New Life Laboratories Private Limited Vs. NLCARE Private Limited

Background: The dispute involves New Life Laboratories Private Limited (plaintiff) and NLCARE Private Limited (defendant), both engaged in the homeopathic medicine business. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed its registered trademark "NEW LIFE" by using the mark "NEW LIFE" and its abbreviation "NL" in its corporate name and products. The case traces back to Dr. Mohammad Idrees, who began practicing homeopathy in Bhopal in 1952, followed by his son, Dr. Mohammad Ilyas, who adopted the "NEW LIFE" trade name in 1970 after patients referred to his treatments as giving them a "new life."

Plaintiff's Claims: The plaintiff, incorporated in 1995 by Dr. Ilyas and his family, asserted exclusive rights to the "NEW LIFE" trademark, registered in 2013 under Class 35 for trading and marketing pharmaceutical preparations. The plaintiff argued that Dr. Ilyas, who founded the business, transferred all rights to the plaintiff company, which invested significantly in developing homeopathic medicines under the "NEW LIFE" brand. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, formed in 2019 by former directors and family members of Dr. Ilyas, infringed the trademark by using "NEW LIFE" and "NL" in its corporate name, packaging, and marketing, thereby passing off its products as those of the plaintiff and eroding its goodwill.

Defendant's Defense: The defendant, led by Dr. Ilyas’s sons Mohammad Zaki and Faizan Mohammad, contended that the "NEW LIFE" trademark originated with Dr. Idrees in 1952 and was used by multiple family members across various clinics and shops in Bhopal for decades. The defendant argued that the trademark was a family-owned asset, with no single entity, including the plaintiff, entitled to exclusive rights. They highlighted that the plaintiff’s registration was limited to a specific label and color scheme, not the word mark "NEW LIFE." The defendant also accused the plaintiff of suppressing material facts, including a prior Delhi High Court suit where no interim injunction was granted, and provided evidence of widespread family use of the trademark since 1975.

Court Proceedings: The plaintiff filed for an interim injunction (G.A. (Com) No. 1 of 2024) to restrain the defendant from using the "NEW LIFE" mark, securing an ad-interim ex-parte order on August 19, 2024. The defendant countered with an application (G.A. (Com) No. 2 of 2024) to vacate the order. The case was heard in the Calcutta High Court, Commercial Division, with arguments concluding on March 7, 2025, and judgment delivered on April 29, 2025.

Court's Findings: Justice Krishna Rao found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for exclusive rights over the "NEW LIFE" trademark. The court noted contradictory statements in the plaintiff’s pleadings, such as claiming exclusive use since 1970 while admitting family-wide use. The defendant’s evidence, including an affidavit from Dr. Idrees’s son, Dr. Mugees Siddiqui, confirmed that approximately 20 family-run shops used the "NEW LIFE" name without objection. The court also criticized the plaintiff for suppressing details of the Delhi High Court proceedings, where similar relief was denied. Citing precedents like Shri Ram Education Trust vs. SRF Foundation, the court held that a family trademark benefits all heirs unless explicitly excluded, and the plaintiff’s registration did not confer exclusivity over the word mark.

Decision: The court vacated the interim order granted to the plaintiff, dismissed G.A. (Com) No. 1 of 2024, and allowed G.A. (Com) No. 2 of 2024. The plaintiff’s request for a stay on the order was refused, affirming the defendant’s right to continue using the "NEW LIFE" trademark pending further proceedings.

Case Title: New Life Laboratories Private Limited Vs. NLCARE Private Limited

Date of Order: April 29, 2025

Case No.: G.A. (COM) No. 1 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Justice Krishna Rao

Alfred Von Schukmann Vs The Controller General of Patents

Introduction:  The case of Alfred Von Schukmann vs The Controller General of Patents, decided by the Delhi High Court on January 12, 2023, represents a pivotal moment in Indian patent law, emphasizing the necessity of reasoned decision-making in patent application rejections. This appeal, filed under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970, challenged the Assistant Controller of Patents’ cryptic order rejecting the appellant’s patent application for a “Step-Action Indexing Mechanism” due to an alleged lack of inventive step. The case underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that patent offices adhere to principles of natural justice, particularly by providing detailed justifications when denying patent protection. By setting aside the impugned order and remanding the matter for fresh consideration, the Delhi High Court reinforced the requirement for patent authorities to engage meaningfully with applicants’ submissions and prior art distinctions, setting a precedent for transparency and fairness in patent adjudication.

Detailed Factual Background:The appellant, Alfred Von Schukmann, filed Indian Patent Application No. 3845/DELNP/2007 on May 10, 2007, at the Patent Office in New Delhi for an invention titled “Step-Action Indexing Mechanism.” This application was a national phase entry under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), claiming a priority date of November 10, 2004. The invention related to a novel indexing mechanism, characterized by features such as a sun gear, planet gear, and indexing fingers extending from a central hub, designed to facilitate stepwise rotary advancement in mechanical systems, such as inhalers or counters.

On November 22, 2013, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER), raising objections, including a critical one under Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act, 1970, alleging that the invention lacked novelty and inventive step. The appellant responded comprehensively, distinguishing the invention from the cited prior art. Subsequent hearing notices reiterated the objection of lack of inventive step, referencing prior art documents labeled D1 (US 2003/0178020 A1), D2 (US 2004/0211420 A1), and D3 (EP 480488 A1). On May 15, 2017, the appellant submitted detailed written submissions, explaining how the invention’s unique features—such as the absence of a planet gear mechanism in D1, the lack of indexing fingers in D2, and the distinct functionality of fingers in D3—differentiated it from the prior art. The appellant also highlighted that the invention had been granted patents in China, Mexico, Canada, the United States, and the European Patent Office (EPO), underscoring its global recognition.

Despite these submissions, the Assistant Controller of Patents issued an order on August 3, 2017, rejecting the application under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, on the grounds that the amended claims 1-11 lacked inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) read with Section 2(1)(ja). The order was brief, stating only that the claims were obvious to a person skilled in the art when taught by D1, D2, and D3 in combination, without addressing the appellant’s arguments or providing a detailed analysis of the prior art.

Detailed Procedural Background:The procedural journey of this case began with the filing of the patent application on May 10, 2007. Following the FER issued on November 22, 2013, the appellant engaged in a series of interactions with the Patent Office, responding to objections and attending hearings. The appellant’s written submissions on May 15, 2017, were a critical attempt to address the inventive step objection by distinguishing the invention from the cited prior art. However, the Assistant Controller’s order on August 3, 2017, rejected the application in a cursory manner, prompting the appellant to file an appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970, before the Delhi High Court.

The appeal, registered as C.A. (COMM. IPD-PAT) 435/2022, was heard by Justice Amit Bansal. The appellant was represented by Mr. Rohit Rangi, along with Mr. Debashish Banerjee, Mr. Vineet Rohilla, and Mr. Ankush Verma, while the respondents, including the Controller General of Patents, were represented by Mr. Asheesh Jain, Central Government Standing Counsel, with Mr. Gaurav Kumar and Mr. Vishal Kumar. The court heard oral arguments and examined the record, delivering its judgment on January 12, 2023, in an oral pronouncement, with the signed order dated January 16, 2023.

Issues Involved in the Case

The court grappled with the following key issues in adjudicating the appeal:Whether the Assistant Controller’s order rejecting the patent application for lack of inventive step was adequately reasoned and compliant with principles of natural justice? Whether the Patent Office failed to engage with the appellant’s submissions distinguishing the invention from the cited prior art (D1, D2, and D3)?  Whether the appellant’s arguments in the appeal introduced new grounds not raised in earlier submissions, and if so, their impact on the appeal’s merits?

Appellant’s Submissions: The appellant argued that the Assistant Controller’s order was fatally deficient for its lack of reasoning. Despite detailed submissions in response to the FER and hearing notices, particularly the May 15, 2017, written submissions, the Patent Office failed to address how the invention lacked inventive step in light of D1, D2, and D3. The appellant emphasized that the invention’s unique features—such as the sun gear with a toothed underside, planet gear mechanism, and indexing fingers directed obliquely upward in a secant form—were absent or functionally distinct in the prior art. For instance, D1 (US 2003/0178020 A1) lacked a planet gear mechanism and relied on a toothed wheel, D2 (US 2004/0211420 A1) had no indexing fingers or sun gear, and D3 (EP 480488 A1) featured fingers that flexed vertically, not obliquely, and lacked the claimed ring part slots. The appellant argued that combining these references would not yield the claimed invention, and the Controller’s failure to analyze this was a procedural flaw.

The appellant relied on Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 940) and Auckland Uniservices Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (C.A. (COMM-IPD-PAT) 8/2022, decided on September 27, 2022), which mandated that patent rejections for lack of inventive step must include a reasoned analysis of the prior art, the invention, and the obviousness to a person skilled in the art. The appellant also cited the grant of patents in multiple jurisdictions as evidence of the invention’s inventiveness. Upon remand, the appellant requested that the matter be assigned to a different officer, citing Art Screw Co. Ltd v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 4429), to avoid any apprehension of bias.

Respondents’ Submissions: The respondents defended the impugned order, arguing that the appellant failed to adequately distinguish the invention from the prior art in its submissions to the Patent Office. They contended that the Controller’s conclusion of obviousness was justified based on the combined teachings of D1, D2, and D3. The respondents further asserted that the appellant raised new grounds in the appeal that were not part of the written submissions, suggesting that these could not be considered. They maintained that the Patent Office’s decision was within its discretion and did not warrant judicial interference.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties: The appellant relied on several precedents to argue that the Patent Office’s cryptic order violated established legal standards:

Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940 (Delhi High Court): This case was central to the appellant’s argument, as it outlined the requirements for rejecting a patent application for lack of inventive step. The court held that the Controller must analyze three elements: the invention disclosed in the prior art, the invention in the application, and how the subject invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the art. A bare conclusion of obviousness, without discussing these elements, is impermissible unless obviousness is absolutely clear. The court emphasized that Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, requires an analysis of existing knowledge and the technical advance or economic significance of the invention. The Delhi High Court in Schukmann applied this framework, finding the impugned order deficient for lacking such analysis.

Auckland Uniservices Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, C.A. (COMM-IPD-PAT) 8/2022, decided on September 27, 2022 (Delhi High Court): This judgment reinforced Agriboard, reiterating that a speaking order is mandatory when rejecting a patent application. The court held that the Patent Office must explain how the prior art renders the invention obvious, engaging with the applicant’s submissions. The Schukmann court cited this case to highlight the Patent Office’s failure to address the appellant’s detailed distinctions from D1, D2, and D3.

N.V. Satheesh Madhav and Anr v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4568 (Delhi High Court): This case, decided by Justice Amit Bansal himself, followed Agriboard and Auckland, affirming the need for reasoned orders in patent rejections. It supported the appellant’s contention that the cryptic nature of the impugned order violated procedural fairness.

Art Screw Co. Ltd v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4429 (Delhi High Court, decided on December 14, 2022): Cited by the appellant to request assignment to a different officer upon remand, this case established that remanding a matter to a different officer is appropriate to avoid apprehension of predetermination. The Schukmann court relied on this precedent to grant the appellant’s request.

Manohar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 681 (Supreme Court of India): Referenced in Agriboard and cited indirectly through that case, this Supreme Court decision underscored that application of mind and reasoned decision-making are core elements of natural justice. The Schukmann court applied this principle to emphasize the Patent Office’s obligation to provide a reasoned rejection.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court began by affirming the principles laid out in Agriboard International, which required the Controller to consider three elements when rejecting an invention for lack of inventive step: the prior art’s disclosure, the invention’s disclosure, and the obviousness to a person skilled in the art. Section 2(1)(ja) defines “inventive step” as a feature involving technical advance or economic significance that is not obvious, necessitating a detailed analysis of how the prior art renders the invention obvious.

The court found the impugned order wholly deficient, as it merely concluded that the amended claims 1-11 were obvious based on D1, D2, and D3, without engaging with the appellant’s submissions. The May 15, 2017, written submissions provided a granular comparison, highlighting the absence of key features like the planet gear mechanism, indexing fingers, and ring part slots in the prior art. For example, D1 relied on a toothed wheel, not a sun or planet gear; D2 lacked the claimed indexing fingers and sun gear; and D3’s fingers functioned differently, lacking the oblique secant form and rotary action. The appellant’s argument that combining these references would not yield the claimed invention was ignored, rendering the order arbitrary.

The court rejected the respondents’ contention that the appellant raised new grounds, noting that the appeal focused on the Controller’s failure to address existing submissions, not new technical arguments. The grant of patents in other jurisdictions, while not binding, supported the appellant’s claim of inventiveness, further underscoring the need for a reasoned evaluation. The court also dismissed the respondents’ defense of the Controller’s discretion, emphasizing that natural justice, as reiterated in Manohar and Agriboard, mandates a speaking order.

On the remedy, the court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, directing the Patent Office to consider the existing record, particularly the appellant’s prior art submissions. Citing Art Screw, the court agreed to assign the matter to a different officer to ensure impartiality, avoiding any perception of predetermination. The court imposed a four-month timeline for the new order, balancing efficiency with thoroughness.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal (C.A. (COMM. IPD-PAT) 435/2022), setting aside the Assistant Controller’s order dated August 3, 2017, which rejected the appellant’s patent application. 

Law Settled in This Case: This case established several critical principles in Indian patent law, particularly regarding the adjudication of patent applications:

Requirement of Reasoned Orders: The Patent Office must pass a speaking order when rejecting a patent application, analyzing the prior art, the invention, and the obviousness to a person skilled in the art, as mandated by Section 2(1)(ja) and principles of natural justice. 

Engagement with Applicant’s Submissions: Controllers must address applicants’ arguments, particularly distinctions from prior art, to ensure procedural fairness and avoid arbitrary rejections. 

Elements of Inventive Step Analysis: Rejection of Patent for lack of inventive step requires a discussion of the prior art’s disclosure, the invention’s features, and the reasoning for obviousness, unless the lack of inventiveness is patently clear. Remand to Different Officer: To avoid apprehension of bias, courts may direct that remanded patent applications be considered by a different officer, ensuring impartial adjudication. 

Case Title: Alfred Von Schukmann Vs The Controller General of Patents

Date of Order: January 12, 2023

Case No.: C.A. (COMM. IPD-PAT) 435/2022

Neutral Citation: 2023/DHC/000273

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Metro Playing Card Co. Vs Wazir Chand Kapoor

Introduction: The case of Metro Playing Card Co. vs Wazir Chand Kapoor, decided by the Delhi High Court on April 5, 1972, is a seminal decision in Indian trademark law, illustrating the principles governing interim injunctions in cases of trademark infringement and passing off. This dispute centered on the use of a tractor device and the word "tractor" as a registered trademark by the respondent, Wazir Chand Kapoor, for playing cards, which the appellant, Metro Playing Card Co., allegedly infringed by using a similar tractor device and the word "Ferguson" on its playing cards. The case highlights the judiciary’s approach to protecting registered trademarks, the significance of visual similarity in infringement claims, and the limitations of defenses based on pending trademark applications or concurrent use. The Delhi High Court’s affirmation of the interim injunction underscores the robust protection afforded to registered trademarks under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and the importance of establishing a prima facie case in interlocutory proceedings.

Detailed Factual Background:The respondent, Wazir Chand Kapoor, was a manufacturer and seller of playing cards, operating under a registered trademark comprising the device of a tractor and the word "tractor." This trademark was registered on February 8, 1968, under No. 233581 in Class 16, which pertains to paper goods, including playing cards. The registration granted Kapoor exclusive rights to use the trademark in relation to his playing cards, which were packaged in cartons bearing the tractor device.

The appellant, Metro Playing Card Co., also engaged in the manufacture and sale of playing cards. In early 1971, Kapoor discovered that Metro was marketing playing cards under the trademark "Ferguson," with a tractor device printed on the back of the cards. While the cartons containing Metro’s playing cards bore only the word "Ferguson" and lacked the tractor device, the cards themselves prominently featured the tractor, which Kapoor alleged was deceptively similar to his registered trademark. Metro claimed to have used the "Ferguson" mark since February 1966 and had applied for its registration in Class 16 at the Trade Mark Registry in Bombay. The application was accepted and advertised in the Trade Mark Journal No. 531 on July 16, 1971, to which Kapoor filed an opposition on September 11, 1971.

Kapoor contended that Metro’s use of the tractor device and the word "Ferguson" infringed his registered trademark and constituted passing off, as it could mislead consumers into believing Metro’s cards were his. He argued that "Ferguson," a well-known tractor brand, was synonymous with "tractor" in common parlance, exacerbating the likelihood of confusion. Metro countered that its use of the tractor was merely ornamental, not a trademark, and that the distinct packaging (cartons without the tractor device) eliminated any risk of confusion. Metro also asserted its prior use of "Ferguson" and the pending registration as defenses against the infringement claim.

Detailed Procedural Background:The dispute arose when Kapoor filed a suit in the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Metro from infringing his registered trademark and passing off its playing cards as his, along with claims for damages and rendition of accounts. Concurrently, Kapoor moved an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), requesting an interim injunction to prevent Metro from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in playing cards bearing the "Ferguson" mark and the tractor device during the pendency of the suit.

Metro opposed both the suit and the interlocutory application, arguing that its trademark application for "Ferguson" had been accepted, its use predated Kapoor’s registration, and the differences in packaging negated any infringement or passing off. The matter was heard by a learned Single Judge, P.N. Khanna, J., on the original side of the Delhi High Court. On November 29, 1971, the Single Judge granted an interim injunction, restraining Metro, its agents, and representatives from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in playing cards printed with the tractor device or any mark resembling Kapoor’s registered trademark. The injunction was limited to the tractor device on the cards, as the court found no infringement in the use of "Ferguson" on the cartons.Aggrieved by this order, Metro filed a First Appeal from Order (F.A.O. (OS) No. 1 of 1972) before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

The court addressed the following key issues in adjudicating the appeal: Whether Kapoor established a prima facie case of trademark infringement to justify the interim injunction against Metro’s use of the tractor device on its playing cards. Whether Metro’s use of the tractor device was likely to cause confusion or deceive consumers, infringing Kapoor’s registered trademark rights under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Whether Metro’s pending trademark application for "Ferguson" and its claim of prior use constituted a valid defense against the interim injunction. Whether the suit should have been stayed pending the outcome of Metro’s trademark registration application, or whether Kapoor should have been subjected to terms in case the suit was dismissed. Whether the scope of Kapoor’s registered trademark extended to the tractor device on the playing cards themselves, or was limited to the carton packaging.

Respondent’s (Kapoor’s) Submissions: Kapoor argued that his registered trademark, comprising the tractor device and the word "tractor," was infringed by Metro’s use of a similar tractor device on its playing cards. He contended that the visual similarity between the two tractor devices was patent, likely to confuse consumers purchasing playing cards. Kapoor emphasized that playing cards are often inspected before purchase, and the presence of the tractor device on Metro’s cards could lead unwary buyers to mistake them for his products. He further argued that "Ferguson," being a well-known tractor brand, was synonymous with "tractor" in common parlance, reinforcing the likelihood of confusion and supporting his passing off claim.

Kapoor relied on Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, asserting that his registration conferred exclusive rights to use the trademark in relation to playing cards, including both the cards and their packaging. He maintained that Metro’s unregistered use of the tractor device violated his statutory rights, as Metro had not challenged the validity of his registration. Kapoor also argued that Metro’s pending application for "Ferguson" did not confer any rights until granted, and its advertisement in the Trade Mark Journal was irrelevant to the infringement claim. He urged the court to uphold the interim injunction to protect his trademark during the suit’s pendency.

Appellant’s (Metro’s) Submissions

Metro contested the interim injunction on several grounds. First, Metro argued that Kapoor failed to establish a prima facie case, as the tractor device on its cards was merely ornamental, not a trademark, and the cartons bore only the word "Ferguson," distinguishing them from Kapoor’s packaging. Metro asserted that playing cards are sold in sealed cartons, and consumers rely on the carton’s labeling, reducing the risk of confusion.

Second, Metro invoked Section 12(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which allows concurrent registration for honest use or special circumstances. Metro claimed that its application for "Ferguson" had been accepted and advertised, and Kapoor’s opposition was pending. It argued that the suit should be stayed until the Registrar decided on its application, citing Edwards v. Elkan (1888) 5 R.P.C. 70, where an interim injunction was deferred pending a defendant’s registration application due to prior use.

Third, Metro claimed prior use of "Ferguson" since February 1966, predating Kapoor’s 1968 registration, and argued that this entitled it to continue using the mark. Metro also contended that the injunction was overly broad, as Kapoor’s registration covered the tractor device on cartons, not the cards themselves, citing the statutory definitions in Section 2(2) of the Act.

Metro cited several precedents to support its case. In Mitchell v. Henry (1880) 15 Ch D 181, an injunction was refused due to dissimilar goods, which Metro analogized to the distinct packaging of its cards. Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant (1957 RPC 183) and Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd. (1957 RPC 498) were cited to argue that injunctions should be denied where similarity is doubtful or there is delay, though Metro did not allege delay by Kapoor. Metro also relied on D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd. (AIR 1960 Mys 142) and an English case (1932 RPC 597) to urge that the suit be stayed or terms imposed on Kapoor, such as security for potential dismissal of the suit.Finally, Metro argued that its pending application, advertised in July 1971, warranted a stay or conditional relief, as concurrent use could be recognized if its registration was granted.

The parties cited several precedents, primarily by Metro, to support their respective positions on trademark infringement, interim relief, and concurrent use:

Edwards v. Elkan, (1888) 5 R.P.C. 70 (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to argue that the suit should be stayed pending its trademark application. In this case, the defendant used the mark "Our Boys" for watches before the plaintiff’s registration, and the court deferred the interim injunction until the defendant’s registration application was decided, as prior use was unchallenged. The Delhi High Court distinguished this case, noting that Metro provided no evidence of prior use of the tractor device, and its application was for "Ferguson," not the tractor, which was the subject of the injunction.

Mitchell v. Henry, (1880) 15 Ch D 181 (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to argue that dissimilar goods negate infringement. The plaintiff’s registered trademark for worsted goods with a specific selvage was not infringed by the defendant’s differently colored goods, despite a similar thread. The court refused an injunction due to lack of similarity. The Delhi High Court rejected this analogy, finding that the tractor devices on both parties’ playing cards were patently similar, unlike the distinct goods in Mitchell.

Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant, (1957 RPC 183) (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to argue that doubtful similarity or delay precludes interim relief. The court refused an injunction where the defendant’s use of “Barrington” was unlikely to deceive customers compared to “Bravington,” and the plaintiff delayed action. The Delhi High Court found this inapplicable, as there was no delay by Kapoor, and the tractor devices’ similarity was clear, unlike the trade names in Bravingtons.

Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd., (1957 RPC 498) (Chancery Division, England): Cited by Metro to support its claim that delay and lack of similarity justify refusing an injunction. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s sweet canisters infringed its trademark and copyright, but the court denied relief due to delay and dissimilar labels. The Delhi High Court dismissed this precedent, noting no delay by Kapoor and the evident similarity of the tractor devices, unlike the distinct canisters in Tavener.

D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys 142 (Mysore High Court): Cited by Metro to argue for a stay or imposition of terms on Kapoor. The Mysore High Court’s decision involved trademark disputes, but specific details were not elaborated in the Delhi High Court’s judgment. The court rejected this precedent, finding no basis to stay the suit or impose terms, as Metro’s appeal and original reply lacked such a prayer.

English Case, (1932 RPC 597): Cited by Metro without specific details, likely to support its stay argument. The Delhi High Court dismissed its relevance, stating that it was not attracted to the present case’s facts, without further elaboration due to Metro’s failure to demonstrate prior use or applicability.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The Division Bench, upheld the Single Judge’s interim injunction, providing a clear and reasoned analysis rooted in trademark law principles. The court’s reasoning addressed Metro’s contentions systematically:

On the prima facie case, the court found that Kapoor established a strong case for infringement. The tractor device on Metro’s playing cards was “patently similar” to Kapoor’s registered trademark, satisfying the visual similarity test for infringement under Section 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The court rejected Metro’s argument that consumers rely solely on carton packaging, noting that it is “common knowledge” that playing cards are inspected before purchase, making the tractor device on the cards a critical factor in consumer perception. The court declined to opine on whether “Ferguson” itself infringed, as the injunction was limited to the tractor device, but acknowledged Kapoor’s argument that “Ferguson” is synonymous with “tractor,” suggesting potential for further scrutiny in the main suit.

Regarding Metro’s pending trademark application, the court held that mere acceptance or advertisement of an application confers no rights, as per Section 28, which grants exclusive rights only upon registration. Metro’s application for “Ferguson” was irrelevant to the injunction, which targeted the tractor device, not the word. The court dismissed Metro’s reliance on Section 12(3) for concurrent use, noting that until registration is granted, Kapoor’s registered trademark prevails, and Metro had not challenged the registration’s validity. The court distinguished Edwards v. Elkan, as Metro provided no evidence of prior use of the tractor device, unlike the defendant’s established use in Edwards.

On Metro’s claim that the tractor device was ornamental, not a trademark, the court found this unpersuasive, as the device’s placement on the cards mirrored Kapoor’s registered use, likely to influence consumer perception. The court also rejected Metro’s argument that Kapoor’s registration was limited to cartons. Citing Sections 2(2), 28, and 29, the court clarified that a registered trademark applies to the goods (playing cards) and their packaging, encompassing the tractor device on the cards themselves.

The court addressed Metro’s request for a stay or terms, finding no basis for either. Metro’s appeal and original reply lacked a prayer for terms, and the precedents cited (e.g., D. Adinarayana Setty) were inapplicable, as they did not align with the case’s facts. The court emphasized that Kapoor’s statutory rights under a valid registration took precedence, and Metro’s claim of concurrent use lacked prima facie evidence.

The court concluded that the balance of convenience favored Kapoor, as the interim injunction protected his registered trademark without unduly harming Metro, pending the suit’s resolution. The injunction’s scope, limited to the tractor device, was proportionate, leaving Metro free to use “Ferguson” on cartons, subject to the main suit’s outcome.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court dismissed Metro Playing Card Co.’s appeal (F.A.O. (OS) No. 1 of 1972) with costs, affirming the Single Judge’s interim injunction of November 29, 1971. The injunction restrained Metro, its agents, and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, or dealing in playing cards printed with the device of a tractor or any mark resembling Kapoor’s registered trademark, pending the disposal of the suit.

Law Settled in This Case: This case clarified several principles in Indian trademark law, particularly for interim injunctions in infringement disputes:

Protection of Registered Trademarks: A registered trademark under Section 28 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, confers exclusive rights, and unregistered use of a similar mark constitutes infringement unless the registration’s validity is challenged. 

Visual Similarity in Infringement: Patent similarity between marks, especially on goods inspected by consumers (e.g., playing cards), establishes a prima facie case of infringement, regardless of differences in packaging. 

Pending Trademark Applications Confer No Rights: Acceptance or advertisement of a trademark application does not grant rights or justify staying a suit, as only registered marks enjoy statutory protection. 

Concurrent Use Defense: Claims of concurrent use under Section 12(3) require evidence of honest use or special circumstances, which must be substantiated at the interim stage to counter a registered trademark’s rights. 

Scope of Trademark Registration: A registered trademark applies to the goods and their packaging, encompassing marks on the goods themselves (e.g., playing cards), not just their containers. 

Case Title: Metro Playing Card Co. Vs Wazir Chand Kapoor

Date of Order: April 5, 1972

Case No.: F.A.O. (OS) No. 1 of 1972

Neutral Citation: AIR 1972 Del 248

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Chief Justice Hardayal Hardy and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prakash Narain

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Educare Limited Vs S.K. Sachdev

Introduction: The case of Educare Limited & Anr vs S.K. Sachdev & Anr, decided by the Delhi High Court on November 14, 2014, stands as a significant precedent in Indian trademark law, particularly in the realm of educational institutions. This dispute revolved around the alleged passing off of the plaintiffs’ well-established trademark "SHRI RAM" by the defendants’ use of the phonetically similar "ShreeRam World School." The case encapsulates the tension between protecting a brand’s goodwill and the challenges posed by common or deity-derived names in trademark disputes. The plaintiffs, associated with the renowned Shri Ram Schools, sought to safeguard their reputation, while the defendants, experienced educationists, argued that "Shri Ram" was a generic term incapable of exclusive association. The judgment delves into principles of passing off, distinctiveness, and the equitable considerations of material concealment, offering valuable insights into trademark protection in India’s competitive educational sector.

Detailed Factual Background:The plaintiffs in this case were Educare Limited (Plaintiff No. 1), a company engaged in establishing schools in India and abroad, and a registered non-profit society (Plaintiff No. 2) operating the Shri Ram Schools since 1988. The first Shri Ram School was established in Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, on a 1.5-acre plot near the ridge forest, starting modestly with 64 students in five tents. Designed to provide a holistic education emphasizing values, self-discipline, and excellence, the school grew to over 700 students and 108 staff members. The Shri Ram School expanded to include a senior school in Moulsari, Gurgaon, and another branch, The Shri Ram School-Aravali, established in 2000 in DLF City Phase IV, Gurgaon.

To address the shortage of quality schools, Educare Limited partnered with Educomp Infrastructure and School Management (EISML), a subsidiary of Educomp Solutions, to establish The Shriram Millennium Schools in Noida (2010) and Faridabad (2012), adopting the pedagogical philosophy of the Shri Ram Schools. In 2011, the second plaintiff collaborated with the Haryana Police Department to set up The Shri Ram Police School in Bhondsi, Haryana, for children of police personnel and the public. By 2014, the plaintiffs operated schools at six locations, all prominently featuring "SHRI RAM" in their names.

The plaintiffs’ schools earned widespread acclaim for their child-centered, value-based education. The Shri Ram School, Vasant Vihar, was ranked fourth in Delhi by Outlook India in 2002 and the best day school in India by Education World Magazine in 2008, 2009, and 2011. In 2010, The Hindustan Times ranked the Delhi and Gurgaon branches as the top schools in Gurgaon and Southwest Delhi. In 2011, The Shri Ram School, Aravali, was ranked the number one school in India by the Delhi-based Center for Forecasting and Research Private Limited and Education World Magazine. By 2013, IndiaRanker.com placed The Shri Ram School, Vasant Vihar, sixth and Aravali twelfth among India’s top schools. The plaintiffs’ students excelled academically and in extracurricular activities, with notable achievements in ICSE exams, sports, photography, and international programs, further enhancing the brand’s reputation.

The plaintiffs claimed that 25 years of continuous use had made "SHRI RAM" synonymous with their schools’ excellence. They filed a trademark application for "THE SHRI RAM SCHOOL" on June 6, 2008 (No. 1696277, Class 41), which was pending at the time of the suit.

The defendants were S.K. Sachdev (Defendant No. 1), the Chairman of ShreeRam World School, and the school itself (Defendant No. 2), operated under the Mata Phoolan Wanti Educational Society. Sachdev, a seasoned educationist, also chaired Sachdeva Public School (Pitam Pura, 1986; Rohini, 1999), Sachdeva Global School (Dwarka, 2007), and Queens Valley School (2009), all under different educational societies. The defendants launched ShreeRam World School in Dwarka, with a domain name www.shreeram.in, and filed a trademark application for "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL" on February 17, 2011 (No. 2101083, Class 41), claiming use from 2014.

The plaintiffs alleged that "ShreeRam" was phonetically and conceptually identical to "SHRI RAM," adopted dishonestly to capitalize on their goodwill. They pointed to the defendants’ silence on the management details of ShreeRam World School’s website, contrasting with the transparency of their other schools’ websites, as evidence of intent to mislead. The defendants countered that "SHRI RAM," derived from the Hindu deity Lord Ram, was a common term in education, used by numerous schools since 1923, and thus incapable of exclusive association with the plaintiffs.

Detailed Procedural Background:The suit, CS(OS) No. 1151/2014, was filed by the plaintiffs in the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from using "ShreeRam World School" and the domain name www.shreeram.in, along with damages and rendition of accounts. On April 25, 2014, the court issued summons and granted an ex parte interim injunction, restraining the defendants from using the trademark "ShreeRam World School" and the domain name, citing their deceptive similarity to "SHRI RAM."

The plaintiffs filed IA No. 7512/2014 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to confirm the interim injunction. The defendants responded with IA No. 10541/2014 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC, seeking vacation of the interim order. Both applications were heard together, with arguments concluding on September 4, 2014, and judgment reserved. The court pronounced its decision on November 14, 2014, disposing of both applications through a common order.

The plaintiffs submitted extensive documentary evidence, including school rankings, newspaper clippings, and student achievements, to demonstrate the goodwill and distinctiveness of "SHRI RAM." The defendants filed a written statement and documents, including trademark search reports, CBSE records, and third-party school details, to argue that "SHRI RAM" was a common term. 

Issues Involved in the Case

The court addressed the following key issues in adjudicating the applications:Whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of passing off, demonstrating that "SHRI RAM" had acquired distinctiveness and goodwill associated exclusively with their schools? Whether the defendants’ use of "ShreeRam World School" was likely to cause confusion or deception among the public, infringing the plaintiffs’ proprietary rights in their trademark? Whether the plaintiffs’ alleged concealment of trademark examination reports and prior statements to the Registrar constituted material misrepresentation, disentitling them to equitable relief? Whether the term "SHRI RAM," as a deity-derived name, was common to the trade and incapable of exclusive appropriation, or whether the plaintiffs’ long use rendered it distinctive?

Detailed Submission of Parties: The plaintiffs argued that their uninterrupted use of "SHRI RAM" since 1988 had made it an intrinsic part of their schools’ goodwill. They highlighted the schools’ top rankings, student achievements, and media recognition, asserting that "SHRI RAM" was exclusively associated with their educational philosophy and excellence. The defendants’ adoption of "ShreeRam World School" in 2014, they contended, was phonetically, structurally, and visually identical to "THE SHRI RAM SCHOOL," differing only by the omission of "THE" and addition of "WORLD." This similarity, coupled with the defendants’ operation in the same educational sector, was likely to deceive parents and students into believing ShreeRam World School was affiliated with the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, experienced educationists since 1986, were aware of their schools’ reputation, particularly after The Shri Ram School was ranked India’s best in 2011, the year the defendants applied for "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL." They pointed to the defendants’ failure to disclose management details on ShreeRam World School’s website, unlike their other schools, as evidence of dishonest intent to trade on the plaintiffs’ goodwill. The plaintiffs argued that this silence was intentional to create a false impression of association.

On the defendants’ claim that "SHRI RAM" was a common deity name, the plaintiffs countered that their 25-year use had rendered it distinctive, and the proliferation of "Shri Ram" schools post-1988 was due to their success. They cited only 12 schools with "Shri Ram" before 1988, compared to 23 between 1988-2000 and 42 from 2001-2014, attributing this increase to their brand’s influence. The plaintiffs also argued that the defendants’ trademark application for "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL" contradicted their claim that the term was publici juris, as seeking registration implied a claim to proprietary rights.

Regarding alleged concealment, the plaintiffs clarified that their letter dated June 8, 2012, to the Registrar, admitting "SHRI RAM" was a deity name, pertained to a different trademark application (No. 1696276, SHRI RAM EDUCARE vs. USHA SHRIRAM), not "THE SHRI RAM SCHOOL." This letter was withdrawn on April 15, 2014, before the suit’s filing on May 25, 2014, and no advantage was derived from it. They denied material concealment, asserting that their plaint focused on the distinctiveness of "SHRI RAM" through long use, not its registrability.

The plaintiffs relied on several precedents to support their passing off claim. In Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co. (AIR 1978 Del 250), the court held that prior use establishes a passing off claim, and proof of fraud or actual damage is unnecessary if the defendant’s mark is likely to deceive. B.K. Engineering and Company v. Ubhi Enterprises (1985 PTC (DB) 1) emphasized that defendants cannot misappropriate a plaintiff’s goodwill, as passing off protects the property in business reputation. Laxmikant V. Patel v. ChetanBhat Shah (2002 (24) PTC 1 (SC)) underscored that a mark acquiring goodwill through long use is protected against competitors’ deceptive use, even without fraudulent intent. The plaintiffs also cited India Hotels Company Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science and Culture (2008 (37) PTC 468 (Del.) (DB)) and Automatic Electric Limited v. R.K. Dhawan (1999 (19) PTC 81 (Del)) to argue that the defendants’ trademark application estopped them from claiming "ShreeRam" was generic.

Defendants’ Submissions:The defendants sought vacation of the interim injunction, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claim was based on material concealment and inconsistent positions. They contended that the plaintiffs withheld trademark examination reports indicating that "SHRI RAM" was registered or pending in other parties’ names and their June 8, 2012, letter to the Registrar admitting that "SHRI RAM" was a common deity name not subject to monopoly. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs’ withdrawal of this letter on April 15, 2014, was dubious, as it was not reflected in the Registrar’s electronic records, suggesting manipulation.

The defendants argued that "SHRI RAM" was a generic term, widely used in education since 1923, with approximately 100 schools bearing the name by 2014. They cited examples from 1932, 1951, 1960, and later decades, supported by CBSE records, photographs, and brochures, to assert that "SHRI RAM" lacked distinctiveness and co-existed peacefully among schools. They relied on McCarthy on Trade Marks and Unfair Competition (4th Ed.), which states that marks in a crowded field are weak and unlikely to cause confusion, as consumers distinguish them based on subtle differences. The defendants also argued that "SHRI RAM," as a deity name associated with learning, was inherently apt for educational use, citing telephone directories showing its widespread adoption.

The defendants invoked judicial reluctance to grant monopolies over deity names, referencing Bhole Baba Milk Food Industries Ltd. v. Parul Food Specialities (P) Ltd. (2011 (45) PTC 217 (Del) and 2011 (48) PTC 235 (DB)), where interim relief was denied despite high sales, as "Krishna" was common in dairy products. Similarly, Kamdhenu Ispat Limited v. Kamdhenu Pickles & Spices (2011 (46) PTC 152 (Del)) and Goenka Institute of Education v. Anjani Kumar Goenka (AIR 2009 Del 139) denied protection to common names like "Kamdhenu" and "Goenka." In Skyline Education Institute v. S.L. Vaswani (2010 (42) PTC 217 (SC)), the Supreme Court held that the generic term "SKYLINE" warranted no injunction due to its common use.

The defendants further argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove goodwill or distinctiveness, as they provided no financial data, fee collections, or advertisement expenditure. They contended that the plaintiffs’ evidence—website printouts and media clippings—was insufficient to establish exclusive association. The defendants also highlighted the cautious nature of parents selecting schools, noting differences in board affiliations (ICSE for plaintiffs, CBSE for defendants) and geographical locations, which minimized confusion.

On adoption, the defendants claimed that "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL" was chosen honestly to honor Defendant No. 1’s mother, a devout Hindu who worshipped Lord Ram and desired a school in his name. They asserted their own goodwill, built through decades of educational ventures, negated any need to rely on the plaintiffs’ reputation. The defendants offered to include a disclaimer stating that ShreeRam World School was run by the Mata Phoolan Wanti Educational Society to clarify its distinct source.

The defendants cited S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994 SCC (1) 1) to argue that concealment of material facts, like the plaintiffs’ letter to the Registrar, rendered their claim inequitable. Living Media India Ltd. v. Alpha Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (2014 (28) DLT 145) and Unichem Laboratories Ltd. v. Ipca Laboratories Ltd. (2011 (45) PTC 488) supported their claim that inconsistent positions before the Registrar and court warranted denial of relief. Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2012 (50) PTC 380) and Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal (AIR 1998 SC 618) reinforced that admissions cannot be withdrawn without Registrar approval. Rajinder Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India (2007 (35) PTC 616) and P.P. Jeweller v. P.P. Buildwell (2009 (41) PTC 217) held that long use alone does not establish distinctiveness in a crowded field.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties:Both parties relied on a robust array of precedents, each applied to specific legal principles in the context of passing off and trademark protection:

Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co., AIR 1978 Del 250 (DB): Cited by the plaintiffs to establish that prior use is critical in a passing off action, and the defendant’s mark need only be likely to deceive to warrant an injunction, without proving fraud or actual damage. The court held that the plaintiff’s prior use of "RAJARANI" entitled them to relief, emphasizing that registration is irrelevant in passing off unless user evidence exists. This supported the plaintiffs’ claim of 25-year use since 1988.

B.K. Engineering and Company v. Ubhi Enterprises, 1985 PTC (DB) 1: Cited by the plaintiffs to argue that passing off protects the property in goodwill, and defendants cannot misappropriate a plaintiff’s labor. The court, dealing with the mark "B.K.," held that a distinctive mark’s misuse injures the plaintiff’s business reputation, even if the defendant uses their own name, if it causes confusion. This bolstered the plaintiffs’ claim that "ShreeRam" exploited their goodwill.

Laxmikant V. Patel v. ChetanBhat Shah, 2002 (24) PTC 1 (SC): Cited by the plaintiffs to underscore that a mark acquiring goodwill through long use is protected against competitors’ deceptive use, regardless of intent. The Supreme Court, in a case involving "MUKTAJIVAN," held that prior use and goodwill establish a prima facie case for injunction if confusion is likely. This supported the plaintiffs’ argument that their established reputation warranted protection.

India Hotels Company Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science and Culture, 2008 (37) PTC 468 (Del.) (DB): Cited by the plaintiffs to counter the defendants’ claim that "SHRI RAM" was publici juris. The court held that a party applying for trademark registration (like the defendants for "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL") cannot argue the mark is descriptive, as it implies a claim to proprietary rights. This estopped the defendants from denying the mark’s distinctiveness.

Automatic Electric Limited v. R.K. Dhawan, 1999 (19) PTC 81 (Del): Cited by the plaintiffs to reinforce that the defendants’ trademark application for "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL" contradicted their generic term argument. The court, dealing with "DIMMERSTAT" vs. "DIMMERDOT," held that seeking registration precludes claiming a mark is generic, supporting the plaintiffs’ estoppel argument.

S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, 1994 SCC (1) 1: Cited by the defendants to argue that the plaintiffs’ concealment of the June 8, 2012, letter and examination reports was fraudulent, rendering their claim inequitable. The Supreme Court held that a litigant must disclose all relevant documents, and non-disclosure constitutes fraud on the court. The defendants used this to challenge the plaintiffs’ equitable relief.

Living Media India Ltd. v. Alpha Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., 2014 (28) DLT 145: Cited by the defendants to argue that the plaintiffs’ inconsistent positions—admitting "SHRI RAM" was common before the Registrar but claiming exclusivity in court—disentitled them to relief. The court denied an injunction where the plaintiff took contradictory stands on "INDIA TODAY" vs. "NATION TODAY," supporting the defendants’ concealment argument.

Unichem Laboratories Ltd. v. Ipca Laboratories Ltd., 2011 (45) PTC 488: Cited by the defendants to reinforce that inconsistent stands before the Registrar and court preclude injunctive relief. The Mumbai High Court denied an injunction due to the plaintiff’s contradictory positions, aligning with the defendants’ claim of material misrepresentation.

Astrazeneca UK Ltd. v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2012 (50) PTC 380: Cited by the defendants to argue that parties cannot approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent stands. The court’s ruling supported the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs’ shifting positions undermined their claim.

Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal, AIR 1998 SC 618: Cited by the defendants to assert that the plaintiffs’ June 8, 2012, admission could not be withdrawn without Registrar approval. The Supreme Court held that admissions are binding unless properly retracted, supporting the defendants’ challenge to the withdrawal letter’s authenticity.

Bhole Baba Milk Food Industries Ltd. v. Parul Food Specialities (P) Ltd., 2011 (45) PTC 217 (Del) and 2011 (48) PTC 235 (DB): Cited by the defendants to argue that deity names like "SHRI RAM" are common and not protectable. The court denied interim relief for "Krishna" in dairy products despite high sales, as it was widely used, supporting the defendants’ claim of a crowded field.

Kamdhenu Ispat Limited v. Kamdhenu Pickles & Spices, 2011 (46) PTC 152 (Del): Cited by the defendants to argue that common names like "Kamdhenu" lack distinctiveness. The court’s denial of protection reinforced the defendants’ position that "SHRI RAM" was not exclusive.

Goenka Institute of Education v. Anjani Kumar Goenka, AIR 2009 Del 139: Cited by the defendants to argue that surnames like "Goenka" are not distinctive in education. The court’s refusal to protect the name supported the defendants’ claim that "SHRI RAM" was a common term.

Skyline Education Institute v. S.L. Vaswani, 2010 (42) PTC 217 (SC): Cited by the defendants to argue that generic terms like "SKYLINE" warrant no protection in a crowded field. The Supreme Court’s ruling that common use negates injunction supported the defendants’ publici juris argument.

Rajinder Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India, 2007 (35) PTC 616: Cited by the defendants to argue that long use alone does not establish distinctiveness for common names like "Aggarwal." The court’s ruling supported the defendants’ claim that "SHRI RAM" lacked exclusivity.

P.P. Jeweller v. P.P. Buildwell, 2009 (41) PTC 217: Cited by the defendants to assert that search reports showing third-party use can negate distinctiveness. The court’s denial of passing off relief due to a crowded field supported the defendants’ argument.

McCarthy on Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, 11:85 (4th Ed.): Cited by the defendants to argue that marks in a crowded field, like "SHRI RAM," are weak and unlikely to cause confusion, as consumers distinguish them based on minor differences. Examples like "GRAND HOTEL" and "BROADWAY" illustrated this principle.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court confirmed the interim injunction, dismissing the defendants’ application to vacate it, based on the following reasoning:

On the issue of concealment, the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs withheld trademark examination reports and their June 8, 2012, letter admitting "SHRI RAM" was a common deity name. The court acknowledged the settled principle that litigants must disclose all relevant documents, and concealment can disentitle equitable relief, as per S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu. However, it found no material misrepresentation. The plaintiffs clarified that the 2012 letter pertained to a different application (SHRI RAM EDUCARE vs. USHA SHRIRAM), not "THE SHRI RAM SCHOOL," and was withdrawn on April 15, 2014, before the suit’s filing. The court accepted this explanation, noting that the plaintiffs derived no advantage from the letter and their plaint focused on goodwill through use, not registrability. The court deemed the alleged concealment immaterial, as it did not affect the core claim of distinctiveness.

The court then assessed whether "SHRI RAM" was distinctive to the plaintiffs’ schools. The defendants argued that it was a common deity name, used by schools since 1923, and thus publici juris, citing Bhole Baba and McCarthy’s crowded field doctrine. They provided evidence of approximately 100 schools with "Shri Ram," asserting peaceful co-existence and consumer ability to distinguish based on differences like "WORLD" vs. "SCHOOL." The plaintiffs countered that their 25-year use since 1988, coupled with top rankings and student achievements, made "SHRI RAM" synonymous with their brand, and post-1988 schools adopted the name due to their success.

The court found that the plaintiffs prima facie established immense goodwill and distinctiveness. It relied on extensive documentary evidence, including 2010 and 2011 rankings naming The Shri Ram School as Delhi’s and India’s best, and newspaper clippings showcasing student achievements (e.g., 98.75% in ICSE exams, sports awards). The court emphasized that for schools, financial metrics are secondary to reputation built on academic and extracurricular excellence. It held that public perception associated "SHRI RAM" with the plaintiffs’ schools, distinguishing them from older or newer "Shri Ram" schools. The court rejected the defendants’ crowded field argument, finding that the plaintiffs’ schools “stood out in the crowd” due to their unique reputation.

On phonetic and visual similarity, the court agreed that "THE SHRI RAM SCHOOL" and "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL" were nearly identical, differing only in minor elements. This similarity, in the same educational services, was likely to cause confusion among parents, satisfying the passing off test under Laxmikant V. Patel.

The court addressed the defendants’ claim of honest adoption, based on Defendant No. 1’s mother’s wish to honor Lord Ram. It found this explanation unconvincing, noting the defendants’ long experience in education since 1986 and operation of schools under distinct names like Sachdeva and Queens Valley. The absence of management details on ShreeRam World School’s website, unlike the defendants’ other schools, was deemed suspicious and intentional, suggesting an attempt to mimic the plaintiffs’ brand. The court also noted the defendants’ failure to specify when the mother’s wish was expressed or her date of death, undermining their bona fides.

The defendants’ trademark application for "SHREERAM WORLD SCHOOL" was a critical factor. Citing India Hotels and Automatic Electric, the court held that seeking registration estopped the defendants from claiming the mark was generic, as it implied a proprietary claim. This contradiction weakened their publici juris argument.

On the balance of convenience, the court found that the plaintiffs, with 25 years of use, would suffer irreparable injury if the defendants continued using "ShreeRam," while the defendants, with use only since 2014, faced minimal harm from an injunction. The court rejected the defendants’ disclaimer offer, as the core issue was the mark’s deceptive similarity, not merely source clarification.

Final Decision

The Delhi High Court allowed IA No. 7512/2014, confirming the interim injunction of April 25, 2014, restraining the defendants from using "ShreeRam World School" and www.shreeram.in. IA No. 10541/2014 was dismissed, denying vacation of the injunction. The matter was listed for further proceedings on February 11, 2015, for admission/denial of documents and March 3, 2015, for framing issues.

Law Settled in This Case: This case clarified several principles in Indian trademark law, particularly for passing off in educational services:

Distinctiveness Through Use: Long, uninterrupted use of a mark, coupled with evidence of reputation (e.g., rankings, achievements), can render even a deity-derived name distinctive, overriding claims of it being publici juris. 

Estoppel by Trademark Application: A defendant applying for trademark registration cannot claim the mark is generic, as it implies a proprietary claim, estopping contradictory arguments. Material Concealment: Concealment disentitles equitable relief only if material and intentional, affecting the claim’s core. Inconsistent positions in unrelated proceedings may not constitute material misrepresentation if withdrawn before suit. 

Passing Off in Education: In educational services, goodwill is assessed through academic and extracurricular reputation, not financial metrics. Phonetic and visual similarity in school names can cause confusion among cautious parents. 

Bona Fide Adoption: Claims of honest adoption, especially by experienced players in the same field, require robust evidence. Suspicious omissions (e.g., website details) can indicate dishonest intent.

Case Title: Educare Limited & Anr Vs S.K. Sachdev & Anr

Date of Order: November 14, 2014

Case No.: CS(OS) No. 1151/2014

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sistani

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. Vs. Cipla Ltd.

Introduction: The case of F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. vs. Cipla Ltd. represents a pivotal moment in Indian patent law, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector. This high-profile dispute centered on the alleged infringement of a patent for Erlotinib, a groundbreaking cancer treatment drug marketed as Tarceva. The case raised critical questions about patent validity, infringement, and the scope of protection for polymorphic forms of pharmaceutical compounds. It also highlighted the tension between intellectual property rights and public interest in access to affordable life-saving drugs. Decided by the Delhi High Court in 2012, the judgment offers profound insights into the application of India’s Patents Act, 1970, particularly Section 3(d), which governs the patentability of new forms of known substances.

Detailed Factual Background: F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (Roche), a Swiss pharmaceutical giant, and OSI Pharmaceuticals Inc. (OSI), a New York-based company, were the plaintiffs in this case. Roche, known for its extensive research in pharmaceuticals and diagnostics, invests heavily in collaborative research, spending approximately 7 billion Swiss Francs annually. OSI, along with Pfizer Products Inc., jointly owned a patent for Erlotinib, a Human Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor (HER/EGFR) inhibitor used to treat advanced or metastatic non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC). Erlotinib, sold under the Trademark Tarceva by Roche, was a tablet formulation approved by the U.S. FDA in 2004 and the European Union in 2005. In India, Roche introduced Tarceva in April 2006, following its registration by the Central Drug Standard Control Organization in December 2005.

The patent in question, Indian Patent No. 196774 (IN’774), was granted on February 23, 2007, to OSI and Pfizer for Erlotinib Hydrochloride, chemically named NOVEL [6,7-BIS(2-METHOXYETHOXY) QUINAZOLIN-4-YL]-(3-ETHYNYLPHENYL) AMINE HYDROCHLORIDE. The patent covered both the drug and its manufacturing process. Roche, under a licensing agreement with OSI dated January 8, 2001, was authorized to manufacture, market, and enforce intellectual property rights for Tarceva in India and other countries.

Cipla Ltd., a prominent Indian pharmaceutical company, was the defendant. Cipla announced plans to launch a generic version of Erlotinib, named Erlocip, in India and for export, as reported in the English daily Mint on January 11, 2008. This prompted Roche and OSI to file a suit against Cipla, alleging infringement of IN’774. Cipla, in turn, challenged the validity of the patent and argued that its product, Erlocip, was a polymorphic form (Polymorph B) of Erlotinib Hydrochloride, distinct from the patented compound, which was a mixture of Polymorphs A and B.

The dispute also involved a subsequent U.S. patent, US 6900221 (US’221), which described Polymorph B of Erlotinib Hydrochloride as a more stable form suitable for tablet formulation. In India, Roche’s application for a patent on Polymorph B (IN/PCT/2002/00507/DEL) was rejected under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, which requires new forms of known substances to demonstrate enhanced therapeutic efficacy. This rejection became a focal point in the case, as Cipla argued that its product aligned with the unpatented Polymorph B, thus not infringing IN’774.

Detailed Procedural Background:The suit, CS(OS) No. 89/2008, was filed by Roche and OSI on January 15, 2008, in the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Cipla from manufacturing, selling, or marketing Erlocip, along with claims for damages, rendition of accounts, and delivery up. Concurrently, the plaintiffs filed an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). On January 16, 2008, the court issued a notice on the interim application, and Cipla admitted to marketing Erlocip for three weeks. The interim application was argued over several hearings, but on March 19, 2008, the court dismissed the injunction request, directing Cipla to maintain accounts and provide an undertaking to pay damages if the suit was decreed.

Roche appealed the interim order in FAO(OS) No. 188/2008, but the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on April 24, 2009. A subsequent Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court (Civil No. 20111/2009) was dismissed on September 28, 2009, with a direction to expedite the trial without being influenced by the Division Bench’s observations.

Cipla filed a written statement and a counterclaim (C.C. No. 52/2008) on January 21, 2008, seeking revocation of IN’774 on grounds including lack of inventive step, obviousness, and non-patentability under Section 3(d). The plaintiffs filed a replication and a written statement to the counterclaim. On September 18, 2008, the court framed five issues, covering infringement, patent validity, the effect of US’221, and the plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief.

Evidence was recorded by a court-appointed commissioner, with both parties submitting affidavits from witnesses, including experts in pharmaceutical sciences and patent law. The plaintiffs presented affidavits from Mr. Shivprasad Laud (PW-1), Prof. Roger Griffin (PW-2), and Prof. Nick Thatcher (PW-3). Cipla’s witnesses included Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan (DW-1), Ms. Shashikala Kanathala (DW-2), Prof. Ashwini Nangia (DW-3), and Dr. Rajender Kumar Lohiya (DW-4). Extensive documentary evidence, including patent specifications, X-ray diffraction (XRD) data, and prior art references, was exhibited.

Cross-examination occurred between April 2009 and November 2010, with final arguments concluding on June 1, 2012. The court reserved judgment on June 1, 2012, and pronounced it on September 7, 2012.

Issues Involved in the Case:The court framed the following issues for adjudication:

Whether the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Erlocip by Cipla infringes the plaintiffs’ Indian Patent No. 196774? (Onus on Plaintiffs)? Whether Indian Patent No. 196774 is liable to be revoked on the grounds raised in Cipla’s written statement and counterclaim? Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction as prayed for?Whether Cipla proves that the plaintiffs’ US Patent 6900221 indicates that the compound of claim No. 1 of IN’774 is a mixture of Polymorphs A and B, requiring separation for acceptable efficacy, and its effect on IN’774? 

Plaintiffs’ Submissions:Roche and OSI argued that IN’774 was a valid patent covering Erlotinib Hydrochloride, and Cipla’s Erlocip infringed it by replicating the patented compound. They emphasized Tarceva’s significance as a life-saving drug, developed after substantial research, and its global approvals. The plaintiffs contended that Section 48 of the Patents Act grants exclusive rights to prevent unauthorized use, and their licensing agreement authorized Roche to enforce these rights.

On infringement, the plaintiffs asserted that Erlocip contained Erlotinib Hydrochloride, identical to the patented compound, and Cipla’s marketing violated their rights. They argued that IN’774’s claims were not limited to a specific polymorphic form, covering both Polymorphs A and B. The plaintiffs relied on the Catnic approach for claim construction, urging a purposive interpretation to include variants like Polymorph B. They cited clinical trial data from 1997 (Ex. PW1/X2) showing Erlotinib’s administration in tablet form, predating Polymorph B’s invention, to argue that the suit patent encompassed solid forms.

Regarding Polymorph B, the plaintiffs argued that it was irrelevant to therapeutic efficacy, as per Dr. Nick Thatcher’s testimony (PW-3), who stated that polymorphism does not affect patient outcomes. They contended that Section 3(d)’s explanation, which considers polymorphs as the same substance unless differing significantly in efficacy, supported their claim that Polymorph B fell within IN’774. The plaintiffs also referenced the Controller’s order in pre-grant opposition (December 15, 2008), which treated Polymorph B as the same substance as IN’774’s compound.

On patent validity, the plaintiffs argued that Cipla failed to prove obviousness or lack of inventive step. They disputed Cipla’s reliance on European Patent 0566226 (EP’226) as prior art, asserting that EP’226’s Markush structure covered millions of compounds, and Example 51 (a methyl-substituted quinazoline) was not the closest prior art. Instead, they highlighted EP’851’s compound (6,7-dimethoxy-4-(5-indolylamino)-quinazoline) with a superior IC50 value (1 nM) as the starting point for a skilled person. The plaintiffs argued that substituting methyl with ethynyl required inventive ingenuity, not mere workshop improvement, and Cipla provided no evidence of motivation to make this substitution.

The plaintiffs cited cases like Daiichi Sankyo v. Matrix Laboratories (670 F. Supp. 2d 359, Fed. Cir. 2010) to explain IC50 values and Glaverbel v. British Coal Corporation (1995 RPC 255) for claim construction, emphasizing that external documents like US’221 should not limit IN’774’s scope. They also relied on Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy (457 F.3d 1284, Fed. Cir. 2006) and Abbott v. Dey (287 F.3d 1097, Fed. Cir. 2002) to argue that subsequent patents (US’221) do not negate earlier claims.

Defendant’s Submissions

Cipla challenged IN’774’s validity, seeking revocation under Section 64 of the Patents Act on grounds of obviousness, lack of inventive step, and non-patentability under Section 3(d). They argued that IN’774 was a derivative of known quinazoline compounds, particularly those disclosed in EP’226, filed by Zeneca Ltd. in 1993. Cipla contended that Example 51 of EP’226, a methyl-substituted quinazoline, was the closest prior art, and replacing methyl with ethynyl to arrive at Erlotinib was obvious to a person skilled in the art. They supported this with Prof. Ashwini Nangia’s affidavit (DW-3), which cited five patents (EP 0477700, US 4138590, US 5427766, US 5736534, WO 93/04047) demonstrating the interchangeability of methyl and ethynyl substituents.

Cipla argued that IN’774 lacked inventive step, as quinazoline derivatives were known for anti-cancer properties, and EP’226 provided sufficient motivation to experiment with substitutions. They referenced C.W. Thornber’s article on bio-isosterism (Ex. D-4) to support the predictability of such substitutions. Cipla also alleged that IN’774 was a derivative of Gefitinib (AstraZeneca’s drug), which was denied a patent in India for being in the public domain, accusing Roche of “evergreening” to extend patent monopolies.

On infringement, Cipla asserted that Erlocip was Polymorph B of Erlotinib Hydrochloride, distinct from IN’774’s mixture of Polymorphs A and B. They relied on US’221’s specification, which described Polymorph B as more stable and suitable for tablets, and Ms. Shashikala Kanathala’s XRD analysis (DW-2) confirming that Tarceva and Erlocip were Polymorph B. Since Roche’s application for Polymorph B (IN’507) was rejected, Cipla argued that manufacturing Polymorph B did not infringe IN’774. They cited the rejection order under Section 3(d) to argue that Polymorph B was not patentable without enhanced efficacy.

Cipla also raised public interest concerns, noting that Tarceva cost ₹4,800 per tablet, while Erlocip was priced at ₹1,600, making it more accessible for cancer patients. They argued that granting an injunction would harm public access to affordable drugs, citing the need to balance patent rights with public welfare.

Cipla referenced cases like Merck (applying Catnic principles to chemical compounds) and EPO Board of Appeal decisions (Ex. DW4/40-42) to support their interpretation of prior art and obviousness. They also relied on Sudhir Engineering Company vs. Nitco Roadways Ltd. (1995 (34) DRJ 86) to argue that public documents could be considered despite marking objections.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

Both parties relied on several precedents to support their arguments, each applied in specific contexts: 

Daiichi Sankyo v. Matrix Laboratories (670 F. Supp. 2d 359, Fed. Cir. 2010): Cited by the plaintiffs to explain IC50 values as a measure of drug potency. The case clarified that lower IC50 values indicate higher potency, supporting the plaintiffs’ argument that EP’851’s compound (IC50 of 1 nM) was the most potent prior art, not EP’226’s Example 51.

Glaverbel v. British Coal Corporation (1995 RPC 255): Cited by the plaintiffs for claim construction principles, emphasizing that courts should interpret patent claims purposively without relying on external documents like US’221 to limit IN’774’s scope. The court in Glaverbel held that specifications should be read in context, which the plaintiffs argued supported a broad interpretation of IN’774.

Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy (457 F.3d 1284, Fed. Cir. 2006): Cited by the plaintiffs to argue that subsequent patents (US’221) do not negate the validity or scope of earlier patents (IN’774). The case involved a challenge to a patent’s validity, where the court upheld the earlier patent’s claims, supporting Roche’s position.

Abbott v. Dey (287 F.3d 1097, Fed. Cir. 2002): Cited by the plaintiffs to reinforce that subsequent developments or patents do not limit the scope of an earlier patent. The case dealt with claim construction, aligning with the plaintiffs’ reliance on Catnic principles.

Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. ([1982] RPC 183): Referenced by both parties, particularly by the plaintiffs, for purposive claim construction. The House of Lords in Catnic established that patent claims should be interpreted to cover variants that achieve the same result in substantially the same way. The plaintiffs argued that Polymorph B was a variant within IN’774’s scope, while the court applied Catnic to conclude that IN’774 did not intend to cover Polymorph B.

Sudhir Engineering Company vs. Nitco Roadways Ltd. (1995 (34) DRJ 86): Cited by Cipla to address objections to document marking. The Delhi High Court held that public documents could be considered despite procedural objections, supporting Cipla’s reliance on patent specifications and Controller’s orders.

EPO Board of Appeal Decisions (T 424/86, T 133/84, T 145/84, dated 1984-1986): Cited by Cipla (Ex. DW4/40-42) to support their obviousness argument. These decisions discussed prior art and the predictability of chemical substitutions, aligning with Cipla’s claim that methyl-to-ethynyl substitution was obvious based on EP’226.

Patent Validity:The court examined Cipla’s counterclaim for revocation, which alleged obviousness, lack of inventive step, and non-patentability under Section 3(d). Cipla argued that IN’774 was obvious based on EP’226’s Example 51, supported by Prof. Nangia’s testimony and prior art patents demonstrating methyl-ethynyl interchangeability. The plaintiffs countered that EP’851’s compound was the closest prior art due to its superior IC50 value, and the substitution required inventive ingenuity.

The court found that Cipla failed to discharge its onus to prove obviousness. It noted that EP’226’s Markush structure encompassed millions of compounds, and selecting Example 51 as the starting point was not sufficiently motivated. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that a skilled person would prioritize EP’851’s compound, and Cipla’s evidence did not establish why ethynyl substitution was an obvious “workshop result.” The court also rejected Cipla’s bio-isosterism argument, finding insufficient evidence of a predictable outcome. Thus, IN’774 was upheld as valid.

Infringement:The court’s analysis of infringement was central to the judgment. The plaintiffs argued that Erlocip contained Erlotinib Hydrochloride, infringing IN’774, and that Polymorph B was covered by the patent’s claims. Cipla contended that Erlocip was Polymorph B, distinct from IN’774’s mixture of Polymorphs A and B, and that the rejection of IN’507 permitted its manufacture.

Applying the Catnic approach, the court construed IN’774’s claims purposively to determine whether Polymorph B was intended to be covered. The court found that Roche’s separate patent applications for Polymorph B (US’221 and IN’507) indicated an intent to treat it as a distinct invention. US’221’s specification revealed that IN’774’s compound was a mixture of Polymorphs A and B, while Polymorph B was more stable and suitable for tablets. The court noted Roche’s failure to disclose US’221 or IN’507 in the suit, suggesting non-disclosure of Polymorph B’s relevance.

The court emphasized that the plaintiffs bore the onus to prove infringement by showing that Polymorph B was subsumed within IN’774’s claims. However, Roche provided no positive evidence to clarify the role of reactants in US’221 or demonstrate that Polymorph B’s properties were inconsequential. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Dr. Thatcher’s testimony, finding it insufficient to address how reactants affected the compound’s stability or dosage.

Cipla’s evidence, particularly Ms. Shashikala’s XRD analysis (Ex. DW2/3-4), confirmed that both Tarceva and Erlocip were Polymorph B, aligning with US’221’s specifications. The court found that Roche’s non-denial of marketing Polymorph B and failure to clinically examine Erlocip undermined their case. The rejection of IN’507 under Section 3(d) further supported Cipla’s position, as Polymorph B was not patented in India.

The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ “fiction” argument under Section 3(d), which considers polymorphs as the same substance unless differing in efficacy. The court held that Section 3(d) creates a limited consideration for patentability, not a deeming fiction for infringement purposes. Extending the fiction beyond Section 3(d)’s scope was impermissible, and the plaintiffs’ failure to prove infringement independently was fatal.

Effect of US’221: The court found that Cipla discharged its onus to prove that US’221 indicated IN’774’s compound was a mixture of Polymorphs A and B, requiring conversion to Polymorph B for stability. The court relied on US’221’s specification and Cipla’s XRD evidence, noting that Roche’s separate patent applications for Polymorph B contradicted their claim that it was covered by IN’774. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that US’221 only taught conversion, not separation, finding that the need for additional steps to achieve Polymorph B distinguished it from IN’774.

Injunction and Relief:Given the finding of non-infringement, the court held that Roche was not entitled to a permanent injunction or damages. The plaintiffs’ prayer focused on Tarceva, which was Polymorph B, not strictly IN’774’s compound, further weakening their case.

Public Interest: The court briefly addressed public interest, noting Cipla’s argument about Erlocip’s affordability (₹1,600 vs. ₹4,800 for Tarceva). However, since non-infringement was established, public interest did not influence the outcome.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court dismissed both the suit (CS(OS) No. 89/2008) and Cipla’s counterclaim (C.C. No. 52/2008). The court held that Cipla’s Erlocip did not infringe IN’774, as it was Polymorph B, not covered by the patent’s claims. The court upheld IN’774’s validity, finding that Cipla failed to prove obviousness or grounds for revocation. No costs were awarded.

Law Settled in This Case:

This case clarified several aspects of Indian patent law: Purposive Claim Construction: The Catnic approach applies to chemical patents, requiring courts to interpret claims to determine the inventor’s intent, especially when variants like polymorphs are involved.

Section 3(d) Interpretation: The explanation to Section 3(d) considers polymorphs as the same substance for patentability unless they significantly differ in efficacy, but this does not create a deeming fiction for infringement purposes.

Burden of Proof in Infringement: Plaintiffs must provide positive evidence to prove that a defendant’s product falls within the patent’s claims, particularly when variants are involved. Non-disclosure of relevant patents (e.g., US’221) can weaken the plaintiff’s case.

Polymorphic Forms: Separate patent applications for polymorphic forms suggest an intent to treat them as distinct inventions, impacting infringement analysis.

Public Documents: Courts can consider public documents like patent specifications despite procedural objections, as per Sudhir Engineering.

Case Title: F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Cipla Ltd.

Date of Order: September 7, 2012

Case No.: CS(OS) No. 89/2008

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manmohan Singh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi