Friday, April 25, 2025

The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. Vs. Ankit Sethi

Introduction

The Indian Hotels Company Ltd., part of the Tata Group and owner of the well-known hotel brand “GINGER,” filed a civil commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction and damages against several defendants, including Ankit Sethi. The company alleged infringement of its registered trademarks, misuse of copyrighted photographs, and passing off through fake websites that impersonated its official hotel booking platform.

Facts of the Case

The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the GINGER trademark in Class 43 and owns the copyright in original professional photographs of its hotel properties. In late 2023, it discovered two fraudulent websites—www.gingerhotelmumbai.info and www.hotelgingermumbai.info—using its mark and photographs to impersonate the official GINGER Hotels website. These sites lured unsuspecting customers into booking fake hotel rooms, using mobile and banking details linked to the defendants.

Upon investigation, the plaintiff traced the registration and operation of the domain names to defendant no. 1, Ankit Sethi, who was allegedly operating a digital business under the name “Hackploit.” Other defendants were also found connected through common contact information, email addresses, and banking records, showing financial transactions related to the fake bookings.

Court Proceedings and Findings

The Delhi High Court had earlier granted an ad-interim ex parte injunction in December 2023, directing the suspension of the impugned domains, blocking of associated bank accounts, and disclosure of KYC and ownership details by relevant telecom and banking entities. Defendants failed to respond or file written statements despite repeated opportunities.

The court examined detailed evidence, including website screenshots, financial records, and customer complaints, which confirmed that the defendants fraudulently misrepresented themselves as the plaintiff’s business, thereby committing trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violations. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Satyam Infoway Ltd. vs. Siffynet Solutions, holding that domain names are entitled to the same protection as trademarks, especially when used for commercial purposes.

Judgment

Finding no real defense or merit on the part of the defendants, the court passed a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of CPC. A decree of permanent injunction was granted restraining the defendants from using the impugned domain names and infringing the plaintiff’s IP rights. The court also awarded damages of Rs. 20 lakhs in favor of the plaintiff, to be paid jointly and severally by the defendants within four months.

Case Title: The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. Vs. Ankit Sethi
Date of Order: 3rd March, 2025
Case No.: CS(COMM) 882/2023
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2266
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Mars Incorporated Vs. Registrar of Trademarks

Introduction

This case arose from the abandonment of a trademark application filed by Mars Incorporated, a well-known multinational company, by the Indian Trade Marks Registry. The application was deemed abandoned under Section 21(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, due to an alleged failure to file a counter-statement following opposition notices. Mars challenged the abandonment on grounds of non-receipt of the opposition notices.

Background

Mars Incorporated filed an application for registration of a mark in Class 30 on 11 February 2019. This application was published in the Trade Marks Journal in September 2021. Two parties, including Cadbury UK Ltd., filed oppositions in January 2022. The Registry claimed that notices of opposition were served on Mars in March 2022 via email. However, the company argued that it never received any such notices through email or any other communication mode.

In February 2023, Mars discovered that its application had been marked as abandoned in a public notice issued by the Registry. Mars immediately filed a representation and later a formal review petition seeking restoration of the application. Despite an earlier directive by the Registry withdrawing similar abandonment notices in other cases, Mars’ application remained marked as abandoned. The review petition was rejected in October 2024, prompting the present appeal.

Legal Arguments and Court’s Analysis

Mars contended that there was no proof of effective service of the opposition notices, and therefore the statutory period to file a counter-statement had not begun. They submitted affidavits affirming non-receipt and relied on various precedents including Rishabh Jain, Purushottam Singhal, and Samsudeen A, where courts had interpreted Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules harmoniously with Section 21(2) of the Act.

The Registrar relied on email success reports and claimed that notices were sent to the registered email addresses. However, the Court noted that there was no acknowledgment or confirmation of delivery to Mars or its agents.

The Court emphasized that a literal reading of Rule 18 would lead to procedural inconsistency. It concluded that actual receipt of the notice is essential for the limitation period to start, as required under Section 21(2). Thus, the court found that Mars had not been properly served and had therefore not defaulted.

Conclusion and Directions

The Court set aside the order of abandonment dated 25 October 2024. It remanded the matter to the Trade Marks Registry, directing it to serve fresh opposition notices to Mars’ counsel and allow Mars to file its counter-statement within the statutory period thereafter. The case was disposed of accordingly.

Case Title: Mars Incorporated vs. Registrar of Trademarks & Ors.
Date of Order: 2nd April, 2025
Case No.: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 88/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2463
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Hermès International Vs. Coco J through Sole Proprietor Ms. Sonal Chadha

Introduction

This case concerns an intellectual property dispute filed before the Delhi High Court by Hermès International, a renowned French luxury fashion house, and its Indian subsidiary, against M/s Coco J, a sole proprietorship run by Ms. Sonal Chadha. The plaintiffs alleged rampant trademark infringement, passing off, and misappropriation of their iconic luxury products by the defendant.

Background of the Plaintiffs and Their Trademarks

Hermès, established in 1837, is globally known for high-end fashion products including the KELLY and BIRKIN handbags and H ORAN sandals. The brand owns numerous trademark registrations in India and internationally, including word marks, device marks, and three-dimensional shape marks. These products have gained iconic status worldwide, including India, where their popularity has been boosted by appearances in media and cinema.

Allegations Against the Defendant

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, through her website and social media channels, was manufacturing and selling counterfeit versions of their luxury products under deceptive names like JELLY KELLY, CANVAS KELLY, KIN, and ADELE. These names and designs closely mimicked Hermès’ registered trademarks and iconic designs, leading to confusion among consumers and dilution of brand value. It was also alleged that the defendant used Hermès' trademarks on promotional materials and engaged in direct references on Instagram.

Evidence Presented

Hermès submitted screenshots, comparison tables, and evidence of online purchases showing that the defendant’s products bore clear visual and conceptual similarities to Hermès' originals. These included the copying of distinctive bag shapes, names suggestive of the original products, and the unauthorized use of the H ORAN sandal design. The plaintiffs also provided photographic evidence from the defendant’s Instagram posts and product listings on her website.

Court’s Findings and Interim Relief

The Court, presided by Justice Amit Bansal, found a strong prima facie case in favor of Hermès. It held that the defendant’s products were deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ trademarks and constituted trademark infringement and passing off. The Court noted that allowing the defendant to continue such acts would cause irreparable harm to Hermès’ reputation and mislead the public.

An interim injunction was granted restraining the defendant from manufacturing, selling, advertising, or displaying the infringing products online or offline. The defendant was also directed to take down all listings of the impugned products from her website and social media platforms.

Case Title: Hermès International & Anr. Vs. Coco J through Sole Proprietor Ms. Sonal Chadha
Date of Order: 17th April, 2025
Case No.: CS(COMM) 343/2025
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

H D U.S.A., LLC Vs Vijaypal Dhayal

Parties Involved

The plaintiff, H-D U.S.A., LLC (Harley-Davidson USA), is a globally recognized manufacturer of motorcycles and branded merchandise. The defendant, Vijaypal Dhayal, is the owner and proprietor of Red Rose Industries, operating from Gurugram, Haryana.

Nature of the Dispute

The plaintiff filed a commercial intellectual property suit alleging infringement of its trademarks and copyrights. It claimed that the defendant was selling footwear bearing a logo deceptively similar to Harley-Davidson’s iconic “Eagle” and “Bar & Shield” marks, which diluted its brand and misled consumers.

Trademark Background

Harley-Davidson began using the ‘HARLEY-DAVIDSON’ trademark in 1903 and introduced the ‘Bar & Shield’ logo in 1910. Over time, it secured more than 2,200 trademark registrations worldwide, including numerous registrations in India. The brand enjoys a significant presence with sales in over 90 countries and a vast dealership network.

Discovery of Infringement

In July 2023, the plaintiff discovered through its representatives that the defendant was marketing footwear using a nearly identical logo under the brand “RONTEX.” The infringing goods were available both physically and on e-commerce platforms like Amazon, Flipkart, and IndiaMART.

Legal Proceedings

The court, on 1st September 2023, issued summons and appointed a local commissioner who, during an inspection, found 640 pairs of infringing shoes at the defendant’s premises. On 25th September 2023, the court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from manufacturing or selling any product using the infringing mark.

Despite receiving several opportunities, the defendant failed to submit a written statement or reply to the court. Consequently, the right to file a written statement was closed, and the plaintiff moved for summary judgment.

Court’s Findings

The court found that the defendant had copied Harley-Davidson’s eagle logo almost entirely. The design elements—eagle figure, ribbon, and shield layout—were replicated with only the textual element changed to “Sports Casual.” The court held that the similarities were likely to mislead consumers into believing that the goods were associated with the plaintiff.

Further, it noted that the defendant appeared to be a habitual infringer, engaging in similar practices with other well-known brands. With no valid defense or denial on record, the court determined that trademark infringement and passing off were clearly established.

Judgment and Relief

The court held that there was no realistic prospect of the defendant successfully defending the suit. Exercising powers under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, it delivered a summary judgment. The plaintiff was granted a permanent injunction. The defendant was directed to destroy all infringing goods in the presence of an authorized representative of the plaintiff. The court also awarded damages and legal costs amounting to five lakh rupees in favor of the plaintiff.


Case Details

Case Title: H-D U.S.A., LLC Vs Vijaypal Dhayal
Date of Order: 2nd April, 2025
Case No.: CS(COMM) 609/2023 & I.A. 42209/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2489
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Thursday, April 24, 2025

Obiter Dictum of Full Bench of High Court is not binding on Single Judge of same High Court: Delhi High Court

Introduction: Delhi High Court through recent Judgement pronounced on 27.03.2025 in CM(M)-IPD 5/2025 ,Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2322,titled as  Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma addressed the question of judicial precedent which involved binding authority of Division Bench obiter dicta even if they lacked supporting rationale on single judge of same High Court.

Procedural Background: Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. through its predecessor-in-interest began manufacturing electrical goods under "KUNDAN" and "KUNDAN CAB" trademarks since 1975. Lakha Ram Sharma trading as Kundan Cable India sells comparable electrical goods under the trademarks "KUNDAN" and "KUNDAN CABLE."

Multiple Suit proceeding: A prolonged series of trademark disputes between Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. and Lakha Ram Sharma, trading as Kundan Cable India, spanning from the 1990s included multiple suits for trademark infringement and passing off incidents and also copyright infringement claims consisting of TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, 932/2016 and 931/2016 which underwent consolidation for trial proceedings.

Trademark Cancellation Proceeding and continuance of passing off action in view of of judicial precedents from Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del) (DB): In the meanwhile cancellation petition was filed against Registered Trademark of Lakha Ram before High Court of Delhi, hence under Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999, trial in both passing off action and Infringement action was sought to be stayed. Through its May 30th 2022 order the Trial Court elected to let the passing off suits continue but kept all infringement proceedings on hold as Trademark rectification petition was pending in Delhi High Court. This order because of judicial precedents from Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del) (DB) and J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Ltd., 2007 (75) PTC 44 (Del), which says that during pending of Trademark rectification petition, only infringement remedy has to be stayed and not passing off.

Stay of Passing off and Infringement in view of Later Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652 Judgement: Lakharam Sharma again made an application in January 2025 under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 asking for stay of all proceedings including passing off claims because of a single reference to passing off in paragraph 44 of Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652, Delhi High Court. The Division Bench Judgement observed that under Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999, infringement and passing claim has to await decision in cancellation petition. In view of the above ,the Trial Court suspended infringement and passing off action both, except the Copyright Act case, as Trademark rectification petition was pending in Delhi High Court. Following this order, the subject matter Revision Petition was filed.

Rival Contention in Court: The petitioner argued that the "passing off" terminology in Amrish Aggarwal lacked binding authority because it was without supporting reasoning and hence being Obiter Dictum, not binding on Single Judge. Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act applies strictly to trademark infringement cases whereas passing off claims proceed through common law channels without any association to registered trademarks.

The Petitioner used decisions like Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405 and State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra & Ors., Air 1968 SC 647 along with Gudri v. Ram Kishun, Air 1984 All 5 to support his case that Judicial comments in passing that were made in cases where issues remained un raised or undetermined lack the legal binding power or that Obiter Dictum of Full Bench of High Court is not binding on Single Judge of same High Court.

While respondent argued that Division Bench's decision in Amrish Aggarwal specifically identified infringement and passing both off claims as subject to stay so the Trial Court properly relied on it through paragraph 34 and 44. The respondent used Naseemunisa Begum v Shaikh Abdul Rehman (2002 (2) Mah LJ 115) and Crocs Inc. USA v Aqualite India Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957) to support their argument that smaller benches have an obligation to follow observations made by larger benches..

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning: The Single Judge clarified that  main dispute in Amrish Aggarwal DB was about continuance of suit and  rectification proceedings in same High Court after IPAB dissolution. The DB issued a verdict in this context. While doing so, a single mention of “passing off” appeared during paragraph 44 of the judgement without providing any assessment or analytical discussion of that point. The Single Judge considered this matter against the precedent set by earlier Puma Stationer  DB in which the Division Bench observed explicitly that infringement suits need temporary stays yet passing off claims should carry forward. The Single Judge , in this case clarified that the trial court wrongly did not implement the ruling of earlier Puma Stationer DB because later Amrish Aggarwal DB. The Single Judge noticed that passing-off comment from Amrish Aggarwal DB lacked proper legal reasoning and hence finding of DB was regarded as mere obiter dictum, having no binding effect.

The Single Judge relied upon State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra judgement  established that only planned statements or practical comments found in judicial rulings create binding authority. The judgment in Gudri v. A reference to Gudri v. Ram Kishun illustrated that larger bench observations without direct adjudication of an issue remain non-binding for later benches required to address the matter independently.

Decision: The Delhi High Court approved the petition while reversing the Trial Court decision from 18 January 2025 that ceased all pending proceedings including those about passing off. The Court has directed infringement and passing off action, both to continue .The Single Judge further observe that  reference to passing off in Amrish Aggarwal DB occurred unintentionally yet lacked any force for binding decisions. The Court ordered proceeding of consolidated suits especially those concerning passing off to start without unnecessary delay. This Single Judge followed earlier Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd DB, which ordered for continuance of passing off action, while adjudicating Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999 objection.

Principles Laid Down in this case: The Single Judge  made it clear that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act 1999 merely affects infringement suits without interfering with passing off trials. The decision confirms that passing off functions as an unregistered common law remedy. The ruling defines a crucial principle about obiter dicta of Division Bench of a High Court , lacks binding authority on Single Bench of Same High Court.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, Patent and Trademark Attorney, Delhi High Court


Monday, April 21, 2025

AstraZeneca AB Vs P Kumar

Superior metabolic stability, was insufficient to rule out objection under Section 3 (d) of the Patent Act , as it did not explicitly demonstrate therapeutic efficacy

Introduction:
The pharmaceutical industry is a battleground where innovation meets accessibility, and intellectual property rights often clash with public health imperatives. The case of AstraZeneca AB & Ors v. P Kumar & Anr, alongside related suits against T Rao & Anr and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Limited, represents a pivotal legal skirmish in India’s patent landscape. At its core, this dispute revolves around AstraZeneca’s efforts to protect its patents for Ticagrelor, a critical antiplatelet drug marketed as Brilinta, against alleged infringement by generic manufacturers. The case, adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi, delves into complex issues of patent validity, evergreening, and the delicate balance between rewarding innovation and ensuring affordable access to life-saving medications. This case study explores the factual and procedural intricacies, the legal arguments advanced by the parties, the judicial reasoning, and the broader implications of the court’s decision.

Detailed Factual Background:
AstraZeneca AB, a global pharmaceutical giant, held three Indian patents related to Ticagrelor: IN 209907 (Species Patent), IN 247984 (Polymorph Patent), and IN 272674 (Formulation Patent). Ticagrelor, an antiplatelet drug, is prescribed to reduce thrombotic events in patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS), such as heart attacks or unstable angina. Approved in the USA in 2011 and in India in 2012, Ticagrelor is marketed by AstraZeneca under the brand name Brilinta at approximately Rs. 50 per tablet. The plaintiffs claimed that Ticagrelor fell within the scope of IN 907 and IN 984, with its finished formulation covered by IN 674. They asserted that these patents were valid, subsisting, and unchallenged since their publication, except for a revocation petition filed by Micro Labs Limited in 2015, which was pending before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB).

The defendants—Micro Labs Ltd., Natco Pharma Ltd., and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.—were accused of planning to launch generic versions of Ticagrelor under brand names such as Bigrelor, an unnamed generic, and Ticaflo, respectively. AstraZeneca alleged that these actions infringed their patents, citing credible market intelligence about the defendants’ imminent launches. The plaintiffs emphasized Ticagrelor’s therapeutic significance, noting that before its introduction, approximately one in three ACS patients faced death, repeat myocardial infarction, or re-hospitalization within six months despite existing treatments. They argued that generic launches would irreparably harm their business and public interest.

The defendants countered that Ticagrelor was disclosed and covered by an earlier patent, IN 241229 (Genus Patent), which expired on July 14, 2018. They alleged that AstraZeneca was engaging in evergreening—extending patent monopolies through subsequent patents without significant therapeutic advancements. The defendants pointed to admissions by AstraZeneca in regulatory filings and foreign litigation, claiming that Ticagrelor was anticipated by IN 229, rendering the suit patents invalid. They also argued that the suit patents lacked novelty, inventive step, and enhanced therapeutic efficacy under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, and that AstraZeneca had suppressed material facts about foreign patent revocations.

Detailed Procedural Background:
The case comprised three suits filed by AstraZeneca: CS(COMM) 749/2018 against P Kumar and Micro Labs Ltd., CS(COMM) 792/2018 against T Rao and Natco Pharma Ltd., and CS(COMM) 1023/2018 against Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. Each suit included applications for interim injunctions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to restrain the defendants from marketing Ticagrelor in violation of AstraZeneca’s patents. Additionally, in CS(COMM) 749/2018, Micro Labs filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC to vacate the interim orders.

On March 22, 2018, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte interim injunction in CS(COMM) 749/2018, restraining Micro Labs from selling Ticagrelor. A similar order was passed on April 23, 2018, in CS(COMM) 792/2018 against Natco Pharma, despite the defendants’ initial claim of not having launched the drug. The court noted that Natco had launched the drug during the pendency of the suit. On July 18, 2018, an interim injunction was granted in CS(COMM) 1023/2018 against Dr. Reddy’s. The defendants filed written statements and counterclaims, seeking revocation of the suit patents under Section 64 of the Patents Act, alleging invalidity on grounds of anticipation, obviousness, and non-compliance with statutory requirements.The court consolidated the hearing of the injunction applications (IA Nos. 3986/2018, 4771/2018, 9332/2018) and Micro Labs’ application to vacate the interim orders (IA No. 5096/2018). 

Issues Involved in the Case:
The case presented several critical legal and factual issues:
Whether Ticagrelor was disclosed and covered by the expired Genus Patent (IN 229), thereby anticipating the suit patents and rendering them invalid?Whether the suit patents were invalid under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act for being derivatives of a known substance without enhanced therapeutic efficacy?

AstraZeneca’s Submissions:
AstraZeneca argued that the suit patents were valid and infringed by the defendants’ planned generic launches. They contended that IN 229, the Genus Patent, covered 150 quintillion compounds but did not specifically disclose Ticagrelor, which was isolated through the Species Patent (IN 907). They asserted that a person skilled in the art could not have identified Ticagrelor from IN 229’s teachings, negating claims of anticipation under Section 13(1)(a). On prior claiming under Section 13(1)(b), they argued that IN 229 lacked a specific claim to Ticagrelor, making the suit patents novel.

Regarding Section 3(d), AstraZeneca denied that Ticagrelor was a derivative of a known substance from IN 229, arguing that structural similarity alone did not trigger the provision. They relied on an affidavit by Dr. Robert Riley, submitted by Dr. Reddy’s, to claim that Ticagrelor exhibited superior metabolic stability and bioavailability, satisfying the enhanced efficacy requirement if Section 3(d) applied. On Section 8, they admitted revocations of equivalent patents in China and Europe but noted pending appeals with automatic stays and grants in 55-60 countries, asserting substantial compliance.

AstraZeneca emphasized their service to six lakh patients annually and argued that generic launches would cause irreparable harm. They distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Novartis AG v. Union of India, claiming it addressed specific disclosure of a known compound, unlike the present case where Ticagrelor was not disclosed in IN 229.

Defendants’ Submissions:
The defendants, represented by Micro Labs, Natco Pharma, and Dr. Reddy’s, argued that the suit patents were invalid as Ticagrelor was disclosed and claimed in IN 229, which expired on July 14, 2018. They relied on AstraZeneca’s admissions in Form 27 filings, where Brilinta and Axcer were declared as working IN 229, and in US litigation against Mylan Inc., where AstraZeneca claimed infringement of US Patent 910 (equivalent to IN 229) by Ticagrelor generics. They contended that these admissions established anticipation and prior claiming, rendering the suit patents invalid under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), and (k).

The defendants accused AstraZeneca of evergreening, arguing that the suit patents were attempts to extend IN 229’s monopoly without significant therapeutic advancements, violating Section 3(d). They highlighted the plaint’s silence on enhanced efficacy and argued that Ticagrelor, being structurally similar to compounds in IN 229, required proof of superior therapeutic efficacy, which was absent. They also alleged non-compliance with Section 8, citing AstraZeneca’s failure to disclose revocations of equivalent patents in China, Europe, and South Korea.

The defendants emphasized public interest, noting that their generics, priced at Rs. 20 per tablet, were significantly cheaper than Brilinta. They argued that the interim injunctions caused irreparable harm to patients and that any loss to AstraZeneca could be compensated monetarily. They relied on judicial precedents, including Novartis AG and F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla, to assert that a credible challenge to patent validity justified denying interim relief.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties:
The parties relied on several landmark judgments to bolster their arguments, each addressing specific aspects of patent law. Below is a detailed analysis of these judgments and their context in the case:

Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Novartis was central to the defendants’ argument on coverage versus disclosure and Section 3(d). The court rejected the appellant’s claim that a patent’s coverage could extend beyond its disclosure, emphasizing that patents grant monopolies in exchange for public disclosure. It held that Section 3(d) sets a higher threshold for pharmaceutical patents, requiring new forms of known substances to demonstrate enhanced therapeutic efficacy. The defendants cited this to argue that IN 229’s coverage of Ticagrelor negated AstraZeneca’s claim of non-disclosure and that the suit patents, as derivatives, failed the efficacy test. AstraZeneca countered that Novartis involved a known compound (Imatinib Mesylate) specifically disclosed in the prior patent, unlike Ticagrelor, which was not disclosed in IN 229. The court found Novartis persuasive, rejecting AstraZeneca’s coverage-disclosure dichotomy and holding that the suit patents prima facie required enhanced efficacy under Section 3(d).

Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, AIR 1982 SC 1444
Cited by the court, this Supreme Court judgment clarified that novelty and inventive step are mixed questions of law and fact, dependent on circumstances. It outlined tests for obviousness, asking whether the invention was publicly known or would naturally suggest itself to a skilled person. The court applied this to assess whether IN 229 disclosed Ticagrelor, noting that the issue required expert evidence and could not be conclusively determined at the interim stage. This supported the court’s finding that the defendants’ challenge was credible but required trial scrutiny.

F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del):
The defendants heavily relied on this Delhi High Court Division Bench decision, which held that a credible challenge to patent validity, particularly under Section 3(d) or Section 64, could deny interim injunctions. The court emphasized full disclosure of patent specifications and related applications in injunction applications. The defendants argued that AstraZeneca’s failure to disclose IN 229’s workings and foreign revocations mirrored the suppression in Roche, justifying vacation of the interim orders. The court agreed, finding AstraZeneca’s omissions material and the defendants’ challenge credible, aligning with Roche’s principles.

F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 (225) DLT 391:
Cited by the court on Section 8 compliance, this Division Bench decision clarified that non-compliance with Section 8 is discretionary under Section 64(1)(m), depending on the intent and materiality of the omission. The court found AstraZeneca’s explanations for foreign revocations reasonable, holding that non-disclosure was not material enough to warrant vacating the interim orders, consistent with this judgment.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. J.D. Joshi, 2015 (64) PTC 135 (Del):
The defendants and the court referenced this Delhi High Court decision, which held that challenges under Section 64 are fact-dependent or mixed questions, and a credible challenge to validity can preclude interim relief. The court applied this to find that the defendants’ arguments on anticipation and Section 3(d) raised substantial questions, rendering the suit patents vulnerable.

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 223 (2015) DLT 454:
Cited by the court, this Delhi High Court decision emphasized the reliance on expert testimony in complex pharmaceutical patent disputes, as courts lack technical expertise. The court noted that the issue of Ticagrelor’s disclosure in IN 229 required expert evidence, reinforcing the need for a trial to resolve the dispute.

Chemtura Corporation v. Union of India, 2009 (41) PTC 260 (Del):
The court cited this Delhi High Court decision to outline Section 8’s requirements for disclosing foreign patent applications. It found AstraZeneca’s disclosures sufficient, as they provided reasonable explanations for foreign revocations, aligning with Chemtura’s emphasis on materiality.

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co. Ltd., [2008] EWHC 2345 (Pat):
AstraZeneca cited this UK High Court decision to argue that a genus patent’s general formula does not disclose specific compounds unless individually described. The court’s finding that a theoretical penumbra of compounds does not negate novelty supported AstraZeneca’s claim that IN 229 did not disclose Ticagrelor. However, the Delhi High Court found this less persuasive in light of AstraZeneca’s admissions and Novartis’s rejection of the coverage-disclosure dichotomy.

Eli Lilly & Company Ltd. v. Apotex Pty Ltd., [2013] FCA 214:
AstraZeneca relied on this Federal Court of Australia decision, which held that selecting a specific compound from a genus patent’s broad class requires significant effort, negating obviousness. AstraZeneca argued that Ticagrelor’s isolation from IN 229’s 150 quintillion compounds was inventive. The court acknowledged this but prioritized AstraZeneca’s admissions and Indian legal standards under Novartis.

Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3 SCR 265:
AstraZeneca cited this Supreme Court of Canada decision to defend selection patents, which encourage improvements over genus patents. The court recognized selection patents’ validity but found that AstraZeneca’s admissions and Section 3(d) concerns raised credible challenges, limiting the judgment’s applicability.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:
Justice Jayant Nath’s judgment meticulously analyzed the competing claims, focusing on three key issues: Ticagrelor’s disclosure in IN 229, compliance with Section 3(d), and Section 8 violations. The court’s reasoning was grounded in Indian patent law principles and judicial precedents, balancing the plaintiff’s proprietary rights against the defendants’ public interest arguments.

On the issue of Ticagrelor’s disclosure in IN 229, the court examined AstraZeneca’s admissions in Form 27 filings and US litigation. The identical Form 27 returns for IN 229, IN 907, IN 984, and IN 674, declaring Brilinta and Axcer sales, suggested that AstraZeneca treated Ticagrelor as working all four patents, implying disclosure in IN 229. The US litigation against Mylan Inc., where AstraZeneca claimed infringement of US Patent 910 by Ticagrelor generics, further reinforced this. The court found AstraZeneca’s explanation—that IN 229 was worked through Ticagrelor only after its isolation via IN 907—unconvincing, as the plaint omitted these details. Citing Novartis, the court rejected the coverage-disclosure dichotomy, holding that AstraZeneca’s admissions prima facie indicated that Ticagrelor was anticipated by IN 229, raising a credible challenge under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), and (k).

Regarding Section 3(d), the court noted the plaint’s silence on enhanced therapeutic efficacy, a critical requirement for derivatives of known substances. AstraZeneca’s belated reliance on Dr. Riley’s affidavit, claiming Ticagrelor’s superior metabolic stability, was insufficient, as it did not explicitly demonstrate therapeutic efficacy over IN 229’s compounds. The court applied Novartis and Roche, concluding that the suit patents prima facie failed the Section 3(d) test, as they appeared to be derivatives of IN 229’s compounds without proven efficacy enhancements.

On Section 8, the court accepted AstraZeneca’s explanations for foreign revocations, noting pending appeals and grants in multiple countries. Citing Chemtura and Roche (2015), the court held that the non-disclosure was not material enough to warrant vacating the interim orders, as AstraZeneca substantially complied with statutory requirements.

The court applied the principles from Roche (2009) and Bristol-Myers, emphasizing that a credible challenge to patent validity precludes interim injunctions. The defendants’ arguments on anticipation and Section 3(d) raised substantial questions, rendering the suit patents vulnerable. The court also considered public interest, noting the defendants’ lower-priced generics (Rs. 20 vs. Rs. 50 per tablet) and the expiration of IN 229, which tilted the balance of convenience in their favor. To safeguard AstraZeneca’s interests, the court mandated the defendants to maintain accurate sales accounts.

Final Decision:
On August 8, 2019, The court vacated the interim injunctions granted on March 22, 2018, April 23, 2018, and July 18, 2018, in CS(COMM) 749/2018, CS(COMM) 792/2018, and CS(COMM) 1023/2018, respectively. The court held that AstraZeneca failed to establish a prima facie case, as the defendants raised a credible challenge to the suit patents’ validity under Sections 64(1)(a), (d), (f), (k), and 3(d). The balance of convenience favored the defendants, given the lower price of their generics and IN 229’s expiration. The defendants were directed to maintain quarterly sales accounts, supported by affidavits and authenticated by chartered accountants, to enable potential compensation if AstraZeneca prevailed at trial. The applications were disposed of accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:
This case reinforces several key principles of Indian patent law:
A credible challenge to patent validity, based on grounds under Section 64 or Section 3(d), is sufficient to deny interim injunctions in infringement suits, as established in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla. The coverage-disclosure dichotomy is untenable in India, as per Novartis AG v. Union of India, requiring specific disclosure for patent validity and infringement claims.Section 3(d) imposes a stringent requirement for pharmaceutical patents, mandating proof of enhanced therapeutic efficacy for derivatives of known substances, with silence in the plaint being fatal.Non-compliance with Section 8 is discretionary under Section 64(1)(m), and non-material omissions do not necessarily warrant revocation, as clarified in Chemtura and Roche (2015).Public interest, particularly access to affordable generics, is a significant factor in balancing convenience in patent disputes, especially post-expiration of foundational patents.

Case Title: AstraZeneca AB Vs P Kumar
Date of Order: August 8, 2019
Case No.: CS(COMM) 749/2018
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jayant Nath

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma

Section 124 of Trademarks Act 1999 is inapplicable to passing off action

Introduction:
In the bustling world of intellectual property disputes, where trademarks and copyrights often clash like titans, the case of Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma Proprietor of Kundan Cable India stands out as a compelling narrative of legal interpretation and judicial reasoning. Decided on March 27, 2025, by the High Court of Delhi, this case delves into the intricate interplay between trademark infringement and passing off actions under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. At its core, the dispute revolves around the use of the "KUNDAN" trademark by two competing entities in the electrical goods market, culminating in a challenge to a Trial Court’s order that stayed multiple suits pending rectification proceedings. This case study explores the factual matrix, procedural twists, legal arguments, and the judiciary’s meticulous analysis, culminating in a ruling that clarifies the scope of stay provisions in trademark litigation.

Detailed Factual Background:
The petitioner, Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., is a company engaged in manufacturing and marketing electrical goods under the trademark "KUNDAN" or "KUNDAN CAB," a label it claims to have adopted through its predecessor-in-interest since 1975. The respondent, Lakha Ram Sharma, operating as Kundan Cable India, is similarly involved in producing electrical P.V.C. wires and cables under the "KUNDAN" and "KUNDAN CABLE" trademarks. This overlapping use of the "KUNDAN" mark sparked a series of legal battles between the parties, dating back to the 1990s. The disputes gave rise to multiple suits, each addressing allegations of trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violations related to the "KUNDAN" label and its artistic representations. The suits, filed between 1994 and 2006, were eventually consolidated for evidence recording, reflecting the intertwined nature of the claims. The petitioner accused the respondent of passing off its goods by mimicking the "KUNDAN" trademark, while the respondent countered with its own claims, asserting prior use and seeking injunctions against the petitioner.

Detailed Procedural Background:
The procedural journey of this case is a labyrinth of filings, orders, and appeals. The litigation began with suits filed in 1994, including TM No. 70 of 2010 (later renumbered as TM No. 968 of 2016) by the respondent against the petitioner for passing off, and a counterclaim (CC No. 07 of 2015, renumbered as TM No. 971 of 2016) by the petitioner for infringement and passing off. Additional suits followed: Suit No. 1371/1994 (renumbered as TM No. 931 of 2016) for copyright infringement and passing off, and Suit No. 1497 of 1995 (renumbered as TM No. 1030 of 2016) seeking an injunction against caution notices and damages. These suits were consolidated for trial. In 2018, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioner’s interim injunction applications, a decision upheld by the Delhi High Court in 2022, which directed the Trial Court to expedite the passing off trial. 

However, in January 2025, the respondent filed an application under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking a stay of all proceedings, citing pending rectification petitions before the Madras High Court. On January 18, 2025, the Trial Court, relying on the Division Bench ruling in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances (2024 SCC Online Del 3652), stayed the suits, except for TM No. 931/2016, which involved copyright claims. Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, leading to the present petition, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025.

Issues Involved in the Case:
The central issue before the Delhi High Court was whether the Trial Court erred in staying the suits, particularly those involving passing off claims, under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, based on the Amrish Aggarwal judgment. 

This raised subsidiary questions: Did the Division Bench in Amrish Aggarwal intend to mandate a stay of passing off actions alongside infringement suits pending rectification proceedings? 

Were the references to "passing off" in Amrish Aggarwal binding precedent or mere obiter dicta? The case also tested the interplay between trademark and copyright claims, as one suit (TM No. 931/2016) involved distinct copyright issues unaffected by the Trade Marks Act.

Detailed Submission of Parties:
Petitioner, argued that the Trial Court misinterpreted Amrish Aggarwal and contended that the Division Bench’s observations on staying passing off actions were obiter dicta, as the case primarily addressed infringement suits. Sibal emphasized that Section 124 applies only to infringement actions, not passing off, and cited the earlier Division Bench ruling in Puma Stationer v. Hindustan Pencils (2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del.) (DB)), which allowed passing off proceedings to continue despite a stay on infringement claims. Petitioner argued that the Trial Court’s reliance on Amrish Aggarwal disrupted a nearly concluded trial, undermining judicial efficiency. 

The respondent, defended the Trial Court’s order, asserting that Amrish Aggarwal explicitly extended the stay requirement to passing off actions, as noted in paragraph 44. Respondent conceded the lack of detailed reasoning but maintained that the Division Bench’s findings, even if obiter, were binding on a Single Judge, citing Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman (2002 (2) Mah.L.J. 115) and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Limited (2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957). Respondent highlighted that the petitioner’s argument in Amrish Aggarwal against staying passing off actions was rejected, reinforcing his position.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context:
The parties relied on several precedents, each dissected by the court. Puma Stationer v. Hindustan Pencils (2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del.) (DB)) was pivotal for the petitioner, where the Division Bench stayed infringement proceedings under Section 124 but explicitly permitted passing off actions to proceed, establishing a clear distinction. J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Limited (75 PTC 44 (Del)) similarly supported this bifurcated approach. The respondent’s cornerstone was Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances (2024 SCC Online Del 3652), where the Division Bench, addressing a post-IPAB abolition scenario, suggested that both infringement and passing off suits should be stayed pending rectification, though its reasoning focused on infringement. The petitioner countered that this reference to passing off was incidental, citing Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner ((1978) 1 SCC 405), where the Supreme Court held obiter dicta non-binding, and State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (1967 SCC OnLine SC 17), emphasizing that only what is decided is authoritative. Gudri v. Ram Kishun (1983 SCC OnLine All 415) further supported this, with the Allahabad High Court treating an inadvertent Full Bench remark as non-binding. The respondent’s reliance on Naseemunisa Begum and Crocs Inc. argued for the weight of higher bench observations, but the court found these inapplicable, as the issues in those cases were directly addressed, unlike the passing off reference in Amrish Aggarwal.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:
Court’s reasoning was a masterclass in statutory interpretation and judicial precedent analysis. The began by contextualizing Amrish Aggarwal, noting its origin in a reference questioning the stay of infringement suits post-IPAB abolition, not passing off. Examining paragraph 44 of Amrish Aggarwal, which mentioned "passing off," Bansal found it relied on Puma Stationer, which explicitly allowed passing off actions to continue. 

The concluded that Amrish Aggarwal did not intend to overrule this, as no disagreement was expressed. Analyzing Section 124, Bansal noted its exclusive application to infringement suits, reinforced by Section 27(2), which preserves passing off actions outside the Act’s purview. The respondent’s reliance on Amrish Aggarwal’s rejection of the petitioner’s argument (paragraphs 34 and 53) was dismissed, as it addressed a different contention—not a direct challenge to staying passing off suits. The court deemed the "passing off" reference in Amrish Aggarwal an inadvertent obiter dictum, not binding under Mohinder Singh Gill and Sudhansu Sekhar Misra. Court distinguished the respondent’s cases, finding Naseemunisa Begum and Crocs Inc. inapposite due to their context-specific rulings. Balancing judicial efficiency with legal clarity, Bansal ruled that the Trial Court’s blanket stay was erroneous, especially given the advanced trial stage.

Final Decision:
The petition was allowed on March 27, 2025. The impugned Trial Court order of January 18, 2025, was set aside, and all stayed suits (TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, and 932/2016) were directed to proceed for trial, alongside TM No. 931/2016, which was never stayed. The Trial Court was urged to expedite the proceedings given the suits’ age.

Law Settled in This Case:
This ruling clarified that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, mandates a stay only for infringement suits pending rectification proceedings, not passing off actions. It reaffirmed that obiter dicta from a higher bench, especially if inadvertent or unsupported by reasoning, do not bind a smaller bench, preserving judicial flexibility in interpreting statutory intent. 

Case Title: Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Lakha Ram Sharma Proprietor of Kundan Cable India
Date of Order: March 27, 2025
Case No.: CM(M)-IPD 5/2025
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sunday, April 20, 2025

Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. & Others Vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd

Introduction:
In the competitive world of fast-moving consumer goods, trademarks are not just identifiers but powerful tools that encapsulate brand identity and consumer trust. The case of Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. & Others vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd., decided on May 30, 2014, by the Delhi High Court, is a landmark dispute that underscores the complexities of trademark law in India. This case revolves around the alleged infringement of the trademark "ALLROUND" and the expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION" by Procter & Gamble’s use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ALLROUNDER" in their toothpaste products. The dispute highlights critical issues of trademark distinctiveness, the descriptive nature of marks, and the principle of approbate and reprobate, offering valuable insights into the protection of slogans and taglines under Indian trademark law.

Detailed Factual Background:
Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd., part of the Anchor Group, is a prominent player in the Indian FMCG sector, known for its dental care products, including toothpaste, under the brand "ANCHOR." Since 2005, Anchor has used the trademark "ALLROUND" and the expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION" for its toothpaste, claiming that these have acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness. The trademark "ALLROUND" was registered on August 26, 2008, under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, following an application filed on September 2, 2005. Anchor asserted that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was extensively used in advertising, including in regional languages through transliteration, and had become synonymous with its brand.

Procter & Gamble (P&G), a global conglomerate, entered the Indian toothpaste market in July 2013 with its "ORAL-B" brand, launching products labeled with "ORAL-B ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ORAL-B ALLROUNDER." Anchor alleged that P&G’s use of these terms infringed its registered trademark "ALLROUND" and the well-known expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION," accusing P&G of attempting to capitalize on Anchor’s established goodwill. P&G, comprising Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd., Procter & Gamble Business Services Canada Company, and Gillette India Ltd., countered that "ALLROUND" was a descriptive term, incapable of trademark protection, and that their use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" was merely descriptive of their product’s qualities.

Detailed Procedural Background:
Anchor filed a suit (CS(OS) No. 1431/2013) in the Delhi High Court, seeking a declaration that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was a well-known mark, a permanent injunction against P&G’s use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ALLROUNDER," and ancillary reliefs like delivery up and rendition of accounts. Alongside the suit, Anchor applied for an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to restrain P&G pending the suit’s outcome. No ex-parte interim relief was granted.

The Single Judge, on May 9, 2014, allowed Anchor’s application, granting an interim injunction against P&G, effective after four weeks to allow compliance. The Single Judge’s order was based on findings that P&G’s use of the disputed terms was not merely descriptive and that their prior trademark applications contradicted their defense. Aggrieved, P&G filed an appeal (FAO(OS) No. 241/2014) under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC, challenging the interim injunction. The Division Bench, comprising the Chief Justice and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, heard the appeal at the admission stage with consent and delivered its judgment on May 30, 2014.
Issues Involved in the Case

The case presented several pivotal issues for adjudication:
Whether Anchor’s registered trademark "ALLROUND" and the expression "ALLROUND PROTECTION" were distinctive or merely descriptive, and thus entitled to protection? Whether P&G’s use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" and "ALLROUNDER" infringed Anchor’s trademark rights or constituted a bona fide descriptive use?Whether P&G’s prior applications for registration of "ALLROUNDER" in India and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" in the United States estopped them from claiming these terms as descriptive? Whether Anchor’s use of "ALLROUND PROTECTION" instead of "ALLROUND" constituted non-use of the registered trademark, thereby weakening its claim?

Detailed Submission of Parties:
Anchor’s Submissions:
Anchor  argued that "ALLROUND" was a distinctive trademark, registered since 2008, and "ALLROUND PROTECTION" had acquired secondary meaning through extensive use since 2005. They highlighted that the trademark was used in advertisements and packaging, including in regional languages via transliteration, indicating its role as a brand identifier rather than a descriptor. Anchor pointed out that P&G’s application for "ALLROUNDER" in 2010 faced objections from the Registrar of Trademarks due to similarity with "ALLROUND," and P&G’s response did not claim the term as descriptive but as distinctive. Similarly, P&G’s U.S. registration of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" disclaimed the word "PROTECTION," suggesting acknowledgment of the mark’s distinctiveness.

Anchor relied on several precedents to bolster its case. They cited Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 (2) SCC 399, to argue that appellate courts should not interfere with discretionary interim orders unless exercised arbitrarily. They referenced Automatic Electric Ltd. vs. R.K. Dhawan, (1999) (19) PTC 81, and Indian Hotels Company Ltd. vs. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 (37) PTC 468 (Del), to assert that P&G’s prior trademark applications precluded them from claiming the terms as descriptive. Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. vs. The Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727, was cited to argue that identical marks negate the need to prove likelihood of confusion. Ruchi Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indian Flame Enterprises, (2001) PTC 876 (Del), supported their claim that use of a similar mark on cognate goods could cause deception. Finally, Amar Singh Chawal Wala vs. Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl. Mills, 2009 (40) PTC 417 (Del) (DB), was used to argue that P&G’s use during the suit’s pendency accrued no rights.
P&G’s Submissions


P&G, represented by senior counsel Dr. A.M. Singhvi and Mr. Sanjay Jain, contended that "ALLROUND" was inherently descriptive and incapable of trademark protection under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. They argued that Anchor never used "ALLROUND" as a standalone trademark but only as part of "ALLROUND PROTECTION," which described the qualitative features of its "ANCHOR" toothpaste. P&G asserted that their use of "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" was bona fide and descriptive, not as a trademark, and that their brands "ORAL-B" and Anchor’s "ANCHOR" were distinct, eliminating confusion.

P&G challenged the Single Judge’s reliance on Automatic Electric Ltd., arguing it was overruled by the Division Bench in Marico Limited vs. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 X AD (Del) 214, which held that descriptive marks like "LOW-ABSORB" were not protectable. They cited Veerumal Praveen Kumar vs. Needle Industries (India) Ltd., 93 (2001) DLT 600 (DB), and Fedders Lloyd Corporation Ltd. vs. Fedders Corporation, 2005 (30) PTC 353 (Del) (DB), to argue that non-use of the registered mark "ALLROUND" disentitled Anchor to protection. P&G admitted to mistakenly applying for "ALLROUNDER" in India and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" in the U.S., offering to withdraw these registrations. They relied on Rhizome Distilleries P. Ltd. vs. Pernod Ricard S.A. France, 2010 (42) PTC 806 (Del) (DB), to argue that laudatory or descriptive words cannot be exclusively claimed.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations:
The parties and the court referenced several precedents, each contextualized to address specific legal points:

Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 (2) SCC 399: Anchor cited this Supreme Court decision to argue that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with discretionary interim orders unless they are arbitrary or perverse. The court implicitly accepted this principle, as it thoroughly evaluated the Single Judge’s reasoning before upholding it.

Automatic Electric Ltd. vs. R.K. Dhawan, (1999) (19) PTC 81: Anchor relied on this Single Judge decision, which held that a defendant registering a mark abroad (e.g., "DIMMER" in Australia) could not claim it as generic in India. P&G argued it was overruled by Marico Limited, but the Division Bench noted its affirmation in Indian Hotels Company Ltd., reinforcing the principle of approbate and reprobate.

Indian Hotels Company Ltd. vs. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 (37) PTC 468 (Del): Anchor cited this Division Bench decision, which approved Automatic Electric Ltd., holding that a party applying for a mark’s registration cannot later claim it as descriptive. The court relied on this to reject P&G’s claim that "ALLROUNDER" and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" were descriptive.

Marico Limited vs. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., 2010 X AD (Del) 214: P&G heavily relied on this Division Bench decision, which denied interim relief for the mark "LOW-ABSORB," deemed descriptive. The court distinguished it, finding "ALLROUND PROTECTION" not generically descriptive but indicative of a unique product quality.

Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. vs. The Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727: Anchor cited this Supreme Court case to argue that identical marks negate the need to prove confusion. The court did not directly address this but implicitly accepted that the similarity between "ALLROUND" and P&G’s marks warranted protection.

Ruchi Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indian Flame Enterprises, (2001) PTC 876 (Del): Anchor used this to argue that use of a similar mark on cognate goods could deceive consumers. The court’s focus on similarity in essential features aligned with this principle.

Amar Singh Chawal Wala vs. Shree Vardhman Rice and Genl. Mills, 2009 (40) PTC 417 (Del) (DB): Anchor cited this to argue that P&G’s use during the suit’s pendency accrued no rights. The court did not directly address this but upheld the injunction, implying agreement.

Veerumal Praveen Kumar vs. Needle Industries (India) Ltd., 93 (2001) DLT 600 (DB): P&G cited this to argue that non-used trademarks are unprotected. The court rejected this, finding Anchor’s use of "ALLROUND PROTECTION" constituted use of the registered mark.

Fedders Lloyd Corporation Ltd. vs. Fedders Corporation, 2005 (30) PTC 353 (Del) (DB): P&G used this to support non-use arguments, but the court found it inapplicable given Anchor’s evidence of use.

Rhizome Distilleries P. Ltd. vs. Pernod Ricard S.A. France, 2010 (42) PTC 806 (Del) (DB): P&G cited this to argue that descriptive or laudatory words are not protectable. The court distinguished it, holding that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was not generically descriptive.

Pankaj Goel vs. Dabur India Limited, 2008 (38) PTC 49 (Del) (DB), Castrol Limited vs. A.K. Mehta, 1997 (17) PTC 408 (DB), and Prakash Roadline vs. Prakash Parcel Service, 1992 (2) Arbitration Law Reporter 174: The court cited these to dismiss P&G’s argument that third-party use negated interim relief, affirming that infringement by others does not preclude protection against a specific defendant.

Stokely Van Camp, Inc. vs. Heinz India Private Limited, 171 (2010) DLT 16, affirmed in MANU/DE/3132/2010, SLP dismissed on April 8, 2011: The court referenced this comprehensive case law discussion to avoid redundant analysis, noting its relevance to trademark disputes.
Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The Division Bench provided a meticulous analysis, rejecting P&G’s appeal and upholding the interim injunction. The court’s reasoning was multifaceted:

Distinctiveness of "ALLROUND": The court noted that neither the Indian nor U.S. Registrar of Trademarks objected to "ALLROUND" as descriptive under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, suggesting prima facie distinctiveness. The Registrar’s objection to P&G’s "ALLROUNDER" application due to similarity with "ALLROUND" further supported this view.

Slogans as Trademarks: The court recognized "ALLROUND PROTECTION" as a slogan or tagline, falling within the definition of a trademark under Sections 2(m) and 2(zb) of the Act. It emphasized that slogans are powerful marketing tools that enhance brand equity, often lingering in consumers’ minds more than the primary brand. The court rejected P&G’s claim that "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was descriptive, arguing that its association with toothpaste arose from Anchor’s long use, not inherent descriptiveness.

Test of Descriptiveness: The court proposed a novel test: a mark’s descriptiveness should be assessed before its use, not after prolonged association with a product. Before Anchor’s use, "ALLROUND PROTECTION" was not inherently descriptive of toothpaste, unlike generic terms like "whiter teeth" or "fresher breath." The court distinguished between marks describing generic qualities and those highlighting unique product features, classifying "ALLROUND PROTECTION" as the latter.

Approbate and Reprobate: The court upheld the Single Judge’s application of this principle, noting that P&G’s applications for "ALLROUNDER" and "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION" contradicted their claim of descriptiveness. P&G’s U.S. registration, disclaiming "PROTECTION," reinforced that "ALL-AROUND" was the distinctive element. The court dismissed P&G’s claim of mistaken applications as unconvincing, lacking sworn evidence.

Use of Registered Mark: The court rejected P&G’s argument that Anchor’s use of "ALLROUND PROTECTION" constituted non-use of "ALLROUND." P&G’s U.S. registration, disclaiming "PROTECTION," indicated that suffixing did not negate the mark’s use. Anchor’s advertisements and invoices further evidenced use of "ALLROUND" as a trademark.

Third-Party Use: The court dismissed P&G’s claim of third-party use, citing precedents that infringement by others does not preclude relief against a specific defendant.

Case Law Analysis: The court reconciled conflicting precedents, affirming Automatic Electric Ltd. via Indian Hotels Company Ltd. and distinguishing Marico Limited based on the unique nature of "ALLROUND PROTECTION." It relied on Stokely Van Camp for comprehensive trademark law principles.

Final Decision:
The Division Bench dismissed P&G’s appeal, upholding the Single Judge’s interim injunction restraining P&G from using "ALL-AROUND PROTECTION," "ALLROUNDER," or any deceptively similar mark during the suit’s pendency. The court clarified that its observations would not influence the trial’s outcome.

Law Settled in This Case:
This case settled several key principles in Indian trademark law:

Slogans as Trademarks: Slogans or taglines, if distinctive and capable of distinguishing goods, qualify as trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, enhancing brand equity through consumer recall.Test of Descriptiveness: A mark’s descriptiveness should be assessed before its use, not after prolonged association with a product. Marks highlighting unique product features, rather than generic qualities, are protectable. Approbate and Reprobate: A party applying for or obtaining registration of a mark cannot later claim it as descriptive, as this contradicts their prior conduct.Use of Registered Mark: Suffixing a registered mark with additional words does not necessarily constitute non-use, especially if the core mark remains prominent.Interim Relief: The balance of convenience favors the plaintiff when the defendant’s infringing use is recent, and third-party use does not preclude interim relief against a specific defendant.

Case Title: Procter & Gamble Manufacturing (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. & Others Vs. Anchor Health & Beauty Care Pvt. Ltd.
Date of Order: May 30, 2014
Case No.: FAO(OS) No. 241/2014
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Chief Justice and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Saturday, April 19, 2025

Obiter No Bar: Delhi HC Revives Passing Off Trial in Balar Marketing Case

New Delhi | March 27, 2025 — In a significant reaffirmation of judicial discipline and statutory interpretation, the Delhi High Court has held that obiter dicta of a High Court, especially when not supported by reasoned analysis, cannot bind a coordinate or subordinate bench. The ruling came in the matter of Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025, decided on 27 March 2025 by the High Court of Delhi, Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2322. The case, while rooted in a trademark dispute, evolved into a wider pronouncement on the limits of judicial precedent and the correct application of Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Trademark Clash and Background

The petitioner, Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., has been manufacturing electrical goods under the trademarks “KUNDAN” and “KUNDAN CAB” since 1975. The respondent, Lakha Ram Sharma, operating as Kundan Cable India, also uses similar marks—“KUNDAN” and “KUNDAN CABLE”—for related products. This overlapping use led to a longstanding legal tussle between the two parties, dating back to the 1990s.

The suits—TM Nos. 968/2016, 971/2016, 1030/2016, 932/2016, and 931/2016—were consolidated for trial. In 2018, the Trial Court declined interim relief to the petitioner. However, by an order dated 30 May 2022, it permitted trial to proceed on the issue of passing off, while staying the trademark infringement claims. The court relied on Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Hindustan Pencils Ltd., 2010 (43) PTC 479 (Del) (DB), and J.K. Oil Industries v. Adani Wilmar Ltd., 2007 (75) PTC 44 (Del).

The 2025 Dispute Over Obiter Dicta

In January 2025, the respondent applied to stay all suits, including those for passing off, citing paragraph 44 of the Division Bench judgment in Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652. That paragraph made a reference to staying proceedings involving both “infringement or passing off” in the context of pending rectification petitions under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Trial Court accepted this argument and stayed all suits except the one solely under the Copyright Act.

Balar Marketing challenged the order before the Delhi High Court, contending that the reference in Amrish Aggarwal was an obiter dicta and lacked binding authority.

The Legal Debate: Precedent vs. Passing Observation

The petitioner argued that the reference to “passing off” in Amrish Aggarwal was not backed by any reasoning and therefore could not override earlier binding precedent. It was submitted that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 applies only to infringement actions, and that passing off, being a common law remedy, operates independently of trademark registration status.

To support the proposition that obiter dicta are not binding, the petitioner relied on authoritative decisions including Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647, and Gudri v. Ram Kishun, 1983 SCC OnLine All 415: AIR 1984 All 5.

The respondent, in contrast, defended the Trial Court’s reliance on the Division Bench judgment. It was argued that the observations in Amrish Aggarwal should be treated as binding, even if made without elaboration. Reference was made to Naseemunisa Begum v. Shaikh Abdul Rehman, 2002 (2) Mah LJ 115, and Crocs Inc. USA v. Aqualite India Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11957, to assert that larger bench observations warrant judicial adherence.

The Court's Reasoning: Drawing the Line Between Ratio and Obiter

The Delhi High Court, examining the issue in depth, observed that the core question in Amrish Aggarwal pertained solely to infringement proceedings during pendency of rectification applications after abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board under the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021. The casual mention of “passing off” in paragraph 44 was not part of the issue framed or adjudicated and thus did not form part of the ratio decidendi.

In reaffirming Puma Stationer Pvt. Ltd., the Court clarified that while infringement proceedings are stayed pending rectification, passing off claims may continue since they do not depend on the validity of trademark registration. The Court also highlighted Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which expressly preserves the right to bring a passing off claim regardless of registration.

The High Court further emphasized that judicial precedent is confined to what is expressly decided. Citing Mohinder Singh Gill and Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, the Court reinforced that stray observations or general remarks lacking legal reasoning do not constitute binding law. It held that Crocs Inc. and Naseemunisa Begum were distinguishable, as those cases involved direct adjudication of the legal issue concerned.

Decision and Directions

The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the Trial Court’s order dated 18 January 2025. It held that the reference to passing off in Amrish Aggarwal was an inadvertent obiter dicta that could not serve as a legal basis for staying the suits. The Court directed that all consolidated suits, particularly those concerning passing off, proceed to trial without delay.

Legal Position Reaffirmed

The judgment in Balar Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Lakha Ram Sharma, CM(M)-IPD 5/2025, 2025:DHC:2322, firmly establishes that Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not extend to passing off actions. It reiterates that passing off is a distinct and independent common law remedy that continues irrespective of registration-related disputes. Above all, it reinforces the principle that only the ratio decidendi of a decision has binding force—obiter dicta, however notable, cannot override statutory interpretation or precedent.

Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, Patent and Trademark Attorney, Delhi High Court

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