Rs. 5,00,000, covering both damages and costs. The plaintiff did not pursue other reliefs, such as rendition of accounts.

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Complete Citation

• Case Name: Harley-Davidson LLC Vs. Vijal Pal Dhayal
• Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
• Case Number: CS(COMM) 609/2023 
• Date of Decision: April 2, 2025
• Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal
• Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2489