Satyadhyan Ghosal & Others vs. Sm. Deorajin Debi & Another

Case Title:Satyadhyan Ghosal & Others vs. Sm. Deorajin Debi & Another

Date of Judgment:April 20, 1960

Case Number:Civil Appeal No. 257/59

Neutral Citation:1960 AIR 941, 1960 SCR (3) 590, AIR 1960 SUPREME COURT 941, 1964 (1) SCWR 301, 1964 (1) SCJ 266, 1960 3 SCR 590, 1962 (1) SCJ 268

Court:Supreme Court of India

Judges:Justice K.C. Das Gupta, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, and Justice K.N. Wanchoo

Introduction:

The case of Satyadhyan Ghosal & Others vs. Sm. Deorajin Debi & Another revolves around the interpretation of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, and its subsequent amendments. The dispute arose between landlords who had obtained a decree for ejectment and the tenants who sought protection under the tenancy law. The key legal question was whether the deletion of Section 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act by a later amendment could be applied retrospectively to pending cases. The judgment also deals extensively with the principle of res judicata in the context of interlocutory orders.

Factual Background:

The appellants, Satyadhyan Ghosal and others, were landlords who had obtained a decree for the eviction of their tenants, Sm. Deorajin Debi and her minor son, on February 10, 1949. Before they could execute the decree, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, came into force, which provided protection to tenants classified as Thika tenants. The tenants initially attempted to set aside the decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but their application was dismissed on July 16, 1949.

Subsequently, on September 9, 1949, the tenants applied under Section 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, asserting their status as Thika tenants and seeking rescission of the decree. The landlords opposed the application, and the Munsif ruled against the tenants, holding that they were not Thika tenants.

During the pendency of a revision petition in the High Court, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952, and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953, came into force, which omitted Section 28. Despite this, the High Court ruled in favor of the tenants, declaring them Thika tenants and remanding the matter to the Munsif for fresh consideration. Following this remand, the Munsif rescinded the eviction decree. The landlords then challenged this decision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the High Court upheld the rescission, ruling that the applicability of Section 28 had already been decided and was therefore res judicata.

Procedural Background:

• Trial Court (Munsif’s Court, Alipore): The tenants’ application under Section 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act was dismissed on the ground that they were not Thika tenants.
• High Court (First Round): On revision, the Calcutta High Court reversed the Munsif’s decision, declaring the tenants as Thika tenants and remanding the case for fresh consideration.
• Trial Court (Post Remand): Following the remand, the Munsif rescinded the eviction decree.
• High Court (Second Round): The landlords’ challenge against the rescission was dismissed, with the High Court ruling that the matter was res judicata.
• Supreme Court: The landlords filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the applicability of Section 28 after its omission by the 1953 Amendment Act.

Issues Involved in the Case:

• Whether the omission of Section 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, by the 1953 Amendment Act had a retrospective effect on pending cases.
• Whether an interlocutory order, not appealed against, can be challenged in an appeal against the final decision.
• Whether the High Court’s previous ruling on the applicability of Section 28 became res judicata, preventing the landlords from raising the issue again.

Appellants (Landlords):

• The landlords argued that the omission of Section 28 of the original Act meant that the tenants could no longer claim relief under it, even in pending proceedings.
• They contended that the Munsif had acted beyond his jurisdiction in rescinding the eviction decree after the deletion of Section 28.
• They further argued that an interlocutory order, such as the High Court’s order of remand, does not attain finality and could still be challenged at a later stage.

Respondents (Tenants):

• The tenants argued that since the High Court had already ruled that Section 28 applied to their case, the issue was res judicata and could not be reopened.
• They contended that the principle of finality in judicial proceedings required that interlocutory decisions, if not appealed at the time, could not be revisited later.

Discussion on Judgments and Cited Cases:

• The Supreme Court considered several precedents while analyzing the principle of res judicata in relation to interlocutory orders:Maharaja Mohesur Singh v. The Bengal Government (1859) 7 M.I.A. 283 – Established that an appellate court can review an interlocutory order when deciding the final appeal.
• Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum (1865) 10 M.I.A. 340 – Held that an interlocutory order that does not terminate proceedings can be challenged in an appeal against the final order.
• Sheonath v. Ramnath (1865) 10 M.I.A. 413 – Confirmed that interlocutory orders that are a step towards final judgment do not attain finality unless specifically appealed.
• Ram Kirpal Shukul v. Mst. Rup Kuari (1883) L.R. 11 I.A. 37 – Differentiated between interlocutory orders that have the effect of a decree and those that do not.
• Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator-General of West Bengal [1960] 3 S.C.R. 578 – This case, decided on the same day, affirmed that Section 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act was not available after its omission by the 1953 Amendment.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:

Justice K.C. Das Gupta, delivering the judgment, held that:The omission of Section 28 meant that tenants could not seek relief under it for pending cases.

The High Court’s order of remand was an interlocutory decision that did not terminate the proceedings and could, therefore, be challenged in an appeal against the final order.

The principle of res judicata did not apply because an interlocutory order, if not forming part of a final decree, does not acquire finality unless appealed against.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and ruled that the Munsif had acted without jurisdiction in rescinding the eviction decree. Consequently, the landlords' eviction decree was restored.

Key Legal Principles Settled in the Case:

• Interlocutory orders that do not terminate proceedings can be challenged in an appeal against the final order.
• Omission of a statutory provision removes its applicability to pending cases unless explicitly saved by the legislature.
• Res judicata does not apply to purely interlocutory orders unless they attain finality as part of a decree.

Disclaimer:

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi