Johnson & Johnson Pte. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar

Trade Dress and Deceptive Similarity

Introduction:The High Court of Delhi, in the recent case of Johnson & Johnson Pte. Ltd. v. Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar & Ors., addressed significant questions surrounding trade mark infringement and passing off within the highly competitive market of consumer healthcare and energy drinks. This dispute involved allegations of deliberate copying of trade dress and marks associated with the plaintiff’s well-known ORSL brand. 

The judgment, delivered by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna on 15 July 2025, demonstrates the application of the Commercial Courts Act’s strict timelines and the consequences of procedural default by defendants. It also illustrates the approach taken by the Court in determining deceptive similarity and infringement, even in the context of defendants attempting to circumvent injunction orders through variant marks.

Factual Background:The plaintiff, Johnson & Johnson Pte. Ltd., a Singapore-incorporated entity established in 1974, had acquired the ORS-L and ORSL trademarks and associated goodwill from Jagdale Industries Limited through an assignment deed dated 7 November 2014. These marks had been used in India since 2003 for flavoured electrolyte drinks. Following acquisition, the plaintiff invested heavily in marketing and brand promotion, resulting in significant goodwill attached to these marks and distinctive trade dress, including a red and white colour scheme and stylised script.

The defendants were engaged in manufacturing and marketing fruit drinks under marks such as ORSI and ERSI, which the plaintiff discovered in September 2022. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ marks and packaging were deceptively similar to its own, intended to mislead consumers and ride on its reputation.

Procedural Background:Following discovery of the allegedly infringing marks, the plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice to defendant no. 1 and M/s Pure Tropic, the manufacturing entity associated with defendant nos. 2 to 5. The plaintiff filed the suit under Section 134(1) read with Sections 27 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking permanent injunction and damages.

On 7 December 2023, the Court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the impugned marks or deceptively similar variants. Local Commissioners were appointed on 9 February 2024 to investigate compliance, leading to the discovery of large stocks of infringing goods manufactured and distributed even after the injunction. 

Defendants failed to file written statements within the mandatory 120-day period prescribed by the CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, despite service of summons and notices. Their right to file written statements was closed by order dated 27 May 2024. Defendant no. 1's application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC challenging territorial jurisdiction was dismissed by judgment dated 4 February 2025. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an application under Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 CPC seeking judgment based on admissions.

Core Dispute:The central dispute was whether the defendants' use of the marks ORSI, ERSI, and similar trade dress constituted infringement and passing off of the plaintiff’s well-known ORSL marks and packaging? Additionally, the Court examined whether minor alterations by defendants, such as changing letters or adopting new variants like ElectroORS, were sufficient to avoid confusion among consumers and whether the defendants had violated the interim injunction? 

Discussion on Judgments:The plaintiff relied upon Christian Broadcasting Network Inc. v. CBN News Pvt. Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11666, to support the proposition that under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, when defendants fail to file written statements, the Court may proceed to pronounce judgment if the plaintiff's claim is unimpeachable. The Court referred to Nirog Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Umesh Gupta, (2016) 235 DLT 354, which emphasised the legislative intent to expedite commercial disputes and discourage dilatory tactics.

In assessing likelihood of confusion, the Court applied the principles laid down in South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953, which highlighted that when products are identical, even a lower degree of similarity in marks can cause confusion among consumers of average intelligence with imperfect recollection. The Court also invoked the “triple identity” test as reiterated in Heifer Project International v. Heifer Project India Trust, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2847, where similarity of marks, business area, and consumer base creates an overwhelming likelihood of deception.

On the procedural aspect, the Court noted its earlier judgment dated 4 February 2025 dismissing the defendants’ challenge to jurisdiction, following Koninklijke Philips N.V. and Another v. Amazestore and Others, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8198, which endorsed the rule of thumb approach to award damages where infringement is established and defendants have acted wilfully.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court observed that the defendants’ marks, though differing superficially by letters such as E instead of O, were presented in fonts and colour schemes closely resembling the plaintiff's well-established trade dress. The deliberate similarity, including the round shape of ‘E’ to mimic ‘O’ and positioning of product elements, evidenced malafide intent to cause confusion.

The Court dismissed defendants' arguments that they were only service providers or distributors without control over the mark, finding that defendant nos. 2 to 5 had continued manufacturing infringing goods even after being served notices and despite the injunction order. Local Commissioner reports corroborated this, showing products with manufacturing dates after the injunction. The Court concluded that such conduct demonstrated clear knowledge and participation in the infringing activity.

The Court held that when defendants fail to file written statements within the statutory limit and evidence shows an unimpeachable case of infringement, it is proper to pass judgment under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC without further trial. The repeated attempts by defendants to modify marks marginally or create new variants like ElectroORS did not alter the likelihood of confusion.

Final Decision:The Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, permanently restraining the defendants from using the infringing marks and trade dress, or any deceptively similar variants. It awarded actual litigation costs and damages against the defendants, noting the wilful violation of the injunction and continued infringement. The defendants’ plea regarding jurisdiction and procedural lapses was rejected, affirming the plaintiff’s rights over its well-known marks and trade dress.

Law Settled in This Case:The judgment reinforces that in commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, failure to file written statements within the statutory 120-day period leads to forfeiture of the right to defend, and the Court may decree the suit under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC if the plaintiff’s case is prima facie unimpeachable. It further affirms that even minor modifications of marks or trade dress by defendants do not negate infringement if the overall impression remains confusingly similar. The decision also clarifies that entities involved in manufacturing or distribution can be held liable if they knowingly aid the principal infringer, especially after notice and injunction orders.

Case Title: Johnson & Johnson Pte. Ltd. v. Mr. Abbireddi Satish Kumar & Ors.

Date of Order: 15 July 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 801/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5622

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

GS Marbles Vs Shree Granites

GS Marbles Vs Shree Granites, Judgment dated 15.07.2025, RFA(COMM) 83/2023: Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:5597-DB, High Court of Delhi, Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

The appeal arose from the judgment and decree dated 02.03.2023 passed by the District Judge (Commercial Court)-02, Tis Hazari, Delhi in CS (COMM) No. 496/2021, whereby the suit filed by M/s Shree Granites for recovery of ₹6,26,617/- with interest was decreed against M/s GS Marbles. The core dispute centred around a purchase order dated 15.06.2018 issued by the respondent for supply of granite slabs, for which an advance payment had been made. The respondent alleged non-supply of material and sought refund of the advance along with interest. The appellant, through its proprietor Mr. Manoj Saini, denied knowledge of the transaction and claimed that the business and accounts were controlled by Mr. Rajaram Agarwal, who allegedly committed GST fraud.

Procedurally, the appellant was served with summons but failed to file a written statement within the statutory period of 120 days, despite entering appearance. The trial court first proceeded ex parte but later set aside that order while closing the right to file the written statement. On an application under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent, relying on the documents including the purchase order signed by Mr. Saini, bank statements showing receipt of advance, and the appellant’s reply letter which did not deny non-supply.

In appeal, the appellant contended that it was itself a victim of fraud committed by Mr. Agarwal and had no knowledge of the transaction. The respondent opposed this, arguing that the appellant had accepted the purchase order and failed to file a written statement even after repeated opportunities. The High Court noted that under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, the outer limit for filing a written statement is 120 days from service of summons, beyond which the right stands forfeited. It also analysed whether in such a situation the suit must automatically be decreed or if the court must examine the merits.

Discussing legal precedents, the court held that a decree under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC is permissible where the plaintiff’s case is unimpeachable and there are no disputed questions of fact requiring evidence. On facts, it was found that the appellant had received the advance, failed to supply goods, and failed to place any credible material on record to substantiate its defence of fraud by Mr. Agarwal. The trial court had rightly held that the documents filed by the respondent were of unimpeachable character and the appellant’s plea was an afterthought.

Dismissing the appeal, the High Court upheld the decree in favour of the respondent along with interest, finding no cause to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Pending applications were also disposed of.

Tata Sons Private Limited Vs John Doe and Ors

Tata Sons Private Limited Vs John Doe and Ors, CS(COMM) 685/2025:July:10, decided on 10th July 2025 by the High Court of Delhi before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The plaintiffs, part of the renowned Tata Group of Companies and proprietors of well-known trademarks including TATA, TATA TEA, TATA COFFEE and others, approached the Delhi High Court seeking urgent interim relief against unknown persons (John Doe defendants) who were fraudulently using the plaintiffs’ marks to impersonate Tata’s representatives and lure the public into fake dealership and distributorship schemes. The plaintiffs narrated that the fraudsters were running multiple deceptive websites containing the TATA mark combined with words like “dealership” and “distributorship”, persuading victims to deposit amounts starting from ₹25,000 under various pretexts such as registration fees and product deposits, ultimately defrauding them of lakhs of rupees. On receipt of several complaints in January 2025, the plaintiffs conducted investigations which revealed a systematic misuse of the TATA brand across multiple domains, email IDs, UPI accounts, and phone numbers, all operated with a similar fraudulent modus operandi.

Faced with continued proliferation of such fraudulent domains and the resultant damage to their goodwill and innocent consumers, the plaintiffs filed the suit along with applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC seeking a permanent injunction. Exemption from pre-institution mediation was also sought under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, citing urgency, which the Court granted.

Justice Amit Bansal observed that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of trademark infringement and fraud, and that the balance of convenience lay in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court acknowledged the irreparable harm to the plaintiffs’ reputation and the need to protect unsuspecting members of the public from fraud. The order restrained the John Doe defendants from using the plaintiffs’ TATA trademarks or any deceptively similar variants across any medium including domain names, email addresses, social media handles, and bank details. The Court also directed domain registrars to suspend and lock the offending domain names, telecom providers to block related phone numbers, banks and payment platforms to freeze related UPI IDs and bank accounts, and the concerned ministries to issue notifications blocking access to the fraudulent websites and phone numbers. Compliance affidavits and KYC details of the perpetrators were directed to be filed by the respective intermediaries.

Dura-Line India Pvt Ltd Vs Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd.

Introduction: The case of Dura-Line India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd. represents a significant intellectual property dispute adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi. This litigation centers on allegations of patent and design infringement concerning a non-metallic pipe assembly with a co-extruded tracer cable, designed for traceability and leakage detection. The plaintiff, Dura-Line India Pvt. Ltd., accused the defendant, Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd., of infringing its Indian Patent No. IN 199722 and Design Registration No. 192665 through the manufacture and sale of similar products. The defendant countered by challenging the validity of the plaintiff’s patent, alleging lack of novelty, inventive step, and sufficient disclosure. This case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the factual and procedural background, the issues involved, the submissions of the parties, the judicial reasoning, the final decision, and the legal principles established.

Detailed Factual Background : Dura-Line India Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary of Dura-Line International Inc., is a company specializing in infrastructure solutions for telecommunications, energy, and water sectors, operating ISO 9001-certified manufacturing facilities in India. The plaintiff holds Indian Patent No. IN 199722, granted on August 30, 2007, for a pipe assembly designed to facilitate traceability and leakage detection in non-metallic pipes used for fluid transport. The invention features a non-metallic pipe with a co-extruded tracer cable encased in polymer material, enabling underground location and leak detection without compromising structural integrity. This product, commercially marketed as "Dura Trac," generated significant revenue, with the plaintiff reporting INR 3,00,66,810 in manufacturing value for 2012. Additionally, the plaintiff secured Design Registration No. 192665 for the surface pattern of a "Detectable Pipe," corresponding to the patented invention.

The defendant, Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd., is a leading manufacturer of plastic pipes in India, known for its research and development capabilities and extensive production of polyethylene (PE) and polypropylene (PP) pipes. The dispute arose in the context of a tender for the Omkareshwar Lift Irrigation Scheme, which required HDPE pipes with underground detectability features, including a co-extruded copper wire. The plaintiff, invited to submit a proposal on November 25, 2011, responded with an offer based on its patented technology. However, a news article in the Hindustan Times, Indore edition, dated December 11, 2012, revealed that the defendant had already supplied pipes for the project. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s products, "B-Sure Polyethylene (PE) and Polypropylene (PP) Sewerage Pipes" and "Jain Insta Tracer Pipes," infringed its patent and design rights by incorporating the essential features of the patented invention and registered design.

The defendant denied infringement and challenged the validity of the plaintiff’s patent under Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970, citing lack of novelty, absence of inventive step, and insufficient disclosure. The defendant also contested the design infringement claim, arguing that the registered design pertained only to the surface pattern and not the functional or structural aspects of the pipe assembly.

Detailed Procedural Background: The plaintiff initiated the lawsuit in 2013, originally numbered as CS(OS) 796/2013, which was later renumbered as CS(COMM) 245/2017 under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The suit alleged infringement of Patent No. IN 199722 and Design Registration No. 192665, seeking remedies including rendition of accounts. The defendant responded with a written statement and a counter-claim (CC(COMM) 54/2017) seeking revocation of the patent. The plaintiff filed a written statement to the counter-claim, and the defendant submitted a replication.

On October 5, 2016, the court framed issues for the suit and counter-claim, addressing the plaintiff’s proprietorship of the patent and design, the defendant’s alleged infringement, the validity of the patent, and the appropriateness of the requested reliefs. A Local Commissioner was appointed to record evidence, with the plaintiff initially bearing the costs. The plaintiff presented two witnesses, Mr. Davender Kumar Sharma (PW-1) and Dr. Prasanta Kumar Tripathy (PW-2), along with documentary evidence, including the patent certificate and Form 27. The defendant examined Mr. Gautam Ray (DW-1) and Mr. J. Wadhwani (DW-2), relying on prior art documents to challenge the patent’s validity.

The court clarified on October 23, 2019, that the infringement analysis would cover both of the defendant’s products. The plaintiff later withdrew its infringement claim regarding the method claim (Claim 9), focusing solely on the apparatus claims (Claims 1, 6, and 7). The case culminated in a judgment pronounced on May 19, 2025, by Justice Sanjeev Narula.

Issues Involved in the Case: The court framed the following issues for determination: Whether the plaintiff is the proprietor of the invention titled "A Pipe Assembly Having Traceability and Leakage Detection Features" bearing Patent Registration No. 199722? Whether the plaintiff is the proprietor of the Design for a pipe having a co-extruded cylindrical structure bearing Design Registration No. 192665? Whether the defendant’s adoption and use of the products "B-Sure Polyethylene (PE) and Polypropylene (PP) Sewerage Pipes" and "Jain Insta Tracer Pipes" amounts to infringement of the plaintiff’s Patent No. 199722? Whether the defendant’s adoption and use of the products amounts to infringement of the plaintiff’s Design Registration No. 192665?

Plaintiff’s Submissions : The plaintiff asserted proprietorship of Patent No. IN 199722, supported by the patent certificate and Form 27, demonstrating commercial exploitation under the "Dura Trac" trademark. They argued that the patent’s novelty and inventive step lay in the combination of a non-metallic pipe, a co-extruded tracer cable, and its encasement in polymer, enabling traceability and leak detection without compromising pipe strength. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s products, "B-Sure PE/PP Sewerage Pipes" and "Jain Insta Tracer Pipes," incorporated all essential elements of Claim 1, as evidenced by product brochures and technical manuals. They provided a claim-to-product comparison, highlighting the presence of a non-metallic pipe (made of HDPE or PP), a co-extruded tracer cable, and its polymer encasement in the defendant’s products.

Regarding the design, the plaintiff contended that Design Registration No. 192665 protected the surface pattern of the "Detectable Pipe," which the defendant’s products imitated, infringing their rights under the Designs Act, 2000. They argued that the defendant’s products visually resembled the registered design, constituting fraudulent or obvious imitation.

The plaintiff refuted the defendant’s counter-claim, asserting that the patent was validly granted after scrutiny by the Patent Office, with no pre-grant or post-grant opposition filed. They argued that the cited prior art did not disclose the specific combination of features claimed, and the specification adequately described the invention for a person skilled in the art (PSA). The plaintiff denied any fraud or misrepresentation during patent prosecution, emphasizing compliance with Section 8 of the Patents Act.

Defendant’s Submissions: The defendant denied infringement, arguing that their products used conventional technology predating the plaintiff’s patent. They claimed that their manufacturing process involved a two-step method—extruding the pipe first and then affixing the tracer cable—distinct from the simultaneous co-extrusion claimed in the patent. The defendant relied on the testimony of DW-2, who described this process, asserting it did not fall within the patent’s scope. They argued that the plaintiff failed to provide technical evidence proving simultaneous extrusion in their products.

The defendant challenged the patent’s validity under Section 64 of the Patents Act, citing lack of novelty (Section 64(1)(e)), absence of inventive step (Section 64(1)(f)), insufficient disclosure (Section 64(1)(h)), and unclear claims (Section 64(1)(i)). They submitted 20 prior art documents, including US patents and technical manuals, to demonstrate that the claimed invention was publicly known or obvious before the priority date of July 25, 2003. The defendant contended that the plaintiff’s product mirrored prior art, particularly US Patent No. 5,918,267, implying that the patent lacked novelty or that their products, if infringing, would also infringe prior art.

On the design infringement claim, the defendant argued that the registered design protected only the surface pattern, not functional features like the tracer cable or pipe structure. They asserted that their products’ visual appearance differed significantly, lacking deceptive similarity to the plaintiff’s design.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations: The court referenced several judicial precedents to guide its analysis, each cited in a specific context: Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881: Cited to address the plaintiff’s objections to the admissibility of the defendant’s prior art documents. The court held that publicly available documents, such as patents and technical manuals, should not be denied admission, as they fall under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. This ruling supported the court’s decision to admit the defendant’s prior art for evaluating patent validity. Maj. (Retd.) Sukesh Behl v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2313: Referenced in the context of the defendant’s claim under Section 64(1)(m) for fraud or misrepresentation. The court noted that non-compliance with Section 8 (disclosure of foreign applications) does not automatically warrant revocation, as the provision is discretionary. This precedent underscored the high threshold for proving deliberate deception, which the defendant failed to meet. Versalis SPA v. Assistant Controller of Patents, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4277: Cited to clarify that a patent specification need not address every possible variation or application, as long as the core invention is sufficiently disclosed. This supported the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s specification met the requirements of Sections 64(1)(h) and 64(1)(i). Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited and Others, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 780: Applied to the design infringement analysis, emphasizing that design protection covers only visual appeal (shape, configuration, pattern, or ornamentation) and excludes functional features. The court relied on this precedent to reject the plaintiff’s design infringement claim, as the claimed features were functional rather than ornamental. Raj Parkash v. Mangat Ram Chowdhry, 1977 SCC OnLine Del 33: Used to articulate the doctrine of “pith and marrow” in patent infringement, focusing on whether the defendant’s product embodies the essential features of the patented invention, regardless of manufacturing method. This supported the court’s finding of infringement, as the defendant’s products matched the structural and functional elements of Claim 1. Rodi & Weinberger A.G. v. Henry Showell Ltd., (1966) RPC 441: Cited to reinforce that infringement cannot be avoided by minor variations in manufacturing methods if the final product embodies the patented features. This precedent bolstered the court’s rejection of the defendant’s two-step process defense. Castrol India Ltd. v. Tide Water Oil Co. Ltd., 1996 (16) PTC 202 (Cal): Applied to the design infringement analysis, establishing that the test for design infringement is visual similarity judged by the average consumer’s eye, not technical or structural identity. The court used this to conclude that the defendant’s products were visually distinct from the plaintiff’s registered design. Uflex Limited v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2022) 1 SCC 165: Referenced for principles on awarding costs in commercial litigation, emphasizing that costs should follow the event, be realistic, and curb frivolous litigation. The court applied these principles to award full commercial costs to the plaintiff.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court first addressed the plaintiff’s proprietorship of the patent and design, finding that the certified patent certificate and design registration, supported by witness testimony, established the plaintiff as the rightful proprietor. The defendant’s failure to adduce contrary evidence upheld the statutory presumption under Section 67 of the Patents Act and the Designs Act.

On the validity of the patent, the court examined the defendant’s challenges under Sections 64(1)(e), (f), (h), (i), and (m). For lack of novelty (Section 64(1)(e)), the court found that none of the 20 prior art documents disclosed the precise combination of a non-metallic pipe, co-extruded tracer cable, and polymer encasement, preserving the patent’s novelty. Regarding inventive step (Section 64(1)(f)), the court determined that the invention involved technical advancements over prior art, such as improved structural integrity and reliable leak detection, which were not obvious to a PSA. The objections under Sections 64(1)(h) and (i) for insufficient disclosure and unclear claims were rejected, as the specification adequately described the invention and its claims were clearly drafted. The fraud allegation under Section 64(1)(m) was dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing deliberate misrepresentation during patent prosecution.

For patent infringement, the court focused on Claim 1, which described a non-metallic pipe with a co-extruded tracer cable encased in polymer. The plaintiff’s claim-to-product comparison, supported by the defendant’s brochures and admissions, confirmed that the defendant’s products incorporated these elements. The court rejected the defendant’s defense of a two-step manufacturing process, citing the “pith and marrow” doctrine and emphasizing that infringement depends on the product’s features, not the method of manufacture. The court also dismissed the defendant’s argument that their products mirrored prior art, as it conflated infringement with validity.

On design infringement, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim relied on functional features (e.g., the tracer cable), which are not protectable under the Designs Act. The visual comparison revealed distinct differences in surface pattern and contour, negating any deceptive similarity. The plaintiff’s failure to provide comparative visual analysis or consumer impression studies further weakened their case.

Final Decision: The court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff for patent infringement, finding that the defendant’s products infringed Patent No. IN 199722. The counter-claim for revocation was dismissed, and the patent’s validity was upheld, with a certificate of validity issued under Section 113 of the Patents Act. The design infringement claim was rejected due to the functional nature of the claimed features and lack of visual similarity. As the patent had expired on July 23, 2023, injunctive relief was unavailable, but the plaintiff was entitled to rendition of accounts for profits earned by the defendant from April 20, 2010, to July 23, 2023. A Local Commissioner was appointed to oversee this process, with the defendant ordered to submit accounts within six weeks. The plaintiff was awarded full commercial costs, to be computed by the Taxing Officer.

Law Settled in This Case: The case reinforces several key principles in Indian intellectual property law: Patent Validity: The grant of a patent by the Controller of Patents under the Patents Act constitutes prima facie evidence of proprietorship of Patent. Infringement Analysis: Patent infringement is assessed based on the “pith and marrow” doctrine, focusing on whether the defendant’s product embodies the essential features of the patented claims, irrespective of manufacturing methods. Design Protection: Design registration under the Designs Act protects only visual features (shape, configuration, pattern, or ornamentation), excluding functional or technical aspects. Remedies for Expired Patents: While injunctive relief is unavailable post-patent expiry, remedies like rendition of accounts remain viable for infringements during the patent term.

Case Title: Dura-Line India Pvt. Ltd. v. Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd.: Date of Order: May 19, 2025: Case No.: CS(COMM) 245/2017 : Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4036: Name of Court: High Court of Delhi: Name of Hon'ble Judge: Sanjeev Narula, J

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Asian Paints Limited Vs Ram Babu

Corporate Victimhood and the Right to Appeal under Section 372 CrPC

Introduction:The case of Asian Paints Limited Vs Ram Babu & Anr., decided by the Supreme Court of India on 14 July 2025, examined the scope of the right of a “victim” under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). At the heart of the matter was whether a corporate entity, as the holder of intellectual property rights harmed by counterfeiting, could maintain an appeal against an acquittal passed by the First Appellate Court, and whether such appeal was procedurally permissible in light of Section 378 CrPC. The decision offers clarity on the victim’s statutory right to appeal and harmonizes earlier judicial interpretations, reaffirming the participatory rights of victims in criminal proceedings.

Factual Background:Asian Paints Limited, a public limited company and a well-known manufacturer of paint products, discovered counterfeit products being sold under its brand at Ganpati Traders, a shop owned by Ram Babu in Rajasthan. Acting through its authorized IPR consultancy firm, M/s Solution, and its field investigator, Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh, the company initiated a complaint with the police on 6 February 2016. A raid led to the seizure of twelve buckets of allegedly counterfeit paint, bearing marks similar to those of Asian Paints but lacking the company's distinctive bottom mark. To verify authenticity, the complainant provided two buckets of genuine Asian Paints products for comparison.

Procedural Background:An FIR bearing No.30/2016 was registered under Sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The matter was investigated, and a chargesheet was filed against Ram Babu. 

The Trial Court, by order dated 3 October 2019, convicted him under the aforementioned provisions, sentencing him to terms of imprisonment ranging from one to three years, along with fines. Ram Babu challenged the conviction before the First Appellate Court, which on 16 February 2022 acquitted him of all charges. Aggrieved, Asian Paints Limited filed S.B. Criminal Appeal (SB) No.2354/2022 before the High Court of Rajasthan under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. 

The High Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the company lacked locus standi as a “victim,” observing that only the complainant or the State could maintain such an appeal. The company then approached the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9888 of 2024.

Core Dispute:The dispute before the Supreme Court was whether Asian Paints Limited, as the aggrieved intellectual property right holder, qualified as a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC and thus could invoke the right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC against the order of acquittal by the First Appellate Court. The case further raised whether such an appeal was procedurally barred under Section 378 CrPC, which traditionally governs appeals against acquittals and requires leave of the High Court.

Discussion on Judgments :The appellant relied on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321, where the Supreme Court clarified that a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC includes persons who have suffered loss or injury due to the crime, and that being the complainant is not a prerequisite to claim victim status. This case was cited to assert that Asian Paints, as the party directly harmed by counterfeiting, qualified as a victim irrespective of whether the formal complaint was filed by its investigator.

Further reliance was placed on Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752, where the Court interpreted the proviso to Section 372 CrPC liberally, holding that victims have an unqualified right to appeal against acquittals and that this right is independent of other provisions of the CrPC.

The appellant also cited Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 184, where the Supreme Court reiterated that the proviso to Section 372 creates an independent and substantive right for victims to prefer appeals against acquittals, convictions for lesser offences, or inadequate compensation, and that this right is not curtailed by other sections, including Section 378 CrPC.

In contrast, the respondent relied on the language of Section 378 CrPC to argue that appeals against appellate acquittals require State intervention and the leave of the High Court, contending that the appeal by Asian Paints was thus procedurally impermissible.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Supreme Court, speaking through Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, examined the statutory text of Sections 2(wa), 372, and 378 CrPC. The Court found that Asian Paints suffered direct reputational and financial injury from the counterfeiting, and that its role was more than that of a mere informant; it was the right holder whose intellectual property had been infringed. This brought the company within the definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC.

The Court emphasized that the proviso to Section 372 CrPC was introduced as a standalone, substantive right, meant to enhance victims' access to justice. Citing Jagjeet Singh and Mallikarjun Kodagali, the Court rejected the view that the right was limited to complainants or to appeals against trial court acquittals only. It held that the right extends to challenging an acquittal by the First Appellate Court, and such an appeal would lie to the next higher forum in the judicial hierarchy, namely the High Court.

Importantly, the Court observed that the High Court had wrongly interpreted the company’s lack of formal status as complainant to exclude it from victim status and had also erred in treating the proviso to Section 372 as being limited by Section 378. The Court reaffirmed that the proviso operates independently, giving victims the right to appeal without the constraints of Section 378, which applies to State appeals and private complainant appeals in complaint cases.

Final Decision:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, and held that the appeal filed by Asian Paints Limited under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC was maintainable. It restored the appeal to the file of the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits and directed the High Court to expedite the matter. The Court clarified that it had only addressed the question of law and left all factual defences open for determination.

Law Settled in This Case:The decision settles that a company harmed by offences like counterfeiting is a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC, entitled to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, even against an acquittal by the First Appellate Court. It affirms that the victim’s right of appeal is independent and standalone, and is not limited by the provisions of Section 378 CrPC. The judgment advances a liberal and purposive interpretation to protect victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings involving harm to property and reputation.

Case Title: Asian Paints Limited Vs. Ram Babu

Date of Order: 14 July 2025

Case Number:SLP (Crl.) No.9888 of 2024

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 828

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pragati Construction Vs Union of India

Introduction: The case of Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India and Bharat Broadband Network Limited v. Sterlite Technologies Limited, adjudicated by a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, addresses a critical procedural issue in the context of applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act). Specifically, the court was tasked with determining whether the non-filing or defective filing of a Statement of Truth, as mandated under Order VI Rule 15A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CC Act), renders an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act "non-est" (non-existent in the eyes of law). This issue is significant due to the strict limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, which allows only three months, extendable by an additional thirty days with sufficient cause, for filing an application to set aside an arbitral award. 

Factual Background: The case arose from two separate matters referred to the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In the first matter, OMP(COMM) 20/2024 (Bharat Broadband Network Limited v. Sterlite Technologies Limited), the petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act on October 27, 2023, to challenge an arbitral award but failed to include a Statement of Truth as required under Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC, applicable to commercial disputes under the CC Act. This omission led to a dispute regarding the validity of the initial filing. 

In the second matter, FAO(OS)(COMM) 70/2024 (Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India), the issue of non-filing of the arbitral award itself was referred to the Full Bench, but the present case study focuses solely on the issue of the Statement of Truth as raised in OMP(COMM) 20/2024. The core contention was whether the absence or defect in the Statement of Truth rendered the application non-est, thereby failing to stop the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.

Procedural Background: The procedural journey of this case began with a reference made by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court on March 21, 2024, in OMP(COMM) 20/2024, due to conflicting views expressed by two Division Bench judgments of the same court. The first judgment, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises (Sree) & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Ltd. (Meil) (2023 SCC OnLine Del 63), held that the non-filing of a Statement of Truth is a procedural defect that is curable and does not render an application under Section 34 non-est. In contrast, the second judgment, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Planetcast Technologies Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 8490), concluded that the absence of a Statement of Truth is a fatal defect, rendering the application non-est and incapable of stopping the limitation period. Recognizing this conflict, the Single Judge referred the matter to a larger bench for authoritative clarification. The Full Bench, comprising Justices Rekha Palli, Navin Chawla, and Saurabh Banerjee, was constituted to resolve this issue, with the judgment delivered on February 7, 2025.

Legal Issue: The primary legal issue before the Full Bench was whether the non-filing of a Statement of Truth, or a defect in its filing, such as blanks or lack of attestation, renders an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act non-est? This question is critical because a non-est filing does not stop the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act, potentially barring the application if refiled beyond the prescribed period of three months plus thirty days. The court also considered whether Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC, which mandates a Statement of Truth for pleadings in commercial disputes, applies to applications under Section 34 of the A&C Act, given that such applications may not strictly qualify as "pleadings" under Order VI Rule 1 of the CPC.

Discussion on Judgments: The parties cited several judgments to support their arguments, which the Full Bench meticulously analyzed in the context of the non-filing of the Statement of Truth. The petitioner in OMP(COMM) 20/2024 relied on Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Joint Venture of Sai Rama Engineering Enterprises (Sree) & Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Ltd. (Meil) (2023 SCC OnLine Del 63), where the Division Bench held that the absence of a Statement of Truth is a procedural defect, not rendering the application non-est. The court emphasized that Section 34 of the A&C Act does not specify procedural requirements beyond setting out grounds for challenge and including the arbitral award, and thus, procedural omissions like the Statement of Truth are curable.

In contrast, the respondent relied on Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Planetcast Technologies Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 8490), which took a stricter view, holding that the absence of a Statement of Truth, as mandated under Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC, renders the application non-est. The court in Planetcast emphasized the mandatory nature of the Statement of Truth under the CC Act, citing its role in ensuring the veracity of pleadings and preventing frivolous filings.

The Full Bench also considered Vidyawati Gupta v. Bhakti Hari Nayak (2006) 2 SCC 777, where the Supreme Court held that the absence of an affidavit under Order VI Rule 15(4) of the CPC in a civil suit does not render the plaint non-est, as such procedural requirements are directory and curable. This precedent was pivotal in shaping the court’s view that procedural defects do not automatically invalidate a filing.

Other judgments cited included Jay Polychem (India) Ltd. v. S.E. Investment Ltd. (2018 SCC OnLine Del 8848) and Director-cum-Secretary, Department of Social Welfare v. Saresh Security Services Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine Del 8503), both of which involved multiple defects, including the absence of signatures, affidavits, and vakalatnamas, leading to a non-est finding due to cumulative deficiencies. Similarly, Indira Gandhi National Open University v. Sharat Das & Associates (P) Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 7915) and Three C Universal Developers (P) Ltd. v. Horizon Crest India Real Estate & Ors. (2020 SCC OnLine Del 2798) involved applications with multiple defects, such as missing signatures, vakalatnamas, and arbitral awards, reinforcing that non-est findings were based on cumulative flaws rather than the sole absence of a Statement of Truth.

The court also reviewed Bajaj Electricals Ltd. v. E-One Infotech Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5154) and KNR Constructions Ltd. v. BHEL (2023 SCC OnLine Del 4910), where a Single Judge held that a Statement of Truth, along with other requirements like signatures on each page, is mandatory for a proper filing. However, the Full Bench disagreed with this strict interpretation, finding it overly pedantic. In A V Industries v. Neo Neon Electrical (P) Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5397), the Division Bench’s finding that a plaint without a Statement of Truth was non-est was distinguished, as it involved a complete failure to file the Statement of Truth even later, unlike the curable defect scenario in arbitration applications.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Full Bench’s reasoning was grounded in a balanced approach to procedural compliance and substantive justice. The court first addressed the applicability of Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC to Section 34 applications. The petitioner argued that Order VI Rule 15A applies only to "pleadings" (plaint or written statement) as defined under Order VI Rule 1 of the CPC, and thus, an application under Section 34, being distinct, is exempt. The court rejected this argument, relying on Section 10 of the CC Act, which vests jurisdiction in Commercial Divisions for arbitration matters and applies the CPC’s procedural framework, including Order VI Rule 15A, to such applications. The court reasoned that the CC Act’s intent to streamline commercial disputes extends to arbitration applications, making the Statement of Truth requirement applicable.

However, the court held that the non-filing or defective filing of a Statement of Truth is a procedural defect, not a fundamental one that renders the application non-est. Drawing from Vidyawati Gupta, the court emphasized that procedural requirements under the CPC are directory, aimed at expediting justice rather than obstructing it. The court distinguished cases like Planetcast, where non-est findings were based on cumulative defects, such as missing signatures, vakalatnamas, and arbitral awards, rather than the sole absence of a Statement of Truth. The court clarified that a non-est filing requires a finding of mala fide intent to stall limitation, such as filing a mere "bunch of papers" without substantive content.

The court further noted that while the Statement of Truth is essential, its absence or defects (e.g., blanks or lack of attestation) can be cured, and the court must consider the totality of defects and the applicant’s intent when determining whether a filing is non-est. This approach ensures that procedural technicalities do not unduly deprive parties of their substantive right to challenge an arbitral award under Section 34.

Final Decision: The Full Bench answered the reference in OMP(COMM) 20/2024 by holding that the non-filing of a Statement of Truth or a defect therein does not, by itself, render an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act non-est. However, if accompanied by other defects that collectively indicate a mala fide intent to merely stop the limitation period without a genuine intention to pursue the application, the court may declare the filing non-est. 

Law Settled in This Case: The judgment settles the law that the non-filing or defective filing of a Statement of Truth under Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, does not automatically render an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act non-est. The court must assess the cumulative effect of all defects and the applicant’s intent. A procedural defect like the absence of a Statement of Truth is curable, and the court retains discretion to condone delays in rectifying such defects, provided the initial filing is within the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. This ruling balances the strict limitation regime of the A&C Act with the need to preserve substantive rights, ensuring that procedural lapses do not unduly bar legitimate challenges to arbitral awards.

Case Title: Pragati Construction Consultants Vs. Union of India : Date of Order: February 7, 2025:Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 70/2024 :Neutral Citation: 2025 :DHC:717-FB:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Name of Hon'ble  Judge: Justice Rekha Palli, Justice Navin Chawla, Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Balwinder Singh Bagary

Residential Projects, Assured Returns, and Commercial Disputes

Introduction:This case revolves around the determination of whether an investment in a residential real estate project, accompanied by buy-back arrangements and promises of assured returns, qualifies as a “commercial dispute” within the meaning of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru was called upon to examine whether such a transaction could be adjudicated by a Commercial Court, or whether it lay outside the domain of commercial disputes, considering the underlying nature of the property involved.

Factual Background:The respondent, Mr. Balwinder Singh Bagary, an individual of Indian origin currently residing in the United Kingdom, invested an amount of ₹2,99,47,777/- in the year 2011 into a real estate project known as “Tefilah Rose,” developed by M/S Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The investment was structured to ensure a guaranteed return of 48% over a period of 36 months, secured against specific portions of the project to match the value of the promised return. The agreements executed between the parties included buy-back provisions which allowed the investor to exit the investment upon completion of the project or upon achieving the specified return.

Procedural Background:Following disputes over repayment, the respondent instituted Commercial O.S. No.787/2022 before the LXXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, seeking recovery of approximately ₹23 crores, including principal and interest. The defendants, namely M/S Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and its Managing Director, Siddhartha Gupta, challenged the maintainability of the suit by filing I.A. No. III under Order VII Rule 10 and Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 2(1)(c)(vii) and Section 6 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. They contended that the dispute pertained to residential property and, therefore, did not fall within the scope of commercial disputes. On 28 March 2023, the Commercial Court dismissed the application, holding that the dispute qualified as a commercial dispute. The defendants thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 9689/2025 before the High Court of Karnataka challenging the dismissal of I.A. No. III.

Core Dispute:The core issue before the High Court was whether the dispute, stemming from the respondent's investment in a residential real estate project, was indeed a “commercial dispute” under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and therefore triable by the Commercial Court. The petitioners argued that since the underlying asset was residential property, the suit could not be classified as a commercial dispute merely because it involved elements of financial investment or buy-back arrangements. The respondent, on the contrary, maintained that the dispute centered on financial investment, making it a commercial dispute under the statute.

Discussion on Judgments :The petitioners relied heavily on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited v. K.S. Infraspace LLP & Anr., (2020) 15 SCC 585, where the Supreme Court held that a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) must relate to immovable property actually used exclusively in trade or commerce, and not merely property that is likely to be used or intended for such use. The petitioners contended that since the subject matter was a residential apartment project, the requirements of actual use in trade or commerce were not met.

Further, the petitioners referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Madhuram Properties v. Tata Consultancy Services Limited, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 725, where the Court held that agreements concerning immovable property meant exclusively for residential use did not fall under the scope of commercial disputes.

The petitioners also cited S.P. Velayutham v. M/S. Emaar MGF Land Limited, where following Ambalal Sarabhai, the Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the High Court to reconsider whether a suit involving real estate investment was a commercial dispute, emphasizing the importance of actual use of property in trade or commerce.

Conversely, the respondent argued that the dispute came under Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Commercial Courts Act, which covers disputes arising out of ordinary transactions of financiers, even if the property in question was residential, citing the explanation to Section 2(1)(c), which clarifies that the existence of immovable property or the nature of the property does not by itself remove the commercial character of a dispute. The respondent contended that the investment aimed at financial returns established the commercial nature of the transaction.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court examined the statutory provisions, particularly Section 2(1)(c)(i) and (vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, alongside the explanation appended thereto. The Court observed that the agreements and memoranda between the parties clearly showed an investment in residential apartments rather than in commercial property intended for use in trade or commerce. The judge emphasized that while the investment had commercial attributes—such as a guaranteed return and a buy-back clause—the underlying property was residential in character.

The judge placed significant reliance on the principle elucidated in Ambalal Sarabhai, underscoring that for a dispute to fall under Section 2(1)(c)(vii), the immovable property must be actually used exclusively in trade or commerce. The mere possibility or intention of future commercial use would not suffice. The High Court also drew support from Madhuram Properties, where the Gujarat High Court reached a similar conclusion regarding agreements involving residential property. Furthermore, the Court noted that the buy-back provision or promise of returns could not transform an otherwise residential real estate transaction into a commercial dispute.

The Court rejected the respondent's reliance on Section 2(1)(c)(i) by clarifying that even if the transaction involved financial elements, its essence remained an investment in residential property, which excluded it from the commercial jurisdiction. The judge reasoned that including such disputes within the ambit of commercial courts would dilute the legislative intent behind establishing a special forum for genuinely commercial disputes linked to trade, commerce, and industry.

Final Decision:The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioners. It quashed the order dated 28 March 2023 passed by the Commercial Court, and allowed I.A. No. III filed under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. Consequently, the plaint was directed to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before the competent civil court having jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court concluded that the dispute did not qualify as a commercial dispute under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, since the property involved was residential and not actually used exclusively in trade or commerce.

Law Settled in This Case:The case reaffirmed the principle that for a dispute to qualify as a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the immovable property must be actually used exclusively in trade or commerce, and mere intention, possibility of future commercial use, or presence of buy-back clauses does not suffice. It also clarified that financial arrangements related to residential real estate projects, even when accompanied by promises of guaranteed returns, do not by themselves convert the dispute into a commercial one under the Act.

Case Title:Tefilah Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs Mr. Balwinder Singh Bagary

Date of Order: 08 July 2025

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 9689/2025 (GM - CPC)

Name of Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Nagaprasanna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

SRK Max Hospital Vs. Max Healthcare Institute Ltd.

SRK Max Hospital Vs. Max Healthcare Institute Ltd. | Date of Order: 10 July 2025 | Case No.: RFA(COMM) 339/2025 | Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5556-DB | Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi | Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

The dispute arose when Max Healthcare Institute Ltd., owner of the well-known “MAX” trademarks used in healthcare services, filed CS (Comm) 475/2024 against SRK Max Hospital and others. The suit alleged infringement and sought to restrain the defendants from using the name “SRK MAX HOSPITAL” and the domain https://srkmaxhospitals.com/, claiming deceptive similarity to its registered “MAX” family of marks. On 14 October 2024, the Commercial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the impugned marks. Despite the injunction, the plaintiff produced evidence including website printouts, social media posts, and signboards showing continued use of the mark by the defendants.

Procedurally, the defendants failed to file their written statement within the stipulated time. The Commercial Court imposed costs of ₹50,000/- as a condition to take the written statement and related applications on record, which were not paid, resulting in the suit being decreed under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC on 1 May 2025. Additionally, the Court found the defendants guilty of willful disobedience of the injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC and directed them to pay ₹5 lakhs as punitive damages, failing which they would face civil imprisonment.

The core dispute centered on whether SRK Max Hospital’s use of “MAX” as part of its branding infringed Max Healthcare’s established trademarks and whether the defendants were in contempt for not complying with the interim injunction. The defendants argued they had eventually removed the infringing material, but evidence showed persistent usage even after multiple warnings.

High Court observed that while the defendants claimed steps were taken to remove the mark, these were delayed and only done after the contempt application was filed. The Court upheld the Commercial Court’s finding of contempt and the award of ₹5 lakhs as damages. Regarding the decree of injunction under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, the High Court noted the defendants’ failure to comply with procedural costs orders and dismissed their claim that they had filed within time. However, to ensure substantial justice, the Court granted the defendants a final opportunity to argue their application for condonation of delay—conditional upon paying ₹5 lakhs damages and ₹50,000/- costs within two weeks.

Ultimately, the High Court upheld the finding of contempt and the penalty, set aside the decree of injunction subject to the defendants complying with costs directions, and remanded the matter to the Commercial Court to hear the application for condonation of delay on merits. Both parties were directed to appear before the Commercial Court on 5 August 2025 without seeking adjournment.

Tips Films Limited Vs HTTPS//0GOMOVIES.COM.

Tips Films Limited Vs HTTPS//0GOMOVIES.COM.TR/ & Ors.:11.07.2025:CS(COMM) 690/2025: High Court of Delhi:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

In the case of Tips Films Limited vs HTTPS//0GOMOVIES.COM.TR/ & Ors., CS(COMM) 690/2025, decided on 11.07.2025 by the High Court of Delhi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal considered a copyright infringement suit concerning online piracy of cinematograph films. The plaintiff, Tips Films Limited, a major player in the Indian film production and distribution industry, approached the Court seeking urgent relief against 56 rogue websites allegedly involved in pirating and streaming its upcoming and existing films without authorization.

The factual background of the case reveals that Tips Films Limited is the producer of two feature films titled “Maalik” (scheduled for release on 11.07.2025) and “Sarbala Ji” (scheduled for release on 18.07.2025). The plaintiff claimed copyright ownership over these films and feared that the defendants—specifically defendants no. 1 to 56—would stream these films illegally on their websites. These websites were identified as rogue piracy platforms frequently engaged in unauthorized streaming of third-party content, including films. The plaintiff also impleaded domain name registrars (defendants no. 57 to 80), various internet service providers (defendants no. 81 to 89), the Department of Telecommunications (defendant no. 90), and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (defendant no. 91), to ensure comprehensive enforcement of the blocking orders.

The procedural background shows that the plaintiff filed applications seeking exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, permission to file additional documents, and exemption from prior notice under Section 80 CPC for government defendants, all of which were granted by the Court. The suit was filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and accompanied by an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking immediate relief to prevent the streaming and downloading of the plaintiff's films through unauthorized websites.

The core dispute in this case concerns copyright infringement and digital piracy, specifically the unauthorized streaming, hosting, and making available of the plaintiff's cinematograph films by rogue websites. The plaintiff contended that defendants no. 1 to 56 were hiding behind domain privacy services to operate anonymously, making it difficult to trace and hold them accountable. The plaintiff invoked Sections 51(a)(i), 51(a)(ii), and 51(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957, to argue that the defendants’ activities constituted clear cases of infringement. The plaintiff also relied on the precedent set in UTV Software Communication Ltd. & Anr. v. 1337x.to & Ors., CS(COMM) 724/2017, where the Delhi High Court had passed similar dynamic injunctions against rogue websites engaged in piracy.

In its discussion, the Court noted the prevalence of online piracy through anonymous and unregulated websites that infringe copyright by streaming films illegally. The Court recognized that rogue websites often obscure their ownership information using domain privacy services, making judicial enforcement more complex. To address this challenge, the Court endorsed a proactive approach, similar to the one adopted in the UTV Software case, to safeguard copyright holders’ rights.

In its decision, the Court held that a prima facie case of copyright infringement was made out in favor of the plaintiff. The balance of convenience was found to be in favor of the plaintiff, as irreparable harm would occur if the films were streamed illegally. Accordingly, the Court passed an interim injunction restraining defendants no. 1 to 56 from hosting, streaming, or communicating the plaintiff's films without authorization. The domain name registrars (defendants no. 57 to 80) were directed to lock and suspend the domain names of the infringing websites and disclose the registrants' details, including payment and contact information. The internet service providers (defendants no. 81 to 89) were directed to block access to the rogue websites. The Department of Telecommunications and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology were directed to issue blocking orders to all ISPs against the identified websites and to extend such orders to any further websites discovered by the plaintiff engaging in similar activities during the pendency of the suit.

The Court also granted liberty to the plaintiff to approach the authorities for immediate blocking of any additional infringing websites and to file affidavits informing the Court of such actions. If any non-infringing website is inadvertently blocked, it would have the right to approach the Court for relief. The case was listed for further proceedings before the Joint Registrar on 15.09.2025 for completion of pleadings and before the Court on 17.11.2025.

Srinivas Jegannathan Vs The Controller of Patents

Srinivas Jegannathan Vs The Controller of Patents: 01.07.2025: (T)CMA(PT)/38/2023 (OA/61/2014/PT/CH):High Court of Madras: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

The appellant challenged the order dated 26.03.2014 passed by the Controller of Patents, which refused Patent Application No. 122/CHE/2006 relating to a pharmaceutical composition combining ceftazidime, tazobactum, and linezolid for enhanced antibacterial activity.

The factual background of the case reveals that the appellant, Srinivas Jegannathan, filed the patent application for a combination therapy designed to treat infections caused by multi-drug-resistant bacteria, including MRSA and VRSA. The composition involves ceftazidime (a cephalosporin), linezolid (an oxazolidinone class antibiotic), and tazobactum (a beta-lactamase inhibitor). 

The appellant aimed to enhance the antimicrobial spectrum and activity by combining these agents. After filing the application, the First Examination Report (FER) was issued on 03.12.2012. The appellant responded by amending the claims on 24.09.2013 and further after a hearing held on 10.02.2014. Despite these efforts, the Controller rejected the application on 26.03.2014.

The procedural background includes multiple rounds of claim amendments by the appellant, with the last set of amended claims focusing on a drug delivery system using biodegradable polymers for sustained release of the active ingredients. The Controller rejected the application, citing lack of inventive step and reliance on prior arts D1 to D6. The appellant contended that the Controller erroneously concluded the invention was obvious without proper reasoning, leading to the present appeal.

The core dispute involves whether the combination of ceftazidime, tazobactum, and linezolid constitutes an inventive step or is obvious to a person skilled in the art (PSITA). 

The appellant argued that prior art D1 disclosed combinations of linezolid with other antibacterial agents but not with a beta-lactamase inhibitor like tazobactum. Prior art D2 combined an oxazolidinone with ampicillin and sulbactum but not cephalosporins. Prior art D3 involved clavulanate, another beta-lactamase inhibitor, but did not disclose the specific combination of the three drugs claimed. The appellant maintained that no cited prior art taught or suggested combining a cephalosporin, a beta-lactamase inhibitor, and an oxazolidinone for enhanced antibacterial efficacy. 

The respondent, however, argued that the appellant had voluntarily amended claims, and as per the decision in Genomatica Inc. v. Controller of Patents and Designs, CMA(PT)/4/2023 (Madras High Court, 19.03.2024), the Controller rightly evaluated the last amended claims, which allegedly overlapped with known compositions.

The Court’s discussion focused on the absence of a clear, reasoned finding in the Controller's order on why a skilled person would combine the three specific agents. While D1 disclosed linezolid and cephalosporins, it did not mention beta-lactamase inhibitors. D2 disclosed oxazolidinones with ampicillin and sulbactum, but not cephalosporins. 

D3 disclosed clavulanate use but not the claimed combination. The Court noted that the Controller’s conclusion—that the combination was obvious—lacked detailed reasoning or explanation of how a skilled person would arrive at the claimed invention from the prior art references. Moreover, since the appellant offered to revert to the original claims rather than the last amended ones, the objections under Section 59 of the Patents Act, 1970 regarding claim amendments and the relevance of D4 to D6 became moot.

In its decision, the Court set aside the impugned order dated 26.03.2014 and remanded the matter for reconsideration by a different officer of the Patent Office. The reconsideration was directed to proceed based on the original claims filed with the complete specification. The Court instructed that a fresh speaking order be passed within three months after providing the appellant with an opportunity of hearing. The respondent was also permitted to cite new prior art references during this reconsideration process if required. The Court clarified that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the patent application and that the remand was solely for proper examination and reasoned adjudication.

This case highlights the judicial insistence on detailed reasoning when rejecting patent applications on the ground of lack of inventive step and affirms the procedural rights of inventors during patent prosecution.

Union Bank of India Vs. Shashi Malik

Case Title: Union Bank of India Vs. Shashi Malik Case No.: RFA(COMM) 30/2023 Date of Order:  15 May 2025) Court: High Court of Delhi Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3865-DB

The Union Bank of India filed a suit against Shashi Malik for recovery of approximately ₹11,19,609.70 on account of a loan under the Pradhan Mantri Loan Scheme. The bank attempted service at two addresses but received back reports stating "no such person at the address," indicating that Shashi Malik was allegedly unserved and possibly non-existent.

Procedural Details:

The trial court dismissed the suit under Order V Rule 20 of the CPC, holding that the defendant’s residence could not be established at the given addresses and accused the bank of misuse of court process. The bank appealed against this order, challenging the dismissal.

Issue:

Whether the defendant, Shashi Malik, was genuinely present at the addresses provided, which would justify substituted service, and whether the suit against a non-existent person was valid.

Decision:

The High Court set aside the order of the trial court, noting the error in its conclusion regarding the defendant’s residence. The Court remanded the matter back to the Commercial Court for reconsideration, emphasizing the need for correct record examination. The Court also highlighted procedural lapses, such as the defective certified copy of the impugned order, and ordered that future procedures be taken with greater caution.

Prime Diamond Tech Vs Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd

Prime Diamond Tech Vs Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd. : 07.07.2025:Special Civil Application Nos. 9066 of 2025:High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad:Hon’ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

In the case of Prime Diamond Tech & Ors. vs Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., R/Special Civil Application Nos. 9066 and 9073 of 2025, decided on 07.07.2025 by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, a division bench examined a dispute involving access to confidential trade secret information in a pending commercial suit concerning copyright infringement and alleged misuse of proprietary technology in the diamond processing industry.

The factual background involves a copyright and trade secret infringement suit filed by Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd. against Prime Diamond Tech and its associated defendants. The plaintiff alleged that defendants 2 to 5, who were former employees, illegally accessed and used the plaintiff’s proprietary information relating to HPHT (High Pressure High Temperature) diamond treatment technology after joining the defendant company. 

The plaintiff claimed that these trade secrets included technical know-how, design drawings, process mechanisms, chemical compositions, and other confidential data, which were unlawfully replicated to develop competing products. To support its claim, the plaintiff submitted three sealed envelopes containing its confidential information along with the plaint and secured a court-appointed Local Commissioner to inspect the defendant’s factory premises. During the commission proceedings in May 2021, data, photographs, and files from the defendant's premises were collected and sealed.

The procedural background reveals that the trial court in Surat, while dealing with Commercial TM C.S. No. 38 of 2021, passed an order on 25.06.2025 allowing both the defendants’ applications (Exhs. 124 and 125) to access the plaintiff’s sealed confidential documents and the plaintiff’s application (Exh. 134) to access the data collected during the local commission. 

The Commercial Court had initially set up a Confidentiality Club and provided limited access to certain materials, such as photographs and videos, but had restricted broader access to highly confidential material. Dissatisfied with the 25.06.2025 order granting wider access, both parties filed special civil applications before the High Court, seeking to prevent disclosure of their respective confidential information to the other side.

The core dispute before the High Court was whether the parties in a copyright infringement suit could be permitted to access each other’s confidential trade secret data and documents, particularly when such materials were protected under claims of confidentiality and involved sensitive technical know-how. 

The defendants argued that the Court Commissioner exceeded the scope of the commission by indiscriminately copying all types of data from their systems, while the plaintiff sought access to this data to substantiate its claims of trade secret theft. Both parties objected to disclosing their respective confidential information to the rival party.

High Court analyzed the scope of confidentiality in intellectual property litigation, particularly where trade secrets are at stake. The Court noted that divulging trade secrets to rival parties would defeat the very purpose of confidentiality protections. 

It emphasized that in a copyright infringement suit, sharing trade secret data with the opposing party is antithetical to the legal safeguards surrounding proprietary information. The Court observed that the Commercial Court’s order of 25.06.2025, allowing advocates for both parties to access the confidential data without adequate reasoning, overlooked the critical issue of trade secret protection. The previous order of 26.05.2021, which had already regulated the Confidentiality Club and imposed conditions on access, was not duly considered by the trial court.

In its decision, the High Court quashed the Commercial Court’s order dated 25.06.2025 and rejected both the defendants' applications (Exhs. 124 and 125) and the plaintiff’s application (Exh. 134) for access to each other’s confidential information. The Court directed the Commercial Court to proceed with the trial expeditiously, in compliance with the Supreme Court's directions dated 09.09.2024 mandating disposal of the suit within one year. 

The High Court clarified that all pending applications and objections, including those related to the Local Commissioner’s report, should be decided by the trial court at the appropriate stage, without the present decision influencing the final outcome. It further held that neither party, nor their advocates, should be given access to the rival party’s trade secret information at this stage. The Commercial Court was left free to form its own opinion during trial, based on the evidence presented, while ensuring fairness and protection of proprietary data.

Raj Kumar Proprietor of MS Royal Pets Cart vs. Pooja Ahirwar

Title: Raj Kumar Proprietor of MS Royal Pets Cart vs. Pooja Ahirwar Proprietor of MS Aselfy Enterprises:Date of Order: 15 May 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 954/2024:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Facts:

Raj Kumar, the plaintiff, owns the trademark ‘ROYAL PETS CART’, which he began using in 2021 for pet-related products including furniture, bedding, cages, and other accessories. He filed multiple trademark applications and reported substantial sales revenue over successive years. The defendant, Pooja Ahirwar, also filed a trademark application for a deceptively similar mark ‘ROYAL PETS CART’ claiming a user date of 2020. Despite being served with legal notices, the defendant did not appear in court.

Procedural Details:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from using the same or similar marks. An affidavit of service was filed indicating service through email and WhatsApp, but the defendant did not respond or appear during proceedings. The court scheduled further hearings and issued interim relief restraining the defendant from manufacturing, marketing, selling, or offering for sale goods under the impugned trademark until the next hearing.

Issue:

Whether the defendant’s use of a mark nearly identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered and used trademark ‘ROYAL PETS CART’, is infringing upon the plaintiff’s rights, and if an injunction should be granted to prevent further misuse.

Decision:

The court held that the defendant’s mark is nearly identical/deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s mark. The court found a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff, highlighting prior use and likelihood of confusion among consumers. The court granted a temporary restraining order preventing the defendant from manufacturing, marketing, or selling goods under the impugned mark pending further proceedings and scheduled the matter for a hearing on 15 October 2025.

Pocket FM Private Limited Vs Mebigo Labs Private Limited

Pocket FM Private Limited Vs Mebigo Labs Private Limited:10.07.2025: CS(COMM) 686/2025: High Court of Delhi: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

In the case of Pocket FM Private Limited vs Mebigo Labs Private Limited, CS(COMM) 686/2025, decided on 10.07.2025 by the High Court of Delhi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee presided over a commercial intellectual property dispute. 

The plaintiff, Pocket FM Private Limited, sought permanent injunction against Mebigo Labs Private Limited (operating Kuku FM) for alleged copyright infringement, trademark passing off, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and other related claims. The plaintiff also sought urgent interim relief, exemption from pre-litigation mediation, and various ancillary orders.

The factual background of the case involves Pocket FM’s claim that it owns and operates several copyrighted audio series including “Super Yoddha,” “Insta Empire,” “Amrapali,” “Vashikaran,” and “The Immortal Warrior.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant launched and streamed five audio series—“Shivay: Brahmaand ka Yoddha,” “Jobless Ghar Jamai,” “The Legend of Amrapali,” “Avtaar,” and “Immortal Yoddha”—which are deceptively similar in titles, storylines, characters, and other creative elements to the plaintiff’s works. The plaintiff argued that this constitutes copyright infringement and passing off, resulting in loss of user traffic and revenues.

The procedural background reveals that the plaintiff filed the suit in July 2025 after claiming to have discovered the infringing content in June 2025. However, the defendant pointed out that the impugned series had been on air since as early as July 2024, with the latest episodes being released in May 2025. The parties had a prior history of intellectual property litigation, with Pocket FM previously instituting CS(COMM) 875/2024 and CS(COMM) 585/2025 against the same defendant for similar issues. The plaintiff sought urgent interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, claiming continuous losses due to redirection of user traffic to the defendant’s platform.

The core dispute centers on whether the defendant’s series on Kuku FM amount to copyright infringement and passing off of the plaintiff’s original series. The plaintiff contended that the defendant not only copied titles but also substantially copied content, character traits, and storylines, creating confusion in the minds of the audience. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant is a habitual offender with a pattern of similar infringements. The defendant argued that the suit was filed with mala fide intent to obstruct competition and that the plaintiff had delayed approaching the Court despite being aware of the broadcasts since 2024.

The Court ,considering that the plaintiff was engaged in other similar lawsuits during this period, the Court found it appropriate to issue notice on the interim injunction application but declined to grant an immediate ad-interim injunction without hearing the defendant fully. 

However, the Court restrained the defendant from releasing any new episodes of the five impugned series until the next date of hearing. The matter was listed for further consideration

Oramed Ltd. Vs The Controller General of Patents:

Oramed Ltd. Vs The Controller General of Patents:04.07.2025:IPDPTA/8/2022: High Court at Calcutta : Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

The appeal challenged the order dated 5th June 2020, passed in Patent Application No. 3996/KOLNP/2010, which had refused grant of a patent for Oramed’s oral insulin composition.

The facts of the case revolve around Oramed Ltd.'s invention concerning an oral pharmaceutical composition aimed at administering insulin without injection. The invention comprises a protein (insulin), two protease inhibitors—Aprotinin and SBTI (Soybean Trypsin Inhibitor)—along with optional components like EDTA and Omega-3 fatty acids. The claimed invention addresses the challenges of injectable insulin, such as lipodystrophy, hypoglycemia, and lack of fine metabolic control, and seeks to enable oral insulin delivery by preventing enzymatic breakdown of insulin in the gastrointestinal tract.

The procedural background traces back to Oramed’s patent journey starting from its US priority application filed on 26th March 2008, followed by a PCT application on 26th February 2009, and subsequent national phase entry in India on 25th October 2010. After the request for examination in 2012, a First Examination Report (FER) was issued on 22nd December 2015. Oramed responded and participated in hearings; however, the Deputy Controller of Patents refused the application on 18th April 2017, citing lack of inventive step. The refusal order was challenged in a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court due to the non-functioning of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). On 18th June 2019, the High Court remanded the matter back to the Patent Office for reconsideration. Despite fresh hearings in 2019, the Deputy Controller passed a similar refusal order on 5th June 2020, leading to the present appeal.

The core dispute centers around whether the claimed invention involved an inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act and whether the composition was excluded under Section 3(e) as a mere admixture of known substances. The appellant contended that the Deputy Controller failed to consider the expert evidence and scientific data submitted, especially regarding the enhanced bioavailability and surprising synergistic effects of the invention.

The appellant also argued that the Deputy Controller shifted the reasoning without due notice by initially referring to prior arts D1 to D4 in the hearing notice but basing the final decision solely on D1 and D4, ignoring D2 and D3. This deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to respond.

In its discussion, the Court noted the procedural lapses in the patent office’s order. The Court relied on Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications Corp. Ltd. vs The Controller of Patents and Designs (Unreported decision dated 13.06.2023, AID No. 20 of 2022), which held that if multiple prior arts are to be combined for assessing obviousness, there must be a common thread linking the claims to those prior arts. 

The mosaicing of prior arts without a clear rationale is impermissible. The Court also cited Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Aloys Wobben (ORA/08/2009/PT/CH, Order No. 123 of 2013, dated 13.06.2013), where it was held that mere existence of individual components in prior art does not automatically lead to a conclusion of obviousness unless a clear and obvious path connects the prior art to the invention.

The Court found that the Deputy Controller failed to consider expert affidavits, including that of Miriam Kidron, who was not only the inventor of the present invention but also the inventor of cited prior art D1. The order also incorrectly applied the principles of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act—relating to therapeutic efficacy—while adjudicating under Section 3(e), which concerns mere admixtures. This conflation of legal provisions was deemed a serious error.

The Court reasoned that the Deputy Controller’s omission of relevant scientific data, failure to consider granted patents in other jurisdictions, and misapplication of statutory provisions vitiated the decision-making process. The impugned order neither reflected a fair assessment of inventive step nor properly addressed the evidence presented.

In its decision, the Court set aside the order dated 5th June 2020 and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by a different Deputy Controller. The Court directed that all materials, including expert affidavits and technical data, be duly considered. The Controller was instructed to furnish detailed reasons for any inferences drawn while adjudicating the matter afresh.

Mohan Meaking Limited Vs Eston Roman Brewery

Mohan Meaking Limited Vs Eston Roman Brewery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd.: 09.07.2025: Commercial Suit No. 07 of 2025: High Court of Himachal Pradesh:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel

The plaintiff, Mohan Meaking Limited, is one of India’s premier liquor companies, famously known for its "Old Monk" products. It holds a registered trademark for "Old Monk Coffee," registered on 09.06.2022 and valid until 22.11.2031. The defendant, Eston Roman Brewery & Distillery Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated in July 2023, recently started manufacturing and selling a coffee-flavored rum under the brand name "Old Mist."

The procedural background of the case began when the plaintiff discovered in June 2025 that the defendant had started selling its "Old Mist" product in Goa. Claiming that the defendant's product closely resembled the "Old Monk Coffee" product in both name and packaging, the plaintiff filed a commercial suit and an application for interim relief (OMP No. 940 of 2025). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was attempting to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff, leveraging the enormous goodwill associated with the "Old Monk" brand, which the plaintiff claims makes it the third-largest rum manufacturer in the world.

The core dispute revolves around whether the defendant’s use of the mark "Old Mist" for its coffee-flavored rum constitutes trademark infringement and passing off, given the plaintiff's prior rights in "Old Monk Coffee." The plaintiff argued that the similarities in the trade dress, labeling, and phonetic structure between "Old Monk Coffee" and "Old Mist" are likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers, potentially leading them to believe that the defendant’s product is associated with or endorsed by the plaintiff.

The Court examined the products, labels, and bottled goods of both parties during the hearing. After a close perusal, it observed that the defendant's product packaging and labeling bore a significant resemblance to that of the plaintiff. The Court noted that the plaintiff's trademark was registered while the defendant had no such registration for "Old Mist." It also acknowledged the plaintiff's status as an established and reputed manufacturer in the liquor industry, while the defendant had only recently entered the market.

In its decision, the Court found that a prima facie case of trademark infringement was made out in favor of the plaintiff. The Court concluded that the defendant's actions were likely to cause confusion among consumers and result in passing off, thereby damaging the plaintiff's goodwill and causing irreparable loss. The balance of convenience, the Court held, was clearly in favor of the plaintiff. Consequently, the Court passed an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant, its representatives, distributors, and employees from selling or distributing the infringing product, namely "Old Mist Coffee Rum," until further orders. The injunction is subject to compliance with Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.