Friday, May 9, 2025

Goethe Institute Vs Abhishek Yadav

Introduction and Background
The case involves the Goethe-Institut, known for promoting German culture and language worldwide, which has been operating in India since 1957 under the name MAX MUELLER BHAVAN. The institute is a well-established entity with a significant presence in India and globally, offering German language courses, examinations, and cultural programs. It has built a strong reputation and brand recognition, not only through its official name but also via the trademark MAX MUELLER/BHAVAN. The institute's name has become synonymous with quality German language education in the country, and it claims extensive use of the mark over several decades.

In recent times, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants, including Abhishek Yadav, have adopted similar marks such as MAX MUELLER, MAX MUELLER INSTITUTE, and other related identifiers. The defendants are said to have started using these marks around 2018, including operating a website called maxmuellerinstitute.com. The plaintiff contends that such use is likely to cause confusion among the public and constitutes infringement and passing off of its well-established mark, thereby risking its brand integrity and causing potential damage to its reputation and goodwill.

Legal Dispute
The core legal issue is whether the defendants' use of marks similar to the plaintiff’s MAX MUELLER/BHAVAN infringes upon its prior rights and constitutes passing off under Indian trademark law. The plaintiff asserts that it has developed exclusive rights through continuous and extensive use since 1957, establishing a strong reputation and associating these marks exclusively with its institute.

The plaintiff seeks an interim injunction to restrain the defendants from using the impugned marks or any similar marks that could cause confusion. The injunction aims to prevent any further dilution of its trademarks and protect its business interests. The application for injunction was filed under relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, seeking urgent relief until the case is fully decided.

Court’s Findings
The court observed that the plaintiff had established prior and continuous use of the marks MAX MUELLER and MAX MUELLER BHAVAN since 1957, and that these marks are well-recognized and associated exclusively with the plaintiff’s institute. The court recognized that the name "MAX MUELLER" had acquired distinctiveness and goodwill over the years through consistent use and branding.

It further noted that the defendant's adoption of similar marks and a website bearing the same name could likely lead to confusion among consumers, especially given the common practice of searching online for the institute’s services.

Conclusion and Orders
Accordingly, the court granted the interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the marks MAX MUELLER, MAX MUELLER INSTITUTE, or any similar marks that could cause confusion with the plaintiff’s established marks.

Goethe Institute Vs Abhishek Yadav/06.05.2025:CS(COMM) 541/2024/2025:DHC:3337/Mini Pushkarna

Trodat GMBH & Anr. Vs. Addprint India Enterprises

Introduction This case involves a legal dispute between Trodat GMBH, a leading global manufacturer of stamps under the brand "Trodat," and Addprint India Enterprises. Trodat filed a suit alleging that Addprint’s "KVIK" branded rubber stamps infringed upon Trodat’s registered designs "FLASHY 6330" and "FLASHY 6903," which protect the unique shape, layout, and appearance of their stamp products.

Background and Registration of Designs Trodat’s products under the "FLASHY" brand were designed in Austria around 2015 and launched in India in 2017. Their designs are registered under the Indian Designs Act, with registration numbers 272348 and 272349. The plaintiffs claimed that their designs were distinctive, innovative, and had acquired goodwill in the market. The defendant, Addprint, entered the Indian market with stamps under the "KVIK" brand, which Trodat alleged were copies of their protected designs.

Initial Court Order and Injunction On 28 October 2022, the court granted an ex-parte ad interim injunction against Addprint, restraining them from manufacturing and selling rubber stamps that were identical or deceptively similar to Trodat’s registered designs. The court observed that the overall look, layout, color schemes, and feel of the products appeared almost identical, justifying the injunction. The injunction also allowed the defendant to sell existing stock after reporting the inventory.

Dispute Over the New Design Following the injunction, the defendant developed an alternative design and proposed it to Trodat during the court-mandated mediation process. However, Trodat rejected the proposed design, asserting that it too was similar enough to infringe their registered rights. The defendant argued that their new design was sufficiently different, claiming a bonafide effort to avoid infringement.

Court Proceedings and Analysis The court’s analysis involved comparing the plaintiffs’ registered designs with the defendant’s proposed products. The court emphasized that protection revolves around the overall impression of the design, and that designs which are deceptively similar would infringe upon the registered rights, even if certain features are changed. The court referred to legal principles and previous judgments to assess whether the new proposed design fell within the scope of the existing injunction.

Defendant’s Argument and Court’s View The defendant claimed they had pioneered the "box-type" stamp design in India back in 1999, decades before Trodat’s registration, and that they had registered several similar designs. They contended that their new design was a bona fide effort to create a distinct product, and that prior use and registration of similar designs by third parties diluted Trodat’s claims. Conversely, Trodat insisted that their designs were original, registered rights, and that the defendant’s new design still mirrored the protected elements too closely.

Current Status and Court’s Direction The court noted that the design in question was retained under the injunction, and that the defendant was not permitted to launch the proposed design unless it was found to be non-infringing. The court also indicated that the dispute over the new design was ongoing, and further examination was required to determine whether it infringed Trodat’s registered rights.

Conclusion This case highlights the complexities of design rights enforcement, especially with evolving product designs and prior art. The court’s primary concern was whether the defendant’s new product design was sufficiently different from the registered designs to avoid infringement, considering the overall visual impression, prior art, and the scope of the existing injunction. The decision underscored the importance of protecting the distinctive visual features that elements of product design confer under the law.

Case Title: Trodat GMBH & Anr. Vs. Addprint India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Date of Order: 6 May 2025 Case No.: CS(COMM) 737/2022 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3336: High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon’ble Justice Mini Pushkarna

Sana Herbal Pvt. Ltd. Vs Dehlvi Ambar Herbals Pvt. Ltd.

This case before the Delhi High Court involves Sana Herbal Pvt. Ltd. as the appellant and Dehlvi Ambar Herbals Pvt. Ltd. as the respondent. The core issue revolves around the appellant's request for an ex parte ad interim injunction to prevent the respondent from continuing certain market activities, which the appellant claimed were infringing upon its rights. The learned District Judge (Commercial Court-01) refused to grant this injunction on the grounds that the respondent was already established in the market, potentially making the injunction unnecessary or ineffective. The appellant challenged this order by filing an appeal before the High Court, which scrutinized the appropriateness of the refusal.

The Court observed that the respondent's existing market presence could not be the sole basis for denying an injunction, referencing an earlier Division Bench ruling in Hulm Entertainment Pvt Ltd v SBN Gaming Network Pvt Ltd. The Court did not delve deeply into the merits of the case but directed both parties to prepare and submit written arguments within ten days and to appear before the Commercial Court on 22 May 2025 for further hearing.

Ultimately, the High Court disposed of the appeal with directions to the Commercial Court to finalize and decide on the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) as expeditiously as possible. The case emphasizes the importance of timely legal proceedings for protection of rights in commercial disputes involving herbal product companies.

Case title: Sana Herbal Pvt. Ltd. Vs Dehlvi Ambar Herbals Pvt. Ltd. Date of order: 1 May 2025 Case No.: FAO (COMM) 104/2025 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3304:DB: Court: Delhi High Court Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Arddy Engineering Innovations Vs Heraeus Technologies

Introduction and Background

This case involves a criminal revision petition filed by Arddy Engineering Innovations Pvt. Ltd. challenging the initiation of criminal proceedings against it by Heraeus Technologies Indian Pvt. Ltd. The core issue revolves around allegations of trademark infringement, counterfeiting, cheating, and violations of court orders related to the trademark ‘Hydris,’ a product used for measuring the hydrogen levels in liquid steel, crucial for railway safety and defense purposes.

Dispute and Allegations

Heraeus Technologies owned the exclusive rights to the ‘Hydris’ trademark and technical know-how. Arddy Engineering, previously authorized as a distributor under a distributorship agreement, allegedly manufactured and supplied counterfeit hydrogen sensors branded ‘Hydris’ even after the termination of the distributorship agreement on 24th October 2013. Heraeus accused Arddy of developing a product called ‘Hysen’ with identical markings and falsely representing it as genuine ‘Hydris.’ The counterfeit products were allegedly supplied to Indian Railways and steel factories, posing significant safety risks and causing financial and reputational damage to Heraeus.

Court Proceedings and Legal Contentions

The criminal case was initiated based on a complaint lodged by Heraeus, which also involved an inquiry under section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The magistrate issued process against Arddy after being satisfied of credible grounds, based on police reports and documents indicating that counterfeit products were manufactured and supplied with the intent to deceive customers and infringe upon Heraeus’s trademarks.

Arddy contended that the proceedings should be quashed, claiming that the complaint lacked sufficient grounds, that the allegations were civil disputes mischaracterized as criminal matters, and that the magistrate did not properly apply judicial mind before issuing process. They argued that the civil injunction order restraining them from using the ‘Hydris’ mark was still in force, emphasizing contradictions in the plaintiff’s stance in civil and criminal courts, as well as reliance on precedents suggesting that criminal proceedings should not be initiated without proper prima facie evidence.

Court’s Analysis

The court examined whether the complaint disclosed an offense under relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code, including cheating, criminal breach of trust, and forgery. It noted that the complaint, along with police reports, laid down factual foundations for criminal liability, including specific allegations of counterfeit manufacturing, misappropriation, and deliberate deception. The court stated that at this stage, the court was required to consider whether there was a prima facie case, not to determine the guilt or innocence.

Regarding Arddy’s argument that the magistrate failed to apply judicial mind, the court observed that orders issuing process under section 204 of CrPC do not necessarily require a formal detailed order, provided that the magistrate was satisfied after due inquiry. The inquiry under section 202, which included police investigations and reports, was deemed sufficient to satisfy this requirement.

The court also considered arguments on whether contradictory pleadings in civil and criminal proceedings could justify quashing the criminal case. It concluded that the complaint’s allegations were detailed enough to show a prima facie offense, especially given the specific role assigned to the accused, including counterfeiting and fraudulent representation, and that the civil injunction did not prevent criminal proceedings.

Decision and Conclusion

The court dismissed the petition, ruling that the initiation of criminal proceedings was justified based on the available evidence and procedural compliance. It emphasized the importance of allowing the case to proceed to trial for a full factual adjudication. The court also urged the lower courts to expedite proceedings, recognizing the ongoing civil injunction and the seriousness of the allegations. In conclusion, the court rejected Arddy’s plea to quash the criminal case, asserting that the process was initiated in accordance with law, with sufficient grounds for the case to be tried on merit.

Arddy Engineering Innovations Vs Heraeus Technologies/16th April 2025/CRR 4690 of 2022/High Court at Calcutta/Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee

Capital Ventures Pvt Ltd Vs Registrar of Trade Marks

This case involves the appellant, Capital Ventures Pvt Ltd, challenging the refusal of their trademark applications for the word "PARLIAMENT" and related "PARLIAMENT-formative" marks by the Registrar of Trade Marks. The appellant had been using these marks extensively since 2013 and had obtained several registrations, claiming genuine use and reputation associated with the marks. The Registrar, however, refused registration under Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(2)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, mainly on the grounds that the word "PARLIAMENT" is a common generic term used to refer to legislative bodies, specifically the Indian Parliament, and is protected under the Emblems and Names Act, which prohibits registration of certain names or emblems that may cause deception or misrepresentation.

The appellant contended that their use was bona fide, and registration granted earlier had established their rights. They further argued that the term "PARLIAMENT" has been used extensively in commerce and should not be denied registration solely because it is a common term or because some prior registrations exist. The respondent, the Registrar, maintained that the word "PARLIAMENT" is a public and legislative term, and registration of such marks could create undue monopoly over a term that describes a legislative institution, which is contrary to statutory provisions and public policy.

A significant aspect of the case involved the legal interpretation of Sections 9(2)(d) and 9(1)(a) of the Act, along with the applicability of the Emblems and Names Act. The Court examined whether existing registrations of similar marks by third parties were lawful or in violation of the law, and whether the Registrar had the authority to cancel or expunge any registrations that were improperly granted.

Throughout the proceedings, the appellant kept asserting their rights based on prior use and registration, while the respondent highlighted the statutory prohibitions on registering such common and public property terms. The proceedings also addressed procedural issues following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), with the case now being heard directly by the High Court under the new tribunals framework.

In its final order, the Court observed that registration of marks containing the word "PARLIAMENT" is not absolutely prohibited but is subject to compliance with legal provisions, especially the restrictions under the Emblems and Names Act. The Court allowed the appeals, directed the respondent to process the applications according to law, and set aside the earlier refusals, emphasizing the need for careful consideration of the legal restrictions and prior rights.

Capital Ventures Pvt Ltd Vs Registrar of Trade Marks/29th April 2025/C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 5/2022/2025:DHC:3311/Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Boon Rawd Brewery Co Ltd. Vs Yunnan Xiangkeng

This case involves the Thai brewery Boon Rawd Brewery Co Ltd. (petitioner), renowned for its iconic SINGHA beer, challenging the registration of a device mark by Yunnan Xiangkeng Trading Co. Ltd. (respondent) in India. The petition was filed under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, seeking the cancellation of the respondent's mark registered in class 32, which covers beer and similar goods. The petitioner’s longstanding use and extensive international registration of the SINGHA trademarks, along with its reputation and goodwill built since 1933, form the basis of its claim. The petitioner alleges that the respondent's mark, which closely copies the lion device and the word SINGHA, is deceptively similar and intended to cause confusion among consumers, infringing on the petitioner’s rights.

The petitioner asserted that the respondent’s registration was obtained dishonestly, in bad faith, and in violation of statutory provisions, especially given the respondent's prior infringement of the petitioner’s trademarks in other jurisdictions. The petition highlighted that the respondent’s adoption of the mark with an intent to trade upon the petitioner’s goodwill and reputation constituted an act of bad faith and statutory infringement. The petitioner also emphasized that the respondent had not filed any reply or appeared in court despite repeated notices, which was deemed an admission of the claims.

The court noted that the respondent’s mark was almost identical to the petitioner’s registered trademarks, which had achieved significant goodwill in India. It observed that the respondent's registration was granted erroneously by the trademark registry without recognizing the prior rights of the petitioner. Moreover, the court pointed out that the respondent’s failure to contest the petition and the similarity of the marks strengthened the case against the respondent’s registration.

After examining the evidence, including the similarities of the marks and the reputation of the SINGHA brand, the court concluded that the respondent’s registration was in violation of the provisions of the Trade Marks Act. The court further held that the registration was made in bad faith and that the respondent’s use of the mark was likely to deceive and cause confusion among ordinary consumers, who associate the SINGHA mark exclusively with the petitioner.The final order directed the registry to remove the impugned mark from the register within four weeks. 

Case Title: Boon Rawd Brewery Co Ltd. Vs Yunnan Xiangkeng Trading Co. Ltd. Date of Order: May 1, 2025 Case No.: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 25/2025 Neutral Citation: 2025: DHC:3334 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

BMI Group Denmark APS Vs The Assistant Controller of Patents

This case pertains to a legal appeal filed by BMI Group Denmark (formerly Icopal Danmark APS) against the refusal of their patent application by the Indian Patent Office. The patent application was for a multilayer sealing web designed for structures such as roofs, cladding, tanks, and cellars. The application was refused primarily on the grounds of lacking inventive step, as per the objections raised by the Controller of Patents during the examination process.

The Indian Patent Office and its Controller had cited multiple prior art references, specifically D1 to D4, which allegedly represented existing technologies that the invention could be obvious in light of. The patent office interpreted the claims as comprising a carrier insert made solely of a glass nonwoven and a separate glass reinforcement of knitted fabric, and concluded that the invention did not involve an inventive step over the cited prior art. Consequently, the Controller rejected the application under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, stating that the claims lacked novelty and inventive step.

The applicant challenged this rejection by filing an appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The appellant's legal team argued that the patent examiner and the Controller had misinterpreted the invention, particularly concerning the combination of the carrier insert features. They asserted that the invention was innovative, as it combined a glass nonwoven with a knitted fabric reinforcement in a manner that was not obvious from the cited prior art. Further, the appellant contended that the patent office had improperly segmented the features of the invention, failing to appreciate the claimed combination as a whole, which imparted unique properties like cost-effectiveness, low shrinkage, and high dimensional stability.

The appellant also challenged the patent office's reliance on prior art D2, which related to decorative textile fabrics, arguing that it was non-analogous and irrelevant for establishing obviousness against the sealing web invention. They emphasized adherence to legal principles that mosaic of prior art can only be used when references are analogous, and this was not proven in the present case.

The court examined the detailed technical features of the invention, particularly focusing on the specific claim that the carrier insert must contain both a glass non woven and a knitted fabric reinforcement – a combination that the patent office reportedly did not recognize properly. The court found that the Controller had failed to consider the invention as a whole and had not adequately demonstrated how the prior art rendered the invention obvious. The court therefore allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the patent office, and directed the authorities to proceed with the grant of patent.

Case Title: BMI Group Denmark APS Vs The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs Date of Order: April 23, 2025 Case No.: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 7/2024 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3174 Court Name: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Blackberry Limited Vs Assistant Controller of Patent

Introduction Blackberry Limited filed a patent application in India for a method and system related to signaling release cause indication in a UMTS network. The application was examined by the Indian Patent Office, which raised several objections, including issues of novelty, inventive step, clarity, and amendments to the claims.

Proceedings and Objections The Patent Office issued a First Examination Report highlighting objections under Sections 2(1)(j), 3(k), 3(m), 8, 10(4)(c), and 10(5) of the Patents Act. Blackberry responded with detailed amendments and written submissions aiming to overcome those objections. Subsequently, the Controller conducted hearings but rejected the amendments, citing non-compliance with Sections 57 and 59 of the Act. The Controller’s order was cryptic, failing to analyze whether the amendments were within the scope of these sections.

Legal Contentions and Court’s Analysis Blackberry argued that their amendments were in the nature of corrections or explanations supported by the original specification, and therefore, should have been allowed. They relied on legal precedents emphasizing that amendments should be supported by the specification and within the scope of the relevant sections. The Court noted that the Controller’s rejection lacked adequate reasoning and did not consider whether the amendments were permissible under Sections 57 and 59. The Court observed that decisions on patent amendments must be reasoned and based on application of mind, as mandated by judicial precedents.

Order and Remand The Court set aside the Controller’s order due to this lack of reasoning and remanded the matter back for de novo consideration. It directed the Controller to afford a fresh opportunity for hearing, including a detailed examination of the proposed amendments in light of applicable legal provisions. 

Case Details Case Title: Blackberry Limited Vs Assistant Controller of Patent Date of Order: 23 April 2025 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 125/2022 Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:3100 High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Abhi Traders Vs Fashnear Technologies

Introduction Abhi Traders, a business engaged in designing and selling ethnic clothing under the trademark "Ibrana," filed a lawsuit against Fashnear Technologies Private Limited and other related defendants. The core issues revolve around copyright infringement and passing off, as Abhi Traders alleged that the defendants were unlawfully reproducing and using their copyrighted photographs to promote counterfeit products online.

Background and Allegations Abhi Traders owned copyrights over specific photographs used for advertising and promoting their products. These images were custom-created to showcase their designs, which contributed to their brand identity and success. The company claimed that the defendants, operating through an online platform managed by Fashnear Technologies (notably the platform 'Meesho'), had used identical or substantially similar photographs without authorization to sell counterfeit items, thereby infringing on Abhi Traders’ copyright rights and passing off their goods as genuine.

Repeated attempts were made by the plaintiff to resolve the matter amicably by approaching the platform provider, but the defendants continued their infringing activities. The plaintiff sought legal intervention to prevent ongoing infringement and misuse of their intellectual property.

Legal Proceedings The court noted that the defendants failed to appear or file any written statements after being served, resulting in their cases being deemed admitted under the procedural rules. The plaintiff presented photographic evidence demonstrating the resemblance between their original images and those used by the defendants. The court acknowledged that the long and continuous use of these photographs had established an inherent copyright ownership for the plaintiff in the relevant images.

The court found sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement and passing off, noting that the defendants had substantially reproduced the copyrighted images and misled consumers about the origin and authenticity of the products. An ad interim injunction was granted early on, restraining the defendants from showcasing, reproducing, or publishing the infringing images or products. The defendants' failure to contest or appear further supported the grant of a final decree.

Final Judgment and Relief The court ultimately passed a decree of permanent injunction in favor of Abhi Traders, restraining the defendants from infringing their copyright and passing off their products under the plaintiff’s well-known mark. The court also dismissed the other reliefs sought by the plaintiff and ordered that the decree sheet be prepared accordingly. All pending applications were disposed of, and the case was concluded in favor of the plaintiff.

Case Title: Abhi Traders Vs Fashnear Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Date of Order: 28th April, 2025 Case No.: CS(COMM) 180/2024 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3280 Court: High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Wednesday, May 7, 2025

Nirmal Kushwaha Vs Kailashnath Agarwal

A pivotal aspect in the case was the nature of possession—whether it was as a lessee or licensee. The courts underscored that the legal character of possession depends strictly on pleadings—what the parties explicitly claim and establish in their pleadings. The respondent asserted that the appellant was a licensee; the appellant claimed co-tenancy or lease rights. The courts emphasized that the settled legal principle constrains courts to determine the nature of possession based purely on the pleadings, not by making a fresh case or expanding beyond what was pleaded.

Legal Principles and Court's Rationale The court reiterated that no argument beyond the pleadings can be considered. The position is that the courts are bound by the claims and contentions made by the parties in their pleadings. In this case, the respondent's pleadings clearly characterized the appellant's position as that of a licensee. The appellant's assertion of co-tenant rights was deemed beyond the pleadings, and the court could not venture to decide on a different stance—that she was a tenant—without pleadings to support such a claim.

The court observed that the distinction between a lease and license is fine but crucial. Here, the evidence showed that the appellant was allowed exclusive possession, and her use of the shop was continuous and formalized under a license agreement, not a lease, especially since rent and other lease conditions were not conclusively established.

The court further noted that the initial pleadings reflected the license arrangement, and subsequent assertions could not alter that legal position. The courts stress that the factual and legal basis for such cases must be limited to the pleadings, and any decision beyond that would amount to a breach of the principle that 'no argument beyond pleadings is permissible.'

Conclusion In the final analysis, the court held that the proper way to determine the nature of the occupation was based solely on the pleadings. Since the pleadings made it clear that the appellant's possession was as a licensee, the court reaffirmed her status as such. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the eviction order based on the license was upheld. The case underscores the importance of pleadings in thrashing out legal issues related to possession and the prohibition against courts making judgments on arguments or facts not pleaded.

Case Details Case Title: Lady Dr. Nirmal Kushwaha vs Kailashnath Agarwal And Ors. Date of Order: 14 February 2002 Case Number: Not explicitly mentioned in the provided pages but identifiable as part of the cited order. Neutral Citation: 2002(2)AWC1189; AIR 2003 (NOC) 553 (ALL); 2003 ALL L. J. 1630; 2003 A I H C 3109 Court: Allahabad High Court Judge: B.K. Rathi

Bansi Dhar Bajaj Vs Bajaj Biscuit Products

The case involves a legal dispute over the registration and use of the trademark "BAJAJ" in relation to biscuits and confectionary goods. The appellant, Bansi Dhar Bajaj, and his company, Bajaj Biscuit Products, opposed the respondent's application to register the same mark for similar products in certain Indian states. The appellant claimed that they had been using the mark since 1983 and had established significant goodwill and reputation in the market, which would be harmed by the respondent’s registration and use of an identical or similar mark. They argued that the respondent’s application for registration, filed in 1984, should be rejected due to the likelihood of confusion and deception among consumers.

The respondent contended that they honestly and bonafidely adopted the "BAJAJ" mark in 1981, knowing that no such mark was in use or registered for similar goods. They claimed that the word "Bajaj" is a surname of all partners involved and that their use was legitimate and prior to the appellant’s. Additionally, the respondent argued that the appellant had only begun using the mark a few years later and that the respondent's use was genuine. They also pointed out that the appellant's use of the letter "R" with the mark was an error, further complicating their claim to exclusivity.

The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks considered the evidence, including bills and documents submitted by both parties, as well as the dates of use, to determine prior adoption and use of the mark. The Registrar found that the respondent had been using the mark earlier than the appellant and thus had rights to register it. The Registrar dismissed the opposition filed by the appellant and allowed the respondent’s application for registration.

The appellant challenged this decision in the High Court of Delhi, which also upheld the Registrar’s ruling, affirming that the respondent was entitled to register the mark based on prior use. The Court noted that both parties’ marks were identical and that the goods in question were of the same description, increasing the potential for confusion. Nonetheless, the court considered the evidence and concluded that the respondent had established prior and honest adoption of the trade mark "BAJAJ," thereby rejecting the appellant’s opposition.

This affirmation of the registration rights of the respondent was based on the evidence of use, the date of adoption, and the absence of deliberate deception. The court emphasized that even minimal evidence of use could establish rights over unregistered marks if shown to be prior and genuine. The case reaffirmed the principles that prior user can gain superior rights against an earlier application, provided the use is honest and continuous.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal of Bansi Dhar Bajaj, rendering the registration of the "BAJAJ" mark in favor of the respondent for biscuits and related goods. The decision reinforced the importance of proof of prior use and the honest intent behind trade mark adoption in trade mark law.

Case Title: Bansi Dhar Bajaj vs Bajaj Biscuit Products And Ors. Date of Order: 05 February 2004 Case Number: TA/78/2003/TM/DEL Neutral Citation: (2004) 28 PTC 680 (IPAB) Court: Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai Judge: S. Jagadeesan, J.

Tuesday, May 6, 2025

Royal Challengers Sports Vs. Uber India Systems

Introduction

The case involves Royal Challengers Sports Private Limited (the plaintiff) and Uber India Systems Private Limited along with its associates (the defendants). The dispute centers around a social media advertisement posted by Uber that the plaintiff claims disparages and infringes upon its well-known trademark "Royal Challengers Bengaluru" (RCB), associated with its IPL cricket team.

Background

The plaintiff is the registered owner of the RCB trademark and has built a significant reputation around it in India. The defendants, a ride-hailing company and its affiliates, posted an advertisement on various social media platforms collaborating with an Australian cricketer, featuring a promotional campaign that included references to the RCB team. The advertisement used the phrase "Royally Challenged Bengaluru," which the plaintiff contends is derogatory and damaging to its brand.

Legal Contentions

The plaintiff argued that the advertisement not only infringes upon their registered trademark under Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act but also disparages their reputation. It claimed that the depiction and language used are demeaning, designed to mock or devalue the brand. The plaintiff sought a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from broadcasting, publishing, or further disseminating this advertisement, asserting that they would suffer irreparable harm if the ad remained.

The defendants contended that the advertisement was a humorous, light-hearted parody or tease based on city names ("Hyderabad" and "Bengaluru") and did not intend or cause any trademark infringement or disparagement. They claimed the ad was a form of satire common in sporting culture and did not harm the reputation of the RCB team.

Court's Analysis

The court examined whether the advertisement constituted infringing use of the RCB trademark and if it caused disparagement. It considered the likelihood of confusion, the intent behind the advertisement, and whether the depiction was derogatory or merely humorous. The court noted that while the ad featured references to the RCB team, the overall tone and context pointed towards playful teasing rather than malicious intent.

Furthermore, the court balanced the rights of the plaintiff against the freedom of expression and the nature of the advertisement as part of sports-related humor. It acknowledged that the advertisement was in the context of a cricket game, where parody and teasing are customary. Considering the absence of clear evidence of irreparable harm or direct infringement sufficient to justify injunction, the court decided that temporarily restraining the advertisement was not warranted at this stage.

Conclusion

The court dismissed the application for a temporary injunction, stating that there was no prima facie case of trademark infringement or disparagement strong enough to outweigh the public interest and the rights of the defendants to free expression. The court emphasized that interference at this preliminary stage would be premature and could unduly restrict the defendants' freedom to create humor and satire related to cricket.

Case Significance

This case highlights the tension between trademark rights and freedom of speech in the context of sports and advertising. It underscores that parody, satire, and humor, especially related to popular culture, may have a protective space under freedom of expression, provided they do not cross into actual infringement or defamatory disparagement.


Case Details

Case Title: Royal Challengers Sports Private Limited Vs. Uber India Systems Private Limited Order Date: May 5, 2025 Case No.: CS (COMM) 345/2025 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3292. Court: Delhi High Court Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra Vs. Babu Lime Private Limited

This case involves a legal dispute between Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra, proprietor of Siddhi Lime, and Babu Lime Private Limited. The matter pertains to a civil revision application filed by Maheshbhai challenging the lower court’s order that rejected an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The rejection was based on the contention that the suit filed by Maheshbhai was not within the jurisdiction of the proper court due to valuation issues and the nature of the dispute falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of a Commercial Court.

The main issue in this revision was whether the Civil Court could have rejected the plaint on the grounds of undervaluation or jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11, especially considering that the suit involved matters of trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright infringement. Maheshbhai argued that the dispute was purely commercial and fell within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court, which the defendant contended was not the case due to undervaluation and other technicalities. The lower court had rejected Maheshbhai’s application, leading to his filing of this revision.

The High Court, after hearing the arguments and reviewing the case records, found that the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 was not justified. The Court observed that such a drastic step could only be taken if the suit discloses no cause of action and is barred by law, which was not established in this case. The Court emphasized that under Order VII Rule 11, the Court’s scope of inquiry is limited solely to the averments in the plaint and the valuation as per the plaintiff’s pleadings. It further noted that the valuation of the suit is to be based on the objection or the plaint itself, and any undertakings or subsequent assessments are of no consequence at this preliminary stage.

In conclusion, the High Court upheld the principle that applications under Order VII Rule 11 should only reject a plaint if the grounds are clearly and unambiguously established from the pleadings and valuation. The case was remanded, and the earlier order was corrected to reflect the proper legal citations and reasoning.

Case Title: Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra Vs. Babu Lime Private Limited Date of Order: 05/05/2025 Case No.: R/CRA/447/2023 Neutral Citation: 2025:GUJHC:24876 Court: High Court of Gujarat, Ahmedabad Judge: Honourable Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker

Monday, May 5, 2025

P.V.S. Knittings Vs. P. Prakash


Background: P.V.S. Knittings, a registered partnership firm, initiated legal proceedings against P. Prakash, trading as  S P S TEX, alleging trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off. The dispute centered on the plaintiff's registered trademark "TWIN BIRDS" and the defendant's use of the trademark "FLY BIRDS" for apparel in Class 25. The plaintiff also sought rectification of the trademark register to cancel the defendant's trademark registration.

Plaintiff's Claims: P.V.S. Knittings claimed that their "TWIN BIRDS" trademark, used since 1969, was infringed by the defendant's "FLY BIRDS" mark, which was deceptively similar in name, design, and pink-and-white color scheme. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's actions constituted trademark infringement under the Trademarks Act, 1999, and copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957, due to the substantial reproduction of their artistic label. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged passing off, asserting that the defendant's use of "FLY BIRDS" misled consumers and capitalized on the plaintiff's goodwill.

Defendant's Defense: P. Prakash contended that the "FLY BIRDS" mark was distinct and not deceptively similar to "TWIN BIRDS." The defendant argued that the term "birds" was common in the garment trade, citing numerous registered trademarks containing the word. They also claimed that the pink-and-white color scheme was standard for women’s apparel and not exclusive to the plaintiff. The defendant raised issues of delay, laches, and acquiescence, asserting that the plaintiff was aware of their trademark since its advertisement in 2019 but failed to act promptly.

Court’s Findings:The High Court of Judicature at Madras found that the plaintiff was the registered proprietor of multiple "TWIN BIRDS" trademarks and had used the mark since at least 2007, establishing prior use over the defendant’s 2017 use of "FLY BIRDS." The court determined that the two marks were deceptively similar due to their shared use of the word "birds," the two-bird device, and the pink-and-white color scheme, likely causing consumer confusion. The court rejected the defendant’s claim that "birds" was common to the trade, as evidence showed insufficient substantial use by others before the defendant’s application in 2016. The court also found the defendant’s adoption of the color scheme to be mala fide, given the similarities and the parties’ proximity in Tirupur.

Issues of Delay and Acquiescence: The court addressed the defendant’s argument of delay and acquiescence, noting that the plaintiff became aware of the defendant’s use in April 2022 and filed the suit in April 2023. Since less than five years had elapsed since the defendant’s trademark advertisement in 2019, acquiescence under Section 33 of the Trademarks Act was not established. The court held that any delay did not bar relief in an infringement and passing-off action.

Passing Off and Goodwill: The court concluded that the plaintiff established goodwill through evidence of substantial turnover and advertising from 1995 to 2022. The defendant’s use of "FLY BIRDS" was deemed a misrepresentation likely to cause loss to the plaintiff, satisfying the classic trinity test for passing off: reputation, misrepresentation, and damage.

Rectification Petition: In the rectification petition, the court found that the defendant’s trademark registration (No. 3237870) violated Section 11 of the Trademarks Act, as it was likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff’s prior mark. The registration was deemed to lack sufficient cause, warranting its cancellation.

Relief Granted:The court granted permanent injunctions against the defendant’s use of "FLY BIRDS," ordered the destruction of infringing materials, and directed the defendant to render an account of profits. To allow the defendant to liquidate existing inventory, the injunction was deferred for four months, subject to filing an affidavit detailing the inventory. The plaintiff was awarded costs of Rs. 5,00,000. The rectification petition was allowed, with the Registrar of Trade Marks directed to cancel the defendant’s trademark within 30 days.

Case Title: P.V.S. Knittings Vs. P. Prakash
Date of Order: 30 April 2025
Case No.: C.S. (Comm. Div.) No. 182 of 2023
Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:1141
Name of Court: High Court of Madras
Name of Judge: Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy J.

New Life Laboratories Private Limited Vs. NLCARE Private Limited

Background: The dispute involves New Life Laboratories Private Limited (plaintiff) and NLCARE Private Limited (defendant), both engaged in the homeopathic medicine business. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed its registered trademark "NEW LIFE" by using the mark "NEW LIFE" and its abbreviation "NL" in its corporate name and products. The case traces back to Dr. Mohammad Idrees, who began practicing homeopathy in Bhopal in 1952, followed by his son, Dr. Mohammad Ilyas, who adopted the "NEW LIFE" trade name in 1970 after patients referred to his treatments as giving them a "new life."

Plaintiff's Claims: The plaintiff, incorporated in 1995 by Dr. Ilyas and his family, asserted exclusive rights to the "NEW LIFE" trademark, registered in 2013 under Class 35 for trading and marketing pharmaceutical preparations. The plaintiff argued that Dr. Ilyas, who founded the business, transferred all rights to the plaintiff company, which invested significantly in developing homeopathic medicines under the "NEW LIFE" brand. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, formed in 2019 by former directors and family members of Dr. Ilyas, infringed the trademark by using "NEW LIFE" and "NL" in its corporate name, packaging, and marketing, thereby passing off its products as those of the plaintiff and eroding its goodwill.

Defendant's Defense: The defendant, led by Dr. Ilyas’s sons Mohammad Zaki and Faizan Mohammad, contended that the "NEW LIFE" trademark originated with Dr. Idrees in 1952 and was used by multiple family members across various clinics and shops in Bhopal for decades. The defendant argued that the trademark was a family-owned asset, with no single entity, including the plaintiff, entitled to exclusive rights. They highlighted that the plaintiff’s registration was limited to a specific label and color scheme, not the word mark "NEW LIFE." The defendant also accused the plaintiff of suppressing material facts, including a prior Delhi High Court suit where no interim injunction was granted, and provided evidence of widespread family use of the trademark since 1975.

Court Proceedings: The plaintiff filed for an interim injunction (G.A. (Com) No. 1 of 2024) to restrain the defendant from using the "NEW LIFE" mark, securing an ad-interim ex-parte order on August 19, 2024. The defendant countered with an application (G.A. (Com) No. 2 of 2024) to vacate the order. The case was heard in the Calcutta High Court, Commercial Division, with arguments concluding on March 7, 2025, and judgment delivered on April 29, 2025.

Court's Findings: Justice Krishna Rao found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for exclusive rights over the "NEW LIFE" trademark. The court noted contradictory statements in the plaintiff’s pleadings, such as claiming exclusive use since 1970 while admitting family-wide use. The defendant’s evidence, including an affidavit from Dr. Idrees’s son, Dr. Mugees Siddiqui, confirmed that approximately 20 family-run shops used the "NEW LIFE" name without objection. The court also criticized the plaintiff for suppressing details of the Delhi High Court proceedings, where similar relief was denied. Citing precedents like Shri Ram Education Trust vs. SRF Foundation, the court held that a family trademark benefits all heirs unless explicitly excluded, and the plaintiff’s registration did not confer exclusivity over the word mark.

Decision: The court vacated the interim order granted to the plaintiff, dismissed G.A. (Com) No. 1 of 2024, and allowed G.A. (Com) No. 2 of 2024. The plaintiff’s request for a stay on the order was refused, affirming the defendant’s right to continue using the "NEW LIFE" trademark pending further proceedings.

Case Title: New Life Laboratories Private Limited Vs. NLCARE Private Limited
Date of Order: April 29, 2025
Case No.: G.A. (COM) No. 1 of 2024
Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Justice Krishna Rao

Sunday, May 4, 2025

Alfred Von Schukmann Vs The Controller General of Patents

Introduction:  The case of Alfred Von Schukmann vs The Controller General of Patents, decided by the Delhi High Court on January 12, 2023, represents a pivotal moment in Indian patent law, emphasizing the necessity of reasoned decision-making in patent application rejections. This appeal, filed under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970, challenged the Assistant Controller of Patents’ cryptic order rejecting the appellant’s patent application for a “Step-Action Indexing Mechanism” due to an alleged lack of inventive step. The case underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that patent offices adhere to principles of natural justice, particularly by providing detailed justifications when denying patent protection. By setting aside the impugned order and remanding the matter for fresh consideration, the Delhi High Court reinforced the requirement for patent authorities to engage meaningfully with applicants’ submissions and prior art distinctions, setting a precedent for transparency and fairness in patent adjudication.

Detailed Factual Background:The appellant, Alfred Von Schukmann, filed Indian Patent Application No. 3845/DELNP/2007 on May 10, 2007, at the Patent Office in New Delhi for an invention titled “Step-Action Indexing Mechanism.” This application was a national phase entry under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), claiming a priority date of November 10, 2004. The invention related to a novel indexing mechanism, characterized by features such as a sun gear, planet gear, and indexing fingers extending from a central hub, designed to facilitate stepwise rotary advancement in mechanical systems, such as inhalers or counters.

On November 22, 2013, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER), raising objections, including a critical one under Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act, 1970, alleging that the invention lacked novelty and inventive step. The appellant responded comprehensively, distinguishing the invention from the cited prior art. Subsequent hearing notices reiterated the objection of lack of inventive step, referencing prior art documents labeled D1 (US 2003/0178020 A1), D2 (US 2004/0211420 A1), and D3 (EP 480488 A1). On May 15, 2017, the appellant submitted detailed written submissions, explaining how the invention’s unique features—such as the absence of a planet gear mechanism in D1, the lack of indexing fingers in D2, and the distinct functionality of fingers in D3—differentiated it from the prior art. The appellant also highlighted that the invention had been granted patents in China, Mexico, Canada, the United States, and the European Patent Office (EPO), underscoring its global recognition.

Despite these submissions, the Assistant Controller of Patents issued an order on August 3, 2017, rejecting the application under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, on the grounds that the amended claims 1-11 lacked inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) read with Section 2(1)(ja). The order was brief, stating only that the claims were obvious to a person skilled in the art when taught by D1, D2, and D3 in combination, without addressing the appellant’s arguments or providing a detailed analysis of the prior art.

Detailed Procedural Background:The procedural journey of this case began with the filing of the patent application on May 10, 2007. Following the FER issued on November 22, 2013, the appellant engaged in a series of interactions with the Patent Office, responding to objections and attending hearings. The appellant’s written submissions on May 15, 2017, were a critical attempt to address the inventive step objection by distinguishing the invention from the cited prior art. However, the Assistant Controller’s order on August 3, 2017, rejected the application in a cursory manner, prompting the appellant to file an appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970, before the Delhi High Court.

The appeal, registered as C.A. (COMM. IPD-PAT) 435/2022, was heard by Justice Amit Bansal. The appellant was represented by Mr. Rohit Rangi, along with Mr. Debashish Banerjee, Mr. Vineet Rohilla, and Mr. Ankush Verma, while the respondents, including the Controller General of Patents, were represented by Mr. Asheesh Jain, Central Government Standing Counsel, with Mr. Gaurav Kumar and Mr. Vishal Kumar. The court heard oral arguments and examined the record, delivering its judgment on January 12, 2023, in an oral pronouncement, with the signed order dated January 16, 2023.
Issues Involved in the Case

The court grappled with the following key issues in adjudicating the appeal:Whether the Assistant Controller’s order rejecting the patent application for lack of inventive step was adequately reasoned and compliant with principles of natural justice? Whether the Patent Office failed to engage with the appellant’s submissions distinguishing the invention from the cited prior art (D1, D2, and D3)?  Whether the appellant’s arguments in the appeal introduced new grounds not raised in earlier submissions, and if so, their impact on the appeal’s merits?

Appellant’s Submissions: The appellant argued that the Assistant Controller’s order was fatally deficient for its lack of reasoning. Despite detailed submissions in response to the FER and hearing notices, particularly the May 15, 2017, written submissions, the Patent Office failed to address how the invention lacked inventive step in light of D1, D2, and D3. The appellant emphasized that the invention’s unique features—such as the sun gear with a toothed underside, planet gear mechanism, and indexing fingers directed obliquely upward in a secant form—were absent or functionally distinct in the prior art. For instance, D1 (US 2003/0178020 A1) lacked a planet gear mechanism and relied on a toothed wheel, D2 (US 2004/0211420 A1) had no indexing fingers or sun gear, and D3 (EP 480488 A1) featured fingers that flexed vertically, not obliquely, and lacked the claimed ring part slots. The appellant argued that combining these references would not yield the claimed invention, and the Controller’s failure to analyze this was a procedural flaw.

The appellant relied on Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 940) and Auckland Uniservices Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (C.A. (COMM-IPD-PAT) 8/2022, decided on September 27, 2022), which mandated that patent rejections for lack of inventive step must include a reasoned analysis of the prior art, the invention, and the obviousness to a person skilled in the art. The appellant also cited the grant of patents in multiple jurisdictions as evidence of the invention’s inventiveness. Upon remand, the appellant requested that the matter be assigned to a different officer, citing Art Screw Co. Ltd v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 4429), to avoid any apprehension of bias.

Respondents’ Submissions: The respondents defended the impugned order, arguing that the appellant failed to adequately distinguish the invention from the prior art in its submissions to the Patent Office. They contended that the Controller’s conclusion of obviousness was justified based on the combined teachings of D1, D2, and D3. The respondents further asserted that the appellant raised new grounds in the appeal that were not part of the written submissions, suggesting that these could not be considered. They maintained that the Patent Office’s decision was within its discretion and did not warrant judicial interference.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties: The appellant relied on several precedents to argue that the Patent Office’s cryptic order violated established legal standards:

Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940 (Delhi High Court): This case was central to the appellant’s argument, as it outlined the requirements for rejecting a patent application for lack of inventive step. The court held that the Controller must analyze three elements: the invention disclosed in the prior art, the invention in the application, and how the subject invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the art. A bare conclusion of obviousness, without discussing these elements, is impermissible unless obviousness is absolutely clear. The court emphasized that Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, requires an analysis of existing knowledge and the technical advance or economic significance of the invention. The Delhi High Court in Schukmann applied this framework, finding the impugned order deficient for lacking such analysis.

Auckland Uniservices Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, C.A. (COMM-IPD-PAT) 8/2022, decided on September 27, 2022 (Delhi High Court): This judgment reinforced Agriboard, reiterating that a speaking order is mandatory when rejecting a patent application. The court held that the Patent Office must explain how the prior art renders the invention obvious, engaging with the applicant’s submissions. The Schukmann court cited this case to highlight the Patent Office’s failure to address the appellant’s detailed distinctions from D1, D2, and D3.

N.V. Satheesh Madhav and Anr v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4568 (Delhi High Court): This case, decided by Justice Amit Bansal himself, followed Agriboard and Auckland, affirming the need for reasoned orders in patent rejections. It supported the appellant’s contention that the cryptic nature of the impugned order violated procedural fairness.

Art Screw Co. Ltd v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4429 (Delhi High Court, decided on December 14, 2022): Cited by the appellant to request assignment to a different officer upon remand, this case established that remanding a matter to a different officer is appropriate to avoid apprehension of predetermination. The Schukmann court relied on this precedent to grant the appellant’s request.

Manohar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 681 (Supreme Court of India): Referenced in Agriboard and cited indirectly through that case, this Supreme Court decision underscored that application of mind and reasoned decision-making are core elements of natural justice. The Schukmann court applied this principle to emphasize the Patent Office’s obligation to provide a reasoned rejection.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court began by affirming the principles laid out in Agriboard International, which required the Controller to consider three elements when rejecting an invention for lack of inventive step: the prior art’s disclosure, the invention’s disclosure, and the obviousness to a person skilled in the art. Section 2(1)(ja) defines “inventive step” as a feature involving technical advance or economic significance that is not obvious, necessitating a detailed analysis of how the prior art renders the invention obvious.

The court found the impugned order wholly deficient, as it merely concluded that the amended claims 1-11 were obvious based on D1, D2, and D3, without engaging with the appellant’s submissions. The May 15, 2017, written submissions provided a granular comparison, highlighting the absence of key features like the planet gear mechanism, indexing fingers, and ring part slots in the prior art. For example, D1 relied on a toothed wheel, not a sun or planet gear; D2 lacked the claimed indexing fingers and sun gear; and D3’s fingers functioned differently, lacking the oblique secant form and rotary action. The appellant’s argument that combining these references would not yield the claimed invention was ignored, rendering the order arbitrary.

The court rejected the respondents’ contention that the appellant raised new grounds, noting that the appeal focused on the Controller’s failure to address existing submissions, not new technical arguments. The grant of patents in other jurisdictions, while not binding, supported the appellant’s claim of inventiveness, further underscoring the need for a reasoned evaluation. The court also dismissed the respondents’ defense of the Controller’s discretion, emphasizing that natural justice, as reiterated in Manohar and Agriboard, mandates a speaking order.

On the remedy, the court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, directing the Patent Office to consider the existing record, particularly the appellant’s prior art submissions. Citing Art Screw, the court agreed to assign the matter to a different officer to ensure impartiality, avoiding any perception of predetermination. The court imposed a four-month timeline for the new order, balancing efficiency with thoroughness.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal (C.A. (COMM. IPD-PAT) 435/2022), setting aside the Assistant Controller’s order dated August 3, 2017, which rejected the appellant’s patent application. 

Law Settled in This Case: This case established several critical principles in Indian patent law, particularly regarding the adjudication of patent applications:

Requirement of Reasoned Orders: The Patent Office must pass a speaking order when rejecting a patent application, analyzing the prior art, the invention, and the obviousness to a person skilled in the art, as mandated by Section 2(1)(ja) and principles of natural justice. 

Engagement with Applicant’s Submissions: Controllers must address applicants’ arguments, particularly distinctions from prior art, to ensure procedural fairness and avoid arbitrary rejections. 

Elements of Inventive Step Analysis: Rejection of Patent for lack of inventive step requires a discussion of the prior art’s disclosure, the invention’s features, and the reasoning for obviousness, unless the lack of inventiveness is patently clear. Remand to Different Officer: To avoid apprehension of bias, courts may direct that remanded patent applications be considered by a different officer, ensuring impartial adjudication. 

Case Title: Alfred Von Schukmann Vs The Controller General of Patents
Date of Order: January 12, 2023
Case No.: C.A. (COMM. IPD-PAT) 435/2022
Neutral Citation: 2023/DHC/000273
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Metro Playing Card Co. Vs Wazir Chand Kapoor

Introduction: The case of Metro Playing Card Co. vs Wazir Chand Kapoor, decided by the Delhi High Court on April 5, 1972, is a seminal decision in Indian trademark law, illustrating the principles governing interim injunctions in cases of trademark infringement and passing off. This dispute centered on the use of a tractor device and the word "tractor" as a registered trademark by the respondent, Wazir Chand Kapoor, for playing cards, which the appellant, Metro Playing Card Co., allegedly infringed by using a similar tractor device and the word "Ferguson" on its playing cards. The case highlights the judiciary’s approach to protecting registered trademarks, the significance of visual similarity in infringement claims, and the limitations of defenses based on pending trademark applications or concurrent use. The Delhi High Court’s affirmation of the interim injunction underscores the robust protection afforded to registered trademarks under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and the importance of establishing a prima facie case in interlocutory proceedings.

Detailed Factual Background:The respondent, Wazir Chand Kapoor, was a manufacturer and seller of playing cards, operating under a registered trademark comprising the device of a tractor and the word "tractor." This trademark was registered on February 8, 1968, under No. 233581 in Class 16, which pertains to paper goods, including playing cards. The registration granted Kapoor exclusive rights to use the trademark in relation to his playing cards, which were packaged in cartons bearing the tractor device.

The appellant, Metro Playing Card Co., also engaged in the manufacture and sale of playing cards. In early 1971, Kapoor discovered that Metro was marketing playing cards under the trademark "Ferguson," with a tractor device printed on the back of the cards. While the cartons containing Metro’s playing cards bore only the word "Ferguson" and lacked the tractor device, the cards themselves prominently featured the tractor, which Kapoor alleged was deceptively similar to his registered trademark. Metro claimed to have used the "Ferguson" mark since February 1966 and had applied for its registration in Class 16 at the Trade Mark Registry in Bombay. The application was accepted and advertised in the Trade Mark Journal No. 531 on July 16, 1971, to which Kapoor filed an opposition on September 11, 1971.

Kapoor contended that Metro’s use of the tractor device and the word "Ferguson" infringed his registered trademark and constituted passing off, as it could mislead consumers into believing Metro’s cards were his. He argued that "Ferguson," a well-known tractor brand, was synonymous with "tractor" in common parlance, exacerbating the likelihood of confusion. Metro countered that its use of the tractor was merely ornamental, not a trademark, and that the distinct packaging (cartons without the tractor device) eliminated any risk of confusion. Metro also asserted its prior use of "Ferguson" and the pending registration as defenses against the infringement claim.

Detailed Procedural Background:The dispute arose when Kapoor filed a suit in the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Metro from infringing his registered trademark and passing off its playing cards as his, along with claims for damages and rendition of accounts. Concurrently, Kapoor moved an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), requesting an interim injunction to prevent Metro from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in playing cards bearing the "Ferguson" mark and the tractor device during the pendency of the suit.

Metro opposed both the suit and the interlocutory application, arguing that its trademark application for "Ferguson" had been accepted, its use predated Kapoor’s registration, and the differences in packaging negated any infringement or passing off. The matter was heard by a learned Single Judge, P.N. Khanna, J., on the original side of the Delhi High Court. On November 29, 1971, the Single Judge granted an interim injunction, restraining Metro, its agents, and representatives from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in playing cards printed with the tractor device or any mark resembling Kapoor’s registered trademark. The injunction was limited to the tractor device on the cards, as the court found no infringement in the use of "Ferguson" on the cartons.Aggrieved by this order, Metro filed a First Appeal from Order (F.A.O. (OS) No. 1 of 1972) before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

The court addressed the following key issues in adjudicating the appeal: Whether Kapoor established a prima facie case of trademark infringement to justify the interim injunction against Metro’s use of the tractor device on its playing cards. Whether Metro’s use of the tractor device was likely to cause confusion or deceive consumers, infringing Kapoor’s registered trademark rights under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Whether Metro’s pending trademark application for "Ferguson" and its claim of prior use constituted a valid defense against the interim injunction. Whether the suit should have been stayed pending the outcome of Metro’s trademark registration application, or whether Kapoor should have been subjected to terms in case the suit was dismissed. Whether the scope of Kapoor’s registered trademark extended to the tractor device on the playing cards themselves, or was limited to the carton packaging.

Respondent’s (Kapoor’s) Submissions: Kapoor argued that his registered trademark, comprising the tractor device and the word "tractor," was infringed by Metro’s use of a similar tractor device on its playing cards. He contended that the visual similarity between the two tractor devices was patent, likely to confuse consumers purchasing playing cards. Kapoor emphasized that playing cards are often inspected before purchase, and the presence of the tractor device on Metro’s cards could lead unwary buyers to mistake them for his products. He further argued that "Ferguson," being a well-known tractor brand, was synonymous with "tractor" in common parlance, reinforcing the likelihood of confusion and supporting his passing off claim.

Kapoor relied on Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, asserting that his registration conferred exclusive rights to use the trademark in relation to playing cards, including both the cards and their packaging. He maintained that Metro’s unregistered use of the tractor device violated his statutory rights, as Metro had not challenged the validity of his registration. Kapoor also argued that Metro’s pending application for "Ferguson" did not confer any rights until granted, and its advertisement in the Trade Mark Journal was irrelevant to the infringement claim. He urged the court to uphold the interim injunction to protect his trademark during the suit’s pendency.
Appellant’s (Metro’s) Submissions

Metro contested the interim injunction on several grounds. First, Metro argued that Kapoor failed to establish a prima facie case, as the tractor device on its cards was merely ornamental, not a trademark, and the cartons bore only the word "Ferguson," distinguishing them from Kapoor’s packaging. Metro asserted that playing cards are sold in sealed cartons, and consumers rely on the carton’s labeling, reducing the risk of confusion.

Second, Metro invoked Section 12(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which allows concurrent registration for honest use or special circumstances. Metro claimed that its application for "Ferguson" had been accepted and advertised, and Kapoor’s opposition was pending. It argued that the suit should be stayed until the Registrar decided on its application, citing Edwards v. Elkan (1888) 5 R.P.C. 70, where an interim injunction was deferred pending a defendant’s registration application due to prior use.

Third, Metro claimed prior use of "Ferguson" since February 1966, predating Kapoor’s 1968 registration, and argued that this entitled it to continue using the mark. Metro also contended that the injunction was overly broad, as Kapoor’s registration covered the tractor device on cartons, not the cards themselves, citing the statutory definitions in Section 2(2) of the Act.

Metro cited several precedents to support its case. In Mitchell v. Henry (1880) 15 Ch D 181, an injunction was refused due to dissimilar goods, which Metro analogized to the distinct packaging of its cards. Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant (1957 RPC 183) and Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd. (1957 RPC 498) were cited to argue that injunctions should be denied where similarity is doubtful or there is delay, though Metro did not allege delay by Kapoor. Metro also relied on D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd. (AIR 1960 Mys 142) and an English case (1932 RPC 597) to urge that the suit be stayed or terms imposed on Kapoor, such as security for potential dismissal of the suit.Finally, Metro argued that its pending application, advertised in July 1971, warranted a stay or conditional relief, as concurrent use could be recognized if its registration was granted.

The parties cited several precedents, primarily by Metro, to support their respective positions on trademark infringement, interim relief, and concurrent use:

Edwards v. Elkan, (1888) 5 R.P.C. 70 (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to argue that the suit should be stayed pending its trademark application. In this case, the defendant used the mark "Our Boys" for watches before the plaintiff’s registration, and the court deferred the interim injunction until the defendant’s registration application was decided, as prior use was unchallenged. The Delhi High Court distinguished this case, noting that Metro provided no evidence of prior use of the tractor device, and its application was for "Ferguson," not the tractor, which was the subject of the injunction.

Mitchell v. Henry, (1880) 15 Ch D 181 (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to argue that dissimilar goods negate infringement. The plaintiff’s registered trademark for worsted goods with a specific selvage was not infringed by the defendant’s differently colored goods, despite a similar thread. The court refused an injunction due to lack of similarity. The Delhi High Court rejected this analogy, finding that the tractor devices on both parties’ playing cards were patently similar, unlike the distinct goods in Mitchell.

Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant, (1957 RPC 183) (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to argue that doubtful similarity or delay precludes interim relief. The court refused an injunction where the defendant’s use of “Barrington” was unlikely to deceive customers compared to “Bravington,” and the plaintiff delayed action. The Delhi High Court found this inapplicable, as there was no delay by Kapoor, and the tractor devices’ similarity was clear, unlike the trade names in Bravingtons.

Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd., (1957 RPC 498) (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to support its claim that delay and lack of similarity justify refusing an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s sweet canisters infringed its trademark and copyright, but the court denied relief due to delay and dissimilar labels. The Delhi High Court dismissed this precedent, noting no delay by Kapoor and the evident similarity of the tractor devices, unlike the distinct canisters in Tavener.

D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys 142 (Mysore High Court): Cited by Metro to argue for a stay or imposition of terms on Kapoor. The Mysore High Court’s decision involved trademark disputes, but specific details were not elaborated in the Delhi High Court’s judgment. The court rejected this precedent, finding no basis to stay the suit or impose terms, as Metro’s appeal and original reply lacked such a prayer.

English Case, (1932 RPC 597): Cited by Metro without specific details, likely to support its stay argument. The Delhi High Court dismissed its relevance, stating that it was not attracted to the present case’s facts, without further elaboration due to Metro’s failure to demonstrate prior use or applicability.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The Division Bench, upheld the Single Judge’s interim injunction, providing a clear and reasoned analysis rooted in trademark law principles. The court’s reasoning addressed Metro’s contentions systematically:

On the prima facie case, the court found that Kapoor established a strong case for infringement. The tractor device on Metro’s playing cards was “patently similar” to Kapoor’s registered trademark, satisfying the visual similarity test for infringement under Section 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The court rejected Metro’s argument that consumers rely solely on carton packaging, noting that it is “common knowledge” that playing cards are inspected before purchase, making the tractor device on the cards a critical factor in consumer perception. The court declined to opine on whether “Ferguson” itself infringed, as the injunction was limited to the tractor device, but acknowledged Kapoor’s argument that “Ferguson” is synonymous with “tractor,” suggesting potential for further scrutiny in the main suit.

Regarding Metro’s pending trademark application, the court held that mere acceptance or advertisement of an application confers no rights, as per Section 28, which grants exclusive rights only upon registration. Metro’s application for “Ferguson” was irrelevant to the injunction, which targeted the tractor device, not the word. The court dismissed Metro’s reliance on Section 12(3) for concurrent use, noting that until registration is granted, Kapoor’s registered trademark prevails, and Metro had not challenged the registration’s validity. The court distinguished Edwards v. Elkan, as Metro provided no evidence of prior use of the tractor device, unlike the defendant’s established use in Edwards.

On Metro’s claim that the tractor device was ornamental, not a trademark, the court found this unpersuasive, as the device’s placement on the cards mirrored Kapoor’s registered use, likely to influence consumer perception. The court also rejected Metro’s argument that Kapoor’s registration was limited to cartons. Citing Sections 2(2), 28, and 29, the court clarified that a registered trademark applies to the goods (playing cards) and their packaging, encompassing the tractor device on the cards themselves.

The court addressed Metro’s request for a stay or terms, finding no basis for either. Metro’s appeal and original reply lacked a prayer for terms, and the precedents cited (e.g., D. Adinarayana Setty) were inapplicable, as they did not align with the case’s facts. The court emphasized that Kapoor’s statutory rights under a valid registration took precedence, and Metro’s claim of concurrent use lacked prima facie evidence.

The court concluded that the balance of convenience favored Kapoor, as the interim injunction protected his registered trademark without unduly harming Metro, pending the suit’s resolution. The injunction’s scope, limited to the tractor device, was proportionate, leaving Metro free to use “Ferguson” on cartons, subject to the main suit’s outcome.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court dismissed Metro Playing Card Co.’s appeal (F.A.O. (OS) No. 1 of 1972) with costs, affirming the Single Judge’s interim injunction of November 29, 1971. The injunction restrained Metro, its agents, and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, or dealing in playing cards printed with the device of a tractor or any mark resembling Kapoor’s registered trademark, pending the disposal of the suit.

Law Settled in This Case: This case clarified several principles in Indian trademark law, particularly for interim injunctions in infringement disputes:

Protection of Registered Trademarks: A registered trademark under Section 28 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, confers exclusive rights, and unregistered use of a similar mark constitutes infringement unless the registration’s validity is challenged. 

Visual Similarity in Infringement: Patent similarity between marks, especially on goods inspected by consumers (e.g., playing cards), establishes a prima facie case of infringement, regardless of differences in packaging. 

Pending Trademark Applications Confer No Rights: Acceptance or advertisement of a trademark application does not grant rights or justify staying a suit, as only registered marks enjoy statutory protection. 

Concurrent Use Defense: Claims of concurrent use under Section 12(3) require evidence of honest use or special circumstances, which must be substantiated at the interim stage to counter a registered trademark’s rights. 

Scope of Trademark Registration: A registered trademark applies to the goods and their packaging, encompassing marks on the goods themselves (e.g., playing cards), not just their containers. 

Case Title: Metro Playing Card Co. Vs Wazir Chand Kapoor
Date of Order: April 5, 1972
Case No.: F.A.O. (OS) No. 1 of 1972
Neutral Citation: AIR 1972 Del 248
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Chief Justice Hardayal Hardy and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prakash Narain

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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