Mars Incorporated Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Introduction:

In the intricate landscape of trademark law, the case of Mars Incorporated v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Ors. emerges as a pivotal exploration of procedural fairness and the sanctity of due process. Adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi, this case underscores the critical importance of effective service of notices in trademark opposition proceedings and the judiciary’s role in rectifying administrative oversights. At its core, the dispute revolves around the erroneous abandonment of Mars Incorporated’s trademark application due to alleged non-receipt of opposition notices, raising questions about the interpretation of statutory provisions and the balance between procedural rules and substantive rights. The judgment not only rectifies an administrative error but also sets a significant precedent for ensuring that trademark applicants are not unfairly prejudiced by lapses in communication, making it a cornerstone case for intellectual property practitioners and multinational corporations navigating India’s trademark regime.

Detailed Factual Background:

Mars Incorporated, a globally renowned multinational company incorporated under the laws of the United States, is a titan in the production of chocolate, confectionery, snack foods, main meals, drinks, and pet care products. With a presence in over 100 countries across five continents, Mars owns a portfolio of iconic trademarks, including GALAXY, M&M’s, PEDIGREE, WHISKAS, MILKY WAY, BOUNTY, MARS, TWIX, and SNICKERS. The present case centers on its trademark application no. 4083355 in Class 30, filed on February 11, 2019, for a mark related to its product offerings. The application was published in Trade Marks Journal No. 2017 on September 13, 2021, inviting public opposition as per standard procedure.

Following the publication, two parties—respondent no. 2 (Cadbury UK Limited) and respondent no. 3 (Celebration)—filed notices of opposition, bearing nos. 1141655 and 1141733, respectively, challenging Mars’ application. The Registrar of Trade Marks purportedly served these notices on Mars on March 7, 2022, via despatch nos. 5527006 (for respondent no. 2) and 5527087 (for respondent no. 3). However, Mars contended that it never received these notices, either through email, post, or courier. On February 6, 2023, the Trade Marks Registry issued a public notice in Journal No. 2090, declaring Mars’ application, among others, “deemed to have been abandoned” under Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, for failing to file a counter-statement within the stipulated two-month period.

Upon discovering its application’s inclusion in the abandonment list, Mars promptly submitted a representation to the Trade Marks Registry on March 6, 2023, supported by affidavits from relevant personnel, asserting non-receipt of the opposition notices. Mars argued that the abandonment was erroneous, as the statutory period for filing a counter-statement had not commenced due to ineffective service. Despite these efforts, the Registry marked the application as abandoned on July 20, 2023, prompting Mars to file a review petition on September 4, 2023 (registered on September 5, 2023), seeking reinstatement of the application and rectification of its status to “Opposed.” The Deputy Registrar dismissed the review petition on October 25, 2024, upholding the abandonment order, leading Mars to file the present appeal before the Delhi High Court.

Detailed Procedural Background:

The procedural journey of this case began with Mars’ trademark application filing on February 11, 2019, followed by its publication in the Trade Marks Journal on September 13, 2021. The subsequent filing of opposition notices by respondents no. 2 and no. 3 triggered the Registrar’s obligation to serve these notices on Mars, which was allegedly done on March 7, 2022. The Registry’s public notice of February 6, 2023, declaring the application abandoned, marked a critical turning point, prompting Mars’ representation on March 6, 2023, to contest the decision.

Concurrently, a related writ petition, Intellectual Property Attorneys Association (IPAA) & Anr. v. Controller General of Patents Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM) & Anr. (W.P.(C)-IPD 21/2023), was filed before the Delhi High Court, challenging the issuance of similar public notices and fresh notices by the Controller General. On April 13, 2023, the respondent in that case voluntarily withdrew the impugned notices, and a public notice dated April 21, 2023, restored all affected applications to their original status. Despite this, Mars’ application was inexplicably marked abandoned on July 20, 2023, without considering its earlier representation.

Mars’ review petition, filed on September 4, 2023, sought to rectify this error, but the Deputy Registrar’s dismissal on October 25, 2024, led to the filing of the present appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, registered as C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 88/2024. The appeal was accompanied by two interlocutory applications: I.A. 49485/2024 (unspecified in the document) and I.A. 8631/2025, filed by respondent no. 3 seeking condonation of a 28-day delay in filing its reply affidavit. Notice in the appeal was issued on December 23, 2024, with respondents no. 1 and 2 accepting notice in court, and respondent no. 3 filing its reply affidavit on March 28, 2025. The case was heard by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal, who delivered an oral judgment on April 2, 2025.

Issues Involved in the Case:

The case presented several critical issues for adjudication. First, whether the Notices of Opposition were effectively served on Mars, triggering the statutory period for filing a counter-statement under Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Second, whether the Trade Marks Registry’s abandonment order of July 20, 2023, and the subsequent dismissal of Mars’ review petition on October 25, 2024, were legally sustainable given the alleged non-receipt of notices. Third, whether the provisions of Section 21(2) of the Act and Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, create procedural ambiguity regarding the commencement of the counter-statement filing period. Fourth, whether Mars’ affidavits asserting non-receipt were adequately considered by the Registrar. Finally, whether the court should restore Mars’ application to allow it to file a counter-statement, balancing procedural compliance with the principles of natural justice.

Detailed Submission of Parties:

Appellant argued that the impugned order was fundamentally flawed due to the non-receipt of the Notices of Opposition. Mars relied on affidavits from its personnel, confirming that neither its advocates nor agents received the notices via email, post, or courier. Appellant emphasized that Section 21(2) of the Act mandates that the counter-statement period begins upon receipt of the notice, and without effective service, the abandonment was premature. Appellant cited precedents from the Delhi and Madras High Courts to argue that non-service invalidates abandonment orders and that the Registry’s reliance on Rule 18(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, which deems service complete upon sending an email, creates ambiguity contrary to the Act’s intent. Mars further contended that the Registrar’s impugned order failed to consider its affidavits, undermining procedural fairness.

The Registrar of Trade Marks conceded that no acknowledgment of the email enclosing the Notices of Opposition was received from Mars. This admission weakened the Registry’s position, as it suggested a lack of evidence confirming effective service. Respondent no. 3,  argued that the appeal should be dismissed, asserting that the notices were duly served at the email address provided in Mars’ application. Respondent no. 3 pointed to the Registry’s records, which showed no email delivery failure, and argued that Mars’ failure to file a counter-statement within the prescribed period justified the abandonment. However, respondent no. 3’s reliance on the Registry’s email success report was challenged by Mars’ affidavits and the Registrar’s admission of non-acknowledgment.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties:The court relied on three key precedents cited by Mars, each addressing procedural fairness in trademark opposition proceedings:

Rishabh Jain v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7990: In this case, the Delhi High Court addressed a similar issue where the petitioner claimed non-receipt of a Notice of Opposition due to an incorrect email address. The court found no evidence of service at the specified email and set aside the impugned order, allowing the appeal. This precedent was directly relevant, as Mars similarly contended that the notices were not served at its registered email, supported by affidavits. The court applied this ruling to question the Registry’s claim of service.

Purushottam Singhal v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1641: Another Delhi High Court decision, this case involved an appellant who asserted non-service of a Notice of Opposition. The court, after reviewing the records, found no proof of service and set aside the abandonment order. This judgment reinforced Mars’ argument that the absence of verifiable service invalidates an abandonment order under Section 21(2), particularly when supported by affidavits attesting to non-receipt.

Samsudeen A v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 6309: The Madras High Court’s ruling was pivotal, as it addressed the ambiguity between Section 21(2) of the Act and Rule 18(2) of the Trade Marks Rules. The court held that Rule 18(2), which deems service complete upon sending an email, must be purposively interpreted to align with Section 21(2)’s requirement of receipt. The Madras High Court allowed the appellant to file a counter-statement, directing the Registrar to consider the opposition on merits. This precedent guided the Delhi High Court’s reasoning, emphasizing that a literal interpretation of Rule 18(2) would undermine applicants’ rights.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

Court's reasoning was anchored in a meticulous analysis of statutory provisions, judicial precedents, and the case’s factual matrix. The court began by examining Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which mandates that the counter-statement period commences upon receipt of the Notice of Opposition. In contrast, Rule 18(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, deems service complete when an email is sent, creating a procedural inconsistency. The court agreed with the Madras High Court’s reasoning in Samsudeen A, holding that Rule 18(2) must be interpreted purposively to align with Section 21(2)’s emphasis on receipt, ensuring fairness to applicants.

The court scrutinized the Registrar’s impugned order, which claimed that the notices were served on Mars’ email (trademark@anandandand.com) on March 7, 2022, with an “email sent success report.” However, the order lacked evidence of acknowledgment from Mars, unlike the documented acknowledgment for the opponents’ service. The Registrar’s failure to address Mars’ affidavits, which deposed non-receipt, further undermined the order’s validity. The court noted the Registrar’s admission, through Ms. Nidhi Raman, that no acknowledgment was received from Mars, casting doubt on the effectiveness of service.

Drawing on Rishabh Jain and Purushottam Singhal, the court emphasized that abandonment orders cannot stand without proof of service, particularly when applicants provide credible evidence of non-receipt. The court found Mars’ affidavits compelling, and the Registry’s reliance on an email success report insufficient to counter this evidence. The court also considered the broader context of the IPAA writ petition, where the Registry’s withdrawal of similar notices indicated systemic issues in service procedures, further supporting Mars’ claim of procedural error.

The court concluded that the abandonment order and the dismissal of Mars’ review petition were unsustainable, as they violated the principles of natural justice and statutory intent. To rectify this, the court directed the Registry to re-serve the Notices of Opposition and allow Mars to file a counter-statement, ensuring its right to a fair hearing.

Final Decision:

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order dated October 25, 2024. The matter was remanded to the Trade Marks Registry, with directions to serve the Notices of Opposition afresh to Mars’ counsel within two weeks. Mars was granted the opportunity to file a counter-statement within the prescribed statutory period. The court disposed of the appeal on April 2, 2025, directing the Registry to supply a copy of the order to the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks for compliance.

Law Settled in This Case:

This case establishes several key principles in trademark law. First, effective service of a Notice of Opposition is a prerequisite for triggering the counter-statement period under Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and abandonment orders based on unverified service are invalid. Second, Rule 18(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, must be interpreted purposively to align with Section 21(2)’s requirement of receipt, prioritizing applicants’ rights over procedural presumptions. Third, affidavits attesting to non-receipt of notices constitute credible evidence, and the Registrar must consider them before upholding abandonment. Finally, the judiciary plays a critical role in rectifying administrative errors to uphold natural justice, ensuring that trademark applicants are not unfairly prejudiced by procedural lapses.

Cause Title: Mars Incorporated Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 88/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2463

Date of Decision: 2 April 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Falcon Licensing Limited Vs. PRI Enterprises Private Limited

Introduction:

In the dynamic realm of intellectual property law, the case of Falcon Licensing Limited v. PRI Enterprises Private Limited stands as a compelling testament to the judiciary’s commitment to preserving the integrity of trademark rights. This landmark case, adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi, addresses critical issues of trademark squatting, non-use, and the protection of prior user rights in the face of deceptive registration practices. Centered around the trademark "BOLDIFY," the dispute encapsulates the tension between a foreign entity’s established brand identity and a domestic entity’s alleged mala fide registration. The judgment not only reinforces the sanctity of the trademark register but also sets a robust precedent for combating opportunistic trademark practices, making it a pivotal study for intellectual property practitioners and businesses alike.

Detailed Factual Background:

Falcon Licensing Limited, a New Zealand-based company, emerged as the petitioner in this case, seeking the cancellation of the trademark "BOLDIFY," registered by PRI Enterprises Private Limited (Respondent No. 1) under application no. 3867168 in Class 3. The petitioner’s claim rested on its long-standing association with the "BOLDIFY" mark, which was first adopted in 2016 by its predecessor-in-interest for hair care products. The mark was used continuously and exclusively, gaining significant global recognition through sales on platforms like www.amazon.com since August 2016 and via the domain www.getboldify.com. The predecessor-in-interest secured trademark registrations in the United States as early as March 27, 2016, for hair shampoos, conditioners, and sprays, with further registrations in countries like New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

In 2017, the petitioner was incorporated to manage the intellectual property assets of the "BOLDIFY" brand. Boldify Inc., a U.S.-based subsidiary, was established in 2018 to operate the brand, and by 2020, it had filed for trademark registration in India under Class 35, which was granted in 2022. An Assignment Agreement dated January 25, 2021, transferred all rights in the "BOLDIFY" trademarks to the petitioner, solidifying its global ownership. The petitioner’s business flourished, with annual sales escalating from USD 48,662 in 2016-17 to a projected USD 17,000,000 in 2023-24, supported by substantial advertising investments.

In contrast, PRI Enterprises, incorporated in December 2017, operated as a micro-enterprise dealing in rubber and plastic products, vacuum storage bags, and household articles. In June 2018, PRI Enterprises allegedly adopted the "BOLDIFY" mark for cosmetics and beauty products, securing registration in Class 3 on December 23, 2018, on a "proposed to be used" basis. However, the petitioner alleged that PRI Enterprises had never used the mark for the registered goods. A critical piece of evidence was the email communication from May 2018, where PRI Enterprises, using the email pri.enterprises64@gmail.com, expressed interest in distributing the petitioner’s "BOLDIFY" products in India. This interaction, followed by PRI Enterprises’ registration of the identical mark, formed the crux of the petitioner’s claim of dishonest adoption and trademark squatting.

Detailed Procedural Background:

The dispute crystallized when the petitioner applied for registration of the "BOLDIFY" word and label marks in Class 3 on March 20, 2023. The Trade Marks Registry objected, citing PRI Enterprises’ existing registration in the same class. Falcon Licensing filed a petition under Section 47 and Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, before the Delhi High Court on October 26, 2023, seeking cancellation of PRI Enterprises’ "BOLDIFY" registration. 

Issues Involved in the Case:

The case presented several pivotal issues for adjudication: Whether PRI Enterprises’ registration of the "BOLDIFY" mark was dishonest and constituted trademark squatting, given its prior knowledge of the petitioner’s brand? Whether PRI Enterprises had used the "BOLDIFY" mark for the goods under Class 3, and if not, whether the non-use warranted cancellation under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act.

Detailed Submission of Parties:

The petitioner contended that PRI Enterprises, aware of the brand’s goodwill, dishonestly registered an identical mark in Class 3 for allied goods like cosmetics, which overlapped with the petitioner’s hair care products. The petitioner emphasized its prior use since 2016, supported by global registrations and substantial sales figures, asserting a strong trans-border reputation. It further argued that PRI Enterprises had never used the mark for Class 3 goods, rendering the registration vulnerable to cancellation under Section 47 for non-use. The petitioner also claimed to be a “person aggrieved,” as PRI Enterprises’ registration obstructed its own trademark application, causing legal and commercial prejudice.

PRI Enterprises countered that it independently adopted the "BOLDIFY" mark in June 2018 for its cosmetics and household goods business, which it later abandoned in 2020 to focus on sanitizers, PPE kits, and plastic products. It argued that the petition was premature, as the five-year non-use period under Section 47 had not elapsed by October 2023, when the petition was filed. PRI Enterprises denied the alleged email communications, though it admitted ownership of the email address pri.enterprises64@gmail.com, claiming no authorized person sent the inquiries. It further contended that the petitioner’s inaction from August 2020 to March 2023 implied acceptance of its registration. Finally, PRI Enterprises asserted that its goods were unrelated to the petitioner’s, negating any likelihood of confusion or prejudice.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties: The court relied on several precedents to navigate the complex issues, each cited for its relevance to specific aspects of trademark law:

Russell Corpn. Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Ashok Mahajan and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4796: This case was pivotal in addressing non-use under Section 47. The court held that genuine use in the relevant class is essential, and unexplained non-use justifies removal of the mark. In the present case, PRI Enterprises’ failure to provide evidence of use for Class 3 goods aligned with this principle, supporting the petitioner’s claim for cancellation.

Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company and Others, 2008 SCC OnLine SC 960: The Supreme Court emphasized that a genuine intention to use a trademark is crucial, and registration without such intent amounts to trafficking, which the law seeks to prevent. The court applied this to PRI Enterprises’ “proposed to be used” registration, which lacked evidence of bona fide intent or actual use, reinforcing the case for cancellation.

BPI Sports LLC : Referenced for its discussion on trademark squatting, this precedent defined squatting as registering a third party’s mark to preempt the legitimate owner’s rights. The court found PRI Enterprises’ actions to be a textbook example of squatting, as its registration appeared designed to block the petitioner’s entry into the Indian market.

Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trademarks and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5844: This case clarified the scope of “person aggrieved” under Section 57, holding that a party whose legal rights are restrained by an impugned registration qualifies. The court applied this to recognize the petitioner’s locus standi, as PRI Enterprises’ mark hindered its registration efforts.

Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723: The Supreme Court underscored the public interest in maintaining the purity of the trademark register, advocating rectification to prevent deception. This principle guided the court’s decision to prioritize the petitioner’s prior rights over PRI Enterprises’ unused mark.

Hardie Trading Ltd. : Cited for its interpretation of “person aggrieved” under the 1958 Act, this precedent supported a liberal construction of locus standi for rectification petitions, particularly when public interest is at stake. The court adopted this approach to affirm the petitioner’s standing.

Powell’s Trade Mark, Re, (1894) 11 RPC 4 : [1894] A.C. 8 : 70 LT 1 (HL): This House of Lords decision emphasized that a “person aggrieved” includes those whose legal rights are limited by a mark’s presence on the register. The court used this to bolster the petitioner’s claim, as PRI Enterprises’ registration restricted its commercial activities.

Larsen & Toubro Limited v. M/S Lachmi Narain Trades and Ors., 2008 SCC OnLine Del 183: The Division Bench rejected the “field of activity” test, holding that confusion can arise even between dissimilar goods if a mark’s reputation is strong. This was critical in dismissing PRI Enterprises’ argument that its goods’ distinct nature negated prejudice to the petitioner.

Sunder Parmanand Lalwani v. Caltex (India) Ltd., AIR 1969 Bom 24: The Bombay High Court held that a well-known mark’s use on unrelated goods can cause confusion, as consumers may assume a connection. This supported the court’s finding that PRI Enterprises’ registration could dilute the petitioner’s brand.

Bata India Ltd. v. Pyare Lal & Co., AIR 1985 All 242: The Allahabad High Court ruled that a passing-off action lies even for dissimilar goods if a mark’s use creates a false impression of origin. This precedent reinforced the potential for consumer confusion in the present case.

Daimler Benz Aktiegesellschaft v. Hybo Hindustan, AIR 1994 Del 239: The Delhi High Court protected a famous mark (“Benz”) from use on unrelated goods (underwear), emphasizing the need to prevent dilution. This supported the petitioner’s claim of trans-border reputation.

Aktiebolaget Volvo & Ors. v. Vinod Kumar & Ors., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1180: The court restrained the use of “VOLVO” for ice cream, despite its primary association with automobiles, citing confusion and dilution risks. This precedent underpinned the court’s rejection of PRI Enterprises’ claim that dissimilar goods negated prejudice.

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (Volume 3, 5th Edition): Though not a judicial precedent, this treatise was cited for its exposition on bona fide intent to use a trademark. It states that failure to provide documentary evidence of intent equates to a lack thereof, which the court applied to PRI Enterprises’ absence of usage proof.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

On the issue of dishonest adoption, the court found compelling evidence in the May 2018 email exchanges, where PRI Enterprises used its verified email to inquire about distributing the petitioner’s “BOLDIFY” products. Despite PRI Enterprises’ denial of sending these emails, its admission of owning the email address, coupled with its failure to explain the communication’s origin, led the court to dismiss its defense as an afterthought. This established PRI Enterprises’ prior knowledge of the petitioner’s mark, rendering its subsequent registration mala fide.

Regarding non-use, the court noted that PRI Enterprises’ registration was on a “proposed to be used” basis, yet no evidence of actual use for Class 3 goods (cosmetics, soaps, etc.) was produced. Citing Section 47 and the Russell Corpn. case, the court held that unexplained non-use warrants cancellation, as PRI Enterprises failed to demonstrate any special circumstances or bona fide intent, per McCarthy’s treatise and the Toshiba case. The court further identified PRI Enterprises’ actions as trademark squatting, aligning with the BPI Sports precedent, as the registration appeared designed to preempt the petitioner’s rights in India.

On the petitioner’s status as a “person aggrieved,” the court applied the liberal interpretation from Kia Wang and Powell’s Trade Mark, finding that PRI Enterprises’ registration restrained the petitioner’s legal rights by blocking its Class 3 application. The court rejected PRI Enterprises’ argument of acquiescence, noting that the petitioner’s three-year delay did not imply acceptance, especially since PRI Enterprises had not used the mark commercially.

Addressing the argument that dissimilar goods negated prejudice, the court relied on Larsen & Toubro, Bata India, Daimler Benz, and Volvo to dismiss the outdated “field of activity” test. It held that the petitioner’s well-known mark, bolstered by global registrations and sales, faced a likelihood of confusion or dilution, even if PRI Enterprises’ goods differed. The court emphasized the public interest in maintaining a pure trademark register, as articulated in Khoday Distilleries, and concluded that PRI Enterprises’ unused mark was a “public mischief” warranting removal.

Final Decision

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove the “BOLDIFY” trademark, registered under application no. 3867168 in Class 3, from the Register of Trade Marks. The court ordered the Registry to send a copy of the judgment to the Trade Marks Registry for compliance, disposing of the petition on April 15, 2025.

Law Settled in This Case:

A trademark registered without bona fide use or intent, particularly on a “proposed to be used” basis, is vulnerable to cancellation under Section 47 if no evidence of use is shown.Trademark squatting, where a party registers a third party’s mark to block its legitimate owner, is impermissible and contravenes the Trade Marks Act’s objective of preventing trafficking.The “person aggrieved” criterion under Section 57 is interpreted liberally, encompassing parties whose legal or commercial rights are restrained by an impugned registration.Fourth, the “field of activity” test is obsolete; a well-known mark’s reputation can be protected against use on dissimilar goods if confusion or dilution is likely.Finally, the public interest in maintaining a pure trademark register overrides claims of acquiescence, especially when the registered mark remains unused.

Case Title: Falcon Licensing Limited Vs. PRI Enterprises Private Limited & Anr.

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 271/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2592

Date of Order: 15 April 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

The Indian Hotels Company Limited Vs. Ankit Sethi

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2266

Date of Order: 3rd March 2025

Case Title: The Indian Hotels Company Limited Vs. Ankit Sethi & Ors.

Case Number: CS(COMM) 882/2023

Court: High Court of Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

In the matter of The Indian Hotels Company Limited v. Ankit Sethi & Ors., the Delhi High Court delivered a summary judgment on 3rd March 2025 under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, in favour of the plaintiff, The Indian Hotels Company Limited, part of the Tata Group and proprietor of the “GINGER” chain of hotels. The suit was instituted to restrain infringement of the plaintiff’s registered trademark “GINGER” in Class 43, as well as to address passing off, dilution, and copyright infringement involving original professional photographs hosted on the plaintiff’s official website.

The plaintiff operates under various prominent hospitality brands such as TAJ, VIVANTA, SELEQTIONS, and GINGER, and maintains the website www.gingerhotels.com. The “GINGER” mark, first adopted in 2004 for its 'Smart Basics' category, has been extensively used and registered in various forms, with the earliest registration dating back to December 2005. The plaintiff also owns the copyright in professionally photographed images of GINGER hotel properties, which are hosted on its official site. Over the years, the GINGER brand has earned widespread recognition and accolades, with its financial reports for FY 2022-23 reflecting revenues exceeding Rs. 300 Crores and EBITDA of Rs. 120 Crores.

The dispute arose when the plaintiff, through its brand monitoring tool locobuzz.com, discovered infringing websites—www.gingerhotelmumbai.info and www.hotelgingermumbai.info—that used the “GINGER” trademark and the plaintiff’s copyrighted images to mislead customers into believing that the websites were associated with the plaintiff’s GINGER hotels. These infringing domain names were registered in November and December 2023 respectively, and were used to impersonate the plaintiff’s brand, causing both reputational and financial damage.

The High Court had granted an ex-parte ad interim injunction on 13th December 2023, directing the suspension of the impugned domain names and blocking the bank accounts and mobile numbers associated with the fraudulent activity. Domain registrars, banks, and telecom operators were directed to submit KYC documents and block further misuse. Investigation revealed that defendant no. 1, Ankit Sethi, operated under the alias 'Hackploit' and created the infringing websites in collusion with defendants 8, 9, and 10. Evidence included transactions made by unsuspecting customers into accounts held by the said defendants and use of common email IDs linking these individuals to the infringing operations.

The Court took judicial note of previous authoritative decisions, notably Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145, wherein the Supreme Court recognized domain names as business identifiers that enjoy protection akin to trademarks. The Court emphasized that misrepresentation by the defendants created likelihood of confusion and deception among consumers and amounted to both trademark and copyright infringement. It also held that use of a similar domain name to divert users away from the rightful owner amounts to passing off.

Defendants 1, 9, and 10 did not appear or file written statements. Defendant 8, though present in earlier hearings, failed to file a written response. The Court deemed their silence as an admission of the plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, invoking Order XIII-A CPC, the Court determined that there was no prospect of a defense and that oral evidence was unnecessary.

Citing Cartier International A.G. v. Gaurav Bhatia, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 8, and Microsoft Corporation v. Rajendra Pawar, 2008 (36) PTC 697 (Del.), the Court reiterated that deliberate evasion of judicial process should not allow infringers to escape liability. Recognizing the egregious nature of the conduct and its potential to cause serious harm to the plaintiff and mislead the public, the Court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages.

Accordingly, the Court decreed a permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff, restraining the defendants from any further use of the GINGER trademarks, copyrighted images, or misleading domain names. It also awarded damages and costs totaling Rs. 20 Lakhs to the plaintiff, payable jointly and severally by defendants 1, 8, 9, and 10, to be paid within four months. The decree sheet was directed to be drawn up and the case was disposed of.

Diageo Scotland Limited Vs. Prachi Verma

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2612

Date of Order: April 16, 2025

Case Title: Diageo Scotland Limited Vs. Prachi Verma and Anr.

Case Number: C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 7/2025

Court: High Court of Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

In Diageo Scotland Limited v. Prachi Verma and Anr., C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 7/2025, the Delhi High Court adjudicated an appeal filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the order dated October 1, 2024, passed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. The impugned order had dismissed the appellant’s opposition to trademark application no. 4398295 for the mark “CAPTAIN BLUE” in Class 33. The appellant, Diageo Scotland Limited, part of the globally recognized Diageo Group and owner of the reputed “CAPTAIN MORGAN” family of marks, claimed proprietary rights in the registered trademarks “CAPTAIN” (reg. no. 1485228) and “CAPTAIN MORGAN” (reg. no. 708544), both registered in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages.

According to the appellant, “CAPTAIN MORGAN” has been used in India since 2006 and has gained immense recognition and commercial success, with reported sales in 2023 alone amounting to approximately USD 6.48 million. The appellant also owns multiple sub-brands under the “CAPTAIN” series, including “CAPTAIN MORGAN GOLD” and “CAPTAIN MORGAN WHITE RUM.” The respondent no. 1 filed a trademark application for “CAPTAIN BLUE” in Class 33 on a proposed-to-be-used basis. Upon its publication in the Trade Marks Journal on January 27, 2020, the appellant opposed it, citing deceptive similarity, likelihood of confusion, and absence of bona fide adoption. The Assistant Registrar dismissed the opposition, finding “CAPTAIN BLUE” distinctive when considered as a whole and citing the presence of unrelated third-party “CAPTAIN” marks.

In appeal, the appellant argued that the impugned order ignored both the statutory and common law rights vested in the family of “CAPTAIN” marks, and that the impugned mark was deceptively similar to its own, incorporating the dominant source-identifying element “CAPTAIN.” The addition of “BLUE,” it was contended, was insufficient to differentiate the mark. The appellant pointed out that the respondent no. 1 failed to produce any evidence of use, bona fide adoption, or commercial intent, and filed no documents under Rule 46 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It was submitted that allowing the impugned mark to remain would cause consumer confusion, particularly as the mark might be mistaken for a variant of the appellant’s “CAPTAIN” products. The appellant further argued that permitting such registrations would compromise the distinctiveness of well-known marks and create a precedent for copycat filings.

Respondent no. 1 neither filed a reply nor appeared, and was accordingly proceeded against ex parte. Respondent no. 2 supported the impugned order, contending that “CAPTAIN BLUE” was not derived from the appellant’s marks, and that the parties' marks were dissimilar. Citing Vinita Gupta v. Amit Arora, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3249, and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 142, respondent no. 2 maintained that no semantic similarity or likelihood of confusion existed. The appellant responded that third-party “CAPTAIN” marks referred to in oral arguments were either not part of the original proceedings or had been abandoned, opposed, or withdrawn. In the case of one such user, IFB Agro Industries, the appellant had entered a confidential settlement and had deliberately refrained from opposition. The appellant relied on Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, and reiterated that even slight conceptual similarities in identical goods can cause confusion, particularly where the prior mark is well-established.

The Court undertook a comprehensive analysis. It noted that the appellant was the prior user and registered proprietor of the “CAPTAIN” and “CAPTAIN MORGAN” marks, with continuous use and significant goodwill both internationally and domestically. The Court held that the use of “CAPTAIN” in “CAPTAIN BLUE” constituted a clear adoption of the appellant’s dominant mark. The addition of the word “BLUE” was insufficient to dispel confusion, especially when the goods—alcoholic beverages—were identical and marketed in the same class. The likelihood of “CAPTAIN BLUE” being misconstrued as a variant or extension of the appellant’s “CAPTAIN” product line was high. The Court was particularly concerned by the complete absence of any evidence of actual use or commercial intention by the respondent, especially given the proposed-to-be-used basis of the application.

The Court noted that the opposition materials submitted by the appellant, including a detailed list of over 80 “CAPTAIN” marks which had been withdrawn, refused, abandoned or opposed by the appellant, were disregarded in the impugned order. There was no indication that the word “CAPTAIN” was in common use for alcoholic beverages in India. The Court found that the Assistant Registrar failed to consider these critical elements. The argument regarding a prior rejection of a similar opposition by the appellant in an unrelated matter was not found sufficient to preclude the appellant from pursuing this appeal, especially as that case had not been contested.

The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Corn Products Refining Co. and Vinita Gupta, affirming that the impugned mark was indeed likely to create confusion and did not deserve registration. Emphasizing the statutory protections under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act for registered proprietors, the Court concluded that the impugned mark should have been refused registration under Section 11. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated October 1, 2024, and directed that the impugned trademark application no. 4398295 for “CAPTAIN BLUE” be removed from the Register of Trade Marks.

Mankind Prime Labs Private Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Neutral Citation: Mankind Prime Labs Private Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2025:DHC:2611

Date of Order: April 16, 2025/Case Number: C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 7/2024/Saurabh Banerjee

In the matter of Mankind Prime Labs Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, the Delhi High Court,  adjudicated an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The appellant challenged the order dated October 17, 2023, passed by the learned Examiner of Trade Marks, New Delhi, which had refused registration of the trademark application no. 4804262 for the word mark “CROSSRELIEF” in Class 5 of the Act.

The appellant, a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 2013 and a subsidiary of Mankind Pharma Limited, one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in India, applied on January 2, 2021, for the registration of the trademark “CROSSRELIEF” on a ‘proposed to be used’ basis. The Trade Marks Registry issued an Examination Report on January 13, 2021, objecting to the application under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, stating that the mark was deceptively similar to existing trademarks in respect of similar goods, which may cause a likelihood of confusion among the public.

The impugned order upheld the objection raised in the Examination Report. The Examiner concluded that the mark “CROSSRELIEF” was identical or deceptively similar to earlier marks and covered goods of similar description, thereby refusing registration under Section 11(1). The appellant, aggrieved by this decision, filed the present appeal.

The appellant argued that “CROSSRELIEF” is a coined term, a portmanteau of the terms “CROSS” and “RELIEF.” The term “CROSS,” it was argued, is commonly used in the medical industry to denote aid or assistance and is thus generic and publici juris. Likewise, the word “RELIEF” is descriptive in nature. However, their combination forms a new, arbitrary and fanciful term which has no existing dictionary meaning and is capable of functioning as a trademark with its own distinct identity. The appellant further contended that the mark should be assessed as a whole and not dissected into individual parts. Citing the anti-dissection principle, the appellant relied on the decision in Ticona Polymers, Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1234, which emphasized that a composite mark must be evaluated as a whole and that dissecting its elements is impermissible in assessing registrability.

The appellant also cited F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 716, where the Supreme Court upheld registration of the coined term “Dropovit,” which, though composed of known words, formed a novel expression not easily recognizable without analysis. In line with this precedent, the Court was urged to consider “CROSSRELIEF” as an invented word entitled to registration.

In further support, the appellant relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 215, wherein it was held that descriptive words used commonly in the trade, such as “micro,” cannot be monopolized and do not justify refusal of trademark registration when forming part of a larger distinctive mark. Additionally, the Madras High Court in Indo-pharma Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. v. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 1998 SCC OnLine Mad 414, observed that where a common element such as “Enerj” is used in rival marks, customers tend to focus on the distinctive suffixes and are unlikely to be confused by the common prefix.

It was the appellant’s submission that the word “CROSS” is widely used in the pharmaceutical industry and is incapable of being monopolized. The term “CROSSRELIEF,” though incorporating a generic component, creates a unique commercial impression when read as a whole. Reference was also made to Disposafe Health & Life Limited v. Rajiv Nath, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1271, which reiterated that even combinations of common words can acquire distinctiveness and be eligible for registration if they produce a unique identity.

The High Court analyzed the matter under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, which disallows registration of a trademark that is identical or similar to an earlier mark and is used in respect of similar goods or services, thereby giving rise to a likelihood of confusion. The Court noted that “CROSSRELIEF” is a coined expression and is not found in any dictionary. It was further noted that the mark does not directly describe the nature or quality of the goods, and when viewed in its entirety, is arbitrary and fanciful.

The Court strongly affirmed the anti-dissection rule, holding that a trademark must be evaluated holistically, both at the stage of registration and in infringement proceedings. The Court referred to Ticona Polymers to reinforce this principle, noting that it applies mutatis mutandis even at the stage of assessing entitlement for registration, and not only post-registration in infringement scenarios.

The Court accepted that while “CROSS” may be common in pharmaceutical marks, its combination with “RELIEF” in a non-standard, creative fashion resulted in a mark that is visually, phonetically, and structurally distinct from the cited marks. The Court concluded that the likelihood of confusion was remote and unsupported by any material placed on record by the respondent.

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court set aside the impugned order dated October 17, 2023, and allowed the appeal. It directed that trademark application no. 4804262 for the mark “CROSSRELIEF” be allowed to proceed for registration. However, it clarified that the registration of the composite mark “CROSSRELIEF” shall not grant any exclusive rights to either component part, “CROSS” or “RELIEF,” in isolation. A copy of the judgment was ordered to be sent to the Registrar of Trade Marks for necessary compliance.

Grey Swift Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

The case involved an appeal filed by Grey Swift Private Limited under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, read with Rule 156 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, challenging the rejection of its application for the trademark “BharatStamp” in Class 9 by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks, vide order dated January 2, 2024.

Grey Swift applied for registration of the word mark “BharatStamp” on February 20, 2021, on a ‘proposed to be used’ basis. The mark faced objection under Section 9(1)(a) of the Act, which bars registration of marks devoid of distinctive character. The Examiner, after reviewing the evidence and submissions, concluded that the mark lacked distinctiveness and was common in use, and therefore unregistrable.

Aggrieved, the appellant contended that “BharatStamp” is a novel and arbitrary juxtaposition of two unrelated terms: “Bharat,” a Sanskrit-origin proper noun, and “Stamp,” an English word with multiple meanings. The appellant argued that the term, when taken as a whole, has no direct reference to digital stamping or the product itself and thus qualifies as suggestive. Consequently, it was inherently distinctive and registrable.

The appellant emphasized the anti-dissection rule, asserting that trademarks must be evaluated as a whole. They relied on decisions such as Global Super Parts v. Blue Super Flame Industries, Ticona Polymers, Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, and T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. to assert that distinctiveness cannot be determined by dissecting the mark into its parts. Moreover, the mark was claimed to have acquired secondary meaning through prolonged and consistent use, with the product used across 20 states, catering to over 300 clients and receiving public recognition, awards, and government empanelments.

Conversely, the respondent argued that the mark lacked distinctiveness and could not be associated with the appellant's goods. It was also asserted that since the application was filed on a ‘proposed to be used’ basis, the appellant could not claim acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning. Further, the evidence supporting secondary meaning post-dated the impugned order and therefore could not be considered.

In its analysis, the Court reiterated that under Section 9(1)(a), a trademark must have the capacity to distinguish the goods or services of one party from another. The Court held that “BharatStamp” is not a dictionary term nor a colloquial phrase. Instead, it is a coined, arbitrary, and fanciful term with no immediate reference to the appellant’s services. Citing the Supreme Court in F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., the Court emphasized that invented words, even if derived from known terms, are registrable if the resulting expression is novel and requires thought to interpret.

The Court further cited McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition to affirm that a combination of generic words could result in a distinctive composite mark. It upheld the principle that such composite marks must be evaluated as a whole (anti-dissection), a view echoed in Ticona Polymers and affirmed by a Division Bench in Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd.

On the issue of secondary meaning, the Court agreed with the precedent in Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. and Marico Ltd., clarifying that distinctiveness may be assessed up to the date of registration and not just the date of application.

Lastly, the Court acknowledged that the Registrar had allowed other marks with similar structural elements (“Bharat” and “Stamp”) or closely related word marks across various classes. While each application must be assessed independently, inconsistency in the Registrar’s approach, especially given the allowance of “BharatSign” to the same applicant, was noted.

Decision:

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated January 2, 2024, and directed that the mark “BharatStamp” (Application No. 4872027) be processed for registration. However, the Court clarified that registration of the composite mark does not grant exclusive rights over its individual components, i.e., “Bharat” or “Stamp.”

Case Title: Grey Swift Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2609

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Case No.: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 18/2024

Date of Judgment: April 16, 2025

Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd

Introduction

The case of Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd. ([1976] R.P.C. 511) is a landmark decision in UK trade mark law, addressing the registrability of a trade mark consisting of the entire external appearance of goods, specifically the colour combinations applied to pharmaceutical capsules and their pellets. This case, decided by the House of Lords, clarified the scope of the term "mark" under the Trade Marks Act 1938 and resolved whether such a mark, covering the whole visible surface of the goods, could be registered as a trade mark. The decision overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling and established a significant precedent for the protection of unconventional trade marks, balancing statutory interpretation with commercial realities.

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Detailed Factual Background

Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. (SKF), a pharmaceutical manufacturer, developed "sustained release" drugs encapsulated in soluble capsules. These capsules were cylindrical with hemispherical ends, containing small spherical pellets. Each pellet had a neutral core (typically sugar), coated with the active drug and an outer layer that dissolved slowly in the digestive system to regulate drug release. To distinguish their products, SKF applied distinctive colour combinations to their capsules and pellets. One half of the capsule was coloured (e.g., maroon or dark grey), while the other half was transparent, revealing multicoloured pellets (e.g., yellow, blue, white, grey, red). These colour schemes varied for different drugs, ensuring market recognition.

In May 1963, SKF applied to register ten such colour combinations as trade marks under Class 5 of the Trade Marks Register for "pharmaceutical substances sold in pellet form within capsules." The applications described the marks verbally, and specimens (actual capsules) were deposited at the Trade Marks Registry due to the limitations of photographic representations. By 1971, evidence showed that these colour combinations were widely recognised by doctors, pharmacists, and hospital administrators as indicating SKF’s products, to the extent that their use by competitors would constitute passing off at common law.

Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd., a rival pharmaceutical manufacturer, opposed the registrations, arguing that the colour combinations did not constitute "marks" or "trade marks" under the Trade Marks Act 1938, as they described the entire external appearance of the goods rather than a distinct mark applied to them.

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Detailed Procedural Background

1. Trade Marks Registry (November 1971):
   • The applications were heard by Assistant Registrar Mr. R.L. Moorby.
   • Moorby held that the colour combinations were "marks" capable of being trade marks under Section 68 of the Trade Marks Act 1938.
   • However, he refused registration on the ground that the marks lacked inherent distinctiveness, as they were not inherently adapted to distinguish SKF’s goods from others.
2. High Court (14 June 1973, [1974] R.P.C. 91):
   • SKF appealed to the High Court, where Graham J. allowed the appeal.
   • Graham J. agreed with Moorby that the colour combinations were "marks" but disagreed on distinctiveness, finding them both factually and inherently distinctive.
   • He ordered registration but limited each mark to the specific drug it had been used for, rather than the broader class of pharmaceutical substances, to prevent overreach.
3. Court of Appeal (8 May 1974, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 861; [1974] F.S.R. 455):
   • Sterling-Winthrop appealed, and the Court of Appeal (Russell, Buckley, and Lawton LJJ) reversed Graham J.’s decision.
   • The Court held that the colour combinations were not "marks" under Section 68, as they constituted the entire external appearance of the goods, not something distinct from them.
   • The issue of distinctiveness was not addressed, as the finding on the definition of "mark" was dispositive.
4. House of Lords (Heard: 6, 10-12 March, 21 May 1975; Decided: 1975, [1976] R.P.C. 511):
   • SKF appealed to the House of Lords, which unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring and expanding Graham J.’s order to permit registration without the drug-specific limitation.

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Issues Involved in the Case

1. Primary Issue: Whether the colour combinations applied to the entire visible surface of SKF’s capsules and pellets constituted a "mark" and thus a "trade mark" under Section 68 of the Trade Marks Act 1938.
2. Secondary Issue: If the colour combinations were marks, whether they were inherently distinctive and registrable under Section 9 of the Act.
3. Ancillary Issue: Whether the registration should be limited to the specific drugs for which each colour combination was used, as ordered by Graham J.

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Detailed Submission of Parties

Appellants (SKF), represented by T.A. Blanco White, Q.C. and Robin Jacob:

• On the Definition of "Mark":
  • The term "mark" in Section 68(1) is inclusive, not exhaustive, and should be given a broad interpretation in line with ordinary English usage, where a thing can be "marked all over."
  • There is no statutory requirement that a mark be distinct from the goods or limited to a portion of their surface. The Act’s language, including "use upon" or "in physical relation to" goods (Section 68(2)), supports marks incorporated into the goods’ structure.
  • Trade mark practice allows registration of marks like labels (e.g., Oxo cube) or woven patterns (e.g., Reddaway’s stripes), and there is no principled difference if the mark covers the entire surface.
  • English cases, such as Reddaway (F.) & Co. Ltd.’s Application (No. 1) (1914) 31 R.P.C. 147 and Winterbottom Book Cloth Co. Ltd.’s Application (1925) 42 R.P.C. 450, support the registrability of colour-based marks integrated into goods.
  • The Australian decision in Smith, Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [1972] R.P.C. 519 (Windeyer J.) was inconsistent with English authorities and commercially impractical, as it required marks to be depicted apart from the goods.
• On Distinctiveness:
  • The colour combinations were conceded to be factually distinctive, as they were recognised as SKF’s in the market.
  • They were also inherently distinctive, as no other trader would legitimately need to use identical or similar colour schemes without improper motive, per Lord Parker’s test in W. & G. Du Cros Ltd.’s Application (1913) 30 R.P.C. 660.
  • Unlike word marks refused for descriptiveness (e.g., Yorkshire Copper Works (1954) 71 R.P.C. 150), these were novel, non-descriptive device marks, inherently capable of distinguishing SKF’s goods.
• On Limitation:
  • Limiting registration to specific drugs was unnecessary, as the marks distinguished SKF’s goods generally, and passing off law would protect against misuse.

Respondents (Sterling-Winthrop), represented by G.D. Everington, Q.C. and Anthony Rogers:

• On the Definition of "Mark":
  • A "mark" must be distinct from the goods and capable of being described or depicted separately, not merely a description of the goods’ appearance.
  • The colour combinations were the entire three-dimensional appearance of the capsules, not a mark applied to them, akin to the dome-shaped black lead in James’s Trade Mark (1886) 3 R.P.C. 340, which was held non-registrable as a mere depiction of the goods.
  • Section 68(1)’s examples (device, brand, etc.) imply a mark is a graphic or superficial symbol, not the goods’ overall get-up.
  • The Reddaway case (1914) involved a distinct mark (stripes), not the entire appearance, and thus supported their position.
  • The Australian decision (Smith, Kline & French [1972] R.P.C. 519) correctly held that a mark must be separable from the goods, and this reasoning should apply.
  • Allowing registration of appearances as trade marks would blur the line with registered designs under the Registered Designs Act 1949, potentially allowing perpetual monopolies (unlike the 15-year limit for designs) and enabling manufacturers to preempt colour combinations.
• On Distinctiveness:
  • Even if the colour combinations were marks, they lacked inherent distinctiveness, as other manufacturers might legitimately wish to use similar colour schemes to identify their drugs.
  • The Assistant Registrar’s discretion, informed by his expertise, should be upheld unless clearly wrong.
  • Graham J.’s decision to limit registration to specific drugs was inconsistent with finding inherent distinctiveness, as it implied the marks were not broadly distinctive.
• On Policy Concerns:
  • Registering appearances as trade marks could lead to market uncertainty, allowing manufacturers to register numerous colour combinations preemptively, stifling competition.
  • The Trade Marks Act should not encroach on the domain of the Registered Designs Act, which is better suited to protect appearances.

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Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations

Judgments:

1. Assistant Registrar (Mr. R.L. Moorby, 2 November 1971):
   • Found the colour combinations to be "marks" under Section 68, capable of being trade marks.
   • Refused registration due to lack of inherent distinctiveness, interpreting Lord Parker’s test in W. & G. Du Cros (1913) 30 R.P.C. 660 as requiring that no other trader would legitimately desire to use similar marks.
   • Considered Reddaway (No. 1) (1914) 31 R.P.C. 147 as supporting colour-based marks but distinguished Smith, Kline & French (Australia) [1972] R.P.C. 519.
2. High Court (Graham J., 14 June 1973, [1974] R.P.C. 91):
   • Upheld the colour combinations as "marks," relying on Reddaway (No. 1) and dismissing Smith, Kline & French (Australia) due to perceived differences in application forms.
   • Found the marks both factually and inherently distinctive, reversing Moorby on the latter point.
   • Limited registration to specific drugs, citing potential passing off protection for broader use.
   • Referenced Hoffmann-La Roche v. D.D.S.A. Pharmaceuticals [1972] R.P.C. 1 and Roche Products Ltd. v. Berk Pharmaceuticals [1973] R.P.C. 461, though these were passing off cases, not directly relevant.
3. Court of Appeal (Russell, Buckley, Lawton LJJ, 8 May 1974, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 861; [1974] F.S.R. 455):
   • Unanimously held that the colour combinations were not "marks," as they described the entire external appearance of the capsules.
   • Russell LJ emphasized that a mark must be distinct from the goods, citing James’s Trade Mark (1886) 33 Ch.D. 392 and Smith, Kline & French (Australia) [1972] R.P.C. 519.
   • Buckley LJ argued that the Act’s language (e.g., "use upon" in Section 68(2)) implied a mark is a graphic or superficial symbol, not the goods’ appearance.
   • Lawton LJ relied on dictionary definitions and James’s Trade Mark to conclude that a mark cannot be the goods’ overall appearance.
   • Did not address distinctiveness, as the primary issue was dispositive.
4. House of Lords (Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon, Lord Salmon, [1976] R.P.C. 511):
   • Lord Diplock delivered the leading speech, with others concurring.
   • Held that the colour combinations were "marks" and registrable trade marks, overturning the Court of Appeal.
   • Found no statutory or business rationale for excluding marks covering the entire visible surface of goods.
   • Upheld Graham J.’s finding of inherent distinctiveness and removed the drug-specific limitation.

Citations and Their Context:

1. Reddaway (F.) & Co. Ltd.’s Application (No. 1) (1914) 31 R.P.C. 147:
   • Context: Registration of three coloured stripes (blue, red, blue) woven into fire hoses, limited to use throughout the hose’s length.
   • Referred by SKF to show that colour-based marks integrated into goods are registrable.
   • House of Lords followed, rejecting the Court of Appeal’s attempt to limit its scope to partial markings.
2. Reddaway (F.) & Co. Ltd.’s Application (No. 2) (1925) 42 R.P.C. 397; (1927) 44 R.P.C. 27 (H.L.):
   • Context: Refusal of registration for similar stripes for export hoses, due to lack of UK distinctiveness.
   • Cited to confirm the correctness of the first Reddaway case, with Viscount Dunedin endorsing Warrington J.’s reasoning.
3. James’s Trade Mark (1886) 33 Ch.D. 392; 3 R.P.C. 340:
   • Context: Validity of a dome-shaped mark for black lead, upheld as a distinct mark affixed to goods, not a monopoly over the shape.
   • Sterling-Winthrop relied on Lindley LJ’s dictum (“a mark must be distinct from the thing marked”) to argue that the capsule’s appearance was not a mark.
   • House of Lords distinguished, noting the mark in James was separate from the goods’ shape, and the dictum was context-specific.
4. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [1972] R.P.C. 519:
   • Context: Australian refusal to register similar colour combinations, as they were not distinct from the goods.
   • Sterling-Winthrop relied on Windeyer J.’s test that a mark must be depicted apart from the goods.
   • House of Lords rejected this test as overly restrictive and inconsistent with Reddaway.
5. W. & G. Du Cros Ltd.’s Application (1913) 30 R.P.C. 660 (H.L.):
   • Context: Lord Parker’s test for inherent distinctiveness, focusing on whether other traders would legitimately desire to use the mark.
   • Cited by both parties on distinctiveness; House of Lords applied it to find SKF’s marks inherently distinctive.
6. Charles Goodall & Son Ltd. v. John Waddington Ltd. (1924) 41 R.P.C. 658:
   • Context: Dictum by Sargant LJ distinguishing designs (part of goods) from trade marks (extra, indicating origin).
   • Sterling-Winthrop cited to argue that the capsule’s appearance was akin to a design.
   • House of Lords clarified that the dictum did not preclude marks integrated into goods.
7. Parke Davis & Co.’s Application [1976] F.S.R. 195 (Ireland):
   • Context: Registration of a blue band around a capsule as a mark.
   • SKF cited to show judicial acceptance of colour-based marks, though the House of Lords noted it was not directly on point.
8. Hoffmann-La Roche v. D.D.S.A. Pharmaceuticals [1972] R.P.C. 1:
   • Context: Passing off case involving capsule colours.
   • Graham J. cited Harman LJ’s use of “mark” to support registrability, but the House of Lords dismissed its relevance, as it was not a trade mark case.
9. Roche Products Ltd. v. Berk Pharmaceuticals [1973] R.P.C. 461:
   • Context: Another passing off case.
   • Cited by Graham J., but deemed irrelevant by the House of Lords.
10. Winterbottom Book Cloth Co. Ltd.’s Application (1925) 42 R.P.C. 450:
    • Context: Registration of a red line at each selvedge of tracing cloth.
    • SKF cited to support colour-based marks, reinforcing Reddaway.
11. Yorkshire Copper Works (1954) 71 R.P.C. 150 (H.L.):
    • Context: Refusal of a geographical name as a trade mark due to lack of distinctiveness.
    • SKF cited to distinguish word marks from device marks like theirs.

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Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge (Lord Diplock, House of Lords)

On the Definition of "Mark":

• Statutory Interpretation:
  • Section 68(1) defines "trade mark" as a "mark" used to indicate trade origin, with "mark" including a non-exhaustive list (device, brand, etc.). The broad ordinary meaning of "mark" encompasses visual indications, including those covering the entire surface.
  • Section 68(2) allows marks to be used "upon" or "in physical relation to" goods, supporting marks integrated into the goods’ structure (e.g., headings in textiles).
  • Nothing in the Act or Trade Marks Rules 1938 (e.g., Rules 23, 28) requires a mark to be two-dimensional or partial. Rule 28’s provision for specimens accommodates three-dimensional marks like SKF’s capsules.
• Commercial Purpose:
  • The colour combinations fulfilled the trade mark’s purpose of distinguishing SKF’s goods, as evidenced by market recognition and the concession of passing off.
  • Excluding marks covering the entire surface would be irrational, as no business purpose justifies distinguishing between partial and complete coverage.
• Precedents:
  • Reddaway (No. 1) (1914) was authoritative, showing that colour-based marks (stripes) woven into goods are registrable, even if position-specific. Extending the stripes to the entire surface would not change their status as a mark.
  • James’s Trade Mark was distinguished, as the dome-shaped mark was a separate device, not the goods’ shape, and Lindley LJ’s dictum was context-specific.
  • Smith, Kline & French (Australia) was rejected, as Windeyer J.’s test (mark depicted apart from goods) was overly restrictive and conflicted with Reddaway. The dichotomy between describing goods with or without markings was elusive.
  • Charles Goodall’s dictum was clarified to mean that designs and trade marks are not mutually exclusive, and SKF’s colours were “extra” to denote origin.

On Distinctiveness:

• Statutory Framework:
  • Section 9(1)(e) allows registration of “any other distinctive mark,” with “distinctive” defined in Section 9(2) as adapted to distinguish the proprietor’s goods.
  • Section 9(3) considers both inherent and factual distinctiveness. SKF’s marks were factually distinctive, as conceded.
• Inherent Distinctiveness:
  • Lord Parker’s test (W. & G. Du Cros) asks whether other traders would legitimately desire to use the same or similar marks without improper motive.
  • The Assistant Registrar erred in extending “some mark nearly resembling it” to any colour-based marking, as Lord Parker meant only deceptive marks. Since SKF’s marks, if copied, would constitute passing off, no legitimate use by others was plausible.
  • The marks were novel, non-descriptive, and unlikely to be needed by competitors, satisfying inherent distinctiveness.
• Judicial Discretion:
  • Section 52 grants the judge the same discretion as the Registrar. Graham J.’s reversal of Moorby was correct, and appellate courts should not lightly interfere.

On Limitation:

• The drug-specific limitation was unnecessary, as the marks distinguished SKF’s goods broadly, and no commercial purpose justified restriction.

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Final Decision

The House of Lords unanimously allowed SKF’s appeal, overturning the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Registrar was ordered to proceed with the registration of the ten trade marks as described in the Trade Marks Journal (11 January 1967), without limitation to specific drugs.

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Law Settled in This Case

1. Definition of "Mark":
   • A mark under Section 68 of the Trade Marks Act 1938 can include the entire visible surface of the goods, provided it serves the trade mark’s purpose of indicating trade origin.
   • There is no statutory or judicial requirement for a mark to be distinct from the goods or limited to a portion of their surface.
2. Registrability of Unconventional Marks:
   • Colour combinations and three-dimensional appearances can be registrable as trade marks if they are visually representable and distinctive, aligning with the Act’s flexible definition of "mark."
3. Inherent Distinctiveness:
   • A mark is inherently distinctive if no other trader would legitimately desire to use it or a deceptively similar mark without improper motive, per Lord Parker’s test.
   • Novel, non-descriptive device marks are likely to satisfy this test.
4. Scope of Registration:
   • Registration need not be limited to specific goods within a class if the mark distinguishes the proprietor’s goods generally.
5. Relationship with Designs:
   • The Trade Marks Act and Registered Designs Act serve distinct purposes, and registrability as a trade mark is not precluded by potential design protection.

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Case Details

• Case Title: Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd.
• Date of Order: 21 May 1975 (published in [1976] R.P.C.)
• Case No.: Not explicitly stated in the report (Trade Mark Application Nos. 849,766–849,776)
• Neutral Citation: [1976] R.P.C. 511
• Name of Court: House of Lords
• Name of Judge: Lord Diplock (leading judgment), with Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Cross of Chelsea, Lord Kilbrandon, and Lord Salmon concurring.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs Sudhir Bhatia

In matters of involving infringement of trademarks and copyrights, injunctions should ordinarily follow 

Introduction:

In the intricate world of intellectual property rights, where brand identity is paramount, the role of prior use, dishonest adoption, and delay in legal action often come under judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Another vs Sudhir Bhatia and Others serves as a pivotal precedent, illustrating that in cases involving copyright or trademark infringement, equitable relief such as injunctions cannot be denied merely on grounds of delay if prima facie dishonesty is established. The case reaffirms the principle that commercial morality and the sanctity of original innovation must be protected against opportunistic infringement.

Detailed Factual Background:

Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd., the appellant in this case, is a manufacturer of insecticides and insect repellents, well-known for its product branded under the term "Laxman Rekha." This phrase, rooted in Indian mythology, had acquired significant brand identity due to its continuous use by Midas since 1991. The company also claimed copyright ownership over the packaging and artistic features associated with this branding.

Sudhir Bhatia, the principal respondent, was a former employee of Midas Hygiene. Post his association with the appellant, Bhatia entered the market with a similar product under the name “Magic Laxman Rekha,” adopting packaging and branding elements that bore a striking resemblance to Midas's products. The similarities extended not only to the name but also to the color scheme, layout, and design of the cartons—elements protected by copyright under the artistic works of Midas.

Detailed Procedural Background:

Midas initiated a civil suit against the respondents, alleging passing off, infringement of copyright, and seeking injunctive relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court granted interim injunction in favor of Midas, restraining the respondents from using the disputed mark and packaging. The learned judge noted the prior use of the mark by the plaintiff and the suspicious similarity in the packaging adopted by the respondent.

The defendants appealed to a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which vacated the injunction on the ground of delay and laches, stating that the plaintiff's inaction in initiating proceedings for a considerable time disentitled them from the equitable remedy of injunction. Aggrieved by this, Midas approached the Supreme Court.

Issues Involved in the Case:

The principal issues before the Supreme Court were: Whether a plaintiff can be denied interim relief in cases of clear trademark or copyright infringement solely due to delay in approaching the court?Whether prima facie dishonesty in adoption of a mark or trade dress mandates injunctive relief?The role of prior employment and insider knowledge in assessing the intent behind adoption of similar branding?

Detailed Submission of Parties:

The appellants contended that they had been using the mark "Laxman Rekha" and the associated packaging since 1991. They highlighted advertisements and registration of copyrights to establish their claim. The appellants argued that the respondents, with prior knowledge gained during their employment, had deliberately adopted the same brand identity to mislead consumers and gain market advantage.

The respondents, on the other hand, did not deny the plaintiffs’ use of the mark but argued that the appellants delayed in bringing the action, and therefore, equitable relief such as injunction should not be granted. They also claimed continuous usage since 1992 and attempted to justify the adoption of the name and packaging as independently developed.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Citations Cited:

The Supreme Court reiterated the well-established principle that in cases involving copyright or trademark infringement, injunctions are not to be denied merely on the basis of delay if dishonesty in the adoption of the mark or packaging is evident. The Court cited its own precedent in Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448, to support the contention that equitable doctrines like delay or acquiescence cannot be used as shields by a person who has acted dishonestly.

The Court also referred to the copyright ownership in the artistic work “Laxman Rekha” registered by the appellants since November 19, 1991, and its renewal in 1999. Further, the respondent's trademark registration application, wherein they claimed continuous use of "Magic Laxman Rekha" since 1992, was also scrutinized for lacking any credible explanation regarding the adoption of an almost identical trade dress.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

The Bench emphasized that the adoption of the mark by the respondents appeared prima facie dishonest, especially considering the absence of any satisfactory explanation for choosing the same name and packaging style. The Supreme Court gave weight to the prior employment of the respondent with the appellant, observing that such a relationship raised serious concerns about the origin of the respondent’s branding strategy.

The Court observed that the use of red, white, and blue colors in the respondent's cartons, similar to that of the appellants, further suggested an intent to deceive the public. The Court found it unacceptable that the Division Bench of the High Court vacated the injunction purely based on delay, disregarding the dishonest intention clearly demonstrated in the factual matrix.

Final Decision:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The order of the Single Judge granting the interim injunction was restored. The Court reiterated that all observations made were prima facie and shall not influence the final adjudication of the suit.

Law Settled in This Case:

The case authoritatively established that in matters of intellectual property infringement, particularly those involving trademarks and copyrights, injunctions should ordinarily follow if the infringement is prima facie established. Delay in initiating legal action does not, by itself, defeat a claim for injunction when there is evidence of dishonest adoption. This decision reinforces the protection of prior use and artistic expression, ensuring that commercial dishonesty does not benefit from procedural technicalities.

Case Title: Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs Sudhir Bhatia and Others

Date of Order: 22 January 2004

Neutral Citation: (2004) 3 SCC 90

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Justices S.N. Variava and H.K. Sema

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Maya Appliances Private Limited Vs Vibrant Concepts And Designs

Use of deceptively similar packaging, fonts, and colors constitutes not only infringement but also passing off.

Introduction:

Trademark conflicts in the consumer appliances sector have seen a surge with increasing brand consciousness and aggressive marketing tactics. The case of Maya Appliances Private Limited vs Vibrant Concepts And Designs is a classic example that draws attention to the nuances of prior use, deceptive similarity, and goodwill associated with trademarks. It reflects how courts interpret statutory provisions in light of facts, commercial honesty, and the intention behind adopting certain marks.

Detailed Factual Background:

Maya Appliances Private Limited, a well-established company known for manufacturing and selling kitchen appliances including mixer grinders, operates under the trademark "BUTTERFLY" and related marks like “BUTTERFLY PREMIUM”, “BUTTERFLY RAPID”, “BUTTERFLY SMART”, etc. The trademark “BUTTERFLY” was registered as early as 1972, and the company claims consistent and continuous use of the mark for over five decades.

The plaintiff alleged that Vibrant Concepts And Designs (defendant), a relatively newer entrant in the market, began manufacturing and selling similar appliances under the impugned mark “Butterfly India”, incorporating it prominently on their packaging and product materials. This adoption, according to Maya Appliances, was dishonest and intended to ride on the goodwill and reputation associated with their mark. The usage of identical and confusingly similar marks on identical products like mixer grinders was causing deception among consumers and amounting to infringement and passing off.

Detailed Procedural Background

Maya Appliances filed a civil suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendant from using the marks “Butterfly India” or any other mark deceptively similar to “BUTTERFLY” in relation to goods falling under class 7 and class 11, particularly kitchen appliances like mixer grinders. An interlocutory application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was also moved seeking temporary restraint against the defendant during the pendency of the suit.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case primarily revolved around the following legal issues:

Whether the defendant’s use of the mark “Butterfly India” amounts to infringement of the plaintiff’s registered trademark “BUTTERFLY”?

Detailed Submission of Parties:

The plaintiff submitted that the trademark “BUTTERFLY” was inherently distinctive and had acquired immense reputation through extensive and continuous use since 1972. It held numerous registrations for variations of the mark in classes 7 and 11, including “BUTTERFLY PREMIUM” (Reg. No. 3638185), “BUTTERFLY SMART” (Reg. No. 2874284), and others. Counsel argued that the mark had acquired the status of a well-known trademark under Section 11(6) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

It was further submitted that the packaging, get-up, and trade dress used by the defendant were a colorable imitation of the plaintiff’s packaging, creating confusion among consumers. Multiple grievances and instances of actual confusion were highlighted.

On the other hand, the defendant claimed that it was using the mark “Butterfly India” as part of its company’s brand strategy and denied any intention to deceive. The defendant also attempted to distinguish its products based on market segment and consumer base.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Case Laws Cited

The plaintiff relied on several landmark decisions, including:

Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73 – where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in determining deceptive similarity, factors such as nature of marks, nature of goods, similarity in nature, and class of consumers must be considered.

Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 – which emphasized that domain names, like trademarks, can be protected from passing off.

K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Sri Ambal & Co., AIR 1970 SC 146 – reinforcing that even phonetically similar marks can cause confusion and hence be injuncted.

Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 183 – highlighting how prior use and registration confer a statutory right to seek injunctions in cases of deceptive similarity.

These judgments were cited in the context of reinforcing the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark and the likelihood of confusion created by the defendant’s use.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

The Hon’ble Judge analyzed the competing marks, packaging, and goods, noting that the defendant had adopted not only the mark “Butterfly India” but had also used packaging deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff, including identical font styles and color schemes. The Court emphasized that such mimicry went beyond mere coincidence and appeared to be a deliberate attempt to trade upon the plaintiff’s reputation.

It was held that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of infringement as well as passing off. The balance of convenience was found to be in favor of the plaintiff, and irreparable harm would be caused if the defendant was not restrained. The Judge further stated that merely adding the word “India” to “Butterfly” did not create sufficient distinction to avoid confusion.

Referring to Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court observed that use of a mark identical or deceptively similar to a registered mark for identical goods amounts to infringement, especially when it causes likelihood of confusion or association.

Final Decision

The Hon’ble High Court granted an ad interim injunction restraining the defendant, its agents, servants, and representatives from using the mark “Butterfly India” or any other deceptively similar mark in relation to mixer grinders or any other kitchen appliances during the pendency of the suit.

Law Settled in this Case:

The case reiterates that:

A registered trademark holder has the exclusive statutory right to protect its mark from misuse, even if a competitor tries to distinguish the impugned mark by suffixing generic country names.

Deceptive similarity is determined not just by visual or phonetic comparison but also by the overall impression, packaging, and intention of use.

Use of deceptively similar packaging, fonts, and colors constitutes not only infringement but also passing off.Well-known trademarks deserve broader protection against attempts to ride on their reputation.

Case Title: Maya Appliances Private Limited Vs Vibrant Concepts And Designs

Date of Order: 2 April 2024

Case No.: CS(COMM) 744/2023 

Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:2445

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anish Dayal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi