Paramvir Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. IIFL Finance Ltd.,

Paramvir Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. IIFL Finance Ltd.:04.04.2026: Commercial Suit No. 126 of 2025: 2026:BHC-OS:11426: BOMBHC:Justice Gauri Godse,H.J.

The Plaintiffs, collectively referred to as the Mordani Group, are real estate developers who had availed substantial loan facilities from IIFL Finance Ltd. and IIFL Home Finance Ltd. (Defendant Nos. 1 and 2) for the development of three projects known as La Maison, Signature Suites, and the Celyn Project. Upon default in repayment, the loan account was declared a non-performing asset on 3rd November 2024, following which a series of legal actions were initiated against the Plaintiffs, including a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act dated 14th November 2024, invocation of personal guarantees on 9th November 2024, and proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code on 12th December 2024. 

In an attempt to resolve all disputes amicably, a Framework Agreement dated 20th December 2024 was executed between the Mordani Group and IIFL Finance Ltd. and IIFL Home Finance Ltd., providing for a composite settlement of all loan facilities. Vensco Developers LLP (Defendant No. 3) was nominated as a new developer for two of the three projects and entered into a separate Memorandum of Understanding and Profit Sharing Agreement with the Plaintiffs. However, the Mordani Group admittedly failed to meet its obligations under the Framework Agreement by the deadline of 31st December 2024, which per the agreement's own terms resulted in automatic termination of the settlement. 

IIFL Home Finance Ltd. proceeded to issue a possession notice under the SARFAESI Act dated 18th February 2025. The Plaintiffs filed a Commercial Suit seeking specific performance of the Framework Agreement and the Profit Sharing Agreement, without first undergoing the mandatory pre-litigation mediation process prescribed under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, pleading the urgency of imminent dispossession and enforcement action as justification. 

The Defendants moved applications for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the triple grounds of: non-compliance with Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; bar under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 restraining courts from granting injunctions to stay proceedings under SARFAESI; and bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act which excludes civil court jurisdiction over matters falling within the domain of the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

The Defendants argued that the Framework Agreement had admittedly terminated automatically by 31st December 2024, that the suit was therefore based on a dead agreement, that the Plaintiffs had waited two months after the possession notice dated 18th February 2025 before filing suit in May 2025, and that the urgency pleaded was therefore a camouflage to bypass the mandatory pre-litigation mediation requirement. 

They further submitted that Defendant No. 2 had not signed the Framework Agreement and therefore no cause of action lay against it, and that no cause of action was disclosed against Defendant No. 3 either. 

The Plaintiffs countered that the suit had been filed on 7th May 2025 and that they had moved with alacrity before the summer vacation beginning 9th May 2025, that the possession notice and the threat of dispossession despite the settlement represented genuine urgency, that the Framework Agreement had been acted upon by all parties including Defendant No. 3 who had received transfer of two projects, and that post-filing conduct was irrelevant when deciding a plaint rejection application under Order VII Rule 11.

The Court f observed that the plaintiffs had genuinely sought urgent interim relief due to ongoing enforcement actions and apprehension of loss of secured assets, thereby attracting the exemption under Section 12-A. 

Relying upon decisions including Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815, and Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd., the Court reiterated that rejection of plaint is a drastic power and that the test is whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated from the standpoint of the plaintiff. Holding that triable issues arose and no statutory bar was clearly established on the face of the plaint, the Court dismissed all applications for rejection of plaint and permitted the commercial suit to proceed. 

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Paramvir Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. IIFL Finance Ltd. and Others: Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Section 12-A of Commercial Courts Act and Rejection of Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

Interplay of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 12-A Commercial Courts Act 2015 in the context of urgent interim relief

Introduction:The judgment delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Paramvir Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. IIFL Finance Ltd. and Others is an important decision concerning the interplay between the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and the provisions relating to rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court examined whether a commercial suit seeking specific performance and urgent interim relief could be rejected at the threshold for non-compliance with mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act.

The judgment assumes considerable importance for commercial litigation because it clarifies the meaning of the expression “urgent interim relief” under Section 12-A and explains the limited jurisdiction of courts while exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court also discussed the extent of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and reiterated that civil courts retain jurisdiction where substantive contractual and specific performance issues are involved beyond the scope of Debt Recovery Tribunal proceedings.

Court undertook a detailed analysis of recent Supreme Court precedents interpreting Section 12-A and emphasized that the Court must examine the pleadings holistically from the standpoint of the plaintiff while determining whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The plaintiffs were developers engaged in slum rehabilitation and redevelopment projects known as “La Maison,” “Signature Suites,” and “Celyn Project.” For the purpose of financing these projects, the plaintiffs had availed various loan facilities from defendant nos. 1 and 2, including loans secured through mortgages and deposit of title deeds relating to certain flats and premises. 

Due to defaults in repayment obligations, one of the loan accounts was declared a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 3 November 2024. Thereafter, defendant no. 2 initiated several recovery measures. Demand notices were issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 on 14 November 2024. Proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were initiated regarding dishonoured cheques. Arbitration proceedings were also invoked under the relevant loan agreements, and insolvency proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were initiated against certain guarantors. 

According to the plaintiffs, while the disputes were ongoing, the parties entered into a comprehensive settlement arrangement through a Framework Agreement dated 20 December 2024. Under this agreement, a new developer, defendant no. 3, was appointed for certain redevelopment projects, and a profit-sharing arrangement was also executed. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had accepted and acted upon the Framework Agreement by obtaining benefits under it, including assignment and transfer of development rights and execution of registered agreements relating to flats and redevelopment projects. 

The plaintiffs further alleged that despite taking benefits under the settlement arrangement, defendant nos. 1 and 2 continued coercive recovery actions under the SARFAESI Act and sought enforcement of security interests. Apprehending imminent loss of secured assets and breach of the Framework Agreement, the plaintiffs instituted a commercial suit seeking enforcement and specific performance of the Framework Agreement and related profit-sharing arrangements. Interim reliefs were also sought restraining the defendants from taking precipitative actions against the secured assets. 

The defendants thereafter filed Interim Applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. They argued that the suit was barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, lacked cause of action, and was also barred due to non-compliance with mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act. 

Dispute Before the Court:

The principal dispute before the Court was whether the plaint in the commercial suit was liable to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Three major legal objections were raised by the defendants.

First, the defendants contended that the civil court’s jurisdiction was barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act because the dispute essentially related to enforcement of security interests and recovery proceedings, matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

Second, it was argued that there was no cause of action against certain defendants, particularly defendant no. 2, because it was allegedly not a signatory to the Framework Agreement.

Third, and most importantly, the defendants argued that the suit was barred under Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act since the plaintiffs had not exhausted the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation before filing the commercial suit. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs had merely used the plea of urgent interim relief as a camouflage to bypass the statutory mediation requirement. 

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the suit primarily sought specific performance and enforcement of contractual obligations arising under the Framework Agreement and profit-sharing arrangement, which could not be adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the SARFAESI mechanism. The plaintiffs further contended that urgent interim relief was genuinely required because coercive actions under SARFAESI proceedings threatened their rights and assets despite the settlement arrangement already being acted upon by the parties. 

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

Court undertook a detailed examination of the plaint and the legal principles governing rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court observed that the substantial prayers in the suit related to enforcement and implementation of the Framework Agreement and the profit-sharing arrangement with defendant no. 3. The Court noted that the plaintiffs had specifically pleaded that the agreements were acted upon and that the defendants had availed benefits arising from them. 

The Court rejected the argument that the suit was barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Justice Godse observed that although the plaintiffs had challenged certain SARFAESI measures, the substantive reliefs sought in the suit related to specific performance of contractual obligations and implementation of settlement agreements. Such issues were outside the scope of adjudication by the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the SARFAESI framework. Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court judgment in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Frontline Corporation Ltd., where it was held that the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred only in respect of matters which the DRT or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine under the SARFAESI Act. 

The Court further held that sufficient cause of action had been pleaded against all defendants. Justice Godse observed that the plaint specifically alleged that defendant no. 2 had acted upon the Framework Agreement and thereafter initiated coercive actions contrary to the settlement arrangement. Since the pleadings disclosed triable issues concerning contractual obligations and alleged breaches, rejection of the plaint at the threshold was impermissible. 

A substantial part of the judgment dealt with interpretation of Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court examined the legislative scheme mandating pre-institution mediation in commercial disputes where urgent interim relief is not contemplated. Justice Godse referred extensively to recent Supreme Court decisions including Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815, and Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd.

In Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, the Supreme Court had declared Section 12-A mandatory and held that commercial suits filed without pre-institution mediation are liable to rejection unless urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated.

The Court then discussed the Supreme Court judgment in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815 : (2024) 3 SCC (Civ) 436. In that decision, the Supreme Court clarified that the expression “contemplate urgent interim relief” requires courts to examine the plaint, documents, and surrounding circumstances from the plaintiff’s standpoint. The Supreme Court also warned that parties should not camouflage ordinary disputes as urgent matters merely to bypass mediation requirements. At the same time, the Court clarified that non-grant of interim relief at a later stage does not automatically justify rejection of the plaint. 

Justice Godse also referred to the Supreme Court judgment in Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd., where it was held that rejection of plaint is a drastic power terminating a civil action at the threshold and therefore the conditions under Order VII Rule 11 CPC must be applied strictly. The Supreme Court further emphasized that the real test is whether urgent interim relief could reasonably be contemplated from the plaintiff’s standpoint at the time of institution of the suit. 

The Court additionally referred to the recent Supreme Court decision in Novenco Building and Industry, where the Supreme Court held that courts must examine whether there exists a real need for urgent intervention by looking at the immediacy of harm, irreparable prejudice, or the risk of losing rights and assets. In Novenco, which concerned continuing patent and design infringement, the Supreme Court observed that insisting upon mediation in the face of ongoing infringement could leave the plaintiff remediless. 

Applying these principles, Justice Godse concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated the existence of urgent circumstances. The pleadings revealed that despite settlement agreements being acted upon, the defendants were continuing recovery proceedings, enforcing security interests, and threatening possession of secured assets. From the standpoint of the plaintiffs, there was genuine apprehension of irreparable harm requiring immediate judicial protection. 

The Court therefore held that the plaint could not be rejected for non-compliance with Section 12-A because the suit genuinely contemplated urgent interim relief. The Court also reiterated that rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is permissible only where the bar is clearly apparent on the face of the plaint itself. Since substantial and triable issues arose in the present case, the matter deserved full adjudication through trial. 

Final Decision of the Court:

The Bombay High Court dismissed all interim applications filed by the defendants seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court held that no statutory bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act or Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act was clearly established at the threshold stage. The Court further held that the plaintiffs had genuinely contemplated urgent interim relief and that the pleadings disclosed substantial triable issues concerning enforcement of the Framework Agreement and related contractual obligations. Consequently, the commercial suit was permitted to proceed in accordance with law. 

Point of Law Settled in the Case:

The judgment settles important principles concerning the scope of Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act and rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court clarified that the test for exemption from mandatory pre-institution mediation is whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated from the standpoint of the plaintiff on a holistic reading of the plaint and supporting documents.

The judgment further establishes that the mere existence of SARFAESI proceedings does not automatically bar civil suits seeking substantive reliefs of specific performance and enforcement of settlement agreements. The Court also reaffirmed that rejection of plaint is a drastic remedy which can only be exercised where the statutory bar is clearly evident on the face of the plaint without requiring adjudication of disputed issues.

Importantly, the judgment reinforces the principle that courts must prevent misuse of Section 12-A while simultaneously ensuring that genuine cases requiring urgent protection are not denied access to judicial remedies merely on technical procedural grounds.

Case Title: Paramvir Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. IIFL Finance Ltd. and Others

Date of Order: 4 April 2026

Case Number: Commercial Suit No. 126 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:11426

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Gauri Godse

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Headnote

The Bombay High Court held that a commercial suit seeking enforcement of a Framework Agreement and urgent interim protection against coercive recovery actions could not be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for non-compliance with Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act. The Court ruled that the test under Section 12-A is whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated from the standpoint of the plaintiff on a holistic reading of the plaint and documents. The Court further held that substantive reliefs relating to specific performance and contractual enforcement are not barred merely because SARFAESI proceedings are pending. Reiterating that rejection of plaint is a drastic remedy, the Court held that disputed and triable issues must ordinarily proceed to trial.

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Bharat Bhogilal Patel Vs TVS Electronics Ltd

Bharat Bhogilal Patel Vs TVS Electronics Ltd.:07.05.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 359 of 20172026:BHC-OS:12044:BombHC: Arif S. Doctor, J.

The Plaintiff, Bharat Bhogilal Patel, holds two patents granted in August and October 2003 , one for an improved laser marking and engraving machine, and another for a process of manufacturing engraved design articles on metals or non-metals. He filed patent infringement suits against TVS Electronics Ltd. and Kalelkar Surgicals Pvt. Ltd. The Defendants moved applications under Order XIII-A CPC seeking summary dismissal of the suits, and one Defendant additionally sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, contending that the patents had already been revoked by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and that no cause of action existed.

The factual backdrop was complex. The IPAB had revoked both patents by a first order dated 12th June 2012. The Plaintiff challenged this before the Madras High Court, which stayed the first order. The IPAB thereafter passed two further revocation orders in March 2013 and March 2014. The Bombay High Court subsequently set aside the first order in September 2015 and remanded the matter to the IPAB. Throughout this period, the Plaintiff continued paying renewal fees and the Controller of Patents maintained both patents as "in force" on the e-Register. The Defendants argued the second and third revocation orders were independent and had attained finality since the Plaintiff never challenged them.

Court  rejected this contention emphatically. A plain reading of the operative portions of the second and third orders revealed they were entirely premised on and consequential to the first order, which itself had been set aside. Applying the Supreme Court's principle in Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu regarding consequential orders, the Court held that once the foundation order falls, orders built upon it cannot stand independently. The Court further noted that the subsequent revocation orders were never given effect , no communication was sent to the Controller under Section 117D(2) of the Patents Act, the patents continued to be renewed and shown as subsisting, and the Controller had itself affirmed in affidavits before the Delhi High Court and in the present proceedings that the patents remained "in force" due to the various stay orders. The Defendants' own failure to seek deletion of the patents under Section 71(c) of the Patents Act further undermined their case.

On the Order VII Rule 11 application, the Court held that the plaint did disclose a cause of action and that the Defendants were impermissibly attempting to travel beyond the plaint to raise disputed questions of fact, which is outside the limited scope of that provision. Several triable issues were identified, including whether the second and third orders were truly independent, the legal effect of the stay orders, the significance of continued renewal, and whether the Plaintiff suppressed material facts.

The Court dismissed all four Notices of In the case of Bharat Bhogilal Patel v. TVS Electronics Ltd., decided on 7 May 2026 by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Justice Arif S. Doctor dismissed multiple applications filed by the defendants seeking summary dismissal of patent infringement suits instituted by inventor Bharat Bhogilal Patel. The matter arose from Commercial IP Suit No. 359 of 2017 and connected proceedings, where the plaintiff alleged infringement of two patents relating to laser marking and engraving technology. The defendants argued that the patents had already been revoked by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) through subsequent revocation orders passed in 2013 and 2014, and therefore no infringement action could survive. They also sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC alleging suppression of material facts.

The Bombay High Court, however, held that the subsequent revocation orders were entirely consequential to the original IPAB revocation order dated 12 June 2012, which had already been set aside and remanded by the Court earlier. The Court observed that the later revocation orders lacked independent reasoning and were dependent upon the first revocation order. The Court further noted that the patents continued to remain “in force” in the Patent Office records, renewal fees were continuously accepted, and even the Controller of Patents had treated the patents as subsisting in official communications and affidavits. Justice Arif S. Doctor held that several triable issues arose regarding the legal effect of the revocation orders, renewal of patents, and conduct of the Patent Office, making summary dismissal impermissible under Order XIII-A CPC. The Court also rejected the plea for rejection of plaint, holding that disputed questions of fact and law could not be adjudicated at the threshold stage. Consequently, all notices of motion filed by the defendants were dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000, and the suits were directed to proceed to trial. 

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Bharat Bhogilal Patel v. TVS Electronics Ltd. and Connected Matters: Bombay High Court Clarifies Effect of Consequential Patent Revocation Orders and Scope of Summary Dismissal in Patent Infringement Suits

Patent Holder’s Right to Full Trial Despite Revocation Orders

Introduction:

The judgment delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Bharat Bhogilal Patel v. TVS Electronics Ltd. is delas with the legal effect of patent revocation proceedings, continuation of patent rights during pending litigation, and the limited scope of summary dismissal under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in commercial intellectual property disputes. The Court was called upon to decide whether patent infringement suits could be summarily dismissed merely because certain revocation orders had been passed by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), even though the foundational revocation order had already been set aside and the patents continued to remain “in force” in the official patent register.

Court examined the interplay between revocation proceedings, stay orders passed by constitutional courts, the conduct of the Patent Office, and procedural provisions governing commercial suits. The judgment assumes significance because it protects the principle that disputed and complex questions concerning subsistence of patent rights must ordinarily proceed to trial rather than being decided summarily at an interlocutory stage. The Court also clarified that consequential administrative or quasi-judicial orders may collapse once the foundational order upon which they depend is set aside.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The plaintiff, Bharat Bhogilal Patel, was the proprietor of two patents granted in the year 2003 relating to laser marking and engraving technology. One patent was titled “Improved laser marking and engraving machine” while the second patent related to a “Process of manufacturing engraved design articles on metals or non-metals.” The plaintiff instituted multiple commercial patent infringement suits against various defendants alleging unauthorized use of the patented technology. 

After grant of the patents, several revocation applications were filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai. One such application filed by Aditi Manufacturing Company resulted in an IPAB order dated 12 June 2012 revoking both patents. The plaintiff challenged this revocation order before the Madras High Court, which on 19 November 2012 stayed the operation of the revocation order. The stay continued from time to time. Subsequently, the IPAB passed additional revocation orders dated 14 March 2013 and 7 March 2014 in connected proceedings filed by other parties. 

The Madras High Court later disposed of the writ petitions on jurisdictional grounds while continuing interim protection and granting liberty to approach the Bombay High Court. Thereafter, the Bombay High Court by order dated 3 September 2015 set aside the original IPAB revocation order dated 12 June 2012 and remanded the matter back to the IPAB for fresh consideration. Meanwhile, the plaintiff continued paying renewal fees for the patents, and the Controller of Patents continued to reflect both patents as “in force” in the electronic register of patents. 

The defendants thereafter moved applications under Order XIII-A CPC seeking summary dismissal of the patent infringement suits and also filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint. The principal argument advanced by the defendants was that the subsequent revocation orders of 2013 and 2014 remained unchallenged and independently revoked the patents, thereby destroying the plaintiff’s cause of action. 

Dispute Before the Court:

The central dispute before the Court was whether the subsequent revocation orders passed by the IPAB in 2013 and 2014 had an independent legal existence or whether they were merely consequential to the original revocation order dated 12 June 2012 which had already been set aside by the Bombay High Court.

The defendants argued that since the later revocation orders were never separately challenged by the plaintiff, the patents stood independently revoked. According to the defendants, a patent infringement suit cannot survive if the patent itself has ceased to exist. They further contended that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts by not specifically disclosing the later revocation orders in the plaint and had attempted to create an artificial cause of action through clever drafting. Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court decisions in Anita International v. Tungabhadra Sugar Works Mazdoor Sangh, (2016) 9 SCC 44, Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group, (2011) 3 SCC 363, Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366 and T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467. 

The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the later revocation orders were entirely dependent upon the first revocation order of 2012. Since the foundational order had been stayed and later set aside, the subsequent orders automatically lost their legal foundation. The plaintiff further emphasized that the Patent Office itself had continuously treated the patents as subsisting by accepting renewal fees and maintaining the patents as “in force” in the official register. Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court decision in Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 8 SCC 395, dealing with the doctrine of consequential orders. 

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Court found that the later orders expressly stated that they were being passed “in view of” the earlier revocation order dated 12 June 2012. The Court observed that although the second order briefly referred to lack of novelty and inventive step, it contained no independent reasoning or analysis supporting those findings. The later revocation orders were therefore not independent adjudications but were clearly derivative and consequential in nature. 

The Court relied significantly upon the Supreme Court judgment in Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 8 SCC 395. In Badrinath, the Supreme Court had held that when a foundational order is set aside by a superior authority, all consequential proceedings and actions flowing from that order also collapse automatically. Applying this principle, Justice Doctor held that once the original revocation order dated 12 June 2012 had been set aside by the Bombay High Court on 3 September 2015, the subsequent revocation orders based upon it also became vulnerable and ineffective. 

Another significant aspect considered by the Court was the conduct of the Patent Office. The Court observed that despite the later revocation orders, the Controller of Patents had continued accepting renewal fees and maintaining the patents as subsisting in the e-register. Official communications issued by the Patent Office to customs authorities also recognized the patents as valid and enforceable. The Court held that these circumstances strongly indicated that the subsequent revocation orders had never actually been implemented or given effect to by the statutory authorities. 

The Court also referred to Section 117D(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, under which revocation orders passed by the IPAB were required to be communicated to the Controller. The continued existence of the patents in the official register suggested that the revocation orders were either not implemented or stood suspended due to the continuing effect of judicial stay orders. 

While considering the defendants’ plea for summary dismissal under Order XIII-A CPC, the Court reiterated that summary judgment can only be granted where there is no real prospect of success and no compelling reason for trial. The Court clarified that the word “real” excludes fanciful or completely hopeless claims, but where substantial and triable questions arise, the matter must proceed to evidence. Court identified several substantial issues requiring adjudication, including whether the later revocation orders were independent or consequential, whether the setting aside of the original revocation order nullified the later orders, and what legal effect flowed from continued renewal and recognition of the patents by the Patent Office. 

The Court further criticized the misuse of Order XIII-A CPC by the defendants. It noted that although the summary dismissal applications were filed in 2019, the defendants had allowed them to remain pending for several years. According to the Court, the conduct of the defendants appeared aimed at delaying the progress of commercial patent suits rather than achieving expeditious adjudication, which is the true object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 

On the question of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court reiterated the settled legal principle that only the averments contained in the plaint can be examined at that stage. The Court held that the defendants were effectively asking the Court to adjudicate disputed factual and legal questions by relying on external materials and rival interpretations. Such an exercise was beyond the limited jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court therefore refused to reject the plaint. 

Final Decision of the Court:

The Bombay High Court dismissed all the Notices of Motion filed by the defendants under Order XIII-A CPC as well as the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court held that the plaintiff had a real prospect of success and that several important triable issues required full adjudication through evidence. The Court imposed costs of Rs.1,00,000 upon the defendants and directed that the commercial patent suits proceed to trial. The Court also observed that misuse of summary dismissal provisions in commercial disputes deserved discouragement through imposition of realistic costs. 

Point of Law Settled in the Case:

The judgment settles important legal principles concerning patent revocation and commercial litigation procedure. The Court clarified that consequential revocation orders based entirely upon an earlier foundational order may lose their legal effect once the foundational order is set aside. Merely subsequent revocation order does not disentitle the plaintiff's right of trial,in case first revocation order is not final.The decision also emphasizes that continued recognition of patents by statutory authorities and maintenance of patents as “in force” may create substantial triable issues preventing summary dismissal of infringement suits.

The Court further reaffirmed that Order XIII-A CPC cannot be used to short-circuit complex patent disputes involving disputed facts and unresolved legal questions. Summary dismissal is permissible only where the claim is completely devoid of merit and incapable of succeeding. Similarly, applications under Order VII Rule 11 CPC cannot be converted into mini trials requiring examination of disputed external material.

The judgment therefore strengthens procedural safeguards in commercial intellectual property litigation and reinforces the principle that complicated questions concerning patent validity and enforceability ordinarily deserve full trial.

Case Title: Bharat Bhogilal Patel v. TVS Electronics Ltd. and Connected Matters

Date of Order: 7 May 2026

Case Numbers: Notice of Motion CD No. 820 of 2018, Notice of Motion CD No. 1604 of 2019 in Commercial IP Suit No. 359 of 2017 along with connected matters

Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:12044

Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Arif S. Doctor

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Effect of Setting Aside Foundational Revocation Orders in Patent Litigation

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Headnote

Where subsequent patent revocation orders passed by the IPAB were entirely consequential to an earlier revocation order that was later set aside by the High Court, the Bombay High Court held that substantial triable issues survived regarding the continued validity and subsistence of the patents. The Court ruled that patent infringement suits could not be summarily dismissed under Order XIII-A CPC merely on the basis of disputed revocation proceedings, particularly when the Patent Office itself continued to maintain the patents as “in force.” The Court further clarified that disputed questions concerning the legal effect of revocation orders, judicial stays, and renewal of patents require full trial and cannot be conclusively determined under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or summary judgment jurisdiction.

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Prashant Kishor Vs The State of Bihar

In in Prashant Kishor vs The State of Bihar Through The Principal Secretary & Ors., decided on 12 May 2026 in CR. WJC No. 271 of 2020, Neutral Citation: 2026:PHHC:____, the Court examined allegations relating to alleged theft and misuse of political campaign data and intellectual property connected with the “Bihar Ki Baat” and “Baat Bihar Ki” campaigns. The informant alleged that confidential campaign material, data, algorithms and designs stored in a laptop were unlawfully accessed and later used by political strategist Prashant Kishor for his campaign. The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR registered under various provisions of the IPC including cheating, forgery and conspiracy. The Court held that the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 420 IPC were not made out as there was no allegation of creation of a “false document”, dishonest inducement, or deception at inception. Relying on landmark precedents including Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj and R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, the Court observed that copyright does not subsist in mere ideas or themes and criminal prosecution cannot continue where foundational ingredients of the alleged offences are absent. The Court concluded that continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process and accordingly quashed the FIR against the petitioner.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Prashant Kishor vs State of Bihar: Patna High Court Quashes FIR in Political Campaign Intellectual Property Dispute

Patna High Court on Copyright and Criminal Law: No Forgery or Cheating in “Baat Bihar Ki” Campaign Case

Can Political Campaign Ideas Be Copyrighted? Detailed Analysis of Prashant Kishor Judgment

Patna High Court Clarifies Difference Between Copyright Infringement and Criminal Offences in Election Campaign Case

Forgery, Cheating and Copyright Claims in Political Consultancy: Analysis of CR.WJC No. 271 of 2020

No Copyright in Mere Ideas: Patna High Court Relies on R.G. Anand While Quashing FIR Against Prashant Kishor

Detailed Analysis of Patna High Court Judgment on Political Campaign Data Theft and Intellectual Property Rights

Criminal Proceedings Cannot Continue Without Ingredients of Offence: Patna High Court in Prashant Kishor Case

Detailed Analytical Article

Introduction

The recent judgment delivered by Patna High Court in Prashant Kishor vs The State of Bihar Through The Principal Secretary & Ors., decided on 12 May 2026 in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 271 of 2020, is an important ruling dealing with the intersection of intellectual property law, criminal law, political consultancy, and copyright protection. The case arose from allegations that political strategist Prashant Kishor had unlawfully used confidential campaign material, data, and political concepts allegedly developed by another political consultant for use in the “Baat Bihar Ki” political campaign during the Bihar Legislative Assembly Elections.

The judgment is significant because the Court examined whether allegations relating to use of campaign ideas, data, concepts, and political strategies could amount to criminal offences such as cheating, forgery, conspiracy, and copyright infringement. The Court also discussed the legal distinction between an “idea” and its “expression” under copyright law and clarified the circumstances in which criminal proceedings can be initiated in intellectual property disputes.

The decision further reiterates settled principles that criminal prosecution cannot be used as a pressure tactic in disputes that essentially lack the necessary ingredients of criminal offences. The Court carefully analysed various landmark judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with forgery, cheating, conspiracy, and copyright law before ultimately quashing the FIR against the petitioner.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose in connection with the Bihar Legislative Assembly Elections. The informant, who was also engaged in political and election consultancy work, claimed that he had conceived and developed a data-driven political campaign titled “Bihar Ki Baat”. According to him, the campaign included concept notes, campaign structures, political workflow models, socio-economic data, designs, and algorithms. It was also claimed that a domain name associated with the campaign, namely “www.biharkibaat.in”, had been registered by him in January 2020.

The informant alleged that one Osama Khurshid, who had earlier worked with him as a political activist, stopped attending the office in February 2020 and left with an office laptop containing confidential campaign material and political data. It was further alleged that shortly thereafter, Prashant Kishor launched a campaign titled “Baat Bihar Ki” and registered the domain “www.baatbiharki.in”.

The principal allegation against the petitioner was that he had conspired with the co-accused to obtain access to confidential political material and thereafter used the same in his political campaign without authorization. The informant further alleged that the petitioner was the mastermind behind the alleged theft and misuse of intellectual property.

An FIR was thereafter registered invoking provisions relating to cheating, forgery, conspiracy and allied offences under the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR on the ground that even if the allegations were accepted in entirety, no criminal offence was made out.

The petitioner argued that the dispute was essentially civil in nature and related to alleged intellectual property claims. It was also contended that no ingredients of forgery, cheating, or conspiracy were satisfied and that criminal law had been wrongly invoked.

On the other hand, the informant argued that the work created by him was original intellectual property resulting from critical analysis, data synthesis, and unique political research. It was contended that the petitioner had unlawfully benefited from stolen confidential material and that the offences under the Copyright Act and IPC were clearly attracted.

Dispute Before the Court

The core dispute before the Court was whether the allegations contained in the FIR disclosed the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code along with allegations connected to copyright infringement.

The Court was required to determine whether alleged use of campaign ideas, data, political concepts and strategies could amount to forgery or cheating under criminal law. Another important issue was whether criminal proceedings could continue in absence of allegations showing deception, false representation, inducement, or creation of false documents.

The Court also examined whether copyright protection could extend to political campaign themes, concepts, and broad ideas and whether use of similar campaign material necessarily amounted to piracy or theft of intellectual property.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the legal ingredients of forgery under Sections 463 and 464 IPC and offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The Court relied heavily upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 751, where the Supreme Court explained the meaning of a “false document” under Section 464 IPC. The Supreme Court had clarified that forgery requires creation of a false document by impersonation, unauthorized alteration, or deception.

The Court further relied upon Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj & Anr., (2018) 7 SCC 581, wherein the Supreme Court held that forgery cannot exist unless the accused himself is the maker of the false document. The High Court observed that in the present case there was no allegation that Prashant Kishor had made, altered, signed, sealed, or executed any false document whatsoever. The allegations merely related to alleged use of data and campaign material.

The Court observed that the foundational requirement for offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC is the existence of a false document within the meaning of Section 464 IPC. Since no such false document existed in the allegations, the offences of forgery were not attracted.

The Court next examined the allegation of cheating under Section 420 IPC. For this purpose, reliance was placed on Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950, where the Supreme Court reiterated that cheating requires deception at inception, dishonest inducement, and delivery of property as a consequence of such deception.

The Court also referred to Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 12 SCC 483, Mariam Fasihuddin v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 11 SCC 733, and A.M. Mohan v. State by S.H.O., (2024) 12 SCC 181. These judgments consistently held that dishonest inducement and deception are indispensable ingredients for attracting Section 420 IPC.

Applying these principles, the Court held that there was no allegation that the petitioner induced the informant to deliver property or made any false representation to him. The informant himself alleged that the co-accused independently left with the laptop. At best, the allegations suggested later use of campaign material, which did not satisfy the ingredients of cheating.

The Court further held that since the substantive offences themselves were not made out, the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC could not survive independently.

An important aspect of the judgment concerns copyright law. The Court relied upon the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in R.G. Anand v. Delux Films & Ors., (1978) 4 SCC 118. The Supreme Court in that case had authoritatively held that copyright does not subsist in ideas, themes, subject matter, plots, or concepts, but only in their specific expression. The Court quoted the observations that similarities arising from common themes do not automatically amount to plagiarism or copyright infringement.

The High Court explained that political campaign ideas, concepts, and themes by themselves may not enjoy copyright protection unless there is substantial copying of protected expression. The Court emphasized that where an idea is expressed differently or developed independently, no copyright violation arises.

The Court also referred to Krishika Lulla v. Shyam Vithalrao Devkatta, (2016) 2 SCC 521, where the Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings relating to alleged misuse of a film title and clarified that copyright does not subsist in mere titles or general concepts.

The judgment therefore clearly distinguished between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas under copyright law. The Court observed that criminal prosecution cannot continue merely on vague allegations of idea theft or conceptual similarities.

Final Decision of the Court

After analysing the FIR and applicable legal principles, the Court concluded that none of the offences alleged against the petitioner were prima facie made out. The Court held that there was no allegation satisfying the legal ingredients of forgery, cheating, conspiracy, or criminal misuse of intellectual property.

The Court further held that continuation of criminal proceedings in absence of essential ingredients of the offences would amount to abuse of process of law. Consequently, the FIR and criminal proceedings against Prashant Kishor were quashed.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settles several important legal principles. It reiterates that criminal prosecution for forgery requires existence of a “false document” as defined under Section 464 IPC and mere use of allegedly copied ideas or data does not amount to forgery.

The judgment also clarifies that cheating under Section 420 IPC requires deception at inception and dishonest inducement resulting in delivery of property. Mere subsequent use of information or material, without inducement or deception, cannot attract criminal liability for cheating.

Most importantly, the Court reaffirmed the settled copyright principle that ideas, themes, political concepts, and broad campaign strategies are not protected by copyright law. Copyright protects only the original expression of an idea and not the idea itself.

The decision is therefore an important precedent in cases involving political consultancy, campaign strategies, data-driven intellectual creations, and criminal allegations arising out of intellectual property disputes.

Case Details

Title of the Case: Prashant Kishor Vs The State of Bihar Through The Principal Secretary & Ors.

Date of Order: 12 May 2026

Case Number: CR. WJC No. 271 of 2020

Neutral Citation: 2026:PHHC:____

Name of Court: Patna High Court

Hon’ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice _______

Headnote

The Patna High Court quashed criminal proceedings against political strategist Prashant Kishor arising out of allegations relating to misuse of political campaign data and intellectual property associated with the “Baat Bihar Ki” campaign. The Court held that offences of forgery under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC were not made out in absence of any “false document” under Section 464 IPC. The Court further ruled that ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC, namely deception, dishonest inducement and delivery of property, were completely absent. Relying upon R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, the Court reiterated that copyright does not subsist in ideas, themes or concepts and protects only original expression. The FIR was quashed as continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Baldev Singh Vs. Godran Rubber Plastic Industries

In Baldev Singh Vs. Godran Rubber Plastic Industries, I.A. No. 9590 of 1998 in Suit No. 934 of 1997, decided on 1 May 1999, reported as 1999 SCC OnLine Del 329 : (1999) 19 PTC 365, the High Court of Delhi dealt with an application seeking amendment of pleadings in a design infringement dispute. The judgment was delivered by Justice Dalveer Bhandari. The plaintiff sought amendment of the plaint to claim prior adoption and continuous use of the footwear design since 1989, despite earlier pleadings asserting rights primarily based on registration obtained in 1994 under the Designs Act, 1911.

The defendant opposed the amendment on the ground that the plaintiff had earlier made clear admissions in the plaint, replication, and cancellation proceedings that no sale of the footwear bearing the impugned design had taken place prior to 25 August 1994. It was argued that the proposed amendment would completely alter the original case and withdraw admissions already made before the Court.

The Delhi High Court observed that although courts generally adopt a liberal approach while allowing amendments, such amendments cannot be permitted when they introduce a wholly inconsistent case or seek to withdraw admissions without satisfactory explanation. The Court relied upon precedents including Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal, (1998) 1 SCC 278, and Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1976) 4 SCC 320, holding that amendments causing irretrievable prejudice to the opposite party should not be allowed.

Finding the plaintiff’s conduct lacking bona fides and holding that the proposed amendment was contrary to the earlier pleadings and admissions, the Court dismissed the amendment application with costs of Rs. 5,000.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Amendment of Pleadings Cannot Be Used to Withdraw Earlier Admissions: A Detailed Analysis of Baldev Singh v. Godran Rubber Plastic Industries

Amendment of Pleadings and Withdrawal of Admissions

Introduction

The decision in Baldev Singh v. Godran Rubber Plastic Industries, reported as 1999 SCC OnLine Del 329 : (1999) 79 DLT 513 : (1999) 19 PTC 365, is an important judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi on the principles governing amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The judgment explains the limitations upon a party seeking to amend pleadings after making clear admissions before the Court. The case is significant in intellectual property and civil litigation because it clarifies that while courts generally adopt a liberal approach in allowing amendments, such liberty cannot be extended to permit a litigant to completely change the foundation of the case or withdraw admissions already made in judicial proceedings.

The judgment was delivered by Justice Dalveer Bhandari on 1 May 1999 in the context of a design infringement dispute concerning footwear designs under the Designs Act, 1911. The Court examined the balance between procedural flexibility and judicial fairness. The ruling emphasized that procedural law cannot be misused to introduce a dishonest or contradictory case after litigation has already progressed on a different factual basis.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose from a suit filed by Baldev Singh against Godran Rubber Plastic Industries alleging infringement of a registered footwear design. The plaintiff claimed rights over a footwear design popularly known as “Article No. 002.” The design had been registered under Design No. 167995 on 25 August 1994 under the Designs Act, 1911.

During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking amendment of the plaint. Through the proposed amendment, the plaintiff intended to introduce a new plea stating that he had conceived and adopted the footwear design as early as the year 1989 and had continuously used it since then. The amendment further sought to claim exclusive rights based on prior adoption, continuous user, and copyright in the design. The plaintiff also proposed to include sales figures from earlier years in support of the claim.

The plaintiff explained that documents proving user since 1989 had only recently been discovered after extensive searches. According to the plaintiff, those documents had earlier remained unavailable because the business had originally functioned as a partnership concern before eventually becoming a sole proprietorship.

The defendant strongly opposed the amendment application. It was argued that the original plaint was entirely based upon the plaintiff’s statutory registration obtained in 1994. More importantly, the defendant pointed out that the plaintiff had repeatedly made categorical admissions in earlier pleadings that no sale of the footwear bearing the impugned design had taken place prior to 25 August 1994. Similar admissions had also been made by the plaintiff in proceedings relating to cancellation of the design registration.

The defendant contended that the amendment was not merely clarificatory but amounted to a complete reversal of the plaintiff’s original case. It was argued that allowing such amendment would seriously prejudice the defence and would permit the plaintiff to escape the consequences of previous admissions made before the Court.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff could be permitted to amend the plaint in a manner that introduced an entirely new factual foundation inconsistent with earlier pleadings and admissions.

The plaintiff argued that courts should generally adopt a liberal approach toward amendment of pleadings and should permit amendments necessary for proper adjudication of disputes. Reliance was placed upon settled principles that procedural rules are intended to advance justice and not defeat it.

The defendant, however, maintained that amendments cannot be permitted when they fundamentally alter the nature of the suit or seek to withdraw clear admissions. The defendant argued that the proposed amendment was mala fide and was intended to overcome weaknesses exposed during litigation.

Thus, the dispute essentially concerned the limits of judicial discretion under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and whether procedural flexibility could extend to permitting contradictory pleas after binding admissions had already been made.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

Court acknowledged at the outset that courts generally adopt a liberal attitude while considering amendment applications. The Court accepted the established legal principle that amendments should ordinarily be allowed if they help determine the real controversy between the parties.

However, the Court clarified that this principle is not absolute. An amendment cannot be permitted if it changes the fundamental character of the suit, introduces an entirely new cause of action, or seeks to withdraw admissions previously made.

The Court examined the plaintiff’s earlier pleadings. It noted that in the original plaint, the plaintiff had relied mainly upon the statutory registration dated 25 August 1994. More importantly, in the replication and cancellation proceedings, the plaintiff had categorically denied any sale or commercial use of the design prior to the date of registration. These statements constituted clear judicial admissions.

The Court found that the proposed amendment directly contradicted those earlier admissions because the plaintiff was now claiming continuous use since 1989. According to the Court, permitting such amendment would effectively allow the plaintiff to abandon the original foundation of the suit and substitute an entirely different case.

The Court relied upon the Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Kumaraswami Gounder v. D.R. Nanjappa Gounder (Dead), AIR 1978 Mad 285, where it had been held that amendments cannot be permitted if they introduce a totally different cause of action or substitute a completely new case under the guise of amendment. The Full Bench had emphasized that amendments are permissible only to clarify or elaborate existing facts already forming part of the original pleadings.

The Court also relied upon the Division Bench decision in Mahinder Singh v. Iqbal Kaur, 1995 Rajdhani Law Reporter 469, which observed that amendments withdrawing admissions can be permitted only where the admission resulted from inadvertent error and where the explanation inspires confidence.

Further reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Panchdeo Narain v. Km. Jyoti, 1984 Supp SCC 594 : AIR 1983 SC 462. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that withdrawal of admissions may sometimes be permitted, but only where a satisfactory explanation exists demonstrating inadvertence or mistake.

The Court then discussed the important Supreme Court judgment in Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal, (1998) 1 SCC 278 : AIR 1998 SC 618. In Heeralal, the Supreme Court had relied upon the earlier three-Judge Bench decision in Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram & Co., (1976) 4 SCC 320 : AIR 1977 SC 680. Those cases established that amendments introducing inconsistent pleas that completely displace the other side from admissions already made cannot ordinarily be permitted because such amendments would cause irretrievable prejudice to the opposite party.

Applying those principles, Justice Dalveer Bhandari concluded that the plaintiff’s proposed amendment lacked bona fides. The Court found that the amendment was clearly inconsistent with earlier pleadings and admissions and was an afterthought intended to improve the plaintiff’s position after litigation had progressed.

The Court therefore held that procedural law could not be used as a tool to introduce contradictory stands and that judicial admissions cannot casually be withdrawn through amendment applications.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for amendment of the plaint. The Court held that the proposed amendment was contrary to the original pleadings and replication and sought to introduce a completely inconsistent case. The Court further held that the amendment was not bona fide and would seriously prejudice the defendant.

Accordingly, the amendment application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

The judgment settled the important principle that although courts generally adopt a liberal approach while allowing amendments of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, such amendments cannot be permitted where they introduce a completely new and inconsistent case or seek to withdraw clear admissions previously made before the Court.

The case further establishes that admissions in pleadings carry significant evidentiary value and cannot casually be withdrawn unless a convincing explanation showing inadvertent error or genuine mistake is provided. The decision reinforces the principle that procedural law must serve justice and fairness and cannot be used to manipulate litigation strategy by changing foundational facts midway through proceedings.

Case Details

Title of the Case: Baldev Singh v. Godran Rubber Plastic Industries

Date of Judgment: 1 May 1999

Case Number: I.A. No. 9590 of 1998 in Suit No. 934 of 1997

Neutral Citation: 1999 SCC OnLine Del 329

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Dalveer Bhandari

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Detailed Analysis of 1999 SCC OnLine Del 329
Can Admissions in Pleadings Be Withdrawn by Amendment?
Design Infringement and Amendment of Pleadings Under CPC
Important Delhi High Court Ruling on Amendment of Plaint
Order VI Rule 17 CPC Explained Through Baldev Singh Case
Supreme Court Principles on Amendment of Pleadings Applied by Delhi High Court

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Headnote

The Delhi High Court in Baldev Singh v. Godran Rubber Plastic Industries, 1999 SCC OnLine Del 329, held that although amendments of pleadings should generally be liberally allowed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, courts cannot permit amendments that introduce a completely inconsistent case or seek to withdraw clear admissions previously made in pleadings and related proceedings. The Court observed that judicial admissions carry substantial value and can only be withdrawn upon satisfactory explanation of inadvertent mistake. Since the plaintiff sought to alter the foundation of the suit by introducing a contradictory plea of prior user after previously denying such use, the amendment application was dismissed with costs.

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Geobrugg AG Vs Techfab (India) Industries Limited

High Court of Himachal Pradesh Dismisses Application for Rejection of Plaint in Patent Infringement Suit by Geobrugg AG Against Techfab (India) Industries Limited

Geobrugg AG Vs Techfab (India) Industries Limited:06.05.2026:OMP No. 343 of 2025 in Civil Suit No. 23 of 2024:2026:HHC:15075:High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma

The High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, in OMP No. 343 of 2025 in Civil Suit No. 23 of 2024, decided on May 6, 2026 by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, dismissed the defendant’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint filed by Swiss company Geobrugg AG.

Geobrugg AG, owner of Indian Patents IN 448244 and IN 454374 relating to high-tensile steel wire mesh (TECCO) for protection against rockfall and natural hazards, sued Techfab (India) Industries Limited for patent infringement. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s “High Tensile Steel Rhomboidal Wire Mesh” infringes its patents, based on samples procured from a third party (Urbtech) in Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, supported by expert evidence.

The defendant sought rejection of the plaint on grounds including lack of cause of action, non-joinder of necessary party (Urbtech), failure to exhaust pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and improper form.

Justice Sandeep Sharma held that non-joinder of a party is not a ground for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The court found that the plaint disclosed a clear cause of action, the suit was not barred by law, and the defendant’s product was available for sale in Himachal Pradesh (including via IndiaMart), conferring territorial jurisdiction. Pre-institution mediation was not mandatory as the suit contemplated urgent interim relief. The application was accordingly dismissed, allowing the patent infringement suit to proceed.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Himachal Pradesh High Court on Patent Infringement and Rejection of Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

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Geobrugg AG v. Techfab (India) Industries Limited: Detailed Analytical Article

Patent Infringement Suit Cannot Be Rejected for Non-Joinder of necessary party

Introduction:  The decision delivered by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Geobrugg AG v. Techfab (India) Industries Limited is an important ruling dealing with rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, territorial jurisdiction in patent infringement matters, non-joinder of parties, and the requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The judgment is significant because it clarifies that courts must examine only the plaint and documents filed by the plaintiff while deciding an application for rejection of plaint and should not consider the defence of the opposite party at that stage. The Court also explained that in intellectual property disputes involving continuing infringement, the requirement of urgent interim relief can exempt a plaintiff from mandatory pre-institution mediation. The ruling further discusses how cause of action can arise in a state where infringing goods are delivered and accepted, thereby conferring territorial jurisdiction upon that court.

Factual and Procedural Background: The plaintiff, Geobrugg AG, is a Swiss company engaged in manufacturing high-tensile steel wire mesh systems used for protection against rockfalls, landslides, avalanches, and similar natural hazards. The company claimed ownership over Indian Patent Nos. 448244 and 454374. These patents related to specialized high-tensile wire mesh technology marketed under the trade name “TECCO”.

The defendant, Techfab (India) Industries Limited, was alleged to be manufacturing and selling a competing wire mesh product called “High Tensile Steel Rhomboidal Wire Mesh”, which according to the plaintiff infringed the plaintiff’s patents.

The plaintiff claimed that in May 2024 it became aware that the defendant’s allegedly infringing product had been sold to Urbtech Engineering Construction Private Limited situated in Kullu, Himachal Pradesh. Samples of the product were obtained and tested. Based upon technical examination and expert analysis, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant’s product contained all essential features covered under Claim 1 of both suit patents.

Consequently, the plaintiff instituted a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction under Section 108 of the Patents Act along with interim relief restraining the defendant from manufacturing and selling the infringing product.

Before the suit could proceed substantially, the defendant filed an application under Order I Rule 9, Order I Rule 13, Order VII Rule 11 and Section 151 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint.

Dispute Before the Court: The defendant mainly raised four objections. First, it was argued that the plaint disclosed no valid cause of action and was therefore liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.  Second, the defendant contended that the plaintiff had failed to comply with mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. According to the defendant, there was no real urgency because the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged infringement since May 2024 and yet delayed filing the suit. Third, it was argued that Urbtech Engineering Construction Private Limited, from whom the plaintiff allegedly obtained the product sample, was a necessary party to the proceedings. Since Urbtech was not impleaded, the suit was said to be defective and liable to rejection. Fourth, the defendant challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Himachal Pradesh High Court by arguing that the contract of sale was completed outside Himachal Pradesh. According to the defendant, the goods were delivered to a common carrier in Uttarakhand and payment was also made outside Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, no cause of action arose within Himachal Pradesh.

The plaintiff opposed all these objections and argued that the suit clearly disclosed a cause of action for patent infringement, that urgent interim relief was being sought against continuing infringement, that Urbtech was not a necessary party, and that part of the cause of action arose within Himachal Pradesh because the infringing goods were delivered and accepted there.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court: The Court emphasized that while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must examine only the averments contained in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiff. The defence of the defendant or allegations in the written statement are irrelevant at that stage.

After discussing the legal framework, the Court examined whether the plaint in the present case disclosed a cause of action. The Court noted that the plaintiff had specifically pleaded ownership of valid patents, sale of infringing products by the defendant, procurement of product samples, technical testing, and expert evidence showing infringement. Therefore, the plaint clearly disclosed a cause of action and could not be rejected at the threshold.

On the issue of non-joinder of Urbtech, the Court held that non-joinder or misjoinder of parties is not a ground for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court observed that under Order I Rule 9 CPC, no suit shall fail merely because of non-joinder of parties.

The Court further accepted the plaintiff’s argument that Urbtech was merely a purchaser or distributor and no substantive relief had been sought against it. Since the plaintiff alleged infringement against the manufacturer itself, namely the defendant company, Urbtech was not a necessary party.

On the issue of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, the Court noted that the statutory requirement does not apply where the suit contemplates urgent interim relief.

The final major issue concerned territorial jurisdiction. The defendant argued that the sale transaction was completed in Uttarakhand when goods were handed over to the carrier and therefore Himachal Pradesh courts lacked jurisdiction.

The Court analyzed Sections 39 and 41 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Section 39 deals with delivery to carrier while Section 41 provides that a buyer is not deemed to have accepted goods unless he has had reasonable opportunity to examine them.

The Court observed that the invoice itself stated that quality-related complaints could be raised within seven days from receipt at the consignee location. This showed that the contract was not treated as finally complete merely upon dispatch through the carrier.

Accordingly, the Himachal Pradesh High Court concluded that the sale transaction attained completion upon acceptance of goods in Kullu, Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, part of the cause of action arose within Himachal Pradesh, conferring territorial jurisdiction upon the Court.

Final Decision of the Court: The High Court dismissed the defendant’s application seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The Court held that the plaint clearly disclosed a valid cause of action for patent infringement. Non-joinder of Urbtech was not a valid ground for rejection of plaint. The suit was not barred by Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act because the plaintiff was seeking urgent interim relief against continuing infringement. The Court further held that part of the cause of action arose within Himachal Pradesh, thereby conferring territorial jurisdiction upon the Court.Accordingly, the commercial suit was permitted to proceed on merits.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles several important principles of commercial and intellectual property law. The decision reiterates that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, courts must examine only the plaint and documents filed by the plaintiff and not the defence raised by the defendant. The judgment clarifies that non-joinder or misjoinder of parties is not a ground for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The ruling further establishes that continuing infringement of intellectual property rights inherently constitutes urgency and therefore suits seeking urgent interim injunctions are exempt from mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. The judgment also explains that in sale transactions involving delivery and subsequent inspection rights, territorial jurisdiction may arise at the place where goods are accepted after examination and not merely where they are dispatched to the carrier.

Case Title: Geobrugg AG Vs Techfab (India) Industries Limited

Date of Order: 6 May 2026

Case Number: OMP No. 343 of 2025 in Civil Suit No. 23 of 2024

Neutral Citation: 2026:HHC:15075

Court: High Court of Himachal Pradesh

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Sandeep Sharma

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Headnote

The Himachal Pradesh High Court held that a plaint in a patent infringement suit cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC merely on the ground of non-joinder of a distributor or purchaser. The Court further held that continuing intellectual property infringement constitutes sufficient urgency to exempt a plaintiff from mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court also ruled that territorial jurisdiction may arise at the place where goods are accepted after examination by the buyer, thereby permitting the patent infringement suit to continue before the Himachal Pradesh High Court.

SEO Tags: Patent Infringement, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, Rejection of Plaint, Commercial Courts Act, Section 12A Commercial Courts Act, Pre Institution Mediation, Territorial Jurisdiction, Intellectual Property Rights, Patent Litigation India, Himachal Pradesh High Court, Geobrugg AG Case, Techfab India Industries, Patent Infringement Suit, Urgent Interim Relief, Non Joinder of Parties, Cause of Action, Commercial Suit, Patent Law India, Civil Procedure Code, Section 48 Patents Act, Sale of Goods Act, IP Litigation, Injunction in Patent Cases, Continuous Infringement, Commercial Courts, AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman, IPAdjutor

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Trimurti Films Private Limited Vs. B62 Studios Private Limited

**Trimurti Films Loses Bid to Block 'Tirchi Topiwale' Use in Dhurandhar: Delhi High Court Refuses Interim Injunction Over Suppression of Material Facts**

Trimurti Films Private Limited Vs. B62 Studios Private Limited:14.05.2026:CS(COMM) 378/2026: 2026:DHC:4280:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Trimurti Films Private Limited, one of India's oldest film production houses founded in 1969 by the late Gulshan Rai and currently managed by his son Rajiv Rai, is the producer of iconic Hindi films including Tridev, Vishwatma, Mohra and Gupt. The dispute centred on the iconic song 'Tirchi Topiwale' from the 1988 film 'Tridev', whose lyrics were written by Anand Bakshi and music composed by Kalyanji-Anandji. In 1988, Trimurti Films had entered into an assignment agreement dated June 30, 1988 with Super Cassettes Industries Private Limited, now the defendant no.3, assigning limited rights for record-based exploitation through cassettes and gramophone records. In the fourth week of March 2026, Trimurti Films discovered that a remixed version of the song titled 'Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)' had been incorporated in the new film 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge', released on March 19, 2026 by defendant no.1 B62 Studios and co-produced with defendant no.2 JIO Studios. Trimurti filed suit seeking to restrain the OTT release of the film to the extent it contained the song.

The defendants mounted a strong defense grounded primarily in the plaintiff's suppression of material facts. Super Cassettes placed on record a legal notice dated April 26, 2016 issued by Trimurti's own law firm Vox Law alleging infringement of Tridev songs in the film 'Azhar', and a reply notice dated May 2, 2016 by Super Cassettes asserting its complete rights under the 1988 agreement. The defendants further demonstrated through court orders and judgments that Trimurti had actively prosecuted multiple copyright lawsuits in various courts between 2016 and 2020, demolishing the plaintiff's claim that its promoter had been out of touch with Indian affairs since 1997. It was also revealed that another song 'Gali Gali' from Tridev had been used in the blockbuster 'K.G.F: Chapter 1' in 2019 without any legal challenge from Trimurti. The trailer of Trimurti's own 2025 film 'Zora' showed the same lawyer Mr. Amey Nargolkar still credited as legal counsel, contradicting Trimurti's claim of ignorance about its legal representatives.

Court refused to grant any interim injunction, applying the well-established principle that a party seeking discretionary equitable relief must approach the court with clean hands and disclose all material facts. The Court relied heavily on the coordinate bench decision in Kent RO System Limited & Anr. v. Gattubhai & Ors.: (2022) SCC OnLine Del 701, affirming that suppression of material facts alone can disentitle a party from equitable relief. Invoking the Latin maxim "suppressio veri suggestio falsi", the Court held that the plaintiff's conduct of concealing prior notices, prior use of Tridev songs in two different films, and active litigation history between 2016 and 2020 amounted to material non-disclosure. The Court also found, prima facie, that a harmonious reading of paragraphs 2(i), 2(xi), 7, 8 and 12 of the 1988 agreement appeared to transfer all rights in the literary, dramatic and musical works of Tridev to Super Cassettes, with the cinematograph film itself being the only exception. The Court further held that it would create an incongruity if the song were permissible in cinema halls but injuncted on OTT, as the legal character of the act could not differ between platforms. Noting that the agreement's definition of "record" in paragraph 1(b) included devices "now or hereafter known", the Court held that digital streaming platforms were covered within the ambit of the 1988 agreement, and that any monetary loss to the plaintiff could be adequately compensated. Accordingly, while refusing injunctive relief, the Court directed Super Cassettes to deposit Rs. 50 Lakhs in court within four weeks, to be held as an interest-bearing FDR for the benefit of whichever party ultimately succeeds at trial.

Disclaimer: Do not treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain subjective errors. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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# When Silence Speaks Louder Than Words: The Tale of Tirchi Topiwale, Trimurti Films, and the Price of Concealment

Clean Hands Doctrine in Copyright Law

Introduction: There is an old saying in law and in life he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. In the world of intellectual property litigation, this principle has particular force when a party approaches a court seeking the powerful and immediate relief of an interim injunction, which is essentially a request to stop someone else's activity before the full facts of a dispute have been examined in a trial. Courts grant such relief cautiously, as a matter of discretion, and only when the party asking for it can demonstrate not only that it has a good legal case but also that it has been honest and transparent with the court about everything that is relevant to its claim.

The judgment delivered on May 14, 2026 by High Court of Delhi in the case of Trimurti Films Private Limited versus B62 Studios Private Limited and Others offers a compelling and somewhat dramatic illustration of what happens when a plaintiff with a potentially arguable legal case undermines its own position through concealment, contradictions, and selective disclosure of facts. The case involves the legendary Bollywood song 'Tirchi Topiwale' from the 1988 blockbuster film 'Tridev', a song that defined an era and remains instantly recognizable to generations of Hindi film lovers. The dispute raises fascinating questions about the scope of old copyright assignment agreements, the rights of film producers versus music labels, the legal significance of long periods of inaction, and the extent to which a court exercising discretionary jurisdiction can  and must  look beyond the technical merits of a claim to the overall conduct of the party seeking relief.

The judgment is significant not only for what it decides but also for the manner in which it decides it. Court engages with complex contractual language from a 1988 agreement, tracks the plaintiff's conduct over a decade of litigation history it had concealed, and arrives at a balanced resolution that neither fully vindicates the plaintiff nor entirely ignores the potential legitimacy of its underlying claim. The Court directed Super Cassettes Industries Private Limited, the music label that is defendant no.3, to deposit Rs. 50 Lakhs in court as a protective measure, while leaving the final determination of rights to trial.

Factual and Procedural Background:Trimurti Films Private Limited is one of Bollywood's most iconic production houses. Founded in 1969 by the late Gulshan Rai, it produced some of Hindi cinema's most memorable films across several decades, including Tridev, Vishwatma, Mohra, Deewar and Gupt. The company is currently managed by Gulshan Rai's son Rajiv Rai. The film 'Tridev', released in 1988, became a massive commercial success and is remembered particularly for its music, including the unforgettable song 'Tirchi Topiwale', with lyrics penned by the legendary Anand Bakshi and music composed by the equally legendary duo Kalyanji-Anandji.

On June 30, 1988, the same day the film was being commercially exploited, Trimurti Films entered into an assignment agreement with Super Cassettes Industries Private Limited, the music label now commonly known as T-Series and referred to in this case as defendant no.3. The agreement assigned certain rights in the literary, dramatic and musical works embodied in the songs of 'Tridev' to Super Cassettes, in exchange for royalty payments. The precise scope of what was assigned under this agreement — and what was retained by Trimurti Films — became the central contractual battleground in the case. Trimurti claimed the assignment was narrow, covering only the manufacture and sale of cassettes and gramophone records, and did not extend to incorporating the songs in any other cinematograph film. Super Cassettes claimed the assignment was broad, transferring all rights in the underlying literary, dramatic and musical works, and giving it the freedom to exploit those works in any manner it chose, including in remixed form in new films.

In or around the fourth week of March 2026, Trimurti Films discovered that a new Bollywood film titled 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' had been released on March 19, 2026. The film had been produced by defendant no.1, B62 Studios Private Limited, with defendant no.2 being JIO Studios, the OTT and production platform. In the said film, a remixed version of 'Tirchi Topiwale', retitled 'Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)', had been incorporated, playing during the closing credits of the film. It was also claimed that the original sound recording of 'Tirchi Topiwale' itself was used within the film. Trimurti asserted that neither it nor defendant no.3 had obtained permission from the plaintiff as the producer and copyright owner of the cinematograph film 'Tridev' before incorporating the song. The remixed version was also being exploited on multiple digital music platforms including Jio, Saavn, Gaana, Spotify, YouTube and Apple Music, generating commercial revenue.

Trimurti filed a civil suit and an application for interim injunction before the High Court of Delhi on April 9, 2026 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to restrain the defendants from infringing its copyright in 'Tirchi Topiwale' and from releasing the film 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' on OTT platforms to the extent it contained the song. Since the film had already been released in cinema halls across India by the time the suit was filed, Trimurti specifically focused its interim prayer on preventing the further exploitation of the song in the forthcoming OTT release of the film and on various digital streaming platforms. 

The Dispute: The dispute operated simultaneously on several levels, each of which the Court was required to examine carefully.

The first and most fundamental level concerned the interpretation of the agreement dated June 30, 1988. Trimurti's position was straightforward  the agreement was a limited assignment covering only the creation and sale of records, meaning physical cassettes and gramophone records, in exchange for royalty payments. Any rights not explicitly assigned remained with Trimurti as the producer of 'Tridev'. In particular, Trimurti argued that the right to incorporate the songs into another cinematograph film  what copyright law calls synchronization rights was never granted to Super Cassettes and therefore remained with Trimurti. Trimurti drew attention to the definition of "record" in Clause (b) of paragraph 1 of the agreement, which specifically excluded "a sound track associated with a cinematograph film", arguing that this showed the agreement was confined to standalone music recordings and not to film synchronization.

Super Cassettes presented a dramatically different reading. It argued that paragraph 2 of the agreement assigned all rights, title and interest in the literary, dramatic and musical works embodied in the film to Super Cassettes, including sweeping rights of publication, sound broadcasting, public performance, mechanical reproduction, and recording. It further relied on paragraph 2(xi) which granted the right to make or authorize the making of any versions of the said work, and paragraph 7 which allowed Super Cassettes to adapt, alter and combine the said work with any other work. Paragraph 8 gave Super Cassettes ownership of the original master recordings and authorship of the records. Paragraph 12 provided that the assignment extended to all songs, dialogues and sequences in the film. Super Cassettes argued that the combined effect of these provisions was an almost complete assignment of musical, literary and dramatic rights, with only the cinematograph film of 'Tridev' itself remaining with Trimurti.

The second level of the dispute concerned what the Court called suppression of material facts. Super Cassettes revealed a series of facts that Trimurti had not disclosed in its plaint. In April 2016, Trimurti had issued a legal notice through its law firm Vox Law, represented by advocate Mr. Amey Nargolkar, to Balaji Motion Pictures, Sony Pictures Networks India and DJ Chetas alleging infringement of two 'Tridev' songs 'Gali Gali Mein Phirta Hai' and 'Gajar Ne Kiya Hai Ishara'  in the film 'Azhar'. Super Cassettes had responded on May 2, 2016 asserting complete rights under the 1988 agreement and directing Trimurti to withdraw its notice. Trimurti never replied to this notice. Despite this notice-reply exchange in 2016, Trimurti's plaint made only a passing, unexplained reference to the film 'Azhar' without disclosing the notice or its reply. Super Cassettes also pointed out that another 'Tridev' song 'Gali Gali' was incorporated in the blockbuster Kannada-Hindi film 'K.G.F: Chapter 1' in 2019, and that Trimurti had taken no legal action against that use either. Additionally, documents showed that Trimurti had actively pursued at least five separate lawsuits in various courts between 2016 and 2020, completely contradicting its claim in the plaint that its promoter Rajiv Rai had been out of touch with Indian affairs since leaving for the United Kingdom in 1997 and was unaware of copyright misuse until his return in 2018-19. Even more damaging was a screenshot from the 2025 film 'Zora' produced by Trimurti, which clearly showed Mr. Amey Nargolkar's name in the legal credits, demonstrating that Trimurti's claimed ignorance of its own legal counsel was untrue.

The third level concerned the practical legal question of whether an OTT-specific injunction was even legally coherent, given that the film had already been released in cinemas with the same allegedly infringing song.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:The Court began by affirming the basic legal framework governing interim injunctions. It noted that such applications are to be decided on the triple test established by the Supreme Court of India  whether the applicant has a prima facie strong case, whether the balance of convenience favors granting relief, and whether the applicant would suffer irreparable injury if relief is refused. But beyond this triple test, the Court emphasized that relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is discretionary, as established by the Supreme Court in Wander Limited versus Antox India Pvt. Ltd.: 1990 Supp SCC 727. Discretionary relief, the Court stressed, can only be obtained by a party that approaches the court with clean hands and does not suppress material facts.

To elaborate on this principle, the Court extracted at length the judgment of a coordinate bench of the Delhi High Court in Kent RO System Limited & Anr. versus Gattubhai & Ors.: (2022) SCC OnLine Del 701. That judgment had held clearly that a party seeking discretionary relief has a duty to disclose all material facts to the court, and that injunctions obtained on account of deliberate suppression of material facts are liable to be vacated on that ground alone, irrespective of the underlying merits of the claim. The principle, as Justice Gedela articulated it, is captured in the classical maxim "suppressio veri suggestio falsi"  the suppression of truth is equivalent to a suggestion of falsehood.

The Court then turned its attention to the extraordinary factual material that Super Cassettes had placed on record. The notice dated April 26, 2016 issued by Trimurti's own law firm and the reply notice dated May 2, 2016 from Super Cassettes were pivotal. The Court identified at least five separate litigations pursued by Trimurti between 2016 and 2020, which it tabulated in the judgment, demonstrating that the promoter's claim of being out of touch with Indian affairs during this period was demonstrably false. These included Trimurti Films Pvt. Ltd. versus Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. in Comm Suit (L) No.459/2017 before the Bombay High Court dated August 22, 2017, Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd. versus Trimurti Films Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported as 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8999, Trimurti Films Pvt. Ltd. versus M/s Eagle Home Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. in Comm IP Suit No.314/2017 before the Bombay High Court dated December 22, 2018, and Trimurti Films Pvt. Ltd. versus Rohit Shetty Pictures LLP & Ors. in Comm IP Suit No.1015/2019 before the Bombay High Court dated March 5, 2020.

The Court examined the affidavits filed by promoter Rajiv Rai and by Mr. Umesh G. Mehta, Trimurti's representative in India. Rai's affidavit dated May 11, 2026 attempted to explain the non-disclosures by claiming that he had inadvertently forgotten about the 2016 notice when instructing his lawyers to draft the 2026 plaint, and that the use of 'Gali Gali' in KGF Chapter 1 had escaped his attention because it was a Kannada film. The Court found these explanations deeply unconvincing. Mehta's affidavit of May 10, 2026 contradicted the position taken in the plaint about his authority and role. The Court observed that the affidavits not only failed to align with the plaint and the rejoinder but in many instances contradicted them directly. While carefully noting that these observations should not be taken as a final view on the merits of the case, the Court concluded that the affidavits did not instill confidence in the truthfulness of the plaint's recitals and that the non-explanations amounted to a form of continued suppression.

The Court also dealt with Trimurti's argument, based on the Supreme Court judgment in Nizam Sugar Factory versus Collector of Central Excise, A.P.: (2006) 11 SCC 573, that facts already known to the defendant need not be disclosed by the plaintiff and cannot constitute suppression. The Court firmly rejected this argument by pointing out that the duty of disclosure to the court exists independently of whether the defendant happens to know the facts. The Court gave a compelling illustration — if the defendant had not appeared at the first hearing, the court might well have granted an ex parte injunction without knowing any of the suppressed facts. The defendant's knowledge cannot protect the court from being misled, and the duty to disclose runs to the court, not merely to the other party.

The Court then turned to the question of the conduct of the plaintiff over the preceding decade. Super Cassettes had not merely asserted rights under the 1988 agreement — it had actually exercised those rights by incorporating 'Tridev' songs in 'Azhar' in 2016 and in 'K.G.F: Chapter 1' in 2019, both times without any legal challenge from Trimurti after the initial notice-reply exchange in 2016. The Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Sanjit Singh Salwan versus Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1697 for the proposition that a party cannot be allowed to remain in deep slumber while others build commercial and financial positions in reliance on the absence of any legal challenge, and then suddenly awaken and seek to disrupt those positions. The Court noted that defendants no.1 and no.2 had invested enormous sums of money and effort in producing 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' in reliance on the rights licensed by defendant no.3, and that causing them financial ruin at the interim stage purely because of the plaintiff's delayed awakening was inequitable.

The Court then examined the 1988 agreement in considerable detail. It noted a crucial distinction between the present agreement and the agreement examined by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. versus Amrit Sharma & Ors.: 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3772, on which Trimurti had placed heavy reliance. In Shemaroo, the Bombay Court had found that a similar assignment was limited to record-based exploitation. However, Justice Gedela observed that the present agreement had a distinctive feature absent in the Shemaroo agreement — it explicitly defined "the said work" as including literary, dramatic, musical, record and cinematographic film copyrights in the film 'Tridev'. Paragraph 2(i) assigned all rights in the literary, dramatic and musical works embodied in the said work. Paragraph 2(xi) granted the right to make or authorize the making of any versions of the said work. Paragraph 7 allowed Super Cassettes to adapt and combine the said work with any other work. Paragraph 8 made Super Cassettes the owner of the original master plates and the author of the records. Paragraph 12 extended all rights and obligations under the assignment to all songs, dialogues and sequences in the film, irrespective of whether they appeared in the final version. Reading all these provisions together and harmoniously, the Court concluded prima facie that the agreement appeared to grant Super Cassettes very broad rights over the musical, literary and dramatic content of 'Tridev', with the only exclusion being the cinematograph film 'Tridev' itself. The Court further observed that this interpretation appeared to be confirmed by the parties' own subsequent conduct — the failure to challenge the use of 'Tridev' songs in 'Azhar' and 'KGF: Chapter 1' was consistent with an understanding that Super Cassettes had such rights, and was inconsistent with Trimurti's current claim that no such rights existed.

On the question of the OTT-specific injunction, the Court found a fundamental legal incongruity in the position urged by the plaintiff. Trimurti was effectively asking the court to hold that the presence of 'Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)' in 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' was permissible when the film played in a cinema hall but became an infringing act the moment the same film was streamed on an OTT platform. Justice Gedela held that this distinction was legally inconceivable and could not be countenanced. The legal character of an act cannot change depending on the medium through which the same content is transmitted. If the use of the song infringed copyright, it did so in cinemas too and the cinema release would have needed to be addressed. If it did not infringe in cinemas, there was no basis to restrain it on OTT. The Court relied on the Delhi High Court judgment in John Hart Jr. versus Mukul Deora: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3499 for the proposition that where any loss suffered by a party is adequately compensable in monetary terms, an injunction restraining the release of a film ought not to be granted.

On the doctrine of contra proferentem — the rule that ambiguity in a contract should be resolved against the party that drafted it, which Trimurti invoked because Super Cassettes had drafted the 1988 agreement — the Court held that this doctrine only comes into play when there is genuine ambiguity. Having analyzed the agreement and found its provisions to be sufficiently clear on a prima facie reading, the Court declined to apply the doctrine at this stage.

Crucially, however, the Court did not entirely abandon Trimurti. It identified one specific provision in the 1988 agreement that worked in Trimurti's favor in a limited way. Paragraph 1(b) of the agreement defined "record" to include any disc, tape, perforated roll and all other devices "now or hereafter known" in which sounds are embodied for reproduction. The Court interpreted the phrase "now or hereafter known" as a forward-looking clause that was deliberately designed to capture technological developments that could not have been foreseen in 1988, and held that this language was broad enough to cover digital streaming platforms such as Spotify, Gaana, Saavn, JioSaavn, YouTube Music and Apple Music that had come into existence decades after the agreement was signed. Reading this together with paragraphs 2(xi) and 7, the Court found it plausible that Super Cassettes' exploitation of the remixed version on digital music platforms might generate royalty obligations toward Trimurti under the agreement, even if the broader synchronization right was arguably covered by the assignment. To protect against this potential monetary loss while the suit proceeded to trial, the Court directed Super Cassettes to deposit Rs. 50 Lakhs in court within four weeks, to be invested in a fixed deposit by the Registrar General, with the accrued amount to benefit whichever party ultimately succeeds at trial.

Final Decision of the Court: Court declined to grant any interim injunction in favor of Trimurti Films. The application was disposed of with the sole direction that Super Cassettes Industries Private Limited deposit Rs. 50 Lakhs in court within four weeks of the date of the order — May 14, 2026 — in the name of the Registrar General of the High Court, who was directed to invest the amount in an interest-bearing fixed deposit with an auto-renewable clause. The Court clarified expressly that all its observations and conclusions were confined to the interim application and would not be treated as any expression on the final merits of the suit, leaving all questions entirely open for determination at trial. 

Points of Law Settled in the Case:The most important principle affirmed is that the duty of full disclosure to the court is absolute and is owed to the court itself, not merely to the opposing party. The fact that a defendant may be aware of facts not disclosed in a plaint does not cure the suppression or excuse the plaintiff from its duty. A court considering interim relief in ex parte or advance-notice situations would be misled by such non-disclosure, and the possibility of that outcome itself constitutes a serious breach of the duty owed to the court. The second principle is that even where a party has some semblance of statutory or contractual rights, the court is not bound to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in that party's favor if its conduct — including suppression, concealment, inconsistency and prolonged inaction in circumstances where others have altered their positions — makes the exercise of such discretion inequitable. The existence of a legal right does not automatically entitle a party to equitable interim relief. The third important point concerns the interpretation of old copyright assignment agreements in the context of new technology. The Court held that the phrase "now or hereafter known" in a 1988 agreement defining what constitutes a "record" is sufficiently broad to include digital streaming platforms that came into existence decades after the agreement. This has significant implications for old Bollywood music agreements and their applicability to the digital economy. The fourth principle is about the legal impossibility of medium-specific copyright — the Court firmly held that the legal character of an act of communication to the public cannot differ depending on whether it is done in a cinema hall or on an OTT platform. The same use is either infringing or it is not, regardless of the medium. The fifth principle, while not entirely new but powerfully restated, is that sustained inaction by a copyright owner while another party openly exercises rights under a contract — especially when that other party has asserted those rights through formal notices and made substantial commercial investments in reliance on the absence of any legal challenge — generates an equitable estoppel that courts will give serious weight to when considering interim relief, even if statutory acquiescence under the Copyright Act, 1957 does not formally exist.

Case Title: Trimurti Films Private Limited versus B62 Studios Private Limited & Ors.

Date of Order: May 14, 2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 378/2026, I.A. 10246/2026 & I.A. 10293/2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4280

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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OTT Platform Copyright Disputes in India 2026: Delhi High Court's Nuanced Ruling in the Tridev Song Case

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Headnote

Trimurti Films Private Limited v. B62 Studios Private Limited & Ors.

CS(COMM) 378/2026 | 2026:DHC:4280 | High Court of Delhi | May 14, 2026 | Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Copyright Act, 1957 — Sections 14, 21 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 — Interim Injunction — Suppression of Material Facts — Clean Hands Doctrine — Copyright Assignment Agreement — Synchronization Rights — Digital Streaming — OTT Platform — Equitable Estoppel

Plaintiff, producer of cinematograph film 'Tridev' (1988), claimed copyright in song 'Tirchi Topiwale' (lyrics: Anand Bakshi; music: Kalyanji-Anandji) and alleged that its remixed version 'Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)' was incorporated without authorization in 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' (released March 19, 2026) by the defendants. Plaintiff contended that assignment agreement dated June 30, 1988 with defendant no.3 Super Cassettes Industries was confined to record-based exploitation through cassettes and gramophone records and did not encompass synchronization rights or incorporation in another cinematograph film. Defendant no.3 placed on record: (i) legal notice dated April 26, 2016 issued by plaintiff alleging infringement of 'Tridev' songs in film 'Azhar'; (ii) reply notice dated May 2, 2016 by defendant no.3 asserting complete rights; (iii) documentary proof of plaintiff's active litigation between 2016-2020 contradicting its claim of being unaware of industry affairs; (iv) use of 'Tridev' song in 'K.G.F: Chapter 1' (2019) without any legal challenge by plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to disclose these facts in its plaint. Held: (1) Duty of full disclosure in interim injunction proceedings is owed to the court and not merely to the opposing party; the fact that the defendant was aware of suppressed facts does not cure the non-disclosure; Nizam Sugar Factory v. Collector of Central Excise (2006) 11 SCC 573 distinguished. (2) Suppression of material facts — including notices exchanged in 2016, active litigation from 2016-2020, and use of songs in two prior films — constituted conduct that disentitled the plaintiff from discretionary equitable relief; "suppressio veri suggestio falsi" applies. (3) Prima facie, harmonious reading of paragraphs 2(i), 2(xi), 7, 8 and 12 of the 1988 agreement appeared to confer broad rights in musical, literary and dramatic works on defendant no.3, excluding only the cinematograph film itself; Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. v. Amrit Sharma: 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3772 distinguished on ground that present agreement contained distinct definition of "the said work". (4) Medium-specific copyright injunction legally untenable — use of song cannot be permissible in cinema halls but infringing on OTT platform, as legal character of communication to the public cannot differ by medium; John Hart Jr. v. Mukul Deora: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3499 applied. (5) Prolonged inaction by copyright owner while other party openly exercises rights, issues formal notices and makes commercial investments in reliance on absence of legal challenge constitutes equitable conduct relevant to grant of interim relief, even if statutory acquiescence does not exist under the Copyright Act, 1957; Sanjit Singh Salwan v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1697 applied. (6) Phrase "now or hereafter known" in definition of "record" in paragraph 1(b) of 1988 agreement held broad enough to include digital music streaming platforms; potential royalty obligations on defendant no.3 toward plaintiff for digital exploitation recognized. Interim injunction refused. Defendant no.3 directed to deposit Rs.50 Lakhs in court within four weeks to be invested in interest-bearing fixed deposit for benefit of successful party at trial.

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