Mangalam Organics Ltd Vs N Ranga Rao And Sons Pvt Ltd

When Courts Won't Go Behind Trademark Registration

Facts:The case involves Mangalam Organics Ltd (the Plaintiff), a company dealing in camphor-based products, suing N Ranga Rao And Sons Pvt Ltd (the Defendant), another company in the fragrance and sanitary products industry, for trademark infringement and passing off. The Plaintiff claimed it created the trademark "CAMPURE" (and its stylized logo) around March 2017 for camphor-related items like deodorants, air fresheners, soaps, hair products, and sanitary toiletries where camphor is the key ingredient. The Plaintiff registered this mark in Classes 3, 4, and 5 under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with registrations dating back to 2017, and these remain valid. 

In 2014, the Plaintiff launched a unique cone-shaped camphor product under its "MANGALAM" brand, wrapped in non-woven fabric, and started using "CAMPURE" for this in 2017. In December 2022, the Plaintiff learned the Defendant might launch a similar cone-shaped product and sent a cease-and-desist notice. The Defendant replied, denying any trademark issues and noting the Plaintiff's cone shape wasn't uniquely registered. No such product appeared from the Defendant at that time.

In July 2024, while checking trademark records, the Plaintiff discovered the Defendant's registration for "AIR KARPURE" (No. 4732154, dated November 4, 2020, in Class 5, on a proposed-to-be-used basis) and similar device marks. The Defendant's website (www.karpure.in) showed use of "AIR KARPURE" (with "AIR" in small font and "KARPURE" prominent) for camphor products like air fresheners, pouches, tablets, mosquito repellents, and personal care items. The Plaintiff filed for rectification/cancellation of the Defendant's mark on August 1, 2024, and the Defendant countered in January 2025, claiming adoption in 2020 and use since 2022.

The Defendant, established in 1948 as a family business and incorporated in 2014, has well-known marks like "CYCLE" (recognized by courts) and uses taglines emphasizing "purity" (e.g., "Purity of Prayers"). It claimed "KARPURE" combines "Karpura" (Sanskrit for camphor) and "Pure," adopted honestly in 2020. The Defendant has registrations in Classes 5 and 11, with sales of Rs. 479 lakhs in 2024-25 under the mark. It argued no infringement suit lies against a registered proprietor and accused the Plaintiff of concealing an opposition to its own "CAMPURE" registration by a third party (Lifestar Pharma for "CALAPURE"), where the Plaintiff had argued no monopoly over "PURE" and settled by restricting goods. The Defendant also claimed dissimilarity in marks and delay in the Plaintiff's suit.

In reply, the Plaintiff argued the Court could question the Defendant's registration at the interim stage due to fraud (e.g., wrong class), similarity in marks as wholes, no estoppel from prior opposition (as "CALAPURE" was dissimilar), no delay (2022 notice was only for cone shape), and jurisdiction as products are sold online in Bombay.

Dispute:The main dispute was whether the Defendant's "AIR KARPURE"/"KARPURE" marks infringed the Plaintiff's "CAMPURE" mark or amounted to passing off. The Plaintiff sought an interim injunction to stop the Defendant from using similar marks, logos, or domain names. 

Key issues:- Similarity: Were the marks visually, phonetically, structurally, or conceptually similar enough to cause confusion? - Validity of Defendant's Registration: Could the Court go behind the registration at the interim stage and find it invalid (e.g., ex facie illegal or fraudulent under Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999)?- Infringement: Under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does use by a registered proprietor constitute infringement?- Passing Off: Did the Plaintiff prove goodwill/reputation by 2022, misrepresentation by the Defendant, and likely damage?- Suppression: Did the Plaintiff hide facts about its own prior opposition, leading to estoppel or denial of relief?- Delay/Laches/Acquiescence: Was the suit delayed after the 2022 notice?- Jurisdiction: Did the Bombay High Court have jurisdiction for passing off, given online sales?

The Plaintiff argued phonetic similarity ("CAMPURE" vs "KARPURE"), copied capital "P," similar goods/channels, prior use since 2017, and fraud in Defendant's Class 11 registration (for apparatus, but used for soaps). The Defendant countered with dissimilarity, honest adoption from Sanskrit and "pure" theme, no monopoly on "PURE," valid registrations, no infringement against registered proprietors (Sections 28(3) and 30(2)(e)), suppression by Plaintiff, and no goodwill shown for 2022.

Detailed Reasoning: The Court began by noting this was an interim application for injunction in a trademark infringement and passing off suit. It summarized facts and submissions from both sides, citing various precedents.

On maintainability against a registered proprietor: Since both parties are registered, no infringement remedy lies (citing Corona Remedies Pvt Ltd vs Franco-Indian Pharmaceuticals Pvt Ltd and S Syed Moideen vs Sulochana Bai). The pleadings showed the Plaintiff relied on "deceptive similarity" from Section 29, but this doesn't apply between registered proprietors.

On validity of Defendant's registration: The Plaintiff challenged it under Sections 9(2)(a) (absolute grounds, e.g., deceptive marks) and 11 (relative grounds, e.g., similarity to earlier mark causing confusion). The Court noted registration confers exclusive rights if valid (Section 28), but between identical/similar registered marks, no exclusive right against each other (Section 28(3)) and no infringement (Section 30(2)(e)). Citing Lupin Ltd vs Johnson and Johnson (Full Bench), the Court can question validity at interim stage only in exceptional cases where registration is ex facie illegal, fraudulent, or shocks the conscience—not just an arguable case. The burden is heavy on the challenger.

Comparing marks: The Court reproduced rival marks and found no ex facie illegality. Plaintiff's "CAMPURE" (block letters, tall "P" in elongated shape) vs Defendant's "KARPURE" (cursive, flower "K," contiguous "P"). Visual, structural, and artwork differences (e.g., no slurring "r" to "m"); phonetic dissimilarity; no confusion likely among educated consumers for these products. Defendant's registration passed Sections 9/11 scrutiny (no opposition from Plaintiff). No fraud shown—Class 5 overlaps with Class 3 for fresheners/deodorizers; classifications are administrative (citing Allied Auto Accessories Ltd vs Allied Motors Pvt Ltd). Honest adoption from "Karpura" +"Pure" (Defendant's theme). Precedents like Pidilite cases (exact copying) didn't apply here.

On suppression: Plaintiff hid opposition to its "CAMPURE" by third party ("CALAPURE"), where it argued no monopoly on "PURE" and settled by restricting goods. This is material; non-disclosure disentitles discretionary relief (citing Phonepe Pvt Ltd vs Resilient Innovations Pvt Ltd).

On passing off: Relevant date is Defendant's adoption (2022). Plaintiff must prove goodwill/reputation by then, misrepresentation, and damage. Sales figures/ad expenses were for all camphor products since 2014, not specifically under "CAMPURE" for 2022—no standalone proof of distinctive reputation. No specific pleading on which Defendant products pass off as Plaintiff's (cone shape excluded). Packaging dissimilar (colors, look); no misrepresentation or confusion (citing Ruston & Hornsby Ltd vs Zamindara Engineering Co; no delay defense as mere delay insufficient without acquiescence).

On other points: No delay/laches (2022 notice was for cone shape); jurisdiction exists due to online sales in Bombay. But overall, no prima facie case for injunction.

Decision:The Court dismissed the interim application, refusing the injunction. The Plaintiff failed to prove ex facie invalidity of Defendant's registration or passing off. The Defendant can continue using its registered mark. 

Case Title: Mangalam Organics Ltd Vs N Ranga Rao And Sons Pvt Ltd

Order Date:September 3, 2025

Case Number:Commercial IP Suit No. 194 of 2025

Neutral Citation:2025:BHC-OS:14413

Name of Court:High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. Vs. B. Vijaya Sai

Section 29 (4) of Trademarks Act 1999 applies only to dissimilar goods and not relevant to identical services

Introduction

In the realm of intellectual property, where brands battle for supremacy, Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others emerges as a landmark showdown before the Supreme Court of India. Decided on January 19, 2022, this case pits a global hospitality giant against a local hotel operator over the use of the trademark "RENAISSANCE." The dispute encapsulates the tension between statutory trademark rights and claims of honest use, weaving a narrative of legal precision, commercial identity, and judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court’s ruling not only resolves a contentious infringement claim but also illuminates the contours of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, offering a masterclass in statutory application and trademark protection in India’s evolving commercial landscape.

Detailed Factual Background

Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc., a Delaware-based corporation, stands as a titan in the global hospitality industry, operating under the trademark "RENAISSANCE" since 1981. This mark, registered in India under Class 16 (Registration No. 610567) for printed materials and Class 42 (Registration No. 1241271) for hotel and related services, has adorned its hotels, spas, and merchandise worldwide, including establishments in Mumbai and Goa since 1990. With an annual advertising budget of US$14 million and a domain name (www.renaissancehotels.com), the appellant asserts a formidable trans-border reputation, claiming "RENAISSANCE" as a distinctive symbol of its luxury hospitality empire.

The respondents, led by B. Vijaya Sai, operate two modest hotels in Bangalore (Kadugodi) and Puttaparthi under the name "SAI RENAISSANCE." Devotees of Sri Shirdi Sai Baba and Sri Puttaparthi Sai Baba, they adopted this name in 2001, believing the latter to be a reincarnation of the former—thus, "renaissance" symbolizing rebirth. Their hotels cater primarily to Sai Baba devotees, offering vegetarian fare sans alcohol, a stark contrast to the appellant’s five-star offerings. The respondents’ use of "SAI RENAISSANCE" came to the appellant’s attention in 2008 via the website www.sairenaissance.com, prompting an investigation that revealed alleged copying of signage, business cards, and the "RENAISSANCE" mark, suggesting an unauthorized affiliation.

Detailed Procedural Background

The appellant initiated legal action in 2009, filing O.S. No. 3 of 2009 before the Principal District Judge, Bangalore Rural District, seeking a permanent injunction, delivery of infringing materials, and damages of Rs. 3,50,000. On June 21, 2012, the trial court partly decreed the suit, granting an injunction against the respondents’ use of "SAI RENAISSANCE" or any mark incorporating "RENAISSANCE" in Classes 16 and 42, but denying damages and delivery-up claims. The respondents appealed to the High Court of Karnataka in Regular First Appeal No. 1462 of 2012. On April 12, 2019, a Single Judge reversed the trial court’s decree, dismissing the suit on grounds of no trans-border reputation, honest use by the respondents, and no likelihood of confusion due to differing customer bases. Aggrieved, the appellant escalated the matter to the Supreme Court via Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2022, arising from SLP(C) No. 21428 of 2019, culminating in the January 19, 2022, judgment by a three-judge bench.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case revolves around several critical issues. First, whether the respondents’ use of "SAI RENAISSANCE" infringes the appellant’s registered trademark "RENAISSANCE" under Sections 29(2)(c), 29(3), 29(5), or 29(9) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Second, whether the High Court erred in applying Section 29(4) (for dissimilar goods/services) instead of provisions for identical marks and services. Third, whether the respondents’ use qualifies as honest concurrent use under Section 30, shielding them from infringement. Fourth, whether the appellant’s delay in filing the suit constitutes acquiescence, barring relief. Finally, whether "RENAISSANCE"’s generic nature or the respondents’ addition of "SAI" negates infringement.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The appellant, represented by Senior Counsel K.V. Viswanathan, argued that the respondents’ use of "SAI RENAISSANCE" infringed its registered mark under multiple provisions of Section 29. Under Section 29(2)(c), the identical mark and services (hotels) triggered a statutory presumption of confusion per Section 29(3). Section 29(5) was invoked as the respondents used "RENAISSANCE" in their trade name, a direct infringement. Section 29(9) applied due to phonetic and visual similarity. Viswanathan contended that the High Court misapplied Section 29(4), which requires reputation and detriment only for dissimilar goods, irrelevant here given the identical services. Citing precedents, he argued that in infringement cases, confusion need not be proven when marks are identical, and the prefix "SAI" did not mitigate the violation.

The respondents, represented by B.C. Sitarama Rao, countered that the suit was untenable due to delay and the appellant’s lack of legal personhood. They portrayed "RENAISSANCE" as a generic dictionary term, incapable of exclusive appropriation, and justified "SAI RENAISSANCE" as an honest tribute to Sai Baba’s reincarnation, used since 2001 without appellant awareness until 2009. They highlighted distinct customer bases—devotees versus luxury travelers—and differing services (vegetarian versus full-service), negating confusion. Claiming honest concurrent use under Section 12 and protection under Section 30, they relied on precedents to argue that their use neither exploited nor harmed the appellant’s mark.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context

The appellant cited Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah [(2002) 3 SCC 65], where the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against a similar mark in the same trade, emphasizing protection of goodwill. In Ruston & Hornsby Limited v. Zamindara Engineering Co. [(1969) 2 SCC 727], the Court ruled that in infringement cases, identical mark use warrants an injunction without proving confusion, distinguishing it from passing off. Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories [[1965] 1 SCR 737] reinforced that close similarity in marks negates the need for further evidence in infringement actions. Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Limited v. Sudhir Bhatia [(2004) 3 SCC 90] underscored that injunctions typically follow infringement, irrespective of delay unless adoption is dishonest.

The respondents relied on Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association [(2008) 10 SCC 723], which addressed acquiescence in rectification proceedings, not infringement, rendering it inapposite. Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited [(2018) 9 SCC 183] distinguished dissimilar marks and goods (milk versus restaurants), unlike the identical services here. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Limited [[1960] 1 SCR 968] and Neon Laboratories Limited v. Medical Technologies Limited [(2016) 2 SCC 672] dealt with distinct contexts (opposition and interim injunctions), offering limited relevance.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice B.R. Gavai, authoring the Supreme Court’s opinion, meticulously dissected the High Court’s errors. The Court traced the evolution of trademark law from the 1940 Act to the 1999 Act, emphasizing the latter’s intent to harmonize global trade practices and prohibit unauthorized use of registered marks in trade names. Under Section 29(2)(c), the identical mark "RENAISSANCE" and identical services (hotels) triggered a presumption of confusion under Section 29(3), rendering further proof unnecessary. Section 29(5) applied as "RENAISSANCE" formed part of the respondents’ trade name, and Section 29(9) covered phonetic and visual similarity, amplifying the infringement.

The High Court’s reliance on Section 29(4) was deemed a misstep, as it pertains to dissimilar goods/services and requires reputation and detriment—irrelevant here given the identical services. The Court criticized the High Court’s focus on customer classes and confusion, citing Ruston & Hornsby to affirm that infringement hinges on mark use, not deception likelihood. The respondents’ Section 30 defense failed, as honest use required both fair practice and no detriment, conditions unmet given the unauthorized adoption. Textual and contextual interpretation, per Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless [(1987) 1 SCC 424], and holistic statutory reading, per Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank [(1987) 1 SCC 606], underscored the High Court’s fragmented approach, ignoring legislative intent.

Final Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court’s judgment of April 12, 2019, and reinstating the trial court’s decree of June 21, 2012. The respondents were restrained from using "SAI RENAISSANCE" or any mark incorporating "RENAISSANCE" in Classes 16 and 42, affirming the appellant’s exclusive rights.

Law Settled in This Case

The judgment clarifies that under Section 29(2)(c) and (3), identical marks and goods/services presume confusion, mandating injunctions without further evidence. Section 29(5) prohibits use of a registered mark in trade names, and Section 29(9) extends protection to phonetic/visual similarity. Section 29(4) applies only to dissimilar goods, requiring reputation and detriment, not relevant to identical services. Section 30’s honest use defense demands both fair practice and no detriment, a conjunctive test. The ruling reinforces statutory primacy in infringement actions, distinguishing them from passing off’s common law roots.

Case Title: Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. Vs. B. Vijaya Sai and Others
Date of Order: January 19, 2022
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2022 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 21428 of 2019]
Name of Court: Supreme Court of India
Name of Judges: Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice B.V. Nagarathna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Maryam Bee Versus Shuibham Jain and Ors

Impleadment of Third Parties in Specific Performance Suits

The case titled Maryam Bee versus Shuibham Jain and Ors., with Case Number FAO(OS) (COMM) 199/2024 : 2025:DHC:7318-DB High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on 26 August 2025 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Ksheterpal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar.

Detailed Summary of the Case

Facts

The underlying dispute originates from a commercial suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell (ATS) dated 27 December 2022, concerning a property admeasuring 82.5 square yards, bearing Municipal No. 1806 (Mezzanine Floor to Second Floor with roof rights), Ward No. 4, Chandni Chowk, Dariba Kalan, New Delhi, 110006 (referred to as the "suit property"). The plaintiffs in the original suit (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, namely Shuibham Jain and others) filed CS (Comm) No. 590/2023 against the appellant, Maryam Bee, seeking specific performance of the ATS. According to the plaintiffs, the ATS was executed for a total sale consideration of Rs. 7,00,00,000 (Rupees Seven Crores Only), and they had made partial payments, but the appellant failed to execute the sale deed in their favor, necessitating the suit.

The appellant (Maryam Bee), however, contended that the total sale consideration was actually Rs. 9,00,00,000 (Rupees Nine Crores Only), as an additional ATS for Rs. 2,00,00,000 (Rupees Two Crores Only) was executed on the same date (27 December 2022). She claimed that the plaintiffs' failure to pay the full amount prevented her from executing the sale deed.

During the pendency of this suit, Respondent No. 4 (the brother-in-law of the appellant) filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), being I.A. No. 23592/2023, seeking to be impleaded as a party to the suit. Respondent No. 4 claimed to be a co-owner of the suit property to the extent of 50%, along with his brother Abdul Malik (the appellant's husband). He asserted that the appellant's ownership claim was based on two Gift Deeds dated 23 August 1981 executed by Late Smt. Zubeda Khatoon and Late Sh. Sheikh Abdul Sattar Sahib (the appellant's mother-in-law and father-in-law, respectively). In contrast, Respondent No. 4 argued that the property was co-shared between him and Abdul Malik.

On 7 May 2024, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed this impleadment application, observing that Respondent No. 4 appeared to have some interest in the property, and excluding him could lead to multiplicity of litigation and conflicting rulings. Aggrieved by this order (specifically the portion allowing impleadment), the appellant filed the present appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 (DHC Act). The appeal was reserved on 6 August 2025 and pronounced on 26 August 2025.

Notably, the plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) opposed the impleadment in the original application and supported the appellant's claim of sole ownership in the appeal. They had separately challenged another portion of the impugned order (regarding a deposit direction) in FAO(OS)(COMM) 167/2024, which was dismissed on 6 August 2024, rendering the impleadment final as against them.

Dispute

The primary dispute in this appeal revolves around the maintainability and propriety of impleading Respondent No. 4 as a defendant in a suit for specific performance of the ATS. The appellant argued that:

• A third party or stranger to the contract cannot be impleaded in a specific performance suit merely to avoid multiplicity of suits, as it would impermissibly enlarge the scope of the suit from enforcing a contract to determining title and possession.
• Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, as dominus litis (masters of the suit), opposed the impleadment, and their stance should be respected.
• The impleadment converts the suit into one for title, which is not permissible.

In opposition, Respondent No. 4 contended:

• The impugned order is not appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC, and Section 10 of the DHC Act cannot be invoked due to Section 13(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA). He relied on cases like Kandla Export Corpn. v. OCI Corpn. (2018) 14 SCC 715, M.V. Polaris Galaxy v. Banque Cantonale De Geneve (2024) 5 SCC 750, Trex India Pvt. Ltd. v. CDE Asia Limited 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2388, and Alka Traders v. Cosco India Ltd. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 3694.
• Impleadment in specific performance suits depends on facts and circumstances, and no rigid rule prohibits it. He cited Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. (2007) 10 SCC 82 and Rajesh Kumar Arora v. Smt. Shila 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1277.
• The impugned order had attained finality against the plaintiffs, as their separate appeal was dismissed.

A preliminary objection was raised on the appeal's maintainability under the CCA and CPC provisions.

Reasoning

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Justices Anil Ksheterpal and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, first addressed the preliminary objection on maintainability. They distinguished the relied-upon cases (Kandla Export, M.V. Polaris Galaxy, Trex India, and Alka Traders), noting that those dealt with arbitration appeals, admiralty suits, rejection of plaints, or ex parte proceedings, which were inapplicable here. Instead, relying on Gurmauj Saran Baluja v. Mrs. Joyce C. Salim 1988 SCC OnLine Del 295 and Supreme Court precedents like Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania (1981) 4 SCC 8 and Jugal Kishore Paliwal v. S. Sat Jit Singh (1984) 1 SCC 358, the Bench held that the impugned order qualifies as a "judgment" under Section 10(1) of the DHC Act. It affects substantive rights (e.g., enlarging the suit's scope and forcing a de novo trial), making the appeal maintainable even if not expressly listed under Order XLIII CPC.

On merits, the Bench analyzed Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, which allows impleadment only if a party's presence is necessary for complete adjudication of the issues involved. They emphasized that suits for specific performance are contract-centric, adjudicating enforceability between contracting parties, and result in judgments in personam (not in rem). Citing the Supreme Court's seminal ruling in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733, the Bench reiterated that impleading a third party claiming adverse title enlarges the suit into one for title/possession, which is impermissible. The two tests from Kasturi for a "necessary party" were applied: (i) right to relief against them in the controversy, and (ii) inability to pass an effective decree without them. A "proper party" requires their presence for effective adjudication.

The Bench distinguished Sumtibai (supra), where impleadment was allowed due to prima facie semblance of title via a registered sale deed involving the defendant's legal representatives (LRs), noting it was fact-specific and not a blanket exception. Similarly, Rajesh Kumar Arora was deemed inapplicable, as it involved multiple applications, pending inter se suits among parties, and the appeal on impleadment was dismissed without merit analysis.

The Bench concluded that Respondent No. 4, as a stranger to the ATS, failed the tests under Order I Rule 10 CPC. His impleadment would introduce collateral title issues, contrary to precedents like Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra (1995) 3 SCC 147, Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha (1996) 10 SCC 53, and Bharat Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Construction Company (2008) 13 SCC 658. The learned Single Judge's reasoning (potential interest and multiplicity avoidance) was flawed, as it overlooked the suit's limited scope. Even assuming Respondent No. 4's prima facie interest, it did not make him necessary or proper for adjudicating the contract's enforceability.

Decision

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order dated 7 May 2024 (allowing I.A. No. 23592/2023) was set aside, thereby reversing the impleadment of Respondent No. 4 as Defendant No. 2 in CS (Comm) No. 590/2023. Respondent No. 4 was granted liberty to pursue his claims via an independent suit before a competent court. The appeal and pending applications were disposed of accordingly, with no other submissions noted from the parties.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Title for This Article

": Delhi High Court Sets Aside Order Allowing Co-Ownership Claim in Contract Dispute"

Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. AL Kareem

Balancing Prior Use and Honest Concurrent Adoption in Trade Mark Rectification

Facts: Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd., a Delhi-based restaurant company, claimed to have used the trademark “KARIM/KARIM’S/KAREEM” since 1913 for their non-vegetarian restaurant business, mainly in Delhi and the NCR, with plans to expand. Incorporated in 1987, they held multiple trademark registrations and provided media articles (Rediff.com 2005, New York Times 2012) and financial records (2003–2021) to prove their reputation.

The first respondent, Al Kareem, a Hyderabad-based hotel, used the trademark “AL KAREEM” (registered under No. 3385555 in Class 43 for restaurant services). They claimed use since 1965, supported by an affidavit from Abdul Hameed Khan, a 1996 Mutton Supply Contract, a 1996 receipt, a 2016 Zomato toolkit, and 2018 FSSAI licenses. Their 2016 trademark application was initially “proposed-to-be-used,” but a 2017 reply claimed use since 2001.

Karim Hotels sought to remove “AL KAREEM” from the Trade Marks Register under Sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, arguing it was too similar to their mark and wrongly registered. Al Kareem countered that their mark was distinct, used honestly in Telangana, and caused no harm to Karim Hotels.

Dispute: The main issue was whether “AL KAREEM” should be removed from the register due to deceptive similarity with “KARIM” or improper registration. Karim Hotels claimed prior use and national rights, while Al Kareem argued honest concurrent use and geographic separation.

Person Aggrieved (Sections 47 and 57):Sections 47 and 57 allow a “person aggrieved” to seek trademark removal or rectification if harmed by the mark’s presence. Arguments: Al Kareem argued Karim Hotels wasn’t aggrieved, as their businesses were in different regions (Delhi vs. Telangana), citing Toshiba (2009). Karim Hotels claimed pan-India trademark rights. Court’s Reasoning: Citing Hardie Trading (2003), the court broadly interpreted “person aggrieved.” Since both were in the restaurant business and Karim Hotels held registered marks, they qualified as aggrieved due to potential rights restrictions.

Section 47: Non-Use: Legal Provision: Section 47 allows removal for non-use in the five years and three months before the petition. Arguments: Karim Hotels questioned Al Kareem’s use since 1965, noting inconsistencies in their claims. Al Kareem provided documents showing use. Court’s Reasoning: Al Kareem’s 1996 contract, receipt, 2016 Zomato toolkit, and 2018 licenses proved use, defeating the Section 47 claim.

Section 57: Wrongful Registration: Legal Provision: Section 57 allows rectification for wrongful or confusing registrations. Arguments: Karim Hotels claimed use since 1913 and argued “AL KAREEM” was deceptively similar, citing S. Syed Mohideen (2016). Al Kareem claimed honest use since 1965, supported by evidence, and geographic limitation, citing London-Rubber (1963) and Section 12.Court’s Reasoning: Karim Hotels’ 1913 claim lacked evidence linking them to earlier users. Al Kareem’s evidence of use since 1996 was sufficient, and their geographic limitation reduced confusion. The Petitioner failed to prove deceptive similarity or wrongful registration.

Section 12: Honest Concurrent Use:Legal Provision: Section 12 allows registration of similar marks if used honestly and concurrently. Court’s View: Al Kareem’s honest use in Telangana supported retaining their mark. Decision: The mark remains on the Register but with an express geographical limitation: This protects the respondent under Sections 12 and 35 while addressing the petitioner's concerns about dilution.

Case Title:  Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. AL Kareem and The Registrar of Trade Marks;

Order Date: 29-07-2025;

Case Number: (T)OP(TM) No. 406 of 2023;

Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:1859;

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras;

Judge: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Anugraha Castings & Anr. Vs. Anugraha Valve Castings Limited

Plea of Prima facie invalidity under Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999

Introduction:  This case is a legal battle between two companies in Coimbatore, India, both using the word "Anugraha" in their business names. Anugraha Castings, a partnership firm, and Anugraha Valve Castings Limited, a company, clashed over who has the right to use "Anugraha" as a trademark. The dispute reached the Madras High Court when Anugraha Castings challenged the Commercial Court’s decision on which issues should be considered in a related lawsuit. This summary explains the facts, the dispute, the court’s reasoning, and the final decision in simple language, while keeping all legal provisions intact, to help law students and junior lawyers understand the case.

Background: Anugraha Valve Castings Limited (the respondent) claimed they started using the word "Anugraha" as a trademark in 2003. They registered it as a trademark (Registration No. 5117934) on 04.09.2021 for use in Classes 6 (metals and alloys), 7 (machines and machine tools), and 40 (material treatment), which are related to the alloys and casting industry.

The respondent sent a cease-and-desist notice to Anugraha Castings in 2021, asking them to stop using "Anugraha" in their business, claiming it violated their trademark rights. However, they did not file a lawsuit until 2025, when they filed a commercial suit (C.O.S.No.2 of 2025) in the Commercial Court, Coimbatore. The suit asked for court orders to stop Anugraha Castings from using "Anugraha" and to enforce the respondent’s trademark rights.

Anugraha Castings, as defendants in the suit, argued that the respondent’s trademark was invalid because "Anugraha" is a common word used in seven languages and not a unique term created by the respondent. They also claimed the respondent lied to the Trademark Registry by saying "Anugraha" was a coined (made-up) word.

Anugraha Castings filed a Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution in the Madras High Court. They asked the court to order the Commercial Court to include nine specific issues (numbered 4 to 12 in their draft) in the lawsuit. On 09.06.2025, the Commercial Court framed some issues for the lawsuit after hearing both sides but did not include all the issues proposed by Anugraha Castings, especially those challenging the validity of the respondent’s trademark. This led Anugraha Castings to file the revision petition in the High Court.

The Dispute: The main issue was whether the Commercial Court made a mistake by not including all of Anugraha Castings’ proposed issues, particularly those questioning the validity of the respondent’s trademark. Anugraha Castings argued that "Anugraha" is a common word, not unique to the respondent, and that the respondent misled the Trademark Registry to get the registration. They wanted the Commercial Court to frame issues that would allow them to challenge the trademark’s validity and possibly seek its cancellation (rectification). The respondent, however, argued that their trademark was validly registered, that "Anugraha" was not a common term in their industry, and that Anugraha Castings’ challenge was weak and too late.

The case involves key provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which governs trademarks in India:

Section 124: This section outlines what happens when a trademark’s validity is challenged in a lawsuit.

If a rectification (cancellation) process is already underway with the Trademark Registry or High Court, the lawsuit must be paused until that process is complete.

If no rectification process is ongoing, and the court believes there’s a strong initial (prima facie) case that the trademark is invalid, the court must frame an issue about the invalidity and give the challenger three months to file for rectification.

Section 31(1): A registered trademark is assumed valid unless successfully challenged within the legal time limit.

Section 17(2)(b): This allows someone to use a trademark in good faith if it’s a common term in the trade, without infringing on another’s rights.

Article 227 of the Constitution of India: This gives High Courts the power to oversee lower courts and correct serious errors, which Anugraha Castings used to challenge the Commercial Court’s decision.

Patel Field Marshal Agencies vs. P.M. Diesel Limited (2018) 2 SCC 112: This Supreme Court case was cited by the petitioners. It states that trademark validity issues must be decided by the Trademark Tribunal, not a civil court, but only if the court finds a strong initial case for invalidity.

Detailed Reasoning: The court agreed that Section 124 allows a defendant to challenge a trademark’s validity, but only if they present a strong and believable case (prima facie tenable). The petitioners’ main argument was that "Anugraha" is a common word in seven languages. However, the court said this didn’t matter unless "Anugraha" was a common term in the alloys and casting industry (Classes 6, 7, and 40). The petitioners provided no evidence that it was common in this industry. The respondent’s explanation—that "Anugraha" was coined from the founder’s and his wife’s names and matched their company name—seemed reasonable and believable at this stage. The court concluded there was no strong case to question the trademark’s validity, so the Commercial Court was right not to frame an issue about invalidity.

Section 124 and Prima Facie Requirement:The court clarified that Section 124 doesn’t require framing an issue for every claim of invalidity. The claim must be strong enough to justify pausing the lawsuit and allowing a rectification challenge.  The court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Patel Field Marshal Agencies, which said that only credible claims of invalidity should lead to framing an issue, to avoid delays from weak or frivolous claims. Since the petitioners’ claim about "Anugraha" being a common word lacked evidence in the context of the industry, it didn’t meet the threshold for framing an issue.

Decision:The court refused to frame an issue on the invalidity of the respondent’s trademark, finding no strong or believable case to support it. The court upheld the Commercial Court’s decision not to include this issue, as the petitioners failed to show that "Anugraha" was a common term in the alloys and casting industry. There were no orders for costs, and the related Civil Miscellaneous Petition was closed.

Conclusion: This case shows how courts handle trademark disputes, especially when one party questions the validity of another’s trademark. The Madras High Court balanced the need to protect valid trademarks with ensuring a fair trial by allowing some of the petitioners’ issues but rejecting their weak challenge to the trademark’s validity. For law students and junior lawyers, this case teaches the importance of presenting strong evidence when challenging a trademark, the role of statutory time limits, and how courts decide which issues to include in a lawsuit. It also highlights the practical application of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act in commercial disputes.

Case Title: Anugraha Castings & Anr. Vs. Anugraha Valve Castings Limited
Order Date: 22.08.2025
Case Number: CRP.No.2480 of 2025 
Name of Court: The High Court of Judicature at Madras
Name of Judge: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.B. Balaji

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Amgen Inc vs The Assistant Controller of Patents

Obviousness, Synergy, and Enablement in Biologic Formulations

Fact:Amgen, a U.S.-based company that makes medicines from natural substances like proteins, created a medicine called romiplostim, sold as Nplate. This medicine mimics a natural body signal (a hormone called thrombopoietin, or TPO) that tells your body to produce platelets—tiny components in your blood that help stop bleeding by forming clots. It’s vital for people with a condition called immune thrombocytopenic purpura (ITP), where the body mistakenly attacks its own platelets, causing low counts and bleeding risks.

Medicines like romiplostim, made from living sources, are delicate. They can break down or clump together if not handled carefully, much like milk curdling outside the fridge. To solve this, Amgen developed a way to freeze-dry the medicine (a process called lyophilization), turning it into a stable powder that’s easier to store, ship, and mix with water for use later.

Amgen applied for a patent in India on 9 September 2008, under application number 5857/CHENP/2008, titled “Lyophilized Therapeutic Peptibody Formulations.” They described a specific dry mix: the main medicine (romiplostim, structured as Formula V in their papers) showing the mix stays stable, doesn’t clump, and that the additives work together better than alone.

Amgen asked the Indian Patent Office to review their application. On 20 July 2013, the office issued a First Examination Report (FER), raising objections under Sections 3(d), 3(e), and 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970. These rules block patents for things like reusing known methods, simple mixes without special effects, or ideas that aren’t creative enough compared to existing documents (called prior arts D1-D6). Amgen responded, narrowing their claims to focus on Formula V, which covered 52 slight variations of the main medicine part.

Then, Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited, an Indian company, objected on 18 July 2016, under Sections 25(1)(e) (obviousness), 25(1)(f) (not an invention), and 25(1)(g) (incomplete explanation). After hearings, the Assistant Controller rejected the application on 31 March 2023, citing the same rules: Section 2(1)(ja) (not creative), Section 3(d) (reusing known methods), Section 3(e) (simple mix), and Section 10(4) (not fully explained). They pointed to prior arts and said there was no proof of real improvement.

Amgen appealed to the Madras High Court under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, which allows challenging patent rejections.

The Core Dispute:

The core issue was whether Amgen’s dry medicine mix qualified as a patentable invention under the Indian Patents Act, 1970. Patents are granted only for ideas that are new, involve a creative step, and can be used industrially, but certain rules block patents for specific cases. The court had to answer four key questions:

1. Section 3(d): Did Amgen’s method for making the dry mix just reuse an old, known process without adding anything new?
2. Section 3(e): Was the mix just a simple blend of known ingredients that don’t work together in a special way to create a better result?
3. Section 2(1)(ja): Would an average expert in medicine-making (called a person skilled in the art, or PSITA) find this mix obvious by looking at old documents (prior arts D1-D5)?
4. Section 10(4): Did Amgen explain their idea fully and clearly in their application, especially since it could apply to 52 variations, but they only tested one?

Amgen argued their mix was unique for their medicine, their tests showed the ingredients teamed up to prevent spoiling and clumping, picking the right additives and amounts was a creative challenge, and their explanation was enough with one example representing the group. The opponents (the Patent Office and Intas) countered that it was obvious by combining old documents, just a simple mix, and not fully explained for all variations.

The Court’s Careful Reasoning: 

The Hon'ble judge beganexplaining in simple terms how medicines from living sources are fragile, need injections (not pills), and why choosing additives is like solving a puzzle—each medicine needs its own perfect recipe. Let’s dive into how the court handled each legal issue, keeping the law’s language intact.

1. Rejection under Section 3(d): Mere Use of a Known substabce

Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, says you can’t patent “the mere use of a known substabce” unless it creates a new product or uses a new ingredient. The Assistant Controller rejected claim 9 (the method for preparing and drying the mix with specific additives and amounts), saying it was just using the old freeze-drying process, pointing to prior art D4 (which mentioned the medicine) and general knowledge.

The court examined claim 9 and disagreed. It found no prior art showed exactly how to dry this specific medicine with these additives in these amounts. Prior art D4 mentioned freeze-drying vaguely, saying compositions “may be in dried powder, such as lyophilized form,” but gave no steps or details. Prior art D5 described drying a different substance but had no method steps. The court concluded that claim 9’s process, with its specific additives and amounts, wasn’t just reusing a known method—it added something new. Thus, the rejection under Section 3(d) was not sustainable.

2. Rejection under Section 3(e): Mere Admixture Without Synergy

Section 3(e) blocks patents for “a substance obtained by a mere admixture resulting only in the aggregation of the properties of the components thereof.” This means a mix where the parts just do their usual jobs, adding up normally, isn’t patentable. The mix must show synergy—where the whole is better than the sum of the parts, like ingredients in a cake that create a unique flavor together.

The Assistant Controller said Amgen’s mix was a simple blend because they didn’t provide data comparing the mix before and after drying to prove better stability. The court rejected this, saying Section 3(e) doesn’t always require before-and-after drying data. The goal is to show the ingredients interact to produce a result greater than their individual effects. Amgen’s tests (Tables 39-41) did this:

• Table 39: Showed that using at least 1.5% sucrose (a stabilizer) reduced chemical breakdown at high temperatures, while less sucrose led to more spoiling. High amounts of another additive (mannitol) alone didn’t help.
• Tables 40 and 41: Showed that adding polysorbate-20 (a clumping preventer) kept clumping under 0.1%, compared to much higher clumping without it. Tests used different medicine amounts (0.5 mg/mL and 0.3 mg/mL), but this didn’t matter for proving the additive’s teamwork.

The Controller argued the different amounts made the data weak, but the court said the tests’ purpose was to show synergy (polysorbate-20’s effect on clumping), not to compare amounts. Unlike prior art D3, which aimed to increase substance concentration, Amgen’s goal was stability, so before-and-after drying data wasn’t needed. The court found clear synergy, setting aside the Section 3(e) rejection.

3. Lack of Inventive Step under Section 2(1)(ja)

Section 2(1)(ja) requires an “inventive step”—a feature that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art (PSITA), defined as an average medicine-making expert with common knowledge but no extraordinary creativity. The Controller said the mix was obvious based on prior arts D1-D5 (D6 and D7 weren’t used in the appeal).

The court played the role of the PSITA and analyzed each prior art:

• D1-D3: D1 (Amgen’s work on a different binder) didn’t mention this medicine or drying. D2 (Amgen’s modified proteins) discussed combining parts for longer life but not drying. D3 focused on drying to increase concentration, not stability, so a PSITA wouldn’t apply it here. These didn’t make the mix obvious alone or together.
• D4: Amgen’s own document on the same medicine (including the exact structure, SEQ ID 1017) for ITP treatment. It mentioned dry forms and additives like sucrose but vaguely, without specific drying steps, additive types, or amounts. A PSITA couldn’t reach Amgen’s mix from D4 or D1-D4.
• D5: Described drying a different substance (IL-12, for cancer) with similar additives: 2% sucrose, 4.15% mannitol, 0.02% polysorbate-20, and a buffer at pH 5.6. The Controller suggested combining D4 and D5, but the court disagreed. The substances were different (IL-12 is a paired helper for cancer; romiplostim is a fused piece for platelets). D4 didn’t suggest looking at D5. Scientific literature showed 6-16 options for each additive type, making selection a complex puzzle with thousands of combinations. No standard recipe exists, and a common clumping preventer (polysorbate-80) differed from Amgen’s choice (polysorbate-20).

The court concluded that choosing these additives and exact amounts for this medicine wasn’t obvious—it took creative work. The Section 2(1)(ja) rejection was unsustainable.

4. Insufficiency under Section 10(4)

Section 10(4) requires a patent application to fully and clearly describe the invention, including the best method known, so others can recreate it. Amgen’s Formula V covered 52 variations of the medicine’s core part, but tests (Tables 39-41) only showed one (SEQ ID 1017). The court noted that these variations differ in structure, affecting how they behave. Without guidance for the other 51, the application didn’t fully enable them. However, the tested variation (and its close family, SEQ ID 1012-1017) was well-explained. The court partly upheld this objection, narrowing the patent to cover only the tested variation (SEQ ID NO. 459).

The Final Decision: 

The Madras High Court allowed Amgen’s appeal under Section 117A, setting aside the Assistant Controller’s rejection order dated 31 March 2023. The patent application was sent back for approval, but with amendment. This ruling is a milestone for medicine patents in India. It shows that courts will protect creative solutions in complex fields like biologics if they demonstrate real teamwork between ingredients and aren’t obvious combinations of old ideas. However, inventors must fully explain their work, especially for broad claims with many variations.

Case Title:Amgen Inc. Vs. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs 

Date of order: 22.08.2025

Case Number:CMA (PT) No.28 of 2023

Neutral Citation 2025:MHC:2096, 

Name of Court:High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Judge:The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. Versus Karnal Foods Pack Cluster Limited

Enforcement of Mandatory Pre-Institution Mediation in Commercial Trademark Disputes

The case titled "Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. Versus Karnal Foods Pack Cluster Limited and others," decided on August 29, 2025, in OMP No. 644 of 2025 under COMS No.1 of 2025:2025:HHC:29474: by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, was presided by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel.

## Detailed Summary

### Facts

Zydus Wellness Products Ltd., the plaintiff, is the registered proprietor of well-known trademarks "Glucon-D" and "Glucon-C" used in relation to glucose powder-based drink mixes. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, primarily Karnal Foods Pack Cluster Limited and others, were manufacturing, selling, and offering for sale products under marks deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s trademarks such as "Glucose-D," "Glucospoon-D," and "Glucose-C," thereby infringing the plaintiff's trademark rights and committing passing off.

The plaintiff traced the alleged infringement activities to April 28, 2023, when it first sent a cease and desist notice to defendant No. 2 concerning the mark "Glucospoon-D." Subsequent reminders and notices were sent to defendants No. 1 and 2 over the following months, including in May 2023. Despite the defendants' reply in July 2023 dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, the alleged infringement continued, particularly online on third-party websites such as IndiaMart and Trade India. The plaintiff then sent fresh cease and desist notices in 2024 and even secured a signed, notarized undertaking from defendant No. 1 in July 2024 to refrain from infringing activities. Nonetheless, the defendants allegedly continued infringement and sales of products bearing the impugned marks up to December 2024, including offering the infringing products to the plaintiff’s legal counsel via WhatsApp.

The plaintiff filed a civil suit seeking permanent injunctions against the defendants’ use of the infringing marks, delivery up and destruction of infringing goods, rendition of accounts of profits, damages, orders against online listings of the products, and a declaration that its trademarks were well-known within the meaning of the Trademarks Act, 1999. Concurrently, the plaintiff sought interim injunctions restraining defendants from further use of the infringing marks during the pendency of the suit.

### Dispute

The defendants contested the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory pre-institution mediation as mandated under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which requires parties in commercial disputes to attempt mediation before filing suit unless urgent interim relief is sought and justified. Defendants argued that the failure to exhaust this remedy before filing the suit warranted rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The defendants contended the plaintiff’s claim for urgent interim relief was unfounded and merely a tactic to bypass the mandatory mediation requirement.

The plaintiff responded that the suit was filed with a prayer for urgent relief justified by ongoing trademark violations, particularly the recent infringing activities in December 2024, and thus pre-litigation mediation was not necessary.

### Reasoning

The Court carefully examined the pleadings, the chronology of events, and relevant Supreme Court precedents to assess whether the plaintiff was justified in bypassing pre-institution mediation under Section 12A.

The Court noted that while the plaintiff alleged ongoing infringement recent as December 2024, the original cause of action arose in April 2023, and there was practically no qualitative or significant change in the situation between April 2023 and the filing of the suit. The defendants' use of similar marks was continuous throughout this period and had been repeatedly notified by cease and desist notices.

The Court relied on Supreme Court judgments, including Patil Automation (2022), Yamini Manohar (2024), and Dhanbad Fuels (2025), which established the mandatory nature of Section 12A mediation and clarified the criteria for claiming urgent interim relief as an exception. These rulings assert that urgent interim relief is only justified if the plaint and facts demonstrate such genuine urgency that bypassing mediation is warranted.

The Court observed the plaint and the accompanying application for urgent relief were silent on why the plaintiff required urgent relief at the time of filing without mediation. Merely filing an interim injunction application is insufficient; the court must holistically examine if the urgency is bona fide or a mask to avoid the mediation mandate.

The Court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim for urgent interim relief lacked substantiation of any new exigency since the initial cause of action. As a result, the bypassing of pre-litigation mediation was not justified. The plaintiff’s application for urgent relief was viewed as a camouflage tactic to circumvent the mandatory mediation provision.

The Court held that non-grant of urgent relief after consideration does not authorize filing the suit without complying with Section 12A. The plaintiff’s failure to comply with mandatory pre-institution mediation was grounds for rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11(d) CPC, as supported by Supreme Court rulings.

### Decision

The Court allowed the defendants’ application seeking rejection of the plaint. The plaint was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the CPC due to the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Costs were made easy, and all pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of.

The Court clarified that this order was independent of whether urgent relief was granted or not and emphasized the court’s duty to prevent misuse of the urgent relief exception to bypass mandatory mediation.

***

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Vaidya Rishi India Health Private Limited & Anr. v. Suresh Dutt Parashar

No Remedy for Infringement against Registered Proprietor of Trademark

Facts:The respondents (Suresh Dutt Parashar & Ors., originally the plaintiffs in the lower court) are the registered proprietors of several trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, including the word mark "VAIDRISHI" in Classes 5 , 35 , and 42 , as well as the device mark "ARSHKALP" (which incorporates "VAIDRISHI" as a prominent element) in Class 5. These registrations date back to December 31, 2018, with the respondents claiming prior user since January 1, 1972. The respondents operate in the health and wellness sector, particularly dealing in Ayurvedic medicines and related products.

The appellants (M/S Vaidya Rishi India Health Private Limited & Anr., originally the defendants) hold registrations for the device mark "VAIDYA RISHI" in Classes 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , and 35 . The appellants also engage in health-related products but in different classes from the respondents' primary Class 5 registrations.

The respondents instituted a commercial suit, CS (Comm) 741/2023, before the District Judge (Commercial Court), West, Delhi, alleging that the appellants' use of "VAIDYA RISHI" infringed their registered marks "VAIDRISHI" and "ARSHKALP". Specifically, the respondents claimed that "VAIDYA RISHI" was phonetically, visually, and deceptively similar to "VAIDRISHI", and that "VAIDRISHI" formed a dominant part of the "ARSHKALP" device mark. They sought an injunction against the appellants' use of "VAIDYA RISHI" in any manner, including as a trademark, trade name, domain name (https://vaidyarishiindia.in/), or on social media and third-party platforms. The suit was based primarily on infringement under the Trade Marks Act, with no detailed examination of passing off elements like goodwill or misrepresentation.

The learned Commercial Court, relying on the Division Bench decision in Raj Kumar Prasad v. Abbott Healthcare (P) Ltd. (2014), granted an ex parte interim injunction on the respondents' application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The order restrained the appellants from manufacturing, selling, advertising, or dealing in goods under "VAIDYA RISHI" or any deceptively similar mark. It also directed the domain registrar (Defendant No. 3 in the suit) to suspend and lock the domain https://vaidyarishiindia.in/ and reveal registrant details. The Commercial Court found prima facie that the marks were phonetically similar, the appellants had dishonestly adopted the mark to ride on the respondents' goodwill, and the goods were nearly identical, likely causing consumer confusion. The balance of convenience and irreparable harm favored the respondents. Notably, the order did not address passing off, focusing solely on infringement. 

Aggrieved, the appellants filed the present appeal (FAO (COMM) 122/2024) before the High Court of Delhi, challenging the injunction on the ground that no infringement action could lie against their registered trademark.

Dispute:The core dispute in the appeal revolved around whether an action for trademark infringement could be maintained against the proprietor of a registered trademark, and consequently, whether the appellants could be injuncted from using their registered mark "VAIDYA RISHI" in the classes for which it was registered (29, 30, 31, 32, and 35). The appellants argued that their mark's registration conferred exclusive rights under the Trade Marks Act, precluding any infringement claim. They offered an undertaking to limit use to their registered classes and not encroach on the respondents' classes (e.g., Class 5). The respondents opposed this, insisting on a complete injunction, claiming priority in registration and user, and alleging deceptive similarity leading to infringement.

A broader legal question arose: the correctness of prior Division Bench decisions like Raj Kumar Prasad (which held that infringement suits against registered marks are maintainable) in light of subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence and statutory provisions.

Reasoning:The Division Bench of the High Court, led by Hon'ble Justice Shri C. Hari Shankar, began with a prefatory note emphasizing that no infringement action can lie against a registered trademark, citing inconsistencies in prior Delhi High Court decisions. It reviewed Raj Kumar Prasad (2014), where a Division Bench affirmed that a registered proprietor could sue another registered proprietor for infringement and obtain an interim injunction. This was followed in Corza International v. Future Bath Products (P) Ltd. (2023). However, the Bench noted conflicting Single Judge decisions and its own prior reference in Abros Sports International (P) Ltd. v. Ashish Bansal (2025) doubting Raj Kumar Prasad's correctness and referring the issue to a larger Bench (outcome pending).

The Court then analyzed the Supreme Court's decision in S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai (2016), which post-dated Raj Kumar Prasad and held unequivocally that no infringement action lies against a registered trademark, as registration confers absolute rights. The Bench concluded that Raj Kumar Prasad was no longer good law, being contrary to Syed Mohideen.

Delving into statutory interpretation, the Court examined key provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999:

Section 29 (Infringement Definition): Sub-sections (1) to (4) define infringement as use by a person "not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use." The Court reasoned that this excludes registered proprietors from the scope of infringement, as the definition presupposes the infringer is unregistered.

Section 30(2)(e): This exempts from infringement the use of a registered trademark by its proprietor, even if identical or similar to another registered mark, reinforcing that registration grants an absolute defense against infringement claims.

Section 28(1): Grants the registered proprietor exclusive right to use the mark in relation to the registered goods/services, making any injunction against such use violative of this right.

Section 28(3): Addresses scenarios where two persons hold identical or similar registered marks, stating that neither can claim exclusive rights against the other (except against third parties). This prohibits one registered proprietor from injuncting another's use, though rectification or cancellation proceedings could be pursued separately.

The Court held that these provisions collectively bar infringement suits against registered marks. An injunction based on infringement would undermine the statutory exclusivity of registration. The impugned order erred by following Raj Kumar Prasad and granting relief solely on infringement grounds without examining passing off (e.g., no findings on the respondents' goodwill or misrepresentation). The appellants' offer to restrict use to their classes further highlighted the lack of overlap, but the respondents' refusal did not alter the legal position. The Bench clarified that while passing off actions  could lie against registered marks, infringement per se could not. The Commercial Court's order was thus unsustainable.

Decision:The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order of the Commercial Court. It held that no infringement action could lie against the appellants' registered mark  in the classes for which it was registered, and the injunction granted on infringement grounds was contrary to law. The Hon'ble Division Bench however clarified that appellant may use the mark only in relation to  the goods and services covered by the registrations held by the appellant in Classes 29, 30, 31, 32 and 3. The respondents' suit could proceed on passing off . 

Case Title: Vaidya Rishi India Health Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Suresh Dutt Parashar & Ors.; Order date: 07.08.2025; 

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 122/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:6644-DB; 

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Optix Healthcare & Ors. Vs. S. Baskaran

The case involves a petition by M/s. Optix Healthcare, represented by its partners Mr. Balaji and M. Maria Parthiban, to rectify the Register of Trade Marks by expunging the trade mark "FLURB" (Trade Mark No. 5475906 in Class 5) registered to S. Baskaran, a former partner of the firm. The petitioners demonstrated prior use of the mark since 15.11.2016, supported by invoices from 20.09.2016, while S. Baskaran applied for the same mark on 04.06.2022 on a "proposed to be used" basis. The court found the marks to be identical and used for identical ophthalmic products, concluding that the petitioners were the prior users. Due to S. Baskaran's failure to contest the case, he was set ex parte, and the court ordered the Registrar of Trade Marks to expunge the impugned entry within thirty days.

M/s. Optix Healthcare & Ors. vs. S. Baskaran & Anr.:12.08.2025: OP(TM)/32/2025,  Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy at the High Court of Judicature at Madras

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Muthukani Thiravidakani Trading as Anil Appalam and Chips & Anr. Vs K.Raja & Anr

**Summary of Case:**  

The review petitioners, operating under "ANIL APPALAM & CHIPS," sought to review the IPAB's order dated 03.06.2013 that allowed the first respondent's rectification petition to remove their registered device mark (Trade Mark No. 687449 in Class 30, effective from 20.11.1995) from the Register. The partnership, originally formed in 1993, underwent multiple reconstitutions, with the first respondent retiring on 14.07.2000 via a release deed and assurance deed that permitted him to use the name in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry while restricting the firm from operating there. The court found the IPAB's removal order erroneous, as the documents indicated a territorial division rather than full transfer of goodwill, and directed the Registrar under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act to modify the registration by imposing a geographical limitation excluding those territories for the petitioners' mark, to be done within 30 days.

**Case Details:** The case titled Muthukani Thiravidakani Trading as Anil Appalam and Chips & Anr. vs K.Raja & Anr., order dated 07-08-2025, case number (T) Rev.Pet. (IPD) No. 4 of 2024, with no neutral citation, was heard by The Hon'ble Mr Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy at the High Court of Judicature at Madras.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Berkadia Proprietary Holding LLC Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Berkadia Proprietary Holding LLC appealed against the Registrar of Trade Marks' order dated 17.12.2024, which rejected Trade Mark Application No. 2381187 for "INVESTOR QUERY" in Class 36, citing a lack of distinctive character. The application, filed on 06.08.2012 on a "proposed-to-be-used" basis, faced an objection in 2013, with the appellant arguing in 2014 that the mark had acquired distinctiveness through use. The High Court, noting a request to amend the mark to "BERKADIA INVESTOR QUERY," set aside the impugned order due to the material change and remanded the matter to the Registrar for reconsideration after accepting the amendment, with a fresh order to be issued within three months.

Case Details: The case titled Berkadia Proprietary Holding LLC vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks, order dated 26.08.2025, case number CMA(TM)/11/2025, with no neutral citation, was heard by the Honourable Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy at the High Court of Judicature at Madras.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Haveli Restaurant and Resorts Ltd Vs Adison Resorts Limited

Haveli Restaurant and Resorts Ltd has filed a suit against Adison Resorts Limited, alleging trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violation due to the defendant's unauthorized use of the 'HAVELI' mark and its derivatives, which the plaintiff has used since 2001, establishing significant goodwill, particularly in North India. The plaintiff claims the defendant, after failed business discussions in 2021, replicated its distinctive trade dress, color schemes, interior designs, and overall ambience under the mark 'PUNJABI HAVELI', applied for on a 'proposed to be used' basis in 2023, causing customer confusion and diluting the plaintiff's brand. The Delhi High Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on August 19, 2025, restraining the defendant from using the impugned mark and directing the removal of related branding materials within one week, with a potential appointment of a Local Commissioner for non-compliance.

The case titled Haveli Restaurant and Resorts Ltd vs. Adison Resorts Limited, order dated 19.08.2025, with case number CS(COMM) 791/2025 and neutral citation not provided, was heard by the Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora at the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV) Vs Ashok Kumar & Ors

New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV) has filed a suit against Ashok Kumar & Ors., alleging infringement of its registered trademark 'NDTV' and its formatives, passing off, copyright infringement, and unfair competition. NDTV, a leader in news broadcasting and digital journalism since 1988, claims that unknown Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 are operating websites incorporating the 'NDTV' trademark in their domain names, misrepresenting themselves as affiliated with NDTV. The plaintiff also alleges that Defendant No. 1 is hosting unauthorized YouTube channels, Telegram groups, X handles, and Facebook accounts/pages that use the 'NDTV' trademark and logo, potentially misleading the public. The Delhi High Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on August 20, 2025, restraining Defendants from using the 'NDTV' trademark, ordering domain name registrars, social media platforms, and government bodies to suspend/block the impugned websites, channels, and accounts, and directing disclosure of registrant details within specified timelines.

Case Details

The case titled New Delhi Television Limited vs. Ashok Kumar & Ors., order dated 20.08.2025, with case number CS(COMM) 869/2025 and neutral citation not provided, was heard by the Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora at the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Shiv Industries Vs Lifetime Care Kitchen Pvt. Limited

Case Title: Shiv Industries Vs Lifetime Care Kitchen Pvt. Limited; Order Date: 20.08.2025; Case Number: CS(COMM) 491/2025; Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi; Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

Summary:

The case involves a dispute where the Plaintiff, M/S. Shiv Industries, alleges trademark infringement against the Defendants, Lifetime Care Kitchen Pvt. Limited and another. The Plaintiff claims proprietary rights over the trademark "Lifetime" with a registered device (Trademark Application No. 1342486 in Class 06) originally registered by Mr. Muniyappan K. Yadav and later assigned to the Plaintiff in August 2023. The Plaintiff has been using the mark extensively since 2013 for furniture fittings and other products, accumulating significant goodwill and sales, supported by a deed of assignment and trademark renewal until 2035.

The Defendants are accused of using confusingly similar trademarks "Lifetime Care" in relation to household and kitchen utensils, which overlaps with the Plaintiff’s product category and consumer base. Defendant No. 1 was incorporated by Defendant No. 2, who was formerly an employee and marketing executive at the Plaintiff's company. The Defendants filed trademark applications for similar marks during their employment or shortly after, and used a domain name similar to the Plaintiff's. The Plaintiff contends that this acts as an attempt to trade on their goodwill, causing potential confusion among consumers.

The Court issued summons to the Defendants and granted the Plaintiff leave to file additional documents and replication. It restrained the Defendants and their associates from using the impugned trademarks or any deceptively similar mark in connection with household or kitchen products, finding prima facie that the Defendants' use was likely to cause confusion and amounted to infringement and passing off.

The matter is listed for further proceedings with directions regarding pleadings, affidavits for admission/denial of documents, and compliance with procedural rules.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi 

Lotus Bakeries N V Vs Micks Products LLP

The case titled "Lotus Bakeries N V Vs Micks Products LLP & Ors." (CS(COMM) 861/2025) was decided by the High Court of Delhi on August 20, 2025, before Justice Tejas Karia.

Summary:

The plaintiff, Lotus Bakeries N V, a Belgian company renowned for its "BISCOFF" trademark and distinctive biscuit shape, filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants Micks Products LLP and others for trademark infringement and passing off. The plaintiff has registered the "BISCOFF" trademark and associated biscuit shape internationally and in India, where it enjoys significant goodwill and commercial success. The defendants were found to have marketed and sold bakery products with a similar biscuit shape and packaging, including the use of the term "BISCO," which the plaintiff contended was phonetically and visually deceptive and likely to cause confusion. Despite receiving cease and desist notices, the defendants continued their infringing conduct, which included misleading packaging and marketing strategies mimicking the plaintiff’s brand identity. The Court held that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of infringement and passing off, granting an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the infringing mark, shape, packaging, and passing off the goods as those of the plaintiff. The matter was posted for further hearing.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Shankar Engineering Works and Ors. Vs Sankar Iron Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd

The case titled "Shankar Engineering Works and Ors. Vs Sankar Iron Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. and Ors." (IP-COM/34/2024, GA-COM/3/2025) was decided by the High Court at Calcutta (Original Side, Intellectual Property Rights Division) on August 25, 2025, before Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur.

Summary:

The plaintiffs, engaged in manufacturing cast iron suction hand pumps, owned the registered trademark "ASHA MAYA" and had also adopted a similar mark "ASHU MAYA" since 2016, under which their products had acquired goodwill and reputation. The defendants filed trademark applications for the identical mark "ASHU MAYA" in a similar category of goods. The plaintiffs initiated a suit for passing off and damages, seeking to restrain the defendants from using the impugned mark. The defendants failed to appear or defend the suit. The Court found the defendants' mark to be deceptively identical and likely to cause confusion and damage to the plaintiffs' goodwill. The Court granted an injunction against the defendants to stop the use of the impugned mark and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Natural Medicine Institute of Zhejiang Vs The Deputy Controller of Patents

The case titled "Natural Medicine Institute of Zhejiang Vs The Deputy Controller of Patents" (CMA (PT) No.171 of 2023) was decided by the High Court of Judicature. The order was dated December 14, 2017. The appeal challenges the rejection of patent application No. 6275/CHENP/2011 for the invention titled “A Mordant and Hair Coloring Products Containing the Same.” The First Examination Report (FER) raised objections on grounds of lack of novelty and inventive step. The appellant replied with amended claims, which initially were accepted by the respondent via email. However, the appellant later filed claims differing from the ones approved, leading the Controller to refuse the patent application under section 15 of the Patent Act 1970 for non-compliance. The invention had been granted patents in multiple jurisdictions including China, USA, South Korea, Brazil, Malaysia, Japan, and the European Patent Office (EPO). The impugned order did not provide reasons rejecting the amended claims.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lloyd Health Care Pvt. Ltd.

The case titled "Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lloyd Health Care Pvt. Ltd. & Anr." (Case Number CS(COMM) 877/2025) was ordered on August 22, 2025, in the High Court of Delhi before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

Summary:

This suit involves a trademark infringement dispute where Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Ltd. (Plaintiff) alleges that Lloyd Health Care Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (Defendants) infringed its registered trademarks belonging to the CONTIN Series of Marks, specifically the "NITROCONTIN" mark used for pharmaceutical products. The Plaintiff, claiming significant goodwill and multiple registrations for CONTIN marks since 1982, contended that the Defendants marketed medicinal products under the confusingly similar mark "LOYCONTIN" for identical products (nitroglycerin controlled release tablets in 2.6 mg and 6.4 mg dosages). The Plaintiff sent cease-and-desist notices which the Defendants either refused or did not respond to and also noticed the Defendants filing a trademark application for the mark "LOY CTN." The Court found a prima facie case in favor of the Plaintiff for an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the Defendants from manufacturing, selling, or distributing products under the infringing marks. The case was listed for further hearing in December 2025.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Utracon Corporation Pte Ltd Vs. Ucon Pt Structural System Private Limited

The case titled "Utracon Corporation Pte Ltd Vs. Ucon Pt Structural System Private Limited & Ors." (Case Number CS(COMM) 661/2024) was ordered on August 25, 2025, in the High Court of Delhi before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

Summary:

This case concerns an application filed by Utracon Corporation Pte Ltd (Plaintiff) against defendants for willful disobedience of an ex-parte ad-interim injunction dated August 7, 2024. The injunction restrained the defendants from using the Plaintiff’s registered trademark "UTRACON" or any deceptively similar mark and from using the domain name www.ultraconindia.com. The Plaintiff alleged that despite being aware of the injunction, the defendants continued to violate it by using the "ULTRACON" mark, including Defendant No. 5 continuing to use "Ultracon Structural Systems Private Limited" as its company name. The defendants disputed these allegations, stating some had ceased use and that the domain in question redirects to a different website, while Defendant No. 5 argued its corporate name usage complied with Ministry of Corporate Affairs regulations. The Court issued notice to the defendants, directing them to cease use of the domain and the name within two weeks pending further proceedings, and listed the matter for hearing in November 2025.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

CMYK Printech Limited Vs. BAA Television Network Private Limited

The case titled  CMYK Printech Limited Vs. BAA Television Network Private Limited" (Case Number CS(COMM) 688/2025) was ordered on August 25, 2025, in the High Court of Delhi before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

Summary:

This is a commercial suit filed by M/s CMYK Printech Limited (Plaintiff) against M/s BAA Television Network Private Limited (Defendant), concerning trademark infringement, passing off, and related claims involving the "THE PIONEER" newspaper mark. The Plaintiff, engaged in the publishing business with longstanding use and trademark registration of the "THE PIONEER" mark, alleged unauthorized use of the mark by the Defendant after termination of a franchise agreement dated March 27, 2012. The Plaintiff claimed the Defendant continued to publish newspapers under the Pioneer brand unlawfully, failed to pay outstanding dues under the agreement, and was operating a digital newspaper under the "THE PIONEER" name without authorization. The Defendant contested the suit on grounds of territorial jurisdiction, prematurity owing to a six-month notice clause for termination, and argued that "Pioneer" is a generic term widely used by others. The Court found a prima facie case in favor of the Plaintiff and granted an ad-interim injunction restraining the Defendant from using the "THE PIONEER" mark on newspapers, digital media, and related services, subject to a deposit by the Plaintiff of six months' content charges. The Court also directed mediation to resolve the dispute and set a deadline for further proceedings.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi