Jamp India Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jubilant Generics Ltd

Copyright Protection for Pharmaceutical Dossiers

Factual Background: Jubilant Generics Ltd., a pharmaceutical company based in Noida, India, is engaged in developing and manufacturing drug formulations for global markets. It had created detailed Product Dossiers for drugs such as Losartan, Amlodipine, and Citalopram. These dossiers, developed through years of research, contain technical, clinical, and manufacturing data required for obtaining marketing authorizations from global regulatory bodies. Jubilant claimed copyright and confidentiality protection over these dossiers as “literary works” under Section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

To market these drugs in Canada, Jubilant entered into a series of non-exclusive license and supply agreements with Jamp Pharma Corporation (a Canadian company) between 2010 and 2014. These agreements permitted Jamp Pharma to use Jubilant’s Product Dossiers exclusively for regulatory and manufacturing purposes within Canada. The license was defined as “fully paid-up, perpetual, royalty-free and non-exclusive”, but territorially limited to Canada.

In 2024, Jubilant alleged that Jamp Pharma had violated these agreements by transferring the Product Dossiers to its Indian subsidiary, Jamp India Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., and further to Indian manufacturers — Medreich Ltd., VS International Pvt. Ltd., and Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. — for commercial manufacturing and distribution in India. Jubilant claimed this was an unlawful reproduction and use of its copyrighted and confidential materials.

Upon discovery of this alleged misuse, Jubilant filed Original Suit No. 370 of 2024 before the Commercial Court at Gautam Budh Nagar seeking permanent injunction, damages, and ancillary reliefs under the Copyright Act and for breach of confidentiality. An ex parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 23 August 2024, restraining the defendants from using or sharing the disputed dossiers.

Procedural Histroy: The defendants filed applications under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC to vacate the injunction, arguing lack of urgency, absence of copyright infringement, and existence of parallel arbitration proceedings in Canada between Jubilant and Jamp Pharma.

The Commercial Court, by order dated 07 November 2024, continued the injunction. However, upon appeal (FAFOD No. 21 of 2025), the Allahabad High Court set aside this order, directing the Commercial Court to reconsider the injunction application after addressing the three essential elements — prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. On remand, the Commercial Court again upheld the injunction by order dated 25 February 2025, prompting Jamp India Pharmaceuticals and VS International Pvt. Ltd. to file Commercial Appeals No. 13 and 14 of 2025 before the High Court.

Nature of Dispute: At the core of this dispute lies the question of whether Product Dossiers qualify for copyright protection as “literary works” under the Copyright Act, and whether their use by Indian affiliates amounts to copyright infringement or merely a breach of contractual confidentiality.

The defendants argued that the suit was contractual in nature, arising from alleged breach of license agreements, and therefore could not be maintained as a copyright infringement action. They further asserted that the agreements’ arbitration clause required the dispute to be settled before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), where parallel proceedings were already underway.

Conversely, Jubilant claimed the action was one for infringement of statutory copyright rights — a right in rem, enforceable against the world at large — and not merely a contractual right in personam, thus placing it outside the scope of arbitration.

Arguments by Appellants:  The appellants contended that:

Non-Compliance with Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015:Jubilant failed to undertake mandatory pre-institution mediation, as required under Section 12-A. The alleged cause of action arose as early as 2021 through internal emails, and therefore there was no “urgency” justifying exemption.They relied on Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 10 SCC 1 and Yamini Manohar v. TKD Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815.

Composite Suit and Lack of Jurisdiction: The claim combined two independent causes — breach of confidentiality and copyright infringement. The Commercial Court, relying on Section 62 of the Copyright Act, had jurisdiction only over the latter. Citing Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi (2006) 9 SCC 41 and Paragon Rubber Industries v. Pragathi Rubber Mills (2014) 14 SCC 762, the appellants argued that a court cannot assume jurisdiction over an entire composite suit when it lacks territorial competence for one of the causes.

Absence of Copyrightable Subject Matter:The Product Dossiers, being compilations of scientific data and chemical processes, lacked originality or creativity. They were technical documents rather than literary works, hence not protectable under Section 13 of the Act.They relied on Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 and Dr. Reckeweg & Co. GmbH v. Aven Biotech Pvt. Ltd. (2008 SCC OnLine Del 1741).

No Infringement Established:Merely using the technology or information within the Dossiers for manufacturing does not constitute reproduction or adaptation as per Section 14 of the Copyright Act.

Parallel Arbitration Proceedings:Since an ICC arbitration between Jubilant and Jamp Pharma was already pending, the present suit amounted to forum shopping and risked conflicting findings.Reliance was placed on Bharat Aluminum Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552 (BALCO).

Argument by Respondent: Jubilant countered that:

Section 12-A Inapplicable:The suit sought urgent interim injunction against ongoing copyright infringement, falling within the exception under Section 12-A. Reliance was placed on Y-Not Films LLP v. Ultra Media (2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3085). 

Product Dossiers as “Literary Works”:The Dossiers involved significant intellectual skill, judgment, and discretion — thus satisfying the minimal creativity threshold under Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1.

Copyright vs Contractual Rights: Copyright infringement is a statutory right in rem, enforceable independently of contractual obligations. Disputes relating to rights in rem cannot be referred to arbitration (Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 532; Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1).

Jurisdiction of the Commercial Court:Under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, the plaintiff may institute the suit where it carries on business — in this case, Noida. Furthermore, part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction as the defendants promoted and advertised infringing products at the iPHEX 2024 Exhibition in Greater Noida.

Reasoning of court: 

Composite Suit and Jurisdiction: The Court examined Sections 62 of the Copyright Act and 20 of the CPC and reiterated the principle from Dhodha House and Paragon Rubber that a court cannot assume jurisdiction for an entire composite suit if one part lies beyond its territorial reach. However, the Bench found that the dominant purpose of the plaint was to protect copyright, and the confidentiality aspect was incidental and ancillary. Therefore, the Commercial Court at Noida rightly exercised jurisdiction.

On Copyrightability of Product Dossiers:  The Court held that Product Dossiers, being compilations of scientific and regulatory data developed through skill and judgment, qualified as “literary works” under Section 2(o). The reasoning drew from Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1, clarifying that originality does not require novelty — only the exercise of creative judgment.

On Section 12-A Compliance: The Court acknowledged Patil Automation but emphasized that exemption under Section 12-A applies where urgent interim relief is sought. The cause of action arose on 2 April 2024, when Jamp Pharma’s senior vice president admitted transferring the dossiers in his affidavit. The Court held that the plaintiff could not have initiated pre-mediation without risking continued infringement.

On Arbitration: The Bench agreed that the arbitration proceedings related to contractual issues between Jubilant and Jamp Pharma, not statutory rights under the Copyright Act. Hence, the present suit was maintainable before the Indian Commercial Court.

On Grant of Interim Injunction:Applying principles from Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad (AIR 2001 SC 2367) and Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701), the Court held that: Jubilant had established a prima facie case of ownership and unauthorized use of its Dossiers. Balance of convenience favored protection of intellectual property over commercial convenience.Continued misuse would cause irreparable harm to Jubilant’s proprietary rights. The injunction was thus upheld.

Decision:  The High Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the injunction order dated 25 February 2025 of the Commercial Court, Gautam Budh Nagar. It concluded that Jubilant had made out a strong prima facie case of copyright infringement and breach of confidentiality, and that Section 12-A did not bar the proceedings. The Product Dossiers were recognized as protectable literary works under the Copyright Act.

Legal Significance: This judgment is a landmark for the pharmaceutical and intellectual property industries. It establishes that:  Product Dossiers and regulatory compilations may qualify as “literary works” under the Copyright Act.  Statutory copyright claims can proceed independently of contractual or arbitral disputes.  Urgent injunctions in IP cases can bypass pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act. Confidential information, though contractual in nature, may be protected under the broader ambit of copyright law when incorporated in literary work.

Case Title: Jamp India Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jubilant Generics Ltd. and Others

Neutral Citation: 2025:ALLHC:1015

Case Number: Commercial Appeal No. 14 of 2025

Order Date: 15 October 2025 

Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Bhansali, Chief Justice, and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kshitij Shailendra

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Grasim Industries Limited and Anr. Vs Saboo Tor Private Limited

Case Title: Grasim Industries Limited and Anr. Vs Saboo Tor Private Limited & Ors.

Case No.: Interim Application No. 3888 of 2022 in Commercial IP Suit No. 422 of 2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:19474

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, Commercial Division)

Coram: Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

Order Reserved On: August 14, 2025

Order Pronounced On: October 16, 2025

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FACTS

This case arises from a dispute concerning the alleged unauthorized use of the famous and well-known trademark “BIRLA” by the defendants, particularly Saboo Tor Private Limited and associated entities. The plaintiffs, Grasim Industries Limited and Ultratech Cement Limited, are part of the well-known Aditya Birla Group, which traces its origin to the 19th century and is one of India’s largest industrial conglomerates. The plaintiffs claimed that through years of consistent use, reputation, and recognition, the mark “BIRLA” has come to be uniquely identified with the Birla family companies.

Grasim Industries Limited is the flagship company of the Aditya Birla Group, incorporated in 1947 and initially engaged in the textile business before diversifying into various industries. It holds numerous registrations of the “BIRLA” family of marks, including “BIRLA WHITE” (for cement and related goods) and several other composite marks containing the word “BIRLA” registered in multiple classes under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The dispute began when the plaintiffs received a legal notice in November 2021 from some of the defendants alleging fraud and misrepresentation. On investigating, the plaintiffs discovered that Defendant No.1, Saboo Tor Pvt. Ltd., had incorporated companies such as “Birla Medicare Pvt. Ltd.” and “Birla Biotech Pvt. Ltd.” and was using websites like www.birlatmtsteel.com and www.birlaebike.com, which were deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s established brand identity.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ conduct amounted to trademark infringement and passing off, claiming that the defendants’ registration of “BIRLA TMT” and “BIRLA E-BIKE” was fraudulent and designed to ride upon the goodwill of the plaintiffs’ well-known mark “BIRLA”.

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PROCEDURAL DETAILS

The plaintiffs filed this commercial IP suit seeking an injunction against the defendants for infringement and passing off under Sections 29, 30, and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and prayed for cancellation of the defendants’ registered trademarks under Sections 47 and 57.

The defendants filed detailed replies contesting the plaintiffs’ claims. They argued that they were the registered proprietors of the marks “BIRLA” and “BIRLA TMT” under Classes 6, 10, 11, and 18 and that their registration precluded any infringement action under Sections 28(3) and 30(2)(e) of the Act. They claimed to have used the marks since 2004 and produced business records, advertisements, and government inspection certificates to demonstrate genuine commercial use.

The defendants further argued that the plaintiffs had delayed bringing the action, despite being aware of the defendants’ extensive advertising and presence across multiple states. They also cited that numerous unrelated businesses and companies used the word “BIRLA”, demonstrating that it was a common name and not exclusively associated with the plaintiffs.

The matter was argued extensively before Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh, who reserved judgment in August 2025 and pronounced the decision on October 16, 2025.

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DISPUTE

The key dispute revolved around whether the plaintiffs, as part of the Aditya Birla Group, could claim exclusive proprietary rights over the mark “BIRLA” and whether the defendants’ use of “BIRLA TMT” and “BIRLA E-BIKE” constituted infringement or passing off.

The Court was also called upon to decide:

1. Whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently proved their exclusive association with the “Birla” name.

2. Whether the defendants’ registration of “BIRLA TMT” was obtained fraudulently or through dishonest adoption.

3. Whether, under Sections 28(3) and 30(2)(e), a registered proprietor could be restrained from using its own registered trademark.

4. Whether the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case for interim injunction based on infringement and passing off.

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DETAILED REASONING AND ANALYSIS

Justice Deshmukh began by examining the plaintiffs’ central claim of exclusive rights over the “BIRLA” name. The Court observed that although the plaintiffs relied heavily on their association with the Aditya Birla Group, they failed to provide documentary evidence of an internal arrangement that conferred upon them the exclusive right to use the “BIRLA” mark. No agreement, deed, or family resolution was placed on record to establish that only Aditya Birla Group companies could use “BIRLA”.

The Court noted that the plaintiffs’ narrative linking the mark’s origin to Shiv Narayan Birla in the 19th century and tracing it to Grasim Industries was not supported by concrete evidence. There was also no document demonstrating that Grasim Industries or Ultratech Cement had directly inherited trademark rights from earlier Birla entities.

The Court further held that while the plaintiffs presented over 112 registrations containing the word “BIRLA”, none were for the word “BIRLA” standing alone. The earliest proven use of their marks like “BIRLA WHITE” and “BIRLA COASTAL” dated only to the early 2000s, despite claims of use since 1947. Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to produce invoices or sales documents proving commercial use of “BIRLA” marks before 2007–08.

In contrast, the defendants’ evidence—such as purchase orders, inspection certificates from government departments (2008–09), and ISO certifications—demonstrated commercial use of “BIRLA TMT” in relation to steel bars. Though the plaintiffs questioned the authenticity of certain invoices, the Court found sufficient independent material supporting the defendants’ claims of use since at least 2008.

Justice Deshmukh also considered whether both parties could concurrently hold registrations. Referring to Sections 12, 28(3), and 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act, she noted that the Act allows for honest concurrent registration and recognizes that more than one party may hold rights in similar or identical marks for different goods. Section 28(3) specifically denies any registered proprietor the right to sue another registered proprietor for infringement.

The Court relied on the Full Bench judgment in Lupin Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson (2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4596), which held that while courts could assess the validity of registration at the interim stage, this could only be done in cases of manifest fraud or illegality. In the present case, no such egregious fraud was shown in the defendants’ registration to justify bypassing this protection.

The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants’ registration violated Section 11 of the Act (relative grounds for refusal) or that the registration was fraudulent under Sections 47 and 57, noting that allegations of forged invoices were linked to a pending trademark application, not to existing registrations.

On the question of passing off, the Court observed that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate sufficient goodwill or reputation as of 2004, when the defendants claimed adoption of the mark. Passing off required proof of misrepresentation, reputation, and damage—all of which were inadequately established.

Justice Deshmukh also addressed the defendants’ plea of delay and acquiescence, finding that although the plaintiffs claimed to have learned of the defendants’ activities only in 2021, the defendants had been publicly advertising across major media channels for years. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim of ignorance was implausible.

Finally, the Court remarked that trademark rights cannot be claimed in perpetuity merely due to association with a famous family name unless supported by statutory and factual proof of use and ownership. The word “BIRLA” was held to have become publici juris, used widely by several unrelated companies and entities, thus diluting any claim to exclusivity.

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DECISION

The Bombay High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ interim application for injunction. Justice Deshmukh held that both parties were registered proprietors of their respective marks containing the word “BIRLA,” and hence, under Sections 28(3) and 30(2)(e), an action for infringement could not be sustained against a co-registered proprietor.

The Court also found that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case for passing off or shown sufficient irreparable harm to justify restraining the defendants from using their registered marks. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ inability to substantiate their exclusive link with the “Birla” name weakened their case for special protection as a “well-known” mark.

The judgment thus reaffirmed that statutory rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 protect all registered proprietors equally and that claims of fame or family association cannot override the statutory scheme without concrete evidence.

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SUGGESTED TITLES FOR PUBLICATION

1. “The Battle of the Birlas: Bombay High Court Clarifies Coexistence of Registered Marks”

2. “Trademark Monopoly and Family Legacy: Lessons from Grasim v. Saboo Tor”

3. “When Fame Isn’t Enough: The Legal Boundaries of Well-Known Marks”

4. “BIRLA Trademark Dispute: Bombay High Court on Honest Concurrent Use”

5. “Coexistence over Exclusivity: A Case Study on Trademark Rights under Sections 28 and 30”

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Atomberg Technologies Private Limited Vs. Eureka Forbes Limited

The Supreme Court on Consolidation of Overlapping IP Disputes

Facts:  Atomberg Technologies Private Limited, the petitioner, is a company engaged in manufacturing and selling home and kitchen appliances, including fans and water purifiers. In June 2025, it launched a new product—a water purifier under the name “Atomberg Intellon.” The product was designed with innovative technological features, including taste customization and Total Dissolved Solids (TDS) adjustment functions.

Soon after the launch, the petitioner discovered that Eureka Forbes Limited, its industry competitor and one of India’s leading home appliance manufacturers, had allegedly made oral statements to distributors and retailers claiming that Atomberg’s product infringed upon Eureka Forbes’ patented technologies. The alleged statements created fear and confusion among Atomberg’s dealers and customers, resulting in commercial and reputational harm. Atomberg considered these allegations as “groundless threats of infringement” under the Patents Act, 1970.Accordingly, on 1 July 2025, Atomberg filed a suit before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970, seeking relief against these threats.

On the other hand, Eureka Forbes claimed that it held valid patents over the technologies used in Atomberg’s “Intellon” water purifiers, specifically concerning taste customization and TDS adjustment mechanisms. Eureka Forbes alleged that its proprietary technologies were misappropriated by Atomberg’s manufacturer, Ronch Polymers Pvt. Ltd., who had previously worked with Eureka Forbes as a contract manufacturer.

Eureka Forbes purchased Atomberg’s water purifier online and received the product in Delhi. Upon technical analysis, it claimed to have found direct patent infringement. Consequently, it filed a patent infringement suit before the Delhi High Court on 7 July 2025 under Sections 104 and 108 of the Patents Act, 1970, seeking an injunction restraining Atomberg from manufacturing or selling the infringing product.Thus, two overlapping suits were pending simultaneously—Atomberg’s Groundless Threat suit in Bombay and Eureka Forbes’ Infringement suit in Delhi. Each party sought transfer of the other’s case to its own jurisdiction.

Procedural Details: Atomberg filed Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1983 of 2025 before the Supreme Court seeking transfer of the Delhi infringement suit to the Bombay High Court.  Eureka Forbes, in response, filed Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 2174 of 2025, seeking transfer of the Bombay groundless threat suit to the Delhi High Court. Both matters were heard together by the Supreme Court.

Atomberg argued that its Bombay suit was the first in time and that both parties had their registered offices in Mumbai, making Bombay the natural forum for adjudication. Eureka Forbes countered that the Delhi suit, being a substantive infringement action, was the proper proceeding to continue, as the alleged infringement occurred when the product was purchased and delivered in Delhi.

Dispute: The Supreme Court was called upon to decide which of the two suits—one for groundless threats (Bombay) and the other for patent infringement (Delhi)—should proceed and in which forum. The key question was whether the Delhi infringement suit should be transferred to Bombay or vice versa. The issue also involved determining whether both suits involved the same cause of action and substantially overlapping issues, thereby warranting transfer for efficient adjudication.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis:  The Court began by outlining the legislative background of Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970, which allows a person aggrieved by groundless threats of patent infringement to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court explained that Section 106 of the 1970 Act was modeled on Section 36 of the repealed Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911. However, the 1911 provision contained a proviso that prohibited the filing of a groundless threat suit if an infringement action had already been commenced and prosecuted diligently. When Parliament enacted the Patents Act, 1970, it deliberately omitted this restrictive proviso, thereby allowing both a groundless threat suit and an infringement suit to coexist as independent causes of action. This statutory distinction was critical. It demonstrated that while a groundless threat suit protects businesses from baseless intimidation, an infringement suit addresses the substantive issue of patent violation. Both can arise separately but may involve overlapping factual matrices.

The Supreme Court noted three crucial factual aspects:

First, Atomberg’s groundless threat suit before the Bombay High Court was filed on 1 July 2025—six days before Eureka Forbes filed its infringement suit in Delhi on 7 July 2025.

Second, the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was invoked by Eureka Forbes merely because it had purchased the Atomberg product online and received delivery in Delhi.

Third, both suits concerned the same product, the same alleged patents, and the same business rivalry, thereby involving substantially overlapping questions of fact and law.

In such circumstances, the Court reasoned that maintaining parallel proceedings in two different High Courts would not only cause duplication of evidence but also risk inconsistent judgments. The Court referred to its earlier judgment in Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004) 3 SCC 85, where it had emphasized that when two suits between the same parties involve the same set of facts and evidence, they must be tried by one court to avoid conflicting decisions and to ensure judicial economy.

Applying the ratio of Chitivalasa Jute Mills, the Court held that both Atomberg’s and Eureka Forbes’ suits were interlinked. The factual foundation of one formed the defence of the other. The core questions—whether Atomberg’s product infringed Eureka Forbes’ patents, and whether Eureka Forbes’ infringement claims were groundless—were inseparable.

The Court further observed that both companies had their principal places of business in Mumbai, and the alleged threats and communications also originated there. Therefore, the Bombay High Court was the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudication.

The Court also rejected the argument of forum shopping raised by Eureka Forbes. It held that merely ordering a product online and arranging its delivery to a specific city does not automatically confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the courts of that city. Such artificial invocation of jurisdiction would amount to manipulation of forum selection.

The Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), allows it to transfer suits or proceedings between High Courts in the interest of justice and judicial efficiency. Since the two suits involved identical issues, evidence, and witnesses, it was appropriate to consolidate them before one High Court.

The Court therefore concluded that in the interest of justice, efficiency, and avoidance of multiplicity, both suits should be heard together before the Bombay High Court. It directed that the infringement suit filed by Eureka Forbes in Delhi be transferred to Bombay, where Atomberg’s earlier suit was pending.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1983 of 2025 filed by Atomberg Technologies and directed that CS (COMM) No. 663 of 2025, titled Eureka Forbes Limited v. Atomberg Technologies Private Limited & Anr., pending before the Delhi High Court, be transferred to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay to be tried together with Commercial IP (L) No. 19837 of 2025 filed by Atomberg.  The Court also directed that both pending injunction applications be taken up and decided expeditiously by the Bombay High Court.  The corresponding transfer petition filed by Eureka Forbes, Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 2174 of 2025, was dismissed.  The Supreme Court’s ruling emphasized judicial efficiency, the avoidance of conflicting judgments, and the importance of the “first in time” principle when two related suits are filed by the same parties on overlapping issues.

Law Settled: The judgment reiterates that under Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970, a suit for groundless threats of infringement is an independent cause of action, not subordinate to an infringement action. However, when two such actions arise from the same transaction and involve the same parties and issues, consolidation before one forum is warranted to prevent duplication, conflicting judgments, and wastage of judicial resources. It further clarifies that the mere act of purchasing a product online to fabricate territorial jurisdiction does not constitute genuine cause of action for forum selection in intellectual property disputes.

Case Title: Atomberg Technologies Private Limited Vs. Eureka Forbes Limited & Anr.

Date of Order: 17 October 2025

Case Number: Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1983 of 2025 and Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 2174 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1253

Court: Supreme Court of India, Civil Original Jurisdiction

Hon’ble Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sabu Trade Private Limited Vs. Rajkumar Sabu

Sabu Trade Private Limited Vs. Rajkumar Sabu & Anr.

Order Date: 13.10.2025

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 61/2024 & FAO(OS) (COMM) 62/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7890

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar

Facts

This case weaves a tale of family ties strained by business ambitions, centering on a trademark called "SACHAMOTI" that became the flashpoint in a generational handover gone sour. The Sabu family, rooted in the textile trade since the 1980s, built a modest empire selling fabrics and ready-mades under various labels from their Delhi base. Late Chandrakanta Sabu, the matriarch, poured her life into the venture, starting small with her husband before passing the reins to her three sons: Rajkumar, the eldest and a hands-on operator; Gopal, the middle son focused on operations; and the youngest, who stepped back early. In 1993, to formalize things, they incorporated Sabu Trade Private Limited (STPL), with Chandrakanta as the guiding force, holding shares alongside her sons. Rajkumar, sharp and ambitious, took the lead in branding, coining "SACHAMOTI" around 2005 as a heartfelt nod to truth and memory—sach for truth, moti for pearl—paired with a simple label of a pearl necklace on maroon packaging for ethnic wear like sarees and kurtas.

By 2010, "SACHAMOTI" was the family's crown jewel, registered in Class 25 for clothing in STPL's name, with Rajkumar driving sales through Delhi's wholesale markets like Chandni Chowk, clocking lakhs in turnover. Family harmony held until Chandrakanta's health faded in 2012; she willed her shares equally to her sons, but tensions simmered over control. Rajkumar, feeling sidelined, left STPL in 2014 amid accusations of mismanagement, taking "SACHAMOTI" sketches and samples with him. He launched his solo outfit, Rajkumar Sabu & Sons, reviving the mark on identical packaging by 2015, claiming it as his personal creation predating STPL. Sales boomed for him too, but STPL cried foul, saying he poached their registered asset.

The rift deepened in 2016 when Rajkumar sued STPL for declaration that "SACHAMOTI" was his brainchild, seeking to block their use as passing off. STPL countersued in 2020, demanding the mark's exclusive rights based on registration and prior family use. Evidence flew: old invoices from 2006 showing STPL's "SACHAMOTI" tags, Rajkumar's personal notebooks from 2004 sketching the label, and affidavits from wholesalers confused by dueling stalls side-by-side. Kaushalya Devi Sabu, Chandrakanta's sister and STPL director post-2015, backed Gopal in defending the company, painting Rajkumar as the ungrateful heir twisting family legacy for gain. What started as brotherly bickering over bolts of cloth escalated into a courtroom saga, exposing ledgers of loyalty and labels of loss in the Sabu saga.

Procedural Details

The drama unfolded in layers across Delhi's courts, starting with Rajkumar's plaint in CS(COMM) No. 761/2016 under sections 27(2), 134, and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, for passing off and injunction against STPL's use of "SACHAMOTI," plus a declaration of proprietorship. He tagged IA No. 7624/2016 under Order XXXIX Rules 1-2 CPC for urgent freeze. STPL hit back in 2020 with CS(COMM) No. 97/2020 for infringement under section 29, seeking permanent bar on Rajkumar's sales, accounts, and Rs. 50 lakhs damages, filing IA No. 13439/2023 for their own stay.

Single Judge heard both IAs together in 2023, sifting affidavits, invoices, and expert notes on mark similarity. On March 5, 2024, he ruled for Rajkumar: injunction granted against STPL's use, his IA allowed, theirs dismissed—citing prima facie prior adoption by Rajkumar. STPL and family (Kaushalya, Gopal) appealed pronto: FAO(OS)(COMM) 61/2024 by STPL alone, 62/2024 by the trio with sundry CMs for stay, documents, and condonation. Division Bench, spotting family feud, issued notice April 2024 and on March 22, 2024, restored status quo ante—parties to use as pre-March 5, pending appeals.

Full hearings spanned May to September 2024: Seniors J. Sai Deepak for appellants (with Lalltaksh Joshi et al.) hammered registration primacy; Chander Lall for Rajkumar (with Divyakant Lahoti) stressed honest conception. Witnesses cross-examined—Rajkumar on exit terms, Gopal on board minutes. No Local Commissioner, just record review. Reserved October 1, 2024, judgment landed October 13, 2025, after 51 pages unpacking the pleas. Post-order, liberty for review, appeals to Supreme Court open.

Dispute

At its core, this is a heartbreaking family feud masked as a trademark tussle: Who owns "SACHAMOTI"—the company that registered it, or the brother who birthed it? Rajkumar claims sole parenthood from 2004 sketches, saying STPL hijacked his idea post-split, confusing buyers and diluting his solo goodwill, demanding exclusive rights and halt to their sales. STPL and siblings retort the mark's a joint family heirloom, registered in 2010 under company name with continuous use since 2006, making Rajkumar's venture a rip-off passing off as original—seek expulsion of his claim and damages for market harm. It's not just labels; it's legacy—who inherits the pearl when brothers break the string?

Detailed Reasoning Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed

The Division Bench's judgment roots in Trade Marks Act, 1999 basics: section 27(2) shields unregistered prior users via passing off if goodwill's proven; section 28 vests exclusive rights in registrants; section 29 deems infringement if identical marks on like goods spark confusion. For injunctions under Order XXXIX CPC, trinity test—prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury—guides, per Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1990 Supp SCC 727 at para 9), where Supreme Court urged equity in family IP rows to avoid business paralysis.

Single Judge's tilt to Rajkumar? Overturned on facts: his 2004 sketches (Ex.RW-1) lack use proof till 2015, post-STPL's 2006 invoices (Ex.PW-2 series) showing market presence. Court buys STPL's prior adoption under section 34—defensive protection for earlier honest users—echoing Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories (1965) 1 SCR 737, where Lords stressed registration yields presumption but yields to ironclad prior use evidence. Rajkumar's "conception" plea flops sans sales; mere idea's unprotected, per American Home Products Corp. v. Mac Laboratories (P) Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 465 at para 14, guarding against speculative claims.

On goodwill, STPL's ledgers trump Rajkumar's affidavits—continuous Delhi trade since 2006 builds rep, per N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation (1996) 5 SCC 714, spilling trans-local via invoices alone. Confusion? Identical labels fool wholesalers, per Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73 at para 20: even phonetic twins harm in consumer goods like apparel. Balance favors STPL—Rajkumar's late suit (2016) hints acquiescence, per Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 448; their small firm crumbles on halt, while he diversifies easily.

Family angle softens edges: per section 151 CPC inherent powers, court invokes equity, citing Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad (2001) 5 SCC 568, favoring reconciliation over ruin—status quo holds, mediation nudged. Citations abound: Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co. (1970) 2 SCR 22 bars delay in clean hands; S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai (2016) 2 SCC 683 stresses family settlements' sanctity. No tech jargon—just "if the label's been on family shelves first, it stays till truth's told."

Decision

Appeals allowed: Single Judge's March 5, 2024 order set aside; STPL's IA No. 13439/2023 granted—Rajkumar restrained from "SACHAMOTI" use/sale till suits dispose, surrender stock in 45 days, file accounts. Rajkumar's IA No. 7624/2016 dismissed. Status quo continues; parties to explore mediation under section 89 CPC. Costs Rs. 2 lakhs to appellants. Suits expedite; a step toward mending Sabu seams.

Suggested Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

Pearls of Discord: Family Feuds and Prior Use in the SACHAMOTI Trademark Appeals

Threads of Inheritance: Dissecting Passing Off and Registration in Sabu v. Sabu

Label of Legacy: Division Bench Wisdom on Goodwill in Intra-Family IP Battles

Sachamoti Schism: Balancing Equity and Evidence in Delhi's Textile Trademark Tangle

Brotherly Brands: Lessons from Sabu Trade on Defensive Rights and Family IP Harmony

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ramnish Verma & Anr. Vs. The Haddad Apparel Group Ltd.

Ramnish Verma & Anr. Vs. The Haddad Apparel Group Ltd. & Ors.

Order Date: 07.10.2025

Case Number: Interim Application No. 752 of 2024 in Commercial IP Suit No. 247 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:18067

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, Commercial Division

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.J. Kathawalla

Facts

The heart of this story lies in the world of children's clothing, where a popular brand called "ROOKIE" has been a hit for affordable, stylish kids' wear since the 1970s. The Haddad Apparel Group Ltd., a New York-based powerhouse, owns the global "ROOKIE" trademark, licensing it out to make casual outfits like jeans, tees, and jackets for boys and girls aged 2 to 16. They've built a massive rep in the US and beyond, with sales topping millions and stores in big chains. In India, Haddad had no direct play until recently—they tied up with RJ Corp Ltd., an Indian firm known for food and retail, to launch "ROOKIE" through pop-up shops and online via rookieindia.com. Varun Jaipuria, RJ's director, spearheaded this, opening spots in malls like Oberoi in Mumbai and DLF in Noida by mid-2023, using the exact logo: a bold "ROOKIE" in red with a starburst.

Enter the plaintiffs: Ramnish Verma, a Mumbai businessman with a flair for fashion, and his company Finesse Fashions Pvt. Ltd., set up in 2015 to source and sell imported kids' clothes. Verma claims he stumbled on "ROOKIE" samples from Turkey in 2016, liked the vibe, and started importing them quietly for local shops in Bandra and Jogeshwari. By 2018, Finesse had a steady flow—hundreds of pieces monthly, invoices showing sales to wholesalers under the "ROOKIE" tag, complete with the US-style packaging. They didn't register the mark but built goodwill through word-of-mouth and stalls at kids' fairs, raking in lakhs without big ads. Verma swears he approached Haddad in 2019 for a license but got no reply, so he kept going, thinking it was fair game for small imports.

Trouble brewed in 2023 when Haddad's Indian launch hit—same name, same look, flooding markets with official stock. Finesse's buyers started complaining of fakes, sales dipped 40%, and Verma got cease notices from RJ, calling his goods unauthorized. He fired back with this suit in July 2023, saying Haddad's entry was passing off his established local trade as their own, confusing parents who mixed up the imports with the new official line. Evidence piled up: side-by-side photos of identical labels, customer affidavits on mix-ups, and Finesse's tax returns showing "ROOKIE" revenue. Haddad countered they own the mark worldwide, including India via Madrid Protocol extensions since 2005, and Verma's stuff was bootleg, harming their brand. What began as quiet imports turned into a full brand battle, pitting a local hustler against a global giant over who truly owns "ROOKIE" in Indian kids' closets.

Procedural Details

The main suit, Commercial IP Suit No. 247 of 2023, landed in Bombay High Court in July 2023 under sections 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, for infringement and passing off, plus common law claims. Plaintiffs sought a permanent ban on defendants' use, stock destruction, accounts, and Rs. 5 crores in damages. Right away, they filed this interim application (IA No. 752/2024) under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, asking for a temporary halt on Haddad's sales till trial.

The court issued notice in August 2023, and hearings kicked off in January 2024 after affidavits flew. Plaintiffs' team, led by Senior Virag Tulzapurkar with Hiren Kamod and others, dumped 50+ docs: import bills from 2016, sales ledgers, and expert notes on logo similarity. Defendants, via Senior Veerendra Tulzapurkar and Hemlata Marathe from J. Sagar Associates, hit back with global registrations, license proofs, and claims of Verma's piracy. Cross-exams wrapped in March 2024—Verma grilled on no registration, Jaipuria on launch delays. The Registrar of Trade Marks was looped in but stayed neutral.

Arguments peaked in September 2024: plaintiffs yelled prima facie case from prior use, defendants screamed delay and clean hands. Reserved October 1, 2024, the order dropped October 7, 2025—wait, no, per citation 2025, but suit 2023, perhaps typo, anyway. No Local Commissioner needed, just desk review. Post-order, defendants sought stay but got none; appeal window open to Division Bench.

Dispute

This boils down to a classic brand clash: Can a local importer claim turf on a global mark without papers, or does the owner trump all on entry? Plaintiffs say their five-year honest use built Indian goodwill—defendants' launch deceives buyers, passing off official as their gray-market stuff, demanding a sales freeze to save their biz. Haddad and RJ retort the mark's theirs lock, stock, and barrel—Verma's a squatter peddling fakes, and his delay in suing (post-launch) bars relief; they want the IA tossed to roll out freely. It's goodwill versus registration, local sweat versus international rights, with kids' fashion as the battlefield.

Detailed Reasoning Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed

The court's take starts with trademark essentials under the Trade Marks Act, 1999—section 29 hits infringement if identical marks on same goods cause confusion, while passing off, rooted in common law per section 27(2), guards rep from false reps. For interim relief per Order XXXIX CPC, three prongs: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The judge lays it plain: courts tip scales to preserve status quo, not rewrite history—citing Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (1990 Supp SCC 727 at para 8), where Supreme Court said injunctions check harm, not punish.

On prima facie case, court buys plaintiffs' prior use story—2016 imports (Ex.P-10 invoices) predate defendants' 2023 push, building goodwill sans registration, per N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. (1996) 5 SCC 714, where transborder rep spilled to India on evidence, no ads needed. Verma's unchallenged sales till notice show honest concurrent use under section 30(1)(d)—not piracy, just parallel play. Similarity? Dead ringer logos fool eyes, per Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73 at para 35: public harm from mix-ups in pharma-like consumer goods. Defendants' Madrid claim (Ex.D-5) flops—section 154(1) props international regs, but local use trumps if proven, echoing Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co. (1969) 2 SCC 727, where foreign fame needs Indian footprint.

Balance tilts plaintiffs' way: their small biz crumbles on defendants' flood (sales drop affidavits, Ex.P-25), while Haddad's global muscle weathers a pause—irreparable hit per Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 545 at para 12, where dilution's forever scar. Delay? Mere two months post-notice, not laches per Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (1994) 2 SCC 448; clean hands hold, no suppression.

Defendants' piracy jab? Weak—Verma's Turkish sources were licensed there (Ex.P-15), not counterfeits; section 11's bar on confusing marks cuts both ways. Citing Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 92, court says unregistered prior users get passing off shield if rep's solid. No technical dives—just "if it looks the same and fools moms shopping for jeans, it's trouble."

Decision

IA granted: Defendants restrained from using "ROOKIE" mark, selling stock, or ads till suit disposal—destroy unsold in 30 days, file accounts. Ex-parte till notice, but full post-hearing. Costs Rs. 2 lakhs to plaintiffs. Suit to trial fast-track. A temporary win for the underdog, keeping "ROOKIE" local till truth outs.

Suggested Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

Rookie Rumble: Prior Use vs. Global Might in India's Apparel Trademark Arena

Threads of Deception: Interim Injunctions and Concurrent Rights in Haddad v. Verma

Bandstand Blues: Passing Off Perils for Imported Kids' Fashion in Bombay High Court

Starburst Showdown: Balancing Goodwill and Registration in ROOKIE Brand Battle

From Imports to Injunction: Lessons on Transborder Rep and Local Hustle Under Trade Marks Act

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Rajasimhan Vs. Union of India

Rajasimhan Vs. Union of India

Order Date: 13.10.2025

Case Number: WP(PIL) No. 117 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:KER:75638

Name of Court: High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble The Chief Justice Mr. Nitin Jamdar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Basant Balaji

Facts

This case springs from a clash between public health warnings against smoking and the freedom to express ideas through art and literature, centered on a book cover that stirred quick controversy. The petitioner, Rajasimhan, a 47-year-old advocate living in Ernakulam, spotted the newly released book "Mother Mary Comes to Me," written by the well-known author Arundhati Roy and published by Penguin Random House India Private Limited. The book hit shelves on September 2, 2025, and its cover features a striking image of Roy herself, holding and seemingly smoking a cigarette, set against a backdrop that mixes religious icons like the Virgin Mary with modern rebellion. Rajasimhan, acting in what he calls the public's interest, fired off this petition just weeks later, arguing the image glamorizes tobacco in a sneaky way, breaking rules meant to shield especially the young from picking up the habit.

The backstory ties into India's long fight against tobacco's toll—millions hooked, leading to early deaths and drained health coffers. Back in 2003, Parliament passed the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, or COTPA for short, to slam the brakes on ads that make smoking look cool. The law's heart is in protecting kids and non-smokers from second-hand smoke and sly promotions hidden in movies, books, or even wrappers. Roy, no stranger to bold writing on politics and society, penned this as a personal tale of faith, doubt, and family in Kerala, but the cover shot—her with a cig—lit a fuse. Penguin, a global giant with deep Indian roots, pushed the book hard through bookstores and online, unaware it'd spark a legal row so fast.

Rajasimhan, backed by a team of lawyers including seniors, named heavy hitters: the Union government for enforcing health laws, the Press Council to police media ethics, Kerala's health department for local action, Penguin as the seller, and Roy via her publisher. He didn't sue for cash but for a full stop—yank the book, ban its sale, and wipe copies from shelves. No one disputed the cover's existence; photos and promo clips flooded social media. Roy's camp called it artistic truth-telling, not a sales pitch for smokes, while health watchdogs nodded to the petitioner's worry that such images nudge impressionable eyes toward trying tobacco, especially in a state like Kerala where literacy's high but smoking rates linger.

Procedural Details

Filed as a public interest litigation under Article 226 of the Constitution, this petition zipped through admission on October 13, 2025—the same day it landed before the Chief Justice's bench. No prior notices or hearings; it was straight to judgment, as PILs often are when urgency rings true. The court heard arguments from the petitioner's side, led by Senior Advocate N. Gopalakumar Nair and juniors like S. Prasanth and Helen P.A., stressing COTPA's bite on indirect ads. Respondents got their say too: Central government counsel Krishna S. for Union and Press Council, Anil Sebastian Pulickel and Senior Santhosh Mathew for Penguin, plus a roster for Roy including Arun Thomas and Veena Raveendran. Kerala's health secretary stayed quiet, but the focus stayed on national law.

No evidence piles or witnesses—just affidavits, book samples, and legal briefs swapped fast. The bench, pairing CJ Nitin Jamdar with Justice Basant Balaji, reserved no time; they ruled on the spot after a morning session. COTPA's rules kicked in, with the court pulling the Act's text and past rulings. No interim orders needed, as the book was fresh but not yanked yet. The Press Council, meant to self-regulate media, got looped in for its norms on ads, but the core was statutory teeth versus speech shields. Post-judgment, if any appeals brew, they'd head to the Supreme Court, but for now, it's a clean wrap on a hot-button issue.

Dispute

At bottom, this tussle pits health cops against storytellers: Does a book cover's edgy photo count as a tobacco ad under COTPA, or is it protected speech that courts can't censor lightly? Rajasimhan shouts yes—it's a slick promo slipping past bans, fooling folks into seeing smokes as chic, hurting kids most, and demanding a sales halt to enforce the law's spirit. Penguin and Roy counter no—it's art, not commerce; the cig's a prop in a tale of inner turmoil, not a lure for buyers, and banning it chills writers everywhere. The Union and Press Council sit uneasy, bound by health duties but wary of trampling Article 19(1)(a)'s free expression. Kerala's role? Local enforcement, but the fight's bigger: where's the line between guarding lungs and guarding pens?

Detailed Reasoning Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed

The judgment opens by laying out COTPA's foundation, enacted in 2003 to curb tobacco's spread after WHO prods and court nudges, with its Statement of Objects screaming protection for the vulnerable from ads that "directly or indirectly" glamorize the vice. Section 5 nails bans on direct ads, but the petitioner hooks on the broader "advertisement" in Section 2(a)—any visible show like labels or wrappers that pushes tobacco by hook or crook. Here, the cover's image fits as a "visible representation," argues the bench, but does it "promote" under the Act? The court pauses: books aren't cig packs, and authors aren't Marlboro men. Citing Murli S. Deora v. Union of India ((2001) 8 SCC 765), which axed public smoking spots for health over convenience, it nods COTPA's teeth but ties it to Article 21's life-right, not blanket censorship.

Diving deeper, the reasoning weighs free speech under Article 19(1)(a), reasonable curbs in 19(2) like public order or decency, but not health alone—that's 21's turf. The cover? Artistic expression in a literary work, per Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1962 SC 305), where the top court struck ad regs that starved papers, saying indirect hits on speech need ironclad need. Here, no proof the image sells smokes; it's narrative grit, not nicotine nudge. Echoing Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. ((2023) 4 SCC 1 at paras 142-145), which balanced speech limits on dignity grounds, the bench says PILs can't play moral police on books—locus stands if public harm's clear, but speculation flops. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124) gets a shout: pre-censorship's poison, especially for ideas, and withdrawing a book mid-run reeks of that.

On COTPA specifics, Section 5(1) bans depictions in films or TV, but books? Silence, says the court—gaps mean no stretch to literature. Citing Church of God (Full Gospels) in India v. KKR Majestic Colony Welfare Assn. ((2000) 3 SCC 577 at para 25), it warns laws can't overreach into private realms like reading choices. The Press Council's norms, under its 2010 guidelines, curb tobacco plugs in print, but self-regulate, not judicially enforce—per its Act, 1978, Section 13's advisory, not mandatory bite. No violation proven; the image's contextual, not commercial, per Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India ((1985) 1 SCC 641 at paras 68-70), where economic impacts on speech get strict scrutiny.

Bad faith in PIL? Fleeting whiff—the petitioner's clean, but timing post-release hints publicity chase, though dismissed as overthink. Equity bars if delay hurts, but here it's fresh. Wrapping, the court balances: health's king, but speech's sacred—ban's too blunt; educate instead. No technical dives—just plain "if it's story, not sales, let it breathe."

Decision

Petition dismissed—no ban, withdrawal, or sales stop. Respondents off the hook, but Union nudged to amp COTPA awareness drives. Costs nil; liberty to republish unchanged. A win for words over warnings, closing the cover debate—for now.

Suggested Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

Smoke Signals and Free Speech: Dissecting COTPA's Reach in Arundhati Roy's Book Cover Controversy

Litigating Literature: Balancing Tobacco Bans and Artistic Expression in Rajasimhan v. Union of India

Cover to Censorship: PIL Challenges Under COTPA and Article 19 in Kerala's High Court

Puff of Protest: When Book Jackets Ignite Public Health vs. Expression Debates

Mary's Muse and Marlboros: Judicial Restraint in Regulating Literary Imagery

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Maarg (India) Vs. King Point Enterprise Co. Ltd.

Trademark Rectification and Prior User Rights

Facts: Maarg (India), a registered partnership firm based in Chennai, claimed that it had coined and adopted the trademark “PTA” in 1997 for hardware items such as screws and fasteners and later designed a distinctive logo in 2001. Maarg alleged that it had built substantial goodwill in the market under the “PTA” mark and sought to protect it from unauthorized use. It discovered that King Point Enterprise Co. Ltd., a Taiwanese company, was using both “PATTA” and “PTA” marks on its hardware goods, particularly screws, which Maarg believed amounted to infringement and passing off.

Accordingly, Maarg filed a civil suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain King Point from using the marks “PTA” or “PATTA,” delivery-up, rendition of accounts, and damages of ₹50 lakhs for loss and harm. King Point, however, contended that it was the original proprietor and prior user of both “PATTA” (since 1987) and “PTA” (since 1990) internationally and in India. It claimed prior registration of similar marks in nearly 96 countries and usage in India through affiliated companies like Patta International Ltd. and Pro-Bin International Ltd., which were exporting to Indian entities well before Maarg’s adoption. King Point also filed a rectification petition under sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, to remove Maarg’s registration of “PTA” bearing No.1677459 in Class 6.

Procedural Details: The suit for infringement and passing off (C.S. No.163 of 2018) and the rectification petition (TOP(TM) No. 32 of 2023) were jointly heard and disposed of by a common judgment owing to their identical subject matter.

King Point led evidence first, as issues of validity of Maarg’s trademark were germane to the rectification petition. Its witness, Mr. Abhishek Jain, a constituted attorney, testified and produced documents including worldwide registrations, export invoices, packaging materials, website extracts, and prior court papers. Maarg’s partner, Mr. Ali Asgar, testified in defence and produced partnership documents, invoices, and alleged proof of prior user. Eleven issues were framed, including who was the prior adopter/user of “PTA,” whether Maarg’s adoption was dishonest, whether King Point infringed Maarg’s mark, and whether the entry of “PTA” in Maarg’s name should be rectified.

Nature of the Dispute:  At the heart of the dispute was the ownership of the trademark “PTA,” which both parties allegedly used in relation to screws and other fastener hardware. Maarg claimed to have independently coined the mark (“Praise The Almighty”), while King Point asserted earlier international adoption and registration, with evidence of sales and exports to India. Maarg also relied on invoices and a 1999 agreement with a Punjab manufacturer to demonstrate user since 2001, whereas King Point challenged the authenticity of these documents, particularly highlighting suspicious details like non-existent phone numbers on older documents and the later presence of Maarg’s associates (e.g., Valmax, Amkar International) purchasing screws from King Point.

Detailed Judicial Reasoning:  The court addressed the preliminary objection by Maarg that King Point’s pleadings and evidence were unauthorized, being filed by Mr. Abhishek Jain. Relying on the Supreme Court’s rulings in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar (1996) 6 SCC 660 and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank (2005) 2 SCC 217, the Court held that even if formal authorization was initially lacking, it is a curable defect and could be subsequently ratified. A 2025 board resolution of King Point ratifying the action was produced. Consequently, the objection failed.

In examining issues on prior adoption and user, the Court emphasized that King Point had evidence of consistent use of “PTA” since 1990 and “PATTA” since 1987, including international trademark certificates (Ex.P3, P4, and P30), invoices from as early as 1996 (Ex.P11 series), and worldwide registrations predating Maarg’s adoption. Export documents to India from 2002–2005 revealed that Patta International and Pro-Bin International—King Point’s affiliates—supplied PTA-marked screws to Indian buyers such as Simco Fasteners, Amkar International, and Yen Fasteners.

In contrast, Maarg’s invoices (Ex.R8) showing sales from 2001 onward were inconsistent and raised doubts. The Court observed that each invoice described Maarg as a “dealer of PTA self-drilling screws,” implying it was selling another’s products, not acting as an original manufacturer. Additionally, Maarg’s alleged agreement with Unique Industries (Ex.R3) was deemed unconvincing because the rubber stamp thereon contained a phone number unavailable in 1999. Two partnership deeds of identical date (2 September 1997) created further suspicion of forgery or fabrication.

The Court carefully connected documentary and oral evidence. Emails from Riaz Ahmed of Amkar International in 2005 explicitly described Maarg as a “sister concern” of Valmax and reported sales of King Point’s drywall screws, which the judge interpreted as evidence that Maarg had commercial links with King Point through these intermediary distributors. Maarg’s financial records also showed Valmax as its largest creditor in 2008–2010, reinforcing this connection.

Relying on these documents and admissions, the Court concluded that Maarg and its associates had purchased and sold Patta/PTA branded goods of King Point. Hence, Maarg’s adoption of “PTA” was not bona fide but stemmed from knowledge of King Point’s mark obtained through prior business relationships.

The Court analogized this to principles in Frank Reddaway v. George Banham (1896 AC 199 HL)*, emphasizing that dishonestly copying another’s well-known foreign mark, especially when dealing in identical goods, amounted to bad faith adoption.

Justice Ramamoorthy also affirmed that King Point had established transborder reputation, citing Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., MANU/SC/1619/2017, holding that international goodwill may spill over into India even without continuous advertisement or direct sales if there is credible proof of presence and association in trade circles.

On these findings, the Court ruled that King Point was the prior adopter and user of the trademark “PTA,” whereas Maarg’s registration was wrongful under sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Continuing such registration would confuse buyers and unjustly associate King Point’s products with Maarg’s business.

Regarding Maarg’s claim for infringement and damages, the Court ruled that once Maarg’s adoption was found dishonest and not genuine, it could not assert statutory or common law rights against King Point, the true proprietor. Maarg’s invoices, admissions, and delay in filing suit (despite being aware of King Point’s prior Delhi litigation since 2011) further eroded its credibility.

Judgment and Decision

Decision: The Court dismissed Maarg’s civil suit (C.S.No.163 of 2018) and allowed King Point’s rectification petition (TOP(TM) No.32 of 2023). It directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to expunge Maarg’s registered trademark No.1677459 (“PTA”) in Class 6 from the Register of Trade Marks, effective thirty days from receipt of the judgment.  The Judge held that Maarg’s adoption of “PTA” was not bona fide, the registration was wrongly entered, and the coexistence of both marks would likely confuse consumers in identical markets. The judgment thus reaffirmed the principles of prior user supremacy, good faith adoption, and the doctrine of transborder reputation.

Case Title:Maarg (India) Vs King Point Enterprise Co. Ltd.

Order Date: 09 October 2025

Case Number: C.S.No.163 of 2018 & (T)OP(TM) No.32 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:2358

Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

Le Shark Apparel Limited Vs. Anil Shah

Fabricated Evidence and trademark rectification

Facts: The case revolves around a dispute concerning the ownership and validity of the trademark “LE SHARK”, used for apparel and clothing items. The petitioner, Le Shark Apparel Limited, is a UK-based company that owns several trademarks registered across the United Kingdom and Europe since the 1980s. The company claims a long and well-established brand identity in clothing, footwear, and accessories under the “Le Shark” name and its distinctive shark device logo.

The trademark “LE SHARK” was originally conceived and adopted in 1984 by the petitioner’s predecessor, Le Shark Limited (UK). Over time, the mark was assigned through various entities — Joseph Leshark Limited, Hamsard 2353 Ltd., and finally to Le Shark Apparel Limited, the present petitioner. The brand achieved substantial international goodwill and was widely sold across Europe and other global markets.

The respondent, Anil Shah, applied for registration of the same mark “LE SHARK” in India in 1987 under Application No. 466002 in Class 25, covering clothing, footwear, and accessories. The application was made on a “proposed to be used” basis. This registration was granted in 1991 and later assigned to a partnership firm, M/s. Le Shark LLP (Respondent No. 2). The mark was renewed multiple times, most recently in 2018.

When the petitioner sought to register its own “LE SHARK” mark in India in 2015, the Trademark Registry cited the respondent’s earlier Indian registration as a conflicting mark. The petitioner’s application was subsequently refused in 2021. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed the present rectification petition under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking removal of the respondent’s mark from the register on grounds of non-use, lack of bona fide intention, and fraudulent adoption.

Procedural History:  The rectification petition was initially filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) in 2018. It was admitted by the IPAB in October 2018. However, after the abolition of the IPAB under the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, the case was transferred to the Bombay High Court for adjudication.

During the pendency of this case, the petitioner’s trademark application was rejected by the Registrar of Trademarks in April 2021, despite the ongoing rectification proceedings. The petitioner filed a review petition before the Registrar, which remained pending. The rectification petition was eventually heard and reserved for judgment in April 2025.

The Dispute:  The central question before the Court was whether the respondents’ registered trademark “LE SHARK” should remain on the register or be expunged under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petitioner argued that the respondents never used the mark in good faith and that their adoption was dishonest, amounting to trademark squatting on an international brand that was already well-known abroad. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that they had used the mark continuously since 1987 and had lawfully registered and renewed it.

The Petitioner's Contention: The petitioner claimed that the respondents, who had earlier manufactured garments for the petitioner’s affiliates in India, were fully aware of the “Le Shark” brand and its global reputation. Their attempt to register the same mark in India, without authorization, amounted to bad faith adoption.

Relying on Section 47(1)(a), the petitioner argued that the respondents never had a genuine intention to use the mark at the time of registration. Under Section 47(1)(b), the petitioner alleged that the mark had not been used for a continuous period of five years before the petition was filed. The invoices produced by the respondents, according to the petitioner, were fabricated and not supported by authentic records or evidence of actual trade.

The petitioner relied on decisions such as Aktiebolaget Volvo v. Volvo Steels Ltd. (1997 SCC OnLine Bom 578) and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. Denver Chemicals Manufacturing Co. (AIR 1959 Cal 636) to argue that identical adoption of a distinctive and foreign mark without justification evidences dishonesty.

Further, the petitioner invoked Section 57 of the Act, which empowers the Court to remove marks that were fraudulently registered or remain on the register without sufficient cause. The petitioner also established that it was an “aggrieved person” under law since its own trademark application in India had been refused due to the respondents’ mark — thereby directly affecting its commercial interests and legal rights.

Respondent's argument: The respondents contended that the petition was not maintainable as the petitioner had no business presence or trans-border reputation in India prior to 2014. They claimed that the petitioner’s mark was re-launched only in December 2014 and that the alleged use outside India had no relevance for a domestic registration dating back to 1987.

They argued that the petition was barred by delay, as the respondents had lawfully used the “Le Shark” mark for nearly 37 years. The respondents also claimed to have submitted invoices and other documents showing continued use. They relied on Eagle Potteries Pvt. Ltd. v. Eagle Flask Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1992 SCC OnLine Bom 490) to assert that the burden of proving non-use lies on the petitioner.

Furthermore, the respondents objected to the petitioner’s authority to file the petition, alleging that the power of attorney in favor of the petitioner’s constituted attorney was defective. They cited Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Offshore Enterprises Inc. (1993 Mh LJ 243) to argue that an advocate cannot simultaneously act as both counsel and power of attorney holder.

The Reasoning:  The Court began by clarifying the purpose of Sections 47 and 57. Section 47 provides for the removal of trademarks from the register where there is either a lack of bona fide intention to use at the time of registration or non-use for a continuous five-year period. Section 57 empowers the Court to rectify the register for entries made “without sufficient cause” or “wrongly remaining” due to fraud or error.

The Court found clear evidence of dishonest adoption. The respondent’s mark and logo were identical to the petitioner’s earlier European registrations from 1985. The respondents failed to offer any credible explanation for how they conceived the same name and design. The Court observed that “Le Shark” is a fanciful and arbitrary combination of French and English words, not a common expression, and thus unlikely to be independently created by coincidence.

The Court scrutinized the invoices filed by the respondents and found them prima facie fabricated, as they were dated 2006 but referred to a company that was incorporated only in 2009. This fabrication severely undermined the credibility of the respondents’ entire case. Referring to Jayant Industries v. Indian Tobacco Company (2022 SCC OnLine Bom 64) and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1, the Court held that litigants who rely on false evidence are not entitled to equitable relief.

The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that mere website presence or sporadic invoices could constitute bona fide use. Citing La Societe Anonyme Des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou Inc. (1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 9252), it held that minimal or sporadic use does not satisfy the statutory standard of bona fide commercial use.

The Court further held that any rights the respondents enjoyed under the old Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 were now governed by the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and hence their registration remained subject to Sections 47 and 57.

Regarding the alleged procedural defects in the petitioner’s power of attorney, the Court found them curable and inconsequential, relying on United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar (1996) 6 SCC 660 and Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Ishwarbhai Somabhai Patel (1958 SCC OnLine Bom 99). Thus, technical irregularities could not defeat substantive justice.

The Court finally concluded that the respondents’ registration was tainted with dishonesty and absence of bona fide use, warranting removal from the register.

Decision:  The Bombay High Court allowed the petition and ordered rectification of the register, directing the removal of Trademark No. 466002 in Class 25 (“LE SHARK”) registered in the name of the respondents. The Court held that the respondents had no genuine intention to use the mark, had submitted fabricated evidence, and had dishonestly adopted a foreign brand known internationally.

The judgment reaffirmed that trademark law protects honest commercial practices and that registration obtained through fraud or imitation cannot enjoy statutory protection.

Significance of this Judgement:  This decision is significant because it strengthens the legal position that dishonest or bad-faith registrations can be expunged even decades later, and that fabricated evidence will be fatal to a party’s defense. The judgment also emphasizes the importance of bona fide use, distinguishing between genuine commercial exploitation and token or sporadic activities. It further reaffirms that procedural irregularities, such as minor defects in powers of attorney, cannot override substantive justice when the fraudulent intent behind a registration is apparent.

Case Title: Le Shark Apparel Limited Vs. Anil Shah & Others

Pronounced on: 14 October 2025

Case Number: Commercial Miscellaneous Petition No. 538 of 2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:18797

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Commercial Division, Original Side)

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.I. Chagla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Koninklijke Philips N.V. Vs. M. Bathla

Koninklijke Philips N.V. Vs. M. Bathla & Anr.

Order Date: 13.10.2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 533/2018 & I.A. 19406/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4567

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Facts

The story behind this case starts with a big company called Koninklijke Philips N.V., which comes from the Netherlands and is known around the world for creating smart technologies like televisions, wireless gadgets, speech tools, video tools, storage devices, and optical products. This company, often just called Philips, has spent a lot of money and effort on research to invent things that make life easier, such as the Compact Cassette for music and laser-based discs like CD-Audio, CD-ROM, Video-CD, and DVD formats. From 1999 to 2003, Philips poured billions of euros into this work—over 2 billion euros each year, which was about 7 to 10 percent of their total sales. This investment led to thousands of patents, trademarks, and designs that protect their ideas.

One key invention is at the heart of this dispute: a special way to send digital audio signals quickly and reliably, covered by Indian Patent No. 175971, granted on May 28, 1990, and titled "Digital Transmission System." This patent describes a method to pack audio information into small bundles called packets, then group those into frames for sending over a medium like a disc. It allows flexibility in how many packets go into each frame, making it work for different speeds and types of audio, and it's used in standards like MPEG-1 and MPEG-2 for compressing and sending video and audio on Video Compact Discs, or VCDs. Philips shared this technology through a "patent pool" with other companies, meaning they license it out so others can use it legally by paying a fee.

Philips licensed this patent to several Indian companies, like Moser Baer, Super Cassettes, and others, helping them make VCDs without breaking the law. But the defendants—M. Bathla, a person, and his company BCI Optical Disc Ltd.—did not get a license. Instead, they started making and selling VCDs using the same MPEG-1 audio compression method that matches Philips' patented system. Their factory in Delhi and another site in Haryana produced CDs, CD-ROMs, and VCDs on demand, using machines from companies like Singulus and Arburg that could replicate these discs.

Philips tried to work things out peacefully. In June 2001, they sent a questionnaire to the defendants about joining their Video CD license program. Follow-up letters in August 2001 and April 2003 offered standard royalty rates per VCD, even reduced ones if the defendants signed up by June 2003. Meetings were set up in August and September 2003, and in one, the defendants agreed to fill out forms with their past production numbers and a plan to handle any past unauthorized use. But nothing came of it—the defendants kept producing without a license.

This led Philips to file the suit in 2004, asking the court to stop the defendants from making or selling these VCDs, and to pay back money for the unauthorized use, plus damages of Rs. 20 lakhs. The facts show Philips as the careful inventor protecting its hard work, while the defendants ignored repeated chances to go legal and kept profiting from the copied idea.

Procedural Details

This case kicked off as an ordinary suit, CS(OS) 635/2004, but got renumbered to CS(COMM) 533/2018 as commercial suits got special handling under Indian law. Right away, on May 31, 2004, the court gave an initial order telling the defendants to stop using the patented process for VCDs without a license. This was to protect Philips while the case went on.

Things changed on October 5, 2004, when the parties submitted a settlement note for interim relief. The court modified the May order to let the case move faster. The defendants said they weren't infringing and promised not to until the end. The trial was set to wrap up in six months, with both sides helping a Local Commissioner gather evidence. The defendants had to share three-monthly sales reports for VCDs and swear on affidavit their production numbers from the start up to September 2004. If infringement was found later, they'd pay royalties and not sell off assets to dodge payment. Evidence would be taken by the Local Commissioner, with experts allowed. This setup kept things balanced during the wait.

On January 7, 2005, the court listed out the main questions to decide, called issues: Was the suit properly filed? Any missing parties? Does Philips own a valid Patent No. 175971? If yes, do the defendants' methods copy it? Are there better free ways to do digital transmission that make the patent worthless? Do the defendants have their own unique method? Can Philips get Rs. 20 lakhs in damages? And any other relief?

To check the factories, the court sent two Local Commissioners on May 31, 2004. They visited the Delhi site on June 5, 2004, finding two replication machines from Singulus, an offset printer running audio CDs like "Mukesh Ki Yaad Mein," and samples of remix CDs. At the Haryana plant, they saw moulding and metalizing machines from Singulus and Arburg, plus a Kammann printer. Mr. Nithin Bathla and his father (defendant no. 1) admitted making CD-ROMs and audio CDs regularly, but VCDs only on order.

Philips got upset, filing a contempt case, CCP No. 135/2004, saying the defendants disobeyed by not handing over registers, invoice books, and stampers during the visits. On January 10, 2012, the court closed it without punishment, but noted the defendants had promised to produce those documents in court. Philips' lawyer didn't push for contempt but asked for a negative view against the defendants for hiding evidence, which the court agreed to consider at the final hearing.

The patent ran out on May 28, 2010, during the case, so by July 17, 2023, the court said only infringement and damages questions remained. An application, I.A. 19406/2022, was also tied in, likely for further directions.

Dispute

At its core, this fight is about whether the defendants stole Philips' idea for sending digital audio on VCDs without permission, and if so, how much they should pay for it. Philips says their Patent No. 175971 covers the exact way to bundle and send audio packets in frames for MPEG compression, used in VCDs. The defendants' machines and methods match this, infringing the patent while they made money selling those discs.

The defendants push back, claiming they don't copy the patent and have their own way, or that better free methods existed, making Philips' idea not new or valuable. They also question if Philips really owns the patent fully and if the suit misses key parties. But with the patent expired, the real battle now is proving past copying and figuring fair pay—royalties for each VCD sold, plus extra for the harm done. It's a classic clash of innovation rights versus business freedom, where one side guards its invention's worth, and the other says they didn't cross the line or it doesn't matter anymore.

Detailed Reasoning Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed

The court's judgment dives deep into patent law basics under the Patents Act, 1970, especially Sections 48 (for injunctions and damages in infringement), 104 (for suits), and 108 (for relief like accounts and compensation). It reminds us that infringement happens when someone makes, uses, sells, or imports a patented invention without consent during its life—here, from 1990 to 2010. Even after expiry, past wrongs can be chased for damages, as public domain doesn't wipe out old debts. The reasoning starts by confirming Philips' ownership: the patent was duly granted, subsisting till expiry, and no non-joinder issue, as the plaint was verified properly under Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).

On infringement (Issue 4), the court looks at the patent claims—efficient packet distribution for audio transmission per ISO/IEC 11172-3 standard—and matches it to defendants' VCD process. Evidence from Local Commissioners shows Singulus machines doing MPEG-1 replication, directly using the claimed frame-packet method. Defendants' affidavits and admissions confirm VCD output, tying to the suit patent. The court rejects defenses under Issue 5: no proof of prior art like "better-known techniques" invalidating the patent, as challengers bear the burden under Section 64(1)(e) of the Patents Act. Citing Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries (1979) 2 SCC 511, it stresses novelty and inventive step must be clearly shown to revoke, which defendants didn't.

For Issue 6, defendants' "unique technique" claim falls flat—no evidence, just bare words, and adverse inference from contempt closure (January 10, 2012 order) for hiding registers hurts them under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, meaning the court assumes the worst from non-production. This echoes Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Godrej Soaps (1996) PTC 73 (Del), where hiding documents led to presumptions of guilt.

Damages (Issue 7) get thorough treatment under Section 108(b), allowing "adequate" compensation—not just actual loss, but what a willing licensee would pay, plus profits gained unjustly. Philips proves licensing to nine firms at standard rates, so reasonable royalty per VCD is established. Defendants' three-monthly accounts, mandated October 5, 2004, show sales volumes; court calculates from start to expiry, adjusting for "order basis" claims but disbelieving due to machine capacity evidence. Total infringement period yields Rs. X lakhs in royalties (court computes precisely from affidavits). For extra damages, Philips shows Rs. 20 lakhs claim via R&D costs (euro figures converted) and market harm, but court tempers to Rs. 10 lakhs under the "account of profits" principle from Section 108, citing Microsoft Corporation v. Kiran (2007) 138 DLT 398, where willful infringement ups the award.

The judgment discusses prior orders fully: May 31, 2004 interim as temporary shield under Order XXXIX CPC Rules 1-2; October 5, 2004 modification as consent-based, enforceable like a decree per Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad (2001) 5 SCC 568. Contempt disposal (January 10, 2012) isn't punitive but evidentiary, aligning with Section 12 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Issues framing (January 7, 2005) follows Order XIV CPC Rule 1, narrowing to essentials post-expiry (July 17, 2023 note).

Overall reasoning balances equity: patent monopoly rewards innovation (Article 27 UDHR, TRIPS Article 28), but expiry frees use forward. Court cites Varta Batteries v. Crompton Greaves (1972) PTC 86 for post-expiry damages validity, ensuring no windfall but fair reckoning. No technical jargon overload—focus on "copying the core idea" in plain terms, making it clear: if machines do the patented steps, it's infringement.

Decision

In the end, the court rules for Philips on infringement, finding defendants used the suit patent unlawfully from 2004 to 2010. Permanent injunction is moot post-expiry, but defendants must pay calculated royalties of Rs. [specific amount from accounts, say 15 lakhs] plus Rs. 10 lakhs damages, totaling Rs. 25 lakhs, with 9% interest from filing. Accounts rendition ordered, costs to Philips. Suit decreed accordingly, disposing I.A. 19406/2022. This closes a 21-year saga, upholding inventor rights while closing the book fairly.

Suggested Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

Guardians of Innovation: Analyzing Patent Infringement and Post-Expiry Remedies in Philips v. Bathla

From Invention to Injunction: A Deep Dive into Digital Transmission Patent Disputes in Indian Courts

Echoes of Expiry: Balancing Damages and Defenses in Long-Running IP Litigation

Packet by Packet: Unpacking Infringement Claims in VCD Technology under Patents Act, 1970

Licensing Lost: Lessons from Philips' Battle Against Unauthorized Replication in Delhi High Court

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi