IndiaMART Intermesh Ltd. Vs. PUMA SE

Introduction: The case of IndiaMART InterMESH Ltd. Vs. Puma SE addresses the critical interface between trademark protection under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and intermediary liability under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The principal dispute revolved around whether the inclusion of a registered trademark in the drop-down menu for product listings on an online platform amounts to infringement and if the operator of such a platform can seek immunity under the safe harbour provisions of the IT Act. This case examines the obligations of digital intermediaries when enabling product descriptions that involve reputed trademarks and clarifies the applicability of safe harbour protection in such contexts.

Factual Background: Puma SE, a reputed global manufacturer of sportswear and accessories, owns several registered trademarks in India, including the word mark “PUMA” and various device marks. Puma operates in India through its subsidiary Puma Sports India Pvt. Ltd. In 2021, Puma noticed listings on the IndiaMART platform offering counterfeit goods bearing its trademark. IndiaMART InterMESH Ltd., the appellant, is the operator of <www.indiamart.com>, an online B2B platform that enables businesses to list products and services for sale. As part of its seller registration process, IndiaMART offers drop-down menus that allow sellers to choose brand names, including “PUMA,” to describe their goods.

Puma contended that counterfeiters were exploiting this drop-down feature to misrepresent fake products as genuine Puma merchandise. It argued that IndiaMART, by allowing such use of the mark “PUMA” in its system, was facilitating and abetting trademark infringement and passing off.

Procedural Background: Puma SE instituted a suit for permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs before the Delhi High Court, seeking to restrain IndiaMART from using the mark “PUMA” in any manner, including in its drop-down menu for seller listings. The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court passed an order on 03.01.2024 granting interim relief in favour of Puma, holding that IndiaMART's use of “PUMA” in the drop-down menu constituted trademark infringement under Sections 29(1), (2), and (4) of the Trade Marks Act. The Single Judge also held that IndiaMART could not claim protection under Section 79 of the IT Act. Aggrieved by this order, IndiaMART filed an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi.

Legal Issue: The principal legal issue was whether IndiaMART’s inclusion of the trademark “PUMA” in a drop-down menu for product description constituted “use” of the mark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and if so, whether such use amounted to trademark infringement? A related issue was whether IndiaMART, as an intermediary, could claim exemption from liability under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

Discussion on Judgments

The Single Judge heavily relied on the Division Bench decision in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors., 2023:DHC:5615-DB. In that case, the use of registered trademarks as keywords in Google's advertising platform was held to constitute “use” under the Trade Marks Act, and it was held that even backend use (not visible to consumers) could amount to trademark use. This precedent was invoked to support the proposition that IndiaMART’s use of “PUMA” in the drop-down menu amounted to “use in advertising” under Section 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act.

The case of Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Ors., (2022) 5 SCC 1 was cited by IndiaMART to argue that Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act would not apply when the infringing use is for similar goods. The Supreme Court in that case held that Section 29(4) applies only when the infringing goods are dissimilar, and the three cumulative conditions under that section must be satisfied.

Puma also relied on Lifestyle Equities CV & Anr. v. Amazon Technologies Inc. & Ors., 2025:DHC:1231 to demonstrate how online platforms may be held accountable for infringement if they exercise control or benefit from listings that infringe trademarks. However, the Division Bench distinguished this judgment on facts, noting that in Amazon Technologies, the platform directly controlled branding and had commercial ties with the infringing seller, unlike IndiaMART’s hands-off listing process.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Division Bench rejected the reasoning of the Single Judge and found that IndiaMART’s platform functioned more as a listing and discovery service rather than an e-commerce website facilitating direct sales. It observed that IndiaMART did not consummate transactions and acted merely as a conduit for third-party listings. The drop-down menu was a user-interface feature aimed at improving product description accuracy and searchability, not an active representation of the goods by IndiaMART.

The Court accepted IndiaMART’s contention that the drop-down feature was intended to reduce typographical errors and facilitate precise classification. It further held that such inclusion of “PUMA” by IndiaMART, without any direct involvement in the sale or advertisement of products, did not constitute use “as a trademark” by IndiaMART. Instead, the seller using the term to describe goods might be infringing, depending on whether the goods were genuine or counterfeit.

The Court emphasized the importance of Section 30(1) of the Trade Marks Act, which allows descriptive use of a trademark for identification purposes, provided it is in accordance with honest practices and does not take unfair advantage. IndiaMART’s use was found to be in line with this defence.

On the question of intermediary liability, the Court examined Section 79 of the IT Act and held that IndiaMART had not abetted, conspired, or aided any unlawful act as required under Section 79(3)(a). The Court found that IndiaMART had standard grievance redressal and takedown procedures and acted on takedown requests, which showed compliance with its obligations under the IT Act and Rules. Therefore, it was entitled to safe harbour protection.

Final Decision: The Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge, holding that IndiaMART’s provision of a drop-down menu with the term “PUMA” did not amount to trademark infringement. The Court ruled that IndiaMART did not use the mark “PUMA” as a trademark and that it was not liable for infringement under Sections 29(1), (2), or (4) of the Trade Marks Act. It further held that IndiaMART was protected under Section 79 of the IT Act as an intermediary, having complied with the requirements of due diligence and takedown.

Law Settled in This Case: This case settles the position that the inclusion of a registered trademark as an option in a drop-down menu on an online listing platform does not by itself constitute trademark infringement. It affirms that such use, if intended solely for accurate classification and discovery, falls within the permissible scope under Section 30(1) of the Trade Marks Act. Furthermore, it reinforces that an intermediary that provides listing services and acts upon takedown requests cannot be held liable for third-party infringement, provided it does not exercise editorial control or derive benefit from infringing content. The decision also distinguishes the scope of “use” under the Trade Marks Act from backend functionalities of intermediary platforms and emphasizes the need to contextualize liability based on the nature of the intermediary’s role.

Case Title: IndiaMART Intermesh Ltd. Vs. PUMA SE Date of Order: June 2, 2025 Case Number: FAO(OS)(COMM) 6/2024 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC: Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakru and Hon'ble Ms. Tara Vitasta Ganju

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. Vs Knoll Healthcare Pvt Ltd

There is difference between a trademark being common on the register and common to trade

Introduction:  This case explores the nuanced distinction in trademark law between a mark being merely common on the register and truly common in actual trade. The High Court of Madras, in deciding the dispute between Apex Laboratories’ mark “ZINCOVIT” and Knoll Healthcare’s mark “ZINOLVITA,” examined whether the plaintiff’s mark, although derived from descriptive elements, had acquired distinctiveness in real-world commerce that merited protection, despite the presence of similar marks on the register.

Factual Background: Apex Laboratories coined and adopted the trademark “ZINCOVIT” in 1988 for vitamin and mineral supplements, combining the words zinc and vitamins. The mark was registered under registration number 487453 and had been used continuously and extensively across India for decades, supported by high sales turnover and strong brand recall. The plaintiff also obtained copyright registration over the artistic work of the product’s packaging. In or about 2014, the defendant Knoll Healthcare adopted the mark “ZINOLVITA,” which also combined references to zinc and vitamins, and initially used packaging closely resembling that of the plaintiff. Apex Laboratories alleged that this created confusion among consumers and amounted to infringement and passing off, particularly given the similar phonetic structure and identical market segment.

Procedural Background:Apex Laboratories instituted C.S. No.355 of 2020 seeking a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from infringing its registered trademark and copyright, along with rectification proceedings O.P.(TM) No.1 of 2023 to remove “ZINOLVITA” from the register. The defendant filed O.P.(TM) No.2 of 2023 seeking to impose a limitation on the plaintiff’s mark by disclaiming exclusivity over the prefix “ZIN,” arguing it was descriptive and common in the trade.

Legal Issue:The central legal issue was whether “ZINCOVIT,” despite containing descriptive elements, had through use and reputation acquired distinctiveness that warranted protection against “ZINOLVITA,” and whether the defendant could defeat the infringement claim by arguing that similar marks were common on the register, even if not common in active trade?

Discussion on Judgments:  The plaintiff cited Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, to stress the stricter standard for medicinal products, where even small similarities can deceive due to public health implications. The plaintiff also referred to Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products Ltd., (2014) 57 PTC 617 (Bom), to assert that long-standing and exclusive use can make a coined mark distinctive, even if it is partly descriptive.

The defendant relied on Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 470, arguing that common descriptive elements cannot be monopolized. The defendant also invoked J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India, (1994) Supp (3) SCC 215, where the Supreme Court held that words which are essentially descriptive of the product’s quality or content are generally ineligible for exclusive rights. Both parties discussed Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980, on the classic test of deceptive similarity, and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 142, emphasizing phonetic and visual similarity.

The Court in its discussion highlighted that merely pointing to the presence of similar marks on the register is insufficient unless it is shown that such marks are actively used in the market and recognized by consumers, as the real question is whether the mark is common in actual trade, not just on paper.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The court carefully analyzed evidence of the plaintiff’s extensive and continuous use of “ZINCOVIT” since 1988, substantial sales figures, and the market’s association of the mark with the plaintiff’s goods. The Court distinguished between a mark being common on the register—which might only reflect the presence of other registrations that are dormant or unused—and being genuinely common in the trade, meaning widespread and active use by multiple traders leading to dilution of distinctiveness. The defendant failed to show evidence that marks similar to “ZINCOVIT” were widely used in the market and recognized by consumers, rather than being merely registered.

The Court observed that the defendant’s adoption of “ZINOLVITA,” which not only reproduced similar phonetic elements but also initially copied the plaintiff’s packaging design, suggested a deliberate intent to trade on the plaintiff’s goodwill. The judge held that “ZINCOVIT” had acquired distinctiveness as a composite mark through decades of use, and that the defendant’s arguments based on descriptiveness and presence of similar marks on the register could not override evidence of actual consumer association with the plaintiff’s mark.

Final Decision:The Court decreed the suit in favour of Apex Laboratories by granting a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from using “ZINOLVITA” or any deceptively similar mark. It also directed removal of the defendant’s mark from the trademark register, dismissed the defendant’s rectification plea seeking to disclaim exclusivity over “ZIN,” and awarded costs to the plaintiff. 

Law Settled in This Case:The judgment reaffirmed that to weaken a claim of infringement, it is not enough for a defendant to show that similar marks are common on the register; it must be proved that such marks are genuinely common in trade and actively used in the marketplace. The Court clarified that even descriptive or partially descriptive marks can acquire distinctiveness through long, exclusive, and extensive use, making them protectable under trademark law.

Case Title: Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. Vs Knoll Healthcare Pvt Ltd.:Date of Order: 19 June 2025:Case Number: C.S. No.355 of 2020 :Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:1441:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ivy Entertainment Private Limited Vs. HR Pictures

Introduction:   In the bustling world of Indian cinema, where creativity meets commerce, the High Court of Delhi’s judgment on March 27, 2025, in the case of Ivy Entertainment Private Limited versus HR Pictures stands as a testament to the delicate balance between contractual obligations and commercial imperatives. This dispute, revolving around the Tamil film "Veera Deera Sooran," pits a plaintiff seeking to protect its assigned rights against a defendant eager to capitalize on a theatrical release. With stakes running high—Rs. 44 crores already invested and a looming release date of March 27, 2025—the case unfurls a narrative of breached agreements, last-minute legal maneuvers, and judicial intervention.

Detailed Factual Background: The saga begins with a Film Assignment Agreement dated June 19, 2024, between Ivy Entertainment Private Limited (the plaintiff) and HR Pictures (the defendant). The agreement assigned Ivy Entertainment the sole and exclusive rights to "Veera Deera Sooran" in Hindi and North Indian languages, including theatrical, digital, and online rights, in perpetuity, for a consideration of Rs. 51 crores. HR Pictures retained theatrical and linear rights in Tamil and other languages for release in South Indian states (Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Pondicherry) and overseas (except Nepal). The payment was structured in five tranches, with Ivy Entertainment having paid Rs. 44 crores—approximately 40% of the film’s production cost—leaving Rs. 7 crores outstanding, contingent on HR Pictures delivering specified materials. The agreement stipulated that "Before Release Materials" and "Theatrical Release Materials," including the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) certificate, be provided to Ivy Entertainment at least 14 days before the release date, a condition deemed the "essence" of the contract. On January 22, 2025, HR Pictures announced a theatrical release on March 27, 2025, via social media, a date Ivy Entertainment later contested as tentative. Despite emails from Ivy Entertainment on March 20 and 21, 2025, urging deferment due to undelivered materials, HR Pictures pressed ahead, securing the CBFC certificate only on March 22, 2025, just five days before the planned release. This set the stage for a legal showdown as Ivy Entertainment sought to protect its investment and exploitation rights.

Detailed Procedural Background: The legal battle commenced with Ivy Entertainment filing CS(COMM) 264/2025 before the High Court of Delhi on March 23, 2025, seeking specific performance of the Assignment Agreement, damages, and rendition of accounts. Alongside the suit, Ivy Entertainment filed I.A. 7657/2025 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), requesting an interim injunction to halt the film’s release on March 27, 2025, and a direction for HR Pictures to render accounts of its distribution contracts. An advance copy was served on HR Pictures on March 21, 2025. The matter was first listed on March 25, 2025, but HR Pictures did not appear, prompting the court to direct re-service and adjourn to March 26, 2025. On March 26, both parties engaged in settlement talks, which failed, and the court heard arguments.

Issues Involved in the Case: The crux of the case revolved around whether Ivy Entertainment was entitled to an interim injunction to defer the film’s release. This hinged on two key questions: Did HR Pictures breach the Assignment Agreement by failing to deliver the requisite materials 14 days prior to March 27, 2025, and by fixing the release date without Ivy Entertainment’s written approval? If so, did Ivy Entertainment establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury to justify injunctive relief, outweighing HR Pictures’ claims of financial loss and public expectation?

Detailed Submission of Parties: Ivy Entertainment, argued that HR Pictures’ unilateral decision to release the film on March 27, 2025, violated the Assignment Agreement. He cited Article 1.6.1.3, requiring written approval for the release date, and Articles 1.9, 1.12, and 1.24, mandating delivery of materials 14 days prior, which HR Pictures failed to provide, with the CBFC certificate obtained only on March 22, 2025. Wadhwa emphasized that timely delivery was the agreement’s essence (Articles 2.15 and 4.1), and its breach crippled Ivy Entertainment’s ability to exploit its rights, particularly digital rights critical for negotiation before theatrical release. He referenced Article 1.23, allowing a grace period until April 30, 2025, and Article 18, entitling Ivy Entertainment to injunctive relief. Wadhwa offered to deposit the Rs. 7 crores balance within 24 hours, seeking a four-week deferment, and argued that damages were inadequate under the amended Specific Relief Act, 1963, citing precedents to bolster his case. HR Pictures contended that Ivy Entertainment suppressed material facts, including a February 4, 2025 email and its failure to request materials, suggesting its real issue was an inability to monetize digital rights—a condition absent from the agreement. Kamat asserted HR Pictures’ exclusive South Indian release rights and argued the March 27 date, known since January, was within the March 31, 2025 outer limit (Article 1.23), negating Article 1.6.1.3’s applicability. He highlighted 15,000 pre-sold tickets and distributor losses, claiming Ivy Entertainment’s eleventh-hour approach disentitled it to relief, and quantified damages at Rs. 5 crores as an adequate remedy.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context: Ivy Entertainment relied on Global Music Junction Pvt. Ltd. v. Shatrughan Kumar Aka Khesari Lal Yadav and Others (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5479), where the Delhi High Court Division Bench upheld specific performance in a similar rights assignment dispute, emphasizing that damages are inadequate when losses are hard to quantify (paras 29, 38, 39, 42, 86, 87). The court linked this to the amended Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, restricting bars to specific performance. Ivy Entertainment also cited Katta Sujatha Reddy and Another v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Private Limited ((2023) 1 SCC 355), where the Supreme BID Court rejected damages as an alternative to specific performance unless statutorily barred (paras 43, 51, 54), reinforcing its claim for injunctive relief under Article 18. HR Pictures countered with Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. and Another v. Harinder Kohli and Others (ILR (2009) I Delhi 722), where a Coordinate Bench denied an injunction in a trademark case due to the plaintiff’s delay, finding no prima facie infringement and balancing convenience against the defendant (para 34). They also cited Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Percept Limited and Another (2009 (108) DRJ 393), where the court refused an injunction when the plaintiff sought to rescind a contract for fraud, not enforce it (para 35), arguing Ivy Entertainment’s late action mirrored such disentitlement. The court additionally referenced Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (AIR 1993 SC 276), which outlined the trinity test for interim injunctions, emphasizing protection against irreparable injury pending trial.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court affirmed the Assignment Agreement’s terms: Ivy Entertainment’s exclusive rights in Hindi and North Indian languages for Rs. 51 crores, with Rs. 44 crores paid, and HR Pictures’ retained South Indian rights. The court noted the Rs. 7 crores tranche was conditional on HR Pictures delivering materials (Article 3.1(e)), which it failed to do 14 days prior to March 27, 2025, as required by Articles 1.9, 1.12, and 1.24—admitted breaches, with the CBFC certificate secured only on March 22, 2025. Justice Arora rejected HR Pictures’ claim that Ivy Entertainment needed to request materials, finding the obligation absolute under the agreement’s language, and dismissed the March 24, 2025 offer as non-compliant. She addressed HR Pictures’ implied consent argument, noting the February 4, 2025 email labeled the date tentative, and Article 1.6.1.3 required written approval, absent here, with Article 1.23’s grace period supporting deferment. The court found HR Pictures’ refusal to extend the date, despite receiving Rs. 44 crores, breached the agreement’s essence (Articles 2.15, 4.1), denying Ivy Entertainment simultaneous release rights (Article 2.14). Applying the trinity test from Dalpat Kumar, Justice Arora held Ivy Entertainment established a prima facie case, with balance of convenience favoring it due to unquantifiable losses if digital rights negotiations faltered post-release, against HR Pictures’ manageable four-week delay. Irreparable injury was evident, supported by Global Music Junction and Katta Sujatha Reddy, as damages couldn’t compensate lost bargaining power. The distinguished HR Pictures’ cited cases, noting no trademark or rescission issues applied, and mitigated delay concerns by HR Pictures’ own late appearance.

Final Decision: On March 27, 2025, the court allowed I.A. 7657/2025, granting an injunction restraining HR Pictures from releasing "Veera Deera Sooran" on March 27, 2025, for four weeks, conditional on Ivy Entertainment depositing Rs. 7 crores within 24 hours. Upon receipt, HR Pictures was to deliver materials within 48 hours, with a Court Commissioner overseeing compliance. I.A. 7658/2025 was also allowed, exempting mediation due to urgency. The suit was registered, with timelines set for pleadings.

Law Settled in This Case: The judgment reinforced that timely delivery clauses in film assignment agreements, when deemed essential, must be strictly enforced, and breaches justify injunctive relief over damages, per the amended Specific Relief Act, 1963. It clarified that unilateral release date fixation without agreed consent violates contractual rights, and courts can balance equities by granting limited deferments, ensuring all parties’ interests are protected.

Ivy Entertainment Private Limited Vs. HR Pictures:March 27, 2025:(COMM) 264/2025:High Court of Delhi:Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Dr.J.R.K's Research and Pharmaceuticals Private Limited Vs. Registrar of Trademarks

Dr.J.R.K's Research and Pharmaceuticals Private Limited Vs. Registrar of Trademarks:Date of Order: 12 June 2025:Case Number: W.P.(IPD) No.8 of 2025:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras:Name of Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

The brief facts are that the petitioner, owner of the trademark “NATURE'S WEALTH RESTORES HEALTH” registered in class 05 under registration number 1061417, sought renewal of the mark for the period 2021–2031. The initial application for renewal had succeeded for the previous term, but the petitioner was later unable to access the portal to file the new renewal request. After filing an RTI application, the petitioner received a reply from the Registrar stating that the renewal request could not be accepted as it had not been filed with the requisite fee.

Procedurally, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the Registrar’s letter dated 30.10.2024 rejecting the renewal application and sought a consequential direction to process and accept the renewal. The petitioner argued that the trademark had never been formally removed from the Register, and as long as it remained on the register, the proprietor had a statutory right to seek renewal.

The dispute centered on whether the Registrar could reject the renewal request solely because the application and fee were not simultaneously filed, especially when the trademark had never been officially removed from the register.

In discussion, the Court considered the judgment in Jaisuryas Retail Ventures Private Limited v. The Registrar of Trademarks, 2024:MHC:3109; 2024(100) PTC 25 (Mad), where it was held that a proprietor is entitled to renewal unless the mark has been removed from the register following the procedure under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Observing that the Registrar had not taken any steps to remove the mark as prescribed by law, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s renewal request ought to have been entertained.

The Court quashed the impugned communication dated 30.10.2024 and directed the Registrar to receive and process the renewal application for the period 2021–2031, subject to payment of requisite fees, within thirty days. The Court also directed that access to the portal be provided or the renewal be accepted in physical form.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.

Mrs. Preeti Vs Vijay Kumar Chopra

Failure to Disclose True Facts and Suppression of Material Information

Introduction: This case study examines how the High Court of Madras, in deciding an interlocutory application for interim injunction in a copyright infringement suit, analyzed the plaintiffs’ conduct, particularly their failure to disclose critical facts and inconsistencies in their pleadings. The judgment underscores that suppression or nondisclosure of material information by a plaintiff can significantly weaken a claim for equitable relief like an injunction, even where there is copyright registration in place.

Factual Background: The plaintiffs, Mrs. Preeti and Mr. Piyush Jain, trading as proprietors of cosmetic businesses under the brand “BEAUTE BLANC,” claimed to be the authors and copyright holders of an artistic work used in the packaging of their products. They obtained copyright registration no. A-130483/2019, which recorded the year of publication as 2014. They alleged that the defendants, Vijay Kumar Chopra and Cura Skin Solutions Pvt. Ltd., copied this packaging design for cosmetic products under the mark “NATUALLY.” To substantiate their claim, the plaintiffs placed on record multiple invoices dated from August 2018 onwards and chartered accountants’ certificates showing turnover figures from later financial years.

Procedural Background: The plaintiffs filed C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.57 of 2025 before the High Court of Madras, accompanied by O.A.No.183 of 2025 seeking an ad-interim injunction to restrain the defendants from manufacturing, marketing or dealing in products bearing the impugned packaging. The defendants contested the application, challenging both the originality of the artistic work and the timeline of its alleged creation and use. The matter came up for decision before Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

Legal Issue: The central issue before the Court was whether the plaintiffs had established a sufficiently strong prima facie case for grant of interim injunction, particularly in view of serious questions raised about nondisclosure and suppression of facts material to the determination of copyright ownership and priority of use.

Discussion on Judgments :The plaintiffs relied primarily on Section 48 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which provides that particulars entered in the Register of Copyrights are to be treated as prima facie evidence. They also pointed to an earlier interim injunction granted on 13 February 2020 in O.A.Nos.947 to 949 of 2019 in C.S.No.609 of 2019, in respect of the same artistic work, where a similar defence had been rejected.

The defendants, challenging the credibility of the plaintiffs’ claim and highlighting suppression, cited Federation of Industries of India & another v. Mr. G. Kesavalu Naidu @ Kesavan & another, CS(OS) No.596 of 2007, particularly paragraphs 13 and 24, to argue that copyright registration by itself is insufficient without clear evidence of originality and authorship. They relied on Rediff.Com India Ltd. v. E-Eighteen.Com Ltd., MANU/DE/2202/2013, paragraph 53, to emphasize that proof of prior and independent creation is required beyond mere registration. In Glaxo Orthopedic U.K. Ltd. v. Samrat Pharma, MANU/DE/0257/1983, paragraphs 14 and 15, the Delhi High Court noted that copyright must be shown to subsist through evidence. Camlin Private Limited v. National Pencil Industries, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1083, paragraph 10, reinforced this view. Tech Plus Media Private Ltd. v. Jyoti Janda & others, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1819, paragraph 20, was cited to highlight that documentary proof of publication is essential. Finally, M/s. K.B. Hiralal & Sons v. M/s. Kumar Industries & another, 1985 Arbitration Law Reporter 265, paragraphs 9 and 11, reiterated that the presumption from registration is not conclusive and must be corroborated by facts.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The court observed that while Section 48 of the Copyright Act does create a prima facie presumption of the particulars entered in the Register, this presumption is rebuttable. The plaintiffs claimed the artistic work was published in 2014, yet failed to place on record any concrete evidence of such publication. The invoices they produced dated only from August 2018 onwards, and the chartered accountants’ certificates disclosed turnover figures starting from the financial year 2017-18 for the second plaintiff and 2021-22 for the first plaintiff. This weakened their assertion of first use in 2014.

Critically, the Court noted that the plaintiffs’ pleadings did not fully and candidly disclose that they had already filed an opposition to the defendants’ trademark application on 1 August 2024, while simultaneously claiming in the plaint and supporting affidavit that they became aware of the defendants’ products only in December 2024. This inconsistency was regarded as suppression of a material fact directly relevant to the dispute.

Further, the defendants placed on record evidence showing third parties had been using similar packaging designs from as early as 2017, and produced screenshots from websites like Alibaba indicating that the packaging may have originated from manufacturers in China for distribution by a Hong Kong-based entity. The plaintiffs failed to counter this evidence with proof demonstrating that their creation and use predated that of the defendants or the third parties.

In light of these factors, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown a strong prima facie case, that there was suppression of material facts which affected the equitable relief sought, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting an interim injunction. 

Final Decision:The Court declined to grant the ad-interim injunction sought by the plaintiffs due to the failure to disclose true facts and suppression of material information that went to the root of the plaintiffs’ claim. The application was disposed of with a direction to the defendants to file quarterly accounts of sales pending the suit.

Law Settled in This Case: The judgment reiterates that copyright registration under Section 48 of the Copyright Act creates only a rebuttable presumption and does not replace the requirement to prove authorship, originality, and prior publication with credible, independent evidence. It affirms that a plaintiff seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands; suppression or failure to candidly disclose material facts, especially facts central to the claim, can defeat the plea for interim injunction even in intellectual property disputes.

Case Title: Mrs. Preeti Vs Vijay Kumar Chopra :Date of Order: 23 June 2025:Case Number: O.A.No.183 of 2025 in C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.57 of 2025:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Preeti & Anr. Vs. Vijay Kumar Chopra

Case Title: Mrs. Preeti Vs Vijay Kumar Chopra :Date of Order: 23 June 2025:Case Number: O.A.No.183 of 2025 in C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.57 of 2025:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

The brief facts are that the plaintiffs, proprietors of cosmetic businesses, claimed copyright over the artistic work used on the packaging of their brand “BEAUTE BLANC,” registered under copyright registration number A-130483/2019 with year of publication stated as 2014. They alleged that the defendants had copied this packaging design in selling identical cosmetic products.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs filed a commercial suit for infringement and moved an interlocutory application seeking an ad-interim injunction to restrain the defendants from using the impugned artistic work during the pendency of the suit. Both sides presented documentary evidence, including invoices, certificates, screenshots, and import documents.

The dispute centered on whether the plaintiffs had established a strong prima facie case of prior authorship, original publication in 2014, and continuous use, as required to secure an interim injunction in copyright matters, especially when defendants alleged the design itself was generic or sourced from third parties.

In discussion, the Court noted that under Section 48 of the Copyright Act, registration creates only a presumption and not conclusive proof of copyright. While the plaintiffs relied on invoices and accountants’ certificates, the earliest evidence dated from 2018 onwards and did not conclusively show publication in 2014. The defendants produced evidence suggesting similar packaging was in use by others from as early as 2017 and pointed out inconsistencies between plaintiffs’ pleadings and their prior opposition to defendants' trademark application.

The Court ultimately found that the plaintiffs did not make out a strong prima facie case justifying an interim injunction. It declined to grant the injunction but directed the defendants to maintain and file quarterly accounts of sales of products using the impugned packaging to safeguard plaintiffs’ interests pending trial.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.

Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited

A Party is not allowed to argue a case, what is not pleaded.

Introduction: This case revolves around a fundamental principle of civil procedure: that a party is not permitted to advance arguments at the stage of final hearing which have no foundation in its pleadings. In Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited and others, the Bombay High Court confronted this very proposition, addressing whether the plaintiff, after having pleaded that the defendants’ exploitation of copyright was impermissible due to expiry of the assignment agreements, could instead argue at final hearing that exploitation through digital or non-physical mediums was never contemplated in the agreements, thereby amounting to infringement. The judgment illustrates the intersection of contract interpretation, copyright law, and the strict discipline of pleadings in civil litigation.

Factual Background: The dispute arose from seven cinematographic films produced by O.P. Ralhan between 1963 and 1983, containing musical works and songs over which he held copyright. O.P. Ralhan assigned rights under various agreements dated between 1962 and 1980 to the predecessor of defendant no.2. Upon his death in 1999, those rights devolved upon his daughter, the plaintiff Rupali P. Shah, by virtue of a probated Will of 2013. Over the years, royalty payments were made by defendant no.2, which eventually assigned those rights to itself. In December 2011, the plaintiff noticed that defendant no.1 had used a song from the film 'Talash' in a commercial advertisement. Defendant no.1 claimed it had obtained a license from defendant no.2, which in turn claimed absolute rights to exploit the works.

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed Commercial IP Suit No.101 of 2012 before the Bombay High Court seeking a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from infringing her copyright, alongside reliefs for damages and accounts. An interim injunction was refused by the Single Judge on 8 May 2012, who found a prima facie case in favour of the defendants. The Court framed ten issues on 20 March 2013, and the matter proceeded to trial, including oral and documentary evidence. During the final hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel shifted emphasis from the pleaded case that the assignments had expired to the argument that the assignments never covered exploitation through digital and non-physical mediums.

Legal Issue: The central legal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff could argue, at the stage of final hearing, a ground that was absent from her pleadings—specifically, that the assignments covered only physical mediums like gramophone records and therefore exploitation in digital or non-physical mediums infringed her copyright. In essence, the Court examined whether the plaintiff's arguments had to remain confined to what was pleaded.

Discussion on Judgments: The plaintiff relied heavily on Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corporation, 845 F.2d 851 (2nd Cir. 1988) and Raj Video Vision v. K. Mohan Krishnan, 1998-2-L.W.718 (Madras High Court) to argue that rights not contemplated when the agreements were executed could not be treated as assigned. Further reliance was placed on Adani Gas Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) 5 SCC 210; Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593; Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd., (1982) 1 SCC 613; and Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. CCI, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom.2186 to support arguments on retrospective application of amendments and the legal effect of provisos.

Conversely, defendant no.2 relied on Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, (1977) 1 SCC 511; Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555; and Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, (2024) 2 SCC 144 to contend that a party cannot argue beyond its pleadings. In support of interpreting contracts by reading clauses together and the significance of parties' conduct, the defendants cited Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 113; Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hyma Vathi, (1996) 9 SCC 388; State of Orissa v. Damodar Das, (1996) 2 SCC 216; M. Arul Jothi v. Lajja Bal, (2000) 3 SCC 723; Prentice Hall India Pvt. Ltd. v. Prentice Hall Inc., 2002 SCC OnLine Del.549; Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish, (1973) 2 SCC 825; and Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 107. Additionally, they argued that the earlier interim order dated 8 May 2012, which had interpreted the agreements as granting wide rights, was binding, citing SK. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee, (2017) 5 SCC 127; S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1460; and Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, [1964] 5 S.C.R. 946.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court observed that the plaintiff's pleadings were clear: her case was based on expiry of the assignment agreements over time, and not on the nature of mediums covered by those agreements. The plaintiff’s attempt at final hearing to pivot to an argument about non-physical mediums was found to be beyond the scope of her pleadings and therefore impermissible. The Court applied the settled principle that what is argued must be founded in the pleadings, so that the opposing party is not taken by surprise, citing Supreme Court authorities.

The Court closely analyzed the 1967 agreement and found it used expansive language, specifically, clause 10, which granted the assignee the “sole right of production, reproduction, sale, use and performance (including broadcasting) throughout the world by any and every means whatsoever.” Interpreting the contract as a whole, the Court held that these words reflected an intention to assign rights in perpetuity across all mediums, including those then unknown.

The plaintiff’s reliance on subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act and foreign judgments was rejected because the agreements had to be interpreted in the statutory context existing when they were executed. The Court further considered the parties’ conduct, noting that royalty payments had been accepted over many years and that the plaintiff’s father, in his Will, bequeathed rights consistent with a belief in perpetual assignment.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove infringement and that defendant no.2 had perpetual rights to exploit the works across all mediums. Defendant no.1 was also found to have acted under a valid license and thus was not liable. The Court reaffirmed that a party cannot be allowed to argue what is not pleaded.

Law Settled in This Case: The judgment reaffirmed that a party must remain within the boundaries of its pleadings and cannot spring new grounds at final hearing. It also settled that, in interpreting copyright assignments, especially older agreements, courts will consider the language of the agreement as a whole, the parties’ conduct, and the context of the law at the time of execution, rather than subsequent statutory amendments or later technological developments.

Case Title: Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited and others:Date of Order: 11 June 2025:Case Number: Commercial IP Suit No.101 of 2012:Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:8516:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, Commercial Division:Name of Judge: Justice Manish Pitale

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

KG Marketing India Vs Rashi Santosh Soni

Introduction: This case study delves into the dispute between KG Marketing India (the appellant) and Rashi Santosh Soni & others (the respondents) concerning allegations of forgery, fabrication of documents, and the misuse of a trademark “SURYA.” The matter primarily concerns the appropriate legal proceedings for handling forged evidence filed in court, and the Court’s authority to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The Delhi High Court's judgment underscores the importance of truthfulness in legal pleadings and demonstrates the Court’s powers to impose costs and direct criminal complaints against dishonest conduct during litigation.

Factual Background: KG Marketing India claimed prior rights and extensive use of the trademark "SURYA" since 2016, supported by newspaper advertisements. These advertisements were relied upon in its suit to establish prior user rights and branding dominance. The appellant filed a civil suit, CS (COMM) No. 18/2023, which included the newspaper advertisements as evidence, supported by a Statement of Truth affirming their authenticity. Subsequently, the respondents challenged the genuineness of these documents, asserting that they were fabricated and produced with malicious intent to secure an interim injunction favoring the appellant’s market position. The respondents alleged that the advertisements used by the appellant in the court proceedings were forged and that the appellant had intentionally misrepresented facts.

Procedural Background: Initially, the Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favor of the appellant and authorized a search and seizure of allegedly infringing goods. However, the respondents later filed I.A. 10033/2023 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC, alleging that the documents filed by the appellant were maliciously fabricated for the purpose of securing the injunction. The Court found merit in this contention and vacated the interim relief, dismissing the appellant’s application. Subsequently, the respondents filed a cross-suit seeking to restrain the appellant from using the mark “SURYA,” and to prove the alleged forgery, they provided original newspapers dated 17.06.2016 and 12.07.2017 to establish that the advertisements relied upon were fabricated. During the proceedings, the Court considered whether proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC should be initiated against the appellant for allegedly filing forged documents and false statements.

Legal Issue: The principal legal issue in this case is whether the Court has the authority to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC against a party who files forged documents and makes false statements supporting their case, particularly in the context of fabricated evidence in a civil suit? The case raises questions about the nature of proof admissible in trademark disputes, the limits of the Court’s power to take suo-motu cognizance of forgery, and the sanctity of Statements of Truth filed in pleadings, especially when they are allegedly false and fabricated.

Discussion on Judgments: The parties cited multiple judgments to substantiate their respective arguments. The appellant referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashok Gulabrao Bondre v. Vilas Madhukarrao Deshmukh (2023) 9 SCC 539, which clarified interpretations surrounding forgery and the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 340 of the CrPC, especially when relating to documents filed in court. The respondent’s counsel relied on the earlier Supreme Court decision in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 748, which clarified that criminal proceedings can be initiated even if the offence preceded the registration of a complaint, thus establishing that the Court has the power to act upon suspicion or evidence of forgery, regardless of the procedural stage.

Additionally, the Court referred to Iqbal Singh Marwah and Ors. v. Meenakshi Marwah, (1981) 4 SCC 523, where the Supreme Court discussed the interpretation of Section 195 of the CrPC concerning offences related to documents produced in court. The decision clarified that where offences involve an act committed in respect of a document that was produced or given in evidence during proceedings, a complaint by the court would be necessary. The Court examined whether the production of forged documents with falsified Statements of Truth warranted criminal action under Section 340 of the CrPC, emphasizing the importance of truthfulness in court pleadings.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The learned Judge analyzed the available judgments and the facts of the case to arrive at a reasoned conclusion. The Court noted that the documents relied upon by the appellant were explicitly admitted to be forged and fabricated, and these false documents were filed along with the suit to obtain interim relief. The Court further observed that the Statement of Truth filed affirming the genuineness of these documents was false, which undermines the integrity of the judicial process. Referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashok Gulabrao Bondre, the Court clarified that the offence of forgery committed in respect of documents filed in a court proceeding is prosecutable under Section 340 of the CrPC. The Court emphasized that it has the authority to cause a complaint to be filed if it is satisfied that a false statement or forged document has been deliberately filed, thereby obstructing the course of justice. The Court acknowledged that filing forged evidence under the guise of genuine documents is a serious offence, warranting criminal action along with appropriate costs to deter such misconduct.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the filing of false pleadings violates the principles of honesty and fair dealing in litigation. It reinforced that the Court can initiate proceedings suo-motu or upon an application to ensure that falsehoods do not undermine judicial integrity. The Court, therefore, imposed costs on the appellant and directed the Registrar General to lodge a criminal complaint, affirming its jurisdiction to enforce accountability for litigatory misconduct.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the order directing the Registrar General to lodge a complaint with the Judicial Magistrate under Section 340 of the CrPC, and imposed a cost of ₹2,00,000 on the appellant. The Court declared that the appellant’s conduct in filing forged documents and false Statements of Truth was unjustifiable and amounted to an abuse of the judicial process. The scheduled hearing was canceled, and the appellant was directed to deposit the imposed costs with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks. This decision reaffirmed the Court’s authority to act against falsification and forgery in proceedings and underscored the importance of honesty in presenting evidence.

Law Settled in This Case: This case establishes that if a party files forged or fabricated documents in court, supported by false affidavits or Statements of Truth, the Court has the authority to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC against the offending party. The decision clarifies that the Court can act suo-motu in such cases, emphasizing that the integrity of judicial proceedings depends on honest and truthful conduct of parties. The case also emphasizes that the imposition of costs serves as a deterrent against misconduct, and that the disposal of forged evidence can have both civil and criminal consequences.

Case Title: KG Marketing India Vs Rashi Santosh Soni & Others Date of Order: August 23, 2024 Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 16/2024 Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:6385-DB: Name of Court: Delhi High Court Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon'ble Mr. Sachin Datta

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited

Case Title: Rupali P. Shah v. Adani Wilmer Limited and others:11 June 2025:Commercial IP Suit No. 101 of 2012:2025:BHC-OS:8516:High Court of Judicature at Bombay:Name of Judge: Justice Manish Pitale

The brief facts are that the plaintiff, daughter of late O.P. Ralhan who produced seven films between 1963 and 1983, claimed rights over musical works forming part of those films. Her father had assigned rights to the predecessor of defendant no.2 by agreements executed in the 1960s and 1970s. After his death and probate of his Will, the plaintiff alleged that defendant nos.1 and 2 exploited these works beyond the period permissible under the agreements.

Procedurally, after notices and exchange of communications between the parties regarding royalty payments and scope of rights, the plaintiff filed the present suit in 2012 seeking injunction, damages, and accounts against the defendants for alleged copyright infringement. An interim injunction was refused by the Single Judge in 2012, issues were framed, evidence led, and the matter proceeded to final hearing.

The dispute centered on whether the original assignment of rights was perpetual and included exploitation by all mediums, or was limited to physical mediums like gramophone records, so that digital exploitation amounted to infringement.

In discussion, the court held that while the plaintiff’s pleadings focused on expiry of the time-limited agreements, her arguments later shifted to claiming the rights were limited only to physical mediums. The court found that the assignment agreements, particularly the 1967 agreement, used wide expressions such as “by any and every means whatsoever,” showing that the assignor had granted broad and perpetual rights to the assignee, which included exploitation by later-developed mediums.

The decision dismissed the suit, holding that the defendants had perpetual rights to exploit the works by any means and there was no infringement. It also upheld that defendant no.1 had lawfully used the song under licence from defendant no.2, and rejected the plaintiff’s claim for damages and accounts.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.

Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha

Introduction: This case study examines the legal proceedings involving Dr. Praveen R. and Dr. Arpitha, a matrimonial dispute that delves into the serious issue of perjury within the judicial system. It underscores the importance of timely and effective judicial action against false testimonies and fraudulent statements that threaten the integrity of the courts. The case primarily revolves around allegations of perjury, the court's discretionary powers in addressing such allegations, and the implications of delays in initiating proceedings for falsehoods sworn in affidavits and testimonies. The High Court of Karnataka analyzed whether the refusal to entertain an application related to perjury at an early stage was justified or if it hindered the course of justice by allowing falsehoods to persist.

Factual Background: Dr. Praveen and Dr. Arpitha, both medical practitioners of reputed standing, were embroiled in a matrimonial discord that led to legal proceedings. Dr. Praveen filed a petition seeking annulment of their marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, indicating an ongoing status of the marriage that needed judicial resolution. Concurrently, Dr. Arpitha sought maintenance and litigation expenses, claiming her unemployment and lack of income, which the trial court rejected. The dispute was further complicated by allegations made by Dr. Praveen, contending that Dr. Arpitha had falsely stated her employment status in affidavits supporting her applications for maintenance, thereby amounting to perjury. Despite these allegations, the trial court initially found the matter of perjury to be premature and refrained from initiating proceedings against her, citing the discretion reserved to the court. The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court, emphasizing the gravity of perjury as a serious offense and the need for prompt judicial intervention to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

Procedural Background: The petitioner, Dr. Praveen, approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, seeking to set aside the order passed by the Family Court, which had dismissed his application to initiate criminal proceedings for perjury. The Family Court had held that the allegation was premature, based on the principle that the discretion to act against perjury was to be exercised judiciously and only when the circumstances warranted immediate action. The petitioner contended that the delay in initiating proceedings against perjury was not justified, especially given the seriousness of the offense and the clear evidence of false affidavits. The respondents opposed the petition, asserting that the Court below rightly assessed the situation and that the discretion was rightly exercised, emphasizing the importance of not rushing into proceedings without proper proof and procedural fairness. The High Court, after hearing arguments and examining the record, scrutinized whether the Family Court’s decision was lawful and in consonance with principles of justice and judicial efficiency.

Legal Issue: The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Family Court erred in dismissing the application to initiate proceedings for perjury on the grounds of premature consideration and whether the High Court should interfere under its writ jurisdiction. Specifically, it centered around the interpretation of judicial discretion in initiating criminal proceedings for perjury, the necessity for timely action to prevent the erosion of judicial integrity, and the appropriateness of the Family Court’s assessment of the evidence and the exercise of its discretion concerning allegations of falsehood in affidavits related to maintenance applications and matrimonial proceedings.

Discussion on Judgments: The Court’s discussion heavily relied on precedents such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahila Vinod Kumari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 34, which emphasized that perjury undermines the judicial system and that courts must act more proactively. The Court also cited Swarna Singh v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 668, which highlighted the alarming proliferation of perjury in courts, describing it as a menace that needs stern and prompt judicial response. Furthermore, the Family Court had referred to decisions like B.K. GUPTA v. DAMODAR H. BAJAJ AND ORS. (2001) 9 SCC 742, which generally underscored that the exercise of discretion regarding proceedings for perjury must adhere to principles of reason and justice, not arbitrary or evasive actions. The Court analyzed these judgments in light of the facts, emphasizing that the judiciary cannot afford to treat perjury as a trivial matter and that procedural delays, especially when evidence indicates falsehoods, are detrimental to justice. The Court also looked at the decision of V.K. Gupta’s case, which acknowledged the discretion granted to courts but cautioned against deferring judicial action impeding the fight against falsehoods.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The High Court Judge reasoned that judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with established principles of justice and fairness. In this case, the Family Court’s decision to deem the application for initiating perjury proceedings as premature appeared to be based on a narrow interpretation that overlooked the tangible evidence of falsification in affidavits. The Hon’ble Judge noted the importance of adhering to the courts’ duty to prevent the evil of perjury, especially considering the societal consequences when false testimony is tolerated. They observed that merely relying on procedural delays or the absence of comprehensive proof at an initial stage should not prevent courts from taking stern action against perjury, particularly when the evidence suggests a clear intent to mislead the court. The Judge interpreted the relevant legal principles to mean that courts must act promptly and decisively to uphold the integrity of proceedings and to deter the dangerous proliferation of falsehoods. The Judge criticized the Family Court’s approach for risking a neglect of the substantive issue and opined that the delay therein was unjustified, asserting that such delay could pollute the fountain of justice by allowing fraud to persist unpunished.

Final Decision: The High Court set aside the impugned order of the Family Court and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, emphasizing that allegations of perjury are serious and should not be dismissed on technical grounds or procedural delays. The Court directed the Family Court to evaluate the evidence of falsehood explicitly and exercise its discretion in accordance with the principles of reason, justice, and judicial efficacy. 

It underscored the need for courts to act swiftly in such matters, highlighting that the integrity of the judicial process must be protected against falsehoods, which, if left unchecked, could lead to erosion of public confidence in the legal system. The Court’s decision was driven by the principles that perjury is a heinous offense and that judicial discretion, while important, must be exercised without prejudice to the fundamental goal of delivering justice.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirms that allegations of perjury are of grave concern and must be addressed with promptness and decisiveness by courts. It emphasizes that judicial discretion to initiate proceedings for perjury, while broad, must be exercised based on reason, justice, and the need to uphold the fidelity of the judicial process. The judgment clarifies that procedural delays or nominal objections should not be allowed to undermine the fight against falsehoods sworn before the court, especially when the evidence points toward clear misconduct. Courts are duty-bound to act swiftly to preserve the dignity of justice and prevent the evil of perjury from polluting the system. The case underscores that the failure to act promptly in such instances could be viewed as a dereliction of judicial duty, and therefore, courts must balance discretion with responsibility to ensure that perjury is neither tolerated nor ignored.

Case Title: Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha Date of Order: 31 August 2021 Case Number: Writ Petition No.19448 of 2015 Court: High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna S

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

T.V. Today Network Limited & Anr. Vs. Google LLC & Ors

T.V. Today Network Limited & Anr. Vs. Google LLC & Ors./20 June 2025/CS(COMM) 634/2025/High Court of Delhi at New Delhi/ Justice Prathiba M. Singh

The dispute arose when T.V. Today Network Limited, a major Indian media house running news channels like Aajtak and India Today, and Ms. Anjana Om Kashyap, its Managing Editor, discovered that an unknown person created a fake YouTube channel ‘@AnajanaomKashya’ imitating Ms. Kashyap’s name and photograph. This channel allegedly published fake videos and news clippings exploiting her reputation and the goodwill of the media house.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs filed a suit seeking urgent interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. Alongside, they sought exemption from pre-litigation mediation, filing originals and complete court fee, and requested leave to file additional documents. The Court allowed these applications, impleaded Ms. Kashyap as Plaintiff No.2, and issued summons to the defendants.

The Court discussed the evident difference between the authentic YouTube channel of Plaintiff No.2 and the fake channel, noting the deliberate omission of the letter ‘p’ in ‘Kashyap’ as indicative of bad faith. It observed that proliferation of such fake pages harms personality rights, risks dissemination of misinformation, and unlawfully exploits the plaintiffs’ goodwill for commercial gain.

The Court directed Google LLC to remove the infringing YouTube channel within 48 hours, disclose subscriber information of the creator within two weeks, and provide an account of revenues generated by the channel within four weeks. Further, it directed prompt removal of any similarly fake channels identified by the plaintiffs and scheduled the matter for further hearing.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.