Triumph Designs Limited Vs Tube Investments of India

Non-Use as Grounds for Trademark Cancellation

Fact :This case is about a company called Triumph Designs Limited, which is the petitioner, asking the court to cancel a trademark owned by Tube Investments of India, the first respondent, and another party. The trademark in question is "TRIUMPH," registered under number 135253 in class 12, which covers cycles that are driven only by feet, like basic bicycles. 

The main reason the petitioner wants this cancellation is because the respondent has not used the mark at all for a very long time. The petitioner is a well-known company from the United Kingdom that makes motorcycles and is part of a group including Triumph Motorcycles Limited and Triumph Motorcycles (India) Private Limited. They all use the "TRIUMPH" mark for motorcycles. The petitioner says they have been using "TRIUMPH" since 1886 in the UK, and over time, it has become famous worldwide, including in India, with good reputation and sales. They have registered the mark in India and many other countries for motorcycles. In India, they have used it continuously and advertised it a lot, leading to high sales. 

The petitioner found out about the respondent's old registration, which dates back to September 28, 1950, but claims there is no proof the respondent ever used it for bicycles. To support this, the petitioner showed internet search results showing no evidence of use. They argue that this unused mark is just blocking them from fully using their own mark and should be removed under the law because of non-use.

Procedural Detail  :The petitioner filed this application under Section 47 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, which allows for the removal of a registered trademark if it has not been used. The case number is IPDATM/30/2023, and it was heard in the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the High Court at Calcutta's Original Side.

Dispute  :The main fight here is whether the respondent's trademark "TRIUMPH" for foot-driven cycles should be canceled because it has not been used for over 75 years. The petitioner says yes, because non-use for five years or more means it can be removed under the law, and they provided proof like internet searches showing no activity. They also say this old unused mark is stopping the trademark office from letting them expand their own use. The respondent says no, arguing that the petitioner is not a "person aggrieved" under the law, meaning they are not really hurt by this mark.

The respondent points out that the petitioner has many registrations themselves that they do not use, like for mopeds or scooters, so they are being hypocritical and just want to grab the mark as a business rival. This, they say, is unfair and against public interest. The dispute boils down to whether the petitioner qualifies to ask for cancellation, if non-use is proven, and if there are any excuses for the non-use.

Reasoning:This case focuses on the rules for removing a trademark that is not being used, as set out in Section 47 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. This section says that a registered trademark can be removed if someone who is aggrieved applies, and shows either that it was registered without any real plan to use it and it was never used, or that it was not used for a continuous five years plus three months before the application. There is also a part about special reasons for non-use, like legal restrictions, that might excuse it. 

The court explains that three main things need to be true for removal: the applicant must be a person aggrieved, there must be no use for at least five years and three months before applying, and no special circumstances explain the non-use. To explain this, the court refers to a case called Kellogg Company vs. Pops Food Products (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6562, decided by the Delhi High Court. 

In that case, the court said that for removal due to non-use, these three conditions must be met, and the use has to be real and commercial in the right category of goods. Here, the court looked at the records and saw that the respondent got the mark in 1950 but showed no proof of using it for 75 years, which is way more than the five-year limit. The court says use must be genuine, meaning actual sales or promotion in the market for bicycles, and there is no explanation from the respondent for why they did not use it.  

To support this point about what counts as genuine use, the court brings up two more cases. One is Russell Corp Australia PTY Limited vs. Ashok Mahajan And Another, (2023) SCC OnLine Del 4796, also from the Delhi High Court. In that judgment, the court discussed how non-use means the mark must be taken off the register if there is no evidence of commercial activity, and internet searches or lack of sales records can prove non-use. 

The other is Fedders Llyod Corporation LTD & Anr vs. Fedders Corporation & Anr., ILR (2005) I Delhi 478, again from Delhi, where the court said that if a mark is registered but not used for years without reason, it blocks others and should be removed to keep the register clean. In this case, the court applies these ideas by saying the respondent's claim of use is empty, with no documents, so non-use is basically admitted.  

Person Aggrieved:Now, on whether the petitioner is a "person aggrieved," the respondent said no, because the petitioner is just a rival trying to corner the market and has unused marks themselves. But the court disagrees, using a key Supreme Court case: Hardie Trading Ltd. vs. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 92. In that judgment, the Supreme Court explained that "person aggrieved" has different meanings depending on the section.

 For non-use under Section 47 (which was Section 46 in the old act, but similar), it is narrower, but for correcting wrong entries under Section 56, it is broader to keep the register pure for public interest.

 The court quotes paragraphs 30 to 32, where the Supreme Court says for non-use, the person must have a real interest, like being in the same trade, but for wrong registrations, anyone in the trade or public can apply. 

Here, the court says the petitioner is aggrieved because they are in a related field—vehicles like motorcycles—and the unused mark blocks them. The petitioner's own non-use of some marks does not matter, as the law focuses on the mark in question. The court rejects the respondent's argument that the petitioner is opportunistic, saying the law allows rivals to apply if non-use is clear.  

Decision :The court allowed the petitioner's application. It ordered that trademark number 135253 for "TRIUMPH" in class 12 be canceled and removed from the register because of proven non-use without any excuse. The court found the petitioner was a person aggrieved, the non-use was for far more than five years, and no special circumstances existed. The case IPDATM/30/2023 was decided in favor of the petitioner.

Case Title:Triumph Designs Limited Vs Tube Investments of India and Anr  

Order date: 25th September, 2025  

Case Number: IPDATM/30/2023  

Name of Court: High Court of Calcutta   

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pooja Electric Co. Vs. Anand Tomar

Subsequent Trademark Grants in Pending Suits

Fact :This case involves a legal battle over trademarks between Pooja Electric Co., which is the plaintiff, and Anand Tomar, who runs a business called Pooja Rading Company, as the defendant. The plaintiff is a company dealing in electrical goods and has claimed rights over certain trademarks related to its business. The main suit was filed to protect these trademarks from being used by the defendant in a way that could confuse customers or harm the plaintiff's reputation. 

The plaintiff had applied for registration of three specific trademarks with numbers 2990322, 3382660, and 2990321 before starting the lawsuit. These applications were still pending when the suit began, and the plaintiff had already mentioned this fact in the original complaint, known as the plaint. After the court had gone through the initial stages and set the main issues for trial on December 18, 2024, something new happened. 

On January 14, 2025, the trademark office approved and granted registration for these three trademarks. This meant the plaintiff now had official certificates proving ownership of these marks. Wanting to update the court about this development, the plaintiff filed a request to change the plaint to include this new information. The defendant opposed this request, but did not file any written reply despite getting chances to do so. The court had to decide whether to allow this change at this stage of the case.

Procedural Detail  :The main lawsuit, numbered CS(COMM) 517/2023, was filed by Pooja Electric Co. against Anand Tomar under the laws protecting trademarks. Along with the suit, there were other related requests, like I.A. 14153/2023, but the key one here is I.A. 3702/2025, which is the application for amending the plaint. 

This application was made under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is a rule that allows parties to correct or update their written statements in a lawsuit if needed, and also under Section 151 of the same code, which gives the court general power to do what is fair. 

Dispute : The main disagreement in this particular application was whether the plaintiff should be allowed to update the plaint to mention the new trademark registrations that were granted after the issues in the case had already been decided. 

The plaintiff argued that this was just a simple update to reflect the current reality, since the pending applications were already disclosed in the original plaint, and now they had become registered. This would help strengthen their case without changing the basic facts. The defendant, on the other hand, opposed the idea, though without explaining why in writing. The broader dispute in the suit is about trademark infringement, where the plaintiff claims the defendant is using similar names or marks that could mislead people into thinking the defendant's products are connected to the plaintiff's business. But for this application, the focus was narrow: is it okay to add this new fact about registrations without a full rewrite of the plaint, especially since the trial stage had started?

Reasoning: The court starts by looking at the rules under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which says that a party can ask to amend their plaint at any time, but after the trial begins, the court can only allow it if the change is needed to settle the real issues and if the party could not have known about it earlier despite trying hard. 

Here, the registrations happened after the issues were framed, so it was a new event that the plaintiff could not have included before. The court agreed that the basic facts about the trademark applications were already in the original plaint, so there was no need to rewrite everything. 

Instead, it allowed the plaintiff to just add the registration certificates to the record as Document-B and use them when presenting evidence. This way, the case can move forward without delay. The court also considered the stage of the suit, noting that issues were framed but evidence had not started yet, so this update would not unfair surprise the defendant. It pointed out that the defendant did not file a reply, which weakened their opposition. Overall, the court used its power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to do what is just, keeping all arguments about the main dispute open for later.  

Decision  :The court allowed the plaintiff's application in part. It permitted the registration certificates to be placed on record as Document-B, and the plaintiff can use them during evidence. However, it said there is no need to actually amend the plaint because the key facts about the applications were already there. The application was disposed of with these directions, and the defendant's rights to argue on the main issues remain open. For the main suit, the plaintiff must file affidavits of all witnesses within four weeks, and the case is listed before the Joint Registrar on November 21, 2025, to fix dates for evidence.

Case Title:Pooja Electric Co. Vs. Anand Tomar Trading as Pooja Rading Company  

Order date: September 25, 2025  

Case Number: CS(COMM) 517/2023  

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Helsinn Healthcare SA & Anr. Vs Hetero Healthcare Limited

Interpreting Time Limits for Replication in Delhi High Court: 

Facts:This case involves a patent dispute between two companies in the healthcare field. The plaintiffs, Helsinn Healthcare SA and another party, filed a lawsuit against the defendant, Hetero Healthcare Limited. The main claim was that the defendant was infringing on the plaintiffs' registered patent number 426553 by selling a product called "NETUPIN." The plaintiffs asked the court for a permanent order to stop the defendant from selling or promoting this product, along with requests for money damages, an accounting of profits, and handing over any infringing items. The lawsuit deals with medicinal or pharmaceutical products, and it touches on complex technology, including references to prior inventions that the defendant used in its defense. The written statement from the defendant was long, running to 81 pages, and relied on 12 earlier documents to argue against the patent claim. 

Procedural Details:The lawsuit started when the plaintiffs filed their complaint, and it first came before the court on April 30, 2024. On that day, the court gave a temporary order stopping the defendant from selling the product until the case could be heard more fully. The complaint was then officially registered as a suit, and a notice was sent to the defendant, who received it on May 21, 2024. The defendant filed its defense document, known as a written statement, on August 16, 2024, but this was late because the rules require it within 30 days of receiving the notice, with a possible extension up to 120 days in some cases. Since it was delayed, the defendant had to ask the court for permission to accept it late. On August 23, 2024, a court officer called the Joint Registrar allowed this delay but made the defendant pay 3,000 rupees as a penalty. The defendant paid this amount on August 30, 2024. After that, the plaintiffs filed their replication on October 5, 2024, along with a request to excuse a 13-day delay in filing it. The court had to decide on this request under a rule from the Delhi High Court that sets time limits for such replies.

Dispute:The main disagreement was about when the clock starts ticking for the plaintiffs to file their replication. The rules of the Delhi High Court say that a replication should be filed within 30 days of receiving the written statement, and the court can extend this by up to 15 more days if there is a good reason, but no longer than that. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs received the written statement by email on August 16, 2024, so the 30-day period ended on September 15, 2024, and even with the extra 15 days, it ended on September 30, 2024. Since the replication came on October 5, 2024, the defendant said it was too late and should not be allowed. The plaintiffs said the time should start from August 23, 2024, when the court officially accepted the late written statement, or even from August 30, 2024, when the penalty was paid. Using that starting point, the 30 days ended on September 22, 2024, and the full 45 days ended on October 7, 2024, making their filing on October 5 timely. They argued that until the court accepts a late defense, there is no need to reply to it, so the time should not start earlier.

Reasoning:The court looked closely at the rule in question, which is Rule 5 of Chapter VII from the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. This rule says the replication must be filed within 30 days of receiving the written statement, and if the court sees a good reason like something unavoidable stopping the filing on time, it can give up to 15 more days, but not beyond that. The rule also says the plaintiff must pay some costs for the extension, and if no replication is filed even then, the court will decide what to do. An advance copy must be sent to the defendant. The court explained that this rule is meant to keep cases moving quickly and avoid delays, but it needs to be applied fairly. The judge noted that in normal cases where the defense is filed on time, the 30 days start from when the plaintiff gets it. But here, the defense was late, so it only became official when the court allowed the delay.

To support this view, the court discussed several past decisions. First, it referred to SNS Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Ijaz Uddin, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 787. In that case, the court said that when a written statement is filed late and only accepted after excusing the delay, the time for replication starts from the date it is taken on record. The reasoning was simple: if the court rejects the late defense, there is nothing to reply to, so it makes no sense to start the clock earlier. The judge in SNS Products explained that the Division Bench in an earlier case, Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2621, had ruled that the 45-day limit is strict and cannot be extended beyond that, but it did not address when the period starts in cases of late filings. So, SNS Products filled that gap by saying the start date is when the defense is officially accepted.

The court also discussed Aroti Sarkar & Anr. v. Ashok Sarkar & Ors., order dated December 5, 2023 in CS(OS) 823/2022. There, the defense was accepted only if costs were paid, and since the costs were not paid yet, the time for replication had not even started. The judge agreed with SNS Products and said payment of costs is a condition for the defense to count, so the replication time begins after that. Similarly, in Parmeet Singh Anand v. Subhash Chand Aggarwal, order dated August 29, 2024 in CS(COMM) 824/2022, the court held that the replication period starts from when the written statement is taken on record after condoning the delay. The same idea was followed in Tata Sons v. Marvel Ltd., order dated December 19, 2024 in CS(COMM) 724/2024, and Quasar Airlines (P) Ltd. v. Shaurya Aeronautics (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2821, where the start date was the acceptance of the late defense.

In cases where acceptance depended on paying costs, like Neeraj Saran Srivastava v. Loudon Owen & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:283, and Bunch Microtechnologies Private Limited & Ors. v. Creator Economy Tech Private Limited & Ors., order dated March 14, 2024 in CS(OS) 14/2023, the courts said the time starts from when the costs are actually paid. The judge in this case applied these ideas, noting that the defense was accepted on August 23, 2024, with costs paid on August 30, 2024. Even starting from August 23, the replication on October 5 was within 45 days.

The defendant argued using other cases that the time always starts from receipt, like in Presto Stantest Pvt. Ltd. v. Pacorr Testing Instruments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:9461, where an email was seen as receipt. Other cases cited included FITJEE Ltd. v. Vidya Mandir Classes & Ors., order dated September 4, 2023 in CS(OS) 656/2021; Shri Ram Housing Finance and Investment of India Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust & Ors., order dated October 4, 2023 in CS(OS) 38/2023; Asha & Ors. v. Rajbala & Ors., order dated October 5, 2023 in CS(OS) 662/2021; Smt. Saroj & Ors. v. Smt. Uma & Ors., order dated December 5, 2023 in CS(OS) 539/2023; Dr. Reddys Laboratories Ltd. v. Wockhardt Ltd. and Anr., order dated February 26, 2024 in CS(COMM) 101/2023; Pradeep Kumar v. Sudesh Bhatia, order dated July 15, 2024 in CS(COMM) 500/2023; and Mrs. Bushra Shuaib v. Mr. Hilal Ahmed, order dated August 22, 2024 in CS(OS) 135/2023. These all said time starts from receipt of the defense.

The defendant also used Ram Swarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors., order dated September 30, 2019 in CS(OS) 182/2019; Ram Swarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2020:DHC:3049-DB; Louis Dreyfus v. Nutralite Agro, Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:238; Delhi Gymkhana Club v. Col. Ashish Khanna, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7022; and the Supreme Court's order dated June 28, 2021 in SLP(C) No. 15142/2020 in Ram Swarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors. These emphasized that the 45-day limit is absolute and cannot be ignored. The defendant said SNS Products was wrong to mix up "receipt" with "taken on record," as receipt means getting the document, not court approval.

The court disagreed, saying those cases did not deal with late defenses, so they do not apply here. Instead, the line of cases like SNS Products better fits when the defense is belated. The judge also referred to Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, where the Supreme Court said phrases like "but not thereafter" mean no further extensions, but here the issue was the start date, not extending beyond 45 days. 

The court said interpreting "receipt" as the date of official acceptance in late cases makes sense to avoid unfairness and keep the process logical. It helps decide cases on real issues rather than strict time traps. The judge noted the conflict in past decisions but followed the purposive approach, meaning looking at the rule's goal of fair and quick justice.

Decision: The court decided in favor of the plaintiffs. It ruled that the replication was filed within the allowed time, starting from August 23, 2024, when the written statement was accepted. The 13-day delay was excused, and the replication was allowed on record. 

Case Title: Helsinn Healthcare SA & Anr. Vs Hetero Healthcare Limited

Order Date: September 26, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM)347/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8658

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Crocs Inc Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Phonetic and Visual Confusion in Footwear Brands

Facts: This case is about a company called Crocs Inc, which makes and sells footwear, asking the court to cancel a trademark owned by another party. Crocs Inc started in 2002 in the United States and created the brand name "CROCS" for its shoes. The company sells many types of shoes for men, women, and children, with over 300 styles that are popular around the world, including in India. In India, Crocs works through a local company in Gurgaon, Haryana, and sells its products in stores, online, and on websites like Ajio, Tata Cliq, and Myntra. Crocs owns the website crocs.com and Indian sites like shopcrocs.in and crocs.in. The company has registered its "CROCS" trademark in India for different classes like 9, 14, 18, 25, 35, and 10. 

The problem started when Crocs found out about another trademark, a logo that looks like "CROOSE", registered under number 3409214 in class 25 for footwear, owned by Respondent No. 2. Crocs believes this mark is too similar to its own and is being used dishonestly to copy its success. Respondent No. 1 is the government office that handles trademarks, and Respondent No. 2 is the owner of the "CROOSE" mark. Crocs says it has built a lot of goodwill with its brand since 2002, and the similar mark could confuse people.

Procedural Details: Crocs Inc filed a petition in the Delhi High Court under sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, to cancel the "CROOSE" trademark. Section 47 allows removal of a mark if it's not used properly, and section 57 lets the court correct or cancel entries in the trademark register. The case also had an application numbered IA No.3113/2023, likely for some related relief. The petition was heard by Justice Tejas Karia. Respondent No. 2 was given several chances to file a reply and written arguments but did not do so. On April 23, 2025, the court closed their right to file these documents. However, the court still allowed Respondent No. 2's lawyer to make oral arguments during the hearing. Lawyers for Crocs presented their side, showing evidence like sales records, registrations, and photos of products. The Registrar of Trademarks, as Respondent No. 1, was represented but did not oppose much, as their role is more administrative. 

Dispute: The main issue was whether the "CROOSE" trademark should be cancelled because it is too similar to Crocs' "CROCS" mark. Crocs argued that "CROOSE" is identical or deceptively similar in look, sound, and style, and is used for the same kind of products, like shoes. They said Respondent No. 2 adopted it in bad faith to benefit from Crocs' popularity, as Respondent No. 2 used to sell under other names like "JNG", "AEROLITE", and "RBS" but switched to this similar one. Crocs claimed this could confuse customers into thinking "CROOSE" products come from Crocs, violating section 11(1)(b) of the Act, which stops registration of marks that are likely to deceive or confuse because they are similar to existing marks for similar goods. They also said the mark is not distinctive and should not have been registered under sections 9 and 11. Respondent No. 2 argued that "CROOSE" is different in structure, sound, and look, and that it was properly registered after following the rules, so it should stay.

Reasoning: The court started by confirming that Crocs is the owner of the "CROCS" trademark in India and sells its products widely here, so it is a "person aggrieved" under section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which means it has the right to ask for cancellation. The judge looked at photos of the products side by side. Crocs' shoes have the "CROCS" name placed in a certain way, and "CROOSE" products have a similar placement and style. The court said the marks look similar overall, sound alike when spoken, and are for the same class of goods, footwear in class 25. This makes "CROOSE" deceptively similar to "CROCS", which could confuse people in the market. The court relied on section 11(1)(b) of the Act, which says a trademark cannot be registered if it is so similar to an earlier mark for the same or similar goods that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. The judge noted that to keep the trademark register clean and fair, such confusing marks should be removed. 

Decision: The court agreed with Crocs and allowed the petition. It ordered the Registrar of Trademarks to cancel and remove the "CROOSE" mark, registration number 3409214 in class 25, from the register. The register must be updated, and the website changed within four weeks. A copy of the order was to be sent to the Registrar by email for action. The case and any pending application were closed.

Case Title: Crocs Inc Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Order Date: September 26, 2025

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 82/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8660

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Honasa Consumer Limited Vs. Cloud Wellness Private Limited

Colour Combinations and Passing Off

Facts: Honasa Consumer Limited brought a suit against Cloud Wellness Pvt. Ltd., alleging that Cloud Wellness had unlawfully copied the packaging, colours, trade dress and overall get-up of its products, thus infringing Honasa’s copyright and passing off. Honasa is a company selling skin care, personal care, and baby products using a unique blend of colours and layouts for packaging—what it calls the “Subject Trade Dress”—since early 2020, especially under its trademark “THE DERMA CO.” The Subject Trade Dress was designed by Lucid Design India Pvt. Ltd. and registered on social media before product launch. Honasa claimed extensive market promotion and fame for its products, which are associated closely with the unique visual style of the packaging. The company noticed similar visual elements in Cloud Wellness’s “DERMATOUCH” branded skin care products and filed a cease and desist notice, which Cloud Wellness rejected. Honasa argued that the colour combinations, brand layout, and product descriptions are unique and that Cloud Wellness's packaging, website, and use of colours are copies seeking to exploit Honasa’s market reputation[1].

Procedural Details:  The lawsuit filed by Honasa included claims for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957, and passing off under common law principles. Honasa requested an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to restrain Cloud Wellness from selling or marketing products using the allegedly copied trade dress until trial. The matter was contested at length, with parties presenting evidence, documents, online sales data, and expert submissions both on originality of the design and market presence. Both side’s counsels argued at length, including extensive reliance on legal precedents and evidentiary documents. The parties have been coexisting in the skincare market for about four years, and Honasa raised its complaint after noticing similar packaging in Cloud Wellness's newer products, released from 2021 onwards[1].

Nature of Dispute:The heart of the dispute was whether Cloud Wellness’s packaging and use of colour combinations in its DERMATOUCH products amounted to copying Honasa’s distinctive trade dress, thus infringing copyright and amounting to passing off. Honasa argued its packaging was a creative, original artistic work per Section 13 of the Copyright Act and uniquely identified with its products in the market through prolonged use, extensive sales, and advertising. Honasa claimed that Cloud Wellness’s adoption of almost identical colour arrangements, label layouts, and website design were deliberate attempts to “hijack” its goodwill and confuse consumers. Cloud Wellness responded by arguing their own adoption was honest, colour combinations for skincare products were industry norms, and similar get-ups existed before Honasa’s in international and domestic markets. Cloud Wellness also challenged the originality and distinctiveness of Honasa’s design, claiming no exclusive right over simple two-colour arrangements, and asserted their larger sales and prior use of the same colour schemes.

Reasoning: The court started with the basic principles for granting interim injunctions: the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable injury. The reasoning emphasized that mere similarity in packaging is not enough—actual risk of confusion among buyers and proof of acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning) must be shown.

The Court noted that both companies have been selling products with similar two-tone colour panels but under distinct brand names, product compositions, and stated ingredients. The presence of the brand name “THE DERMA CO.” on Honasa products and “DERMATOUCH” on Cloud Wellness’s products was highlighted for being easily distinguishable by buyers. The judge found that skincare consumers are informed and ingredient-focused, with branding and formulation making more impact than colour alone. The comparison also showed that both businesses list product ingredients prominently, affecting purchasing decisions. Therefore, similarity in trade dress, without evidence that consumers equate only the packaging colours with the source, is not enough for confusion.

Justice Karia referenced a series of precedents from Indian and international courts, including Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Anchor Health (2003), Marico Ltd. v. Zee Hygiene Products (2025), Kellogg Company v. Pravin Kumar Bhadabhai (1996), Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Ltd. (2010), and more. Precedents set the tone that, especially for passing off, the plaintiff must show (i) goodwill in the get-up at the time defendant adopted it, (ii) misrepresentation by defendant, and (iii) likely damage to plaintiff’s business. Packaging alone rarely signals product origin unless it is proven to have acquired secondary meaning in the market. Monopoly over basic colour schemes and simple trade dress is disfavoured unless market reality shows exclusive association in consumers’ minds. Normal coexistence and the presence of clear brand names further lower risk of confusion. Professor Wadlow, Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour Co., and other foreign decisions were cited to explain that brand name—and not just packaging colour—matters most to consumers in differentiating products.

Decision: Justice Karia dismissed Honasa’s application for interim injunction. He found that Honasa had not established a prima facie case of distinctiveness or exclusive secondary meaning in the two-tone packaging at the relevant time. He also observed that the companies have coexisted for four years without actual confusion reported. The balance of convenience was held to favour Cloud Wellness, whose ongoing business would be seriously harmed by an injunction, while Honasa could be compensated monetarily if injury was found at trial. The judge concluded that originality of the trade dress, prior adoption, and distinctiveness are all issues needing a full trial with evidence, not summary determination at the interim stage. The question will be determined at trial, and until then, both companies may continue using their respective trade dresses.

Case Title: Honasa Consumer Limited Vs. Cloud Wellness Private Limited & Anr.  

Order Date: September 26, 2025  

Case Number: CSCOMM 483/2025  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8662

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Neeraj Gupta Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs

Inventive Step and Procedural Fairness

Facts:  The case involved an appeal by Neeraj Gupta ("Appellant") against the Controller of Patents and Designs ("Respondent") after the rejection of his patent application titled ‘An Intravenous Catheter Device’. The device's primary purpose is to infuse medication or fluids directly into a vein or draw blood samples for testing. The patent application (No. 201911036272) was filed on September 10, 2019 before the Indian Patent Office. The device aimed to improve upon existing catheter technologies, especially in solving problems related to blood backflow prevention.

Procedural Details:  Upon initial scrutiny, the Patent Office issued the First Examination Report (FER) on February 10, 2020, citing lack of novelty and inventive step, with particular reference to prior art documents D1 (WO2018096549A1) and D2 (WO2015161294A1). The Appellant replied to FER, addressing the objections with detailed arguments and clarifications. Subsequently, hearings were held, and written submissions were filed, but the Controller rejected the application via an order dated February 11, 2021. A review petition was filed by the Appellant, which was dismissed as well. The matter then came up before the High Court in appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970[1].

Nature of Dispute:  The main contention was the validity of the Controller’s rejection, which was based on the assertion that the catheter device lacked the inventive step required under the Patents Act. The Controller held that the disclosed device was obvious to a person skilled in the art when considering the combined teaching of D1 and D2. The Appellant argued that the Controller had not truly considered the novel aspects of his invention, especially the 'valve closure member', and alleged procedural errors and lack of proper reasoning in the Controller’s order.

Reasoning: The Appellant argued that his device's distinguishing feature—a "valve closure member"—was not found in prior art and formed the inventive core of the invention. The Appellant criticized the Controller for arbitrarily combining features from D1 and D2 without showing how an ordinary skilled person would combine these references to produce the invention. The Appellant pointed out that while prior art relied on material elasticity for self-sealing, his invention used a mechanical force exerted by the valve closure member for more reliable prevention of blood backflow.

The Respondent insisted that features claimed as novel were obvious in view of prior documents. Specifically, the Respondent pointed to certain sections and drawings in D1 and D2, arguing they disclosed or at least suggested the allegedly inventive element. However, the Court observed that critical differences, such as the shape, composition, and mechanism of operation of the valve and the effectiveness in long-term prevention of blood backflow, were not discussed in detail in the Controller’s decision.

The High Court referred to precedent, notably Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 940), which clarified how a controller should examine obviousness. The judgment mandates a three-step reasoning: discuss prior art, discuss the invention under review, and then logically explain why the invention would be obvious to a skilled person.

The Court examined documents D1 and D2 thoroughly.  - D1’s primary goal was to prevent blood backflow using a flexible valve design without an additional closure member.  D2 solved backflow issues using the elasticity and self-sealing property of a septum, also preventing flow by channels engineered for this purpose. However, it relied on intermolecular forces in blood versus air, which only worked for a limited time.  The High Court found that neither prior art fully disclosed a valve closure member as designed by the Appellant, which forcefully sealed the prongs and thus the slit, overcoming limitations of material fatigue and longevity found in prior solutions.The Controller’s finding that all features were present in prior art was critically examined and found lacking. The Court emphasized the absence of meaningful discussion on why the invention would be obvious and pointed out procedural failings—most prominently, the lack of adequate reasoning, a point highlighted in Agriboard International.

Decision: The High Court, after careful review, set aside both the original rejection and the order dismissing the review petition. The Court ordered the matter to be remanded back to the Patent Office for fresh consideration, with the explicit instruction that the Controller must provide an opportunity for re-hearing and apply the three-stage reasoning mandated by law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this Order. 

Conclusion: This judgment reaffirms that decisions rejecting patent applications for lack of inventive step must be supported with clear and logical reasoning. The Court clarified that mere references to prior art are not enough; every element claimed as inventive must be duly examined and reasoned. The procedural protections embedded in patent law exist to ensure that inventors benefit from a fair hearing and thorough consideration. This case also highlights the significance of economic and technical advancement as components of the inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, and sets an example of judicial adherence to reasoned decision-making in intellectual property matters[1].

Case Title: Neeraj Gupta Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs  

Order Date: September 26, 2025  

Case Number: C.A.COMM.IPD-PAT 29/2023  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8664 

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

The Trustees of Princeton University Vs. The Vagdevi Educational Society

Transborder Reputation and Prior User Rights

Facts:  Princeton University, a world-renowned Ivy League institution in the United States, was originally established in 1746 as the College of New Jersey and became “Princeton University” in 1896. Over the centuries, it gained international reputation and became home to numerous Nobel laureates, US Presidents, judges, and other dignitaries. The University has an established presence in India through academic collaborations, student exchange programs, seminars, and enrolment of Indian students. Princeton owns registrations of the trademark “PRINCETON” in India under Classes 16, 25, and 41 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

In 2020, Princeton discovered that the Vagdevi Educational Society, based in Telangana, was running institutions under the name “Princeton” and operating a website www.princetonschoolofeducation.com. The appellant alleged that this amounted to infringement and passing off, since “PRINCETON” is its registered and well-known mark.

The respondents, Vagdevi Educational Society, had been in existence since 1991 and claimed that their use of the word “Princeton” was independent. They asserted that the word was coined from “Prince” and “ton” (a ton of princes/princesses to be educated), and had no connection with the Ivy League University. They also claimed to be prior users in India and denied that any consumer could confuse their local colleges with Princeton University in the US.

Procedural Background: Princeton University filed a civil suit in 2022 (CS (COMM) 270/2022) before a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court seeking an injunction to restrain the respondents from using the mark “Princeton.” Alongside the suit, it filed an interim application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.On 6 September 2023, the learned Single Judge dismissed the interim injunction application. The Single Judge held that Princeton had not established actual use of its mark in India prior to 1991 and that the respondents were entitled to protection under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act as prior users.Aggrieved, Princeton filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, challenging the order of dismissal.

Core Dispute:  The essential dispute was whether Princeton University, as a foreign entity with trademark registrations in India, could restrain Vagdevi Educational Society from using the word “Princeton” for its educational institutions in India.Key questions included: Whether Princeton’s historical and international reputation amounted to sufficient use of its mark in India.

Judicial Reasoning:  The Division Bench undertook a detailed analysis of both statutory provisions and judicial precedents.

On use of mark and prior rights, the Court referred to Section 2(2)(c)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which defines “use in relation to services” as making a statement about availability, provision, or performance of services. The Bench clarified that such use need not be by the proprietor alone. Newspaper reports, academic collaborations, and recognition of Princeton’s presence in India since 1911 were considered sufficient to show actual use .

On transborder reputation, the Court examined Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court recognised the territoriality principle but also left scope for recognition of foreign marks with strong reputation. The Bench noted that Princeton’s goodwill in India, supported by historical material, admissions of Indian students, and international recognition, distinguished it from Toyota, where there was negligible presence .

On confusion and dilution, the Bench disagreed with the Single Judge’s view that no consumer could confuse a Telangana-based college with Princeton University. The Court explained that confusion could arise not only through direct deception but also through dilution, initial interest confusion, and unfair advantage. Even if fee structures and admission modes were different, the core issue was misuse of a well-known mark for identical services (education)  .

On geographical significance, the respondents argued that “Princeton” was a place name in New Jersey and could not be monopolised. The Court rejected this argument, holding that while geographical names are generally not monopolised, exceptional cases exist where the name acquires distinctiveness through long use and recognition, as seen in Manipal Housing Finance Syndicate Ltd. v. Manipal Stock & Share Brokers (1996 SCC OnLine Mad 736) . Princeton, through decades of global use, had become uniquely associated with the appellant.

On injunction principles, the Bench reiterated the threefold test laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi (2024) 11 SCC 351: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. Princeton, as the registered proprietor with global reputation, satisfied all three conditions. Non-interference would allow dilution and unfair advantage by the respondents .

On precedents, the Court relied on Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. [1990 Supp SCC 727], Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah [(2002) 3 SCC 65], and Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai [(2006) 5 SCC 282], holding that appellate courts can interfere when discretion is exercised perversely or contrary to settled law .

Decision: The Division Bench allowed the appeal. The order of the Single Judge dated 6 September 2023 was set aside. The Court restrained the respondents from opening any new institution under the mark “Princeton” or any deceptively similar mark during the pendency of the suit.

However, considering that respondents were already running existing institutions under the name for several decades, the Court directed them to file affidavits every six months disclosing receipts from those institutions. This mechanism was to ensure transparency and prevent further unfair advantage .

Law Settled: The judgment affirms that foreign institutions with substantial reputation and trademark registrations in India are entitled to protection of their marks, even if their physical operations are limited to abroad. It recognises that use of a mark in India can be established through indirect presence, media coverage, and collaborations. The decision strengthens the concept of protection against dilution and initial interest confusion, even in the absence of direct competition. It clarifies that Section 34 protection of prior users is not automatic if the claimant can show earlier and continuous reputation in India.

Case Title: The Trustees of Princeton University Vs. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors.

Case Number: FAO (OS) (COMM) 239/2023 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8654-DB

Court: High Court of Delhi 

Order Pronounced On: 26 September 2025

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Renu Bhatnagar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Anugya Gupta And Another Vs. I Think Apps Pvt. Ltd.

Trademark Disputes in Online Education Portals

Fact of the Case: This case revolves around a trademark dispute between Anugya Gupta and another party acting against I Think Apps Pvt. Ltd., represented by Director Arpit Seth. The core business of the plaintiff is providing career and employment-related services in India, with a focus on competitive examination preparation. The plaintiff had started an online service under the name "Sarkari Result" in 2009, and over time built a web portal, mobile apps, and related services using this mark. The mark became widely recognized and used by millions across India. The plaintiff asserted its right over the trademark "Sarkari Result," citing registration records, municipal licenses, domain registration details, Google analytics, and recognitions by various government and private entities. 

Procedural Details: The dispute arose when, during a trademark registry search on 12.01.2025, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants attempted to register a similar trademark, allegedly misusing the plaintiff’s website and brand. When confronted, the defendant sent a cease and desist notice to the plaintiff. This led the plaintiff to seek an injunction from the Commercial Court in Varanasi, dispensing with mandatory pre-institution mediation requirements on grounds of urgency. The Commercial Court granted an ex-parte interim injunction, stopping the defendants from using any mark similar or identical to “Sarkari Result” and directing removal from all public platforms controlled by them. The defendants objected, challenging both the urgency and the merits of the injunction, arguing prior domain use and knowledge by the plaintiff. The trial court, however, found evidentiary support in favor of the plaintiff’s claims and granted relief. Aggrieved, the defendants appealed the order in the Allahabad High Court. 

Nature of Dispute: The main contention is over the trademark and domain name "Sarkari Result." The plaintiff claims to be the prior adopter and continuous user of the mark since 2009, whereas the defendants argue prior use of a similar name and domain from 2012, and raise issues of knowledge, acquiescence, and suppression of material facts. The defendants also question procedural compliance, especially exemption from pre-institution mediation.

Detailed Reasoning : The Court examined extensive documentary evidence and rival submissions. The plaintiff brought forth domain registration documents, municipal corporation licenses from 2011, continuous service history, and widespread usage on social platforms, establishing long-term use and public association with “Sarkari Result.” Financial records certified by a Chartered Accountant and Google analytics demonstrated both substantial investment and user engagement.

The defendants countered these with claims of domain registration from 2012 and cited orders from previous cases before the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court, where they had received some relief against other third parties. However, invoices or primary ownership records for the disputed period were lacking. Defendants further argued that certain email communications between parties (from 2016 and 2023) signaled early knowledge and therefore acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part. The Court, relying on judgments like Ramdev Food Products P Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Pater (SCC pp. 769-770, paras 103-106) and Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines P Ltd. explained that acquiescence requires active encouragement or express assent—mere silence or delay is insufficient for a defendant to claim continued use.

The Commercial Court had also relied upon the principle from Midas Hygiene Industries P Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004 3 SCC 90), which states that in cases of infringement of trademark or copyright, injunction normally follows, and delay does not by itself defeat relief.The Court observed that the plaintiff’s continuous public use, widespread market recognition, and documentary evidence of early inception outweighed the defendants’ claims. The principle that a mere registration does not confer indefeasible rights in trademark disputes (see N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. AIR 1995 Del 300) was also considered.

Decision: The Allahabad High Court upheld the Commercial Court’s decision to grant temporary injunction preserving the plaintiff’s rights in "Sarkari Result." It was noted that the injunction was justified given the plaintiff’s prior continuous use, substantial investment, market reputation, and absence of valid counter-evidence from defendants. The Court repeated that interim relief rests on showing a prima facie case, balance of convenience in plaintiff’s favor, and risk of irreparable harm to goodwill if the injunction is refused. Procedural objections regarding mediation were not persuasive given the urgent nature and previous conduct of both sides. The appeal and connected petitions were dismissed.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Case Title: Anugya Gupta And Another Vs. I Think Apps Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: 23.09.2025

Case Number: Commercial Appeal No. 24 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC:170327-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Allahabad

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mr. AR Rahman Vs. Ustaf Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar and Ors

Copyright Challenges in Traditional Compositions

Facts: The story of this legal battle starts with a famous musician named Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar, who is a Padma Shri awardee and a well-known singer in the Dagarvani style of Dhrupad, which is a type of old Indian classical music. He is the son of the late Ustad N. Faiyazuddin Dagar and the nephew of the late Ustad N. Zahiruddin Dagar, together known as the Junior Dagar Brothers. These brothers are said to have created a musical piece called Shiva Stuti . stad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar claims that the rights to this music came to him through a spoken family agreement in 1994 among the heirs. He says he owns the copyright because of this agreement. He uses this music to teach his students but has not allowed anyone to use it for making money or public shows without his okay. He has given limited permissions to some music companies and schools only for learning and practice. 

Two of his students, Shivam Bharadwaj and Arman Ali Dehlvi, knew about Shiva Stuti from their lessons. According to Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar, these students went to A.R. Rahman, a famous music maker, and shared the music without his permission. Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar found out that parts of Shiva Stuti were used in a song called Veera Raja Veera in the Tamil movie Ponniyin Selvan – II.  

A.R. Rahman made the music for the film, produced by Madras Talkies and Lyca Productions, with the music rights held by Tips Industries. The song credits said it was based on Dagarvani Tradition Dhrupad, but did not name the Junior Dagar Brothers or Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar. Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar says the song copies key parts like the note patterns, rhythm, and the main essence of Shiva Stuti, even if shifted to a different key. He wrote a letter  to A.R. Rahman and the director Mani Ratnam about this, saying it broke the moral rights of the Junior Dagar Brothers and his copyright.  Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar sent a legal notice by email. Madras Talkies replied  denying all claims.

Procedural Details:Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar filed a lawsuit in the Delhi High Court, case number CS (COMM) 773 of 2023, asking for a permanent order to stop the use of Shiva Stuti without credit to the Junior Dagar Brothers and without his permission, plus damages and account of profits. Along with the suit, he filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for temporary relief during the case. 

The single judge of the Delhi High Court, in judgment , partly allowed the temporary application. The judge ordered changing the song credits to name the Junior Dagar Brothers, made A.R. Rahman, Madras Talkies, and Lyca Productions deposit two crore rupees in court until the trial ends, and pay two lakh rupees in costs to Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar. A.R. Rahman appealed this.

Dispute:The main fight is about whether Shiva Stuti is an original music piece that Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar owns the copyright to, and if A.R. Rahman and others broke that copyright by using it in Veera Raja Veera without proper credit or permission. Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar says the Junior Dagar Brothers made it in the 1970s as a joint work, and he got the rights through a family deal. He claims the song copies protected parts like the special note sequences and rhythm, hurting the moral rights to be named as authors and his economic rights. A.R. Rahman says it's a traditional Dhrupad piece passed down orally, in the public domain, with no proof the brothers created it. He argues the shared parts are common to Raag Adana and not original enough for protection. The dispute also covers if the single judge was right to give temporary relief based on the evidence, or if he wrongly put the burden on the defendants to disprove ownership.

Reasoning :The division bench looked closely at two big questions: first, if the Junior Dagar Brothers were the authors of Shiva Stuti, and second, if it was original enough for copyright. On authorship, the court said under Section 2(d) of the Copyright Act, 1957, an author is the person who makes the work. Section 17 says the author is the first owner unless there's an agreement otherwise. The court noted that for music, authorship means creating the notes and structure, not just performing it. 

They discussed Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, where the Supreme Court said originality needs skill and judgment, not just hard work, and authorship must be proven. In that case, the court said copying court judgments with small changes isn't original enough for copyright. Applying this, the bench said Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar's evidence,  and inlay card, only shows the brothers performed Shiva Stuti, not that they made it. The card lists them as performers, not composers. The family letter from 2023 and diary are weak because they're recent and not direct proof from the 1970s. The 1995 agreement with PAN Records is about publishing rights for the recording, not composing. The bench said the single judge wrongly assumed authorship because there was no contrary proof, shifting the burden wrongly. They cited Section 55(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which presumes the name on published copies is the author, but here no copies name the brothers as composers. 

They discussed R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, where the Supreme Court said no copyright in ideas, themes, or historical facts, only in how they're expressed, and similarities must be substantial. Here, the bench said common Raag elements aren't protectable. On originality, the court said under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, copyright is for original musical works. From Eastern Book Company again, originality means independent skill, judgment, and some creativity, more than just sweat of the brow. The bench said the single judge didn't properly check if Shiva Stuti added enough new to Raag Adana to be original. 

Decision:The bench said the single judge didn't do this filtration and wrongly found originality just because no contrary evidence. They cited Wander Ltd v. Antox India Pvt Ltd, , on when to give temporary relief: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. Here, no prima facie case for authorship or originality. Also, Pernod Ricard (P) Ltd v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, , on interim orders. The bench discussed State of Maharashtra v. M.N. Kaul, , saying presumptions come from facts, not other presumptions. Here, presuming authorship from performance is wrong. They mentioned Hazi Mohammad Ekramul Haq v. State of W.B.,  on expert evidence, but said the single judge used his own music knowledge without experts, which was okay if not challenged well, but here the conclusions were wrong. Overall, the bench said the single judge's reasoning had errors, like mixing performance with authorship and not proving originality properly. The division bench allowed the appeal, set aside the single judge's order of April 25, 2025, and said Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar didn't show a strong enough starting case for authorship or originality. They clarified this is only for the temporary stage, and the full trial can decide the merits. 

Case Title:Mr. AR Rahman Vs. Ustaf Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar and Ors

Order date: 24.09.2025

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 86/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8522

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte. Ltd. Vs. Syed Jawed Mohsin

Phonetic and Visual Similarity in Trademark rectification

Facts:Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte. Ltd., part of the globally known Danone Group, has a long history in the nutrition sector dating back to 1896. One of its most recognized products in India is PROTINEX, a nutritional protein supplement brand introduced in 1957. Over time, the ownership of this brand changed hands. It was first registered by Dumex Pvt. Ltd., later acquired by Pfizer Group in 1972, then taken over by Wockhardt Group in 2006, and finally assigned to the Danone Group through a deed of assignment. Along with the trademark, Danone also acquired the goodwill, associated intellectual property, and trade dress rights.

In September 2024, Danone discovered a product named PROTIFIX being marketed online through Alvo Life Science’s website and various e-commerce platforms. Subsequent investigation revealed that the product was being manufactured at the premises of Zyrath Health Care Pvt. Ltd. under the trademark “PROTIFIX.” The mark “PROTIFIX” was registered in Class 5 under Trademark No. 3592264.

Danone contended that “PROTIFIX” was deceptively similar to its well-known registered trademark “PROTINEX” and that the packaging and trade dress were also strikingly alike, creating confusion in the minds of consumers. The petition for rectification of the impugned mark was filed on the grounds of non-use and deceptive similarity.

The respondents argued that the petitioner could not claim exclusivity over the prefix “Proti” as it was common to the trade, and several companies in the nutrition market used it. They also claimed differences in the color scheme and layout of the packaging, asserting that no confusion would arise.

Procedural Background: Danone filed this rectification application before the Calcutta High Court under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the respondent’s mark.

Earlier, in December 2024, Danone had filed a separate infringement suit in the Delhi High Court against the respondents and other parties. The Delhi court granted an interim injunction against some defendants, and the suit was amicably resolved with defendants 1 to 7. However, with respect to defendants 8 to 10, which included the present respondent, the suit was still pending and contested.

In the present rectification proceedings, the court examined whether the registration of “PROTIFIX” was liable to be removed from the Trade Marks Register.

The Core Dispute: The dispute revolved around two connected questions. First, whether the mark “PROTIFIX” had been genuinely used by the respondent, since non-use for a continuous period of five years and three months makes a registered mark vulnerable to cancellation under Section 47(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Second, whether the mark was deceptively similar to Danone’s “PROTINEX” in a way that was likely to cause confusion among consumers, thereby violating Sections 29 and 57 of the Act.

Detailed Judicial Reasoning: On the issue of non-use, the court found that the respondents failed to produce credible proof showing actual and genuine use of the mark “PROTIFIX.” The invoices and licenses relied upon did not clearly establish that the respondent was trading under the impugned mark. Rather, the documents suggested that a third party, Jay Bharat Pharmaceuticals, was involved in the sale of the product. The court referred to Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 92, where it was held that unless non-use is justified by special circumstances, the mark is liable to be removed.

On the issue of inconsistent statements, the court highlighted contradictions in the respondent’s affidavit filed before the Calcutta High Court and the written statement filed before the Delhi High Court. While in one proceeding the respondent claimed personal use through Jay Bharat Pharmaceuticals, in the other proceeding they argued that different defendants independently adopted the mark in good faith. This inconsistency undermined their credibility and showed lack of bona fides.

On the issue of deceptive similarity, the court noted that when the two products—PROTINEX and PROTIFIX—were compared side by side, the similarities were obvious. The essential portion of the petitioner’s mark “PROTI” had been carried over, and the slight variation in the suffix “NEX” and “FIX” was not enough to prevent confusion.

The court relied on several landmark cases. In Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. and Co., Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618, the Supreme Court had observed that the test of deceptive similarity must be applied from the perspective of an ordinary purchaser, who does not have the sharp observation of Sherlock Holmes. In Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449, the court emphasized that resemblance must be judged on overall similarity in sight, sound, and impression, keeping in mind the nature of the goods and the consumers.

The court also referred to Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 11, where it was held that the presence of similar prefixes or suffixes in the market does not automatically negate confusion unless extensive evidence of common use is shown. In the present case, the respondents failed to produce evidence of widespread use of the prefix “Proti” by other traders.

Similarly, in Fedders Lloyd Corporation Ltd. v. Fedders Corporation, ILR (2005) 1 Delhi 478, the Delhi High Court reiterated that marks must be compared as a whole, not dissected into parts. Applying this principle, Justice Kapur held that the overall impression of “PROTIFIX” was confusingly similar to “PROTINEX.”

The court further noted that the trade dress, including color combination and packaging style, was also deceptively similar, increasing the likelihood of consumer confusion. Since both products were in the same category of goods—nutritional protein supplements—the likelihood of deception was very high.

Final Decision:  The Calcutta High Court concluded that the registration of “PROTIFIX” was wrongful. It held that the mark was not genuinely used by the respondent, and even otherwise, it was deceptively similar to Danone’s well-known mark “PROTINEX.” The adoption of the mark was found to be dishonest and in bad faith.The court directed that the registration of “PROTIFIX” under Trademark No. 3592264 in Class 5 be cancelled and removed from the Register of Trade Marks. The rectification petition was thus allowed in favour of Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte. Ltd.

Case Title: Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte. Ltd. Vs. Syed Jawed Mohsin & Another

Case Number:IPDATM/5/2024

Date of Order:24 September 2025

Court:High Court at Calcutta

Hon’ble Judge:Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nokia Technologies Oy Vs. Asustek Computer Inc.

Judicial Approach to Confidentiality club in Patent Suits

Facts: Nokia Technologies Oy (Plaintiff) initiated three connected suits against Asustek Computer Inc, Acer Inc, and Hisense Group Holdings, alleging infringement of two patents, IN 424507 and IN 338105. The defendants manufacture electronic products and were accused of using Nokia's patented technology without authorization. To substantiate its claims and to comply with court procedure, Nokia also proposed to file comparable licensing agreements signed with third parties, many containing sensitive commercial information.

Procedural Detail: The core dispute in these suits related to the creation and functioning of a “Confidentiality Club” to safeguard the confidential nature of licensing agreements Nokia wished to file. Nokia applied under Rule 11 of the Delhi High Court Rules Governing Patent Suits, 2022, read with Chapter VII, Rule 17 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The application argued for ten conditions for such a club, but significant opposition developed regarding four key conditions: who should be members (specifically, whether in-house representatives of the defendants could be included), redaction of confidential information before sharing, and rules around disclosure and access.

Dispute: Nokia requested that only external counsels, consultants, and experts (not in-house employees of the defendants) be part of the Confidentiality Club. The rationale was protecting not just Nokia’s confidential information but also those of its licensees who may be commercial competitors to the defendants. Nokia allowed that in-house representatives could participate, but only under a “limited-licensing restriction”: for two years, those who accessed particular agreements could not negotiate with the relevant third party unless that party specifically consented. This mirrored certain international practices, especially under the Unified Patent Court, Munich.

Defendants objected, stating that such restrictions were arbitrary and omitted under both Indian procedural rules and in past practice. It was argued that restricting key personnel risks prejudice and competitive disadvantage, particularly when the pool of employees dealing with licensing was small. Defendants also contended that the order cited by Nokia was a “consent order” and did not set binding precedent. They further argued that confidentiality could be maintained without such limitations and pointed out that in similar past cases, defendants themselves chose their in-house representatives.

Detailed Reasoning: The court noticed that the inclusion of defendants’ in-house representatives within a Confidentiality Club has been settled by previous judgments (InterDigital vs. Xiaomi, 2020:DHC:3598; InterDigital VC Holdings Inc v. Oppo Mobile, 2024:DHC:1338; Nokia Technology Oy v. Lenovo Group Ltd, order dated 24.02.2020). Courts routinely permit in-house representatives as members in SEP (Standard Essential Patent) suits when confidentiality concerns are properly safeguarded. The judge noted that parties were already following similar practices in parallel proceedings abroad, and trying to impose additional restrictions in India, inconsistent with positions taken elsewhere, was not justified.

On the proposal to limit licensing activities (the “two-year embargo”), the court held that such restriction was neither practical nor warranted. Instead, the court imposed an obligation for full and prior disclosure: if an in-house representative was privy to a licensing agreement in the capacity of the Confidentiality Club, they must disclose this to any third-party licensee before negotiating. Thereafter, negotiation is possible only at the licensee’s discretion. This balanced transparency and protected licensees without inactivity or prejudice to the defendants.

Regarding the redaction of confidential material, the court followed the precedent from InterDigital v. Xiaomi and Koninklijke Philips v. Vivo Mobile (2020:DHC:3598; 2023 order). Redaction is permitted only for genuinely confidential details agreed to remain undisclosed between Nokia and its licensees, and only if such information is not relevant to determining royalty rates (FRAND terms—Fair, Reasonable & Non-Discriminatory). Non-redacted versions of documents should be available for inspection by the counsels within the Confidentiality Club, but not by in-house representatives, unless directed otherwise by the court.

Decision: The court issued clear directions: Confidentiality Club is to have the same in-house representatives as those already members in Munich proceedings, ensuring consistency and avoiding unnecessary dissemination of confidential data.  The proposed two-year licensing restriction on in-house representatives is not accepted; rather, full and prior disclosure obligations are imposed. Redaction of information is permitted, but only for data confidential by agreement and irrelevant to FRAND assessment, with inspection rights limited for in-house representatives. Nokia must disclose all comparable licence agreements without discretion, ensuring fairness in evaluating licensing terms (FRAND compliance). Other proposed conditions not objected to (such as process for sealed covers, affidavits, experts, etc.) were accepted. The applications are disposed with these terms, and the connected matters are listed for further court orders.

Case Title: Nokia Technologies Oy Vs. Asustek Computer Inc & Ors.

Order Date: 22nd September, 2025

Case Numbers: CSCOMM 643/2025, 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8511

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pankaj Plastic Industries Private Limited Vs Anita Anu

Case Title

Pankaj Plastic Industries Private Limited Vs Anita Anu

Case Number

APDT/16/2025 with IP-COM/28/2024 and IA NO: GA-COM/1/2025

Neutral Citation

2025:CALHC:APDT:16 (As per format of neutral citations, reflecting the year, Court, and appeal number)

Court

High Court at Calcutta, Commercial Appellate Division, Original Side

Bench

Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee

Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

Date of Decision

24 September 2025

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Facts

Pankaj Plastic Industries Private Limited, the appellant, is a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of plastic pipes, machines, and related tools. Over the years, it has registered and used several trademarks such as “Pankaj Flex,” “Pankaj Flexy,” and “Pankaj.” The company also secured copyright registration for its artistic packaging and trade dress.

The respondent, Anita Anu, started marketing and selling similar products under the trademark “Poly-Punkaj.” According to the appellant, this mark was deceptively similar to their registered marks and likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers. The appellant also alleged that the respondent copied the artistic trade dress, including color combinations and packaging.

The respondent’s mark “Poly-Punkaj” was registered in December 2023. Soon after, the appellant filed for rectification in January 2024 to remove the respondent’s mark from the Trade Marks Register.

The appellant filed a commercial suit in September 2024 before the Calcutta High Court, seeking injunction against the respondent for infringement and passing off. Along with the suit, the appellant requested the court to dispense with pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, arguing that urgent relief was necessary and mediation would be futile.

Initially, the Single Judge granted this dispensation, accepted the suit, and even passed an ex parte ad interim injunction in October 2024 restraining the respondent from using the mark “Poly-Punkaj.” However, the respondent later filed an application seeking revocation of the leave granted under Section 12A. The Single Judge allowed this plea, dismissed the suit, and vacated the injunction in May 2025.

The present appeal arose from that dismissal.

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Procedural Background

1. In September 2024, the Single Judge granted leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, Order II Rule 2 CPC, and dispensed with pre-suit mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.

2. In October 2024, an ex parte ad interim injunction was granted restraining the respondent from using the impugned mark “Poly-Punkaj.”

3. In May 2025, on an application by the respondent, the Single Judge revoked the earlier leave under Section 12A, dismissed the suit, and vacated the injunction.

4. The appellant challenged this May 2025 order before the Division Bench.

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The Core Dispute

The central dispute was not about trademark infringement itself, but about whether the appellant was entitled to bypass the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The appellant argued that because intellectual property matters involve urgent interim relief, mediation should not be required. The respondent, however, argued that since the appellant had knowledge of the alleged infringement as early as January 2024 but filed the suit only in September 2024, there was no urgency, and thus Section 12A could not be dispensed with.

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Detailed Reasoning and Judicial Discussion

Appellant’s Arguments

The appellant, through Senior Counsel Debnath Ghosh, argued that:

Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act has an exception where urgent interim relief is required. Intellectual property cases, by their very nature, involve urgent intervention since even one infringing act causes irreparable harm. Reliance was placed on Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd., MANU/TL/1081/2024 (DB).

Every act of infringement or passing off is a continuing wrong and gives rise to a fresh cause of action, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co., (1997) 1 SCC 99.

Delay in filing the suit should not automatically mean that urgency is absent. Courts in several cases, such as Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Chemco Plast, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1607, granted urgent interim relief even after several years of delay.

Courts must take a holistic approach rather than looking only at time gaps, as emphasized in Unique Entrepreneurs and Finance Ltd. v. Really Agritech Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 2426.

The appellant’s perception of urgency should be respected, and the court should not second-guess it.

Respondent’s Arguments

The respondent, represented by Advocate Soumya Ray Chowdhury, argued that:

Section 12A is mandatory, as held by the Supreme Court in Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1.

The appellant admittedly became aware of the respondent’s registration in January 2024 but filed the suit only in September 2024, a gap of nine months. This delay itself showed that there was no real urgency.

In SRMB Srijan Pvt. Ltd. v. B.S. Sponge Pvt. Ltd., MANU/WB/1666/2023, the Calcutta High Court had refused dispensation of Section 12A where plaintiffs delayed in filing. That decision was later upheld by a Division Bench.

The appellant’s argument that mediation would be futile cannot justify bypassing Section 12A. Otherwise, every plaintiff could escape mediation by merely alleging futility.

Courts cannot go beyond the pleadings. The plaint did not clearly explain why urgent relief was required after such delay.

Division Bench’s Analysis

The Division Bench carefully analyzed both positions. It emphasized that:

Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is a statutory mandate, and its purpose is to encourage mediation and reduce unnecessary litigation burdens.

Exceptions for urgent relief must be applied strictly. Otherwise, the provision would become meaningless. Reliance was placed on Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 for the principle that courts cannot interpret statutes in a way that makes provisions nugatory.

The Supreme Court in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815 had warned that urgency cannot be artificially created to bypass Section 12A.

While it is true that infringement gives recurring cause of action, this cannot automatically mean that urgency exists. Plaintiffs must act with diligence.

In this case, the appellant waited nine months after acquiring knowledge. The plaint gave no proper explanation for this delay, except claiming that mediation would be an idle formality. The court held that this argument cannot be accepted because it would allow every plaintiff to sidestep Section 12A.

The court observed that the appellant’s conduct showed no real urgency, and thus the Single Judge was correct in revoking the earlier dispensation.

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Final Decision

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Single Judge. It held that:

1. The dispensation under Section 12A was wrongly granted and rightly revoked.

2. The suit stood dismissed, not on merits, but only because of non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

3. The appellant is free to file a fresh suit after following the statutory requirement of pre-institution mediation.

No order as to costs was passed. The court also clarified that the appellant may apply for refund of court fees if it decides to file a fresh suit.

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Pre-Suit Mediation under Section 12A: Calcutta High Court Reinforces the Mandate in Pankaj Plastic v. Anita Anu

2. Trademark Disputes and Section 12A: When Delay Defeats Urgency

3. Urgency and Mediation: A Study of Calcutta High Court’s Ruling in Pankaj Plastic v. Anita Anu

4. Dispensation of Section 12A in IP Disputes: Limits and Judicial Scrutiny

5. Balancing Urgency with Statutory Mandate: Lessons from Pankaj Plastic Industries v. Anita Anu

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Disclaimer

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi