San Nutrition Vs. Arpit Mangal

Case Title: San Nutrition Vs. Arpit Mangal

Date of Order: April 28, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 420/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2973

Name of Court: High Court (Delhi)

Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Justice Amit Bansal

Fact:

The plaintiff, San Nutrition, a company engaged in the sale and marketing of nutraceutical and healthcare products, filed a suit against the defendant, Arpit Mangal, alleging that the defendant, a social media influencer, posted videos on platforms like YouTube and Instagram containing defamatory, disparaging, and infringing statements concerning the plaintiff's products. The defendant's statements were backed by scientific reports, and the plaintiff contended that these videos damaged its reputation and business interests.

Procedural Details:

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from further defamatory statements. Summons and notices were issued, but the defendant did not appear or file a written statement. The court heard arguments from the plaintiff and amici curiae appointed to assist in balancing the rights to free speech versus reputation. The matter was reserved for judgment after multiple hearings.

Issue:

Whether the defendant’s social media posts, supported by scientific reports, warrant an injunction restricting their transmission, balancing free speech rights and the plaintiff's right to reputation.

Decision:

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for interim injunction. It held that the statements made by the defendant had a scientific basis, and therefore, the court could not restrain such expressions that are protected under the right to free speech. The court emphasized the importance of protecting free expression, especially when statements are backed by objective scientific evidence and not reckless or reckless in nature.

Exclusive Capital Ltd. Vs. Silver and C.Z. International

Introduction

The case of Exclusive Capital Ltd. v. Silver and C.Z. International is a significant commercial dispute adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi, addressing the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The appellant, Exclusive Capital Ltd., challenged the dismissal of its suit by the Commercial Court for failing to comply with the pre-litigation mediation mandate, alongside its application for waiver of this requirement. The suit sought recovery of an outstanding loan amount from the respondent, Silver and C.Z. International, under a loan agreement. The High Court’s judgment, delivered on May 2, 2025, by Justices Navin Chawla and Renu Bhatnagar, upheld the Commercial Court’s decision, reinforcing the mandatory nature of Section 12A and clarifying the limited scope for bypassing mediation through claims of urgent interim relief. This case underscores the judiciary’s commitment to promoting alternative dispute resolution in commercial matters and sets a precedent for evaluating the genuineness of urgent relief claims to avoid circumventing statutory mandates.

Detailed Factual Background

Exclusive Capital Ltd., the appellant, extended a loan facility of ₹2 crore to the respondent, Silver and C.Z. International, under a Term Loan Facility Agreement dated April 29, 2022. The loan, spanning four years from April 2022 to May 2026, required repayment in equal monthly installments of ₹5,07,252. The agreement stipulated an interest rate of 10% per annum, with a default interest of 2% per month and an additional penal charge of 2% per month in case of non-payment. The respondent provided an undertaking on the same date, acknowledging compliance with the loan terms. The appellant alleged that the respondent defaulted on multiple installments from July 1, 2022, to January 22, 2023, breaching the agreement. The respondent made partial payments of ₹1 crore on January 23 and 24, 2023, but failed to clear the outstanding balance, including principal, interest, default interest, and penal charges. Citing a long-standing relationship, the appellant granted additional time for repayment, but the respondent did not comply. On June 1, 2024, the appellant issued a demand notice for ₹17,22,372, claimed due as of March 31, 2024. By January 31, 2025, the appellant claimed an outstanding amount of ₹42,00,434.09, including penal charges, as of December 31, 2022.

Detailed Procedural Background

The appellant filed a suit, CS (COMM) No. 113/2025, before the District Judge (Commercial-01), South District, New Delhi, seeking a decree for ₹42,00,434.09 and pendente lite and future interest at 10% per annum, plus default interest and penal charges from February 1, 2025, until realization. Alongside the suit, the appellant filed two applications: one under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking the respondent’s deposit of the claimed amount as security and an injunction against alienating assets, and another under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, requesting exemption from pre-institution mediation. The Commercial Court, in its judgment dated March 5, 2025, dismissed the Section 12A application, finding no genuine urgency for interim relief, and consequently rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for non-compliance with the mandatory mediation requirement. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal, RFA (COMM) 257/2025, before the Delhi High Court, represented by Senior Advocate Siddharth Yadav and others. The respondent did not appear, and the High Court heard the appeal ex parte, delivering its judgment on May 2, 2025.

Issues Involved in the Case

The primary issue was whether the Commercial Court erred in dismissing the appellant’s suit for non-compliance with Section 12A’s pre-institution mediation requirement, given the appellant’s claim for urgent interim relief. Subsidiary issues included whether the Commercial Court could reject the plaint outright rather than directing mediation, whether the appellant’s application for interim relief under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC genuinely contemplated urgent relief to bypass mediation, and whether external factors, such as the suspension of the appellant’s board, justified non-compliance with Section 12A?

Detailed Submission of Parties

The appellantargued that the Commercial Court’s rejection of the plaint was legally flawed. They contended that even if the court found no maintainable urgent relief, it should have dismissed the Section 12A application and referred the matter for mediation, not rejected the plaint. The appellant relied on Chandra Kishore Chaurasia v. R.A. Perfumery Works Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3529, where the Delhi High Court held that the plaintiff’s desire for urgent relief determines the need for mediation, and the court’s refusal to grant such relief does not warrant plaint rejection. They also cited Kaulchand H. Jogani v. Shree Vardhan Investment & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 4752, from the Bombay High Court, and Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815, to argue that plaint rejection was disproportionate. The appellant further submitted that the delay in filing the suit was due to the suspension of its board by the National Company Law Tribunal, lifted by the Supreme Court on February 24, 2025, justifying the urgency claimed.

The respondent, Silver and C.Z. International, did not appear or file submissions, leaving the appellant’s claims and evidence uncontested. The High Court noted the respondent’s absence, proceeding ex parte.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

The appellant relied on three judgments to support its case. In Chandra Kishore Chaurasia v. R.A. Perfumery Works Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3529, the Delhi High Court held that the plaintiff’s decision to seek urgent interim relief determines whether pre-institution mediation under Section 12A is required. The court ruled that the plaintiff’s choice to include such a prayer exempts the suit from mediation, and the court’s decision on the interim relief’s merits is irrelevant to this determination. The appellant used this to argue that its application for urgent relief under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC should have exempted it from mediation, and the plaint’s rejection was erroneous.

In Kaulchand H. Jogani v. Shree Vardhan Investment & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 4752, the Bombay High Court addressed a similar issue, emphasizing that non-compliance with Section 12A should not automatically lead to plaint rejection. The court suggested that the Commercial Court could direct mediation instead, preserving the suit. The appellant cited this to challenge the Commercial Court’s outright dismissal.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815, was pivotal. The Court partially approved Chandra Kishore Chaurasia, agreeing that non-grant of interim relief does not justify plaint rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. However, it rejected the notion that plaintiffs have an absolute right to bypass Section 12A by merely praying for urgent relief. The Court held that such prayers must genuinely contemplate urgency, and courts must scrutinize them to prevent camouflage or guise to evade mediation. The appellant relied on this to argue that the Commercial Court should have evaluated the suit’s merits rather than rejecting it, but the High Court interpreted it to emphasize the need for genuine urgency.

The High Court also referenced Patil Automation (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court declared Section 12A mandatory, holding that non-compliance warrants plaint rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court highlighted mediation’s role in reducing court backlogs and promoting expeditious dispute resolution, emphasizing that the provision applies unless urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated. This precedent guided the High Court’s analysis of the appellant’s claims.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Court meticulously analyzed the appellant’s claims, affirming the Commercial Court’s decision. The court began by outlining Section 12A’s purpose, as elucidated in Patil Automation, which mandates pre-institution mediation for suits not contemplating urgent interim relief to promote amicable and expeditious dispute resolution. The court noted that Patil Automation explicitly authorizes plaint rejection for non-compliance, exercisable even suo motu, effective from August 20, 2022.

Addressing the appellant’s reliance on Chandra Kishore Chaurasia, the court acknowledged its partial approval in Yamini Manohar. However, it emphasized Yamini Manohar’s clarification that plaintiffs cannot bypass Section 12A through disguised or mala fide claims for urgent relief. The court must examine the suit’s nature, cause of action, and interim relief prayer to ensure genuineness, preventing deception that defeats Section 12A’s legislative intent. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the Commercial Court should have referred the matter for mediation, citing Patil Automation’s mandate for plaint rejection in cases of non-compliance.

Evaluating the appellant’s interim relief application under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, the court found it lacked specificity. The appellant’s vague assertions of “credible information” and “reasonable apprehension” that the respondent might dispose of assets were unsupported by evidence. The claimed amount of ₹42,00,434.09, including penal charges, and the suit’s filing nearly two years after the alleged default (July 2022 to January 2023) undermined the urgency claim. The court concluded that the interim application was a camouflage to bypass Section 12A, aligning with Yamini Manohar’s caution against such tactics.

The court also dismissed the appellant’s explanation for the delay, citing the National Company Law Tribunal’s suspension of its board. The Supreme Court’s stay on February 24, 2025, did not justify bypassing mediation, as the default predated this period, and no immediate threat to asset dissipation was substantiated. The court found the Commercial Court’s assessment—that no interim relief was contemplated—correct, as the suit’s facts belied urgency.

Final Decision

The High Court dismissed the appeal and the accompanying application, upholding the Commercial Court’s judgment dated March 5, 2025. The appellant was ordered to pay costs of ₹25,000 to the Delhi High Court Clerk’s Association within two weeks. The court found no merit in the appellant’s challenge, affirming the mandatory nature of Section 12A and the propriety of plaint rejection for non-compliance.

Law Settled in This Case

The judgment reinforces the mandatory nature of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, as established in Patil Automation. It clarifies that non-compliance warrants plaint rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, even suo motu, unless the suit genuinely contemplates urgent interim relief. Courts must scrutinize interim relief prayers to prevent camouflage or guise to bypass mediation, ensuring alignment with the legislative intent of expeditious dispute resolution. Vague or unsubstantiated claims of urgency do not exempt plaintiffs from Section 12A, and external delays, such as corporate governance issues, do not justify non-compliance absent immediate threats.

Exclusive Capital Ltd. Vs. Silver and C.Z. International: May 2, 2025: RFA (COMM) 257/2025:2025:DHC:3212-DB:High Court of Delhi: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla, Hon’ble Ms. Justice Renu Bhatnagar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armasuisse

Law Settled in the Case:

The case of Promoshirt SM SA v. Armasuisse and Anr. addressed a critical issue regarding the maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals (LPAs) under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, in light of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The court established several key legal principles:

First, the court clarified that Section 100-A of the CPC, which bars further appeals from judgments of a Single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction, applies only to decrees or orders as defined under the CPC, specifically those emanating from a civil court.

The court emphasized that the terms "decree" and "order" in Section 100-A, as per Sections 2(2) and 2(14) of the CPC, refer to formal adjudications by a civil court, not decisions by tribunals or authorities like the Registrar of Trade Marks, which do not qualify as civil courts.

Consequently, Section 100-A does not bar LPAs against decisions of a Single Judge hearing appeals under Section 91 of the 1999 TM Act, as the Registrar’s decisions are not decrees or orders of a civil court.

Second, the court held that the Registrar of Trade Marks does not satisfy the "trappings of a court" test, as enunciated in cases like Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpn. and Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd.

The Registrar lacks the attributes of a civil court, such as the ability to conduct a full-fledged trial under the CPC or the Evidence Act, and its decisions do not constitute decrees or orders as defined by the CPC. Thus, an appeal from the Registrar’s decision to a Single Judge under Section 91 of the 1999 TM Act does not attract the bar of Section 100-A.

Third, the court distinguished the 1999 TM Act from its predecessors, the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which had provisions (Sections 76(3) and 109(8), respectively) applying CPC rules to appeals. The absence of such a provision in the 1999 TM Act indicates that appeals under Section 91 are not governed by CPC appeal provisions, preserving the right to an LPA under the Letters Patent unless expressly barred by the statute.

Fourth, the court reconciled conflicting precedents, such as Avtar Narain Behal and Mahli Devi, by holding that Section 100-A applies to appeals under special statutes only when the statute explicitly subjects the appeal to CPC provisions, as in Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Where the special statute, like the 1999 TM Act, is silent on further appeals and does not adopt CPC rules, an LPA remains maintainable under the Letters Patent, as supported by National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros.

Finally, the court underscored that the non-obstante clause in Section 100-A overrides Letters Patent provisions only for appeals involving civil court decrees or orders or where the special statute incorporates CPC appeal provisions. In the absence of such conditions, the Letters Patent remedy remains intact, ensuring an additional layer of judicial scrutiny for trademark disputes.

Case Details

• Case Title: Promoshirt SM SA Vs. Armasuisse and Anr.
• Date of Order: September 6, 2023
• Case Number: LPA 136/2023 & LPA 137/2023
• Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:6352-DB
• Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
• Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Yashwant Varma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharmesh Sharma

Under Armour, Inc. Vs . Anish Agarwal

Case Detail: Under Armour, Inc. Vs . Anish Agarwal: May 23, 2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 174/2024: 2025:DHC:4243:High Court of Delhi: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sachin Datta

Law Settled in the Case:

Initial Interest Confusion under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999:

The court held that under Section 29(1), (2), and (4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a registered trademark is infringed if a mark used by another party is likely to cause confusion or indicate an association with the registered trademark, even if the confusion is brief or momentary (Paras 102-103, 163).

Likelihood of Confusion:

The court emphasized that the test for trademark infringement is whether a customer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, upon encountering the impugned mark, is likely to believe it is associated with the registered trademark, even briefly.  (Paras 101, 104).

Dishonest Adoption:

The court reiterated that dishonest adoption of a mark, especially one that is phonetically and visually similar to a well-known registered trademark, warrants an injunction.  (Paras 105, 108-110).

Degree of Protection for Strong Marks:

The court clarified that the degree of protection accorded to a trademark is proportional to its strength and recognition. A new entrant must maintain a greater distance from a strong, well-known mark to avoid infringement. In this case, the respondents’ use of "AERO ARMOUR," which bore phonetic and visual similarity to "UNDER ARMOUR" and was used in a similar manner (e.g., placement on sleeves), was deemed prima facie dishonest (Para 109).

Non-Dissection Rule and Global Appreciation Test:

While the learned Single Judge applied the anti-dissection rule and global appreciation test to assess trademark similarity (Paras 27-28), the appellate court found that the Single Judge erred in concluding no likelihood of confusion. The appellate court held that the phonetic and visual similarity between "AERO ARMOUR" and "UNDER ARMOUR," combined with similar trade channels and product placement, created a real likelihood of confusion, satisfying the infringement criteria (Para 104).

Sophistication of Consumers:

The court clarified that the sophistication or knowledge of consumers does not preclude trademark infringement. Even informed or sophisticated consumers may experience initial confusion, particularly due to modern business trends like trademark licensing or mergers, which may lead them to assume an association between similar marks. This was supported by references to cases like Institute Europeen D. Administration Des Affaires, Insead v. Fullstack Education Pvt. Ltd. [2023 SCC OnLine Del 3016] and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp. (Paras 53-58, 99).

Injunction for Infringement:The court held that where there is prima facie evidence of trademark infringement due to similarity and likelihood of confusion, an injunction is warranted. The respondents were restrained from using "AERO ARMOUR" or any mark deceptively similar to "UNDER ARMOUR" until the suit’s disposal, setting aside the Single Judge’s order that had denied a full injunction (Para 111).

Conclusion: The court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that even transient confusion caused by a deceptively similar mark constitutes infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The respondents’ use of "AERO ARMOUR" was found to be prima facie dishonest, given its similarity to "UNDER ARMOUR" and the appellant’s established reputation, leading to an injunction against the respondents.

Chafur Bakhsh Vs Jwala Prasad

Infringement of a copyright can extend to the entire work if a substantial part, including the arrangement and sequence, is copied verbatim, and that the copyright rights can extend to the entire book, not just the specific pages copied. 

Chafur Bakhsh Vs Jwala Prasad : 06.01.2021: First Appeal No. 214 of 1919: Allahabad High: Hon'ble Justice: Court:Pramad Charan Banerjee and Gokul Prasad: @Para 415 of SCC

Veekesy Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kamal Bansal

Veekesy Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kamal Bansal: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 542/2022:27th February, 2025:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal:2025:DHC:1451

Legal Principles and Law Settled:

1. Prior User and Registration Rights: The petitioner established its prior use and registration of the trademark "VKC" since 1985, which is protected under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly referencing Sections 9(1)(a), 11(1)(a), and 18, which safeguard prior users and registered marks.

2. Conflicting Marks and Likelihood of Confusion: The court held that the respondent's mark "VKG" is deceptively similar to the petitioner's "VKC," both visually and phonetically, which is likely to cause confusion among consumers and amount to passing off, violating Sections 9(1)(a) and 11(1)(a) of the Act.

3. Dishonest Adoption and Deceptive Similarity: The court found that the respondent adopted the mark "VKG" dishonestly to trade upon the goodwill of the petitioner’s established mark "VKC," contravening Sections 47 and 57 of the Act, which relate to cancellation and rectification of the Register of Trade Marks for dishonest registration.

4. Invalidity of Registration: The court decreed to cancel the registration of "VKG" based on its similarity with "VKC," and on grounds that the registration was obtained dishonestly, and was in violation of the Act, citing the applicable sections.

5. Ex-parte Proceedings: Due to non-appearance of the respondent despite proper service, the court proceeded ex-parte, reaffirming that a failure to defend does not preclude the court from granting relief.

6. Order to Remove the Trademark: The court directed the Trade Mark Registry to remove the trademark "VKG" from the register, emphasizing the importance of protecting prior rights and preventing deceptive registration.

Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajluxmi Publications

There cannot be any partial rejection in the plaint.  

Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajluxmi Publications : 27th February 2025: CS(COMM) 218/2023:High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble MS. Justice Mini Pushkarna  @Para 7

Geetha, D/o Late Krishna and Others Versus Nanjundaswamy and Others, 2023 SCC @Para 12

State of Rajasthan Vs Rao Raja Kalyan Singh

The Court can entertain the legal plea regarding proceeding being not maintainable , even in absence of pleading. 

State of Rajasthan Vs Rao Raja Kalyan Singh 1972 (4) SCC 165  @Para 4 to 6

Pragati Construction Vs Union of India

Law Settled in the Case: Non-filing of a Statement of Truth in petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not render the petition automatically "non-est" or invalid; rather, such omission is considered a curable procedural defect. 

Pragati Construction Vs Union of India : 07.02.2025:OMP(COMM) 20/2024: 2025:DHC: 717:FB: Hon’ble MS. Justice Rekha Palli, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee: @Para 93

Rajiv Ghosh Vs. Satya Naryan Jaiswal

3. Application of Order XII Rule 6 of CPC (Judgment on Admissions):
• The court held that when the defendant’s written statement contains clear and unequivocal admissions regarding his status as a tenant or heir, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction without further proof of the facts admitted.
• Relevant Para: [T3, Para 42] — "The object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission..."
2. Status of Dependents under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997:
• The court clarified that the dependent heirs of the original tenant, unless they are widows of the tenant, can only retain tenancy rights for up to 5 years from the date of the tenant’s death, as per Section 2(g).
• Relevant Para: [T4, Para 17] — "The plain reading of Section 2(g) indicates that the dependent heir of the original tenant unless she is the widow of the original tenant would be entitled to carry on as a tenant... for a period of 5 years from the demise of the original tenant."
3. Legal Effect of Admissions in Written Statements:
• The court reiterated that pleadings, particularly written statements, when they include clear admissions, are sufficient for the court to pass a judgment under Order XII Rule 6, barring the defendant’s proof to the contrary.
• Relevant Para: [T6, Para 18-20] — "It is well-settled that law of legal arguments need not be pleaded... It would suffice if the necessary factual ingredients to satisfy Section 2(g) are pleaded in the written statement."

Rajiv Ghosh Vs. Satya Naryan Jaiswal:SLP (C)  No. 9975 of 2025:07 April 2025:2025 INSC 467: Supreme Court of India

Taiho Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. Vs Controller of Patents

Case Title: Taiho Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. Vs Controller of Patents Case No.: C.A. (COMM.IPD-PAT) 6/2022 Date of Order: 15 May 2025 Court: High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3777

Facts:

Taiho Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., a Japanese entity, filed a patent application in India for a novel piperidine compound, claiming priority from a Japanese patent. The application was filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and designated for national phase entry in India. The Indian Patent Office conducted substantive examination and rejected the application, citing lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) and non-patentability under Section 3(d), primarily on the grounds that the claimed compound was considered a new form of a known substance without enhanced efficacy, and that the invention was obvious in light of prior art D1.

Procedural Details:The Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) in March 2018, raising objections regarding Sections 2(1)(ja), 3(d), and 3(i).The applicant responded with detailed submissions in September 2018.A hearing was held in November 2019.The Patent Office’s Controller decided to reject the application on 18 June 2021.The applicant, Taiho Pharmaceutical, filed an appeal before the Delhi High Court challenging this order.

Issue:The main issues were whether the claimed compound was patentable under Indian law, specifically:Whether the claims involved an inventive step as per Section 2(1)(ja)?Whether the compound was patentable under Section 3(d), considering it was a new form of a known substance but lacked enhanced therapeutic efficacy?

Decision:The High Court upheld the appeal in part, setting aside the Patent Office’s rejection under Sections 2(1)(ja) and 3(d). It remanded the case back to the Patent Office for a fresh hearing, emphasizing the need for proper identification of the ‘known substance’ against which the claims are assessed. The Court highlighted that the prior art did not specifically identify the ‘known substance’ and that the applicant was not given a fair opportunity to demonstrate enhanced efficacy.

Summary: The Court ordered a re-examination of the patent application, allowing the applicant to substantiate their claims effectively, thus reinforcing procedural fairness and proper identification of prior art in pharmaceutical patent examination.

Iconic IP Interests LLC Vs Shiv Textiles

Case Title: Iconic IP Interests LLC Vs Shiv Textiles: Date of Order: 09 May 2025:Case No.: R/Special Civil Application No. 1543 of 2025:Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad:Coram: Hon’ble The Chief Justice Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pranav Trivedi

Brief Facts:Iconic IP Interests LLC, a U.S.-based IP licensing company and subsidiary of Highlander Partners, is the proprietor of the globally recognized trademark “JOLLY RANCHER,” used for confectionery and other products. It holds valid trademark registrations in India as well. The respondent, M/s Shiv Textiles, based in India, registered the mark “JOLLY RANGER LEGWEAR” for apparel in Class 25 in 2019.

In April 2023, the petitioner discovered the respondent’s mark and sent legal notices asserting its prior rights. The respondent refused to comply, asserting that “JOLLY” is a common term and their adoption was honest. Subsequently, Shiv Textiles filed Commercial Trademark Suit No. 1 of 2023 in Bhavnagar seeking relief against alleged harassment and interference. Iconic IP challenged the maintainability of this suit and filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint, which was dismissed by the Bhavnagar District Court. Hence, the petitioner approached the Gujarat High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues:

1. Whether the plaint filed by the respondent disclosed any cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.Whether the Bhavnagar court had territorial jurisdiction based on the facts pleaded?Whether suppression of material facts by the plaintiff (respondent) justified rejection of the plaint?Whether the non-joinder of a necessary party (Hershey Company) rendered the suit legally untenable?

Reasoning of the Court:

The Gujarat High Court analyzed whether the respondent’s plaint revealed any real or legal cause of action arising within its jurisdiction. It held that the mere existence of U.S.-based online listings of the petitioner’s products on Amazon.com did not create jurisdiction in India. The goods were not shown to be marketed or sold in India, nor was there any evidence of transactions targeted at Indian consumers.

The Court distinguished the facts from those in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, noting that in that case the defendants operated within India. In contrast, here, both the trademark and sales platform (Amazon USA) operated outside India. Without any evidence of purposeful targeting of Indian customers, no cause of action arose within Bhavnagar.

The Court also found that the respondent suppressed critical information, including prior knowledge of the petitioner’s registered trademarks in India and legal notices served upon them. This suppression of facts and non-disclosure of the petitioner’s prior rights was seen as an abuse of process.

Additionally, the Court accepted the petitioner’s argument that the suit was bad for non-joinder of Hershey Company, which had material rights under a licensing agreement and was a necessary party for complete adjudication.

Final Decision:

The High Court quashed the trial court’s order and allowed the writ petition. It held that the plaint did not disclose a valid cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Bhavnagar court and was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. Consequently, Commercial Trademark Suit No. 1 of 2023 was dismissed.

Ramway Foods Limited Vs Rajendra Sharma

Case Title: Ramway Foods Limited Vs Rajendra Sharma & Anr.:Date of Order: 7th May, 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 182/2023:Court: High Court of Delhi:Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Facts:

The plaintiff, M/s Ramway Foods Ltd., has been manufacturing and trading food products under the trademark “DOUBLE TAALA” since 2011. The mark is registered under Classes 29, 30, 31, and 44, and features a distinctive label and trade dress. The defendant, Rajendra Sharma, initially sold the plaintiff’s goods as a broker, but later began selling identical goods under deceptively similar marks like “DOUBLE TAALA CHAVI” and later “CHAVI TAALA”, using copied packaging, trade dress, and even elements specific to plaintiff’s batch code such as “RF”.

Upon learning of the infringement, the plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice in October 2022, but the defendant did not respond. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present suit seeking permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs. The defendants failed to respond meaningfully in court, leading to their ex-parte proceedings.

Legal Issues:

1. Whether the defendants’ use of “DOUBLE TAALA CHAVI” and “CHAVI TAALA” infringed the plaintiff’s registered trademarks and copyrights?Whether the defendants’ actions amounted to passing off?Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree in the absence of a written statement from the defendants?

Reasoning:

The Court found that the defendants had copied not only the plaintiff’s registered trademark but also various distinctive elements of its packaging and labeling, including batch-specific identifiers. The defendants were aware of the plaintiff's prior rights, having previously sold its goods. Their subsequent imitation was held to be dishonest and mala fide.

Due to their non-participation, the defendants were proceeded ex-parte and the Court deemed all averments of the plaint to be admitted under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC and Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.

The Court held that the plaintiff had successfully established both infringement and passing off. Further, relying on precedent (Inter Ikea Systems BV v. Imtiaz Ahamed), the Court held that non-participating defendants should not escape consequences and granted damages in addition to injunction.

Decision:

The Court granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using the marks/labels deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s “DOUBLE TAALA” marks. It also awarded ₹5,00,000 as damages and costs in favour of the plaintiff.

Hero Invest Corp Private Limited Vs Sehgal Auto House

Case Title: Hero Invest Corp Private Limited Vs Sehgal Auto House through its Proprietor Mr. Sunil Sehgal:Date of Order: April 22, 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 436/2022:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Facts:

The plaintiffs, Hero Invest Corp Pvt. Ltd. and Hero MotoCorp Ltd., owners of the registered trademark ‘HERO’ and the 'H' device logo, filed a suit against the defendant, Sehgal Auto House, for infringing their intellectual property rights. The defendant, a spare parts supplier, was found selling counterfeit automotive parts bearing the plaintiffs’ marks without authorization, invoices, or warranty, and at prices below genuine MRP. An ex-parte injunction was granted earlier, and a Local Commissioner seized 5,682 infringing items from the defendant’s premises.

Legal Issues:

1. Whether the defendant’s use of the trademark ‘HERO’ and ‘H’ device constituted trademark and copyright infringement?Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction under Order XIII-A CPC based on undisputed facts?

Reasoning:

The Court noted the extensive goodwill, market reputation, and financial records presented by the plaintiffs. The defendant did not deny the claims, had shut down his business, and paid a nominal settlement amount of ₹3,00,000. The counterfeit nature of the products was confirmed through unique product identifiers maintained by the plaintiffs. Since the defendant did not contest the local commissioner’s report or continue the infringing activity, the court found no triable issue.

Final Decision:

The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiffs. A permanent injunction was granted restraining the defendant and all associated persons from dealing in any goods or services bearing the mark ‘HERO’, the ‘H’ device, or any similar mark, thus upholding the plaintiffs’ trademark and copyright rights.

Rainbow Children’s Medicare Limited Vs Rainbow Healthcare

Case Title: Rainbow Children’s Medicare Limited Vs Rainbow Healthcare Court: High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru Date of Order: 23rd April 2025 Case No.: COMAP No. 286 of 2024 & COMAP No. 287 of 2024 Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao & Hon’ble Mr. Justice T. M. Nadaf

Facts:

Rainbow Children’s Medicare Limited, based in Hyderabad, has been operating under the “Rainbow” brand since 1998. It has established its presence across multiple cities, including Bengaluru. Rainbow Healthcare, operating in Bengaluru since 2013, also uses the name “Rainbow Healthcare Hospital,” creating a dispute over the use of the “Rainbow” mark. The plaintiff claims prior adoption and use of the trademark in relation to healthcare services, asserting their rights over the mark.

Procedural History:

The Court initially passed interim orders granting injunctions in favor of Rainbow Healthcare, which the plaintiff challenged through appeals filed under the Commercial Courts Act. The Trial Court (Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru) had vacated interim injunctions earlier issued in April 2023, dismissing the interlocutory applications (IAs). The appeals seek to set aside these dismissals and restore the earlier interim relief.

Issues:

Whether the trial court was justified in vacating the interim injunctions despite finding that Rainbow Healthcare had established a prima facie case?Whether the interim orders granted by the trial court cause irreparable harm to Rainbow Children’s Medicare Limited?Whether the court should prioritize public interest and the balance of convenience in granting interim relief in cases involving trademarks and business names.

Decision:

The High Court observed that courts should not grant interim orders solely based on a prima facie case without considering the balance of convenience, public interest, and potential prejudice. The Court found that the Trial Court failed to appropriately consider these factors and had wrongly vacated the interim orders. Consequently, it allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders passed by the Trial Court, thereby reinstating the interim relief to protect Rainbow Children’s Medicare Limited’s rights.

Diamond Modular Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Vikash Kumar

Case Title: Diamond Modular Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Vikash Kumar & Anr. Case No.: RFA(COMM) 166/2025 Date of Order: May 5, 2025 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3619 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon’ble Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Justice Ajay Digpaul

Facts:

Diamond Modular Pvt. Ltd. (appellant) alleged that Vikash Kumar (respondent) was using the mark "DIAMOND GOLD" in relation to electrical goods, which infringed upon its registered trademarks "DIAMOND" registered in Classes 9 and 11. The appellant had built a reputation since 1975 in electrical goods, and its "DIAMOND" mark was well-known and registered since 1984. The respondent, without registration, used the mark "DIAMOND GOLD" for fans and other electrical goods starting July 2022.

Procedural History:

The appellant filed CS (Comm) 444/2023 before the Commercial Court for a permanent injunction against the respondent's use of the mark "DIAMOND GOLD" and for other reliefs. The Commercial Court dismissed the suit on October 15, 2024. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal before the High Court.

Issue:

Whether the respondent's use of "DIAMOND GOLD" constitutes infringement of the registered "DIAMOND" mark, and whether the trademarks are deceptively similar, causing confusion.

Decision:

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashing the impugned order and directing the Commercial Court to decree in favor of the appellant. The court held that there was deceptive similarity between "DIAMOND" and "DIAMOND GOLD", and that the appellant had established prior registration and use rights. The court issued a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from using the mark "DIAMOND GOLD" or any deceptively similar mark.

Uttam Chand Kothari Vs. Gauri Shankar Jalan

Uttam Chand Kothari vs. Gauri Shankar Jalan and Ors.:Date of Order: October 30, 2006 Case No.: MANU/GH/0209/2006 Neutral Citation: AIR2007Gau20, 2007(1)GLT37 Court: Gauhati High Court Judge: I.A. Ansari, J.

Facts: The plaintiff filed a suit seeking eviction of the defendant for default in rent and for the premises for their own use. The defendant's written statement included admissions on material facts, which he later wished to amend, citing lawyer’s mistake or inadvertence.

Legal Issue: Can a defendant withdraw or amend an admission—express or implied—made in his written statement, particularly when such admission was made due to counsel's error or omission?

Reasoning: The court examined whether admissions are binding and when amendments are permissible. It noted that express admissions are typically final, but implied admissions, especially those made inadvertently, can be corrected through amendments. The court emphasized that amendments should be allowed to prevent injustice, unless they cause serious prejudice or alter the core case of the plaintiff.

Issues:

• Whether admissions in pleadings can be withdrawn or amended?Difference between express and implied admissions concerning their withdrawal.Whether mistakes by counsel justify amendments to retract inadvertent admissions?

Conclusion: The court held that amendments allowing withdrawal of implied or mistaken admissions are permissible, provided they do not prejudice the other party. It emphasized that courts should exercise their discretion generously to prevent injustice but must balance fairness. The court directed a reconsideration of the matter allowing appropriate amendments, clarifying that mistakes, especially due to counsel’s error, should not be a bar to justice.

Vinay Jain Vs. Rakesh Jain

Vinay Jain Vs. Rakesh Jain & Others Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 36/2025 Order Date: May 16, 2025 Court: High Court of Delhi Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3990-DB

Fact:

Vinay Jain challenged an order of the Single Judge (dated 10 September 2024) that directed the defendant to lead evidence first concerning certain documents in a commercial dispute. The appellate court, in its judgment dated 16 April 2025, reviewed this order while hearing the appeal.

Legal Issue:

• Whether the Single Judge’s direction to the defendant to lead evidence first was consistent with procedural laws, particularly Rules under Order XVIII of the CPC?
• Whether new arguments not previously raised can be considered in the review proceedings?

Reasoning:

The Court observed that the directions did not comply with proper legal standards under Order XVIII, which governs the order of parties' evidence. It clarified that the order was a case management decision and not one issued under specific provisions that empower the court to decide the sequence of evidence. Additionally, the Court noted that the new submissions, not included in the pleadings or arguments during the original hearing, could not be entertained in the review petition, which is mainly intended to correct errors of law or fact in the original judgment.

Result:

The Court dismissed the review petition, upheld the appellate judgment, and set aside the Single Judge’s order, emphasizing that the parties should proceed to lead evidence in accordance with the law.

Vinay Pictures Vs Good Hope

Case Title: Vinay Pictures Vs Good Hope  Case Number: CS(COMM) 475/2025 Order Date: 14th May 2025 Court: Delhi High Court, Commercial Division Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal 

Facts:

Vinay Pictures, owner of the copyrighted film "Andaz Apna Apna," filed a suit against multiple defendants for infringing its intellectual property rights. The defendants allegedly uploaded, streamed, and distributed content related to the film online, including merchandise featuring film characters, dialogues, and scenes, in violation of the plaintiff's rights. They are also accused of using AI-generated content and virtual stickers to exploit the film’s IP commercially, thereby causing irreparable harm and economic loss.

Legal Issue:

Whether the defendants’ actions constitute infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright, trademarks, and related rights, and whether interim relief in the form of an injunction should be granted to prevent ongoing and future infringement?

Reasoning:

The Court observed that the plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of rights violation, with clear evidence of unauthorized online activities that cause irreparable harm. Given the widespread nature of the infringement and the potential for dilution and tarnishment of the film’s IP, the Court found that urgent interim relief was justified. The Court noted the difficulty in controlling such infringements across diverse platforms and technologies, especially with AI involvement.

Order & Issues:

The Court granted ex parte ad interim injunctions restraining the defendants, including their agents and affiliates, from hosting, streaming, creating derivative content, or selling merchandise based on the film.

Dr. Vinod Bhaskar Rao Joshi Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Dr. Vinod Bhaskar Rao Joshi Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Case Number: WP-15990 of 2025 Date of Order: 13th May 2025 Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench Judge: Hon’ble Shri Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke Neutral Citation: 2025: MPHC-GWL:10501

Facts of the Case:

Dr. Vinod Bhaskar Rao Joshi, the petitioner, operates a physiotherapy and pain clinic under the trademark “Pushkar Pain Clinic Evam Physiotherapy Center.” The petitioner alleges that an individual named Trivendra Kumar Kaushik is illegally running a physiotherapy center under the guise of medical practice, claiming to possess a degree in Bachelor of Physiotherapy (BPT) from an unverified and possibly fraudulent institution. This person is accused of misrepresenting, infringing the petitioner’s registered trademark, and providing illegal medical services.

The petitioner had submitted a complaint to the relevant licensing authority under Madhya Pradesh law, seeking cancellation of the license issued to the unauthorized person and action under applicable statutes. Despite this, no action has been taken to revoke or scrutinize the license, leading the petitioner to approach the court for intervention.

Procedural Details:

• The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking:

• A mandamus to direct the Respondent No.2 (the licensing authority) to decide and act upon the pending complaint.

• Cancellation of the unauthorized person’s license if investigations reveal misconduct.

• Disclosure of investigation findings and records related to the complaint.

• The respondent (state authority) raised preliminary objections, asserting the petitioner’s status as a complainant, not an adversarial litigant, and citing landmark case law (notably Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector) that restricts the locus standi of complainants in such matters.

• The court examined submissions from both sides, referencing precedents that clarify the limitations on a complainant’s capacity, emphasizing that the petitioner cannot act as an adversarial litigant seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus directly to resolve a licensing or criminal matter.

Issues:

1. Maintainability and locus standi: Whether the petitioner, as a complainant, has the legal standing to seek issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the authority to act or revoke licenses?
2. Legal remedy applicability: Whether the petitioner’s grievance involves rights inhering to him or is merely a representation that the authorities are obliged to consider within their jurisdiction.
3. Appropriate jurisdiction: Whether the court can intervene in licensing matters or if the matter needs to be resolved through administrative or civil remedies.

Decision:

The Hon’ble Court observed that:

• The petitioner is essentially a complainant who has submitted allegations but cannot act as a party to a dispute or a litigant seeking a writ directly against the licensing authority.
• As per judicial precedents (notably Ravi Yashwant Bhoir and Ayub Khan Noorkhan Pathan), a complainant’s role is limited to providing evidence or information; he cannot act as an adversarial party in a legal contest.
• The court emphasized that decisions regarding license cancellation or criminal action are within the domain of the licensing authority and the respective criminal courts, not the writ jurisdiction of the High Court unless there is a violation of fundamental rights or procedural irregularity.

Therefore, the court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner’s request for direct judicial intervention in license cancellation or investigation is not maintainable through the writ petition.