Raj Kumar Prasad Vs. Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction

In the realm of intellectual property law, where trademarks serve as the bedrock of brand identity, a recurring conundrum surfaces: Can one registered trademark proprietor sue another for infringement when their marks are deceptively similar? This question, steeped in statutory interpretation and judicial precedent, took center stage in the Delhi High Court case of Raj Kumar Prasad & Anr. vs. Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., decided on September 10, 2014. The case pitted a pharmaceutical giant against a smaller player, unraveling the interplay between exclusive rights under the Trademarks Act, 1999, and the judiciary’s power to grant interim relief. This landmark ruling not only resolved a trademark tussle but also clarified the legal framework governing such disputes, offering a beacon for future litigants.

Detailed Factual Background

The dispute originated with Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary of Abbott Laboratories Chicago, a global leader in pharmaceuticals. Abbott claimed ownership of the trademark "ANAFORTAN," used for Camylofin Dihydrochloride formulations, tracing its lineage back to 1988 through Khandelwal Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., which registered the mark under serial No. 501608 in Class 5. Through a series of assignments—first to Nicholas Piramal India Ltd. (later Piramal Healthcare Ltd. and then Piramal Enterprises Ltd.) on April 15, 2008, and subsequently to Abbott on September 8, 2010—Abbott asserted continuous use and substantial goodwill, evidenced by sales of Rs. 7.84 crores in late 2010 and Rs. 23.047 crores in 2011. The conflict arose when Raj Kumar Prasad, operating as Birani Pharmaceuticals, began selling a similar formulation under the trademark "AMAFORTEN," registered under No. 1830060 in Class 5, with manufacturing support from Alicon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Abbott alleged deceptive similarity—both phonetic and visual—between "ANAFORTAN" and "AMAFORTEN," compounded by a mimicking golden trade dress for their tablet strips. Abbott sought to rectify the defendants’ registration and secure an injunction, claiming prior use and reputation since 1988 against the defendants’ entry around 2012.

Detailed Procedural Background

Abbott filed a suit (CS(OS) No. not specified in the document) in the Delhi High Court, accompanied by an application for interim injunction (IA No. 23086/2012). The learned Single Judge, on April 25, 2014, granted the injunction, restraining the defendants from using "AMAFORTEN" or any deceptively similar mark. Aggrieved, Raj Kumar Prasad and Alicon Pharmaceuticals appealed (FAO(OS) 281/2014) before a Division Bench comprising Justice Pradeep Nandrajog and Justice Mukta Gupta. The appeal, argued on September 5, 2014, and decided on September 10, 2014, saw Abbott represented by Senior Advocate Sanjeev Sindhwani and Mr. Manav Kumar, while the appellants were represented by Mr. Mohan Vidhani, Mr. Rahul Vidhani, and Mr. S.B. Prasad. The Bench tackled territorial jurisdiction, stamp duty on assignments, and the core issue of trademark rights between registered proprietors, affirming the Single Judge’s order with detailed reasoning.

Issues Involved in the Case

The central issue was whether a registered trademark proprietor could sue another registered proprietor for infringement based on deceptive similarity, despite both holding valid registrations. Ancillary issues included the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction, the validity of assignment agreements due to alleged stamp duty deficiencies, and the interplay between Sections 28 and 124 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, particularly regarding interim relief and rectification proceedings. The case also raised questions about balancing prior use, goodwill, and statutory rights in trademark disputes.

Detailed Submission of Parties

Abbott argued that "AMAFORTEN" was deceptively similar to "ANAFORTAN," risking consumer confusion, especially in pharmaceuticals where precision is critical. They emphasized their long-standing use since 1988, inherited goodwill, and substantial sales, asserting a prima facie case for infringement. Abbott relied on Section 124, contending that a suit against another registered proprietor was maintainable, with rectification proceedings as a parallel remedy, and sought interim protection pending such action. They also justified Delhi’s jurisdiction via their branch office and sales presence.

The appellants countered that Section 28(3) of the Trademarks Act granted mutually exclusive rights to registered proprietors of similar marks, barring one from suing the other. They challenged jurisdiction, claiming no sales in Delhi, and attacked the assignment deeds for inadequate stamp duty, though without specifics. They defended "AMAFORTEN" as a legitimate registered mark since July 12, 2011 (applied for on June 17, 2009), arguing that Abbott’s suit was untenable without first invalidating their registration.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

The appellants did not cite specific case law in the judgment text, relying instead on a literal reading of Section 28(3) to argue mutual exclusivity. Abbott, while not directly citing precedents in the provided document, implicitly drew on principles from Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727, as noted by the court. This Supreme Court decision established the framework for interim injunctions—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury—guiding the court’s assessment of Abbott’s prior use and goodwill against the appellants’ later entry. The Single Judge and Division Bench leaned on statutory interpretation rather than extensive precedent, though Wander provided the legal lens for injunctive relief. The appellants’ jurisdictional and stamp duty pleas were dismissed for lack of evidence, aligning with procedural norms rather than specific citations.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Pradeep Nandrajog, authoring the judgment, began with the jurisdictional issue, affirming a prima facie finding of Delhi’s competence due to Abbott’s sales office, pending trial evidence. On stamp duty, he found the appellants’ vague objections insufficient, upholding the assignments’ validity for interim purposes. The crux lay in reconciling Sections 28 and 124 of the Trademarks Act. Section 28(1) granted exclusive rights to a registered proprietor, while Section 28(3) suggested that identical or similar marks’ proprietors could not sue each other, only third parties. However, Section 124 permitted infringement suits where a defendant’s registration was challenged as invalid, allowing stays for rectification while empowering interim orders under Section 124(5).

The court harmonized these provisions, rejecting a rigid interpretation of Section 28(3) that would bar all suits between registered proprietors. It held that Section 124’s mechanism—staying suits for rectification while preserving interlocutory relief—indicated legislative intent to protect prior users like Abbott pending validity disputes. The phonetic and visual similarity between "ANAFORTAN" and "AMAFORTEN" was deemed ex-facie deceptive, especially for identical pharmaceutical goods, trade channels, and consumers. Abbott’s 1988 precedence and goodwill trumped the appellants’ 2011 registration, with the latter’s non-disclosure of market entry reinforcing Abbott’s case. Applying Wander principles, the court found a strong prima facie case, tipping the balance of convenience and irreparable harm in Abbott’s favor, particularly given ongoing rectification proceedings initiated by Abbott.

Final Decision

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, upholding the Single Judge’s order of April 25, 2014, granting an interim injunction against the appellants’ use of "AMAFORTEN" or any deceptively similar mark. Costs were imposed on the appellants, payable to Abbott, affirming the restraint pending suit resolution.

Law Settled in This Case

The ruling clarified that a registered trademark proprietor can sue another registered proprietor for infringement if the marks are deceptively similar, despite Section 28(3)’s apparent exclusivity. Section 124 enables such suits, allowing interim relief while rectification proceedings address registration validity, ensuring protection of prior use and goodwill. This harmonized interpretation balances statutory rights with equitable remedies, reinforcing trademark law’s flexibility in safeguarding established brands.

Case Title: Raj Kumar Prasad & Anr. Vs. Abbott Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.

Date of Order: September 10, 2014

Case No.: FAO(OS) 281/2014

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pradeep Nandrajog and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mukta Gupta

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Aktiebolaget Volvo Vs. R. Venkatachalam

Introduction

In the ever-evolving landscape of civil litigation, where procedural intricacies often dictate the course of justice, a pivotal question emerged in the High Court of Delhi: Can a party rely solely on photocopies of documents in a lawsuit, producing originals only for inspection, or does the law mandate the filing of originals on the court record? This issue, central to the case of Aktiebolaget Volvo & Ors vs. R. Venkatachalam & Anr., decided on May 18, 2009, challenged traditional interpretations of evidence and procedural laws in India. The ruling not only addressed a practical dilemma faced by litigants with documents critical to multiple global litigations but also set a precedent that harmonized legal requirements with modern technological advancements and judicial expediency.

Detailed Factual Background

The dispute arose in a trademark infringement lawsuit filed by Aktiebolaget Volvo and others (the plaintiffs), a globally recognized entity, against R. Venkatachalam and another (the defendants). The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing their trademark, passing off their goods, and other ancillary reliefs such as damages and delivery of infringing materials. As part of their evidence, the plaintiffs filed photocopies of various documents—trademark certificates, invoices, and magazine advertisements—claiming these supported their case. However, they refrained from submitting the originals, citing their necessity in ongoing and potential litigations across multiple jurisdictions worldwide. To address this, the plaintiffs filed an application (IA No. 5683/2008) under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), seeking permission to rely on photocopies while producing the originals only for inspection during the admission/denial stage and when tendering evidence. The defendants opposed this, arguing that the law mandated the filing of original documents and that relying on photocopies prejudiced their ability to verify authenticity.

Detailed Procedural Background

The case, registered as CS(OS) 516/2007, reached a critical juncture when the plaintiffs’ application came before Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw in the Delhi High Court. The application was contested, leading to a detailed hearing on May 18, 2009. The plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Praveen Anand, assisted by Ms. Diva Arora and Ms. Tanya Varma, while the defendants were represented by Mr. Amarjeet Singh and Ms. Navneet Momi. The court framed a specific legal question: whether it was permissible under Indian law to allow a party to file photocopies, exempt them from placing originals on the court file, and produce originals only for inspection at designated stages, with exhibit marks placed on the photocopies. This procedural issue required an in-depth analysis of the CPC, the Indian Evidence Act, and judicial precedents, culminating in a reasoned judgment that balanced statutory mandates with practical considerations.

Issues Involved in the Case

The primary issue was whether the law permitted a party to rely on photocopies in a civil suit, producing originals only for inspection, rather than filing them on the court record. This raised several sub-issues: the interpretation of “production” under the CPC, the requirement of primary evidence under the Evidence Act, the feasibility of marking exhibits on photocopies, and the court’s discretion to adapt procedural rules to modern realities. The case also tested the balance between ensuring fairness to the opposing party (in verifying documents) and accommodating the practical difficulties faced by litigants with documents needed in multiple forums.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The plaintiffs argued that filing originals was impractical due to their involvement in global litigations, where the same documents were required. They contended that modern photocopying technology ensured copies were as reliable as originals, and producing originals for inspection at key stages—admission/denial and evidence—sufficiently safeguarded the defendants’ rights. They relied on legal commentaries and precedents to assert that “production” did not equate to “filing” and that courts had discretion to accept photocopies under certain conditions.

The defendants, in opposition, asserted that the CPC (Order 7 Rule 14 and Order 13 Rule 1) and the Evidence Act mandated the filing of originals as primary evidence. They argued that photocopies constituted secondary evidence, insufficient without proof of loss or destruction of originals under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. They further contended that the plaintiffs’ claim of needing originals elsewhere was unsubstantiated, suggesting certified copies as an alternative, and emphasized that relying on photocopies hindered their ability to verify authenticity, especially in a trademark dispute heavily reliant on documentary proof.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case

The plaintiffs cited several authorities to bolster their case. Firstly, they referred to Mulla’s CPC, 17th Edition, Volume-II, Page 694, where the commentary on Order 13 Rule 1 suggested that “produce” meant having documents available in court, not necessarily filing them, relying on Talewar Singh vs. Bhagwan Dass, (1908) 12 Cal WN 312. This Calcutta decision supported the view that courts could accept documents at later stages, implying flexibility in procedural requirements. Secondly, they cited The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 1987 Edition, which defined “produce” as showing a document without parting with possession, reinforcing their argument that inspection sufficed. Thirdly, Prem Kumari vs. Sushil Kumari, AIR 2000 Rajasthan 415, was invoked, where photocopies were exhibited after originals were produced for evidence and retained for cross-examination, though the judgment lacked detailed legal discussion. Lastly, Sehgal Puri Pvt. Ltd. vs. The National Newsprint and Paper Mills Ltd., AIR 2001 Delhi 449 (DB), permitted originals at the evidence stage when photocopies were filed with the plaint, aligning with their request for flexibility.

The defendants countered with their own citations. They referenced R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, AIR 2003 SC 4548, though its relevance to the specific issue was limited, focusing more on evidence admissibility. Sivasubramania Thevar vs. T.N.S. Theerthapathi, AIR 1933 Madras 451, and Om Prakash Berlia vs. Unit Trust of India, AIR 1983 Bombay 1, were also cited but deemed inapplicable by the court, as they did not directly address the question of photocopies versus originals in this context. The defendants leaned heavily on statutory provisions rather than case law, emphasizing the mandatory language of the CPC and Evidence Act.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw embarked on a comprehensive analysis, beginning with practical considerations. He noted the overburdened state of Indian courts, where infrastructure lagged behind the rising tide of litigation, making preservation of originals on court files risky due to physical handling and space constraints. He highlighted the advent of e-courts and paperless filing systems globally, suggesting that insisting on originals contradicted this evolution. Advancements in photocopying technology, rendering copies nearly indistinguishable from originals, further supported a shift from rigid norms established in an era of manual copies.

Turning to the law, the judge scrutinized the CPC provisions. Order 7 Rule 14 and Order 8 Rule 1A required documents to be “produced” with the plaint or written statement, but did not specify originals. Order 13 Rule 1, however, explicitly mandated originals before settlement of issues where copies were filed earlier. Contrasting “produce” with “filed” in the same rule, he concluded that “produce” meant making originals available for inspection, not filing them, supported by dictionary definitions and Public Prosecutor vs. T. Amrath Rao, AIR 1960 AP 176. The Evidence Act’s Section 62 defined primary evidence as the document itself “produced for the inspection of the court,” reinforcing that filing was not required even at the proof stage.

Addressing Order 13 Rule 4’s requirement of endorsing exhibits on admitted documents, Justice Endlaw held that this procedural step could apply to photocopies once originals were inspected, as substantive law prioritized inspection over filing. He cautioned that this flexibility was not absolute—courts could demand originals in cases of doubt or where documents (e.g., wills) required physical retention—but found no such necessity here. The plaintiffs’ documents (magazines, invoices) were not doubtful, and their global litigation needs were credible, outweighing the defendants’ inconvenience, which mirrored the effort required even if originals were filed.

Final Decision

The court allowed the plaintiffs’ application (IA No. 5683/2008), permitting them to rely on photocopies while producing originals for inspection at the admission/denial and evidence stages. Exhibit marks would be placed on the photocopies of admitted documents. The matter was listed before the Joint Registrar on July 23, 2009, for compliance.

Law Settled in This Case

The judgment settled that, under Indian law, courts have discretion to allow parties to file photocopies instead of originals, provided originals are produced for inspection when required. “Production” under the CPC and Evidence Act means making documents available for court scrutiny, not necessarily filing them, aligning procedural law with technological progress and judicial efficiency. This flexibility, however, is subject to judicial oversight, ensuring fairness and authenticity in appropriate cases.

Case Title: Aktiebolaget Volvo & Ors vs. R. Venkatachalam & Anr.

Date of Order: May 18, 2009

Case No.: IA No. 5683/2008 in CS(OS) 516/2007

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

R.G. Anand Vs Delux Films & Ors.

Inspiration, Imitation, Copying and copyright Infringement

Introduction: In the annals of Indian copyright law, few cases have shaped the understanding of intellectual property protection as profoundly as R.G. Anand Vs Delux Films & Ors., decided by the Supreme Court of India on August 18, 1978. This landmark case revolved around the alleged infringement of a copyrighted play, Hum Hindustani, by a cinematic production, New Delhi. It stands as a seminal exploration of the boundaries between inspiration and imitation, addressing the intricate question of whether a film can infringe upon a play’s copyright when both share a common theme but diverge in execution. The judgment not only clarified the principles governing copyright infringement but also established enduring tests that continue to guide courts in India and beyond.

Detailed Factual Background: The plaintiff, R.G. Anand, was an architect by profession and a seasoned playwright, dramatist, and producer. He had authored and staged several plays prior to Hum Hindustani, including Des Hamara, Azadi, and Election. However, it was Hum Hindustani, written in 1953 and first performed in 1954 at the Wavell Theatre in New Delhi under the aegis of the Indian National Theatre, that became the focal point of this dispute. The play, centered on the theme of provincialism, depicted the tensions between a Punjabi family and a Madrasi family over a proposed marriage between their children, Amni and Chander. Its popularity soared, earning critical acclaim and prompting multiple performances in Delhi and Calcutta between 1954 and 1956.

In November 1954, Anand received a letter from Mohan Sehgal, the second defendant and a film director associated with Delux Films (the first defendant), expressing interest in adapting Hum Hindustani into a film. Sehgal requested a copy of the script, but Anand suggested he attend a performance in Delhi scheduled for December 11, 1954, at the National Drama Festival. In January 1955, Sehgal and another defendant visited Anand in Delhi, where Anand narrated the entire play to them. No firm commitment was made, and communication lapsed thereafter. In May 1955, Sehgal announced the production of a film titled New Delhi, which was released in September 1956. Anand, upon viewing the film and reading reviews suggesting similarities with his play, concluded that it was a pirated adaptation of Hum Hindustani. He alleged that Sehgal had dishonestly imitated his work after hearing it narrated, thereby violating his copyright.

The play Hum Hindustani portrayed the love story of Amni (a Madrasi) and Chander (a Punjabi), thwarted by their families’ provincial prejudices. The narrative climaxed with a suicide pact, followed by a reconciliation after the couple’s marriage, facilitated by a marriage broker, Dhanwantri. In contrast, New Delhi followed Anand, a Punjabi youth, who, disguised as a South Indian, navigates housing discrimination in Delhi due to provincialism, falls in love with Janaki (a Madrasi), and faces familial opposition. The film introduced additional themes, such as the evils of caste and dowry, culminating in a resolution involving multiple families and a broader social critique.

Detailed Procedural Background

Aggrieved by the perceived infringement, Anand filed a suit in the District Court of Delhi seeking damages, an account of profits, and a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from exhibiting New Delhi. The defendants, including Delux Films and Sehgal, contested the suit, denying any infringement and asserting that while they had heard the play, it was inadequate for a commercial film. They argued that provincialism, as a common theme, could not be copyrighted and that New Delhi differed significantly in content, spirit, and climax.

The trial court framed five issues: (1) whether Anand owned the copyright in Hum Hindustani; (2) whether New Delhi infringed that copyright; (3) whether the defendants had infringed by producing, distributing, or exhibiting the film; (4) whether the suit suffered from misjoinder of parties or causes of action; and (5) the relief to which Anand was entitled. The court ruled in Anand’s favor on the first issue, confirming his copyright ownership, and dismissed the fourth issue as unpressed. However, on the pivotal second and third issues, it found no infringement, dismissing the suit. Anand appealed to the Delhi High Court, where a Division Bench upheld the trial court’s decision on May 23, 1968. Undeterred, Anand sought and obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, leading to the case being heard by a three-judge bench comprising Justices Syed Murtaza Fazalali, Jaswant Singh, and R.S. Pathak.

Issues Involved in the Case:  The Supreme Court grappled with two primary issues: (1) What constitutes infringement of a copyright in a play when adapted into a film, and what tests should be applied to determine such infringement? (2) Whether the film New Delhi infringed the copyright of the play Hum Hindustani based on the facts and evidence presented. These issues necessitated an examination of the legal principles governing copyright, the scope of protection for dramatic works, and the distinction between unprotected ideas and protected expressions.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context:  The Supreme Court extensively reviewed precedents from England, America, and India to frame its analysis, as no Indian statute specifically governed copyright at the time (the Copyright Act of 1957 was not yet in force for this dispute). Instead, the court relied on the British Copyright Act of 1911, which defined copyright under Section 1(2)(d) as the sole right to reproduce a dramatic work, including in cinematographic form, and under Section 2 as infringed by unauthorized use of that right.

From English law, Hanfstaengl v. W.H. Smith & Sons ([1905] 1 Ch D 519) was cited, where Bayley J. defined a copy as something so near the original as to suggest it to viewers, emphasizing the impression created. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. ([1964] 1 All ER 465) clarified that infringement requires substantial copying of the original work as a whole, not fragmented parts. Corelli v. Gray (29 TLR 578) and Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service Ltd. ([1934] 1 Ch D 593) reinforced that copyright extends to dramatic incidents, not just verbatim text, but excludes mere ideas or scenes.

American cases included Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Isidor Straus (210 US 339), affirming infringement as a statutory trespass, and Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. (81 F 2d 49), where copying with colorable variations was deemed actionable if substantial. Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures (100 F 2d 533) and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer (140 F 2d 579) emphasized that infringement hinges on substantial appropriation, judged by the average observer’s impression, not hypercritical analysis. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System (216 F 2d 945) and Otto Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications (246 F 2d 598) underscored that quality, not quantity, determines infringement, even if paraphrased.

Indian precedents like Macmillan & Co. Ltd. v. K. & J. Cooper (51 IA 109) established that piracy requires substantial copying or evasive imitation. Florence A. Deeks v. H.G. Wells (60 IA 26) demanded cogent evidence for copying claims against credible denials. N.T. Raghunathan v. All India Reporter Ltd. (AIR 1971 Bom 48) and K.R. Venugopala Sarma v. Sangu Ganesan (1972 Cr LJ 1098) clarified that copyright protects expression, not ideas, and substantial resemblance must be evident to the eye or mind. The Daily Calendar Supplying Bureau v. The United Concern (AIR 1967 Mad 381) and C. Cunniah & Co. v. Balraj & Co. (AIR 1961 Mad 111) applied visual impression tests to determine copying.

These citations collectively shaped the court’s framework, distinguishing between unprotected ideas (e.g., provincialism) and protected expressions (e.g., specific plot structures), and requiring substantial imitation for infringement.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court while delivering the leading judgment, synthesized these authorities into seven propositions: 

"(1) Copyright does not extend to ideas, themes, or facts, but to their form, manner, and expression; 

(2) Similarities from a common idea are inevitable, but infringement occurs only if fundamental aspects of expression are copied; 

(3) The surest test is whether an average viewer perceives the subsequent work as a copy; 

(4) A differently treated theme creates a new work, avoiding infringement; 

(5) Material dissimilarities negate copying intent; 

(6) Piracy requires clear, cogent proof; and 

(7) Proving infringement from a play to a film is harder due to the latter’s broader scope, yet a totality of impression can establish violation."

Applying these tests, the court. analyzed Hum Hindustani and New Delhi. The play focused solely on provincialism in marriage, with a tight narrative involving two families, a suicide pact, and a happy resolution. The film, however, expanded to housing discrimination, caste issues, and dowry, involving three families and a complex climax. While acknowledging 18 similarities (e.g., shared locale, character names, and a suicide note), the court found them trivial and attributable to the common theme of provincialism. Dissimilarities—such as the film’s additional themes, different character dynamics, and absence of a mutual suicide pact—outweighed these parallels, showing a distinct treatment.

Court noted Sehgal’s awareness of the play but found no evidence of intent to copy, emphasizing that inspiration from a known work does not equate to infringement absent substantial imitation. The court’s screening of the film and reading of the play reinforced this view, concluding that no prudent person would see New Delhi as a copy of Hum Hindustani. Concurrent findings of the lower courts further bolstered this stance, with the Supreme Court reluctant to disturb them absent legal error.

Final Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed Anand’s appeal by special leave, affirming the Delhi High Court’s decree dismissing the suit. No costs were awarded in the Supreme Court, reflecting the case’s complexity and novelty.

Law Settled in This Case:This judgment crystallized several principles in Indian copyright law: (1) Copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves; (2) Infringement requires substantial and material copying of the original’s form and expression, not mere thematic overlap; (3) The “average observer” test—whether a viewer perceives the subsequent work as a copy—is a key determinant; (4) Different treatments of a shared theme preclude infringement; and (5) Film adaptations of plays face a higher evidentiary burden due to their expansive medium, but a totality of impression can prove piracy. These principles remain foundational in Indian copyright jurisprudence.

Case Title: R.G. Anand Vs Delux Films & Ors.

Date of Order: August 18, 1978

Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 2030 of 1968

Neutral Citation: 1978 AIR 1613, 1979 SCR (1) 218, 1978 SCC (4) 118

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Syed Murtaza Fazalali, Jaswant Singh, R.S. Pathak

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pidilite Industries Limited Vs. Riya Chemy

Trade Mark Infringement, Passing Off, and Trade Dress Protection

Introduction: In the fiercely competitive realm of intellectual property, where brands are built on trust and distinctiveness, the clash between Pidilite Industries Limited and Riya Chemy over the marks "M-SEAL" and "R-SEAL" offers a gripping narrative of legal ingenuity and commercial rivalry. Heard before the Bombay High Court in 2022, this case encapsulates the tension between established trade mark rights and alleged imitators, weaving together issues of trade mark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off. At stake was not just the sanctity of a renowned brand but also the broader principles governing how courts protect intellectual assets in a crowded marketplace. This case study dives into the intricate details of the dispute, exploring the factual underpinnings, procedural maneuvers, legal arguments, judicial precedents, and the court’s ultimate reasoning, culminating in a decision that reaffirms the robustness of trade mark law in India.

Detailed Factual Background:Pidilite Industries Limited, a titan in the sealants and adhesives industry since 1969, traces its legacy to the mark "M-SEAL," conceived in 1968 by its predecessors, Mahindra Van Wijk and Visser Ltd. (later Mahindra Electrochemical Products Ltd.). Acquired by Pidilite in 2000 with its goodwill intact, "M-SEAL" has since become a household name, synonymous with quality sealants. The mark, registered as early as August 16, 1972 (No. 282168), boasts a user claim from December 1, 1968, and spans multiple classes with variations like "M-SEAL Phataphat" and "M-SEAL Superfast." Its distinctive packaging—featuring a white, blue, and red color scheme, stylized red "M-SEAL" lettering with an underlining flourish, the tagline "SEALS JOINS FIXES BUILDS," and the sub-mark "PHATAPHAT"—is protected by both trade mark and copyright registrations. Pidilite’s extensive sales, exceeding crores of rupees, and substantial promotional investments underscore the mark’s market dominance and public recognition.

Enter Riya Chemy, the defendant, whose sealant product under the mark "R-SEAL" emerged in December 2020, catching Pidilite’s attention. The "R-SEAL" mark mirrors "M-SEAL" in style, with a disjuncted "R" underlined similarly, and its packaging echoes Pidilite’s color scheme, layout, and tagline (albeit reversed as "BUILDS FIXES JOINS SEALS"), alongside the sub-mark "JHAT-PAT." Riya Chemy secured trade mark registrations for "R-SEAL" (Nos. 860804 and 860805) in Class 1, claiming use since 1999, though its earliest invoices date to 2005. Pidilite alleges blatant copying, pointing to structural, phonetic, and visual similarities, and accuses Riya Chemy of exploiting its goodwill. Riya Chemy counters that "SEAL" is generic, its mark distinct, and its long use precludes confusion, setting the stage for a legal showdown.

Detailed Procedural Background

The dispute crystallized with Pidilite filing Commercial IP Suit No. 147 of 2022 in the Bombay High Court, accompanied by Interim Application (L) No. 15502 of 2021, seeking ad-interim relief against Riya Chemy’s use of "R-SEAL." Prior to the suit, Pidilite issued a cease-and-desist notice on December 15, 2020, met with Riya Chemy’s refusal on December 19, 2020. On April 9, 2021, Pidilite filed rectification applications before the Trade Marks Registry to cancel Riya Chemy’s registrations, alleging fraud—a matter still pending. 

Issues Involved in the Case: The case raised a constellation of legal questions pivotal to intellectual property law: Was "R-SEAL" deceptively similar to "M-SEAL," infringing Pidilite’s registered trade marks under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999? Did Riya Chemy’s packaging reproduce Pidilite’s copyrighted "M-SEAL" label, violating Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957? Did Riya Chemy’s actions constitute passing off by misrepresenting its goods as Pidilite’s, damaging its goodwill? Could Riya Chemy’s registrations be challenged as fraudulent at the interim stage? Did disclaimers on "SEAL" in Pidilite’s registrations weaken its exclusivity claims? Was "SEAL" or the color scheme common to the trade, diluting Pidilite’s rights? Finally, did the balance of convenience favor interim relief, considering prior use, honesty of adoption, and potential harm?

Detailed Submission of Parties

Pidilite argued that "R-SEAL" infringed its "M-SEAL" registrations under Sections 29(2)(b) and 29(4), citing structural, phonetic, and visual similarities—particularly the stylized underlining—and its use on identical goods. Kamod asserted that Riya Chemy’s label replicated "M-SEAL’s" essential features, infringing its copyright, and that minor variations were irrelevant under settled law. He accused Riya Chemy of passing off, leveraging "M-SEAL’s" reputation through identical trade dress, taglines, and the confusingly similar "JHAT-PAT." Pidilite’s prior use since 1968, bolstered by its 1972 registration and 2000 assignment with goodwill, was emphasized, dismissing Riya Chemy’s 1999 user claim for lack of evidence pre-2005. Kamod argued that disclaimers on "SEAL" did not diminish protection, citing judicial precedent, and that Riya Chemy’s failure to search the registry or prove "SEAL’s" generic status underscored its mala fides. He sought an injunction, asserting a prima facie case, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

Riya Chemy  countered that Pidilite’s assignment details were unproven, questioning its pre-2000 use claims and alleging fraudulent backdated user claims for "Phataphat" and "Superfast." Ramakrishnan claimed "R-SEAL" use since 1999, supported by 2005 invoices and affidavits, with earlier records lost due to a shift to Tally ERP. He argued "SEAL" was generic, disclaimed in Pidilite’s registration, and that "R-SEAL’s" distinct presentation—featuring a star and "Riya"—avoided confusion. On copyright, he denied substantial similarity, noting differences in layout and asserting prior use since 1999. Ramakrishnan defended its registrations as legally obtained, unchallenged by "M-SEAL" in examination reports, and argued against interim relief, citing potential business ruin (80-85% of sales from "R-SEAL") versus Pidilite’s broader portfolio.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:Pidilite relied on Pidilite Industries Limited v. S.M. Associates & Ors., 2004 (28) PTC 193 (Bom) to affirm "M-SEAL’s" protection despite disclaimers, where the court upheld injunctive relief against "S M-Seal," emphasizing whole-mark comparison. Cadilla Healthcare Limited v. Cadilla Pharmaceuticals Limited, 2001 (2) PTC 541 (SC) supported focusing on common features over minor differences, originally applied to medicinal marks but extended here. Jagdish Gopal Kamath & Ors. v. Lime & Chilli Hospitality Services, 2015 (62) PTC 23 (Bom) reinforced that trivial distinctions do not avert confusion and that generic claims require extensive third-party use evidence, which Riya Chemy lacked. Lupin v. Johnson & Johnson, AIR 2015 Bom 50 and Pidilite Industries Limited v. Poma-Ex Products, 2017 (72) PTC 1 (Bom) empowered courts to override fraudulent registrations at the interim stage, relevant to Riya Chemy’s contested marks. ITC Limited v. NTC Industries Ltd., MANU/MH/2559/2015 and Aglowmed Limited v. Aglow Pharmaceuticals Private Limited, MANU/MH/2075/2019 underscored that acquiescence must be pleaded, absent here. Cadilla Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Sami Khatib, MANU/MH/0497/2011 negated honesty as a defense to infringement, while Bal Pharma Ltd. v. Centaur Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., 2002 (24) PTC 226 (Bom) (DB) faulted Riya Chemy’s lack of due diligence. Serum Institute of India Limited v. Green Signal Bio Pharma Pvt. Ltd., 2011 (6) Bom CR 82 and Pidilite Industries Limited v. Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products Limited bolstered whole-mark protection and estoppel arguments.

Riya Chemy cited Hamdard National Foundation (India) & Anr. v. Sadar Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., CS COMM 551/2020, 9th January 2022 (Del), where peaceful coexistence negated confusion, though its relevance was limited by dissimilar facts. Ramakrishnan distinguished Pidilite’s cases: Lupin involved stayed proceedings post-interim relief, unlike here; Poma-Ex hinged on identical colors absent in "R-SEAL"; Jubilant featured withdrawn applications; Sami Khatib and Aglowmed were inapposite due to medicinal or acquiescence contexts; and S.M. Associates involved closer mimicry than "R-SEAL."

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court  prima facie affirmed Pidilite as the prior user, tracing "M-SEAL" to 1968 via its 1972 registration (No. 282168), with the 2000 assignment under Sections 38 and 42 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, preserving goodwill and historical use. Riya Chemy’s 1999 claim faltered for lack of pre-2005 evidence, with 2005 invoices and vague affidavits insufficient against Pidilite’s documented legacy, judicially noticed in S.M. Associates.

Comparing the marks, court found "R-SEAL" deceptively similar to "M-SEAL" in structure, phonetics, and stylization, with identical underlining, color schemes, and taglines signaling intent to confuse. He dismissed Riya Chemy’s "natural colors" and "generic SEAL" defenses, noting its failure to prove extensive third-party use per Jagdish Gopal Kamath and S.M. Associates. The defendant’s own registration of "SEAL" as a key feature estopped it from claiming genericness, aligning with Jubilant and Jagdish Gopal Kamath. Disclaimers on "SEAL" were irrelevant, as S.M. Associates and Serum Institute mandated whole-mark comparison, reflecting consumer perception.

Chagla deemed Riya Chemy’s registrations (Nos. 860804, 860805) prima facie fraudulent under Lupin and Poma-Ex, citing concealment of "M-SEAL’s" prior rights, violating Section 11 of the 1999 Act. Riya Chemy’s lack of registry search, per Bal Pharma, underscored its mala fides, negating honest adoption or concurrent use defenses (ITC and Aglowmed). On copyright, the substantial reproduction of "M-SEAL’s" label features met the S.M. Associates threshold, despite minor tweaks. Passing off was evident from the trade dress mimicry, risking Pidilite’s goodwill.

Balancing convenience, Chagla favored Pidilite, given its prima facie case, irreparable harm from dilution, and Riya Chemy’s broader product range mitigating its loss. He rejected Hamdard as factually distinct, upholding settled law over Riya Chemy’s distinctions.

Final Decision: On November 11, 2022, The court granted Interim Application (L) No. 15502 of 2021, issuing injunctions restraining Riya Chemy from using "R-SEAL," its labels, taglines, and trade dress, pending suit disposal. The relief barred infringement of Pidilite’s trade marks (Nos. 282168, etc.), copyright in "M-SEAL" labels, and passing off, with no costs ordered.

Law Settled in This Case:The ruling reinforced that prior use with goodwill transcends assignment dates, disclaimers do not negate whole-mark protection, and fraudulent registrations can be challenged interimly. It affirmed that generic claims require extensive third-party evidence, estoppel applies to contradictory stances, and trade dress copying constitutes passing off, prioritizing consumer perception and statutory rights over minor differences.

Case Title: Pidilite Industries Limited Vs. Riya Chemy:Date of Order: November 11, 2022:Case No.: Interim Application (L) No. 15502 of 2021 in Commercial IP Suit No. 147 of 2022:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction:Name of Judge: Justice R.I. Chagla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pfizer Inc. Vs. Softgel Healthcare Private Limited

Cross-Border Evidence Collection under the Hague Convention

Introduction: In an era where global commerce and intellectual property disputes increasingly transcend national boundaries, the interplay between domestic laws and international judicial cooperation becomes a critical arena of legal exploration. The case of Pfizer Inc. & Ors. v. Softgel Healthcare Private Limited, adjudicated by the Madras High Court in 2025, stands as a compelling testament to this dynamic. This legal battle, rooted in a patent infringement dispute originating in the United States, showcases the intricate mechanisms of the Hague Evidence Convention and the principles of international comity. At its core, the case examines whether an Indian court can compel a third party to produce evidence for a foreign litigation, balancing confidentiality, sovereignty, and the pursuit of justice across jurisdictions. This case study delves into the factual and procedural intricacies, the contentious issues, the arguments of the parties, the judicial precedents invoked, and the reasoning that shaped the final decision, offering a comprehensive analysis of a landmark ruling.

 

Detailed Factual Background:The dispute traces its origins to a patent litigation pending before the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, where Pfizer Inc., along with its affiliates FoldRx Pharmaceuticals, LLC, PF PRISM IMB B.V., and Wyeth LLC (collectively, the petitioners), alleged infringement of their "441 Patent." This patent pertains to Tafamidis 61 mg capsules, marketed under the brand name VYNDAMAX, a drug used to treat Transthyretin Amyloid Cardiomyopathy. The petitioners claimed that two Indian pharmaceutical companies, Cipla and Zenara Pharma Pvt. Ltd. (now Hikma), infringed this patent by submitting Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market generic versions of VYNDAMAX before the patent’s expiration. Specifically, Cipla’s ANDA No. 218409 and Zenara’s ANDA No. 218205 were cited as acts of infringement.

Softgel Healthcare Private Limited, the respondent, emerged as a pivotal entity in this saga despite not being a direct party to the U.S. litigation. The petitioners asserted that Softgel, an Indian company with contractual ties to Cipla and Zenara, possessed critical documents and information related to the ANDA products. These materials were deemed essential to proving the infringement claims in the Delaware court. The petitioners had unsuccessfully sought these documents from Cipla and Zenara in the U.S. proceedings, prompting them to request international judicial assistance via Letters Rogatory issued by the Delaware court on May 13, 2024, under the Hague Evidence Convention of 1970, to which both India and the United States are signatories.

The factual complexity deepened with the respondent’s assertion that the petitioners’ patent application for VYNDAMAX had been rejected by the Indian Patent Office under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, as a new form of a known substance. This rejection fueled Softgel’s contention that the petitioners lacked enforceable patent rights in India, raising questions about the legitimacy of their evidence-seeking expedition in Indian jurisdiction.

Detailed Procedural Background: The procedural journey began in the U.S., where the petitioners, unable to secure the necessary evidence from Cipla and Zenara, sought and obtained Letters Rogatory from the Delaware court. These letters formally requested the Madras High Court to assist in obtaining documents and testimony from Softgel, as outlined in Schedules A and B of the request. The petitioners then filed two original petitions, O.P. (PT) Nos. 5 and 6 of 2024, before the Intellectual Property Division of the Madras High Court under Order XXVI Rules 19-22 and Sections 78 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908. These petitions sought the appointment of a Local Commissioner to collect evidence, the establishment of a Confidentiality Club to protect sensitive information, and the execution of the Letters Rogatory in a manner compliant with Indian law and international obligations.

During the proceedings, confidentiality concerns arose, with Zenara requesting that the Letters Rogatory not be disclosed publicly unless safeguarded by a Confidentiality Club. Consequently, the petitioners filed a redacted version of the Letters Rogatory, seeking permission to submit the unredacted version once protective measures were in place. The respondent, Softgel, mounted a robust defense, challenging the maintainability of the petitions and the propriety of compelling a third party to disclose sensitive commercial data.

Issues Involved in the Case: The case presented a constellation of legal and procedural issues, each layered with international and domestic implications:

Jurisdiction and Maintainability: Could the Madras High Court entertain petitions to execute Letters Rogatory against a third party not involved in the U.S. litigation?

Scope of the Hague Convention: Did the Hague Evidence Convention permit the collection of both oral and documentary evidence from a non-party, and were the petitioners’ requests compliant with its provisions, particularly Articles 3, 9, 12, 23, and 39?

Conflict with Domestic Law: Did the rejection of the petitioners’ patent application in India under the Patents Act, 1970, preclude the court from assisting in evidence collection for a foreign patent dispute?

Confidentiality and Commercial Interests: Could the court balance the petitioners’ need for evidence with the respondent’s right to protect confidential research and development data?

Specificity and Proportionality: Were the documents sought in the Letters Rogatory sufficiently specific, or did they constitute an impermissible “fishing expedition” under Article 23 of the Hague Convention?

International Comity: How should the court weigh the principles of international judicial cooperation against India’s sovereignty and the respondent’s commercial interests?

Detailed Submission of Parties:The petitioners, argued that the Letters Rogatory were a legitimate tool under the Hague Convention to secure evidence critical to their U.S. litigation. They emphasized that Softgel, despite being a third party, held documents vital to proving infringement by Cipla and Zenara, as confirmed by Cipla’s suggestion in the U.S. proceedings that such materials could be obtained from Softgel. They contended that Order XXVI Rules 19-22 and Section 78 of the CPC empowered the court to issue a commission for evidence collection, and that the Hague Convention supported both oral and documentary evidence procurement. To address confidentiality concerns, they proposed a Confidentiality Club and in-camera proceedings, aligning with the protective order issued by the Delaware court. They further argued that the Indian Patent Office’s rejection was irrelevant, as their claim was limited to evidence collection, not enforcement of patent rights in India.

The respondent countered with a multi-pronged defense. They asserted that as a non-party to the U.S. litigation, Softgel could not be compelled to produce evidence, especially given the absence of an infringement claim against it. They invoked Article 11(1) of the Hague Convention, arguing that participation could be refused if it conflicted with domestic laws or sovereignty, and Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement to protect confidential data integral to their pharmaceutical research. They highlighted the Indian Patent Office’s rejection of the petitioners’ application, contending that it negated their right to seek evidence in India for a patent unenforceable domestically. They labeled the petitioners’ requests as vague and disproportionate, constituting a “fishing expedition” barred by Article 23, and warned that disclosure would disproportionately harm their commercial interests and those of their collaborators.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:Both parties relied on a rich tapestry of judicial precedents to bolster their arguments, each cited with specific relevance to the case’s issues:

Aventis Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Inc., MANU/AP/0650/2008 (Andhra Pradesh High Court): Cited by the petitioners, this case upheld the enforcement of Letters Rogatory to collect evidence from an Indian entity for a foreign patent dispute. The court ruled that Indian courts could assist under the CPC and the Hague Convention, provided no violation of domestic law occurred. The petitioners used this to argue that precedent favored their request.

Pfizer Inc. v. Unimark Remedies Limited, 2016 SCC Online Bom 8599 (Bombay High Court): Another petitioner-cited case, it affirmed the execution of Letters Rogatory for evidence collection in a patent matter, emphasizing the Hague Convention’s role in facilitating international cooperation. The court allowed evidence from a third party, supporting the petitioners’ stance that Softgel’s status as a non-party was immaterial.

Wooster Products Inc. v. Magna Tek Inc. and Others, MANU/DEL/0102/1988 (Delhi High Court): The petitioners referenced this ruling, where the court permitted evidence collection via Letters Rogatory, reinforcing that Indian courts have a duty to assist foreign proceedings absent legal prohibitions. It underscored the liberal interpretation of CPC provisions.

Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, Roskill LJ A.C. 133 (House of Lords): The petitioners invoked this English precedent, which established that a third party innocently involved in a tortious act must assist the injured party by disclosing information. They argued that Softgel, linked contractually to Cipla and Zenara, had a similar duty.

Leighton International Limited v. Gavin John Hodge and Others, 2014 SCC Online Guj 15738 (Gujarat High Court): Cited by the respondent, this decision limited evidence collection to oral testimony, rejecting broad documentary requests as prejudicial to third parties. Softgel used this to argue against compelled disclosure of sensitive data.

Fenix Diamonds LLC v. Carnegie Institute of Washington, 2020 SCC Online Guj 1628 (Gujarat High Court): The respondent relied on this case, where the court restricted Letters Rogatory execution to parties in the foreign litigation, refusing broad discovery from non-parties. It supported their claim that the petitions were maintainable only against Cipla and Zenara.

Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (U.S. Supreme Court): Both parties cited this landmark ruling, which outlined five factors for assessing international comity in discovery requests: importance of the evidence, specificity, origin, alternative means, and impact on national interests. The petitioners argued these factors favored their request, while the respondent contended they highlighted the lack of specificity and harm to Indian interests.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court's reasoning was a meticulous blend of statutory interpretation, international law, and judicial precedent, culminating in a decision that prioritized international cooperation while safeguarding confidentiality. He began by affirming the court’s jurisdiction under Order XXVI Rules 19-22 and Section 78 of the CPC, which empower High Courts to issue commissions for evidence collection at the behest of foreign courts in civil proceedings. He interpreted “evidence” broadly, encompassing both oral and documentary forms, rejecting the Gujarat High Court’s narrower view in Leighton and Fenix Diamonds as inconsistent with the CPC and the Hague Convention’s intent.

The judge analyzed the Hague Convention’s provisions, noting that Article 3 required specificity in evidence requests, which the Letters Rogatory satisfied by listing documents in Schedules A and B. He dismissed the respondent’s vagueness objection as premature, delegating specificity disputes to the Local Commissioner. Article 12’s grounds for refusal—lack of judicial function or prejudice to sovereignty—were deemed inapplicable, as the request fell within the court’s powers and no national security threat was evidenced. Article 23’s limitation on pre-trial discovery was inapplicable, as the documents were specified, aligning with India’s declaration.

Addressing the respondent’s domestic law argument the court held that the Indian Patent Office’s rejection was irrelevant, as the petitions sought evidence, not patent enforcement in India. He distinguished the Gujarat precedents, noting their post-commissioner contexts, and aligned with the Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, and Delhi rulings, which supported evidence collection absent legal violations. The Aerospatiale factors were applied: the documents’ importance to the U.S. litigation was clear, their specificity was ascertainable by the Commissioner, they originated in India, no alternative sources were proven, and no significant Indian interest was undermined.

Confidentiality concerns were meticulously addressed through the establishment of a Confidentiality Club, in-camera proceedings, and sealed records, ensuring compliance with the Delaware court’s protective order and Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement. The judge rejected the “fishing expedition” claim, emphasizing the petitioners’ categorical assertion—unrebutted by evidence—that Softgel uniquely possessed the documents. International comity, reinforced by the Hague Convention, compelled the court to assist, balancing the petitioners’ justice-seeking needs with Softgel’s commercial interests through protective measures.

Final Decision: The Madras High Court allowed both petitions on January 28, 2025, issuing comprehensive directions. It appointed Mr. Adarsh Ramanujam as Local Commissioner (replacing Ms. Vindhya S.Mani due to a conflict) to collect evidence and testimony as per the Letters Rogatory, conferring special powers to summon, record, and transcribe. A Confidentiality Club was established with named members from both sides, proceedings were ordered in-camera, and documents were to be sealed, accessible only to club members. The evidence was to be forwarded to the Delaware court in a sealed cover, with the petitioners bearing costs and the Commissioner’s remuneration set at Rs. 2,00,000 initially.

Law Settled in This Case: This ruling clarified several legal principles: Indian courts can compel third parties to produce evidence for foreign litigation under the CPC and Hague Convention, provided no domestic law is violated; “evidence” includes both oral and documentary forms; specificity objections are resolved post-commissioner appointment; and confidentiality can be safeguarded through structured mechanisms like a Confidentiality Club. It reinforced the primacy of international comity in judicial assistance, subordinating domestic patent rejections to the limited scope of evidence collection.

Case Title: Pfizer Inc. & Ors. Vs. Softgel Healthcare Private Limited: Date of Order: January 28, 2025:Case No.: O.P. (PT) Nos. 5 and 6 of 2024:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras:Name of Judge: Justice Abdul Quddhose

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Dolby International AB & Anr. v. Lava International Ltd.

Case Title: Dolby International AB & Anr. v. Lava International Ltd.

Date of Order: 10 July 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 350/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5426

Court: High Court of Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The plaintiffs, Dolby International AB and Dolby Laboratories Inc., filed a suit seeking permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs against Lava International Ltd., alleging infringement of a suite of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) forming part of Dolby’s Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) technology. Dolby claimed Lava's mobile devices implemented AAC-compliant technologies without procuring appropriate licenses, despite repeated communications since 2018.

The core dispute revolves around Dolby’s assertion that Lava had used AAC-related patents, some expired and others still valid, without entering into a FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) license, even after extensive negotiations. Dolby contended that Lava engaged in dilatory tactics, failed to submit a counter-offer for years, and refused to pay any royalties while continuing to market devices that allegedly used Dolby’s patented technology.

Procedurally, the suit was instituted in 2024, followed by an application for interim relief and a pro tem security deposit under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. On 1 May 2024, the Court gave Lava an opportunity to negotiate and submit a counter-offer. After failed negotiations, the Court directed Lava on 22 May 2024 to deposit ₹5.13 per device as volunteered by them, pending a formal determination.

The Court, after examining the prolonged negotiations, Dolby’s multiple offers, claim charts, licensing history with other manufacturers, and the absence of a timely counter-offer from Lava, held that Lava had acted as an unwilling licensee and indulged in patent holdout. The Court found that Dolby had complied with its FRAND obligations, whereas Lava had not reciprocated in good faith.

Rejecting Lava’s belated challenges on patent validity and essentiality, the Court emphasized that such issues were not raised during the six-year negotiation window and appeared to be afterthoughts. It held that Dolby had established a prima facie case of validity, essentiality, and infringement through extensive licensing, prior judicial precedents, and technical documentation.

Recognizing the need to balance equities and prevent Lava from gaining an unfair market advantage, the Court allowed Dolby’s application for a pro tem security order. It directed Lava to continue depositing ₹5.13 per device sold, as an interim measure, until the final adjudication of the suit. The judgment reaffirmed the Delhi High Court’s authority to grant such pro tem measures in SEP litigation to maintain the balance between implementers and patent holders.

Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Case Title: Kishore Chhabra v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others

Date of Order: 08 July 2025

Case Number: Criminal Revision No. 408 of 2015

Neutral Citation: 2025:MPHC-IND:17175

Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore

Judge: Hon'ble Shri Justice Gajendra Singh

This Criminal Revision was preferred by the petitioner under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 CrPC challenging the legality of the order dated 18.03.2015 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, whereby the charges framed under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 420 IPC by the JMFC, Ujjain in Criminal Case No. 5042 of 2013 were set aside and the accused persons were discharged.

The petitioner, Kishore Chhabra, had obtained a patent for an invention titled "Oil Chamber Cleaning Machine" effective from 08.08.2006. He later obtained a copyright registration for the same as a literary work under the title "Rock Engine Oil Chamber Cleaning Machine" on 19.01.2009. An FIR was registered by the petitioner on 17.07.2013 under Crime No. 607/2013 against the respondents, who were allegedly manufacturing similar machines through their firms Speed Engine and Mahalaxmi Engineering. It was alleged that the respondents’ products infringed upon the petitioner’s patent and copyright and were intended to deceive customers, thereby attracting charges under Section 420 IPC and Section 63 of the Copyright Act.

After submission of the final police report, charges were framed by the JMFC. However, during trial, the respondents filed an application under Section 216 CrPC contending that no copyright or patent infringement had occurred, the machines were different, and the subject machine was an unprotectable assembled product. They claimed the copyright was wrongfully obtained and the issue was purely civil in nature. The application was rejected by the trial court.

Subsequently, the respondents filed a revision before the Sessions Court, which on 18.03.2015, allowed their plea, setting aside the trial court’s order and discharging them. The Sessions Judge held that once a design is capable of registration under the Designs Act and has been exploited more than fifty times industrially, copyright protection ceases as per Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. It was also held that no literary work had been filed with the complaint and hence no case under Section 63 was made out.

The petitioner approached the High Court against the Sessions Court’s order, arguing that both patent and copyright registrations existed independently and that the prosecution version did disclose a prima facie case. He further argued that the Revisional Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining a discharge application indirectly through Section 216 CrPC, despite an earlier rejection under Section 227 CrPC.

The High Court accepted the petitioner’s contentions. It held that the copyright registration being subsequent to the grant of patent was legally sustainable and the factual questions regarding industrial reproduction and design eligibility could only be determined by evidence at trial. It also held that no literary work need be annexed at the stage of complaint to sustain a charge under Section 63. Citing Supreme Court precedent in K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2283, the Court emphasized that Section 216 CrPC does not permit backdoor discharge and the Sessions Court’s interference at the charge stage was unwarranted.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision, set aside the order dated 18.03.2015 passed by the Sessions Court, and directed restoration of Criminal Case No. 5042/2013 before the trial court, with further proceedings to continue from where they stood. The respondents were directed to appear before the trial court on 04.08.2025.

Sita Ram Iron Foundry and Engineering Works v. Hindustan Technocast (P) Ltd

Rectification of Trademark Register: The Threshold of Proof in Allegations of Fraud and Fabrication

Introduction:The case of Sita Ram Iron Foundry and Engineering Works v. Hindustan Technocast (P) Ltd. & Anr. raises significant questions of trademark ownership, assignment validity, and the burden of proof in rectification proceedings under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petitioner sought cancellation of the trademark “BADAL” registered in favour of Hindustan Technocast, alleging fraud and impropriety in the chain of title. Delhi High Court adjudicated the matter and delivered the judgment on 9 July 2025 in C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 150/2021.

Factual Background:The petitioner, M/s Sita Ram Iron Foundry, a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing and marketing of Toka machines, is the registered proprietor of the trademark “GHANGHOR BADAL”, applied for in 2013 and registered in 2017 under Class 07. The petitioner has claimed continuous use since 2002. The impugned mark “BADAL”, originally registered in 2000 by M/s Jodh Singh Sehmbey and Sons, was later claimed to have been assigned to Mr. Iqbal Singh Sehmbey in 2006, and subsequently to Hindustan Technocast in 2011. The petitioner alleged that these assignments were fraudulent and defective, and that the respondent had wrongly obtained the registration.

Procedural Background:The present rectification petition was originally filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and was transferred to the Delhi High Court following the abolition of IPAB via the Tribunals Reforms Ordinance, 2021. The petition was filed under Sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trade Marks Act. It arose as a consequence of proceedings in a suit for trademark infringement filed by the respondent in the District Court, Jind, Haryana, where the petitioner is defendant no. 2. The Jind Court had stayed proceedings under Section 124 of the Act to await the outcome of the rectification petition.

Core Dispute:The core issue was whether the respondent’s trademark “BADAL” had been fraudulently assigned and registered in its name, thereby warranting rectification of the Register? The petitioner challenged the authenticity of two assignment deeds – one dated 25 May 2006 (from the original firm to Mr. Iqbal Singh Sehmbey) and another dated 12 April 2011 (from Iqbal Singh to Hindustan Technocast). The petitioner alleged that the first assignment was self-dealing, and the second was riddled with irregularities, including multiple conflicting versions.

Discussion on Judgments:The petitioner relied on Anshul Vaish v. Hari Om, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 664, where fabricated user documents were found to undermine the respondent’s claim. The Court, in that case, held the user documents to be forged as they referred to a TIN number issued after the alleged use date.

The petitioner also cited Gandhi Scientific Co. v. Gulshan Kumar, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 820, and Khushi Ram Behari Lal v. Jaswant Singh Balwant Singh, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6702, to argue that obvious manipulation in assignment records could render registrations void ab initio.

In contrast, the Court relied heavily on Safari International v. Subhash Gupta, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1767, where the Division Bench held that fraud must be pleaded with specificity and proved with cogent evidence. Mere allegations or suspicion do not suffice to cancel a registered mark.

Further, the Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in A.C. Ananthaswamy v. Boraiah, (2004) 8 SCC 588, reiterating that allegations of fraud require high standards of proof—akin to criminal trials.

The Court also relied on Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, (2024) 4 SCC 696, and Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396, to emphasize that a plaintiff cannot succeed merely because the defendant did not file a written statement. The burden remains on the petitioner to prove its own case.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Court held that no conclusive evidence was brought on record by the petitioner to prove that the assignment deeds were fraudulent. The petitioner’s contention that Mr. Iqbal Singh Sehmbey executed an assignment deed in both capacities—as assignor and assignee—was found insufficient, as no partner or member of the HUF had contested this claim. The Registrar had also accepted Form TM-16 and TM-24 filed in support of this ownership transfer.

On the second assignment to Hindustan Technocast, the Court noted that although two versions of the same deed were placed on record, it required trial-level inquiry to determine which was genuine. Rectification under Section 57 could not be based on mere allegations without trial.

The Court clarified that even in cases where the respondent did not file a reply, the burden still lies with the petitioner to prove the pleaded case with substantive evidence. The Court underscored that the petitioner must succeed on the strength of its own case, not by highlighting deficiencies in the respondent’s position.

Further, the Court observed that the “BADAL” trademark was claimed to have been in use since 1945. Given such long-standing use, a high degree of scrutiny was necessary before cancelling it. The petitioner neither alleged non-use nor similarity, and the Registrar had already acknowledged the coexistence by granting registration to “GHANGHOR BADAL”.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court dismissed the rectification petition, holding that the allegations of fraud were not substantiated by evidence strong enough to warrant cancellation of a trademark with a legacy dating back to 1945. The Court concluded that disputed facts around assignment could only be decided through trial, and such a rectification proceeding was not the appropriate forum for that purpose.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reaffirms the legal position that rectification of the Register under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act requires a strong evidentiary foundation, particularly when allegations of fraud are made. Mere procedural anomalies or the absence of opposition from the respondent do not relieve the petitioner of the burden of proof. The judgment strengthens the principle that registration enjoys a presumption of validity and can only be rebutted through cogent, credible, and admissible evidence. Furthermore, it affirms that long-standing use of a mark (here since 1945) cannot be lightly interfered with, especially in the absence of proof of deceit or fabrication.

Case Title: Sita Ram Iron Foundry and Engineering Works v. Hindustan Technocast (P) Ltd. & Anr.:Date of Order: 09 July 2025:Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 150/2021:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5395:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi :Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. V-Guard Industries Ltd

Self-Contradiction as Estoppel: When Design Registration Bars Invalidity Claims

Introduction:In the case of Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. V-Guard Industries Ltd., the Delhi High Court addressed a critical legal issue concerning the enforceability of design rights and the scope of permissible challenges to registered designs. The matter pertained to allegations of design piracy under the Designs Act, 2000, and whether a defendant, who had itself obtained design registration for a substantially similar design, could subsequently challenge the plaintiff’s registered design on the ground of prior publication. 

Factual Background: Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. (“the plaintiff”) held three design registrations (Nos. 296178, 296179, and 296180) for its “LYNCUS” range of switch plates. The plaintiff alleged that V-Guard Industries Ltd. (“the defendant”) was infringing these registered designs through its “MATTEO” range of switch plates. The novelty of the plaintiff’s designs resided in their unique shape and configuration, including a convex central surface tapering towards thumb-pressed corners, and a distinctive concave-cum-convex periphery. These designs were registered in 2017 but deemed effective from 27 July 2017, the date of application.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff instituted the suit under Section 22 of the Designs Act, 2000, for piracy of its registered designs and sought an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC through IA No. 14683/2021. The defendant contested the interim relief by asserting that the plaintiff's designs were not novel and had been disclosed to the public before registration, thereby invoking Section 4(b) and Section 19(1)(b) read with Section 22(3) of the Designs Act to question the design’s validity.

Core Dispute:The principal legal issue was whether the defendant could claim the plaintiff’s registered design to be invalid for want of novelty and prior publication, especially when the defendant itself had secured registration for a similar design allegedly based on the same source, i.e., “Concept 6” shared by their OEM supplier, NIPA International Pvt. Ltd.

Discussion on Judgments:To support its contention that the plaintiff’s design lacked novelty, the defendant cited prior correspondence with NIPA, which had shared ten design concepts, including “Concept 6”, in December 2016 and February 2017. The defendant argued that this prior communication constituted “publication in tangible form” under Section 4(b) of the Act. They relied on principles from Rosedale Associated Manufacturers Ltd. v. Airfix Products Ltd. [1957 RPC 239 (CA)], as cited in Diageo Brands B.V. v. Alcobrew Distilleries India Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4499, to argue that publication does not require a physical product but merely visibility of the design to a person skilled in the art.

In response, the plaintiff relied on Pantel Kabushiki Kaisha v. Arora Stationers, (2019) 79 PTC 429 (Del)(DB), to assert that the defendant, having itself registered a design similar to the plaintiff’s, was estopped from challenging its validity. The plaintiff also contested that “Concept 6” was merely a preliminary concept never applied to an article, and hence not a “design” under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The court rejected the defendant’s reliance on the email communications and design concepts on several grounds. Firstly, he clarified that for a publication to constitute prior art under Section 4(b), it must involve a tangible article to which a design has been applied, as per the statutory definition under Sections 2(a) and 2(d) of the Designs Act. The Court held that “Concept 6” remained a mere idea illustrated via computer-generated images, and there was no evidence of its actual application to an article prior to the plaintiff’s filing date.

Secondly, the Court found no material to show that “Concept 6” was finalized or that it bore the precise shape and configuration claimed in the plaintiff’s registrations. The presentation slide from the defendant’s internal meeting on 3 March 2017 indicated that Concept 6 was under review and required modifications before any adoption.

Thirdly, the Court emphasized the estoppel principle, noting that the defendant, having obtained registration for its own switch plate design, could not now impugn the validity of the plaintiff’s registration based on alleged prior disclosure of the same “Concept 6”.

Lastly, regarding other allegedly similar prior registered designs (e.g., Luminous Designs No. 277682 and 277683), the Court declined to consider them as grounds for invalidation, noting that only perspective views were presented and they were insufficient for a meaningful design comparison.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court held that the plaintiff’s registered designs had not been shown to be invalid on account of prior publication under Section 4(b) of the Designs Act. The Court restrained the defendants, their directors, distributors, and agents from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in switch plates bearing the impugned designs or any obvious or fraudulent imitation thereof, pending final adjudication of the suit. IA 14683/2021 was allowed accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:This decision reinforces the principle that a party who has itself obtained design registration is estopped from challenging the validity of a similar registered design on grounds of prior publication. It also clarifies that mere conceptual illustrations or computer-generated images do not constitute “publication in tangible form” under Section 4(b) unless they have been applied to a physical article. For a design to be invalidated for lack of novelty, concrete evidence of its prior tangible use or disclosure must be presented.

Case Title: Novateur Electrical & Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. V-Guard Industries Ltd.:Date of Order: 04 January 2023:Case Number: CS(COMM) 567/2021:Neutral Citation: 2023/DHC/000106:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Belvedere Resources DMCC Vs. OCL Iron and Steel Ltd

Belvedere Resources DMCC Vs. OCL Iron and Steel Ltd. & Ors. | Date of Order: 01 July 2025 | Case No.: O.M.P.(I)(COMM.) 397/2024 | Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5128 | Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi | Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jasmeet Singh

Belvedere Resources DMCC, a UAE-based coal trading company, filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking interim relief against OCL Iron and Steel Ltd. (R1) and its group entities for securing a claim of USD 2,777,000 (approx. ₹23.34 crore). The petitioner alleged wrongful repudiation of a coal supply contract initially entered into with S.M. Niryat Pvt. Ltd. (SMN), which later amalgamated with R1 pursuant to an NCLT order dated 30 January 2024.

The factual matrix reveals that the agreement for supply of coal was concluded through electronic exchanges and WhatsApp communications in October 2022, incorporating terms based on the Standard Coal Trading Agreement (SCoTA), which included an arbitration clause with Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) as the seat. The petitioner nominated the vessel MV GLYFADA for delivery, but SMN purportedly cancelled the contract on 15 November 2022 without payment or performance. Arbitration proceedings were later initiated in June 2024 under SIAC.

Before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court in November 2024 seeking interim protection including attachment of assets, furnishing of security, and disclosure of bank accounts. The respondent contested the maintainability of the petition on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction, absence of a concluded arbitration agreement, and non-fulfilment of the legal standard for interim relief under Section 9 of the Act.

Justice Jasmeet Singh, after considering the communications and conduct of the parties, held that a valid arbitration agreement existed under Section 7(4)(b) of the Act through electronic correspondence. However, the Court ruled that it did not have territorial jurisdiction since no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi and the mere existence of a branch office of R1 in Delhi, which had no role in the transaction, was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

On the merits, the Court declined to grant interim relief. It held that the claim was for unliquidated damages due to breach of contract and did not constitute a "debt due" warranting security under Section 9. The petitioner failed to satisfy the stringent preconditions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, such as showing intent of the respondent to dispose of assets to defeat a potential award. The Court noted that commercial borrowing or the respondent’s previous insolvency proceedings were not grounds for presuming mala fide asset dissipation.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition for interim relief, clarifying that its findings would not affect the arbitration proceedings.

Reliance Retail Limited Vs. Ashok Kumar

Case Title: Reliance Retail Limited Vs. Ashok Kumar :Date of Order: 07 July 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 647/2025:Court: High Court of Delhi:Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Reliance Retail Limited, part of Reliance Industries Ltd., approached the Delhi High Court seeking urgent ex parte relief to curb large-scale fraudulent activities being conducted using its registered trademark “Tira” and variants thereof. The company alleged that unknown entities (Defendant No. 1), by impersonating its representatives through mobile and WhatsApp communications, were deceiving consumers into making online payments via UPI and QR codes for fictitious products and services. The fraud was being perpetrated using the plaintiff’s name and marks to lend credibility to these transactions, often citing fabricated gift cards, false cancellations, and fake payment failures.

The plaintiff highlighted that it launched the “Tira” brand in April 2023 in the beauty and personal care sector and had since acquired significant goodwill. Trademark registrations existed for “Tira” and its variants across multiple classes under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Complaints were pouring in nationwide, with over 8,900 cases reported in just two months—666 of them from Delhi alone—indicating organized and widespread consumer deception causing financial losses exceeding ₹41 lakhs.

The procedural history reflects that the Court exempted the plaintiff from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and granted other procedural exemptions given the urgency and public interest involved. Reliance Retail also impleaded telecom companies (Defendants 2–4), WhatsApp (Defendant 5), NPCI (Defendant 6), and relevant Government Ministries (Defendants 7 and 8) for effective execution of any future injunctions and to identify the persons behind the fraudulent mobile numbers and UPI accounts.

Upon examining the pleadings, documents, and urgency of the matter, the Court found prima facie evidence of impersonation, misrepresentation, and misuse of the plaintiff’s trademarks. It observed that Defendant No. 1's activities were deliberate, calculated, and harmful to both the plaintiff and the general public.

The Court, therefore, granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining Defendant No. 1 and all related persons from using “Tira” or any deceptive variants. Further, it directed telecom operators to block and disclose details of the rogue numbers, WhatsApp to suspend related accounts and disclose user information, and NPCI to freeze and disclose information about UPI and QR code holders involved. It also directed all defendants to act similarly for any future rogue entities identified by the plaintiff.