Suparshva Swabs India Vs. AGN International

Case Title: Suparshva Swabs India Vs. AGN International & Ors.

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 253/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:253

Order Date: 03.11.2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arose out of a conflict between two entities engaged in manufacturing and marketing consumer goods, primarily involving the use of the word “TULIP” as a trademark. The appellant, Suparshva Swabs India, is a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing cotton buds, cotton balls, and allied products since 1999. The firm claimed that it had coined, adopted, and used the trademark “TULIPS” (word and device) continuously since that year and had obtained registrations under various classes of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. According to the appellant, the mark “TULIPS” had, over time, acquired substantial goodwill and reputation, not just in India but also abroad, and had attained a distinctive association with its hygiene products.

On the other hand, the respondent, AGN International, is a firm engaged in the business of perfumes and cosmetic products. It had registered the trademark “AGN TULIP” in 2010 in Class 3 under a “proposed to be used” application, claiming that its goods, namely perfumes and sprays, were unrelated to the appellant’s products. The appellant alleged that the respondents had dishonestly and fraudulently adopted a deceptively similar mark to trade upon its reputation and confuse consumers.

In 2021, Suparshva Swabs discovered that AGN International was marketing perfumes under the name “AGN TULIP”. Believing that the impugned mark infringed its “TULIPS” trademark and amounted to passing off, the appellant filed a suit before the Commercial Court, South, Saket, New Delhi, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain AGN International from using the word “TULIP” in any form for perfumes, cosmetics, or related goods.

The plaintiff also filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking a temporary injunction pending trial. The trial court dismissed this application on 03.10.2023, holding that no prima facie case was made out. The appellant challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

PROCEDURAL DETAILS

Before the District Judge, Suparshva Swabs claimed that its trademark “TULIPS” was arbitrary, coined, and distinctive. It argued that the mark was registered in several classes, including Class 3 (cosmetics), and that it had long-standing use since 1999, with significant advertising and international recognition. The plaintiff asserted that AGN International’s use of “AGN TULIP” for perfumes was deceptively similar, given that the dominant portion of the respondent’s mark was the word “TULIP,” used prominently while “AGN” appeared merely as a prefix.

The defendants opposed the injunction, contending that “TULIP” is a generic term associated with fragrances and floral products. They asserted that their mark “AGN TULIP” was duly registered and that their goods — perfumes and sprays — were entirely different in nature and market segment from the plaintiff’s cotton buds and swabs. They further argued that the plaintiff had no exclusive right over a common word like “TULIP,” which naturally described the floral fragrance of their goods.

The District Judge, after hearing both sides, held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or show irreparable harm. The court found that “TULIP” is a generic term for perfumes and that the goods were dissimilar. The judge observed that perfumes, being fragrant floral products, naturally associate with flowers such as tulips and roses. Hence, “TULIP” could not be monopolized by one trader for all categories of goods. The plaintiff’s plea for interim injunction was thus rejected.

Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the present appeal before the Delhi High Court.

CORE DISPUTE

The principal question before the High Court was whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The core issue revolved around whether the appellant’s mark “TULIPS” enjoyed such reputation and goodwill that it extended to the respondents’ category of perfumes, making their use of “AGN TULIP” likely to cause confusion or deception in the minds of consumers.

The dispute also required the Court to determine whether “TULIP” was a generic or descriptive term in relation to perfumes and fragrances, and whether the appellant’s prior use since 1999 conferred upon it rights superior to the respondents’ later registration from 2010.

LEGAL REASONING AND JUDICIAL ANALYSIS

The High Court began by reaffirming that when both parties hold trademark registrations, no action for infringement can lie between them. The only available remedy is passing off, as explained by the Supreme Court in S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683. Therefore, the question before the Court was confined to whether the appellant had established goodwill and reputation in “TULIPS” sufficient to sustain a passing off action against “AGN TULIP.”

The Court then examined the three essential elements of passing off laid down in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65 — goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The judges emphasized that goodwill must be established in the specific market or line of trade in which the alleged misrepresentation occurs. They further referred to Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 73 PTC 1 (SC), where it was held that goodwill cannot be presumed merely from global reputation; it must exist in India and within the relevant segment of trade.

Applying these principles, the Court found that while Suparshva Swabs had substantial goodwill in relation to cotton buds, cotton balls, and hygiene products, it had not demonstrated that this goodwill extended to perfumes or fragrances before the respondents’ adoption in 2010. The evidence produced, including invoices, advertisements, and awards, showed recognition in hygiene products, but not in cosmetics or perfumery. Thus, the element of goodwill within the relevant trade segment was not satisfied.

The Court also evaluated whether “TULIP” was capable of exclusive protection. It noted that while “TULIP” might be arbitrary in connection with cotton products, it is descriptive or generic when used for perfumes, as tulips are flowers naturally associated with fragrance. Citing Nestle’s Products (India) Ltd. v. P. Thankaraja, 1977 SCC OnLine Mad 72, and Jain Riceland (P) Ltd. v. Sagar Overseas, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11305, the Court reiterated that generic words cannot be monopolized by traders for ordinary use. Hence, the plaintiff could not prevent others from using a floral name for perfumes.

The Court further discussed the claim that “TULIPS” was a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg) and Section 11(6) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It observed that for a mark to achieve “well-known” status, it must be widely recognized by the general public beyond its product class. Relying on Mahindra & Mahindra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 147, the judges noted that while “Mahindra” immediately evokes the automobile company, “TULIP” does not trigger an immediate association with Suparshva Swabs in the minds of consumers. The recognition of “TULIPS” was confined to a specific market segment of hygiene products, not perfumes or cosmetics.

On the issue of prior use, the Court reaffirmed that though prior use prevails over registration, it must be shown within the relevant trade context. The plaintiff’s use since 1999 in hygiene products did not automatically extend to perfumes. The Court found no evidence of consumer confusion or overlap in product identity sufficient to warrant protection across categories.

The High Court also referred to Wipro Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. Himalaya Wellness Co., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6859, which reiterated that the test of “allied and cognate goods” depends on consumer perception, not mere retail proximity. The Court concluded that even though hygiene products and perfumes might appear in similar retail spaces, they cater to different consumer needs and associations.

Finally, the Court upheld the trial court’s view that “TULIP” was generic in the context of perfumes and that no irreparable injury or confusion was demonstrated. The balance of convenience lay with the respondents, who were using a registered mark within their trade domain.

FINAL DECISION

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the District Judge’s order dated 03.10.2023. It held that the appellant failed to establish the essential elements of passing off — particularly, goodwill in the relevant trade and likelihood of deception. The Court clarified that procedural fairness and trademark protection cannot extend to monopolizing common or descriptive words, especially those naturally connected to the goods in question. The Court concluded that both parties, being registered proprietors in their respective domains, must coexist without encroaching upon each other’s legitimate business rights.

The Court’s closing observation emphasized that the word “TULIP,” while distinctive in connection with hygiene products, cannot be treated as a proprietary or well-known mark across unrelated product categories such as perfumes. Hence, the injunction sought by the appellant was rightly denied, and the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Suggested Titles for Publication

“Floral Words and Trademark Boundaries: The Tulip Trademark Battle”

“Generic Terms and Trademark Rights: Lessons from Suparshva Swabs v. AGN International”

“When Tulips Lose Their Fragrance: A Study on Genericness and Passing Off”

“Trademark Protection Beyond Product Lines: The Delhi High Court’s Tulip Ruling”

“Balancing Prior Use and Genericness: Revisiting the Limits of Trademark Monopoly”

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ankit Batra Vs Ravinder Kumar

Case Title: Sh. Ankit Batra, Proprietor of M/s KD Industries v. Ravinder Kumar & Anr.

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 253/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____

Date of Order: 16 October 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Factual Background

This case centers around a trademark dispute in the Indian spices industry, where the petitioner, Mr. Ankit Batra, proprietor of M/s KD Industries, sought rectification and cancellation of the registered trademark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ owned by respondent Mr. Ravinder Kumar. The conflict arose over the use of the letters “KD”, which the petitioner claimed as the core part of his brand identity.

The petitioner’s case was founded on long-standing use, reputation, and prior adoption of the trademark ‘KD’ and its label ‘KD Masale’. The petitioner asserted that his firm, M/s KD Industries, had been using the mark ‘KD’ since 2003 in connection with manufacturing and selling spices and blended condiments. The mark had become widely recognized in both domestic and international markets, with sales and exports extending to countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

The petitioner claimed that the rights in the trademark ‘KD’ were originally held by his predecessor in business, who had assigned those rights to him through a valid Assignment Deed dated 16 February 2022. Thus, by operation of both statutory and common law principles, he was the lawful proprietor and user of the trademark.

According to the petitioner, the respondent dishonestly and with mala fide intent adopted a deceptively similar mark, ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’, under Application No. 4923053 in Class 30, which covers spices and similar goods. The petitioner argued that this imitation was deliberate and intended to exploit his established goodwill and reputation, thereby deceiving consumers and diluting the distinctiveness of his mark.

The petitioner supported his claim with evidence including invoices dating back to 2013, packaging, promotional materials, and online listings showing consistent and extensive use of the ‘KD’ mark and label for over two decades.

Procedural Background

The petitioner approached the High Court under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation and rectification of the respondent’s registered trademark on grounds of dishonest adoption and likelihood of confusion. Alongside the main petition, he filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking a stay on the operation of the respondent’s registration during the pendency of the rectification proceedings.

The petition also included an application requesting the Court to summon the complete record of the impugned registration from the office of the Registrar of Trade Marks to facilitate fair adjudication.

Upon hearing the matter, Hon’ble Justice Tejas Karia issued notice to both respondents — Mr. Ravinder Kumar (the private respondent) and the Registrar of Trade Marks (as the statutory respondent). The Central Government Standing Counsel accepted notice on behalf of the Registrar.

The respondent was directed to file a reply within four weeks, and the petitioner was allowed to file a rejoinder thereafter. Meanwhile, the Court proceeded to examine the petitioner’s interim application for a stay on the respondent’s mark.

Core Legal Dispute

The principal issue before the Court was whether the registration of the respondent’s trademark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ was valid and bona fide or whether it constituted an infringement upon the petitioner’s prior rights in the mark ‘KD’.

The case also raised critical questions of trademark law such as:

Whether the respondent’s adoption of the impugned mark was honest or tainted by mala fide intent;

Whether the impugned mark was deceptively similar to the petitioner’s registered and prior-used mark;

Whether continued operation of the respondent’s registration would cause confusion and prejudice to the petitioner’s business;

Whether the Registrar’s decision to register the mark contravened Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner

Counsel for the petitioner argued that his client was the lawful proprietor of the trademark ‘KD’, being the assignee of the original registration (No. 1446270 in Class 30). The mark, they submitted, had been continuously and extensively used since 2003 and had acquired a strong reputation and distinctiveness in the market.

The petitioner’s mark ‘KD’ formed the dominant and essential feature of his packaging, labeling, and brand presentation under ‘KD Masale’. Because the respondent’s mark, ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’, prominently reproduced the same element ‘KD’ in identical font and structure, it was bound to create confusion among consumers.

It was also pointed out that the respondent’s application was filed in 2021, almost two decades after the petitioner’s adoption of the mark, and that it was made on a “proposed to be used” basis, demonstrating the absence of prior use. The petitioner alleged that the respondent’s adoption was not innocent but intentionally designed to mislead consumers and unfairly benefit from the goodwill of the ‘KD’ brand.

Citing Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, counsel argued that registration of the impugned mark was in direct violation of statutory provisions, as it was both deceptive and confusingly similar to an existing registered mark. They further contended that balance of convenience and equity lay in favor of the petitioner since continued use of the impugned mark would irreparably harm his reputation and mislead the public.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents

The respondent’s counsel was yet to file a formal written reply, but during oral submissions, the government counsel representing the Registrar accepted notice and agreed to furnish the complete record of the registration in question. The respondent’s position, as recorded, was that the petition would be contested, though no concrete rebuttal on merits was placed on record at this interim stage.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Tejas Karia began by examining the petitioner’s claim of prior use and continuous business reputation. The Court noted that the petitioner had produced ample evidence of use of the mark ‘KD’ since 2003, supported by documentary proof such as invoices, packaging labels, and promotional materials. The petitioner’s business, it was observed, was not limited to domestic operations but had extended internationally, thereby adding weight to his claim of distinctiveness and goodwill.

The Court further observed that the impugned mark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ reproduced the essential and dominant part of the petitioner’s mark — the letters ‘KD’. This similarity, both visually and phonetically, was likely to cause confusion among consumers in the same line of trade, especially because both parties operated in the same market segment (spices under Class 30).

The Court also considered the statutory framework under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 9(2)(a) prohibits registration of marks that are likely to deceive or cause confusion, while Section 11 mandates refusal of registration if the mark is identical or deceptively similar to an earlier registered mark in respect of similar goods or services.

On this basis, the Court found that the respondent’s registration appeared prima facie to violate these provisions. The respondent’s mark was a subsequent adoption made in bad faith and lacked originality. The Court held that the balance of convenience was clearly in favor of the petitioner, as the potential for confusion in the marketplace was undeniable.

Justice Karia also observed that the petitioner had established both statutory rights (through registration and assignment) and common law rights (through long and continuous use), entitling him to protection even independent of registration. Allowing the respondent’s registration to remain in effect during pendency of the rectification petition would, therefore, cause irreparable harm to the petitioner and mislead the public.

In light of these findings, the Court exercised its equitable powers under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to grant interim relief.

Decision

The Court held that the petitioner had made out a strong prima facie case for protection of his mark and for suspension of the respondent’s registration. It observed that the impugned mark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ incorporated the petitioner’s dominant feature ‘KD’ and was likely to deceive the public and trade.

Consequently, the High Court of Delhi ordered that the operation and effect of the registration of the impugned mark (Application No. 4923053 in Class 30) be stayed until the next date of hearing. The Court concluded that the respondent’s registration was prima facie in violation of Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The matter was adjourned to 10 February 2026 for further hearing, and both parties were directed to complete their pleadings within stipulated timelines.

Conclusion

This case highlights how courts protect prior and bona fide trademark owners from deceptive and opportunistic registrations that attempt to capitalize on existing goodwill. The judgment also reinforces the dual protection afforded under Indian trademark law — both statutory and common law — and emphasizes the importance of continuous, consistent use in establishing proprietorship.

The Court’s reasoning affirms the principle that in matters of trademark disputes, the dominant feature test, likelihood of confusion, and intent of adoption are crucial determinants of judicial protection. The stay granted here safeguards both commercial integrity and consumer interest until a final determination is made.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Prior User Prevails: Delhi High Court Protects KD Masale in Trademark Dispute

2. Goodwill vs. Imitation: An Analysis of Ankit Batra v. Ravinder Kumar (KD Masale Case)

3. Trademark Protection Through Prior Use: Lessons from the KD Masale Litigation

4. When Similarity Breeds Confusion: Delhi High Court on Deceptive Marks under the Trade Marks Act

5. Safeguarding Brand Identity: Interim Protection for KD Masale Against Copycat Trademark

Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of Karnataka

Private complaint in non-compliance of Section 155(3) of Cr.P.C. is not maintainable

Factual Background: This case arose from a conflict between M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioners) and Mr. Ashish Koruth Philip (the complainant), concerning ownership and control over an online domain name — routesrezworld.com — and allegations of cyber fraud and data misuse.

The complainant, Mr. Philip, claimed that he personally purchased and registered the domain routesrezworld.com through GoDaddy.com on 28th October 2019, using his own HDFC Bank account, for a payment of ₹400.85. He alleged that the domain was never part of any intellectual property transfer agreement with the petitioners, as the agreements between the parties dated 7th February 2019 were executed before this domain even existed.

He further claimed that the petitioners later attempted to forcibly take control of his domain by changing passwords and credentials, misusing customer credit card data without authorization, and fraudulently operating the website for profit. The complainant alleged that this conduct violated PCI (Payment Card Industry) regulations and amounted to cybercrime.

On the other hand, the petitioners — a company engaged in technological and software services — contended that routesrezworld.com was, in fact, their lawful business asset, transferred to them under an Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement (IPR Agreement) and Service Bond Agreement executed between Mr. Philip’s former firm, StraightDrive Softlab LLP, and the petitioners. They asserted that the complainant’s claim was false and had already been settled through arbitration proceedings, where his rights over the disputed domain were conclusively determined.

Procedural Background:Following the complainant’s allegations, a First Information Report (FIR) dated 3rd May 2025 was registered by Surya Nagar Police Station, Bangalore, bearing Crime No. 0185/2025. The offences invoked included Sections 66, 66C, 66D, 84C, and 85 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with several provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, including Sections 3(5), 308, 314, 316, 318, 319, 323, 351, 353, 45, and 61(2).

The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, approached the High Court of Karnataka under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), seeking to quash the FIR on grounds that the dispute was purely civil and commercial, not criminal in nature. They argued that the matter had already been adjudicated in arbitration, where the complainant’s claim was rejected, and thus, the continuation of criminal proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law.

Core Dispute:The central question before the Court was whether the FIR and criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners amounted to misuse of criminal law to re-litigate a commercial dispute that had already been conclusively decided in arbitration.

Closely tied to this was the question of ownership over the domain routesrezworld.com: whether it belonged personally to Mr. Philip or was part of the intellectual property assets acquired by M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. under the IPR Agreement.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners: The petitioners argued that the complaint was baseless, malicious, and filed to harass them after losing in arbitration. They produced documents such as the Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement and Service Bond Agreement dated 7th February 2019, which explicitly transferred all technological assets, software programs, and related intellectual property from the complainant’s former firm to the petitioners.

They relied heavily on the arbitration award, which had already restrained the complainant from using or interfering with the domain name routesrezworld.com and the associated trademark Caledonrez. This award had attained finality, and thus, the issue was no longer open to criminal proceedings.

The petitioners also presented email communications from November 2019 and January 2020, showing that the complainant himself had acknowledged the domain as belonging to the company and had sought permission from the company’s directors regarding its use. They further contended that although the initial domain payment was made by the complainant, the company had later reimbursed him, and therefore the domain was purchased for business, not personal use.

They also raised a procedural challenge under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, arguing that the private complaint was invalid because the complainant failed to comply with Section 173(1) and (4) of the BNSS, which require prior intimation to the Superintendent of Police before filing a private complaint. Lodging a report on the cybercrime online portal, they argued, did not satisfy this legal requirement, since the portal was not recognized as a “police officer” or “police station” under the law.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent (Complainant): The complainant, argued that the domain was personally purchased by Mr. Philip in October 2019 and therefore was not part of the earlier IPR transfer. She emphasized that the payment for the domain and its four-year renewal was made entirely from his personal HDFC account, and documentary evidence of such transactions was submitted.

She contended that the company later hacked into his GoDaddy account, altered credentials, and gained unauthorized control over the domain, thereby committing offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Regarding the procedural objections, she submitted that the filing of a complaint through the cybercrime portal constituted substantial compliance with the requirement of reporting to police under Section 155(3) CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS). Reliance was placed on Supreme Court rulings in S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka (2025 INSC 917) and Siddartha v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1044-46/2022), where the Court recognized flexibility in procedural compliance when substantial justice required it.

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning: The court examined the Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement (IPR Agreement) between the parties. Clause 8(a) of the Agreement made it clear that all intellectual property, including software programs, web interfaces, and related technological developments, vested solely in the purchaser — M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. The clause explicitly prohibited the creator (Mr. Philip) from holding or using any copies of source codes or related data, and Clause 8(b) obligated him to execute further documents to give full effect to this transfer.

The Court concluded that, by this clause alone, the ownership of all intellectual property — including domains developed for the company’s business — rested with the petitioner company.

Next, the Court turned to the arbitral award, which had directly addressed the issue of domain ownership. Paragraph 66 of the arbitral award categorically stated that the complainant (Mr. Philip) was restrained from interfering with the domain routesrezworld.com and the trademark Caledonrez, both of which were declared to be the exclusive property of the petitioner company. The arbitrator had also prohibited the complainant from engaging in competing business activities or operating similar websites.

Based on this finding, the Court held that the issue of ownership had already been conclusively determined in arbitration and could not be reopened through a criminal complaint. Allowing the complaint to proceed, the judge observed, would amount to “re-litigation of a settled civil dispute through criminal law machinery,” which is impermissible.

The Court then analyzed the complainant’s argument about personal payment for the domain. Documentary evidence, including emails from 2019 and 2020, revealed that the complainant had acknowledged the company’s ownership of the platform and discussed rebranding the site under the name Caledonrezworld. Furthermore, the company had reimbursed him for the domain registration expenses, reinforcing the conclusion that the domain was acquired for business use, not personal use.

On the procedural aspect, the Court emphasized that merely filing a complaint on the cybercrime portal does not constitute compliance with Section 155(3) CrPC or Section 173 BNSS. The online portal is not equivalent to a “police officer” or a “police station” under statutory definitions. Therefore, the private complaint filed without following this legal procedure was not maintainable.

Citing the principle that criminal law should not be used as a tool to settle business or contractual disputes, the Court reiterated the settled law from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) that where allegations predominantly involve a civil nature, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the judicial process.

Final Decision:  The Court concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil and commercial in nature, having already been settled through arbitration. The FIR, therefore, was an abuse of process. The complaint did not disclose the essential ingredients of any offence under the Information Technology Act or the BNS, 2023.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR dated 3rd May 2025 (Crime No. 0185/2025) registered at Surya Nagar Police Station for alleged offences under Sections 66, 66C, 66D, 84C, and 85 of the IT Act, and multiple sections of the BNS, 2023, as against the petitioners. The court concluded by reaffirming that criminal law cannot be invoked to settle contractual or proprietary disputes that have already been adjudicated by a competent arbitral forum.

Case Title: Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Neutral Citation: 2025:KHC:43558

Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 7222 of 2025

Order Date: 30th October 2025

Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi