Case Title: Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr.
Order Date: 31 October 2025
Case Number: CRR 2817 of 2025 with CRAN 1 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:2011
Court: High Court at Calcutta, Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Apurba Sinha Ray
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Facts
The case arose from a controversy surrounding a book published in 2015 which contained certain passages and allegations about the personal life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of West Bengal. The author of the book had claimed that the Chief Minister had been secretly married prior to assuming office and had attempted to conceal this fact from the public. The book described the alleged relationship and questioned the integrity and honesty of the Chief Minister, suggesting that her public persona did not match her private conduct.
In the same book, the author published a letter dated 30 April 2012 addressed to the Chief Minister in her capacity as Chairperson of the All India Trinamool Congress. The letter contained two specific questions — whether a particular individual (allegedly her spouse) had attended her oath-taking ceremony at Raj Bhavan on 20 May 2011, and whether that individual was present in her official chamber at the Writers’ Buildings on the same day when she assumed charge as Chief Minister. These questions, according to the author, were meant to expose what he described as “undisclosed facts of her personal life.”
The book was never banned or restricted by any government order and continued to be sold publicly.
The petitioner, Koustav Bagchi, an advocate and political figure, uploaded certain pages from the book—particularly the page containing the 2012 letter—on social media platforms. He also made comments on television channels referring to the same content. This act led to allegations that he had defamed the Hon’ble Chief Minister. Consequently, the Public Prosecutor of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta filed a complaint under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), corresponding to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, invoking Section 222(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which allows the Public Prosecutor to file a defamation complaint on behalf of certain public functionaries such as the President, Governors, or Ministers for defamatory acts committed against them in the discharge of their official duties.
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Procedural Background
Upon receiving the complaint, the Chief Judge of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta, after hearing the petitioner as required under Section 223 of the BNSS, took cognizance of the offence under Section 356(2) BNS and issued summons to the petitioner.
Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a criminal revision application before the Calcutta High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 of the CrPC), seeking to quash the proceedings. He raised three principal arguments.
First, that the book had been published nearly a decade earlier and was freely available in the market, and therefore, merely reproducing its content on social media did not constitute a new offence.
Second, that since the original author had not been prosecuted and the book had not been banned, his act of reproduction could not be treated as defamation.
Third, that even if the statements were defamatory, they did not relate to the Chief Minister’s conduct in discharge of her public duties, and therefore, the Public Prosecutor had no authority to initiate proceedings under Section 222(2) BNSS; only the Chief Minister herself could have done so as an aggrieved person.
The State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor, opposed the revision, arguing that at the stage of cognizance, the Court should not conduct a detailed inquiry or “mini-trial” but only see whether a prima facie case existed. He relied on Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338 and Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221), to emphasize that the trial court had correctly taken cognizance on the basis of the material on record.
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The Core Dispute
The key legal questions before the Court were:
1. Whether the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 222(2) of the BNSS was maintainable when the allegedly defamatory statements concerned the personal life of the Chief Minister and not her conduct in discharge of official duties.
2. Whether mere reproduction or sharing of a previously published book on social media amounted to fresh defamation, attracting criminal liability.
3. Whether the learned Chief Judge erred in issuing summons to the petitioner without sufficient grounds.
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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Apurba Sinha Ray undertook a detailed examination of Section 222 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The section provides that ordinarily, only an aggrieved person can file a complaint for defamation. However, under sub-section (2), the Public Prosecutor may file a complaint if the defamation concerns the conduct of certain high constitutional functionaries—including the President, Governors, or Ministers—in the discharge of their public functions, provided that the appropriate government grants prior sanction.
The Court first acknowledged that the Public Prosecutor indeed has authority to file such complaints, but this authority is limited strictly to instances where the alleged defamation concerns the official or public conduct of the functionary. Personal or private matters of life fall outside the ambit of this provision. Relying on K.K. Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2018) 6 SCC 676] and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [(2016) 7 SCC 221]*, the Court emphasized that the Public Prosecutor must independently examine whether the material truly relates to the conduct of the public official in discharge of public duties and must act with independence, not as a mere agent of the State.
In the present case, while the initial allegations in the book related to the personal and private life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, certain references—such as whether a particular person was present during the oath-taking ceremony or inside her office chamber at the Writers’ Buildings—could arguably relate to her official capacity. The Court noted that the definition of “conduct” includes not only action but also demeanor and behavior. Therefore, if the statements linked her personal relationship to the functioning of her office, they could potentially relate to her conduct in discharge of public duties.
Justice Ray observed that determining whether the defamatory content was purely personal or had a nexus with the Chief Minister’s public conduct required a full trial and examination of evidence. Hence, the complaint could not be dismissed at the preliminary stage.
On the second issue, regarding republication, the Court held that re-sharing or reproducing defamatory material amounts to a fresh act of defamation. The Court referred to Kaikhusuru Naroji Kabraji v. Jehangir Byramji Murzban (1890 ILR 14 Bom 532), where the reprinting of a defamatory article made the re-publisher equally liable as the original author. It also relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Arvind Kejriwal v. State [2024 SCC OnLine Del 719], where retweeting defamatory content without disclaimer was held to constitute republication.
The Court further cited Ruchi Kalra v. Slowform Media [2025 SCC OnLine Del 1894], which held that hyperlinking or referencing defamatory content could amount to republication if it expands the defamatory reach. Similarly, in Amber Quiry v. Yohan Tangra [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1093], the Bombay High Court reiterated that every repetition of defamatory material gives rise to a new cause of action.
Justice Ray emphasized that even though the book was not banned, it carried a clear copyright notice prohibiting reproduction without permission from the author. The petitioner had failed to show that he had obtained such permission. Therefore, his act of sharing the pages online amounted to unauthorized reproduction, both in defamation law and copyright terms.
The Court also discussed K.K. Mishra (supra) in depth, where the Supreme Court quashed a similar complaint because the alleged defamatory remarks did not concern the Chief Minister’s official duties but personal matters. However, in the present case, the defamatory imputations included references to the Chief Minister’s office and oath ceremony, thereby partially overlapping with her public functions. This, according to the Court, justified the continuation of proceedings.
Lastly, the Court reiterated that the role of the Public Prosecutor, as laid down in Subramanian Swamy and Bairam Muralidhar v. State of A.P. [(2014) 10 SCC 380], is not mechanical. He must independently assess the materials before filing the complaint. However, in the absence of evidence showing mala fides or lack of independent scrutiny at this stage, the Court found no basis to interfere with the complaint.
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Decision
The Calcutta High Court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the order dated 18 June 2025 of the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. Justice Apurba Sinha Ray held that the cognizance taken by the trial court was legally valid and that the proceedings could not be quashed at the preliminary stage.
The Court observed that whether the alleged statements were truly connected to the Chief Minister’s official duties or were purely personal was a matter of evidence and trial. Hence, the complaint was not barred in law. The Court clarified that its observations were only for the purpose of the revisional application and not on the merits of the trial.
Consequently, the revision application (CRR 2817 of 2025) was dismissed, along with the connected application (CRAN 1 of 2025). The interim stay, if any, stood vacated, and the Court directed that the book produced during proceedings be returned to the petitioner’s counsel.
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Conclusion
This judgment in Koustav Bagchi v. The State of West Bengal sheds light on the delicate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation, particularly concerning public functionaries. It clarifies the limited scope of Section 222(2) of the BNSS, emphasizing that the Public Prosecutor can intervene only when the defamatory act is connected to a Minister’s official duties, not private life. However, where private life allegations spill into official conduct—such as office presence or public events—the matter may warrant judicial scrutiny through trial.
The Court’s observations on republication underline that digital repetition, retweeting, or reposting of defamatory material is legally equivalent to fresh defamation. The decision also underscores the principle that the Public Prosecutor must act independently and cautiously when filing defamation complaints under statutory authority.
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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
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Suggested Titles for Publication
1. Republication and Responsibility: Calcutta High Court on Digital Defamation and Public Functionaries
2. Private Lives and Public Duties: Legal Limits of Defamation under Section 222(2) BNSS
3. Freedom of Speech versus Dignity of Office: The Case of Koustav Bagchi v. State of West Bengal
4. Defamation in the Digital Age: When Reposting Becomes a Crime
5. Public Prosecutor’s Role in Political Defamation: Insights from the Calcutta High Court Judgment
