Wednesday, December 31, 2025

Zino Davidoff S.A Vs Ala Mode Ecommerce

Zino Davidoff S.A., a Swiss company founded in 1984 owning registered trademarks 'DAVIDOFF', 'DAVIDOFF COOL WATER', 'COOL WATER', 'HOT WATER' and distinctive trade dresses for perfumes with global sales including India since 1997, discovered in 2025 that defendant Ala Mode Ecommerce LLP was operating website antibrnd.in selling cheaper imitation perfumes under deceptively similar marks 'COOL WATER PARFUM', 'HOT WATER PARFUM' and near-identical trade dresses to mislead consumers by associating with plaintiff's products; filed commercial suit for injunction against infringement, passing off, copyright violation, damages; court granted procedural exemptions from filing legible documents, pre-institution mediation due to urgency citing Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi, extension for court fees, permission for additional documents; registered plaint as suit, issued summons with 30-day written statement deadline and admission/denial affidavits; on ex-parte interim application, found plaintiff's long use established goodwill, defendants' adoption dishonest creating confusion/deception for identical goods, prima facie case with irreparable harm and balance favoring plaintiff; granted ad-interim injunction restraining defendants from using impugned marks/dresses, directed domain registrar to disclose subscriber info in sealed cover, compliance under Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC, listed for further proceedings.

  • Exemption from mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of Commercial Courts Act, 2015, permissible where suit contemplates urgent interim relief: Zino Davidoff S.A vs Ala Mode Ecommerce Llp & Anr, Para 4.
  • Ex-parte ad-interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC granted upon prima facie dishonest adoption of deceptively similar marks and trade dresses for identical goods causing confusion and irreparable harm to goodwill: Zino Davidoff S.A vs Ala Mode Ecommerce Llp & Anr, Para 22-24.

Case Title: Zino Davidoff S.A Vs Ala Mode Ecommerce Llp :22.12.2025:CS(COMM) 1397/2025: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd Vs Shimla Drugs Health Care Private Limited

Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd and another, long-time manufacturers of the renowned liver tonic "Liv.52" since 1955 with valid and subsisting trademark registrations including word mark from 1957 claiming use since 1955, distinctive green-white-orange packaging, immense reputation, goodwill, huge turnover and advertisement spend, discovered in October 2025 that Shimla Drugs Health Care Private Limited and another were selling a deceptively similar product under the mark "Liv.72" with nearly identical overall visual appearance, colour scheme, trade dress and packaging, leading to likelihood of confusion and deception in the pharmaceutical market. Plaintiffs filed suit for infringement of trademark/trade dress/copyright and passing off, seeking interim relief; despite service including via email, defendants failed to appear. Court found strong prima facie case of deceptive similarity and calculated adoption to mislead consumers, bad faith evident from rejected trademark application for "Liv.72" on proposed use basis yet continued sales, overwhelming similarities in mark, colour combination and product presentation amounting to infringement and misrepresentation, balance of convenience and irreparable injury favouring plaintiffs given nature of medicinal goods. Interim injunction granted in terms of prayers (a) to (c) of notice of motion restraining defendants from using "Liv.72" or similar marks/packaging, with liberty to defendants to apply for vacation/variation/modification, matter listed on 07 January 2026 with direction for fresh service and affidavit thereof.

  • Deceptively similar marks like "Liv.52" and "Liv.72" with identical colour scheme (green, white, orange) and overall visual appearance on similar medicinal products constitute prima facie infringement and passing off warranting ex-parte interim injunction due to likelihood of confusion and deception: Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd And Anr vs Shimla Drugs Health Care Private Limited And Anr, Para (implicit from comparison and reasoning section).
  • Bad faith adoption evidenced by filing and rejection of trademark application on proposed use basis followed by continued market sales justifies strong prima facie case for interim relief in pharmaceutical goods: Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd And Anr vs Shimla Drugs Health Care Private Limited And Anr, Para (implicit from rejection and continued sale finding).

Case Title: Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd Vs Shimla Drugs Health Care Private Limited:IP-COM/53/2025: High Court at Calcutta Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Chryscapital Advisors Llp Vs Raj Lal Kumari

Chryscapital Advisors LLP, a financial advisory firm part of ChrysCapital group since 1999 with registered trademarks CHRYSCAPITAL and formative marks, filed suit for injunction against infringement and passing off after discovering in 2024 that defendants 1-13 were running fraudulent investment schemes via WhatsApp groups and website www.rn.chryscapital.com using plaintiff's marks, executives' names/photos to dupe public into fake investments; amended plaint added defendants 20-22 for similar fraud via www.cc-securities.com, with proforma defendants WhatsApp, Airtel, banks, DoT, MeitY, UOI for disclosure/blocking. Ex-parte ad-interim injunction granted 29.05.2024 blocking numbers/accounts/websites, extended to new defendants 29.07.2024; infringing defendants unserved or non-appearing, written statement rights closed; suit earlier decreed against some defendants 29.10.2025. Court found fraudulent use deceptive, exploiting goodwill with no contest, deeming plaint admitted under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC without trial; permanent block on numbers unnecessary as finite resource without proprietary claim, one-year block sufficient as cooling/disincentive with no reallocation to same KYC. Suit decreed with permanent injunction restraining infringing defendants from using marks; directions to WhatsApp/Airtel for one-year block on specified accounts/numbers; other reliefs not pressed, suit disposed.

  • In uncontested infringement suits where defendants fail to file written statements, court may decree permanent injunction under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC relying on verified plaint without requiring ex-parte evidence: Chryscapital Advisors Llp vs Ms Raj Lal Kumari & Ors, Para 18.
  • Mobile numbers being finite resources without proprietary rights, permanent blocking not warranted to curb fraud; one-year deactivation sufficient as cooling period with direction against reallocation to same KYC holder: Chryscapital Advisors Llp vs Ms Raj Lal Kumari & Ors, Para 23.

Case Title: Chryscapital Advisors Llp Vs Raj Lal Kumari:19.12.2025:CS(COMM) 475/2024: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Inter Ikea Systems Bv Vs Jin Hua Zhang

Inter Ikea Systems BV, owner of the globally renowned IKEA trademarks registered in India since 2007 with worldwide sales of 44.6 billion Euros in 2022, filed a suit for permanent injunction against infringement and passing off after discovering in 2023 that defendants Jin Hua Zhang and AT were operating phishing websites misusing the IKEA mark to falsely advertise and sell identical home furnishing products, leading to deception as evidenced by plaintiff's undelivered test order; domain registrars NameSilo LLC and Namecheap Inc., along with DoT and MeitY, were impleaded as proforma defendants. Ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 01.06.2023; infringing defendants, served in 2023-2024, failed to file written statements, leading to closure of their right on 01.08.2024. At final hearing, plaintiff pressed only for injunction; court found unauthorized use caused deception, irreparable harm to goodwill, and with no contest, deemed plaint averments admitted, decreeing permanent injunction under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC while deleting proforma defendants and disposing other reliefs as not pressed.

  • Failure to file written statement deems plaint averments admitted, enabling decree under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC without ex-parte evidence: Inter Ikea Systems Bv vs Jin Hua Zhang And Others, Para 29.
  • Unauthorized use of registered trademark on identical goods via phishing websites constitutes infringement and passing off, warranting permanent injunction due to likelihood of confusion and harm to goodwill: Inter Ikea Systems Bv vs Jin Hua Zhang And Others, Para 25.

Case Title: Inter Ikea Systems Bv Vs Jin Hua Zhang : 19.12.2025:CS(COMM) 390/2023:Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Capital Foods Private Limited Vs Spice Nest Impex Private Limited

Capital Foods Private Limited, a leading food enterprise and associate of TATA Group pioneering 'Desi Chinese' cuisine, adopted and registered the trademark 'SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY' in 2012 for sauces with copyright in trade dress, achieving secondary significance per prior court order, significant sales of Rs. 18,677 lakhs and promotion expenses of Rs. 1,599.96 lakhs in FY 2024-25; discovered in May 2025 that defendant Spice Nest Impex was manufacturing and selling identical products under the same mark via websites and e-commerce, sent cease notices met with refusal claiming descriptiveness; filed commercial suit for infringement, passing off, seeking injunction. Court granted procedural reliefs including extension for court fee, exemption from pre-institution mediation due to urgency, filing dim documents and additional documents; registered plaint as suit, issued summons with 30-day WS deadline; on ex-parte IA hearing, found prima facie triple identity in mark, goods, channels causing confusion, irreparable harm to plaintiff, balance of convenience favoring it; granted ad-interim injunction restraining defendant from using 'SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY' or similar marks, but permitted 'SCHEZWAN SAUCE' per plaintiff's concession, with notice and compliance under Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC, listing for further dates.

  • Prior registered trademark with acquired secondary significance warrants ex-parte ad-interim injunction against identical impugned mark on identical goods due to triple identity and likelihood of confusion: Capital Foods Private Limited vs Spice Nest Impex Private Limited, Para 29.
  • Exemption from mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of Commercial Courts Act, 2015, permissible in suits seeking urgent interim relief as per Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi: Capital Foods Private Limited vs Spice Nest Impex Private Limited, Para 5.
  • Plaintiff entitled to protection against passing off where defendant's adoption lacks plausible explanation other than riding on goodwill: Capital Foods Private Limited vs Spice Nest Impex Private Limited, Para 24.2.

Case Title: Capital Foods Private Limited Vs Spice Nest Impex Private Limited:18.12.2025:CS(COMM) 1358/2025: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Salman Khan Vs Ashok Kumar

Salman Khan, a renowned actor with over three decades of career establishing immense goodwill and celebrity status, filed a commercial suit against John Does and various defendants including online platforms and sellers for misappropriation of his personality/publicity rights, trademark and copyright infringement, performer's rights violation, and passing off through unauthorized sale of merchandise featuring his name, image, voice, likeness, and spreading fake news; procedural steps included granting exemptions from filing clear/original documents and pre-institution mediation due to urgency, registering the suit, issuing summons to identified infringing defendants while treating platforms as proforma defendants for compliance without summons. The court, perusing the plaint and documents, held prima facie that Salman Khan's personality traits are protectable under common law as per precedents like DM Entertainment, Anil Kapoor, and Jackie Shroff cases, finding unauthorized commercial exploitation causes irreparable harm with balance of convenience favoring him. Ex-parte ad-interim injunction granted restraining infringing defendants from using his attributes, with directions to proforma defendants to remove/suspend/block specified URLs/domains/accounts within 72 hours, listing for further proceedings.

  • Celebrities acquire proprietary rights over personality attributes like name, image, voice, and likeness through goodwill, entitling injunction against unauthorized commercial exploitation: Salman Khan vs Ashok Kumar/John Doe & Ors., Para 34.
  • Unauthorized use of celebrity personality for merchandise or fake news dissemination violates publicity rights, warranting ex-parte interim relief upon prima facie case of irreparable harm: Salman Khan vs Ashok Kumar/John Doe & Ors., Para 35.
  • Online platforms as proforma defendants may be directed to remove infringing content without adversarial summons, subject to future issuance if position turns hostile: Salman Khan vs Ashok Kumar/John Doe & Ors., Para 23.
  • Exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A Commercial Courts Act permissible for suits seeking urgent interim relief: Salman Khan vs Ashok Kumar/John Doe & Ors., Para 12.

Case Title: Salman Khan Vs Ashok Kumar:11.12.2025:CS(COMM) 1322/2025:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Zydus Healthcare Ltd. Vs Assistant Controller of Patents

Zydus Healthcare Ltd, a pharmaceutical company, challenged the Controller's order granting Patent No. 426553 to Respondent No. 2 for an application filed in 2012 titled 'Compositions and Methods for Treating Centrally Mediated Nausea and Vomiting', which underwent three amendments to claims, reducing from 51 to a final set after voluntary changes and responses to FER and hearings.

Petitioner filed pre-grant opposition in 2021 alleging broadening of claims violating Sections 57 and 59, lack of hearing opportunity at second hearing violating natural justice, but Controller rejected opposition and granted patent after separate examination hearing to applicant only.

The court, relying on Novartis AG v. Union of India, held that pre-grant opposition and patent examination are distinct processes with no right for opponent to participate or be heard in examination phase, voluntary pre-FER amendments need no separate order and can be addressed in FER, no jurisdictional error or natural justice violation occurred as opposition hearing was provided and documents uploaded publicly, merits review impermissible in writ absent manifest error, and Delhi High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction since Patent Office is in Mumbai. Writ petition dismissed.

  • Pre-grant opposition and patent examination are separate proceedings; opponent has no right to hearing or participation in the examination process: Para 60(e).
  • Voluntary amendments to patent claims before issuance of First Examination Report require no separate determination order and may be considered in the FER: Para 60(c).
  • High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction over writ petition challenging patent grant if relevant Patent Office is not located within its jurisdiction: Para 60(a).
  • Review on merits involving disputed facts not permissible in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 absent jurisdictional error by Controller: Para 60(d).
  • High Court may exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 despite alternative remedies if manifest jurisdictional error found: Para 60(b).

Case Title: Zydus Healthcare Ltd. Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs:24.12.2025:W.P.(C)-IPD 23/2023:2025:DHC:11932:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Rajvaidya Shital Prasad Vs Karna Goomar

Introduction: In the evolving landscape of intellectual property law in India, the case of Rajvaidya Shital Prasad and Sons versus Karna Goomar and Another stands as a significant precedent underscoring the paramount importance of prior use, goodwill, and the prevention of deceptive similarity in trademark disputes. Delivered by the Delhi High Court, this judgment addresses a rectification petition filed under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking the cancellation, removal, or rectification of the registered trademark 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' held by the respondent. The petitioner, a long-established entity in the ayurvedic medicine sector, argued that the impugned mark infringed upon their well-known trademark 'HEMPUSHPA', which has been in continuous use for over nine decades. 

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, emphasizing how extensive historical usage and acquired reputation can trump subsequent registrations that appear to capitalize on established goodwill. This decision not only reinforces the protective mechanisms of the Trade Marks Act but also highlights the judiciary's role in maintaining the purity of the trademark register by eliminating marks that could lead to consumer confusion and unfair trade practices. At its core, the case illustrates the delicate balance between innovation in branding and the safeguarding of legacy marks in competitive markets like pharmaceuticals and ayurvedic products, where phonetic and structural similarities can easily mislead the average consumer.

Factual Background:  The petitioner, Rajvaidya Shital Prasad and Sons, has been deeply entrenched in the business of manufacturing and marketing medical preparations, including ayurvedic syrups and tonics, for generations. They claim proprietorship over the trademark 'HEMPUSHPA' in Class 05, which encompasses pharmaceutical and ayurvedic preparations. The origins of this mark trace back to the late 1920s or early 1930s, with documented use commencing as early as June 1, 1933. 

Initially, the petitioner applied for registration of 'HEMPUSHPA' as a word mark under Application No. 362381, claiming usage from January 1, 1938, and it was successfully registered on February 28, 1983, with renewal extending up to May 30, 2028. During ongoing business operations, older records surfaced, prompting a fresh application (No. 4054631) in 2019 to register it as a label mark, reflecting the earlier 1933 usage, though this application remains pending. 

Over the years, 'HEMPUSHPA' has been continuously and exclusively used without interruption, building substantial trade value and becoming synonymous with high-quality ayurvedic tonics specifically targeted at women's health. The mark's distinctiveness stems from long-term, extensive promotion, including endorsements by Bollywood celebrities, positioning it as the leading ayurvedic tonic for women in India. This has led to secondary meaning acquisition, rendering it a well-known trademark under the Act, with associated goodwill and reputation that the petitioner asserts is protected under both statutory and common law, including copyright over the label design. 

On the other side, the respondent, Karna Goomar, operates in a similar domain, dealing in ayurvedic medicines. They adopted the mark 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' for identical or allied goods in Class 05, applying for registration on February 4, 2013, claiming use since January 1, 1992, and securing registration (No. 2471490) on December 14, 2016. Additionally, the respondent pursued registrations for 'KUDOS ACTIVE PUSHPA LABEL' under applications Nos. 3998498 and 4024987, which the petitioner opposed. The petitioner contends that the respondent's adoption was dishonest, as 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' is phonetically, visually, and structurally deceptively similar to 'HEMPUSHPA', particularly with the shared prominent element 'PUSHPA', which is arbitrary in the context of ayurvedic products. This similarity, coupled with identical trade channels and consumer bases, is alleged to inevitably cause market confusion, deception, and passing off, allowing the respondent to unfairly benefit from the petitioner's established reputation.

Procedural Background: The procedural journey of this dispute began with the petitioner filing a rectification petition before the Delhi High Court under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, invoking multiple provisions including Sections 9, 11, 12, 18, 34, 47, and 125 to challenge the validity of the respondent's 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' registration. Aggrieved by what they perceived as fraudulent adoption and registration that infringed upon their prior rights, the petitioner detailed their historical use and registration, highlighting the respondent's later entry into the market. 

Petitioner insisted on deceptive similarity, bad faith adoption, and violations of trademark principles. They cited numerous precedents to bolster their case, emphasizing phonetic similarity, the dominance of 'PUSHPA' as a key feature, and the lack of distinctiveness in the impugned mark. The respondents, defended countered by asserting honest adoption of 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' under their house mark 'KUDOS', claiming it was a coined term combining 'ACTIVE' (denoting liveliness) and 'PUSHPA' (Sanskrit for flower, symbolically linked to women). 

They argued for holistic comparison of marks, pointing to industry practices where 'PUSHPA' variations are common, and invoked Sections 15 and 17 of the Act to deny exclusivity over 'PUSHPA' since it wasn't separately registered by the petitioner. Evidence of third-party uses of 'PUSHPA'-containing marks was submitted to argue commonality. The court proceedings involved detailed submissions from both sides, with no apparent interim orders mentioned, leading directly to the final judgment after considering affidavits, documents, and legal citations. The petitioner also referenced their oppositions to the respondent's additional applications, underscoring ongoing conflicts, while the respondents highlighted their investments in promotion to establish goodwill.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The Delhi High Court's reasoning in this case was rooted in a comprehensive analysis of trademark law principles, prioritizing the petitioner's prior adoption, continuous use, and accrued goodwill over the respondent's subsequent registration. Justice Tejas Karia meticulously dissected the competing marks, noting that both 'HEMPUSHPA' and 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' are word marks in Class 05 for similar ayurvedic products, with the petitioner's mark enjoying precedence in registration (from 1983) and use (from 1933). 

The court found the impugned mark deceptively similar, satisfying the triple identity test—identical goods, similar marks, and same trade channels—leading to inevitable confusion. Phonetic similarity was particularly emphasized, drawing from precedents like K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal & Co., where 'AMBAL' and 'ANDAL' were deemed confusingly alike; here, the shared suffix 'PUSHPA' was deemed the dominant, essential feature, arbitrary and non-descriptive in the ayurvedic context, not merely laudatory or common as argued by the respondent. The court rejected the respondent's claim of honest concurrent use under Section 12, citing evident bad faith: the respondent's awareness of the petitioner's reputation, lack of plausible explanation for adopting a similar mark, and failure to conduct prior searches indicated an intent to pass off and encash on established goodwill. 

Evidence showed the respondent's actual use was minimal or non-existent prior to 1992, contradicting their claims and violating Section 47 for non-use. Under Section 11, the registration was deemed contrary to the Act, as it conflicted with a well-known mark, and Section 9 was invoked for lack of distinctiveness. The court dismissed arguments on commonality of 'PUSHPA', requiring substantial third-party evidence which was insufficient, and applied anti-dissection rules from cases like Parle Products v. J.P. and Co., viewing marks holistically rather than side-by-side. 

Broader considerations included potential future business expansions and the need to protect against dilution, as in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetan Bhai Shah. Ultimately, the court decided to allow the petition, directing the Registrar of Trade Marks to cancel, remove, or rectify 'ACTIVEPUSHPA' from the register, affirming the petitioner's statutory and common law rights to prevent infringement and maintain market purity.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment solidifies several key principles in Indian trademark jurisprudence, particularly that extensive, continuous use spanning over 90 years can establish a mark as well-known, granting it superior protection against deceptively similar subsequent marks under Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, even if the common element like 'PUSHPA' is argued to be generic or common to trade without substantial evidence of widespread third-party usage. 

It reiterates that bad faith adoption, evidenced by lack of search reports, implausible explanations, and intent to ride on another's goodwill, cannot be cured by any amount of subsequent use, as per precedents like Hindustan Pencils v. India Stationary Products, and mandates cancellation under Section 47 for proven non-use or frivolous registration. The case clarifies that phonetic similarity alone, especially in dominant features, suffices for deceptive similarity and passing off, applying the test from K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar, while holistic comparison trumps dissection, rejecting claims of honest concurrent use under Section 12 absent honesty in adoption. 

Furthermore, it establishes that prior registration and use confer both statutory and common law rights to seek rectification under Sections 18, 34, 57, and 125, emphasizing the judiciary's role in purifying the register to prevent consumer confusion in allied goods markets.

Case Detail: Rajvaidya Shital Prasad and Sons Vs Karna Goomar and Anr.
Date of Order: 24.12.2025 
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 385/2021 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:11881 
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi  
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Friday, December 26, 2025

creamline Dairy Products Ltd. Vs. RK Ganapathi Chettiar

Creamline Dairy Products Ltd. filed a suit against RK Ganapathi Chettiar and Arihant Marketings for copyright infringement and passing off related to the sale of ghee, after discovering the alleged infringement in November 2024, with the suit instituted in late February 2025 without prior cease and desist notice or mediation. 

The first defendant applied to reject the plaint for non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which mandates pre-institution mediation unless urgent interim relief is contemplated, arguing the suit lacked urgency and distinguishing the Supreme Court's Novenco judgment on facts involving prior party relations and communications. 

The plaintiff countered that Novenco supports viewing IP infringement suits as involving continuing acts, thus inherently contemplating urgency. The court, referencing Yamini Manohar and Novenco, examined the plaint from the plaintiff's perspective, considering the nature of IP actions and public interest, and found no basis to deem the interim relief prayer as camouflage to evade mediation given the suit's filing within four months of discovery, ultimately dismissing the rejection application without costs.

Law Point:

In suits for infringement of intellectual property rights, which involve continuing acts of alleged infringement, it cannot be concluded that the suit does not contemplate urgent interim relief :Para 3.

The question of whether a suit contemplates urgent interim relief, exempting it from mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, should be decided by the court from the plaintiff's perspective : Para 4-5.

Case Title: Creamline Dairy Products Ltd. Vs. RK Ganapathi Chettiar:08.12.2025: C.S(Comm.Div)No.108 of 2025 : Madras HC:Honourable Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Thursday, December 25, 2025

Sun Pharmaceutical Ind. Ltd. Vs Meghmani Life Sciences

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited filed a commercial IP suit against Meghmani Lifesciences Limited and another for trademark infringement and passing off alleging defendant's mark 'EsiRaft' deceptively similar to plaintiff's registered 'RACIRAFT' both used for identical oral suspension products containing Sodium Alginate Sodium Bicarbonate and Calcium Carbonate treating heartburn and indigestion with plaintiff adopting mark in January 2022 securing Class 5 registration and achieving sales of 11.85 crores in 2022-2023 and 24.49 crores in 2023-2024 while defendant No1 markets and No2 manufactures the impugned product since July 2024. Procedurally ex-parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 7 April 2025 restraining defendants from using the mark after which defendant sought vacation under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC but the interim application was heard finally with consent reserved on 9 December 2025 and pronounced on 23 December 2025. The court reasoned applying principles of deceptive similarity under Trade Marks Act 1999 including anti-dissection rule holistic comparison visual structural and phonetic assessment that marks are dissimilar with distinct prefixes RACI vs Esi and common descriptive suffix RAFT indicating foam-forming property from sodium alginate providing plausible defense for adoption two-color depiction common to trade not deceptive by itself no dishonest adoption given defendant's cogent explanation for Esi no prima facie case for infringement or passing off under Cadila factors considering dissimilar get-up no confusion likelihood and defendant's prior use without acquiescence. The court vacated the ad-interim relief dismissed the interim application but extended the relief for one week from order upload date.

  • In determining deceptive similarity of pharmaceutical trademarks, courts must apply the anti-dissection rule and conduct a holistic visual, structural, and phonetic comparison of marks as a whole, where a common descriptive suffix like 'RAFT' indicating product properties (foam formation from sodium alginate) does not render marks similar if prefixes are distinct [Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited vs Meghmani Lifesciences Limited and Another, Interim Application (L) No.9484 of 2025 in Commercial IP (L) No.353 of 2025, Paras 20, 23].
  • Use of a descriptive term such as 'RAFT' for raft-forming antacids constitutes a plausible defense against claims of dishonest adoption, and two-color combinations common to the trade do not by themselves establish deceptive similarity absent overall confusion [Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited vs Meghmani Lifesciences Limited and Another, Interim Application (L) No.9484 of 2025 in Commercial IP (L) No.353 of 2025, Paras 19, 31].
  • For passing off actions involving unregistered trademarks, the factors outlined in Cadila Health Care Ltd. vs Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73—including nature of marks, resemblance, goods, purchasers, purchase mode, and surrounding circumstances—must be considered with variable weightage based on case facts, and absence of resemblance precludes relief [Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited vs Meghmani Lifesciences Limited and Another, Interim Application (L) No.9484 of 2025 in Commercial IP (L) No.353 of 2025, Para 34].

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Ind. Ltd. Vs Meghmani Life Sciences:23.12.2025:Commercial IP Suit No. .353 of 2025: Bombay HC:Sharmila U. Deshmukh

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs Trinetra Venture

Phonographic Performance Limited filed commercial IP suits against Trinetra Venture and Ors owning 94 restaurants and Anoor Paripati and Ors for copyright infringement in sound recordings and quia timet action for apprehended future violations claiming ownership and exclusive licensing rights via assignments from music companies entitling it to grant public performance licenses under Section 30 of Copyright Act 1957 supported by cease and desist notices affidavits of unauthorized broadcasting during visits on specific dates and video evidence while defendants contended non-maintainability for failure to implead owners under Section 61 plaintiff not being registered society suppression of facts via non-annexure of agreements incomplete redacted sample deeds and inadequate stamping. The court reasoned following prior Bombay decisions that registration under Section 33(1) is unnecessary for owners or exclusive licensees to sue non-joinder under Section 61 is not fatal given joint cause as owner and licensee and court's discretion unstamped deeds' admissibility arises at evidence stage under Stamp Act Section 34 redacted samples and full deeds on CD/website suffice prima facie unreasonable fees no defense absent Section 31 compulsory license proceedings implying rights admission infringement established by unchallenged affidavit tilting balance favoring plaintiff against continuing loss. The court granted interim injunction restraining defendants from public performance or communication of plaintiff's repertoire without license pending suit disposal.

  • An owner or exclusive licensee of copyright in sound recordings is entitled to maintain an infringement action and grant licenses under Section 30 of the Copyright Act, 1957, without registration as a copyright society under Section 33(1) [Phonographic Performance Limited vs Trinetra Venture and Ors., Interim Application (L) No. 36005 of 2025 in Commercial IP Suit No. 668 of 2025, Para 10].
  • Non-joinder of the copyright owner under Section 61 does not bar interim relief when the plaintiff sues in dual capacity as owner and exclusive licensee, with the court having discretion to dispense with joinder, and Section 54 includes exclusive licensee within "owner of copyright" for civil remedies under Section 55 [Phonographic Performance Limited vs Trinetra Venture and Ors., Interim Application (L) No. 36005 of 2025 in Commercial IP Suit No. 668 of 2025, Para 12].
  • Unstamped assignment deeds do not preclude consideration for ad-interim relief, as their admissibility in evidence under Section 34 of the Stamp Act is determined at the trial stage [Phonographic Performance Limited vs Trinetra Venture and Ors., Interim Application (L) No. 36005 of 2025 in Commercial IP Suit No. 668 of 2025, Para 14].
  • Redacted sample agreements annexed to the plaint, with full voluminous deeds provided on compact disk and hosted on the plaintiff's website, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the interim stage without requiring physical annexure to avoid burdening court records [Phonographic Performance Limited vs Trinetra Venture and Ors., Interim Application (L) No. 36005 of 2025 in Commercial IP Suit No. 668 of 2025, Para 13].
  • Allegations of unreasonable licensing fees or refusal to license do not constitute a defense to copyright infringement unless pursued via compulsory licensing under Section 31, and such plea implies admission of the plaintiff's ownership rights [Phonographic Performance Limited vs Trinetra Venture and Ors., Interim Application (L) No. 36005 of 2025 in Commercial IP Suit No. 668 of 2025, Para 15].

Case Title: Phonographic Performance Limited Vs Trinetra Venture:24.12.2025: Comm IP Suit No. 668 OF 2025:2025:BHC-OS:26530:Bombay HC:Sharmila U. Deshmukh J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

MEX Switchgears Vs Vikram Suri

MEX Switchgears Pvt Ltd appealed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act 1999 against the Deputy Registrar's order dated 24.05.2018 deeming their Opposition No. 851850 to respondent Vikram Suri's Application No. 1985391 for registration of "ARMEX" as abandoned under Rule 45(2) of Trade Marks Rules 2017 for failure to file evidence in support or reliance statement within prescribed time after service of counter statement on 22.11.2017 solely via email, with the respondent served but filing no reply and remaining absent throughout proceedings. The court reasoned that Section 143 permits service of documents by leaving at or sending by post to the address for service provided in the application or notice of opposition, interpreting "leaving them at" expansively to include email only if an email ID is voluntarily provided therein as it implies consent to electronic service, but since appellant provided no email ID, email dispatch alone did not constitute valid legal service as parties have discretion to choose service address absent statutory mandate for email, rendering the abandonment order unsustainable for lack of proper service. The court set aside the impugned order without costs, directed appellant to comply with post-service statutory requirements like filing evidence within stipulated time reckoned from judgment date, with failure entailing statutory consequences.

  • Service of documents under Section 143 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, must be effected by leaving them at or sending them by post to the address for service stated in the application or notice of opposition; service by email is permissible only if an email ID is provided as part of the address for service, as it conveys consent to such mode [M/S MEX Switchgears Pvt. Ltd. vs Vikram Suri Trading as M/S Armex Auto Industries, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 69/2022, Paras 7-8].
  • Where no email ID is provided in the notice of opposition, sending documents solely by email does not constitute valid service under Section 143, even if sent to the opponent's actual email, as the choice of service address vests with the party and the Registry must adhere strictly to the provided address [M/S MEX Switchgears Pvt. Ltd. vs Vikram Suri Trading as M/S Armex Auto Industries, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 69/2022, Paras 9-10].
  • An order deeming opposition abandoned under Rule 45(2) of Trade Marks Rules, 2017, for non-filing of evidence due to improper service is liable to be set aside, with the opponent directed to comply with evidentiary requirements from the date of the appellate judgment [M/S MEX Switchgears Pvt. Ltd. vs Vikram Suri Trading as M/S Armex Auto Industries, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 69/2022, Paras 12-15].

Case Title: MEX Switchgears Vs Vikram Suri Order date: 13.10.2023 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 69/2022 Neutral Citation: Not Available Name of court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Coffee Board Vs Fulkant Jha

Coffee Board filed a petition under C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 391/2022 against Fulkant Jha trading as JFK International and another in a trademark dispute concerning the use and exclusive rights over a logo or mark, with the petitioner relying on certain documents to demonstrate its prior use and policy against individual exporters claiming exclusivity. In the interlocutory application I.A. 8296/2024, the petitioner sought to place additional documents 1 to 9 on record, which the respondent opposed on grounds of irrelevance for documents 1-3, delay for document 4, lack of merit for foreign judgments in documents 5-7, and general contentions for documents 8-9 that were previously exchanged. The court reasoned that relevance objections for documents 1-3 could be addressed at final hearing without prejudicing admissibility, document 4 was essential for adjudicating merits despite delay claims, documents 5-7 as foreign judgments could anyway be cited in arguments rendering opposition meritless, and documents 8-9 could be admitted without prejudice allowing respondent rebuttal. The court decided to take all documents 1-9 on record with respondent's rights and contentions preserved including relevance objections for final arguments, granted respondent four weeks to file rebuttal documents failing which liberty exhausts, disposed of the application, noted original documents seen and returned for final hearing, permitted parties to file amended written submissions one week before next date, and listed the main petition for hearing on 15.04.2026.

  • Objections to the relevance of additional documents sought to be placed on record in intellectual property proceedings are to be considered at the stage of final hearing, and taking such documents on record does not constitute an expression on their relevance  Para 4].
  • Documents that rebut the respondent's basis for claiming exclusive rights, such as a policy document disallowing individual claims over a logo, deserve to be taken on record to properly adjudicate the merits of the dispute, notwithstanding objections of delay [ Para 5].
  • Judgments of foreign courts can be relied upon during oral arguments without the need to formally file them as additional documents, and thus opposition to taking them on record lacks merit , Para 6].
  • Documents previously exchanged between parties may be taken on record without prejudice to the respondent's rights and contentions, with liberty granted to the respondent to file rebuttal documents within a specified time frame , Para 7].

Case Title: Coffee Board Vs Fulkant Jha:19.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 391/2022: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Astellas Institute For Regenerative Medicine Vs The Controller Of Patents

Astellas Institute for Regenerative Medicine appealed against the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs' order dated March 23, 2022, rejecting their national phase patent application No. 1547/KOLNP/2010 titled "Improved Methods of Producing RPE Cells and Compositions of RPE Cells," which involves a method for differentiating retinal pigment epithelial (RPE) cells from human pluripotent stem cells like embryonic and induced ones for screening and therapeutic uses, on the ground that it falls under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970, as potentially contrary to morality and prejudicial to human life due to ethical concerns in deriving stem cells from single blastomeres that may harm embryo implantation and survival.

Procedurally, the application was filed, a First Examination Report issued on May 25, 2017, responses and amended claims submitted, hearings conducted with written arguments, and fresh objections under Section 59(1) addressed before the impugned rejection. The appellant contended the method uses pre-established cell lines without new embryo destruction and sources stem cells solely from umbilical cord or biological waste, but the court reasoned that this claim was not borne out from the pleadings, specifications, or amended claims, which do not limit the stem cell source and treat parthenogenesis as optional, rendering the invention ethically challenging as per evidence cited; the impugned order was found adequately reasoned without infirmity, illegality, or perversity, leading to dismissal of the appeal without costs.

  • An invention whose primary or intended use or commercial exploitation is contrary to public order or morality or causes serious prejudice to human, animal, or plant life or health or to the environment is not patentable under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970 [Astellas Institute for Regenerative Medicine vs The Controller of Patents and Designs, IPDAID/41/2024, Para 8].
  • Arguments raised in appeal must be supported by the pleadings, amended claims, and specifications filed with the patent application; contentions introduced for the first time from the bar, such as limiting stem cell sources to umbilical cord, cannot be entertained if not reflected in the application documents [Astellas Institute for Regenerative Medicine vs The Controller of Patents and Designs, IPDAID/41/2024, Paras 5, 10].
  • Rejection of a patent on ethical grounds under Section 3(b) is justified if the order is reasoned, considers all submissions, and relies on evidence showing the invention's process is ethically challenging and not embryo-saving, such as potential detrimental effects on embryo survival [Astellas Institute for Regenerative Medicine vs The Controller of Patents and Designs, IPDAID/41/2024, Paras 7, 12].

Case Title: Astellas Institute For Regenerative Medicine Vs The Controller Of Patents:22.12.2025:IPDAID/41/2024:2025-CHC-OS/273:Calcutta HC: Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Wednesday, December 24, 2025

Baldev Raj Vs. Brothers Tobacco

The petitioner challenged an order dated 09.12.2025 of the District Judge dismissing his application to bring on record two trademark registration certificates obtained in 2018 in a passing off suit filed in 2010, but subsequently limited his challenge to seeking permission to tender these certificates through an additional affidavit of PW-1 without converting the suit into one for infringement.

The respondent consented to the certificates being taken on record while reserving all rights and contending that the suit remains confined to passing off since the registrations post-dated the filing and issues had already been framed. The High Court, accepting the mutual stand of the parties, allowed the petitioner to file the additional affidavit with the certificates within three days but expressly clarified that no claim of infringement could be raised and the suit would proceed only on passing off, while leaving the respondent's objections on merits open, directing expeditious evidence, and noting consent for a short adjournment on costs.

  • Subsequent trademark registration obtained after filing of a passing off suit cannot be used to convert the cause of action or relief to infringement, especially when the plaintiff was in possession of the registration certificates before framing of issues and consciously chose not to amend the plaint (Para 7).
  • Limited liberty can be granted to place post-filing trademark registration certificates on record in a passing off suit through additional evidence, subject to the condition that it does not alter the nature of the suit from passing off to infringement (Paras 6-7).

Case Title: Baldev Raj Vs. Brothers Tobacco & Ors.:18.12.2025:CM(M)-IPD 49/2025:ge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Zentic Pharmaceutical Vs. Apsara Herbals

M/s Zentic Pharmaceutical filed a commercial suit CS(COMM) 1111/2025 before the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but subsequently moved an application under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute fresh proceedings, stating that an earlier suit CS(COMM) 2865/2024 on the same cause was pending before the District Judge (Commercial Court), South East District, Saket Courts, making the High Court suit incompetent due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The defendant did not oppose the withdrawal. The Delhi High Court allowed the application, permitted withdrawal of the suit without prejudice to rights, and granted liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action.

  • Where a commercial trademark infringement suit is filed in the High Court but an identical suit on the same cause is already pending in a competent Commercial Court below the pecuniary jurisdiction threshold, the plaintiff can withdraw the High Court suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC with liberty to pursue or file afresh, especially when withdrawal is unopposed (Order paras on application and consent).

Case Title: Zentic Pharmaceutical Vs. Apsara Herbals: November 27, 2025:2025:DHC:11307: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

U.S. Green Building Council Vs. Deming Certification Services Pvt Ltd

U.S. Green Building Council sued Deming Certification Services Pvt Ltd in 2022 alleging trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off by the defendant's use of marks including a circular logo with building design, the abbreviation IGBC and content copied from the plaintiff's website in relation to green building certification services. The defendant filed a written statement but thereafter stopped appearing, leading to proceedings ex parte. The plaintiff moved an application under Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 CPC for judgment on admissions and non-traversal. The Delhi High Court found the defendant's written statement evasive without specific denial of plaintiff's assertions of prior adoption, registration, reputation and deceptive similarity, treated key averments as admitted, held infringement, copyright violation and passing off established, decreed the suit with permanent injunction, delivery up and costs of Rs. 5 lakhs.

  • Non-specific or evasive denials in a written statement amount to admission under Order VIII Rule 5 CPC, entitling the plaintiff to judgment under Order VIII Rule 10 where the defendant ceases to appear (Paras on admissions and application of Order VIII).
  • Use of a deceptively similar logo and abbreviation (IGBC resembling plaintiff's known marks) along with copied website content in identical services (green building certification) constitutes infringement, copyright infringement and passing off (Paras on comparison of marks/content and likelihood of confusion).
  • In ex parte proceedings, where written statement contains admissions due to lack of proper denial, the court can pronounce judgment without requiring further evidence from the plaintiff (Paras on procedure under Order VIII Rules 1 & 10).

Case Title: U.S. Green Building Council Vs. Deming Certification Services Pvt Ltd:24.12.2025: CS(COMM) 664/2022:2025:DHC:11865:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Trident Limited Vs. Controller of Patents

Trident Limited appealed against the Controller's order dated 05.01.2021 refusing patent application No. 1867/DEL/2010 titled “Air Rich Yarn and Fabric and its Method of Manufacturing” on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja). The Controller relied on prior arts D1 to D5, held the claims obvious by combining teachings particularly of D1 and D3, and found no technical advancement or unexpected effect demonstrated. The Delhi High Court found the Controller's analysis of inventive step deficient for failing to identify the skilled person's knowledge, not explaining why the combination was obvious, ignoring appellant's evidence of commercial success and technical advantages like superior air retention and softness, and introducing new objections post-hearing without opportunity to respond, set aside the refusal order and remanded the application for fresh consideration within three months.

  • The Controller must provide reasoned analysis for lack of inventive step, including identifying the person skilled in the art, the obviousness of combining prior arts, and addressing evidence of technical advance or secondary indicia like commercial success; mere conclusory statements are insufficient (Paras on inventive step assessment).
  • New prior arts or grounds of objection cannot be introduced in the final refusal order without prior notice in FER or hearing notice, violating natural justice (Paras on procedural fairness).
  • Evidence of commercial success, long-felt need, and comparative data showing unexpected technical effects must be considered in assessing inventive step and cannot be disregarded without reasons (Paras on secondary considerations).

Case Title: Trident Limited Vs. Controller of Patents: August 11, 2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 162/2022:2025:DHC:10343: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Tesla Inc. Vs. Tesla Power

Tesla Inc. filed a suit in 2024 alleging trademark infringement and passing off by Tesla Power India Private Limited and others using marks like ‘TESLA POWER’ and ‘TESLA POWER USA’ for batteries and related products, including domain names, claiming deceptive similarity to its globally renowned ‘TESLA’ mark with transborder reputation spilling over to India. Defendants initially undertook not to enter the EV market or use the mark for EVs, but plaintiff alleged continued misuse and leveraging of its reputation. The Delhi High Court found prima facie triple identity in marks, goods (allied/cognate batteries and power products) and trade channels, dishonest adoption evident from ‘TESLA POWER USA’ suggesting US origin connection, likelihood of confusion including initial interest confusion, and transborder reputation established despite limited direct sales in India, granted interim injunction extending the undertaking to restrain use of the impugned marks for all current goods/services including batteries, inverters, UPS and all advertising until final disposal of the suit.

  • Transborder reputation of a foreign trademark spills over to India through global publicity, website traffic from India and international fame, entitling protection even without substantial local sales or registration in relevant classes (Paras on spillover reputation and goodwill).
  • Where marks are identical with dominant feature ‘TESLA’, goods allied (batteries/power products cognate to EVs and advanced battery tech), and same trade channels, a case of ‘triple identity’ exists warranting interim injunction for infringement and passing off (Paras on similarity analysis).
  • Adoption of ‘TESLA POWER USA’ indicates dishonest intent to mislead consumers into believing association with US-based plaintiff or origin of technology (Paras on dishonest adoption and ‘USA’ suffix).
  • Doctrine of initial interest confusion applies in trademark cases, particularly with well-known marks, where initial attraction due to similarity causes irreparable harm even if confusion clarified later (Paras on confusion and prejudice).

Case Title: Tesla Inc. Vs. Tesla Power India Private Limited : November 24, 2025: CS(COMM) 353/2024:2025:DHC:10367: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sunil Jain Vs. Registrar of Trademarks

Sunil Jain appealed against the Registrar's order dated 17.06.2025 allowing registration of Respondent No.2's trademark application No. 6480151 for 'Secure Fencing' in Class 7 despite the appellant's opposition. The appellant and Respondent No.2, being brothers, jointly used the mark 'Secure Fencing' from 2013 pursuant to a family business, and under an oral family settlement in 2019 agreed that the appellant would exclusively own 'Secure Fencing' while Respondent No.2 would own 'Kisaan Jaali and Fencing'. Respondent No.2 surreptitiously obtained registrations for 'Secure Fencing' and in one proceeding admitted the appellant's exclusive rights, yet proceeded with the opposed application. The Delhi High Court found prima facie evidence of the family settlement, Respondent No.2's inconsistent stand, and likelihood of confusion, granted interim injunction restraining Respondent No.2 from using 'Secure Fencing' pending the appeal, and directed expeditious disposal.

  • Oral family settlements dividing trademark rights in a family business are enforceable and can form the basis for granting interim relief in trademark opposition appeals where prima facie evidence supports exclusive allocation to one party (Order paras on family settlement and prima facie case).
  • Inconsistent admissions by a party in earlier trademark proceedings regarding exclusive ownership of a mark bind them and constitute strong prima facie evidence against subsequent contradictory applications (Order paras on Respondent No.2's admission in TM No. 5350849).
  • Where parties are family members with prior joint use and a settlement allocating marks, surreptitious registration attempts by one party justify interim injunction to maintain status quo (Order paras on balance of convenience and irreparable harm).

Case Title: Sunil Jain Vs. Registrar of Trademarks & Anr. Order Date: December 17, 2025 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 60/2025 & I.A. 22422/2025 Neutral Citation: Not available in document Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Oziel Pharmaceuticals

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit for permanent injunction against Oziel Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. and its director alleging trademark infringement and passing off of its registered marks ‘PEPFIZ’ (registered since 1991) and ‘MINOZ’ (registered since 2003). The plaintiff moved an application for summary judgment under Order XIIIA CPC against Defendant No. 2 (director) on the basis of admissions in the written statement and defendant's non-appearance despite service. The Delhi High Court noted that Defendant No. 2 admitted the plaintiff's prior registrations and use, acknowledged the defendants' adoption of identical marks, and failed to contest the suit, held that no triable issues existed regarding infringement liability of the director jointly with the company, granted summary judgment decreeing the suit against Defendant No. 2 with permanent injunction, nominal damages of Rs. 2 lakhs, and costs.

  • In trademark infringement suits, summary judgment under Order XIIIA CPC can be passed against a defendant (including director) based on clear admissions in the written statement regarding plaintiff's prior rights and defendant's use of identical marks, coupled with non-appearance, without requiring trial (Paras on application of Order XIIIA in IP suits).
  • Directors can be held jointly liable for infringement committed by the company where admissions establish their involvement or control, and summary decree of injunction and damages can be passed against them (Paras on joint liability and summary procedure).

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Vs. Oziel Pharmaceuticals:December 16, 2025: CS(COMM) 1041/2024:2025:DHC:11923: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Street One GmbH Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Street One GmbH appealed against the Registrar's order dated 25.01.2024 dismissing its opposition and allowing registration of the mark “STREET9” in Class 25 applied for by Respondent No.3 on 24.11.2020 with user claim since 01.04.2014. The appellant, proprietor of prior registered marks “STREET ONE/Street One” adopted in 1983 and registered in India since 2003 including in Class 25, opposed on grounds of deceptive similarity under Section 11. The Registrar dismissed the opposition primarily on lack of evidence of reputation and spillover, treating prior use as relevant. The Delhi High Court held that the Registrar misapplied Section 11 by requiring proof of reputation when the appellant relied on prior registrations, as Section 11 read with Section 29 protects registered marks without needing proof of prior use or transborder reputation once similarity and identical goods are established, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter for fresh decision on relative grounds under Section 11.

  • Where opposition is based on prior registered trademarks for identical goods, Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is attracted without requirement of proving reputation or prior use in India; the Registrar cannot dismiss opposition merely for lack of evidence of spillover reputation (Paras examining misapplication of Section 11, relying on principles that Section 11 is alter ego of Section 29).
  • Proof of transborder reputation or actual use is not mandatory for invoking Section 11 when relying on prior Indian registrations; the relative grounds of refusal focus on likelihood of confusion due to similarity of marks and goods (Paras on correct application of Section 11).

Case Title: Street One GmbH Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks :November 28, 2025: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 38/2024:2025:DHC:11169: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Shri Kirit Bhadiadra Vs. Wings Pharmaceuticals Private Limited

Wings Pharmaceuticals Private Limited sued Kirit Bhadiadra, proprietor of Rapple Healthcare, for trademark infringement and passing off, claiming its registered mark “MEDILICE” (used since 2004 for anti-lice shampoo) was infringed by the defendant's “MEDILICE LICE KILLER” (used for ayurvedic anti-lice hair oil). The Commercial Court decreed the suit on 04.03.2024, granting permanent injunction and awarding Rs. 10 lakhs punitive damages. On appeal, the Delhi High Court Division Bench found the marks deceptively similar with “MEDILICE” as the dominant essential feature, the products allied addressing the same lice issue likely causing confusion, defendant's prior use claim unsupported by credible evidence, and infringement/passing off established; it upheld the injunction but reduced damages to Rs. 3 lakhs considering the circumstances, dismissing the appeal.

  • In pharmaceutical/medicinal products for treating the same ailment (head lice), even if one is shampoo and the other hair oil, the goods are allied, and use of an identical dominant mark creates likelihood of confusion warranting injunction for infringement and passing off (Paras examining similarity of goods and marks, relying on established principles in medicinal trademark cases requiring higher scrutiny).
  • The dominant and essential feature of the mark is “MEDILICE”; addition of descriptive words like “LICE KILLER” does not distinguish it sufficiently to avoid deception (Paras on anti-dissection rule and phonetic/visual similarity).
  • Prior use defence requires robust documentary evidence of continuous commercial use; mere manufacturing licenses or pending applications are insufficient (Paras on evaluation of defendant's evidence).
  • Punitive damages in trademark infringement can be awarded but must be proportionate; reduction from Rs. 10 lakhs to Rs. 3 lakhs is appropriate where infringement is established but scale justifies moderation (Paras on damages assessment).

Case Title: Shri Kirit Bhadiadra Vs. Wings Pharmaceuticals Private Limited: December 22, 2025: RFA(COMM) 149/2024:2025:DHC:11709-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Reckitt and Colman Vs. Ind Swift Limited

Reckitt and Colman Overseas Health Limited appealed against the Registrar of Trade Marks' order dated 09.02.2024 dismissing its opposition and allowing registration of Ind Swift Limited's mark 'DECA-NEROPHEN' in Class 05, applied for on 26.02.1999 with claimed use since 1992, for pharmaceutical preparations. Reckitt, proprietor of the prior registered mark 'NUROFEN' (registered since 1983), contended that 'DECA-NEROPHEN' was deceptively similar as 'NUROFEN' was wholly subsumed and 'DECA' was descriptive of Nandrolone Decanoate, that adoption was dishonest given 'NUROFEN' being a coined word and Respondent's failure to search the register, and that no concurrent honest use was established due to lack of credible evidence predating or contemporaneous with the application. The Registrar erred in holding the marks dissimilar yet granting benefit under Section 12 for alleged concurrent use, and in accepting post-application evidence. The Delhi High Court found the marks phonetically similar, adoption dishonest, no honest concurrent use proven, and Registrar's contradictory findings unsustainable, set aside the impugned order, allowed the opposition, and refused registration of 'DECA-NEROPHEN'.

  • In pharmaceutical trademarks, a higher degree of scrutiny is required, and honest concurrent use under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be claimed where adoption is dishonest, especially when the prior mark is a coined word and the later mark subsumes it with a descriptive prefix (Paras 28-32, relying on Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73).
  • The Registrar cannot simultaneously hold rival marks as dissimilar and yet apply Section 12 (honest concurrent use), as the provision presupposes similarity; such contradictory findings vitiate the order (Paras 20-22).
  • Dishonest adoption is inferred where no explanation is provided for choosing a mark incorporating a prior registered coined mark, and the applicant fails to conduct a trademark search despite the stringent duty in pharmaceutical cases (Paras 25-30, citing Bal Pharma Ltd. v. Centaur Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., 2002 (24) PTC 226 (Bom)).
  • Evidence of use post-dating the application cannot establish honest concurrent use for Section 12, and illegible or inadequate documentary proof fails to discharge the burden (Paras 33-35).

Case Title: Reckitt and Colman Vs. Ind Swift Limited : December 24, 2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 51/2024: 2025:DHC:11867: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Osaka University Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Osaka University appealed against the Assistant Controller's order dated 29.08.2020 refusing patent application No. 3495/DELNP/2012 for bridged artificial nucleosides and nucleotides featuring a five to seven-membered cyclic amide bridge, on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) and non-patentability under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970. The Controller primarily relied on prior art D2, miscompared nuclease resistance data by wrongly referencing Example 13 instead of Example 12, failed to explain how multiple prior arts rendered the invention obvious to a person skilled in the art, introduced new reasoning in the impugned order without prior notice, and raised Section 3(d) objections without identifying the specific known substance or prior art in the FER and hearing notice, denying the appellant opportunity to respond. The Delhi High Court found these procedural and substantive infirmities rendered the order unsustainable and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with a hearing within six months.

  • While rejecting a patent for lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), the Controller must discuss three elements: invention in prior art, invention in the application, and how it would be obvious to a person skilled in the art; a bare conclusion without such analysis is impermissible (Paras 33-34, following Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4786).
  • New grounds or reasoning for objections under Sections 2(1)(j) or 3(d) cannot be introduced for the first time in the final refusal order without giving the applicant prior notice and opportunity to address them (Paras 55, 60).
  • For an objection under Section 3(d), the Controller must specifically identify the "known substance" and explain how the claimed compounds are new forms or derivatives thereof; failure to do so in the FER or hearing notice violates principles of natural justice (Paras 56-62, following DS Biopharma Limited v. The Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3211).

Case Title: Osaka University Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs:24.12.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 390/2022:2025:DHC:11878:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nippon Steel Corporation Vs. The Controller of Patents


Nippon Steel Corporation filed a patent application in India on 01.07.2021 for a high-strength steel sheet invention involving four employee-inventors, one of whom, Kohichi Sano, had passed away before filing. The company submitted Form 1 signed by the three living inventors, a declaration referencing internal Basic Regulations assigning employee inventions to the company, and later an employment agreement of the deceased inventor. The Controller refused the application vide order dated 27.11.2024, holding that the employment agreement and declaration did not constitute sufficient proof of right under Section 7(2) of the Patents Act, particularly since the inventor was deceased and no assignment from his legal representative or death certificate was filed. On appeal, the Delhi High Court examined the documents, distinguished Section 68 (applicable only to granted patents), and held that the duly executed employment agreement combined with the declaration and corporate policy sufficiently established the company's right as assignee under Section 6(1)(b) read with Section 7(2), especially given consistent acceptance of identical documents in six prior granted patents with the same inventors. The Court set aside the refusal order and directed further examination for grant.

  • An employment agreement executed by an employee-inventor, when read with a declaration and internal corporate regulations providing for automatic assignment of inventions conceived during employment, constitutes sufficient “proof of the right” under Section 7(2) of the Patents Act, 1970 to enable the employer-assignee to file a patent application (Paras 42–47).
  • Section 68 of the Patents Act, 1970 applies only to assignment of a granted patent and not to assignment of the right to apply for a patent before grant (Para 38).
  • Section 6(1)(c) requiring assignment from the legal representative of a deceased person has no application where the employer establishes its right as assignee under Section 6(1)(b) through pre-existing employment terms vesting rights in the employer (Paras 14, 40–42).
  • Procedural requirements under the Patents Act are intended to advance justice and not to defeat substantive rights where sufficient documentary evidence of ownership exists (Paras 48–50).

Case Title: Nippon Steel Corporation Vs. The Controller of Patents:24.12.2025: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 10/2025:2025:DHC:11876:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Malkit Singh Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Trademarks

Malkit Singh, proprietor of Makhan Fish Corner, claimed use of the trademark ‘MAKHAN FISH CORNER’ since 1962 for restaurant and food services in Class 43, obtained registration in 2023 after successfully defending an opposition filed by Makhan Fish Co in 2016 which was dismissed in 2022.

However Makhan Fish Co subsequently filed a rectification petition in 2024 leading to the Registrar removing the mark from the register vide order dated 14.08.2025 on the ground that Makhan Fish Co was the prior user with evidence from 1981 while the appellant’s earliest document was from 2013.

The Delhi High Court in appeal found the impugned order non-speaking as it failed to consider or evaluate the appellant’s evidence including third-party affidavits and CA certificates from 2001 substantiating use, ignored substantive objections to maintainability of rectification, overlooked class distinction between Class 29/35 and Class 43 and likelihood of confusion analysis, and violated principles of natural justice by lacking reasons, consequently the appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside and the rectification petition remanded for fresh decision with directions to pass a reasoned order within six months without being influenced by prior observations.

Law Point:

  • A quasi-judicial order, particularly one adversely affecting statutory rights of a registered trademark proprietor, must be a reasoned and speaking order disclosing application of mind to facts, evidence and submissions; failure renders it unsustainable (Paras 18-20).
  • Non-consideration of material evidence on record and proceeding on erroneous assumptions demonstrate non-application of mind (Paras 13, 17).
  • Distinction in classes of goods/services and absence of analysis on likelihood of confusion, trade channels and consumer overlap are essential considerations in rectification proceedings (Paras 15-16).
  • Principles of natural justice and legitimate expectation require statutory authorities to provide reasons for conclusions (Para 20).

Case Title: Malkit Singh Proprietor Makhan Fish Corner Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Trademarks Registry & Anr.:26.11.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 80/2025:2025:DHC:10956:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Saurabh Gupta Vs. Sheopals Pvt. Ltd.

Saurabh Gupta, owner of the registered trademark OPAL in Class 3 since 1992 for cosmetics with substantial goodwill and turnover exceeding ₹28 crores by 2023-24, sued Sheopals Pvt. Ltd. (SPL) in 2024 alleging infringement and passing off by SPL's use of SHEOPAL’S mark launched in the market around that time despite SPL having adopted the mark in 2016, applied for registration in Class 3 in 2018 and 2022 (opposed by Saurabh) and holding registration in Class 5 since 2018. The Commercial Court initially granted ex-parte injunction in favour of Saurabh in August 2024 but vacated it in September 2024; on appeal, a Division Bench remanded the matter in November 2024 criticising dissection of the mark, following which the Commercial Court in April 2025 vacated the injunction citing delay of six years in filing suit despite knowledge of trademark applications and applying dominant part test to find deceptive similarity yet denying relief on account of laches and prejudice to SPL. In cross-appeals, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court disagreed with the Commercial Court's application of anti-dissection and dominant part principles, held that OPAL and SHEOPAL’S were neither visually nor phonetically similar with no likelihood of confusion when viewed as wholes, found no infringement or passing off, upheld vacation of injunction but on the ground of absence of deceptive similarity rather than delay, and dismissed Saurabh's appeal while allowing SPL's appeal to set aside adverse findings on merits.

  • Anti-dissection rule requires comparison of competing marks in their entirety as average consumers perceive them, without breaking into components, and dominant part test applies only exceptionally where one element overwhelmingly dominates perception (Paras 13.3-13.10).
  • Marks OPAL and SHEOPAL’S are neither visually, structurally nor phonetically similar; prefix SHE in SHEOPAL’S sufficiently distinguishes the marks as wholes, resulting in no likelihood of confusion or deception (Paras 13-20).
  • No infringement under Section 29(2)(b) of Trade Marks Act, 1999 or passing off established where marks lack deceptive similarity despite identical/similar goods in Class 3 (Paras 21-22).
  • Delay/laches not relied upon as primary ground but noted that knowledge of trademark application does not necessarily imply knowledge of actual use in market (Paras 23-25).

Case Title: Saurabh Gupta Vs. Sheopals Pvt. Ltd.26.11.2025: FAO (COMM) 175/2025: 2025:DHC:10443-DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd Vs KRBL Limited

Introduction: The case of Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd v. KRBL Limited, decided by the High Court of Delhi, represents a significant judicial interpretation in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPR) litigation in India, particularly concerning the interplay between procedural rules governing IPR disputes and the general transfer powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). 

This matter revolves around a transfer petition seeking to shift a copyright infringement suit from a District Court to the High Court's Intellectual Property Division (IPD) for consolidation with a related rectification petition. The decision underscores the High Court's broad discretionary authority to streamline IPR proceedings to prevent multiplicity and conflicting judgments, even when the underlying suit does not qualify as a "commercial" matter under specialized legislation. This ruling emerges against the backdrop of evolving IPR frameworks in India, following the abolition of bodies like the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and the establishment of dedicated IPD rules to expedite dispute resolution. 

By affirming the primacy of Section 24 of the CPC over restrictive interpretations of Rule 26 of the IPD Rules, 2022, the court sets a precedent for efficient case management in IPR cases, highlighting the need for harmonious construction of statutory provisions to serve the ends of justice. The judgment not only facilitates consolidated adjudication but also reflects the judiciary's proactive stance in adapting procedural norms to the complexities of modern IPR enforcement, where overlapping issues of copyright validity and infringement often span multiple forums.

Factual Background:The dispute originates from allegations of copyright infringement involving trade dress and artistic works in the food industry, specifically basmati rice packaging. KRBL Limited, a prominent player in the rice export market known for its "India Gate" brand, initiated a suit in 2021 before the Additional District Judge at Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, against Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd. The suit accused Fair Food of infringing KRBL's copyright in its trade dress, seeking remedies including a permanent injunction, passing off declaration, rendition of accounts, and damages. 

The trade dress in question pertained to visual elements like packaging design, which KRBL claimed as proprietary. In response, KRBL also filed a rectification petition before the High Court's IPD, aiming to expunge Fair Food's copyright registration No. A-121365/2017 for a similar artistic work, arguing it was invalid or improperly granted. Fair Food, on the other hand, contested these claims, asserting the legitimacy of its registration and denying any infringement. The factual matrix reveals a classic IPR tussle where both parties claim rights over similar aesthetic elements in product packaging, a common issue in competitive markets like food exports. 

The suit was valued below the Rs. 3 lakh threshold, rendering it a non-commercial matter under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, while the rectification petition fell squarely under the High Court's IPR jurisdiction post the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, which transferred such matters from the defunct IPAB to High Courts.

Procedural Background: KRBL's suit (TM No. 305 of 2021) filed in the District Court, where interim applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for injunction and under Order VI Rule 17 CPC for plaint amendment were pending, indicating the matter was at an nascent stage without substantial progress. Parallelly, KRBL's rectification petition (C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 707/2022) was lodged before the High Court's IPD. Fair Food then filed the transfer petition (TR.P.(C.) 7/2024) under Section 24 CPC read with Rule 26 of the IPD Rules, seeking to transfer the District Court suit to the High Court for joint hearing with the rectification petition to avoid duplicative proceedings. 

Fair Food's counsel argued that the early stage of the suit, overlapping IPR issues, and the IPD Rules' consolidation powers justified the transfer, citing precedents like Patola Industries v. Mahesh Namkeen Pvt Ltd, where similar transfers were ordered. They emphasized that Rule 26 empowers consolidation of related IPR matters and that Section 24 CPC provides general transfer authority, not limited to commercial courts. 

In opposition, KRBL's counsel contended that Rule 26 applies only to suits before commercial courts, as the suit's low valuation excluded it from such classification, and transfers must be read restrictively in conjunction with CPC provisions. They relied on Fox & Mandal v. Somabrata Mandal from the Calcutta High Court, stressing the importance of procedural stage and potential delays, and Sonani Industries Pvt Ltd v. Sanjay Jayantibhai Patel, where a rectification was stayed pending suit disposal. 

Reasoning and Decision of Court: In its detailed analysis, the court, presided over by Justice Tejas Karia, meticulously dissected the interplay between Rule 26 of the IPD Rules and Section 24 of the CPC. The court acknowledged the respondent's (KRBL's) primary objection that Rule 26 limits transfers to matters pending before commercial courts, as explicitly stated in the rule, which allows the IPD to exercise Section 24 powers only for such consolidations. However, the court adopted a harmonious interpretation, holding that Rule 26 does not curtail the High Court's inherent general powers under Section 24 CPC, which permit transfers of any subordinate court proceedings at any stage, even suo motu, to prevent multiplicity and ensure consistent adjudication. 

The court reasoned that the reference to Section 24 in Rule 26 is merely clarificatory and does not restrict its broader application, emphasizing that both provisions share the objective of avoiding conflicting decisions in related matters. Applying this to IPR disputes, where parties often pursue remedies across forums, the court noted the identical subject matter—copyright validity and infringement—in the suit and rectification petition, making consolidation expedient. It distinguished precedents like Fox & Mandal, where advanced procedural stages and delays weighed against transfer, observing that the present suit was at an early juncture with pending interim applications, causing no prejudice. Similarly, Sonani Industries was differentiated due to Supreme Court directives for expeditious suit disposal, which were absent here. 

The court also referenced its prior exercises of transfer powers in Loreal India Pvt Ltd and Patola Industries, even if consensual, to affirm that non-commercial IPR matters can be transferred under Section 24 independently of Rule 26. Ultimately, the court allowed the transfer petition, directing the District Court suit to be transferred to the High Court, renumbered, and consolidated with the rectification petition for joint hearing on March 16, 2026, while disposing of the transfer petition and listing the rectification accordingly.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:  The judgment settles a crucial point of law regarding the scope of transfer powers in IPR proceedings under the IPD Rules vis-à-vis the CPC. Specifically, it clarifies that Rule 26 of the IPD Rules, which empowers the High Court to consolidate related IPR matters and transfer those pending before commercial courts using Section 24 CPC, does not limit or circumscribe the general transfer authority under Section 24 CPC for non-commercial IPR suits. The court establishes that Section 24 confers wide, independent powers on the High Court to transfer any subordinate court proceeding involving IPR subject matter, irrespective of commercial classification, to avoid multiplicity, parallel adjudication, and conflicting decisions. This harmonious construction ensures that the IPD Rules supplement rather than restrict CPC provisions, promoting efficient resolution in IPR disputes where overlapping issues are common. By rejecting a narrow reading of Rule 26, the decision affirms the judiciary's discretion in case management, setting a benchmark for future transfers in hybrid commercial-non-commercial IPR litigations.

Case Title: Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd Vs KRBL Limited 
Date of Order: 04.12.2025 
Case Number: TR.P.(C.) 7/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:11705
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi 
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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