AstraZeneca AB Vs P Kumar

Superior metabolic stability, was insufficient to rule out objection under Section 3 (d) of the Patent Act , as it did not explicitly demonstrate therapeutic efficacy

Introduction:

The pharmaceutical industry is a battleground where innovation meets accessibility, and intellectual property rights often clash with public health imperatives. The case of AstraZeneca AB & Ors v. P Kumar & Anr, alongside related suits against T Rao & Anr and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Limited, represents a pivotal legal skirmish in India’s patent landscape. At its core, this dispute revolves around AstraZeneca’s efforts to protect its patents for Ticagrelor, a critical antiplatelet drug marketed as Brilinta, against alleged infringement by generic manufacturers. The case, adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi, delves into complex issues of patent validity, evergreening, and the delicate balance between rewarding innovation and ensuring affordable access to life-saving medications. This case study explores the factual and procedural intricacies, the legal arguments advanced by the parties, the judicial reasoning, and the broader implications of the court’s decision.

Detailed Factual Background:

AstraZeneca AB, a global pharmaceutical giant, held three Indian patents related to Ticagrelor: IN 209907 (Species Patent), IN 247984 (Polymorph Patent), and IN 272674 (Formulation Patent). Ticagrelor, an antiplatelet drug, is prescribed to reduce thrombotic events in patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS), such as heart attacks or unstable angina. Approved in the USA in 2011 and in India in 2012, Ticagrelor is marketed by AstraZeneca under the brand name Brilinta at approximately Rs. 50 per tablet. The plaintiffs claimed that Ticagrelor fell within the scope of IN 907 and IN 984, with its finished formulation covered by IN 674. They asserted that these patents were valid, subsisting, and unchallenged since their publication, except for a revocation petition filed by Micro Labs Limited in 2015, which was pending before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).

The defendants—Micro Labs Ltd., Natco Pharma Ltd., and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.—were accused of planning to launch generic versions of Ticagrelor under brand names such as Bigrelor, an unnamed generic, and Ticaflo, respectively. AstraZeneca alleged that these actions infringed their patents, citing credible market intelligence about the defendants’ imminent launches. The plaintiffs emphasized Ticagrelor’s therapeutic significance, noting that before its introduction, approximately one in three ACS patients faced death, repeat myocardial infarction, or re-hospitalization within six months despite existing treatments. They argued that generic launches would irreparably harm their business and public interest.

The defendants countered that Ticagrelor was disclosed and covered by an earlier patent, IN 241229 (Genus Patent), which expired on July 14, 2018. They alleged that AstraZeneca was engaging in evergreening—extending patent monopolies through subsequent patents without significant therapeutic advancements. The defendants pointed to admissions by AstraZeneca in regulatory filings and foreign litigation, claiming that Ticagrelor was anticipated by IN 229, rendering the suit patents invalid. They also argued that the suit patents lacked novelty, inventive step, and enhanced therapeutic efficacy under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, and that AstraZeneca had suppressed material facts about foreign patent revocations.

Detailed Procedural Background:

The case comprised three suits filed by AstraZeneca: CS(COMM) 749/2018 against P Kumar and Micro Labs Ltd., CS(COMM) 792/2018 against T Rao and Natco Pharma Ltd., and CS(COMM) 1023/2018 against Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. Each suit included applications for interim injunctions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to restrain the defendants from marketing Ticagrelor in violation of AstraZeneca’s patents. Additionally, in CS(COMM) 749/2018, Micro Labs filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC to vacate the interim orders.

On March 22, 2018, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte interim injunction in CS(COMM) 749/2018, restraining Micro Labs from selling Ticagrelor. A similar order was passed on April 23, 2018, in CS(COMM) 792/2018 against Natco Pharma, despite the defendants’ initial claim of not having launched the drug. The court noted that Natco had launched the drug during the pendency of the suit. On July 18, 2018, an interim injunction was granted in CS(COMM) 1023/2018 against Dr. Reddy’s. The defendants filed written statements and counterclaims, seeking revocation of the suit patents under Section 64 of the Patents Act, alleging invalidity on grounds of anticipation, obviousness, and non-compliance with statutory requirements.The court consolidated the hearing of the injunction applications (IA Nos. 3986/2018, 4771/2018, 9332/2018) and Micro Labs’ application to vacate the interim orders (IA No. 5096/2018). 

Issues Involved in the Case:

The case presented several critical legal and factual issues:

Whether Ticagrelor was disclosed and covered by the expired Genus Patent (IN 229), thereby anticipating the suit patents and rendering them invalid?Whether the suit patents were invalid under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act for being derivatives of a known substance without enhanced therapeutic efficacy?

AstraZeneca’s Submissions:

AstraZeneca argued that the suit patents were valid and infringed by the defendants’ planned generic launches. They contended that IN 229, the Genus Patent, covered 150 quintillion compounds but did not specifically disclose Ticagrelor, which was isolated through the Species Patent (IN 907). They asserted that a person skilled in the art could not have identified Ticagrelor from IN 229’s teachings, negating claims of anticipation under Section 13(1)(a). On prior claiming under Section 13(1)(b), they argued that IN 229 lacked a specific claim to Ticagrelor, making the suit patents novel.

Regarding Section 3(d), AstraZeneca denied that Ticagrelor was a derivative of a known substance from IN 229, arguing that structural similarity alone did not trigger the provision. They relied on an affidavit by Dr. Robert Riley, submitted by Dr. Reddy’s, to claim that Ticagrelor exhibited superior metabolic stability and bioavailability, satisfying the enhanced efficacy requirement if Section 3(d) applied. On Section 8, they admitted revocations of equivalent patents in China and Europe but noted pending appeals with automatic stays and grants in 55-60 countries, asserting substantial compliance.

AstraZeneca emphasized their service to six lakh patients annually and argued that generic launches would cause irreparable harm. They distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Novartis AG v. Union of India, claiming it addressed specific disclosure of a known compound, unlike the present case where Ticagrelor was not disclosed in IN 229.

Defendants’ Submissions:

The defendants, represented by Micro Labs, Natco Pharma, and Dr. Reddy’s, argued that the suit patents were invalid as Ticagrelor was disclosed and claimed in IN 229, which expired on July 14, 2018. They relied on AstraZeneca’s admissions in Form 27 filings, where Brilinta and Axcer were declared as working IN 229, and in US litigation against Mylan Inc., where AstraZeneca claimed infringement of US Patent 910 (equivalent to IN 229) by Ticagrelor generics. They contended that these admissions established anticipation and prior claiming, rendering the suit patents invalid under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), and (k).

The defendants accused AstraZeneca of evergreening, arguing that the suit patents were attempts to extend IN 229’s monopoly without significant therapeutic advancements, violating Section 3(d). They highlighted the plaint’s silence on enhanced efficacy and argued that Ticagrelor, being structurally similar to compounds in IN 229, required proof of superior therapeutic efficacy, which was absent. They also alleged non-compliance with Section 8, citing AstraZeneca’s failure to disclose revocations of equivalent patents in China, Europe, and South Korea.

The defendants emphasized public interest, noting that their generics, priced at Rs. 20 per tablet, were significantly cheaper than Brilinta. They argued that the interim injunctions caused irreparable harm to patients and that any loss to AstraZeneca could be compensated monetarily. They relied on judicial precedents, including Novartis AG and F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla, to assert that a credible challenge to patent validity justified denying interim relief.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties:

The parties relied on several landmark judgments to bolster their arguments, each addressing specific aspects of patent law. Below is a detailed analysis of these judgments and their context in the case:

Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Novartis was central to the defendants’ argument on coverage versus disclosure and Section 3(d). The court rejected the appellant’s claim that a patent’s coverage could extend beyond its disclosure, emphasizing that patents grant monopolies in exchange for public disclosure. It held that Section 3(d) sets a higher threshold for pharmaceutical patents, requiring new forms of known substances to demonstrate enhanced therapeutic efficacy. The defendants cited this to argue that IN 229’s coverage of Ticagrelor negated AstraZeneca’s claim of non-disclosure and that the suit patents, as derivatives, failed the efficacy test. AstraZeneca countered that Novartis involved a known compound (Imatinib Mesylate) specifically disclosed in the prior patent, unlike Ticagrelor, which was not disclosed in IN 229. The court found Novartis persuasive, rejecting AstraZeneca’s coverage-disclosure dichotomy and holding that the suit patents prima facie required enhanced efficacy under Section 3(d).

Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, AIR 1982 SC 1444

Cited by the court, this Supreme Court judgment clarified that novelty and inventive step are mixed questions of law and fact, dependent on circumstances. It outlined tests for obviousness, asking whether the invention was publicly known or would naturally suggest itself to a skilled person. The court applied this to assess whether IN 229 disclosed Ticagrelor, noting that the issue required expert evidence and could not be conclusively determined at the interim stage. This supported the court’s finding that the defendants’ challenge was credible but required trial scrutiny.

F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del):

The defendants heavily relied on this Delhi High Court Division Bench decision, which held that a credible challenge to patent validity, particularly under Section 3(d) or Section 64, could deny interim injunctions. The court emphasized full disclosure of patent specifications and related applications in injunction applications. The defendants argued that AstraZeneca’s failure to disclose IN 229’s workings and foreign revocations mirrored the suppression in Roche, justifying vacation of the interim orders. The court agreed, finding AstraZeneca’s omissions material and the defendants’ challenge credible, aligning with Roche’s principles.

F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 (225) DLT 391:

Cited by the court on Section 8 compliance, this Division Bench decision clarified that non-compliance with Section 8 is discretionary under Section 64(1)(m), depending on the intent and materiality of the omission. The court found AstraZeneca’s explanations for foreign revocations reasonable, holding that non-disclosure was not material enough to warrant vacating the interim orders, consistent with this judgment.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. J.D. Joshi, 2015 (64) PTC 135 (Del):

The defendants and the court referenced this Delhi High Court decision, which held that challenges under Section 64 are fact-dependent or mixed questions, and a credible challenge to validity can preclude interim relief. The court applied this to find that the defendants’ arguments on anticipation and Section 3(d) raised substantial questions, rendering the suit patents vulnerable.

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 223 (2015) DLT 454:

Cited by the court, this Delhi High Court decision emphasized the reliance on expert testimony in complex pharmaceutical patent disputes, as courts lack technical expertise. The court noted that the issue of Ticagrelor’s disclosure in IN 229 required expert evidence, reinforcing the need for a trial to resolve the dispute.

Chemtura Corporation v. Union of India, 2009 (41) PTC 260 (Del):

The court cited this Delhi High Court decision to outline Section 8’s requirements for disclosing foreign patent applications. It found AstraZeneca’s disclosures sufficient, as they provided reasonable explanations for foreign revocations, aligning with Chemtura’s emphasis on materiality.

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co. Ltd., [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat):

AstraZeneca cited this UK High Court decision to argue that a genus patent’s general formula does not disclose specific compounds unless individually described. The court’s finding that a theoretical penumbra of compounds does not negate novelty supported AstraZeneca’s claim that IN 229 did not disclose Ticagrelor. However, the Delhi High Court found this less persuasive in light of AstraZeneca’s admissions and Novartis’s rejection of the coverage-disclosure dichotomy.

Eli Lilly & Company Ltd. v. Apotex Pty Ltd., [2013] FCA 214:

AstraZeneca relied on this Federal Court of Australia decision, which held that selecting a specific compound from a genus patent’s broad class requires significant effort, negating obviousness. AstraZeneca argued that Ticagrelor’s isolation from IN 229’s 150 quintillion compounds was inventive. The court acknowledged this but prioritized AstraZeneca’s admissions and Indian legal standards under Novartis.

Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3 SCR 265:

AstraZeneca cited this Supreme Court of Canada decision to defend selection patents, which encourage improvements over genus patents. The court recognized selection patents’ validity but found that AstraZeneca’s admissions and Section 3(d) concerns raised credible challenges, limiting the judgment’s applicability.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

Justice Jayant Nath’s judgment meticulously analyzed the competing claims, focusing on three key issues: Ticagrelor’s disclosure in IN 229, compliance with Section 3(d), and Section 8 violations. The court’s reasoning was grounded in Indian patent law principles and judicial precedents, balancing the plaintiff’s proprietary rights against the defendants’ public interest arguments.

On the issue of Ticagrelor’s disclosure in IN 229, the court examined AstraZeneca’s admissions in Form 27 filings and US litigation. The identical Form 27 returns for IN 229, IN 907, IN 984, and IN 674, declaring Brilinta and Axcer sales, suggested that AstraZeneca treated Ticagrelor as working all four patents, implying disclosure in IN 229. The US litigation against Mylan Inc., where AstraZeneca claimed infringement of US Patent 910 by Ticagrelor generics, further reinforced this. The court found AstraZeneca’s explanation—that IN 229 was worked through Ticagrelor only after its isolation via IN 907—unconvincing, as the plaint omitted these details. Citing Novartis, the court rejected the coverage-disclosure dichotomy, holding that AstraZeneca’s admissions prima facie indicated that Ticagrelor was anticipated by IN 229, raising a credible challenge under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), and (k).

Regarding Section 3(d), the court noted the plaint’s silence on enhanced therapeutic efficacy, a critical requirement for derivatives of known substances. AstraZeneca’s belated reliance on Dr. Riley’s affidavit, claiming Ticagrelor’s superior metabolic stability, was insufficient, as it did not explicitly demonstrate therapeutic efficacy over IN 229’s compounds. The court applied Novartis and Roche, concluding that the suit patents prima facie failed the Section 3(d) test, as they appeared to be derivatives of IN 229’s compounds without proven efficacy enhancements.

On Section 8, the court accepted AstraZeneca’s explanations for foreign revocations, noting pending appeals and grants in multiple countries. Citing Chemtura and Roche (2015), the court held that the non-disclosure was not material enough to warrant vacating the interim orders, as AstraZeneca substantially complied with statutory requirements.

The court applied the principles from Roche (2009) and Bristol-Myers, emphasizing that a credible challenge to patent validity precludes interim injunctions. The defendants’ arguments on anticipation and Section 3(d) raised substantial questions, rendering the suit patents vulnerable. The court also considered public interest, noting the defendants’ lower-priced generics (Rs. 20 vs. Rs. 50 per tablet) and the expiration of IN 229, which tilted the balance of convenience in their favor. To safeguard AstraZeneca’s interests, the court mandated the defendants to maintain accurate sales accounts.

Final Decision:

On August 8, 2019, The court vacated the interim injunctions granted on March 22, 2018, April 23, 2018, and July 18, 2018, in CS(COMM) 749/2018, CS(COMM) 792/2018, and CS(COMM) 1023/2018, respectively. The court held that AstraZeneca failed to establish a prima facie case, as the defendants raised a credible challenge to the suit patents’ validity under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), (k), and 3(d). The balance of convenience favored the defendants, given the lower price of their generics and IN 229’s expiration. The defendants were directed to maintain quarterly sales accounts, supported by affidavits and authenticated by chartered accountants, to enable potential compensation if AstraZeneca prevailed at trial. The applications were disposed of accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:

This case reinforces several key principles of Indian patent law:

A credible challenge to patent validity, based on grounds under Section 64 or Section 3(d), is sufficient to deny interim injunctions in infringement suits, as established in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla. The coverage-disclosure dichotomy is untenable in India, as per Novartis AG v. Union of India, requiring specific disclosure for patent validity and infringement claims.Section 3(d) imposes a stringent requirement for pharmaceutical patents, mandating proof of enhanced therapeutic efficacy for derivatives of known substances, with silence in the plaint being fatal.Non-compliance with Section 8 is discretionary under Section 64(1)(m), and non-material omissions do not necessarily warrant revocation, as clarified in Chemtura and Roche (2015).Public interest, particularly access to affordable generics, is a significant factor in balancing convenience in patent disputes, especially post-expiration of foundational patents.

Case Title: AstraZeneca AB Vs P Kumar

Date of Order: August 8, 2019

Case No.: CS(COMM) 749/2018

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jayant Nath

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma

Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999 is inapplicable to passing off action

Introduction:

In the bustling world of intellectual property disputes, where trademarks and copyrights often clash like titans, the case of Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma Proprietor of Kundan Cable India stands out as a compelling narrative of legal interpretation and judicial reasoning. Decided on March 27, 2025, by the High Court of Delhi, this case delves into the intricate interplay between trademark infringement and passing off actions under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. At its core, the dispute revolves around the use of the "KUNDAN" trademark by two competing entities in the electrical goods market, culminating in a challenge to a Trial Court’s order that stayed multiple suits pending rectification proceedings. This case study explores the factual matrix, procedural twists, legal arguments, and the judiciary’s meticulous analysis, culminating in a ruling that clarifies the scope of stay provisions in trademark litigation.

Detailed Factual Background:

The petitioner, Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., is a company engaged in manufacturing and marketing electrical goods under the trademark "KUNDAN" or "KUNDAN CAB," a label it claims to have adopted through its predecessor-in-interest since 1975. The respondent, Lakha Ram Sharma, operating as Kundan Cable India, is similarly involved in producing electrical P.V.C. wires and cables under the "KUNDAN" and "KUNDAN CABLE" trademarks. This overlapping use of the "KUNDAN" mark sparked a series of legal battles between the parties, dating back to the 1990s. The disputes gave rise to multiple suits, each addressing allegations of trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violations related to the "KUNDAN" label and its artistic representations. The suits, filed between 1994 and 2006, were eventually consolidated for evidence recording, reflecting the intertwined nature of the claims. The petitioner accused the respondent of passing off its goods by mimicking the "KUNDAN" trademark, while the respondent countered with its own claims, asserting prior use and seeking injunctions against the petitioner.

Detailed Procedural Background:

The procedural journey of this case is a labyrinth of filings, orders, and appeals. The litigation began with suits filed in 1994, including TM No. 70 of 2010 (later renumbered as TM No. 968 of 2016) by the respondent against the petitioner for passing off, and a counterclaim (CC No. 07 of 2015, renumbered as TM No. 971 of 2016) by the petitioner for infringement and passing off. Additional suits followed: Suit No. 1371/1994 (renumbered as TM No. 931 of 2016) for copyright infringement and passing off, and Suit No. 1497 of 1995 (renumbered as TM No. 1030 of 2016) seeking an injunction against caution notices and damages. These suits were consolidated for trial. In 2018, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioner’s interim injunction applications, a decision upheld by the Delhi High Court in 2022, which directed the Trial Court to expedite the passing off trial. 

However, in January 2025, the respondent filed an application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking a stay of all proceedings, citing pending rectification petitions before the Madras High Court. On January 18, 2025, the Trial Court, relying on the Division Bench ruling in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances (2024 SCC Online Del 3652), stayed the suits, except for TM No. 931/2016, which involved copyright claims. Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, leading to the present petition, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025.

Issues Involved in the Case:

The central issue before the Delhi High Court was whether the Trial Court erred in staying the suits, particularly those involving passing off claims, under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, based on the Amrish Aggarwal judgment. 

This raised subsidiary questions: Did the Division Bench in Amrish Aggarwal intend to mandate a stay of passing off actions alongside infringement suits pending rectification proceedings? 

Were the references to "passing off" in Amrish Aggarwal binding precedent or mere obiter dicta? The case also tested the interplay between trademark and copyright claims, as one suit (TM No. 931/2016) involved distinct copyright issues unaffected by the Trade Marks Act.

Detailed Submission of Parties:

Petitioner, argued that the Trial Court misinterpreted Amrish Aggarwal and contended that the Division Bench’s observations on staying passing off actions were obiter dicta, as the case primarily addressed infringement suits. Sibal emphasized that Section 124 applies only to infringement actions, not passing off, and cited the earlier Division Bench ruling in Puma Stationer v. Hindustan Pencils (2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del.) (DB)), which allowed passing off proceedings to continue despite a stay on infringement claims. Petitioner argued that the Trial Court’s reliance on Amrish Aggarwal disrupted a nearly concluded trial, undermining judicial efficiency. 

The respondent, defended the Trial Court’s order, asserting that Amrish Aggarwal explicitly extended the stay requirement to passing off actions, as noted in paragraph 44. Respondent conceded the lack of detailed reasoning but maintained that the Division Bench’s findings, even if obiter, were binding on a Single Judge, citing Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman (2002 (2) Mah.L.J. 115) and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Limited (2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957). Respondent highlighted that the petitioner’s argument in Amrish Aggarwal against staying passing off actions was rejected, reinforcing his position.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:

The parties relied on several precedents, each dissected by the court. Puma Stationer v. Hindustan Pencils (2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del.) (DB)) was pivotal for the petitioner, where the Division Bench stayed infringement proceedings under Section 124 but explicitly permitted passing off actions to proceed, establishing a clear distinction. J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Limited (75 PTC 44 (Del)) similarly supported this bifurcated approach. The respondent’s cornerstone was Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances (2024 SCC Online Del 3652), where the Division Bench, addressing a post-IPAB abolition scenario, suggested that both infringement and passing off suits should be stayed pending rectification, though its reasoning focused on infringement. The petitioner countered that this reference to passing off was incidental, citing Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner ((1978) 1 SCC 405), where the Supreme Court held obiter dicta non-binding, and State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (1967 SCC OnLine SC 17), emphasizing that only what is decided is authoritative. Gudri v. Ram Kishun (1983 SCC OnLine All 415) further supported this, with the Allahabad High Court treating an inadvertent Full Bench remark as non-binding. The respondent’s reliance on Naseemunisa Begum and Crocs Inc. argued for the weight of higher bench observations, but the court found these inapplicable, as the issues in those cases were directly addressed, unlike the passing off reference in Amrish Aggarwal.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:

Court’s reasoning was a masterclass in statutory interpretation and judicial precedent analysis. The began by contextualizing Amrish Aggarwal, noting its origin in a reference questioning the stay of infringement suits post-IPAB abolition, not passing off. Examining paragraph 44 of Amrish Aggarwal, which mentioned "passing off," Bansal found it relied on Puma Stationer, which explicitly allowed passing off actions to continue. 

The concluded that Amrish Aggarwal did not intend to overrule this, as no disagreement was expressed. Analyzing Section 124, Bansal noted its exclusive application to infringement suits, reinforced by Section 27(2), which preserves passing off actions outside the Act’s purview. The respondent’s reliance on Amrish Aggarwal’s rejection of the petitioner’s argument (paragraphs 34 and 53) was dismissed, as it addressed a different contention—not a direct challenge to staying passing off suits. The court deemed the "passing off" reference in Amrish Aggarwal an inadvertent obiter dictum, not binding under Mohinder Singh Gill and Sudhansu Sekhar Misra. Court distinguished the respondent’s cases, finding Naseemunisa Begum and Crocs Inc. inapposite due to their context-specific rulings. Balancing judicial efficiency with legal clarity, Bansal ruled that the Trial Court’s blanket stay was erroneous, especially given the advanced trial stage.

Final Decision:

The petition was allowed on March 27, 2025. The impugned Trial Court order of January 18, 2025, was set aside, and all stayed suits (TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, and 932/2016) were directed to proceed for trial, alongside TM No. 931/2016, which was never stayed. The Trial Court was urged to expedite the proceedings given the suits’ age.

Law Settled in This Case:

This ruling clarified that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, mandates a stay only for infringement suits pending rectification proceedings, not passing off actions. It reaffirmed that obiter dicta from a higher bench, especially if inadvertent or unsupported by reasoning, do not bind a smaller bench, preserving judicial flexibility in interpreting statutory intent. 

Case Title: Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma Proprietor of Kundan Cable India

Date of Order: March 27, 2025

Case No.: CM(M)-IPD 5/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. & Others Vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd

Introduction:

In the competitive world of fast-moving consumer goods, trademarks are not just identifiers but powerful tools that encapsulate brand identity and consumer trust. The case of Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. & Others vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd., decided on May 30, 2014, by the Delhi High Court, is a landmark dispute that underscores the complexities of trademark law in India. This case revolves around the alleged infringement of the trademark "ALLROUND" and the expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION" by Procter & Gamble’s use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ALLROUNDER" in their toothpaste products. The dispute highlights critical issues of trademark distinctiveness, the descriptive nature of marks, and the principle of approbate and reprobate, offering valuable insights into the protection of slogans and taglines under Indian trademark law.

Detailed Factual Background:

Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd., part of the Anchor Group, is a prominent player in the Indian FMCG sector, known for its dental care products, including toothpaste, under the brand "ANCHOR." Since 2005, Anchor has used the trademark "ALLROUND" and the expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION" for its toothpaste, claiming that these have acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness. The trademark "ALLROUND" was registered on August 26, 2008, under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, following an application filed on September 2, 2005. Anchor asserted that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was extensively used in advertising, including in regional languages through transliteration, and had become synonymous with its brand.

Procter & Gamble (P&G), a global conglomerate, entered the Indian toothpaste market in July 2013 with its "ORAL-B" brand, launching products labeled with "ORAL-B ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ORAL-B ALLROUNDER." Anchor alleged that P&G’s use of these terms infringed its registered trademark "ALLROUND" and the well-known expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION," accusing P&G of attempting to capitalize on Anchor’s established goodwill. P&G, comprising Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., Procter & Gamble Business Services Canada Company, and Gillette India Ltd., countered that "ALLROUND" was a descriptive term, incapable of trademark protection, and that their use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" was merely descriptive of their product’s qualities.

Detailed Procedural Background:

Anchor filed a suit (CS(OS) No. 1431/2013) in the Delhi High Court, seeking a declaration that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was a well-known mark, a permanent injunction against P&G’s use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ALLROUNDER," and ancillary reliefs like delivery up and rendition of accounts. Alongside the suit, Anchor applied for an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to restrain P&G pending the suit’s outcome. No ex-parte interim relief was granted.

The Single Judge, on May 9, 2014, allowed Anchor’s application, granting an interim injunction against P&G, effective after four weeks to allow compliance. The Single Judge’s order was based on findings that P&G’s use of the disputed terms was not merely descriptive and that their prior trademark applications contradicted their defense. Aggrieved, P&G filed an appeal (FAO(OS) No. 241/2014) under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC, challenging the interim injunction. The Division Bench, comprising the Chief Justice and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, heard the appeal at the admission stage with consent and delivered its judgment on May 30, 2014.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case presented several pivotal issues for adjudication:

Whether Anchor’s registered trademark "ALLROUND" and the expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION" were distinctive or merely descriptive, and thus entitled to protection? Whether P&G’s use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ALLROUNDER" infringed Anchor’s trademark rights or constituted a bona fide descriptive use?Whether P&G’s prior applications for registration of "ALLROUNDER" in India and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" in the United States estopped them from claiming these terms as descriptive? Whether Anchor’s use of "ALLROUND PROTECTION" instead of "ALLROUND" constituted non-use of the registered trademark, thereby weakening its claim?

Detailed Submission of Parties:

Anchor’s Submissions:

Anchor  argued that "ALLROUND" was a distinctive trademark, registered since 2008, and "ALLROUND PROTECTION" had acquired secondary meaning through extensive use since 2005. They highlighted that the trademark was used in advertisements and packaging, including in regional languages via transliteration, indicating its role as a brand identifier rather than a descriptor. Anchor pointed out that P&G’s application for "ALLROUNDER" in 2010 faced objections from the Registrar of Trademarks due to similarity with "ALLROUND," and P&G’s response did not claim the term as descriptive but as distinctive. Similarly, P&G’s U.S. registration of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" disclaimed the word "PROTECTION," suggesting acknowledgment of the mark’s distinctiveness.

Anchor relied on several precedents to bolster its case. They cited Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 (2) SCC 399, to argue that appellate courts should not interfere with discretionary interim orders unless exercised arbitrarily. They referenced Automatic Electric Ltd. vs. R.K. Dhawan, (1999) (19) PTC 81, and Indian Hotels Company Ltd. vs. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 (37) PTC 468 (Del), to assert that P&G’s prior trademark applications precluded them from claiming the terms as descriptive. Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. vs. The Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727, was cited to argue that identical marks negate the need to prove likelihood of confusion. Ruchi Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indian Flame Enterprises, (2001) PTC 876 (Del), supported their claim that use of a similar mark on cognate goods could cause deception. Finally, Amar Singh Chawal Wala vs. Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl. Mills, 2009 (40) PTC 417 (Del) (DB), was used to argue that P&G’s use during the suit’s pendency accrued no rights.

P&G’s Submissions

P&G, represented by senior counsel Dr. A.M. Singhvi and Mr. Sanjay Jain, contended that "ALLROUND" was inherently descriptive and incapable of trademark protection under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. They argued that Anchor never used "ALLROUND" as a standalone trademark but only as part of "ALLROUND PROTECTION," which described the qualitative features of its "ANCHOR" toothpaste. P&G asserted that their use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" was bona fide and descriptive, not as a trademark, and that their brands "ORAL-B" and Anchor’s "ANCHOR" were distinct, eliminating confusion.

P&G challenged the Single Judge’s reliance on Automatic Electric Ltd., arguing it was overruled by the Division Bench in Marico Limited vs. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 X AD (Del) 214, which held that descriptive marks like "LOW-ABSORB" were not protectable. They cited Veerumal Praveen Kumar vs. Needle Industries (India) Ltd., 93 (2001) DLT 600 (DB), and Fedders Lloyd Corporation Ltd. vs. Fedders Corporation, 2005 (30) PTC 353 (Del) (DB), to argue that non-use of the registered mark "ALLROUND" disentitled Anchor to protection. P&G admitted to mistakenly applying for "ALLROUNDER" in India and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" in the U.S., offering to withdraw these registrations. They relied on Rhizome Distilleries P. Ltd. vs. Pernod Ricard S.A. France, 2010 (42) PTC 806 (Del) (DB), to argue that laudatory or descriptive words cannot be exclusively claimed.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations:

The parties and the court referenced several precedents, each contextualized to address specific legal points:

Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 (2) SCC 399: Anchor cited this Supreme Court decision to argue that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with discretionary interim orders unless they are arbitrary or perverse. The court implicitly accepted this principle, as it thoroughly evaluated the Single Judge’s reasoning before upholding it.

Automatic Electric Ltd. vs. R.K. Dhawan, (1999) (19) PTC 81: Anchor relied on this Single Judge decision, which held that a defendant registering a mark abroad (e.g., "DIMMER" in Australia) could not claim it as generic in India. P&G argued it was overruled by Marico Limited, but the Division Bench noted its affirmation in Indian Hotels Company Ltd., reinforcing the principle of approbate and reprobate.

Indian Hotels Company Ltd. vs. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 (37) PTC 468 (Del): Anchor cited this Division Bench decision, which approved Automatic Electric Ltd., holding that a party applying for a mark’s registration cannot later claim it as descriptive. The court relied on this to reject P&G’s claim that "ALLROUNDER" and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" were descriptive.

Marico Limited vs. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 X AD (Del) 214: P&G heavily relied on this Division Bench decision, which denied interim relief for the mark "LOW-ABSORB," deemed descriptive. The court distinguished it, finding "ALLROUND PROTECTION" not generically descriptive but indicative of a unique product quality.

Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. vs. The Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727: Anchor cited this Supreme Court case to argue that identical marks negate the need to prove confusion. The court did not directly address this but implicitly accepted that the similarity between "ALLROUND" and P&G’s marks warranted protection.

Ruchi Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indian Flame Enterprises, (2001) PTC 876 (Del): Anchor used this to argue that use of a similar mark on cognate goods could deceive consumers. The court’s focus on similarity in essential features aligned with this principle.

Amar Singh Chawal Wala vs. Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl. Mills, 2009 (40) PTC 417 (Del) (DB): Anchor cited this to argue that P&G’s use during the suit’s pendency accrued no rights. The court did not directly address this but upheld the injunction, implying agreement.

Veerumal Praveen Kumar vs. Needle Industries (India) Ltd., 93 (2001) DLT 600 (DB): P&G cited this to argue that non-used trademarks are unprotected. The court rejected this, finding Anchor’s use of "ALLROUND PROTECTION" constituted use of the registered mark.

Fedders Lloyd Corporation Ltd. vs. Fedders Corporation, 2005 (30) PTC 353 (Del) (DB): P&G used this to support non-use arguments, but the court found it inapplicable given Anchor’s evidence of use.

Rhizome Distilleries P. Ltd. vs. Pernod Ricard S.A. France, 2010 (42) PTC 806 (Del) (DB): P&G cited this to argue that descriptive or laudatory words are not protectable. The court distinguished it, holding that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was not generically descriptive.

Pankaj Goel vs. Dabur India Limited, 2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del) (DB), Castrol Limited vs. A.K. Mehta, 1997 (17) PTC 408 (DB), and Prakash Roadline vs. Prakash Parcel Service, 1992 (2) Arbitration Law Reporter 174: The court cited these to dismiss P&G’s argument that third-party use negated interim relief, affirming that infringement by others does not preclude protection against a specific defendant.

Stokely Van Camp, Inc. vs. Heinz India Private Limited, 171 (2010) DLT 16, affirmed in MANU/DE/3132/2010, SLP dismissed on April 8, 2011: The court referenced this comprehensive case law discussion to avoid redundant analysis, noting its relevance to trademark disputes.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The Division Bench provided a meticulous analysis, rejecting P&G’s appeal and upholding the interim injunction. The court’s reasoning was multifaceted:

Distinctiveness of "ALLROUND": The court noted that neither the Indian nor U.S. Registrar of Trademarks objected to "ALLROUND" as descriptive under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, suggesting prima facie distinctiveness. The Registrar’s objection to P&G’s "ALLROUNDER" application due to similarity with "ALLROUND" further supported this view.

Slogans as Trademarks: The court recognized "ALLROUND PROTECTION" as a slogan or tagline, falling within the definition of a trademark under Sections 2(m) and 2(zb) of the Act. It emphasized that slogans are powerful marketing tools that enhance brand equity, often lingering in consumers’ minds more than the primary brand. The court rejected P&G’s claim that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was descriptive, arguing that its association with toothpaste arose from Anchor’s long use, not inherent descriptiveness.

Test of Descriptiveness: The court proposed a novel test: a mark’s descriptiveness should be assessed before its use, not after prolonged association with a product. Before Anchor’s use, "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was not inherently descriptive of toothpaste, unlike generic terms like "whiter teeth" or "fresher breath." The court distinguished between marks describing generic qualities and those highlighting unique product features, classifying "ALLROUND PROTECTION" as the latter.

Approbate and Reprobate: The court upheld the Single Judge’s application of this principle, noting that P&G’s applications for "ALLROUNDER" and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" contradicted their claim of descriptiveness. P&G’s U.S. registration, disclaiming "PROTECTION," reinforced that "ALL-AROUND" was the distinctive element. The court dismissed P&G’s claim of mistaken applications as unconvincing, lacking sworn evidence.

Use of Registered Mark: The court rejected P&G’s argument that Anchor’s use of "ALLROUND PROTECTION" constituted non-use of "ALLROUND." P&G’s U.S. registration, disclaiming "PROTECTION," indicated that suffixing did not negate the mark’s use. Anchor’s advertisements and invoices further evidenced use of "ALLROUND" as a trademark.

Third-Party Use: The court dismissed P&G’s claim of third-party use, citing precedents that infringement by others does not preclude relief against a specific defendant.

Case Law Analysis: The court reconciled conflicting precedents, affirming Automatic Electric Ltd. via Indian Hotels Company Ltd. and distinguishing Marico Limited based on the unique nature of "ALLROUND PROTECTION." It relied on Stokely Van Camp for comprehensive trademark law principles.

Final Decision:

The Division Bench dismissed P&G’s appeal, upholding the Single Judge’s interim injunction restraining P&G from using "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION," "ALLROUNDER," or any deceptively similar mark during the suit’s pendency. The court clarified that its observations would not influence the trial’s outcome.

Law Settled in This Case:

This case settled several key principles in Indian trademark law:

Slogans as Trademarks: Slogans or taglines, if distinctive and capable of distinguishing goods, qualify as trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, enhancing brand equity through consumer recall.Test of Descriptiveness: A mark’s descriptiveness should be assessed before its use, not after prolonged association with a product. Marks highlighting unique product features, rather than generic qualities, are protectable. Approbate and Reprobate: A party applying for or obtaining registration of a mark cannot later claim it as descriptive, as this contradicts their prior conduct.Use of Registered Mark: Suffixing a registered mark with additional words does not necessarily constitute non-use, especially if the core mark remains prominent.Interim Relief: The balance of convenience favors the plaintiff when the defendant’s infringing use is recent, and third-party use does not preclude interim relief against a specific defendant.

Case Title: Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. & Others Vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd.

Date of Order: May 30, 2014

Case No.: FAO(OS) No. 241/2014

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Chief Justice and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Obiter No Bar: Delhi HC Revives Passing Off Trial in Balar Marketing Case

New Delhi | March 27, 2025 — In a significant reaffirmation of judicial discipline and statutory interpretation, the Delhi High Court has held that obiter dicta of a High Court, especially when not supported by reasoned analysis, cannot bind a coordinate or subordinate bench. The ruling came in the matter of Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025, decided on 27 March 2025 by the High Court of Delhi, Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2322. The case, while rooted in a trademark dispute, evolved into a wider pronouncement on the limits of judicial precedent and the correct application of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Trademark Clash and Background

The petitioner, Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., has been manufacturing electrical goods under the trademarks “KUNDAN” and “KUNDAN CAB” since 1975. The respondent, Lakha Ram Sharma, operating as Kundan Cable India, also uses similar marks—“KUNDAN” and “KUNDAN CABLE”—for related products. This overlapping use led to a longstanding legal tussle between the two parties, dating back to the 1990s.

The suits—TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, 932/2016, and 931/2016—were consolidated for trial. In 2018, the Trial Court declined interim relief to the petitioner. However, by an order dated 30 May 2022, it permitted trial to proceed on the issue of passing off, while staying the trademark infringement claims. The court relied on Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del) (DB), and J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Ltd., 2007 (75) PTC 44 (Del).

The 2025 Dispute Over Obiter Dicta

In January 2025, the respondent applied to stay all suits, including those for passing off, citing paragraph 44 of the Division Bench judgment in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652. That paragraph made a reference to staying proceedings involving both “infringement or passing off” in the context of pending rectification petitions under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Trial Court accepted this argument and stayed all suits except the one solely under the Copyright Act.

Balar Marketing challenged the order before the Delhi High Court, contending that the reference in Amrish Aggarwal was an obiter dicta and lacked binding authority.

The Legal Debate: Precedent vs. Passing Observation

The petitioner argued that the reference to “passing off” in Amrish Aggarwal was not backed by any reasoning and therefore could not override earlier binding precedent. It was submitted that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 applies only to infringement actions, and that passing off, being a common law remedy, operates independently of trademark registration status.

To support the proposition that obiter dicta are not binding, the petitioner relied on authoritative decisions including Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, and Gudri v. Ram Kishun, 1983 SCC OnLine All 415: AIR 1984 All 5.

The respondent, in contrast, defended the Trial Court’s reliance on the Division Bench judgment. It was argued that the observations in Amrish Aggarwal should be treated as binding, even if made without elaboration. Reference was made to Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman, 2002 (2) Mah LJ 115, and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957, to assert that larger bench observations warrant judicial adherence.

The Court's Reasoning: Drawing the Line Between Ratio and Obiter

The Delhi High Court, examining the issue in depth, observed that the core question in Amrish Aggarwal pertained solely to infringement proceedings during pendency of rectification applications after abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board under the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021. The casual mention of “passing off” in paragraph 44 was not part of the issue framed or adjudicated and thus did not form part of the ratio decidendi.

In reaffirming Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd., the Court clarified that while infringement proceedings are stayed pending rectification, passing off claims may continue since they do not depend on the validity of trademark registration. The Court also highlighted Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which expressly preserves the right to bring a passing off claim regardless of registration.

The High Court further emphasized that judicial precedent is confined to what is expressly decided. Citing Mohinder Singh Gill and Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, the Court reinforced that stray observations or general remarks lacking legal reasoning do not constitute binding law. It held that Crocs Inc. and Naseemunisa Begum were distinguishable, as those cases involved direct adjudication of the legal issue concerned.

Decision and Directions

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the Trial Court’s order dated 18 January 2025. It held that the reference to passing off in Amrish Aggarwal was an inadvertent obiter dicta that could not serve as a legal basis for staying the suits. The Court directed that all consolidated suits, particularly those concerning passing off, proceed to trial without delay.

Legal Position Reaffirmed

The judgment in Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025, 2025:DHC:2322, firmly establishes that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not extend to passing off actions. It reiterates that passing off is a distinct and independent common law remedy that continues irrespective of registration-related disputes. Above all, it reinforces the principle that only the ratio decidendi of a decision has binding force—obiter dicta, however notable, cannot override statutory interpretation or precedent.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, Patent and Trademark Attorney, Delhi High Court

Property Owners Association Vs. State of Maharashtra

Introduction:

The settled law that obiter dicta are not binding can be found discussed in the Supreme Court's judgment in Property Owners Association vs. State of Maharashtra (2024), particularly in its analysis of prior rulings like Sanjeev Coke and Ranganatha Reddy. The Court clarified that observations in a judgment which are not part of the ratio decidendi — i.e., not necessary for the decision of the case — do not have binding precedential value.

The Issue of Obiter Dictum:

The issue of obiter dictum arose prominently in the context of the respondents’ reliance on Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536, a decision by a nine-judge bench. In Mafatlal, Justice Jeevan Reddy, speaking for the majority, observed that "the material resources of the community are not confined to public resources but include all resources, natural and man-made, public, and private owned." This statement was cited to support the expansive interpretation of Article 39(b) adopted in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 and Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1983) 1 SCC 147, which included privately owned resources within the ambit of "material resources of the community." The appellants challenged the authority of this observation, arguing that it was obiter dictum, as it was not central to the ratio decidendi of Mafatlal, a case primarily concerned with excise duties rather than property rights or Article 39(b). The respondents countered that the observation, made by a nine-judge bench, carried significant weight and reinforced the settled interpretation of Article 39(b), aligning with the Court’s consistent jurisprudence.

Obiter dictum, as a legal concept, refers to remarks or observations made by a judge that are incidental to the main issue being decided and thus lack binding precedent. Unlike the ratio decidendi—the core reasoning that resolves the case—obiter dicta are persuasive at best, their authority depending on the context, the bench’s composition, and their alignment with established law. In this case, the Supreme Court meticulously examined the Mafatlal observation to determine its legal status. The appellants argued that since Mafatlal did not directly address a challenge to the acquisition of private property under Article 39(b), the remark on material resources was extraneous to the case’s core issue. They contended that endorsing this observation as binding would improperly elevate a passing comment to the status of precedent, especially given its reliance on Ranganatha Reddy’s minority opinion and Sanjeev Coke, which they argued required reconsideration.

The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, urged the Court to view the Mafatlal observation as authoritative, given the nine-judge bench’s stature and its reference to a line of cases, including Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke. They argued that the observation was not merely incidental but reflected a deliberate affirmation of the broad interpretation of Article 39(b), consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence on directive principles. The respondents emphasized that the Court’s repeated endorsements of this interpretation in cases like State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu Kavur Bai (1984) 1 SCC 515 and National Textile Corp Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. (1986) AIR SC 1234 lent credence to the Mafatlal statement, diminishing any claim that it was obiter dictum.

Chief Justice delivering the judgment, addressed the obiter dictum issue with precision. The Court acknowledged that the Mafatlal observation was made in a context unrelated to the acquisition of private property, as the case dealt with excise duty disputes. Consequently, it classified the remark as obiter dictum, noting that it did not form part of the ratio decidendi necessary to resolve the dispute in Mafatlal. However, the Court did not dismiss its persuasive value outright. It recognized that the observation, emanating from a nine-judge bench, carried significant weight, particularly as it aligned with the expansive interpretation of Article 39(b) in Sanjeev Coke, a five-judge bench decision that adopted the minority view of Justice Krishna Iyer in Ranganatha Reddy. The Court reasoned that while the Mafatlal statement was not binding, its consistency with prior and subsequent judicial interpretations bolstered the argument for including private resources in Article 39(b).

The Court’s analysis extended to the broader context of judicial discipline and precedent. It critiqued the appellants’ reliance on the majority opinion in Ranganatha Reddy, which avoided engaging with Article 39(b), to challenge Sanjeev Coke. The Court clarified that Sanjeev Coke’s adoption of the minority view was a deliberate choice by a five-judge bench, rendering it binding unless overruled by a larger bench. The Mafatlal observation, though obiter, was seen as reinforcing this binding precedent, as it cited Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke approvingly. The Court also referenced Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673, which emphasized that a smaller bench is bound by a larger bench’s decision, underscoring that Sanjeev Coke’s interpretation held sway over any contrary implications from Ranganatha Reddy’s majority.

The reasoning on obiter dictum was further informed by the Court’s commitment to constitutional coherence. The Court noted that directive principles, such as Article 39(b), are integral to the Constitution’s social justice framework, as evidenced by Constituent Assembly debates advocating equitable resource distribution. The Mafatlal observation, while not binding, resonated with this ethos, particularly in light of India’s persistent socio-economic inequalities, as highlighted by the country’s rankings on the Human Development Index and Global Hunger Index. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the Mafatlal remark endorsed a specific economic ideology, clarifying that Article 39(b)’s broad language allows legislative flexibility, subject to judicial review for nexus with the common good.

The implications of classifying the Mafatlal observation as obiter dictum were significant. By doing so, the Court preserved the binding authority of Sanjeev Coke while acknowledging the persuasive influence of Mafatlal. This approach maintained judicial flexibility, allowing future benches to reassess the scope of Article 39(b) without being constrained by a non-binding remark. However, the Court’s endorsement of Sanjeev Coke’s interpretation ensured continuity in the law, affirming that privately owned resources could be considered "material resources of the community" when their distribution serves the public interest. The decision underscored the judiciary’s role in balancing the persuasive weight of obiter dicta with the binding force of precedent, particularly in constitutional matters where historical and social contexts are paramount.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s treatment of obiter dictum in Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra illuminated the nuanced interplay between binding and persuasive judicial statements. By classifying the Mafatlal observation as obiter dictum, the Court upheld the authority of Sanjeev Coke while recognizing the persuasive value of a nine-judge bench’s remarks. This analysis not only clarified the legal status of prior observations but also reinforced the Constitution’s dynamic interpretation, ensuring that directive principles like Article 39(b) remain responsive to India’s evolving socio-economic landscape.

The Highlight of case:

Here’s the specific holding:

“The single-line observation in Mafatlal is obiter dicta” and therefore not binding precedent. Furthermore, the Court noted that Sanjeev Coke erred in relying on the minority view in Ranganatha Reddy, which itself was not endorsed by the majority and thus did not constitute the binding ratio.

This establishes that only the reasoning necessary for the decision (ratio decidendi) is binding, while obiter dicta are merely persuasive at best.

Thus, the settled law is:

Obiter dicta, even if made by a coordinate or larger bench, do not bind subsequent benches unless they form part of the ratio decidendi. 

Case Title:Property Owners Association Vs. State of Maharashtra

Date of Order:November 5, 2024

Case No.:Civil Appeal No. 1012 of 2002 and connected matters

Neutral Citation:2024 INSC 835

Name of Court:Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge:Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., Hrishikesh Roy, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Rajesh Bindal, S.C. Sharma, Augustine George Masih, B.V. Nagarathna, and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Cryogas Equipment Private Limited Vs. Inox India Limited

The interplay between copyright and design law in India has long been a fertile ground for legal disputes, particularly when artistic works and industrial designs converge. The Supreme Court of India's judgment in Cryogas Equipment Private Limited v. Inox India Limited, delivered on April 15, 2025, marks a pivotal moment in clarifying this complex intersection. This case, arising from a dispute over the alleged infringement of proprietary engineering drawings and literary works related to cryogenic semi-trailers, addresses the critical question of whether such works are protected under the Copyright Act, 1957, or fall within the ambit of the Designs Act, 2000. By establishing a definitive two-pronged test to distinguish between artistic works and designs, the Supreme Court not only resolves the immediate conflict between Inox India Limited and appellants Cryogas Equipment Private Limited and LNG Express India Private Limited but also sets a robust precedent for harmonizing the Copyright Act and Designs Act. This case study delves into the factual and procedural intricacies, the legal issues, the parties’ arguments, the judicial reasoning, and the broader implications of the judgment, offering a comprehensive analysis of a landmark decision in Indian intellectual property (IP) law.

Detailed Factual Background

The dispute centers on Inox India Limited (Inox), a company engaged in designing and manufacturing cryogenic storage tanks and distribution systems mounted on trailers and semi-trailers for transporting industrial gases, including liquefied natural gas (LNG). Inox claimed proprietary rights over two distinct types of IP: (i) Proprietary Engineering Drawings, which are technical drawings for LNG semi-trailers tailored for Indian roads, and (ii) Literary Works, comprising details, processes, descriptions, and narrations created by Inox employees to develop these drawings. These IPs were allegedly developed to meet specific technical and regulatory requirements for cryogenic semi-trailers. On September 24, 2018, Inox filed Trademark Suit No. 3/2019 before the 4th Additional District Judge at Vadodara (Commercial Court) against Cryogas Equipment Private Limited (Cryogas), LNG Express India Private Limited (LNG Express), and others, alleging that the defendants had infringed its copyrights by using these Proprietary Engineering Drawings and Literary Works without authorization. Inox sought multiple reliefs: a declaration of infringement, a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from using or reproducing similar drawings or works, an injunction against using associated IP or know-how, an order to surrender infringing materials for destruction, and damages of ₹2 crores. Additionally, Inox filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking an ad interim injunction to prevent further infringement during the suit’s pendency. The defendants, Cryogas and LNG Express, countered by alleging that Inox’s Proprietary Engineering Drawings constituted a “design” under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, 2000, and were thus ineligible for copyright protection under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, due to their industrial application exceeding fifty reproductions. This factual matrix set the stage for a legal battle that would test the boundaries of IP protection in India.

Detailed Procedural Background

The procedural journey of this case reflects a protracted legal tussle across multiple judicial forums. Inox initiated Trademark Suit No. 3/2019 before the Commercial Court on September 24, 2018, accompanied by an application for an ad interim injunction. LNG Express responded by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that the suit was not maintainable under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. On April 1, 2022, the Commercial Court allowed LNG Express’s application, rejecting Inox’s plaint and dismissing its injunction application, reasoning that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings were designs under the Designs Act and thus unprotected by copyright law due to industrial reproduction exceeding fifty times.

Inox appealed to the High Court of Gujarat, which, on March 13, 2024, set aside the Commercial Court’s order, remanding the matter for fresh consideration and restoring the suit to its original number. The High Court directed the Commercial Court to adjudicate the pending applications concurrently, issuing separate orders. On May 3, 2024, the Commercial Court, upon reconsideration, reiterated its earlier stance, allowing LNG Express’s application under Order VII Rule 11 and dismissing Inox’s injunction application.

Inox again appealed to the High Court, which, via its impugned judgment on October 22, 2024, set aside the Commercial Court’s orders, rejected LNG Express’s application, restored the suit, and reinstated Inox’s interim injunction application, directing its expeditious adjudication within eight weeks. Aggrieved, Cryogas and LNG Express filed Civil Appeals before the Supreme Court, arising from Special Leave Petitions (C.) Nos. 28062/2024 and 28017/2024. The Supreme Court, after reserving judgment on January 29, 2025, permitted the Commercial Court to hear the interim application but directed it to hold the final order in abeyance. The Supreme Court’s final judgment on April 15, 2025, dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s decision and issuing directions for the Commercial Court to proceed with the trial and interim application.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case presented two core issues for adjudication. First, what are the parameters for determining whether a work or article falls within the limitation set out in Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, thereby classifying it as a “design” under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act? This issue required the court to delineate the boundaries between artistic works protected under the Copyright Act and designs governed by the Designs Act, particularly in the context of industrial application. Second, did the High Court err in setting aside the Commercial Court’s order, which allowed LNG Express’s application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, thereby rejecting the plaint? This issue necessitated an examination of whether the Commercial Court’s dismissal of the suit at the threshold was justified, given the mixed questions of law and fact involved in determining the nature of Inox’s Proprietary Engineering Drawings and Literary Works.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The appellants, Cryogas and LNG Express argued that the High Court erred in overturning the Commercial Court’s order. They contended that Inox’s Proprietary Engineering Drawings were designs under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act, as they were capable of registration and had been industrially reproduced more than fifty times, triggering the bar under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act. They asserted that Inox’s claim of ₹122 crores in revenue implied large-scale production of semi-trailers, exceeding the fifty-reproduction threshold. The appellants argued that the drawings’ purpose was industrial, not artistic, and that Inox’s failure to register them under the Designs Act extinguished any copyright protection. They further contended that the drawings adhered to international standards (e.g., ASME, PED) and Indian regulations, limiting their originality and aesthetic appeal. The appellants dismissed Inox’s claim of visual appeal, arguing that the drawings, even if covering external components, were functional and registrable under Class 12-10 of the Designs Act. They also challenged Inox’s claims of confidential information theft, asserting that the plaint lacked specific prayers and that such claims were outside the Commercial Court’s jurisdiction. Citing Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Bhonsle (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844), they argued that Inox’s evasive drafting could not create a valid cause of action.

Inox countered that the suit involved two distinct copyrights: the Proprietary Engineering Drawings and the Literary Works, each requiring independent assessment. They argued that the drawings were artistic works under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act, as they depicted internal components of cryogenic containers, lacking the visual appeal required for a design under Section 2(d) of the Designs Act. Inox contended that Section 15(2) did not apply, as the drawings were neither registered nor capable of registration under the Designs Act, falling under the exception for “modes or principles of construction” or “mere mechanical devices.” They emphasized that the Literary Works, comprising processes and descriptions, were not subject to Section 15(2) and were wrongly conflated with the drawings by the Commercial Court. Inox also asserted that the theft of confidential information constituted a separate claim, actionable under common law and not barred by Section 15(2). They argued that determining the drawings’ registrability under the Designs Act involved mixed questions of law and fact, unsuitable for resolution under Order VII Rule 11. Inox supported its claims with evidence from a Local Commissioner’s Report (September 26, 2018), which found proprietary materials at the defendants’ premises, substantiating unauthorized use.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context

The Supreme Court and the parties relied on several precedents to navigate the copyright-design interface, each contributing to the legal framework.

Microfibres Inc v. Girdhar, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 60: Cited by Inox and the High Court, this Delhi High Court decision involved a dispute over upholstery fabric patterns. The court held that the plaintiff’s drawings, intended for industrial use, were designs under the Designs Act, not artistic works under the Copyright Act, due to their commercial purpose and lack of independent artistic existence. The court emphasized the shorter protection period under the Designs Act compared to the Copyright Act, reflecting legislative intent to limit copyright protection for industrially applied works. In the present case, Inox used this precedent to argue that the Proprietary Engineering Drawings were artistic works, while the appellants cited it to assert their design status due to industrial application.

Microfibres Inc v. Girdhar and Co, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1647 (Microfibres II): An appeal from the above decision, this Delhi High Court Division Bench ruling was heavily relied upon by the High Court and Inox. The court clarified that artistic works under Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act have a broad scope, including abstract drawings, but lose copyright protection under Section 15(2) if industrially applied beyond fifty reproductions without design registration. It emphasized that original artistic works retain copyright protection, but designs derived for industrial use are governed by the Designs Act. Inox leveraged this to argue that its drawings were artistic works, while the appellants used it to highlight the industrial application bar.

Dart Industries Inc v. Techno Plast, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 892: Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case involved Tupperware products. The court held that copyright protection ceases once a design is registered under the Designs Act or industrially reproduced beyond fifty times, as per Section 15. The appellants used this to argue that Inox’s drawings, if industrially applied, lost copyright protection, while Inox distinguished it, noting its drawings were unregistered and not necessarily designs.

Mattel, Inc v. Jayant Agarwalla, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1059: Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case concerned the board game Scrabble. The court denied copyright protection for the game board, a three-dimensional article reproduced over fifty times without design registration, following Microfibres I. The appellants argued that Inox’s semi-trailers, similarly reproduced, were ineligible for copyright protection, while Inox contended that its two-dimensional drawings were distinct artistic works.

Bharat Glass Tube Ltd v. Gopal Glass Works Ltd, (2008) 10 SCC 657: Referenced by the Supreme Court, this case clarified the Designs Act’s purpose of protecting original designs for a limited period (ten years) to reward innovation. The court noted that designs must be new, original, and unpublished to be registrable. The Supreme Court used this to underscore the Designs Act’s focus on commercial exploitation, contrasting it with the Copyright Act’s broader protection for artistic works.

Smithkline Beecham Plc v. Hindustan Lever Ltd, 1999 SCC OnLine Del 965: Cited by the Supreme Court, this Delhi High Court case applied the functional utility test to deny design protection for a toothbrush’s S-shaped design, deemed primarily functional. The court used this to emphasize that functional works are excluded from design protection, supporting Inox’s argument that its drawings lacked aesthetic appeal.

Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd v. Standard Combines Pvt. Ltd, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 5470: Referenced by the Supreme Court, this Madras High Court case applied the functional utility test to a tractor design dispute, holding that the plaint could not be rejected at the threshold due to unresolved questions about functionality versus aesthetics. The court used this to support the need for a trial in the present case.

Standard Corporation India Ltd v. Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 850: A Division Bench reaffirmation of the above, cited by the Supreme Court to reinforce the functional utility test’s application in distinguishing designs from artistic works.

Mohan Lal v. Sona Paint and Hardwares, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1980: Cited by the Supreme Court, this Delhi High Court Full Bench decision reaffirmed Smithkline, applying the functional utility test to mirror frames, though primarily addressing passing off claims. It supported the court’s focus on functionality.

Whirlpool of India Ltd v. Videocon Industries Ltd, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 565: Cited by the Supreme Court, this Bombay High Court case noted that functionality does not preclude design protection if alternative shapes can perform the same function, aiding the court’s analysis of aesthetic versus functional features.

Photoquip India Ltd v. Delhi Photo Store, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 1088: Referenced by the Supreme Court, this Bombay High Court case adopted a conjunctive approach, interpreting Section 15(2) alongside functional utility. The court held that functional drawings were not designs but could be artistic works, supporting Inox’s claim.

Pranda Jewelry Pvt. Ltd v. Aarya 24 KT, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 958: Cited by the Supreme Court, this Bombay High Court case followed Microfibres II, reinforcing the distinction between artistic works and designs.

Fun World and Resorts (India) Pvt. Ltd v. Nimil KK, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 219: Referenced by the Supreme Court, this Kerala High Court case aligned with Microfibres II, affirming the copyright-design distinction.

TTK Prestige Ltd v. KCM Appliances Pvt. Ltd, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2129: Cited by the Supreme Court, this recent Delhi High Court case reaffirmed the functional utility test’s relevance in design disputes.

Amp v. Utilux, [1972] RPC 103: Cited by the Supreme Court, this House of Lords decision introduced the functional utility test, distinguishing aesthetically appealing designs from purely functional ones, influencing Indian jurisprudence.

Interlego A.G v. Tyco Industries Inc, [1988] UKPC 3: Referenced by the Supreme Court, this Privy Council decision applied the functional utility test, reinforcing the aesthetic-functional distinction.

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954): Cited by the Supreme Court, this U.S. Supreme Court case introduced conceptual separability, allowing copyright protection for artistic features separable from utilitarian functions, paralleling India’s functional utility test.

Esquire, Inc v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978): Referenced by the Supreme Court, this U.S. case clarified that utilitarian designs are ineligible for copyright, supporting the functional utility approach.

Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980): Cited by the Supreme Court, this U.S. case introduced a primary-subsidiary approach to conceptual separability, emphasizing artistic dominance.

Carol Barnhart Inc v. Economy Cover Corp, 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985): Referenced by the Supreme Court, this U.S. case refined conceptual separability, requiring artistic features to be non-essential to function.

Brandir International, Inc v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co, 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987): Cited by the Supreme Court, this U.S. case emphasized artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations.

Pivot Point Int’l, Inc v. Charlene Prods, Inc, 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004): Referenced by the Supreme Court, this U.S. case reinforced the need to exclude industrial designs from copyright protection.

Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co, 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005): Cited by the Supreme Court, this U.S. case introduced the marketability approach to conceptual separability, focusing on aesthetic marketability.

Star Athletica, L.L.C v. Varsity Brands, Inc, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 197 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2017): Referenced by the Supreme Court, this U.S. Supreme Court case established a clear test for copyright protection of design features, requiring separability and independent artistic value, harmonizing U.S. law and influencing the Indian approach.

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Bhonsle, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3844: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case was used to argue that evasive drafting cannot create a cause of action, though the court did not extensively engage with it.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The Supreme Court adopted a comprehensive approach to resolve the dispute, focusing on the interplay between the Copyright Act and Designs Act. The court framed two issues: the parameters for classifying a work under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act as a design, and the propriety of the High Court’s rejection of the Order VII Rule 11 application. On the first issue, the court conducted a three-part analysis: examining India’s IP statutory framework, evaluating global jurisprudence, and formulating a definitive test. The court noted that the Copyright Act protects artistic works under Section 2(c), including drawings, while the Designs Act under Section 2(d) protects visually appealing features applied industrially, excluding functional devices. Section 15(2) limits copyright protection for unregistered designs reproduced over fifty times industrially, creating a potential overlap. The court reviewed Indian precedents like Microfibres I and II, which distinguished artistic works from designs based on industrial intent and functional utility, and English cases like Amp v. Utilux, which introduced the functional utility test. U.S. cases, particularly Star Athletica, provided the conceptual separability standard, aligning with India’s approach. International treaties like TRIPS reinforced the functional utility test but left harmonization to national laws.

The court formulated a two-pronged test to determine protection: (i) assess whether the work is a purely artistic work under the Copyright Act or a design derived from it and industrially applied, per Section 15(2); (ii) if not copyrightable, apply the functional utility test to determine if the work’s dominant purpose is aesthetic or functional, qualifying it for design protection. This test ensures harmony between the statutes, protecting artistic works while regulating industrial designs. On the second issue, the court upheld the High Court’s rejection of the Order VII Rule 11 application, finding that the Commercial Court erred in summarily dismissing the suit. The court held that determining the drawings’ nature involved mixed questions of law and fact, requiring a trial. The Commercial Court’s assumption that the drawings were designs ignored their potential artistic status and the separate claims for Literary Works and confidential information. Citing Microfibres II, the court emphasized the broad scope of artistic works and the need for detailed inquiry. The court directed the Commercial Court to apply the two-pronged test and independently assess all claims, ensuring a comprehensive resolution.

Final Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s decision to reject the Order VII Rule 11 application. It directed the Commercial Court to decide Inox’s interim injunction application within two months and conduct a trial within one year, applying the two-pronged test to ascertain the Proprietary Engineering Drawings’ nature and addressing other IP claims.

Law Settled in This Case

The judgment establishes a clear framework for distinguishing artistic works under the Copyright Act from designs under the Designs Act. It introduces a two-pronged test: first, determining if a work is a purely artistic work or a design derived from it and industrially applied; second, applying the functional utility test to assess aesthetic versus functional dominance for design protection. This harmonizes the Copyright Act and Designs Act, ensuring that artistic works retain copyright protection unless industrially applied beyond fifty reproductions without design registration, while designs are governed by the Designs Act’s shorter protection period. The decision clarifies that such determinations involve mixed questions of law and fact, precluding summary dismissal under Order VII Rule 11, and reinforces the judiciary’s role in balancing IP rights with commercial realities.

Case Title: Cryogas Equipment Private Limited Vs. Inox India Limited and Others

Date of Order: April 15, 2025

Case No.: Special Leave Petition (C.) No. 28062 / 2024

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 483

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Justices Surya Kant, Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi