Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva Vs. Skyways Air Services Pvt. Ltd.

Introduction: The case of Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva v. Skyways Air Services Pvt. Ltd. [CM(M) 147/2024, Delhi High Court] is a significant ruling by the Delhi High Court that addresses the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), particularly the requirement for a plaint to disclose a cause of action to survive rejection. The petitioner challenged the trial court’s dismissal of his application to reject the respondent’s plaint, arguing that it lacked sufficient details to constitute a valid cause of action. The High Court’s decision clarifies the principles governing the rejection of a plaint, emphasizing that both the averments in the plaint and accompanying documents must be considered to determine the existence of a cause of action. This case study provides a detailed analysis of the factual and procedural background, issues, submissions, judicial reasoning, cited judgments, and the law settled, offering insights into the procedural safeguards against frivolous litigation under the CPC.

Detailed Factual Background:  The dispute originates from a commercial suit (CS (Comm.) No. 886/2020) filed by the respondent, Skyways Air Services Pvt. Ltd., against the petitioner, Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva, before the District Judge, Commercial Court-03, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. The respondent sought recovery of Rs. 21,28,478, comprising Rs. 18,03,795 as principal and Rs. 3,24,683 as interest, alleging that the petitioner availed logistic services to transport goods to foreign destinations via air but failed to pay the outstanding amount. The respondent claimed that the petitioner booked consignments through their services, which involved coordination with airlines, but defaulted on payments, leading to the financial claim.

The petitioner contested the suit by filing a written statement, raising preliminary objections, including that the plaint was vague, ambiguous, and lacked material particulars, thereby failing to disclose a valid cause of action. On October 12, 2023, the petitioner filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-disclosure of a cause of action. The trial court dismissed this application with costs of Rs. 5,000, holding that the plaint sufficiently elaborated the cause of action, which involved mixed questions of law and fact requiring adjudication. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court, challenging the trial court’s order.

Detailed Procedural Background: The procedural history began with the respondent’s filing of the commercial suit in 2020. The petitioner responded with a written statement, contesting the claim and raising legal objections, including the lack of a valid cause of action due to insufficient details in the plaint. On October 12, 2023, the petitioner escalated this objection by filing an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint. The trial court, on the same date, dismissed the application, finding that the plaint’s averments, particularly the cause of action paragraph, were sufficient to proceed with the suit. The trial court reasoned that the cause of action involved mixed questions of law and fact, necessitating a full trial.Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court under Article 227, filing CM(M) 147/2024 along with an application for stay (CM APPL. 4557/2024). 

Issues Involved in the Case: The primary issue was whether the respondent’s plaint disclosed a valid cause of action under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC, warranting its continuation or rejection?Whether the plaint’s lack of specific details about the goods, airlines, freight charges, taxes, and service charges rendered it deficient in disclosing a cause of action?Whether the trial court erred in considering the cause of action as a mixed question of law and fact, contrary to the principle that only the plaint’s averments are relevant under Order 7 Rule 11?Whether documents filed with the plaint, such as ledger accounts and airway bills, could be considered to determine the existence of a cause of action?Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application was legally sustainable or warranted interference under Article 227?

Petitioner's submission: The petitioner  argued that the respondent’s plaint was fatally deficient, lacking specific details about the goods booked, their quantity, dispatch dates, airlines used, freight charges, taxes, and the respondent’s service charges. They contended that the plaint merely stated the total amount per consignment without explaining how these amounts were calculated, rendering it vague and ambiguous. The petitioner asserted that this omission failed to disclose a valid cause of action, justifying rejection under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC. 

They criticized the trial court’s finding that the cause of action was sufficiently elaborated, arguing that the court’s reliance on mixed questions of law and fact was contrary to settled law, which restricts the inquiry to the plaint’s averments, excluding evidence, documents, or the written statement. The petitioner cited several Supreme Court and High Court judgments, including Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasana Singh [(2020) 16 SCC 601], and Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 207], to emphasize that a plaint must contain all essential facts to establish a right to sue, and any deficiency warrants rejection. They urged the High Court to set aside the trial court’s order as a misinterpretation of law.

Respondent's submission: The respondent countered that the plaint, read with the accompanying documents, adequately disclosed a cause of action. They argued that the plaint summarized the facts of the petitioner’s use of their logistic services and non-payment, while detailed documents—ledger accounts, sub-agency collection reports, airway bills, customer instructions, and billing reports (spanning 200 pages)—provided specifics on consignments, destinations, and charges. The respondent accused the petitioner of deliberately omitting these documents from the High Court record to mislead the court. They contended that under Order 7 Rule 11, the court must consider both the plaint’s averments and filed documents, as established by the Supreme Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success & Another [(2004) 9 SCC 512]. The respondent asserted that the trial court rightly dismissed the application, as the combined reading of the plaint and documents established a triable cause of action. They urged the High Court to uphold the trial court’s order and dismiss the petition.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations: The Delhi High Court relied on several precedents to resolve the issue, with the petitioner and the court citing key Supreme Court and High Court decisions to clarify the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 and the concept of cause of action.

Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557:  Cited by the petitioner, this Supreme Court decision holds that for an application under Order 7 Rule 11, only the plaint’s averments are relevant, and the defendant’s pleas in the written statement are immaterial. The Court emphasized that if the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, it should be rejected to prevent frivolous litigation. The Delhi High Court acknowledged this principle but noted that the petitioner’s reliance was incomplete, as subsequent rulings expanded the scope to include documents filed with the plaint.

Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasana Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 601: The petitioner cited this case, where the Supreme Court reiterated that a plaint must disclose a cause of action through clear averments, and clever drafting cannot create an illusion of a cause of action. The Delhi High Court accepted this proposition but found it inapplicable, as the respondent’s plaint, supported by documents, was not a case of clever drafting but a genuine claim.

Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 207: Cited by both the petitioner and the Court, this Supreme Court decision provides a comprehensive definition of “cause of action” as a bundle of facts that the plaintiff must prove to succeed, including the defendant’s act causing the infraction. The Court quoted extensively from this judgment to explain that a cause of action encompasses all essential facts necessary for a judgment, distinguishing it from evidence. The Delhi High Court applied this definition, finding that the respondent’s averments and documents collectively disclosed a cause of action.

Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 294: Cited by the petitioner, this Supreme Court case defines cause of action as the facts necessary to establish a right to sue, including both the infraction and the right itself. The Delhi High Court referenced this in conjunction with Om Prakash Srivastava to affirm the broad and narrow senses of cause of action, supporting its conclusion that the respondent’s plaint met this standard.

Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, (2006) 3 SCC 100: The petitioner relied on this Supreme Court decision, which holds that a plaint lacking a cause of action should be rejected at the threshold to avoid vexatious litigation. The Delhi High Court agreed with the principle but found it inapplicable, as the respondent’s plaint was not vexatious.

Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510: Cited by the petitioner, this Supreme Court case emphasizes that the court must read the plaint as a whole to determine if it discloses a cause of action, ignoring the defendant’s defenses. The Delhi High Court adhered to this approach, reading the respondent’s plaint with its documents to find a valid cause of action.

H.D. Vashishta v. Glaxo Laboratories, AIR 1979 SC 134: The petitioner cited this Supreme Court decision, which supports the rejection of a plaint if it fails to disclose a right to sue. The Delhi High Court acknowledged this but found it irrelevant, as the respondent’s plaint and documents established a right to sue.

Hari Gokal Jewellers v. Satish Kapoor, 2006 (88) DRJ 837 (Delhi) (DB): Cited by the petitioner, this Delhi High Court decision reinforces that only the plaint’s averments are considered under Order 7 Rule 11. The Court noted that subsequent rulings, like Liverpool, expanded this to include documents, limiting this case’s applicability.

A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, 1989 (2) JT (SC) 38: The petitioner relied on this Supreme Court case, which holds that a plaint must clearly state facts constituting a cause of action. The Delhi High Court found this consistent with its analysis, as the respondent’s documents supplemented the plaint’s averments.

Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174: Cited by the Court, this Supreme Court decision reiterates that a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if it is vexatious or lacks a cause of action, but the power must be exercised cautiously. The Court must read the plaint holistically, ignoring the written statement. The Delhi High Court applied this to affirm that the respondent’s plaint was not vexatious.

Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success & Another, (2004) 9 SCC 512: Cited by the respondent and the Court, this Supreme Court decision is pivotal, holding that documents filed with the plaint under Order 7 Rule 14 must be considered to determine a cause of action. A plaint should not be rejected if the averments or documents disclose a triable claim, even if the facts require proof. The Delhi High Court relied heavily on this to reject the petitioner’s argument that only the plaint’s averments matter.

Pfizer Enterprises & Anr. v. Dr. H.R. Manchanda & Anr., CS (OS) 641/2007 (Delhi High Court): Cited by the Court, this Delhi High Court decision, relying on Liverpool, holds that the court must examine the plaint and accompanying documents to assess a cause of action. A meaningful reading of the plaint is required to prevent rejection based on formal deficiencies. This supported the Court’s conclusion that the respondent’s documents cured any deficiencies in the plaint.

Inspiration Clothes & U v. Colby International Limited, 88 (2000) DLT 769 (DB): Cited by the Court, this Delhi High Court decision distinguishes cases where the plaint facially lacks a cause of action from those where documents disclose one. The Court held that documents filed with the plaint can be considered to ascertain a cause of action, reinforcing the respondent’s position.

Sopan Sukhdeo v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137: Referenced in Pfizer Enterprises, this Supreme Court decision emphasizes a meaningful, not formal, reading of the plaint to determine a cause of action. The Delhi High Court indirectly applied this through Pfizer to adopt a holistic approach.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:  Justice Ravinder Dudeja’s reasoning focused on the legal framework of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the definition of cause of action, and the role of documents in assessing a plaint’s sufficiency. The Court’s analysis can be summarized as follows:

Definition of Cause of Action: The Court adopted the Supreme Court’s exposition in Om Prakash Srivastava, defining cause of action as a bundle of facts the plaintiff must prove to succeed, including the defendant’s act causing the infraction. The respondent’s plaint alleged the petitioner’s use of logistic services and non-payment, which, though lacking detailed specifics, constituted a prima facie cause of action when read with the documents.

Scope of Order 7 Rule 11: The Court reiterated that Order 7 Rule 11 empowers rejection of a plaint for non-disclosure of a cause of action, but this power is drastic and must be exercised cautiously, as per Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy. The plaint must be read holistically, and rejection is warranted only if the suit is manifestly vexatious or lacks any right to sue.

Consideration of Documents: The Court’s pivotal finding, based on Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd., was that documents filed under Order 7 Rule 14 are integral to assessing a cause of action. The respondent’s ledger accounts, airway bills, and billing reports provided details on consignments, charges, and taxes, curing the plaint’s lack of specificity. The petitioner’s contention that only the plaint’s averments matter was rejected in light of Liverpool, Pfizer Enterprises, and Inspiration Clothes.

Trial Court’s Reasoning: The Court found no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application. The trial court’s reference to mixed questions of law and fact, while arguably imprecise, did not vitiate its conclusion that the plaint disclosed a cause of action. The High Court clarified that the trial court’s reliance on the plaint’s averments was supplemented by the documents, aligning with judicial precedents. Petitioner’s Arguments: The Court dismissed the petitioner’s reliance on cases like Saleem Bhai and Raghwendra Sharan Singh, noting that while they emphasize the plaint’s averments, subsequent rulings like Liverpool expanded the scope to include documents. The petitioner’s failure to dispute the documents’ existence on the trial court record weakened their case. Threshold for Rejection: The Court emphasized that the phrase “does not disclose a cause of action” is narrowly construed, and rejection is an exceptional remedy. The respondent’s plaint, supported by 200 pages of documents, presented an arguable case, precluding rejection under Order 7 Rule 11.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition (CM(M) 147/2024) and the accompanying stay application (CM APPL. 4557/2024), finding no merit in the challenge to the trial court’s order dated October 12, 2023. The Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, confirming that the respondent’s plaint, read with its documents, disclosed a valid cause of action. No costs were awarded.

Law Settled in the Case:  The case clarified several principles under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC: Holistic Reading of Plaint: A plaint must be read as a whole, including documents filed under Order 7 Rule 14, to determine if it discloses a cause of action. Role of Documents: Documents accompanying the plaint are integral to assessing a cause of action, and a plaint should not be rejected if these documents cure deficiencies in the averments. Narrow Construction of Non-Disclosure: The ground of non-disclosure of a cause of action is narrowly construed, and rejection is warranted only in exceptional cases where the plaint is manifestly vexatious or lacks any right to sue.Cautious Exercise of Power: The power to reject a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is drastic and must be exercised cautiously, ensuring that arguable cases proceed to trial.Irrelevance of Defendant’s Pleas: The defendant’s written statement or defenses are irrelevant when deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11, focusing solely on the plaint and its documents.

Case Title: Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva Vs. Skyways Air Services Pvt. Ltd.:Date of Order: May 8, 2025:Case No.: CM(M) 147/2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3427:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ravinder Dudeja, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Parshottam Kumar Vs Hafiz Mohd Sami

Maintainability of Appeals during pendency of Reviews Petition

Introduction: This case is a significant decision by the Delhi High Court that addresses the interplay between the right to file a review petition and an appeal under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The case clarifies the legal position regarding the maintainability of an appeal when a review petition has been filed and subsequently dismissed, emphasizing the conditions under which a court retains jurisdiction to hear a review petition. The Delhi High Court, relying on authoritative Supreme Court precedents, resolved the petitioner’s challenge to an appellate court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal after the dismissal of a review petition. This case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the factual and procedural background, issues, submissions, judicial reasoning, cited judgments, and the law settled, offering insights into the procedural nuances of review and appellate jurisdiction under the CPC.

Detailed Factual Background:The case arises from a dispute where the respondent challenged an order dated February 20, 2013, by filing a review petition on April 2, 2013. On the date of filing the review petition, no appeal had been preferred against the impugned order. Subsequently, the respondent filed an appeal, and the review petition was dismissed by the court that passed the original order. The petitioner, aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision to entertain the appeal, filed a petition (CM(M) 130/2017) before the Delhi High Court, contending that the filing of a review petition barred the respondent from maintaining an appeal against the same order. The petitioner argued that Order 47 Rule 1 CPC prohibits an appeal once a review petition is filed, as the review petition constitutes an election of remedy. The respondent, however, maintained that the dismissal of the review petition restored their right to pursue an appeal, and no provision in the CPC explicitly barred such an appeal. The factual details of the underlying dispute (e.g., the nature of the original suit or the parties’ identities) are not specified in the judgment, as the case focuses solely on the procedural question of maintainability.

Detailed Procedural Background:The procedural history begins with the impugned order dated February 20, 2013, passed by a lower court. The respondent, seeking to challenge this order, filed a review petition on April 2, 2013, under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, alleging grounds such as an error apparent on the face of the record or new evidence. At the time of filing the review petition, no appeal had been preferred, satisfying the condition under Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) CPC. Subsequently, the respondent filed an appeal against the same order, and the review petition was dismissed by the original court. The appellate court, where the respondent’s appeal was pending, proceeded to hear the appeal, prompting the petitioner to file a petition (CM(M) 130/2017) before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner sought to quash the appellate proceedings, arguing that the filing of the review petition precluded the respondent from pursuing an appeal. The Delhi High Court heard arguments from both parties and delivered its judgment on February 1, 2017, addressing the legal question of whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Issues Involved in the Case:The primary issue was whether the filing of a review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC bars a party from subsequently filing an appeal against the same decree or order after the review petition is dismissed. 

Subsidiary issues included:The interpretation of Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) CPC, which allows a review petition from a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but no appeal has been preferred.The effect of filing an appeal after a review petition on the jurisdiction of the court hearing the review.The impact of the dismissal of a review petition on the maintainability of a subsequently filed appeal.Whether the appellate court’s decision to hear the appeal violated the principles governing review and appellate jurisdiction.

Petitioner's submission: The petitioner argued that Order 47 Rule 1 CPC imposes a restriction on filing an appeal once a review petition is preferred against a decree or order. They contended that the respondent, having elected to file a review petition on April 2, 2013, was barred from subsequently filing an appeal, as this would constitute pursuing two inconsistent remedies. The petitioner relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rekha Mukherjee v. Ashish Kumar Das & Ors. [(2005) 3 SCC 427], arguing that an appeal filed during the pendency of a review petition is not maintainable. They asserted that the respondent’s appeal was incompetent because the review petition, even though dismissed, exhausted the respondent’s right to challenge the order through an appeal. The petitioner urged the court to set aside the appellate proceedings, claiming that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in light of the prior review petition.

Respondent's submission: The respondent countered that the dismissal of the review petition restored their right to file an appeal, as no provision in the CPC explicitly prohibits an appeal after a review petition is rejected. They argued that Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) only requires that no appeal be filed at the time the review petition is lodged, a condition they satisfied when filing the review on April 2, 2013. The respondent relied on Supreme Court precedents, including Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1964 SC 1372] and Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. [(2000) 6 SCC 359], to assert that the court hearing a review petition retains jurisdiction to dispose of it on merits, even if an appeal is filed subsequently, provided the appeal is not disposed of first. Since their review petition was dismissed and the appeal was still pending, the respondent contended that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. They urged the court to dismiss the petitioner’s petition, arguing that the appellate proceedings were lawful.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations: The Delhi High Court relied on three Supreme Court judgments to resolve the issue, each addressing the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and the relationship between review and appellate jurisdiction.

Rekha Mukherjee v. Ashish Kumar Das & Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 427:The petitioner heavily relied on this case, where the Supreme Court held that an appeal filed during the pendency of a review petition is not maintainable under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Rekha Mukherjee, the respondents filed a review petition against a decree dismissing their suit for specific performance. During the review’s pendency, they filed an appeal, which the Supreme Court deemed incompetent because the review petition was still pending. The Court clarified that if a review is granted, the original decree is modified or ceases to exist, rendering an appeal against it infructuous. However, if the review is rejected, the original decree remains intact, and an appeal may be filed, subject to the appeal’s merits. The Delhi High Court distinguished this case, noting that in the present matter, the review petition had been dismissed before the appellate court heard the appeal, thus removing any bar to the appeal’s maintainability.

Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1372:Cited by the respondent and extensively discussed by the Court, this three-judge bench decision clarified that the crucial date for determining compliance with Order 47 Rule 1(1) is the date the review petition is filed. If no appeal has been filed on that date, the review petition is maintainable, and the court can dispose of it on merits, even if an appeal is filed later. The jurisdiction of the review court ends only if the appeal is disposed of before the review petition is decided. In Thungabhadra, the Supreme Court allowed a review petition to proceed because no appeal was filed when the review was lodged, and the appeal’s subsequent filing did not oust the review court’s jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court applied this principle, noting that the respondent’s review petition was filed when no appeal existed, and its dismissal before the appeal’s disposal preserved the appellate court’s jurisdiction.

Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359:Also cited by the respondent, this three-judge bench decision reaffirmed Thungabhadra’s holding. In Kunhayammed, the Supreme Court addressed a review petition filed before a High Court, followed by a special leave petition (SLP) under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court held that the review petition’s maintainability depends on the absence of an appeal at the time of filing, and the review court can proceed unless the appeal is disposed of first. If a review is granted, the original decree merges into the reviewed decree, rendering an appeal against the original decree incompetent. The Delhi High Court found this precedent directly applicable, as the respondent’s review petition was dismissed, leaving the original order intact for the appeal.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:The Court focused on the statutory framework of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and the authoritative interpretations provided by the Supreme Court. The Court’s analysis can be distilled into the following key points:

Interpretation of Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a): The Court emphasized that Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a) allows a review petition from a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but no appeal has been preferred at the time of filing. The respondent satisfied this condition, as no appeal was filed on April 2, 2013, when the review petition was lodged. The subsequent filing of an appeal did not retroactively invalidate the review petition’s maintainability.

Jurisdiction of the Review Court: Relying on Thungabhadra and Kunhayammed, the Court held that a review court retains jurisdiction to dispose of a review petition on merits, even if an appeal is filed later, provided the appeal is not disposed of first. If the appeal is decided before the review, the review court’s jurisdiction ends. In this case, the review petition was dismissed before the appeal’s disposal, preserving the appellate court’s jurisdiction.

Effect of Review Dismissal: The Court clarified that the dismissal of a review petition leaves the original decree or order intact, allowing the party to pursue an appeal. Unlike a granted review, which modifies or replaces the original decree, a rejected review does not alter the decree’s status, making an appeal legally permissible. The petitioner’s reliance on Rekha Mukherjee was misplaced, as that case addressed an appeal filed during a pending review, not after its dismissal.

No Statutory Bar to Appeal: The Court found no provision in the CPC that bars an appeal after a review petition is filed and dismissed. The petitioner’s argument that the review petition constituted an election of remedy was rejected, as Order 47 Rule 1 does not impose such a restriction. The Court noted that the appellate court’s decision to hear the appeal was consistent with the legal position established by the Supreme Court.

Application to Facts: The Court applied these principles to the facts, noting that the respondent filed the review petition on April 2, 2013, when no appeal existed. The review’s dismissal and the subsequent appeal’s pendency did not violate Order 47 Rule 1. The appellate court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal was upheld, as the appeal was not disposed of before the review’s dismissal.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition (CM(M) 130/2017), finding no infirmity in the appellate court’s decision to hear the respondent’s appeal. The Court held that the filing of a review petition does not bar a subsequent appeal, especially after the review is dismissed, and the appellate court had jurisdiction to proceed. All pending applications were also dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Law Settled in the Case:  The case clarified several principles governing review and appellate jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC:

Maintainability of Review Petitions: A review petition is maintainable if no appeal has been filed at the time of its filing, as per Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a). The subsequent filing of an appeal does not invalidate the review petition.

Jurisdiction of Review Court: A court hearing a review petition retains jurisdiction to dispose of it on merits, even if an appeal is filed later, unless the appeal is disposed of first.

Effect of Review Dismissal: The dismissal of a review petition leaves the original decree or order intact, allowing the party to file an appeal without any statutory bar.

No Election of Remedy: Filing a review petition does not preclude a party from pursuing an appeal after the review’s dismissal, as Order 47 Rule 1 does not impose such a restriction.

Crucial Date for Compliance: The date of filing the review petition is determinative for assessing compliance with Order 47 Rule 1(1)(a), ensuring clarity in procedural rights.

Case Title: Parshottam Kumar Vs Hafiz Mohd Sami:Date of Order: February 1, 2017:Case No.: CM(M) 130/2017:Neutral Citation: 2017:DHC:627:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Hon'ble Judge: Jayant Nath, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

A.P. State Financial Corporation Vs. Gar Re-Rolling Mills

The doctrine of election  does not apply when proceedings differ in ambit and scope

Introduction:The doctrine of election is a fundamental principle in law that typically prevents a party from pursuing two inconsistent remedies for the same relief. However, its applicability becomes nuanced when statutory provisions explicitly provide for multiple remedies with differing scopes and objectives. The case of A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills & Another [(1994) 2 SCC 647] is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India that addresses the interplay between the doctrine of election and the remedies available under Sections 29 and 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (the Act). The Court examined whether a State Financial Corporation (SFC), after initiating proceedings under Section 31 and obtaining an order, could abandon those proceedings and invoke Section 29 to recover its dues without being barred by the doctrine of election. This case study explores the factual and procedural background, the issues involved, the submissions of the parties, the judicial reasoning, and the law settled, with a specific focus on the doctrine of election.

Detailed Factual Background:The case involves two consolidated civil appeals: Civil Appeal No. 3689 of 1987 (A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Kota Subba Reddy and Others) and Civil Appeal No. 3216 of 1988 (A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and Another). Both appeals arose from disputes between the Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation (the Corporation) and defaulting industrial concerns that had borrowed loans and failed to repay them.

In Civil Appeal No. 3689 of 1987, the respondent, Kota Subba Reddy, borrowed Rs 99,500 from the Corporation on December 27, 1966, to manufacture agricultural implements, securing the loan with a mortgage deed. The respondent defaulted on repayments, prompting the Corporation to file an application (O.P. No. 211 of 1969) under Section 31 of the Act before the District Judge, Guntur, seeking recovery of Rs 1,09,020.19 with interest. On September 7, 1971, the District Judge allowed the petition but reduced the future interest rate from 8.5% to 6%. The respondent appealed to the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which stayed execution on March 1, 1973, contingent on the respondent depositing one-fourth of the amount due and furnishing security. The respondent failed to comply, and on March 5, 1975, the High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the Corporation’s cross-objections, restoring the 8.5% interest rate. The Corporation also filed a suit (O.S. No. 13 of 1974) to enforce the personal liability of the respondent and his guarantor, which was decreed. However, the respondent evaded enforcement by relocating the business, rendering it untraceable. Consequently, the Corporation invoked Section 29, issuing a newspaper advertisement for the sale of the respondent’s concern and accepting a tender of Rs 2,05,000. The respondent challenged this action through Writ Petition No. 235 of 1982, alleging that the Corporation, having pursued Section 31, could not invoke Section 29.

In Civil Appeal No. 3216 of 1988, M/s Gar Re-Rolling Mills borrowed Rs 2,94,000 on November 10, 1970, for its re-rolling mills business, executing a mortgage deed. The respondent defaulted on repayments, leading the Corporation to issue a sale advertisement under Section 29. The respondent filed Writ Petition No. 4187 of 1980, challenging the Section 29 action, and obtained a stay. The High Court dismissed the petition on December 14, 1981, upholding the Corporation’s action. The Corporation accepted a tender from M/s Bhagchandka Brothers, who took possession of the property. The respondent appealed to a Division Bench, which, relying on the Full Bench decision in the Kota Subba Reddy case, held that the Corporation could not invoke Section 29 after pursuing Section 31.

Detailed Procedural Background:In Civil Appeal No. 3689 of 1987, the Corporation’s application under Section 31 resulted in an order on September 7, 1971, which the respondent challenged in the High Court. The High Court’s dismissal of the appeal and the respondent’s failure to comply with conditional stay orders led the Corporation to pursue alternative recovery measures. After failing to enforce the decree against the respondent’s personal liability due to the respondent’s relocation, the Corporation invoked Section 29. The respondent’s writ petition (No. 235 of 1982) was referred to a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court due to conflicting bench decisions on Section 29’s vires. The Full Bench, without addressing the vires, held that the Corporation could not invoke Section 29 after obtaining relief under Section 31, allowing the writ petition.

In Civil Appeal No. 3216 of 1988, the Corporation’s attempt to sell the respondent’s property under Section 29 was challenged in Writ Petition No. 4187 of 1980. The Single Judge dismissed the petition, affirming the Corporation’s right to proceed under Section 29. However, the Division Bench, following the Full Bench decision in the Kota Subba Reddy case, reversed the Single Judge’s order, prompting the Corporation to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court granted special leave in both cases to resolve the common legal question: whether the Corporation could invoke Section 29 after obtaining an order under Section 31 without executing it, particularly in the context of the doctrine of election.

Issues Involved in the Case: The primary issue was whether the doctrine of election barred the Corporation from invoking Section 29 of the Act to recover dues after initiating proceedings and obtaining an order under Section 31, which it subsequently abandoned.? 

Appellant (A.P. State Financial Corporation):The Corporation argued that the remedies under Sections 29 and 31 are distinct in scope and purpose, and the doctrine of election does not apply when remedies differ in ambit. Section 29 provides a self-contained mechanism for the Corporation to take over management or possession of a defaulting concern and sell its property without court intervention, making it a broader and more expeditious remedy. In contrast, Section 31 involves court-supervised reliefs, such as property attachment or management transfer, akin to execution proceedings. The phrase “without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29” in Section 31 explicitly preserves the Corporation’s right to invoke Section 29, even after pursuing Section 31, unless the Section 31 order is fully executed or the claim is rejected on merits. The Corporation contended that it could abandon Section 31 proceedings at any stage, including execution, if recovery seemed unlikely, and resort to Section 29 to protect its financial interests. It emphasized that simultaneous pursuit of both remedies was impermissible, but sequential pursuit was lawful, especially given the respondents’ dilatory tactics and failure to honor Section 31 orders. The Corporation cited Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd. [(1979) 1 SCC 193] to argue that Section 31 proceedings are not monetary claims but akin to attachment in execution, supporting its position that Section 29 remains available.

Respondents submission: The respondents argued that the doctrine of election applied, barring the Corporation from invoking Section 29 after choosing Section 31 and obtaining an order. They contended that both sections aim to recover dues, making them alternative remedies for the same relief. Once the Corporation elected to proceed under Section 31 and secured a court order, it was estopped from abandoning that remedy and invoking Section 29, as this would allow forum shopping and prejudice the respondents. The respondents relied on the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s Full Bench decision in the Kota Subba Reddy case, which held that pursuing Section 31 exhausted the Corporation’s right to invoke Section 29. They argued that the Corporation’s actions violated principles of fairness and equity, as it sought to bypass court orders under Section 31 to pursue a more aggressive remedy under Section 29. The respondents also challenged the Corporation’s abandonment of Section 31 proceedings as arbitrary, claiming it deprived them of the opportunity to contest the claims in a judicial forum.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations: The Supreme Court, in its judgment delivered by Dr. A.S. Anand J. (with Kuldip Singh J. concurring), extensively analyzed the interplay between Sections 29 and 31, the doctrine of election, and the cited precedent.

Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd., (1979) 1 SCC 193; AIR 1978 SC 1765: This case was relied upon by the Corporation and extensively discussed by the Court (Paras 10 and 14). In Natson, the Supreme Court held that an application under Section 31 is not a monetary claim but akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree. The Court in the present case reaffirmed this, noting that Section 31 proceedings involve court-supervised reliefs like property attachment or management transfer, which differ fundamentally from the self-executing, broad remedy under Section 29. The Natson ruling supported the Corporation’s argument that Section 31 does not exhaust its remedies, as it is not a substantive monetary claim, and Section 29 remains available.

Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1:This case was referenced in the document’s metadata (Pages 1–18) to affirm the copyright protection of the judgment’s text as published by the Eastern Book Company. It was not substantively discussed in the judgment but underscores the legal protection of the source material used in the SCC publication. The Court’s reliance on Natson was pivotal, as it clarified the distinct nature of Section 31 proceedings, undermining the respondents’ claim that Sections 29 and 31 are alternative remedies for the same relief, thus negating the doctrine of election’s applicability. Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: Dr. A.S. Anand J. delivered a comprehensive judgment, analyzing the statutory provisions, the doctrine of election, and equitable principles under Article 226. The Court’s reasoning can be distilled into the following key points: Distinct Scope of Sections 29 and 31: The Court meticulously examined Sections 29 and 31, concluding that they serve different purposes. Section 29 is a self-contained code, granting the Corporation expansive rights to take over management or possession of a defaulting concern and sell its property without court intervention. It is a broader remedy, encompassing both rights and enforcement procedures. Section 31, however, involves court-supervised reliefs, such as property attachment or management transfer, and is akin to execution proceedings rather than a monetary claim. The Court relied on Natson to affirm that Section 31 applications are not substantive monetary claims, reinforcing the distinction in scope (Paras 9–10, 14).  Interpretation of “Without Prejudice” Clause: The phrase “without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29” in Section 31 was central to the Court’s analysis. The Court interpreted this as a legislative intent to preserve the Corporation’s right to invoke Section 29, even after initiating Section 31 proceedings. This clause indicates that Section 31 is not intended to limit the Corporation’s remedies but to provide an additional, court-based option without extinguishing Section 29’s broader remedy. The Court held that the Corporation could abandon Section 31 proceedings at any stage, including execution, and resort to Section 29 if recovery under Section 31 proved impractical (Paras 12–13, 17).

Inapplicability of Doctrine of Election: The Court explicitly addressed the doctrine of election, holding that it does not apply when the remedies differ in ambit and scope. The doctrine typically applies when two remedies seek the same relief, allowing the party to elect one. However, since Sections 29 and 31 have distinct objectives—Section 29 being a direct, self-executing remedy and Section 31 involving court-supervised enforcement—the doctrine is inapplicable. The Court noted that applying the doctrine would lead to injustice, as it would bind the Corporation to a potentially ineffective remedy under Section 31, frustrating its ability to recover dues (Para 15).

Equitable Jurisdiction under Article 226:  The Court emphasized that equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 should promote honesty and good faith, not assist defaulting parties in evading legitimate claims. It held that there is no equity in favor of defaulting parties who fail to honor Section 31 orders, and courts should not interfere under Article 226 to frustrate the Corporation’s recovery efforts. The Court underscored that equity defends the law against crafty evasions, aligning with the Act’s purpose of enabling SFCs to recover dues efficiently to support industrialization (Para 18).

Limits on Simultaneous Pursuit:While affirming the Corporation’s right to switch remedies, the Court clarified that simultaneous pursuit of Sections 29 and 31 for the same relief is impermissible, as it would lead to inconsistent outcomes. Additionally, if a Section 31 claim is rejected on merits, the Corporation may be barred from invoking Section 29, depending on the case’s facts, to ensure fairness (Para 19).

Application to Facts: In Civil Appeal No. 3689 of 1987, the Court found that the respondent’s relocation frustrated the Corporation’s efforts to enforce the Section 31 order. The Corporation’s implicit abandonment of Section 31 proceedings and invocation of Section 29 were justified, as the respondent’s actions could not extinguish the Corporation’s recovery rights (Para 20). In Civil Appeal No. 3216 of 1988, the Court noted the respondent’s persistent delaying tactics and lack of intent to repay, upholding the Corporation’s Section 29 action as a legitimate response to the respondent’s non-compliance with Section 31 orders (Para 21).

Final Decision:The Supreme Court allowed both appeals, setting aside the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s judgments. In Civil Appeal No. 3689 of 1987, the Court overturned the Full Bench’s ruling, holding that the Corporation could invoke Section 29 after abandoning Section 31 proceedings. In Civil Appeal No. 3216 of 1988, the Court reversed the Division Bench’s decision, affirming the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition and upholding the Corporation’s Section 29 action. The Court awarded costs of Rs 5,000 in each appeal, emphasizing the respondents’ dilatory conduct.

Law Settled in the Case: The judgment settled several key legal principles in the context of the doctrine of election and the State Financial Corporations Act:

Non-Applicability of Doctrine of Election: The doctrine of election does not apply when remedies under a statute, such as Sections 29 and 31 of the Act, differ in scope and purpose. The Corporation can choose between these remedies or switch from Section 31 to Section 29 without being barred by election, provided it abandons the earlier proceedings.

Preservation of Section 29 Rights: The phrase “without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29” in Section 31 preserves the Corporation’s right to invoke Section 29, even after obtaining a Section 31 order, unless the order is fully executed or the claim is rejected on merits.

Sequential but Not Simultaneous Remedies: The Corporation cannot pursue Sections 29 and 31 simultaneously for the same relief, but it can abandon Section 31 proceedings at any stage and resort to Section 29 if recovery under Section 31 is impractical.

Equitable Principles: Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 should not assist defaulting parties in evading legitimate claims, as equity promotes honesty and prevents legal fraud. The Act’s purpose of enabling SFCs to recover dues for industrial financing must be upheld.

Limits on Remedy Switching: If a Section 31 claim is rejected on factual grounds, the Corporation’s ability to invoke Section 29 may be restricted, subject to the case’s specific circumstances.

Case Title: A.P. State Financial Corporation Vs. Gar Re-Rolling Mills and Another:Date of Order: February 10, 1994:Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 3216 of 1988:Citation: (1994) 2 SCC 647:Name of Court: Supreme Court of India:Name of Hon'ble Judges: Kuldip Singh and Dr. A.S. Anand, JJ.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Crystal Crop Protection Limited Vs Safex Chemicals India Limited

Introduction: The case of Crystal Crop Protection Limited vs Safex Chemicals India Limited and Others is a significant patent infringement dispute adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi. The plaintiff, Crystal Crop Protection Limited, sought to protect its registered patent for a weedicidal formulation, alleging that the defendants, Safex Chemicals India Limited and its associated entities, infringed the patent by manufacturing and selling products with identical compositions. The dispute centered on an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which was ultimately dismissed by the court. This case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the factual and procedural background, the issues involved, the submissions of the parties, the judicial reasoning, and the final decision, along with the legal principles established.

Detailed Factual Background: Crystal Crop Protection Limited, a prominent Indian company engaged in the manufacture and sale of agrochemicals, including pesticides, insecticides, weedicides, and herbicides, claimed ownership of patent no. 417213, titled "Weedicidal Formulation and Method of Manufacture thereof." The patent, filed on March 9, 2010, and granted on January 9, 2023, pertains to a novel composition comprising Clodinafop-Propargyl 9% and Metribuzin 20% in a ratio of 1:2.2, combined with a surfactant, a dyeing agent or pigment, and a safener. This formulation was designed to enhance weed control in wheat crops, reduce phytotoxicity, and improve crop yield, with the dyeing agent or pigment ensuring visible application for effective use. The plaintiff markets this patented product under the trademark "ACM-9" and has achieved significant commercial success, with annual sales exceeding Rs. 2,400 Crores in the financial year 2022-2023.

In January 2024, the plaintiff discovered that Safex Chemicals India Limited (defendant no. 1) was manufacturing and selling a product named "RACER," which, upon laboratory testing, was found to contain Clodinafop-Propargyl 9%, Metribuzin 20%, and a safener, identical to the plaintiff’s patented formulation. Further investigation revealed that Indo Swiss Chemicals Limited (defendant no. 2) and Smith N Smith Chemicals Limited (defendant no. 3), entities associated with Safex Chemicals, were also offering products named "Trophy" and "Jodi No.1," respectively, with the same composition. The plaintiff alleged that these products infringed its patent and sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from manufacturing, selling, or marketing these products.

The suit patent faced legal challenges, including four pre-grant oppositions, all of which were dismissed by the Controller of Patents. Two writ petitions challenging the patent’s grant were also resolved: one was withdrawn, and the other was dismissed on January 8, 2024. A post-grant opposition by the Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers Association was pending but did not affect the patent’s validity or the plaintiff’s enforcement rights.

Detailed Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed the suit (CS(COMM) 196/2024) along with an interim injunction application (I.A. 5255/2024) under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking to restrain the defendants from infringing the suit patent. On March 12, 2024, the predecessor bench issued summons in the suit and notice in the interim injunction application. The court directed the defendants to disclose their product’s composition in their reply and ordered the plaintiff to file an affidavit clarifying the functional role of the dyeing agent or pigment in the suit patent, specifically addressing whether its absence in the defendants’ products would constitute infringement of Claim 1.

The defendants filed their reply to the interim injunction application on July 29, 2024. The court heard arguments on November 28, 2024, January 23, 2025, February 27, 2025, and March 24, 2025, when the judgment was reserved. Both parties submitted written arguments, expert reports, affidavits, and scientific journals to support their claims. The defendants also filed a counterclaim (CC(COMM) 28/2024) seeking revocation of the suit patent, challenging its validity on grounds of lack of novelty and inventive step. The court, however, focused primarily on the interim injunction application and the issue of infringement at this stage.

Issues Involved in the Case:  The primary issues before the court were:

Whether the defendants’ products ("RACER," "Trophy," and "Jodi No.1") infringed the plaintiff’s suit patent by replicating its claimed composition?Whether the absence of a dyeing agent or pigment in the defendants’ products constituted non-infringement, given its inclusion as an essential element in the suit patent’s claims?

Plaintiff’s Submissions: The plaintiff argued that its suit patent was valid, having overcome pre-grant oppositions and writ petitions, and was commercially successful under the "ACM-9" brand. The defendants’ products, containing Clodinafop-Propargyl 9%, Metribuzin 20%, and a safener, were identical to the patented formulation, constituting clear infringement. The plaintiff emphasized that the dyeing agent or pigment, described as an adjuvant, was not essential to the invention’s core function of weed control. In its affidavit, the plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Satish Kumar Chalna, stated that the dyeing agent or pigment merely enhanced visibility during application and did not materially affect the formulation’s efficacy. The plaintiff contended that, under the Doctrine of Equivalents, the defendants’ products infringed the suit patent by performing substantially the same function, even if the dyeing agent was absent.

The plaintiff relied on three judgments to support its case:  Sotefin SA v. Indraprastha Cancer Society & Research Center: The plaintiff cited this case to argue that infringement could be established under the Doctrine of Equivalents if the defendants’ products included most essential elements of the patented invention, even if minor elements were omitted.  UPL Limited v. Pradeep Sharma: The plaintiff referenced this case to assert that the absence of a non-essential component (like the dyeing agent) did not preclude a finding of infringement, as long as the core function of the invention was replicated.  SNPC Machines (P) Ltd. v. Vishal Choudhary: The plaintiff used this case to argue that the pith and marrow of the invention—effective weed control—was achieved by the defendants’ products, regardless of the dyeing agent’s absence.

Defendants’ Submissions: The defendants argued that their products did not infringe the suit patent because they lacked the dyeing agent or pigment, an essential element explicitly claimed in the patent. They contended that the dyeing agent was critical to the invention’s objective of ensuring visible application, as highlighted in the patent’s complete specification. The defendants’ expert evidence supported their claim that the absence of the dyeing agent fundamentally altered the composition, rendering it non-infringing. They further argued that the plaintiff’s reliance on the Doctrine of Equivalents was misplaced, as the dyeing agent was not a trivial or substitutable component but a deliberate inclusion to address a specific problem in prior art.

The defendants also challenged the validity of the suit patent in their counterclaim, alleging lack of novelty and inventive step. However, they emphasized that the court should focus on non-infringement at the interim stage, as the absence of the dyeing agent was sufficient to dismiss the injunction application. The defendants asserted that granting an injunction would cause them irreparable harm, while the plaintiff could be compensated through damages if it succeeded at trial.

The plaintiff relied on the following judgments, which the court analyzed in the context of the present case:

Sotefin SA v. Indraprastha Cancer Society & Research Center (2022 SCC OnLine Del 4299): In this case, the defendant’s product included 17 out of 19 elements of the plaintiff’s patent claim. The court, relying on a report from independent scientific advisors, applied the Doctrine of Equivalents and found infringement because the omitted elements were not essential to the invention’s central purpose. The court in the present case distinguished Sotefin, noting that the dyeing agent or pigment was an essential element of the suit patent, explicitly claimed and tied to the invention’s objective of visible application. Additionally, unlike Sotefin, no independent scientific advisor’s report was available in this case.

UPL Limited v. Pradeep Sharma (2020 SCC OnLine Del 1770): This case involved an agrochemical formulation where the defendant’s product lacked a stabilizer. The court held that the stabilizer was not essential, as its absence did not affect the formulation’s core function. The court in the present case distinguished UPL, observing that the dyeing agent or pigment performed a specific function in the suit patent, addressing a problem identified in prior art (ensuring visible application). Its absence materially affected the invention’s objectives, making UPL inapplicable.

SNPC Machines (P) Ltd. v. Vishal Choudhary (2022 SCC OnLine Del 1746): In this case, the court found infringement because the defendant’s mobile brick-making machine achieved the same core function (mobile brick laying) as the plaintiff’s patented invention, despite lacking an in-built mobility mechanism. The court in the present case distinguished SNPC, noting that the absence of the dyeing agent or pigment prevented the defendants’ products from fully achieving the suit patent’s intended function, particularly the visibility aspect critical to effective application.  The court’s analysis of these judgments underscored that the essentiality of the dyeing agent or pigment was a key factor distinguishing the present case from the cited precedents.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The Court’s reasoning focused on the interim injunction application, emphasizing a prima facie assessment of infringement, the balance of convenience, and the potential for irreparable injury. The court adopted the following approach:

The court first examined the composition of the suit patent, which explicitly included Clodinafop-Propargyl 9%, Metribuzin 20%, a surfactant, a dyeing agent or pigment, and a safener. The defendants’ products ("RACER," "Trophy," and "Jodi No.1") contained all elements except the dyeing agent or pigment. The plaintiff argued that the dyeing agent was a non-essential adjuvant, citing its expert’s affidavit, which described it as enhancing visibility without materially affecting weed control efficacy. The defendants countered that the dyeing agent was essential, as it was explicitly claimed and addressed a specific problem (visible application) identified in the patent’s complete specification.

The court analyzed the role of the dyeing agent or pigment, noting that the plaintiff’s own submissions highlighted its advantages, such as ensuring effective application by making the formulation visible on crops. The court referenced the Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s definition of an adjuvant as an ingredient that modifies the action of principal ingredients. While adjuvants are not principal ingredients, the court found that the dyeing agent played a crucial role in achieving the invention’s objectives, as outlined in the patent specification. This distinguished the present case from precedents like UPL, where the omitted component (stabilizer) was non-essential.

The court applied the Doctrine of Equivalents but concluded that the absence of the dyeing agent was not a trivial variation. Unlike Sotefin, where omitted elements were deemed non-essential by scientific advisors, the dyeing agent’s role in the suit patent was integral to its claimed advantages. Similarly, unlike SNPC, where the core function was achieved despite a variation, the absence of the dyeing agent undermined the suit patent’s objective of visible application. The court emphasized that determining the essentiality of the dyeing agent required a full trial, as both parties had submitted conflicting expert reports and scientific journals.

On the validity of the suit patent, the court declined to delve into the defendants’ counterclaim at the interim stage, given its finding of non-infringement. The court noted that patent validity, involving complex issues of novelty and inventive step, should be tested at trial. The court’s prima facie view was that the defendants’ products did not infringe the suit patent due to the absence of the dyeing agent, and material questions raised by the defendants warranted a full trial.

The court assessed the balance of convenience, finding it in favor of the defendants. Granting an injunction would cause undue hardship to the defendants by halting their business operations, while the plaintiff could be compensated through damages if it succeeded at trial. The court also considered the potential for irreparable injury, concluding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that monetary compensation would be inadequate.

Final Decision:  The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction (I.A. 5255/2024) on May 7, 2025. However, it directed the defendants to maintain complete accounts of the manufacture and sale of the impugned products ("RACER," "Trophy," and "Jodi No.1") and file half-yearly statements of accounts. The court clarified that its observations were solely for the purpose of deciding the interim application and would not affect the final outcome of the suit or counterclaim. The suit, counterclaim, and other pending applications were listed before the Joint Registrar on July 30, 2025.

Law Settled in this Case:  This case reinforces several key principles in patent law, particularly in the context of interim injunctions:

Essentiality of Claimed Elements: In patent infringement disputes, the court must assess whether all elements of the patent’s claims are present in the allegedly infringing product. If an explicitly claimed element is absent, the court will evaluate its essentiality to determine infringement.

Doctrine of Equivalents: The Doctrine of Equivalents applies only when omitted elements are non-essential or perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way. If an omitted element is integral to the invention’s objectives, infringement cannot be established.

Case Title: Crystal Crop Protection Limited Vs Safex Chemicals India Limited:Date of Order:May 7, 2025:Case No.CS(COMM) 196/2024:Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:3382:Name of Court:High Court of Delhi:Name of Hon'ble Judge:Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Aloys Wobben Vs Yogesh Mehra

Introduction:The case of Dr. Aloys Wobben and Another vs. Yogesh Mehra and Others is a landmark judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India on June 2, 2014. It addresses critical issues in patent law, particularly concerning the interplay between revocation petitions filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and counter-claims for revocation filed in response to patent infringement suits before a High Court. The case delves into the interpretation of Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970, and the procedural propriety of pursuing multiple remedies simultaneously to challenge the validity of a patent. The judgment clarifies the legal position on whether a party can pursue both a revocation petition and a counter-claim concurrently and establishes principles to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, thereby ensuring judicial efficiency and fairness.

Detailed Factual Background:Dr. Aloys Wobben, a scientist-engineer and the first appellant, is renowned for his contributions to wind turbine generators and wind energy converters. He holds approximately 2,700 patents across more than 60 countries, including about 100 in India. Wobben Properties GmbH, the second appellant, acquired the rights to Dr. Wobben’s Indian patents and designs through an assignment agreement dated January 5, 2012. Dr. Wobben is also involved in manufacturing wind turbines through Enercon GmbH, a company among the top three global manufacturers in this field, operating in 27 countries with over 8,000 employees.

In India, Dr. Wobben conducted his manufacturing operations through a joint venture with Yogesh Mehra and Ajay Mehra (respondents nos. 1 and 2), forming Enercon India Limited (respondent no. 3), later renamed Wind World (India) Limited. Established in 1994, this joint venture operated under intellectual property license agreements granted by Dr. Wobben, with the last agreement executed on September 29, 2006, superseding prior agreements from 1994 and 2000. Enercon GmbH terminated this agreement on December 8, 2008, citing non-fulfillment of obligations by Enercon India Limited.

Despite the termination, the respondents continued to use Dr. Wobben’s patented technology, prompting allegations of unauthorized exploitation of intellectual property. In response, Enercon India Limited filed 19 revocation petitions in January 2009 before the IPAB under Section 64(1) of the Patents Act, seeking to revoke Dr. Wobben’s patents. Subsequently, Dr. Wobben initiated multiple patent infringement suits against the respondents, starting with the first suit on July 27, 2009, followed by additional suits filed between October 2009 and July 2010. In response to these suits, the respondents filed counter-claims seeking revocation of the same patents, and later filed four additional revocation petitions before the IPAB in 2010 and 2011.

The simultaneous pursuit of revocation petitions and counter-claims led to a complex legal dispute, with some revocation petitions being resolved by the IPAB while others remained pending. The respondents’ actions raised questions about the permissibility of pursuing multiple remedies for the same purpose, the jurisdiction of the IPAB versus the High Court, and the procedural propriety of such parallel proceedings.

Detailed Procedural Background:The procedural history of the case is intricate, reflecting the multiplicity of legal actions initiated by both parties. In January 2009, Enercon India Limited filed 19 revocation petitions before the IPAB, challenging the validity of Dr. Wobben’s patents. In response, Dr. Wobben filed a series of patent infringement suits before the Delhi High Court, beginning with suit no. 1349 of 2009 on July 27, 2009. Additional suits (nos. 1963, 1967, and 1968 of 2009) were filed on October 20, 2009, followed by suit no. 176 of 2010 on January 28, 2010, suit no. 1305 of 2010 on July 2, 2010, and suit no. 1333 of 2010 on July 5, 2010, totaling ten infringement suits.

In response to these suits, the respondents filed counter-claims seeking revocation of the patents in question. For instance, a counter-claim was filed on September 9, 2009, in suit no. 1349 of 2009, on January 30, 2010, in suit no. 1963 of 2009, and on April 30, 2010, in suit no. 176 of 2010. Additionally, the respondents filed four more revocation petitions before the IPAB in 2010 and 2011, further complicating the proceedings.

On September 1, 2010, the Delhi High Court passed a consent order consolidating the infringement suits and counter-claims for expedited trial, with the parties agreeing to a schedule for pleadings, document filing, and evidence recording. Despite this, the respondents continued pursuing their revocation petitions before the IPAB, resulting in orders revoking six of Dr. Wobben’s patents, which were also under consideration in the counter-claims before the High Court.

Dr. Wobben appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s handling of the case and arguing that the respondents’ simultaneous pursuit of revocation petitions and counter-claims was legally impermissible. The Supreme Court was tasked with resolving the legal and procedural issues arising from these parallel proceedings.

Issues Involved in the Case:The case presented several critical issues for adjudication, primarily centered on the interpretation of the Patents Act, 1970, and the procedural propriety of pursuing multiple remedies to challenge a patent’s validity. The key issues were:

Permissibility of Simultaneous Remedies: Whether a party, as “any person interested” under Section 64(1) of the Patents Act, can simultaneously pursue a revocation petition before the IPAB and a counter-claim for revocation in a patent infringement suit before the High Court?

Jurisdictional Conflict: Whether the filing of a counter-claim in a High Court ousts the IPAB’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a revocation petition concerning the same patent, and vice versa?

Interpretation of Section 64: Whether the use of the word “or” in Section 64(1) indicates that the remedies of filing a revocation petition and a counter-claim are mutually exclusive, preventing a party from pursuing both concurrently?

Consent Order’s Binding Nature: Whether the consent order dated September 1, 2010, consolidating the suits and counter-claims before the High Court, precluded the respondents from pursuing revocation petitions before the IPAB?

Appellants’ Submissions (Dr. Aloys Wobben and Wobben Properties GmbH): The appellants, represented by learned counsel, advanced several arguments to challenge the respondents’ simultaneous pursuit of revocation petitions and counter-claims:

Exclusive Jurisdiction of High Court: The appellants contended that once a counter-claim for revocation is filed in response to an infringement suit, the High Court assumes exclusive jurisdiction to determine the patent’s validity. They argued that the IPAB, as an administrative tribunal, lacks the authority to adjudicate the same issue once a counter-claim is pending before a superior forum like the High Court.

Disjunctive Nature of “Or” in Section 64(1): The appellants emphasized that the word “or” in Section 64(1) indicates that the remedies of filing a revocation petition and a counter-claim are mutually exclusive. They argued that a party must choose one remedy, and pursuing both simultaneously could lead to conflicting decisions, undermining judicial consistency.

Subservience of Section 64: The appellants highlighted that Section 64 is prefaced with “Subject to the provisions contained in this Act,” making it subservient to other provisions, such as Section 25(2), which governs post-grant opposition. They argued that if a party has initiated proceedings under Section 25(2), they cannot subsequently file a revocation petition or counter-claim under Section 64(1).

Res Judicata and Procedural Bar: The appellants invoked principles akin to res judicata, arguing that once a party files a revocation petition, they cannot file a counter-claim on the same grounds, and vice versa. They relied on Section 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), to assert that parallel proceedings on the same cause of action should be stayed to prevent abuse of process.

Consent Order’s Binding Effect: The appellants pointed to the consent order dated September 1, 2010, where the respondents agreed to consolidate the suits and counter-claims before the High Court. They argued that the respondents’ continued pursuit of revocation petitions before the IPAB violated this agreement and constituted an abuse of judicial process.

Analogy with Trade Marks Act: The appellants drew a parallel with Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which allows courts to stay infringement suits pending rectification proceedings before the IPAB. They argued that the absence of a similar provision in the Patents Act implies that parallel proceedings should not be permitted, and the High Court’s jurisdiction should prevail.

Respondents’ Submissions (Yogesh Mehra, Ajay Mehra, and Enercon India Limited):The respondents, defending their actions, presented counter-arguments to justify their pursuit of both revocation petitions and counter-claims:

Independent Remedies under Section 64(1): The respondents argued that Section 64(1) provides two independent remedies—filing a revocation petition before the IPAB and a counter-claim in an infringement suit—without explicitly prohibiting their simultaneous pursuit. They contended that the word “or” does not necessarily imply mutual exclusivity and that both remedies could be pursued to protect their interests.

IPAB’s Statutory Jurisdiction: The respondents asserted that the IPAB, established under the Patents Act, has statutory jurisdiction to adjudicate revocation petitions under Section 64(1). They argued that the filing of a counter-claim in the High Court does not oust the IPAB’s jurisdiction, as both fora are competent to address patent validity.

No Procedural Bar: The respondents contended that neither the Patents Act nor the CPC explicitly bars a party from pursuing both a revocation petition and a counter-claim. They argued that their actions were within the legal framework, as the revocation petitions were filed before most infringement suits, giving them precedence.

Broader Remedial Scope of Revocation Petitions: The respondents highlighted that revocation petitions offer broader remedial avenues, including appeals and reviews, compared to counter-claims, which are limited to the High Court’s adjudication. They argued that restricting them to counter-claims would curtail their statutory rights.

Consent Order’s Scope: The respondents maintained that the consent order of September 1, 2010, was limited to consolidating the suits and counter-claims for procedural convenience and did not preclude them from pursuing revocation petitions before the IPAB, which were already pending.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments and Citations:The Supreme Court’s judgment extensively analyzed the provisions of the Patents Act and drew upon legal principles to resolve the issues. While the judgment did not cite specific case law, it relied on statutory provisions and procedural principles to arrive at its conclusions. The key provisions and their contexts are discussed below:

Section 64 of the Patents Act, 1970:Context: Section 64(1) allows a patent to be revoked by the IPAB on a petition by “any person interested” or the Central Government, or by the High Court on a counter-claim in an infringement suit. The appellants argued that the word “or” indicates mutual exclusivity, while the respondents contended that both remedies could be pursued.Court’s Analysis: The Court held that the word “or” is disjunctive, meaning a party cannot simultaneously pursue both a revocation petition and a counter-claim for the same patent. The prefatory phrase “Subject to the provisions contained in this Act” was interpreted to make Section 64 subservient to other provisions, such as Section 25(2), which governs post-grant opposition.

Section 25 of the Patents Act, 1970:Context: Section 25(1) allows “any person” to oppose a patent application before its grant, while Section 25(2) permits “any person interested” to oppose a granted patent within one year of publication. The appellants argued that Section 25(2) proceedings eclipse subsequent Section 64(1) remedies.Court’s Analysis: The Court clarified that if a party initiates proceedings under Section 25(2), they cannot later file a revocation petition or counter-claim under Section 64(1) for the same patent. This ensures that the patent’s validity is finalized through the opposition process before further challenges are raised.

Section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970:Context: Section 104 provides that infringement suits and counter-claims for revocation must be filed before the High Court. The appellants relied on this to argue that counter-claims take precedence over IPAB proceedings.Court’s Analysis: The Court affirmed that counter-claims are adjudicated by the High Court, a superior forum, but clarified that the timing of proceedings determines which remedy prevails. If a revocation petition is filed before an infringement suit, the counter-claim is barred, and vice versa.

Section 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:Context: Section 10 allows courts to stay suits where the same issue is pending in a previously instituted suit, while Section 151 preserves the court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse of process. The appellants invoked these provisions to argue that parallel proceedings should be stayed.Court’s Analysis: The Court applied these principles analogously, treating a counter-claim as a suit and holding that a subsequently filed revocation petition or counter-claim on the same cause of action is barred, akin to res judicata, to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.

Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999:Context: Section 124 allows courts to stay trademark infringement suits pending rectification proceedings before the IPAB. The appellants argued that the absence of a similar provision in the Patents Act implies that parallel proceedings are not contemplated.

Court’s Analysis: The Court noted this analogy but did not rely on it, as the Patents Act’s framework was deemed sufficient to resolve the issue. The Court’s focus remained on harmonizing Section 64 with other provisions to avoid conflicting outcomes.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge:The Supreme Court, presided over by Justices Jagdish Singh Khehar and A.K. Patnaik, provided a comprehensive analysis of the legal and procedural issues, grounding its reasoning in statutory interpretation, procedural fairness, and judicial efficiency. The key aspects of the Court’s reasoning are:

Interpretation of Section 64(1):The Court emphasized that the prefatory phrase “Subject to the provisions contained in this Act” renders Section 64 subservient to other provisions, such as Section 25(2). This implies that if a party has initiated post-grant opposition under Section 25(2), they cannot pursue revocation under Section 64(1), ensuring a sequential approach to patent challenges.The word “or” in Section 64(1) was interpreted as disjunctive, meaning a party must choose between filing a revocation petition or a counter-claim. The Court reasoned that allowing both remedies simultaneously could lead to conflicting decisions, undermining judicial consistency and fairness.

Timing of Proceedings:The Court introduced a temporal framework to determine which remedy prevails:If a revocation petition is filed before an infringement suit, the counter-claim is barred, as the issue is already under adjudication before the IPAB.

If an infringement suit is filed first, followed by a counter-claim, a subsequent revocation petition is barred, as the High Court assumes jurisdiction over the revocation issue.This approach was grounded in the principle of res judicata, analogized through Section 10 of the CPC, which prevents parallel proceedings on the same cause of action.

Jurisdictional Harmony:The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the High Court’s jurisdiction is inherently superior to the IPAB’s. Instead, it held that both fora have statutory jurisdiction under the Patents Act, and the choice of remedy depends on the timing of initiation. This ensured that neither forum’s authority was undermined, while preventing abuse of process.

Consent Order’s Validity:The Court upheld the consent order of September 1, 2010, as a procedural agreement that streamlined adjudication before the High Court. It reasoned that such agreements, being consensual and within the High Court’s jurisdiction, are valid and binding, especially when they promote judicial efficiency by consolidating related disputes.

Judicial Efficiency and Procedural Fairness:The Court underscored the importance of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings to prevent conflicting outcomes and conserve judicial resources. By limiting parties to a single remedy, the Court ensured that the patent’s validity is adjudicated in one forum, reducing the risk of contradictory rulings.The application of CPC principles (Sections 10 and 151) reinforced the Court’s commitment to preventing abuse of process, treating counter-claims as independent suits subject to procedural constraints.

Practical Considerations:The Court acknowledged the complexity of the case, with 19 revocation petitions, 10 infringement suits, and multiple counter-claims. It encouraged parties to consensually resolve disputes before a single forum, as reflected in the consent order, to simplify adjudication and reduce litigation burdens.

Final Decision:The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Delhi High Court and disposed of the appeal with the following conclusions: Eclipse by Section 25(2) Proceedings: If a party initiates post-grant opposition under Section 25(2), they cannot file a revocation petition or counter-claim under Section 64(1) for the same patent.Revocation Petition Precedes Counter-Claim: If a revocation petition is filed before an infringement suit, the counter-claim is barred, and the IPAB retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the revocation.Counter-Claim Precedes Revocation Petition: If a counter-claim is filed in response to an infringement suit, a subsequent revocation petition is barred, and the High Court adjudicates the revocation.Consent Order Upheld: The consent order of September 1, 2010, consolidating suits and counter-claims before the High Court, was affirmed as a valid procedural agreement.Single Remedy Principle: A party cannot pursue both Patent revocation petition and a counter-claim seeking revocation of Patent simultaneously under Section 64(1), as the remedies are mutually exclusive.The Court directed that the proceedings be governed by these principles, ensuring that only one remedy is pursued based on the timing of initiation, and affirmed the parties’ ability to consensually choose a single forum for adjudication.

Law Settled in the Case:The judgment settled several important principles in Indian patent law:

Mutual Exclusivity of Remedies under Section 64(1): The remedies of filing a revocation petition and a counter-claim under Section 64(1) are mutually exclusive, and a party must choose one based on the timing of proceedings.

Subservience of Section 64: Section 64 is subservient to other provisions of the Patents Act, particularly Section 25(2), which takes precedence if initiated first.

Temporal Priority: The forum for adjudicating patent revocation depends on whether a revocation petition or an infringement suit (with a counter-claim) was filed first, preventing parallel proceedings.

Res Judicata in Patent Disputes: Principles akin to res judicata apply to patent revocation proceedings, barring subsequent challenges on the same cause of action in a different forum.

Consent Orders for Procedural Efficiency: Parties can consensually agree to resolve patent disputes before a single forum, and such agreements are binding, provided they align with statutory jurisdiction.

Prevention of Abuse of Process: The judiciary has the authority to streamline proceedings to avoid multiplicity and ensure judicial efficiency, drawing on CPC principles where necessary.

Case TitleDr. Aloys Wobben and Another vs. Yogesh Mehra and Others:Date of Order June 2, 2014:Case No. Civil Appeal No. 6718 of 2013:Neutral Citation AIR 2014 SC 2210, (2014) 15 SCC 360 :Name of Court: Supreme Court of India:Name of Hon'ble Judge Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar and Justice A.K. Patnaik

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra Vs. Babu Lime Private Limited

Introduction: This case pertains to a civil revision application filed by Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra, proprietor of Siddhi Lime, challenging an order passed by the 7th Additional District Judge, Rajkot, in a trademark suit. The core issue revolves around the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit, specifically whether the Commercial Court had exclusive jurisdiction based on the nature and valuation of the dispute. The case highlights the nuances of jurisdictional jurisdiction under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the applicability of Order VII Rule 11 CPC in dismissing plaints. The recent order by the Gujarat High Court involves a correction of a previous judgment, underscoring the importance of accurate citations and proper procedural considerations.

Detailed Factual Background: The plaintiff, Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra, filed a suit for permanent injunction, claiming infringement of trademark, passing off, and copyright. The plaint sought to restrain the defendant, Babu Lime Private Limited, from manufacturing, marketing, and selling edible lime using a deceptively similar trademark ‘SIDDHI’, along with reproduction of artistic work representing copyright infringement. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant’s use of the mark and artistic work was an imitation of the plaintiff’s registered copyright and trademark rights. The reliefs included permanent injunctions, a declaration of exclusive rights over the trademarks ‘BABU’ and ‘DELUXE’, accounts of profits, and damages with interest.

Procedural Background: The defendant moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint on the ground that the suit did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court, primarily because the valuation of the suit was below Rs. 3 lakhs and the dispute did not satisfy the statutory criteria for a commercial dispute as per Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Trial Court rejected this application, holding that the suit was maintainable in the regular civil jurisdiction. The defendant challenged this order through a civil revision application before the High Court. The High Court, upon re-examining the case, noted that an omission had occurred in citing relevant legal authorities, which was later rectified by the court’s order dated 01/05/2025, citing a pivotal judgment, MANU/KA/1066/2024. The court then modified its earlier judgment accordingly.

Issues Involved in the Case: The primary issue concerned whether the civil suit was maintainable within the jurisdiction of a commercial court, specifically whether the dispute qualified as a ‘commercial dispute’ under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, and whether its valuation exceeded Rs. 3 lakhs? The second issue was whether the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC should have been allowed, leading to rejection of the plaint on the grounds of non-compliance with jurisdictional and valuation criteria?

Parties' Detailed Submissions: The petitioner contended that the dispute fell squarely within the domain of Section 2(1)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, as it involved infringement of trademarks and copyright related to goods valued above Rs. 3 lakhs. He argued that the defendant under-valued the claim just to keep the suit within the ordinary jurisdiction, which was outside the legislative intent of the law. Relying on judgments such as 2022 (0) AIJEL – 7000 and an unreported judgment from Karnataka High Court in Civil Revision Application No.426 of 2023, he submitted that the commercial court’s jurisdiction was barred only if both the nature of dispute and its valuation met the statutory conditions, which it did. He further emphasized that the defendant’s argument about the suit’s valuation was unfounded since the plaintiff’s initial valuation was above the threshold.

The respondent, Babu Lime Pvt. Ltd., argued that the suit was not a ‘commercial dispute’ as per the definition, and the valuation was less than Rs. 3 lakhs, which should limit the jurisdiction to the ordinary civil courts. Their advocate relied on established legal principles, including the Supreme Court’s judgment in Vishal Pipes and the Karnataka High Court decision in Kirloskar Aaf Limited v. American Air Filters Company Inc., to assert that the discretion to choose the forum rested solely with the plaintiff and that the defendant could not insist on a specific court unless jurisdiction was lacking.

Discussion of Judgments and Their Citations: The High Court’s order of 01/05/2025 referenced the Karnataka High Court judgment in Kirloskar Aaf Limited v. American Air Filters Company Inc., which clarified that the two essential criteria for jurisdiction under the Commercial Courts Act are the existence of a ‘commercial dispute’ as per Section 2(c) and a minimum pecuniary threshold of Rs. 3 lakhs. The court also relied on the judgment in Vishal Pipes, which underscored that a suit involving intellectual property rights can qualify as a ‘commercial dispute’ if it involves commercial transactions and the valuation exceeds the stipulated amount. The cited case MANU/KA/1066/2024 clarified the importance of proper citation and what constitutes a ‘commercial dispute’.

Further, the court noted that the legislative intent behind the Commercial Courts Act was to establish a specialized forum for disputes of a certain value, and that the valuation and nature must be analyzed in conjunction to determine jurisdiction. It reaffirmed that the plaintiff’s valuation, if properly documented, could not be disregarded solely on the basis of under-valuation by the defendant, and that the court must rely on the contents of the plaint and statutory provisions.

Reasoning and Analysis by the Judge: The Judge emphasized that jurisdictional questions must be approached holistically, considering both the nature of the dispute and the valuation as per Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act. The court acknowledged the principles laid down in the judgments cited by both parties but noted a potential oversight regarding the citation of legal authorities in the previous order. The court, therefore, corrected the omission and held that the initial order was based on a thorough judicial appreciation of the facts and applicable law. It observed that the essential question was whether the suit involved a ‘trade dispute’ of the kind envisaged under the law and whether it pertained to goods or intellectual property valued above Rs. 3 lakhs.

The court found that the plaintiff’s claims regarding copyright infringement and trademark violations, coupled with the valuation, clearly qualified the dispute as a ‘commercial dispute’. Consequently, the application under Order VII Rule 11, which sought to reject the plaint for lack of jurisdiction, was not justified. The order of the Trial Court was thus set aside, and the suit was allowed to proceed in the appropriate forum.

Final Decision: The High Court, upon considering all aspects, dismissed the application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, holding that the suit was properly maintainable within the jurisdiction of a commercial court. The earlier rejection of the suit was set aside, and the judgment was modified accordingly, with clarification on the importance of proper citation and legal referencing. The case was remanded for further proceedings on merits.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirmed the legal proposition that in cases involving intellectual property rights and commercial disputes, the jurisdiction of the commercial courts depends on both the nature of the dispute and the valuation. The twin requirements must be satisfied for the court to entertain the commercial suit, and mere undervaluation by the defendant does not automatically bar the suit if the plaintiff’s valuation and statement of facts qualify under the statutory criteria. It also clarified the importance of precise legal citations and the need for courts to rely on established judgments for clarity in legal proceedings.

Case Title: Maheshbhai Hajibhai Sojitra vs Babu Lime Private Limited: Date of Order: 01/05/2025: Case Number: R/CRA/447/2023: Neutral Citation: 2025:GUJHC:24876: Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad: Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker: 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi