The Trustee of Princeton University Vs The Vagdevi Educational Society

Trademark user claimed by a party prior to what has been claimed in trademark application

Introduction:

The issue of whether a party can claim use of a trademark prior to what has been declared in a trademark application is a matter of significance in trademark law. This article delves into a notable case involving the trademark "PRINCETON" in the context of educational institutions and services in India.

The case presents a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding the claimed user dates of the trademark. The plaintiff asserts use since 1911, while the defendant's claimed use in India dates back to 1991. The core question is whether a party can assert use prior to what has been declared in their trademark application.

Background of the Case:

In this case, the defendant raised an argument that the plaintiff must restrict its earliest claim of using the "PRINCETON" mark to 1996. This contention was based on the fact that, in the plaintiff's affidavit of user filed with its trademark application in 2012, the plaintiff stated use of the mark starting from 1996. The defendant asserted that this declaration should be binding on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that even if they declared use of the mark from 1996 during the trademark registration process, they should still be entitled to claim use from an earlier date if they could provide irrefutable evidence of such prior use. Essentially, the plaintiff argued that the declaration made during the registration process should not override actual use.

Legal Analysis:

The case was brought before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, which issued a noteworthy judgment providing valuable insights into this legal conundrum. The court's ruling emphasizes several key principles:

Declaration of User:

The court recognized that the declaration of user made at the time of applying for trademark registration is significant. In most cases, it would ordinarily bind the applicant. This declaration is vital for establishing the timeline of use and securing exclusive rights.

Approbate and Reprobate:

The court cited the principles of approbate and reprobate, indicating that a party cannot simultaneously assert use from a particular date during the registration process and claim earlier use if it suits their interests. Ordinarily, the declaration should be consistent with the asserted use date.

Actual Use Prevails:

However, the court emphasized that if the party can indisputably demonstrate actual use of the asserted mark from a point in time earlier than what was declared during registration, this evidence would prevail. In such cases, the court cannot ignore the material presented by the party regarding prior use.

Practical Example:

To illustrate this principle, the court provided a practical example. If the trademark relates to an educational institution's name and the plaintiff declared use from 2010 during registration but could prove that the institution prominently displayed the mark on its premises since 2000, then the use of the mark would be reckoned from 2000, not 2010.

The Concluding Note:

In conclusion, the case involving the trademark "PRINCETON" in the context of educational services highlights the nuanced approach taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi regarding claims of use prior to what has been declared in a trademark application. While the declaration of user is important and should ordinarily be consistent with actual use, the court recognized that evidence of prior use can override the declared date if presented convincingly.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:06/09/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 270/2022

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:6420

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, H.J.

Case Title: The Trustee of Princeton University Vs The Vagdevi Educational Society

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Atlantech Online Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs Google India Pvt. Ltd.

The Maximum Time Limit for Filing Replication in Delhi High Court

Introduction:

In civil litigation, the replication plays a significant role in responding to the defendant's written statement. In the Delhi High Court, the time limit for filing a replication is governed by Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 ("the Original Side Rules"). This article examines the provisions of Rule 5, recent judicial decisions, and their implications on the maximum time limit for filing a replication.

Rule 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018

Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules provides the framework for filing a replication in the Delhi High Court. It is essential to note that this rule applies specifically to suits filed on the original side of the court. The rule establishes the initial time limit for filing a replication at 30 days from the date of service of the written statement. However, Rule 5 contains a critical limitation: "but not thereafter."

The phrase "but not thereafter" is significant, as it unequivocally restricts any extension of time beyond 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period. This means that, even in exceptional and unavoidable circumstances, the maximum allowable time for filing a replication in the Delhi High Court is 45 days from the date of service of the written statement. This strict limitation is intended to promote the expeditious resolution of cases and prevent unnecessary delays in the litigation process.

Judicial Precedent: Ram Sarup Lugani vs. Nirmal Lugani 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1353:

The decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ram Sarup Lugani Vs. Nirmal Lugani, reported as 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1353, is of particular significance in understanding the maximum time limit for filing a replication in the Delhi High Court. In this case, the Division Bench held that the provisions of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, prevail over the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) regarding the time limit for filing a replication.

The Division Bench's ruling affirmed the supremacy of the Original Side Rules in this regard, establishing that the maximum time for filing a replication cannot exceed 45 days from the date of service of the written statement. In light of this decision, any application seeking condonation of delay in filing a replication that exceeds the 45-day limit would be dismissed.

Implications and Analysis:

The Delhi High Court's strict adherence to the 45-day time limit for filing a replication is rooted in the principles of efficiency and expedition.The decision in Ram Sarup Lugani vs. Nirmal Lugani reinforces the importance of adhering to the Original Side Rules and emphasizes the need for litigants and legal practitioners to be diligent in complying with procedural timelines. It also highlights the limited scope for seeking condonation of delay in filing a replication beyond the prescribed 45-day limit.

The concluding Note:

In conclusion, the Delhi High Court's Rule 5, Chapter VII of the Original Side Rules, 2018, establishes a strict maximum time limit of 45 days for filing a replication in suits filed on the original side of the court. The decision of Hon'ble Division Bench, High Court of Delhi in Ram Sarup Lugani vs. Nirmal Lugani reaffirms the supremacy of these rules over the CPC and underscores the importance of adhering to procedural timelines. Legal practitioners and litigants should be mindful of this limitation and exercise due diligence to ensure timely compliance with the prescribed time limits for filing a replication in the Delhi High Court.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:29/08/2023

Case No. CS(COMM) 647/2021

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:6373

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: C Hari Shankar, H.J.

Case Title: Atlantech Online Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs Google India Pvt. Ltd.

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Marie Stopes International Vs Parivar Seva Santha

Weightage of Testimony of a Deceased Witness

Introduction

In the realm of legal proceedings, a crucial question often arises when a witness who has been examined-in-chief passes away before the completion of their cross-examination. This scenario poses a challenging dilemma for courts in assessing the value and weightage to be given to the testimony of such a deceased witness. This article delves into the legal framework surrounding this issue, particularly in the context of a recent case involving Dr. Tim Black, whose testimony was relied upon even though he expired before his cross-examination was completed.

Legal Precedents and Principles

In the case of Krishan Dayal v. Chandu Ram, 1969 SCC OnLine Del 134, the High Court of Delhi established a significant legal precedent. It ruled that a witness's statement in examination-in-chief does not become inadmissible merely due to the witness's subsequent death before cross-examination. The court can consider whether the testimony in question has been corroborated by surrounding circumstances.

A similar viewpoint was upheld by the High Court of Calcutta in Somagutta Sivasankara Reddy v. Palapandia Chinna Gangappa, MANU/AP/1284/2001.

In the case at hand, Dr. Tim Black was examined through video conferencing due to his illness. His cross-examination took place over a span of three days, from 19th to 21st August, 2014, at the High Commission of India in London. However, Dr. Black sadly passed away on 11th December, 2014, before the cross-examination could be completed. The central question that arises is the weight to be given to his testimony under the circumstances.

The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, taking guidance from the aforementioned legal precedents, aptly recognized that Dr. Tim Black's testimony should not be summarily dismissed due to his demise before cross-examination. Instead, the court was tasked with assessing the testimony's credibility and reliability based on the evidence presented. Notably, the court found that Dr. Black's testimony had been sufficiently corroborated by the evidence of Mr. V.K. Govil. In this case testimoany of Dr. Tim Black was relied by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi as the same was duly corroborated by other witness.

The concluding Note:

The legal framework surrounding the testimony of a deceased witness, particularly when cross-examination remains incomplete, is well-established through judicial precedents. In such cases, the courts have consistently held that the testimony should not be deemed inadmissible solely due to the witness's death. Instead, the court must determine the weight to be attached to the testimony by considering the facts and circumstances of the case and assessing whether it is corroborated by other evidence.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:20/09/2023

Case No. C.S.Comm 298 of 2018

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:6806

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Amit Bansal, H.J.

Case Title: Marie Stopes International Vs Parivar Seva Santha

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Kia Wang Vs Registrar of Trademark

Bad Faith and Trademark Cancellation:

Introduction:

Trademark law places a significant onus on trademark registrants to act in good faith when seeking registration and using their marks. In this article, we delve into the case of ROCKPAPA, a brand specializing in children's products, and explore the concept of "bad faith" in trademark registration, particularly in the context of trademark cancellation.

Background'

ROCKPAPA, founded in 2014 in the UK, swiftly gained international recognition for its children's products, including headphones, pencil boxes, and school bags. The brand's trademark, 'ROCKPAPA,' became widely associated with quality and innovation, extending its reach to the USA, Canada, Australia, and India in subsequent years.

In contrast, Respondent No.2 applied for the registration of the mark 'ROCKPAPA' on January 7, 2020. The mark was officially registered under Certificate No. 2500462 on September 13, 2020, as per Trade Mark Journal No. 1966. This registration stands as the focal point of the ongoing dispute.

Understanding Bad Faith:

In trademark law, "bad faith" refers to an unfair practice characterized by a lack of honest intention, a deliberate wrongdoing, and actions that deviate from accepted standards of commercial behavior. 

It entails an intention to capitalize on the goodwill associated with another party's trademark. In the case of ROCKPAPA, it is crucial to scrutinize whether Respondent No.2's adoption of the trademark 'ROCKPAPA' was conducted in bad faith.

Evidence of Bad Faith:

Several aspects of Respondent No.2's actions suggest bad faith:

1. Similarity in Mark: 

Respondent No.2 adopted a mark, 'ROCKPAPA,' strikingly similar to the Petitioner's established trademark. This similarity extended to the use of identical wording, color, font, and style. Such a blatant replication raises suspicions of an intention to confuse consumers and capitalize on the goodwill associated with the original mark.

2. Identical Goods: 

Both parties were involved in the production and sale of children's products, creating direct competition. Respondent No.2's use of 'ROCKPAPA' for identical goods further reinforces the notion of an intention to ride on the coattails of the Petitioner's brand.

3. Lack of Contest: 

Perhaps the most telling sign of bad faith is Respondent No.2's non-contestation. In the face of the Petitioner's challenge, Respondent No.2 failed to appear in the matter, did not file a counter statement, and provided no evidence to rebut the claims of prior usage. This lack of response implies a consciousness of wrongdoing and an unwillingness to defend the legitimacy of the mark.

Trademark Cancellation:

Given the evidence of bad faith, the impugned trademark 'ROCKPAPA' is vulnerable to cancellation. Trademark cancellation is a legal process that rectifies the register by removing marks that were improperly registered. In this case, it seeks to protect the integrity of the trademark system by eliminating marks that were registered in violation of the principles of good faith and fair competition.

The Concluding Note:

Trademark law is fundamentally rooted in the principles of honesty, fair competition, and protection of intellectual property rights. The case of ROCKPAPA underscores the importance of maintaining these principles in trademark registration. Respondent No.2's adoption of the mark 'ROCKPAPA' for identical goods, coupled with the absence of contestation, strongly suggests bad faith. As such, the impugned trademark should rightfully be canceled to uphold the integrity of the trademark system and protect the interests of honest trademark holders like the Petitioner.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:15/09/2023

Case No. C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM)02/2021

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:6684

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Jyoti Singh, H.J.

Case Title: Kia Wang Vs Registrar of Trademark

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Raytheon Company Vs Controller General of Patent

Patent Eligibility for Computer-Related Inventions

Abstract:

This article discusses the evolving standards for patent eligibility in the context of computer-related inventions, with a focus on the requirement of "novel hardware." It examines a recent case where the Indian patent office erroneously applied the 2016 Computer-Related Inventions (CRI) Guidelines, which included the novel hardware requirement, instead of the 2017 guidelines that omitted it. The article argues that the novel hardware standard lacks a legal basis and should not be used as a criterion for patent eligibility in the field of computer-related inventions.

Introduction:

Patent law plays a crucial role in incentivizing innovation by granting inventors exclusive rights to their inventions for a limited period. In the realm of computer-related inventions (CRIs), determining patent eligibility has been a contentious issue. This article delves into the evolving standards for patent eligibility in CRIs, with a particular focus on the controversial "novel hardware" requirement.

The Novel Hardware Requirement:

The excerpt provided in the introduction refers to the contention surrounding the novel hardware requirement as part of the 2016 CRI Guidelines. These guidelines stipulated that, in order to be patent-eligible, a CRI must involve novel hardware. This requirement significantly raised the bar for obtaining patents in the field of CRIs. However, it is essential to highlight that this standard was replaced by the 2017 CRI Guidelines, which did not include the novel hardware requirement. The central issue in the case discussed in the excerpt is whether the patent office erroneously applied the outdated 2016 guidelines, leading to the rejection of the patent application.

Analysis of the Novel Hardware Requirement:

The novel hardware requirement has been a subject of debate in various jurisdictions. Critics argue that it imposes an unduly high standard on CRI inventors and is not rooted in the principles of patent law. The fundamental question is whether the presence of novel hardware should be a prerequisite for patent eligibility in CRIs.

Lack of Legal Basis:

One of the primary criticisms of the novel hardware requirement is its apparent lack of a legal basis. Patent law, at its core, focuses on protecting novel and non-obvious inventions, regardless of whether they involve hardware or software components. The requirement of novel hardware deviates from this fundamental principle and creates an arbitrary distinction within the realm of patent eligibility.

Technological Contribution vs. Novel Hardware:

In the field of CRIs, it is essential to determine whether an invention makes a "technical contribution" or achieves a "technical effect." This assessment focuses on the practical utility and innovation of the invention rather than its hardware components. The excerpt highlights the need for examining whether the invention reduces the time period in scheduling job execution in a High-Performance Computing (HPC) system. This emphasizes the importance of the invention's technical contribution, not the novelty of its hardware.

Evolving Guidelines:

The evolving nature of CRI guidelines further underscores the controversy surrounding the novel hardware requirement. The shift from the 2016 to the 2017 CRI Guidelines indicates a reconsideration of the patent office's stance on this issue. This shift reflects a recognition that the novel hardware standard may not align with the evolving nature of technology and innovation in the CRI field.

The concluding Note: 

In conclusion, the case discussed in the excerpt illustrates the ongoing debate surrounding the patent eligibility of CRIs and the controversial novel hardware requirement. The excerpt argues that the novel hardware requirement lacks a legal basis and should not be used as a criterion for patent eligibility in CRIs. The evolution of CRI guidelines, as demonstrated by the shift from the 2016 to the 2017 guidelines, suggests a growing recognition that patent eligibility should be based on an invention's technical contribution rather than the presence of novel hardware. It is imperative for patent offices and courts worldwide to continue refining their approach to CRIs to strike a balance between incentivizing innovation and upholding the principles of patent law.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:15/09/2023

Case No. C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 121/2022

Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:6673

Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Prathiba M Singh, H.J.

Case Title: Raytheon Company Vs Controller General of Patent

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,

IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney

Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,

Mob No: 9990389539

Marie Stopes International Vs Parivar Seva Santha-Rectification

No prior leave under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is must  in Rectification Proceedings

Factual Background

The case under consideration involves a dispute between a Plaintiff and a Defendant over trademark issues. The Defendant raised an objection to the maintainability of the present rectification petitions on the grounds that no application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 was filed, and no issues were framed in respect thereof in the connected suit. On the other hand, the Plaintiff argued that since the suits were filed based solely on passing off, Section 124 of the Act was not applicable.

The Plaintiff's contention rested on the premise that the Defendant's suit was solely grounded in passing off, with no claims of trademark infringement or any relief sought in that regard. Therefore, according to the Plaintiff, Section 124 of the Act had no relevance to a passing-off suit.

The Role of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 deals with the rectification of the register of trademarks. It empowers the Registrar of Trade Marks to make decisions on rectification applications, and it lays out the procedure for such rectifications. Importantly, Section 124 primarily applies to situations where there are issues concerning the registration of a trademark or its cancellation.

Infringement vs. Passing Off

To understand the crux of this legal dispute, it is vital to distinguish between trademark infringement and passing off. Trademark infringement occurs when someone uses a registered trademark in a way that is likely to deceive or confuse the public. In contrast, passing off is a common law remedy that protects unregistered trademarks or trade dress from misrepresentation and unfair competition.

Analysis of the Legal Arguments

The Plaintiff's argument hinged on the nature of the Defendant's suit, which was premised solely on passing off. The Defendant did not plead trademark infringement or seek any relief related to trademark registration. Given this context, the Plaintiff contended that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 would not be applicable.

The Defendant, on the other hand, asserted that the absence of a Section 124 application and issues framed in the connected suit should render the rectification petitions non-maintainable. This position was based on a strict interpretation of the Act's requirements.

Court's Decision

After considering the arguments presented by both parties, the court found in favor of the Plaintiff. The court determined that since the Defendant's suit was solely founded on passing off and did not involve any claims of trademark infringement or relief related to trademark registration, Section 124 of the Act was not applicable in this case.

Moreover, the court referred to Rule 26 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Properties Rights Division Rules, 2021, which stipulates that rectification proceedings are to be consolidated with civil suits and decided together. This rule emphasizes the importance of considering the specific nature of the suit in question, which in this instance was passing off.

Conclusion

The case highlights the importance of understanding the nuances of trademark law, particularly when it comes to the applicability of provisions like Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. In this instance, the court's decision was grounded in a pragmatic approach that considered the nature of the dispute and the relief sought by the parties involved. Ultimately, the court's finding that Section 124 had no application in a suit for passing off underscores the need for a contextual and case-specific analysis in trademark litigation.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:20/09/2023
Case No. C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 35/2022
Neutral Citation No: 2023:DHC:6805
Name of Hon'ble Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Amit Bansal, H.J.
Case Title: Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate 

Marie Stopes International Vs Parivar Seva Santha

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney
Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,
Mob No: 9990389539

Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Private Limited Vs Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Sahakari Karkhana

The Impact of Acquiescence in an action for Copyright Infringement

Introduction

The case at hand revolves around a copyright infringement dispute between the Plaintiff/Appellant [referred to as the Plaintiff] and the Defendant/Respondent [referred to as the Defendant], both of whom operate in the liquor sale industry. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant's trademark, "TWO PUNCH Premium Label," infringed upon their own trademark, "TANGO PUNCH Label." The Plaintiff not only sought remedies for passing off but also claimed copyright infringement. 

The lower court, in so far as relief of passing off was concern,  initially ruled in favor of the Plaintiff but was later stayed by the Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai, a decision upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. One of the critical aspects leading to this outcome was the doctrine of acquiescence on the part of the Plaintiff.

Acquiescence and its Implications in an action for Copyright Infringement:

Acquiescence is a legal doctrine that arises when a party, through its actions or inactions, appears to accept or tolerate a situation or conduct that would otherwise constitute an infringement of their rights. In this case, the Defendant had applied for permission to use the "TWO PUNCH Premium" label in March 2016. Initially, the Plaintiff objected to this application but later withdrew the objection. This change in stance by the Plaintiff was deemed as acquiescence.

Acquiescence is based on the principle that a party cannot lead another party to believe that their conduct is acceptable and then later claim infringement. By withdrawing the objection, the Plaintiff essentially communicated to the Defendant that they did not consider the use of the label as a violation of their rights. This change in position weakened the Plaintiff's claim of copyright infringement, as they had, in effect, given their tacit approval to the Defendant's use of the similar label.

Proof of Goodwill and Expenditure:

Another pivotal issue in this case was the Plaintiff's failure to establish goodwill associated with their product. To prove goodwill, it is not sufficient to merely present sales figures; one must also demonstrate the expenditure incurred on the promotion and advertisement of the product. Goodwill, in the context of trademark and copyright cases, refers to the reputation and public perception built around a brand or product. In this case, the Plaintiff's inability to substantiate their claim of goodwill weakened their position.

The Plaintiff presented statements of accounts, signed by their Chartered Accountant, which indicated expenses related to advertising and promotion, as well as sales figures. While such documents may serve as prima facie evidence at the initial stages of a case, they must be rigorously proven during the final hearing. The Plaintiff failed to meet this burden of proof in a manner acceptable under the law. Without a solid demonstration of goodwill and related expenditures, their claim was further compromised.

Cooperation in Cross-Examination:

Lastly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also noted the importance of cooperation between advocates during cross-examination. Objections raised during cross-examination can indeed be crucial in determining the truth, but excessive or frivolous objections can unduly prolong trials and impede the administration of justice. The Court emphasized the need for a cooperative approach from members of the Bar to ensure that trials proceed smoothly and efficiently.

The Concluding Note:

In the case of the Plaintiff/Appellant challenging the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Mumbai, the doctrine of acquiescence played a significant role in the ultimate decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Plaintiff's change in position regarding the Defendant's trademark application weakened their claim of copyright infringement. Additionally, their failure to establish goodwill and related expenditure further undermined their case.

This case serves as a reminder of the legal principles surrounding copyright infringement, trademark disputes, and the importance of careful legal strategy. Parties involved in such disputes must be diligent in preserving their rights and be prepared to meet the burden of proof required by the law. Cooperation between advocates during legal proceedings is also crucial to ensure the efficient functioning of the justice system.

Case Law Discussed:

Date of Judgement:14/09/2023
Case No.Civil Appeal No. 2768 of 2023
Neutral Citation No: N. A.
Name of Hon'ble Court: Supreme Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Abhay S Oka Vs Rajesh Bindal, H.J.
Case Title: Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate 
Private Limited Vs Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna 
Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Sahakari Karkhana

Disclaimer:

Information and discussion contained herein is being shared in the public Interest. The same should not be treated as substitute for expert advice as it is subject to my subjectivity and may contain human errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of the fact and issue involved herein.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,
IP Adjutor: Patent and Trademark Attorney
Email: ajayamitabhsuman@gmail.com,
Mob No: 9990389539