Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited

A Party is not allowed to argue a case, what is not pleaded.

Introduction: This case revolves around a fundamental principle of civil procedure: that a party is not permitted to advance arguments at the stage of final hearing which have no foundation in its pleadings. In Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited and others, the Bombay High Court confronted this very proposition, addressing whether the plaintiff, after having pleaded that the defendants’ exploitation of copyright was impermissible due to expiry of the assignment agreements, could instead argue at final hearing that exploitation through digital or non-physical mediums was never contemplated in the agreements, thereby amounting to infringement. The judgment illustrates the intersection of contract interpretation, copyright law, and the strict discipline of pleadings in civil litigation.

Factual Background: The dispute arose from seven cinematographic films produced by O.P. Ralhan between 1963 and 1983, containing musical works and songs over which he held copyright. O.P. Ralhan assigned rights under various agreements dated between 1962 and 1980 to the predecessor of defendant no.2. Upon his death in 1999, those rights devolved upon his daughter, the plaintiff Rupali P. Shah, by virtue of a probated Will of 2013. Over the years, royalty payments were made by defendant no.2, which eventually assigned those rights to itself. In December 2011, the plaintiff noticed that defendant no.1 had used a song from the film 'Talash' in a commercial advertisement. Defendant no.1 claimed it had obtained a license from defendant no.2, which in turn claimed absolute rights to exploit the works.

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed Commercial IP Suit No.101 of 2012 before the Bombay High Court seeking a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from infringing her copyright, alongside reliefs for damages and accounts. An interim injunction was refused by the Single Judge on 8 May 2012, who found a prima facie case in favour of the defendants. The Court framed ten issues on 20 March 2013, and the matter proceeded to trial, including oral and documentary evidence. During the final hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel shifted emphasis from the pleaded case that the assignments had expired to the argument that the assignments never covered exploitation through digital and non-physical mediums.

Legal Issue: The central legal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff could argue, at the stage of final hearing, a ground that was absent from her pleadings—specifically, that the assignments covered only physical mediums like gramophone records and therefore exploitation in digital or non-physical mediums infringed her copyright. In essence, the Court examined whether the plaintiff's arguments had to remain confined to what was pleaded.

Discussion on Judgments: The plaintiff relied heavily on Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corporation, 845 F.2d 851 (2nd Cir. 1988) and Raj Video Vision v. K. Mohan Krishnan, 1998-2-L.W.718 (Madras High Court) to argue that rights not contemplated when the agreements were executed could not be treated as assigned. Further reliance was placed on Adani Gas Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) 5 SCC 210; Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593; Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd., (1982) 1 SCC 613; and Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. CCI, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom.2186 to support arguments on retrospective application of amendments and the legal effect of provisos.

Conversely, defendant no.2 relied on Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, (1977) 1 SCC 511; Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555; and Mohammed Abdul Wahid v. Nilofer, (2024) 2 SCC 144 to contend that a party cannot argue beyond its pleadings. In support of interpreting contracts by reading clauses together and the significance of parties' conduct, the defendants cited Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 113; Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hyma Vathi, (1996) 9 SCC 388; State of Orissa v. Damodar Das, (1996) 2 SCC 216; M. Arul Jothi v. Lajja Bal, (2000) 3 SCC 723; Prentice Hall India Pvt. Ltd. v. Prentice Hall Inc., 2002 SCC OnLine Del.549; Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish, (1973) 2 SCC 825; and Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 107. Additionally, they argued that the earlier interim order dated 8 May 2012, which had interpreted the agreements as granting wide rights, was binding, citing SK. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee, (2017) 5 SCC 127; S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1460; and Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, [1964] 5 S.C.R. 946.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court observed that the plaintiff's pleadings were clear: her case was based on expiry of the assignment agreements over time, and not on the nature of mediums covered by those agreements. The plaintiff’s attempt at final hearing to pivot to an argument about non-physical mediums was found to be beyond the scope of her pleadings and therefore impermissible. The Court applied the settled principle that what is argued must be founded in the pleadings, so that the opposing party is not taken by surprise, citing Supreme Court authorities.

The Court closely analyzed the 1967 agreement and found it used expansive language, specifically, clause 10, which granted the assignee the “sole right of production, reproduction, sale, use and performance (including broadcasting) throughout the world by any and every means whatsoever.” Interpreting the contract as a whole, the Court held that these words reflected an intention to assign rights in perpetuity across all mediums, including those then unknown.

The plaintiff’s reliance on subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act and foreign judgments was rejected because the agreements had to be interpreted in the statutory context existing when they were executed. The Court further considered the parties’ conduct, noting that royalty payments had been accepted over many years and that the plaintiff’s father, in his Will, bequeathed rights consistent with a belief in perpetual assignment.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove infringement and that defendant no.2 had perpetual rights to exploit the works across all mediums. Defendant no.1 was also found to have acted under a valid license and thus was not liable. The Court reaffirmed that a party cannot be allowed to argue what is not pleaded.

Law Settled in This Case: The judgment reaffirmed that a party must remain within the boundaries of its pleadings and cannot spring new grounds at final hearing. It also settled that, in interpreting copyright assignments, especially older agreements, courts will consider the language of the agreement as a whole, the parties’ conduct, and the context of the law at the time of execution, rather than subsequent statutory amendments or later technological developments.

Case Title: Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited and others:Date of Order: 11 June 2025:Case Number: Commercial IP Suit No.101 of 2012:Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:8516:Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, Commercial Division:Name of Judge: Justice Manish Pitale

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

KG Marketing India Vs Rashi Santosh Soni

Introduction: This case study delves into the dispute between KG Marketing India (the appellant) and Rashi Santosh Soni & others (the respondents) concerning allegations of forgery, fabrication of documents, and the misuse of a trademark “SURYA.” The matter primarily concerns the appropriate legal proceedings for handling forged evidence filed in court, and the Court’s authority to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The Delhi High Court's judgment underscores the importance of truthfulness in legal pleadings and demonstrates the Court’s powers to impose costs and direct criminal complaints against dishonest conduct during litigation.

Factual Background: KG Marketing India claimed prior rights and extensive use of the trademark "SURYA" since 2016, supported by newspaper advertisements. These advertisements were relied upon in its suit to establish prior user rights and branding dominance. The appellant filed a civil suit, CS (COMM) No. 18/2023, which included the newspaper advertisements as evidence, supported by a Statement of Truth affirming their authenticity. Subsequently, the respondents challenged the genuineness of these documents, asserting that they were fabricated and produced with malicious intent to secure an interim injunction favoring the appellant’s market position. The respondents alleged that the advertisements used by the appellant in the court proceedings were forged and that the appellant had intentionally misrepresented facts.

Procedural Background: Initially, the Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favor of the appellant and authorized a search and seizure of allegedly infringing goods. However, the respondents later filed I.A. 10033/2023 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC, alleging that the documents filed by the appellant were maliciously fabricated for the purpose of securing the injunction. The Court found merit in this contention and vacated the interim relief, dismissing the appellant’s application. Subsequently, the respondents filed a cross-suit seeking to restrain the appellant from using the mark “SURYA,” and to prove the alleged forgery, they provided original newspapers dated 17.06.2016 and 12.07.2017 to establish that the advertisements relied upon were fabricated. During the proceedings, the Court considered whether proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC should be initiated against the appellant for allegedly filing forged documents and false statements.

Legal Issue: The principal legal issue in this case is whether the Court has the authority to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC against a party who files forged documents and makes false statements supporting their case, particularly in the context of fabricated evidence in a civil suit? The case raises questions about the nature of proof admissible in trademark disputes, the limits of the Court’s power to take suo-motu cognizance of forgery, and the sanctity of Statements of Truth filed in pleadings, especially when they are allegedly false and fabricated.

Discussion on Judgments: The parties cited multiple judgments to substantiate their respective arguments. The appellant referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashok Gulabrao Bondre v. Vilas Madhukarrao Deshmukh (2023) 9 SCC 539, which clarified interpretations surrounding forgery and the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 340 of the CrPC, especially when relating to documents filed in court. The respondent’s counsel relied on the earlier Supreme Court decision in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 748, which clarified that criminal proceedings can be initiated even if the offence preceded the registration of a complaint, thus establishing that the Court has the power to act upon suspicion or evidence of forgery, regardless of the procedural stage.

Additionally, the Court referred to Iqbal Singh Marwah and Ors. v. Meenakshi Marwah, (1981) 4 SCC 523, where the Supreme Court discussed the interpretation of Section 195 of the CrPC concerning offences related to documents produced in court. The decision clarified that where offences involve an act committed in respect of a document that was produced or given in evidence during proceedings, a complaint by the court would be necessary. The Court examined whether the production of forged documents with falsified Statements of Truth warranted criminal action under Section 340 of the CrPC, emphasizing the importance of truthfulness in court pleadings.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The learned Judge analyzed the available judgments and the facts of the case to arrive at a reasoned conclusion. The Court noted that the documents relied upon by the appellant were explicitly admitted to be forged and fabricated, and these false documents were filed along with the suit to obtain interim relief. The Court further observed that the Statement of Truth filed affirming the genuineness of these documents was false, which undermines the integrity of the judicial process. Referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashok Gulabrao Bondre, the Court clarified that the offence of forgery committed in respect of documents filed in a court proceeding is prosecutable under Section 340 of the CrPC. The Court emphasized that it has the authority to cause a complaint to be filed if it is satisfied that a false statement or forged document has been deliberately filed, thereby obstructing the course of justice. The Court acknowledged that filing forged evidence under the guise of genuine documents is a serious offence, warranting criminal action along with appropriate costs to deter such misconduct.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the filing of false pleadings violates the principles of honesty and fair dealing in litigation. It reinforced that the Court can initiate proceedings suo-motu or upon an application to ensure that falsehoods do not undermine judicial integrity. The Court, therefore, imposed costs on the appellant and directed the Registrar General to lodge a criminal complaint, affirming its jurisdiction to enforce accountability for litigatory misconduct.

Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the order directing the Registrar General to lodge a complaint with the Judicial Magistrate under Section 340 of the CrPC, and imposed a cost of ₹2,00,000 on the appellant. The Court declared that the appellant’s conduct in filing forged documents and false Statements of Truth was unjustifiable and amounted to an abuse of the judicial process. The scheduled hearing was canceled, and the appellant was directed to deposit the imposed costs with the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks. This decision reaffirmed the Court’s authority to act against falsification and forgery in proceedings and underscored the importance of honesty in presenting evidence.

Law Settled in This Case: This case establishes that if a party files forged or fabricated documents in court, supported by false affidavits or Statements of Truth, the Court has the authority to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 340 of the CrPC against the offending party. The decision clarifies that the Court can act suo-motu in such cases, emphasizing that the integrity of judicial proceedings depends on honest and truthful conduct of parties. The case also emphasizes that the imposition of costs serves as a deterrent against misconduct, and that the disposal of forged evidence can have both civil and criminal consequences.

Case Title: KG Marketing India Vs Rashi Santosh Soni & Others Date of Order: August 23, 2024 Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 16/2024 Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:6385-DB: Name of Court: Delhi High Court Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Hon'ble Mr. Sachin Datta

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Rupali P. Shah Vs. Adani Wilmer Limited

Case Title: Rupali P. Shah v. Adani Wilmer Limited and others:11 June 2025:Commercial IP Suit No. 101 of 2012:2025:BHC-OS:8516:High Court of Judicature at Bombay:Name of Judge: Justice Manish Pitale

The brief facts are that the plaintiff, daughter of late O.P. Ralhan who produced seven films between 1963 and 1983, claimed rights over musical works forming part of those films. Her father had assigned rights to the predecessor of defendant no.2 by agreements executed in the 1960s and 1970s. After his death and probate of his Will, the plaintiff alleged that defendant nos.1 and 2 exploited these works beyond the period permissible under the agreements.

Procedurally, after notices and exchange of communications between the parties regarding royalty payments and scope of rights, the plaintiff filed the present suit in 2012 seeking injunction, damages, and accounts against the defendants for alleged copyright infringement. An interim injunction was refused by the Single Judge in 2012, issues were framed, evidence led, and the matter proceeded to final hearing.

The dispute centered on whether the original assignment of rights was perpetual and included exploitation by all mediums, or was limited to physical mediums like gramophone records, so that digital exploitation amounted to infringement.

In discussion, the court held that while the plaintiff’s pleadings focused on expiry of the time-limited agreements, her arguments later shifted to claiming the rights were limited only to physical mediums. The court found that the assignment agreements, particularly the 1967 agreement, used wide expressions such as “by any and every means whatsoever,” showing that the assignor had granted broad and perpetual rights to the assignee, which included exploitation by later-developed mediums.

The decision dismissed the suit, holding that the defendants had perpetual rights to exploit the works by any means and there was no infringement. It also upheld that defendant no.1 had lawfully used the song under licence from defendant no.2, and rejected the plaintiff’s claim for damages and accounts.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.

Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha

Introduction: This case study examines the legal proceedings involving Dr. Praveen R. and Dr. Arpitha, a matrimonial dispute that delves into the serious issue of perjury within the judicial system. It underscores the importance of timely and effective judicial action against false testimonies and fraudulent statements that threaten the integrity of the courts. The case primarily revolves around allegations of perjury, the court's discretionary powers in addressing such allegations, and the implications of delays in initiating proceedings for falsehoods sworn in affidavits and testimonies. The High Court of Karnataka analyzed whether the refusal to entertain an application related to perjury at an early stage was justified or if it hindered the course of justice by allowing falsehoods to persist.

Factual Background: Dr. Praveen and Dr. Arpitha, both medical practitioners of reputed standing, were embroiled in a matrimonial discord that led to legal proceedings. Dr. Praveen filed a petition seeking annulment of their marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, indicating an ongoing status of the marriage that needed judicial resolution. Concurrently, Dr. Arpitha sought maintenance and litigation expenses, claiming her unemployment and lack of income, which the trial court rejected. The dispute was further complicated by allegations made by Dr. Praveen, contending that Dr. Arpitha had falsely stated her employment status in affidavits supporting her applications for maintenance, thereby amounting to perjury. Despite these allegations, the trial court initially found the matter of perjury to be premature and refrained from initiating proceedings against her, citing the discretion reserved to the court. The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court, emphasizing the gravity of perjury as a serious offense and the need for prompt judicial intervention to uphold the integrity of the judicial process.

Procedural Background: The petitioner, Dr. Praveen, approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, seeking to set aside the order passed by the Family Court, which had dismissed his application to initiate criminal proceedings for perjury. The Family Court had held that the allegation was premature, based on the principle that the discretion to act against perjury was to be exercised judiciously and only when the circumstances warranted immediate action. The petitioner contended that the delay in initiating proceedings against perjury was not justified, especially given the seriousness of the offense and the clear evidence of false affidavits. The respondents opposed the petition, asserting that the Court below rightly assessed the situation and that the discretion was rightly exercised, emphasizing the importance of not rushing into proceedings without proper proof and procedural fairness. The High Court, after hearing arguments and examining the record, scrutinized whether the Family Court’s decision was lawful and in consonance with principles of justice and judicial efficiency.

Legal Issue: The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Family Court erred in dismissing the application to initiate proceedings for perjury on the grounds of premature consideration and whether the High Court should interfere under its writ jurisdiction. Specifically, it centered around the interpretation of judicial discretion in initiating criminal proceedings for perjury, the necessity for timely action to prevent the erosion of judicial integrity, and the appropriateness of the Family Court’s assessment of the evidence and the exercise of its discretion concerning allegations of falsehood in affidavits related to maintenance applications and matrimonial proceedings.

Discussion on Judgments: The Court’s discussion heavily relied on precedents such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahila Vinod Kumari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 34, which emphasized that perjury undermines the judicial system and that courts must act more proactively. The Court also cited Swarna Singh v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 668, which highlighted the alarming proliferation of perjury in courts, describing it as a menace that needs stern and prompt judicial response. Furthermore, the Family Court had referred to decisions like B.K. GUPTA v. DAMODAR H. BAJAJ AND ORS. (2001) 9 SCC 742, which generally underscored that the exercise of discretion regarding proceedings for perjury must adhere to principles of reason and justice, not arbitrary or evasive actions. The Court analyzed these judgments in light of the facts, emphasizing that the judiciary cannot afford to treat perjury as a trivial matter and that procedural delays, especially when evidence indicates falsehoods, are detrimental to justice. The Court also looked at the decision of V.K. Gupta’s case, which acknowledged the discretion granted to courts but cautioned against deferring judicial action impeding the fight against falsehoods.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The High Court Judge reasoned that judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with established principles of justice and fairness. In this case, the Family Court’s decision to deem the application for initiating perjury proceedings as premature appeared to be based on a narrow interpretation that overlooked the tangible evidence of falsification in affidavits. The Hon’ble Judge noted the importance of adhering to the courts’ duty to prevent the evil of perjury, especially considering the societal consequences when false testimony is tolerated. They observed that merely relying on procedural delays or the absence of comprehensive proof at an initial stage should not prevent courts from taking stern action against perjury, particularly when the evidence suggests a clear intent to mislead the court. The Judge interpreted the relevant legal principles to mean that courts must act promptly and decisively to uphold the integrity of proceedings and to deter the dangerous proliferation of falsehoods. The Judge criticized the Family Court’s approach for risking a neglect of the substantive issue and opined that the delay therein was unjustified, asserting that such delay could pollute the fountain of justice by allowing fraud to persist unpunished.

Final Decision: The High Court set aside the impugned order of the Family Court and remitted the matter for fresh consideration, emphasizing that allegations of perjury are serious and should not be dismissed on technical grounds or procedural delays. The Court directed the Family Court to evaluate the evidence of falsehood explicitly and exercise its discretion in accordance with the principles of reason, justice, and judicial efficacy. 

It underscored the need for courts to act swiftly in such matters, highlighting that the integrity of the judicial process must be protected against falsehoods, which, if left unchecked, could lead to erosion of public confidence in the legal system. The Court’s decision was driven by the principles that perjury is a heinous offense and that judicial discretion, while important, must be exercised without prejudice to the fundamental goal of delivering justice.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reaffirms that allegations of perjury are of grave concern and must be addressed with promptness and decisiveness by courts. It emphasizes that judicial discretion to initiate proceedings for perjury, while broad, must be exercised based on reason, justice, and the need to uphold the fidelity of the judicial process. The judgment clarifies that procedural delays or nominal objections should not be allowed to undermine the fight against falsehoods sworn before the court, especially when the evidence points toward clear misconduct. Courts are duty-bound to act swiftly to preserve the dignity of justice and prevent the evil of perjury from polluting the system. The case underscores that the failure to act promptly in such instances could be viewed as a dereliction of judicial duty, and therefore, courts must balance discretion with responsibility to ensure that perjury is neither tolerated nor ignored.

Case Title: Dr. Praveen R. Vs. Dr. Arpitha Date of Order: 31 August 2021 Case Number: Writ Petition No.19448 of 2015 Court: High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna S

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

T.V. Today Network Limited & Anr. Vs. Google LLC & Ors

T.V. Today Network Limited & Anr. Vs. Google LLC & Ors./20 June 2025/CS(COMM) 634/2025/High Court of Delhi at New Delhi/ Justice Prathiba M. Singh

The dispute arose when T.V. Today Network Limited, a major Indian media house running news channels like Aajtak and India Today, and Ms. Anjana Om Kashyap, its Managing Editor, discovered that an unknown person created a fake YouTube channel ‘@AnajanaomKashya’ imitating Ms. Kashyap’s name and photograph. This channel allegedly published fake videos and news clippings exploiting her reputation and the goodwill of the media house.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs filed a suit seeking urgent interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. Alongside, they sought exemption from pre-litigation mediation, filing originals and complete court fee, and requested leave to file additional documents. The Court allowed these applications, impleaded Ms. Kashyap as Plaintiff No.2, and issued summons to the defendants.

The Court discussed the evident difference between the authentic YouTube channel of Plaintiff No.2 and the fake channel, noting the deliberate omission of the letter ‘p’ in ‘Kashyap’ as indicative of bad faith. It observed that proliferation of such fake pages harms personality rights, risks dissemination of misinformation, and unlawfully exploits the plaintiffs’ goodwill for commercial gain.

The Court directed Google LLC to remove the infringing YouTube channel within 48 hours, disclose subscriber information of the creator within two weeks, and provide an account of revenues generated by the channel within four weeks. Further, it directed prompt removal of any similarly fake channels identified by the plaintiffs and scheduled the matter for further hearing.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi.

ITC Limited Vs. Pravin Kumar & Ors.

Descriptive Terms, Distinctive Rights

Introduction:This case presented before the Calcutta High Court is a comprehensive intellectual property dispute involving allegations of trademark infringement, copyright infringement, passing off, and trafficking in trademark rights. The plaintiff, ITC Limited, a dominant and long-standing player in the Indian tobacco industry, alleged that the defendants, including Pravin Kumar and associated entities, were engaged in manufacturing and distributing counterfeit cigarettes under the brand name “GOLD STAG” that bore deceptive similarity to ITC’s well-known cigarette brand “GOLD FLAKE.” The central legal question revolved around the extent to which a company can claim proprietary rights over a composite mark containing a laudatory expression like “GOLD” and whether the defendants’ packaging constituted infringement or passing off.

Factual Background:ITC Limited is a multinational conglomerate with a substantial presence in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes in India under the brand “GOLD FLAKE,” a trademark that it has allegedly used uninterruptedly since 1905. The plaintiff possesses numerous trademark and copyright registrations in India for marks such as “GOLD FLAKE Hallmark,” “GOLD FLAKE Ultima,” “GOLD FLAKE Century,” and “GOLD FLAKE Super Star.” The petitioner claims that the “GOLD FLAKE” mark and its associated trade dress, including the red and gold color combination, device marks, and packaging format, have become distinctive identifiers of its products.

In late 2024, ITC discovered the marketing and sale of cigarettes under the brand “IJM GOLD STAG” by the defendants. The packaging of “GOLD STAG” cigarettes bore a striking resemblance to that of “GOLD FLAKE,” employing similar colors, layout, typography, and even similar roundel devices. ITC contended that the use of the word “GOLD” and the replication of packaging elements by the defendants constituted infringement of their registered trademarks and copyright, passing off, and intentional counterfeiting.

Procedural Background:Upon discovery of the infringing activity, ITC filed the suit on 28 January 2025 under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The High Court initially passed an ad-interim order on 6 February 2025 and appointed Special Officers for site inspections. The defendants filed applications under GA-COM/2/2025 for vacating the interim injunction, and under GA-COM/4/2025 for revocation of dispensation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act on the ground that pre-institution mediation was bypassed without just cause. All applications were heard analogously.

Legal Issue:The primary legal issues before the court were whether the defendants' use of the mark “GOLD STAG” and its associated packaging infringed upon ITC’s registered trademarks and copyrighted artistic work and whether the plaintiff’s claim of urgency justified bypassing the mandatory pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Ancillary issues involved whether the use of the word “GOLD” could be monopolized and whether the defendants’ registration of “GOLD STAG” provided them any protection against such infringement claims?

Discussion on Judgments:In support of its arguments, the plaintiff relied on multiple judicial precedents that recognized the distinctiveness of the “GOLD FLAKE” mark and the protection available under both trademark and copyright laws for packaging and trade dress.

In ITC Limited v. Golden Tobacco Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 2437, the Madras High Court acknowledged the long-standing reputation of “GOLD FLAKE” and restrained the use of similar marks. Similarly, in ITC Ltd. v. NTC Industries Ltd., 2015 (64) PTC 244 (Bom), the Bombay High Court granted injunctive relief to ITC against the use of deceptively similar marks by rival businesses. The Calcutta High Court itself had previously restrained parties from using variants like “GOLD STEP,” “GOLD FROST,” “GOLD FLICKER,” and “GOLD VIMAL” in various suits such as CS(COMM) No. 124/2024 and CS(COMM) No. 60/2024, recognizing the deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion.

The court also cited the landmark decision in Parakh Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. v. Baroma Agro Product, (2018) 16 SCC 632, which emphasized that claims of secondary meaning and exclusivity over common or descriptive terms require careful scrutiny.

For assessing the maintainability of suit without pre-institution mediation, the court referred to Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1, and Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382. These decisions collectively held that mediation is mandatory unless the suit seeks urgent interim relief and the urgency is not falsely pleaded. The court emphasized that it is for the court, not the plaintiff, to determine the urgency’s authenticity.

On the procedural side, the court relied on Autodesk Inc. v. A.V.T. Shankardass, (2008) 105 DRJ 188, and Time Warner Entertainment v. RPG Netcom, 2007 (34) PTC 668 (Del), to uphold the procedural validity of executing search-and-seizure orders before formal service under Order 39 Rule 3 CPC, especially when the object is to prevent the destruction of evidence.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur held that the plaintiff made out a strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. The court accepted that the plaintiff’s mark “GOLD FLAKE” had acquired distinctiveness through continuous and extensive use over decades. While acknowledging that “GOLD” is a laudatory term, the court emphasized that the overall packaging, trade dress, and visual similarities could not be ignored. The red and gold color scheme, the use of similar roundel devices, and the layout of product elements gave the impugned product an appearance deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff’s.

The judge rejected the defendant’s argument that ITC had no exclusive right over the word “GOLD” alone, stating that while “GOLD” per se may be descriptive or laudatory, its use in conjunction with deceptive packaging and overall presentation constituted actionable infringement and passing off.

On the issue of bypassing Section 12A, the court held that ITC had pleaded sufficient urgency. There was no evidence that ITC had prior knowledge of the infringing acts before December 2024. The court also noted the complex corporate structure and concealed relationships among the defendants which justified ITC’s prompt approach to court. The court distinguished this case from others where urgency was found to be a guise.

Additionally, the court found the licensing agreements submitted by the defendants to be suspect, noting discrepancies in the documents and the absence of valid assignments or written authorizations as mandated under Sections 30 and 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Final Decision:The Calcutta High Court upheld the ad-interim injunction previously granted and allowed ITC’s application for interim relief. It dismissed the applications by the defendants seeking to vacate the injunction and revoke the dispensation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act. The court restrained the defendants from using the impugned mark “GOLD STAG” or any deceptively similar trade dress, packaging, or devices in relation to cigarettes. The court also noted that the acts of the defendants warranted further scrutiny at trial to examine claims of counterfeiting and trafficking.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that even descriptive or laudatory components of a composite trademark may attain distinctiveness when used extensively over a long period, and such acquired distinctiveness can be protected under trademark and copyright laws. The judgment clarifies that trade dress and packaging play a crucial role in consumer perception and can independently ground claims of infringement and passing off. Furthermore, the court reiterated that bypassing the requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is permissible only when genuine urgency exists, and the courts are the ultimate arbiters of such urgency.

Case Title: ITC Limited v. Pravin Kumar & Ors.:Date of Order: 20 June 2025:Case Number: IP-COM/12/2025:Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta, Original Side (IPR Division):Name of Judge: Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Satya Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd

Case Title: Satya Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd.: Date of Order:7th February, 2013:Case Number:CS(OS) 1213/2011:2013:DHC:653:High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw

Facts:

The plaintiffs, comprising companies under the "Satya Group," claimed long-standing use of the trademark "SATYA" in connection with their real estate and infrastructure businesses since 1986. They alleged that the defendant, Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd., incorporated in 2009, had adopted the mark "SATYA" in its name with the intent to misappropriate the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs and cause confusion among consumers.

The plaintiffs had registered trademarks for "SATYA," "SATYA & Logo," and other variants under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and had invested substantially in building brand recognition. They filed the suit seeking a permanent injunction, delivery of infringing materials, rendition of accounts, and damages.

Procedural History:

The defendant did not appear despite service of summons.

The court proceeded ex parte against the defendant.

Plaintiffs, through counsel, elected to pursue only the relief of permanent injunction, foregoing damages and other reliefs for expediency.

Issues:

Whether the use of the mark “SATYA” by the defendant in its corporate name constituted infringement of the plaintiffs’ registered trademark and amounted to passing off.

Decision:

The High Court:

Held that the plaintiffs had established long-standing, continuous, and registered use of the "SATYA" mark in relation to real estate and related services.

Found that the defendant's use of "SATYA" in its corporate name was likely to cause confusion and mislead the public into believing an association with the plaintiffs.

Observed that such use amounted to infringement of trademark rights under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from using the name “Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd.” or any deceptively similar name or mark.

Provided a three-month period for the defendant to comply before the injunction would take effect.

Directed that a copy of the judgment be served on the Registrar of Companies to initiate rectification of the defendant’s name if necessary.

Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India

Article 226 Invoked to Rectify Trademark Registry Irregularities

Introduction:This case highlights serious procedural lapses in the functioning of the Trade Marks Registry and the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, Kamdhenu Limited, approached the High Court through five writ petitions, challenging the perfunctory and irregular acceptance of certain trademark applications that had allegedly ignored the petitioner’s prior rights and bypassed the statutory mandates under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Trade Mark Rules, 2017. The Court, in an unprecedented move, exercised its suo motu jurisdiction to rectify administrative irregularities that had broader implications on public confidence in the trademark registration system.

Factual Background:Kamdhenu Limited is a well-established entity with several registered trademarks to its name. The dispute arose when five trademark applications—bearing application numbers 6890699, 6845025, 6845771, 6890704, and 6742246—were hastily accepted by the Trade Marks Registry on the same date they were filed. The petitioner discovered that these applications were processed and accepted within minutes without proper examination, and shockingly, without reference to the petitioner’s prior existing trademarks, despite their valid registration status.

A glaring omission in the search reports generated by the Registry was that 16 of the petitioner’s valid trademarks were not reflected, raising concerns of non-compliance with Rule 33 of the Trade Mark Rules and Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act. These circumstances suggested a breakdown in due diligence and adherence to statutory obligations by the Registry and its officers.

Procedural Background:The matter first came up before the High Court on 9th May 2025, when the Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the records and explanations furnished by the Registry. The Court found the omissions in the search reports troubling and called upon the relevant officers—Examiners of Trade Marks, as well as the Registrar—to appear and assist the Court. Subsequently, on 15th May 2025, the officers demonstrated the software and processes used to generate search reports. Following this, the Registrar of Trade Marks voluntarily submitted a short affidavit admitting procedural failures and stating that administrative action had been initiated against the concerned Examiners. The Registrar also offered to withdraw the earlier acceptance orders and undertake a fresh examination of the applications.

Legal Issue:The diputed question was whether the acceptance of the five trademark applications by the Trade Marks Registry, in apparent disregard of prior existing marks and statutory procedures, could be sustained under law and whether the High Court could intervene under Article 226 in the absence of the petitioner having availed of alternate statutory remedies.

Discussion on Judgments:To support the writ petitions, the petitioner relied on Jai Bhagwan Gupta v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Ors., 2020:DHC:1532, where the Court emphasized the necessity for a reasoned order and clear application of mind by the Registrar while accepting a mark under Section 20(1) of the Act. It was held that such acceptance cannot be mechanical and must reflect proper scrutiny.

The petitioner also referred to Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. & Anr. vs. D. N. Bahari Trading, 2024:DHC:2868, where a Co-ordinate Bench held that compliance with Rule 33 of the Trade Mark Rules is mandatory. Though the respondent contested the relevance of this case by stating it related to a rectification petition and not a writ petition, the Court found the principles applicable given the similar factual matrix.

The respondents, particularly Respondent No. 4, cited T.K. Lathika Vs. Seth Karsandas Jamnadas, (1999) 6 SCC 632 to argue that the Court should not bypass the issue of maintainability and should allow opposition proceedings to take their course. They also relied on Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. & Anr. vs. Registrar of Trademarks & Ors., 2023:DHC:2066 to suggest that judicial restraint should be exercised where the statutory process is available.

However, the Court emphasized the exceptionality of the present facts and drew support from Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. vs. Chhabil Das Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, and State of H.P. & Ors. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499, to reaffirm the principle that the bar on writ jurisdiction in the face of alternate remedies is not absolute but a rule of prudence and policy.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:  The court noticed that it was not just about isolated errors, but a systemic administrative failure that shook the very integrity of the trademark registration process. The Court noted that the speed and uniformity with which the applications were processed and accepted on the same day, without due scrutiny, indicated a failure to comply with Rule 33 and Section 11 of the Act.

The Court also appreciated the Registrar's candid admission of error and swift initiation of departmental action. However, recognizing that such failures could have far-reaching consequences and erode public faith in the statutory regime, the Court felt compelled to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to prevent further miscarriage of justice.

While acknowledging that the petitioner had not yet initiated opposition proceedings and that the time for doing so was still available, the Court found that the blatant procedural lapses warranted judicial intervention. The judge emphasized that the object was not to preempt statutory remedies but to correct a grave wrong that could affect the credibility of a public institution.

Final Decision:The Court disposed of the writ petitions by remanding all five trademark applications back to the Registrar of Trade Marks for de novo adjudication in accordance with law. The Court directed the Registrar to give appropriate notice to all concerned parties and ensure that future proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Trade Marks Act and Rules. The Registry was also instructed to initiate necessary administrative steps as per the Court’s earlier orders.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that High Courts can and should invoke their extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 when there is a demonstrable failure of statutory duties by public authorities, even if alternate remedies are available. It also affirms that the Trade Marks Registry must adhere strictly to Rule 33 of the Trade Mark Rules and Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, and cannot mechanically process applications without a thorough examination. Administrative convenience or speed cannot override legal compliance and procedural fairness.

Case Title:Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India :Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 29-33/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India

Case Title:Kamdhenu Limited Vs. Union of India :Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 29-33/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

The petitioner, Kamdhenu Limited, filed a batch of writ petitions challenging the manner in which the Trade Marks Registry processed and accepted five trademark applications. The challenge was based on serious procedural lapses, including non-compliance with Rule 33 of the Trademark Rules and Section 11 of the Trademarks Act. It was alleged that the Registry ignored existing prior registrations of the petitioner and accepted the impugned applications within minutes on the same day of filing, without due examination.

The dispute centered on whether the acceptance of the impugned trademark applications by the Registrar of Trade Marks was legally valid when the process showed signs of procedural irregularities, including suspicious haste and lack of a proper search report reflecting the petitioner’s prior trademarks.

The Judge found that the circumstances indicated a clear administrative lapse and failure of statutory duties by the Registry. The Court acknowledged that although alternate statutory remedies were available, the exceptional facts warranted exercise of the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the Registrar of Trade Marks had already admitted errors and initiated departmental action against the concerned examiners.

In its decision, the Court exercised suo motu powers to remand all five trademark applications for fresh adjudication. It directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to conduct a de novo examination of the applications in accordance with law, after giving due notice to all parties. The petitions were accordingly disposed of without delving into the merits of each application.

RPG Enterprises Limited Vs. RPG Nirman Private Limited:

Case Title: RPG Enterprises Limited Vs. RPG Nirman Private Limited:Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 532/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The plaintiff, RPG Enterprises Limited, filed a suit seeking permanent injunction against the defendants for trademark infringement, passing off, and related reliefs. The plaintiff asserted rights over the well-known trademark ‘RPG’, which has been in use since 1979 and registered since 1999, derived from the name of its founder Rama Prasad Goenka. The plaintiff pointed out that the defendants were using the identical mark ‘RPG’ despite an earlier rectification order dated 8th January 2025, whereby the registration of the defendant’s trademark had been cancelled on the grounds of bad faith and dishonesty.

The dispute concerned the unauthorized and continued use of the ‘RPG’ mark by the defendants, who were found to be operating from the same address and managed by the same individual. The plaintiff argued that such use was not only dishonest but also caused confusion and amounted to misuse of the goodwill attached to the well-known mark ‘RPG’.

The Judge held that a prima facie case had been established in favour of the plaintiff. The Court found that the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiff and that irreparable harm would be caused if the defendants were allowed to continue using the mark. The Court also observed that public interest would be harmed due to the likelihood of confusion caused by the deceptively similar marks.

The Court granted an interim injunction, restraining the defendants from using the mark ‘RPG’ or any ‘RPG’-formative marks in relation to their services, until the next date of hearing.

Paris Foods and Chemical Industries Vs. Martbaan

Case Title: Paris Foods and Chemical Industries Vs. Martbaan:Date of Order: 28th May, 2025:Case Number: CM(M)-IPD 20/2024:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

The petitioner challenged an order passed by the District Judge in a commercial suit for trademark infringement, where the trial court had permitted the respondent to place on record additional documents belatedly. These documents, including certain invoices, were allowed without notice to the petitioner and without any explanation from the respondent for the delay in filing them along with the original or amended plaint.

The dispute before the High Court involved the validity of the trial court’s order that accepted late documents without prior notice or opportunity to respond, allegedly in violation of the Commercial Courts Act and the Civil Procedure Code provisions, particularly Order XI Rule 1. The petitioner argued that allowing such documents without leave of the court and without just cause contravened procedural norms and relied on multiple precedents to support this claim.

The Judge held that the order passed by the District Judge was legally sustainable as it was a conditional order requiring the respondent to pay costs of ₹10,000 and also granted the petitioner liberty to file rebuttal documents. The Court noted that the petitioner had already accepted the cost amount, and by doing so, effectively acquiesced to the order and waived the right to challenge it. It reiterated the settled principle that parties cannot approbate and reprobate and cited various precedents confirming that accepting costs amounts to accepting the order.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no error in the District Judge’s decision and that the petitioner, having accepted the benefits under the impugned order, could not subsequently challenge it.

Rakesh Kumar Mittal Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Case Title: Rakesh Kumar Mittal Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: 27th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 40/2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4432:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

The petitioner applied for registration of the trademark MILTON in Class 9, which was granted on 30th May 2003 and was due for renewal on 6th May 2004. The trademark was removed from the Register due to non-renewal, as notified in the Trade Marks Journal dated 16th October 2010. The petitioner later discovered via an RTI response that the Registrar had not issued the mandatory Form O-3 notice before removing the mark, as required under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 64(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002.

The dispute revolved around whether the removal of the registered trademark from the Register was valid when the Registrar had failed to issue the statutory notice informing the proprietor of the impending expiration and renewal conditions. The petitioner contended that without such notice, he had no knowledge of the expiry and hence could not file for renewal.

The Judge analyzed Section 25(3) and Rule 64(1), affirming that the issuance of Form O-3 notice is a mandatory precondition for the removal of a registered trademark. Citing binding precedents including Union of India v. Malhotra Book Depot (2013 SCC OnLine Del 828) and Cipla Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1270), the Court held that failure to serve the notice rendered the removal illegal. The Court emphasized that statutory procedures must be followed step by step and that skipping mandatory steps vitiates the legality of administrative action.

The Court held the removal of the petitioner’s trademark MILTON from the Register to be unlawful and directed its restoration. It also directed that, upon filing appropriate applications and completing formalities, the trademark must be renewed for the periods 2004–2014, 2014–2024, and 2024–2034, and renewal certificates be issued accordingly.

Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Procedural Integrity and Proprietary Authority in Trademark Administration

Introduction:This case concerns the legal complexities arising from a trademark ownership dispute between former partners of a business. The matter delves into issues surrounding the alteration of the registered address of a trademark, the validity of administrative orders passed by the Trade Marks Registry, and the procedural integrity of such modifications. The High Court of Delhi was approached through a writ petition by the registered proprietor of the trademark “AMBIKA,” seeking rectification of the address entry in the trademark register which had been unilaterally changed at the instance of a former partner.

Factual Background:Ambika Industrial Corporation, the petitioner firm, is a longstanding user and registered proprietor of the trademark “AMBIKA” in relation to cycles and their parts. The mark has been in use since 1981, with multiple registrations filed under various classes, particularly Classes 12, 28, and 35. The dispute arises from the involvement of Respondent No. 2, Rakesh Kumar, who was formerly a partner of the petitioner firm. He retired from the firm through a retirement deed dated 1st April 1987, relinquishing all his rights, title, and interest in the firm. Despite this retirement, Respondent No. 2 later attempted to interfere with the records of the Trade Marks Registry concerning the trademark “AMBIKA.”

The petitioner firm had obtained registration of the trademark under application number 381350. A TM-24 form was submitted on 30th April 1998, requesting entry of subsequent proprietors, which was allowed by the Registry on 30th November 2006. Subsequently, the petitioner firm also instituted a civil suit, CS(COMM) 63/2018, against Ambika Exports Pvt. Ltd., a company wherein Respondent No. 2 is a director. An ad-interim injunction was passed by the Delhi High Court restraining the use of “AMBIKA” or deceptively similar marks by the respondent’s entity.

Procedural Background:The controversy arose when Respondent No. 2 filed a Form TM-34 on 23rd September 2013, seeking change of address of the registered proprietor of the trademark to his own address at 110-R, Modern Town, Ludhiana. The Trade Marks Registry allowed this request through an order dated 13th July 2018. The petitioner firm, on discovering this development through an RTI application, filed a review petition against the said order. Although a hearing was initially scheduled, it was adjourned on the request of Respondent No. 2 and never rescheduled, despite multiple reminders from the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking restoration of the original address in the register of trademarks.

Legal Issue:The core legal issue before the Court was whether the Trade Marks Registry acted lawfully and within its jurisdiction in allowing the change of address of the registered proprietor of a trademark on the basis of an application by a person who was no longer associated with the proprietor firm?

Discussion on Judgments:No external judicial precedents or case laws were cited by either party or referred to by the Court in the present matter. The case was determined purely on the basis of the factual matrix, administrative conduct of the Trade Marks Registry, and the proprietary status as per the Register of Trade Marks.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court observed that the petitioner firm continues to be the registered proprietor of the trademark “AMBIKA.” It was not in dispute that Respondent No. 2 had retired from the firm in 1987. Despite the respondent's claim to co-ownership, that dispute was pending adjudication in a civil suit and did not justify a unilateral change in the registered address by the Trade Marks Registry. The Court noted that the order passed by the Registry did not provide any rationale or legal basis for the address change, especially when it was initiated by someone with no legal authority in the firm. The Court held that such a change without notice to the registered proprietor and without any inquiry into the validity of the request was both procedurally and substantively unjustified.

Final Decision:The Court quashed the impugned order dated 13th July 2018 passed by the Trade Marks Registry and directed restoration of the registered address of the trademark “AMBIKA” to its position prior to the said order. To maintain fairness and transparency, the Court also directed that all future communications regarding the trademark by the Registry be marked to both the petitioner firm and Respondent No. 2. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with directions for compliance to be conveyed to the Trade Marks Registry.

Law Settled in This Case:The case affirms that any administrative change in the Trade Marks Register, particularly relating to address or ownership of a registered trademark, must be based on proper authority, transparency, and rationale. Unauthorized and unilateral actions by third parties without proper notice or standing cannot form the basis of valid alterations in the official records maintained by the Trade Marks Registry. Furthermore, mere pending civil disputes regarding ownership do not empower a former partner to act as a proprietor for administrative purposes unless judicially recognized.

Case Title: Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: 26th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 35/2022:Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:4865:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Case Title: Ambika Industrial Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks:Date of Order: 26th May, 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 35/2022:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4865:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The petitioner firm, Ambika Industrial Corporation, is the registered proprietor of the trademark "AMBIKA". Respondent No. 2, a former partner of the petitioner firm who had retired in 1987, filed a Form TM-34 seeking change of address of the registered proprietor to his own address. The Registrar of Trade Marks allowed this request by an order dated 13th July 2018. The petitioner challenged this order, asserting that the respondent had no right to request such a change after retirement, and that the Registry acted without justification.

The dispute centered on whether the Registry was justified in altering the registered address of the trademark on the basis of a request from a person who was no longer associated with the registered proprietor.

The Judge observed that the petitioner firm remains the registered proprietor of the mark and that the impugned order lacked any reasoning or legal basis for the address change. Without entering into the merits of the parties’ partnership dispute, which is already pending in civil court, the Court held that the change of address could not be sustained.

The Court quashed the Registrar’s order dated 13th July 2018 and directed restoration of the trademark's registered address as it stood prior to the said order. It further directed that all communications from the Registry should be marked to both the petitioner firm and respondent No. 2.

Aktiebolaget Volvo Vs. Mantis Technologies Pvt. Ltd

Case Title: Aktiebolaget Volvo Vs. Mantis Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Case Number: CS(COMM) 199/2020 Date of Order: May 13, 2025 Court: High Court of Delhi Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:3938

Fact:

Aktiebolaget Volvo (and its associated entities) filed a suit against Mantis Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and other defendants, alleging infringement of its well-known "VOLVO" trademark, which is extensively recognized and registered in India. The plaintiffs operate in the automotive and transportation sectors, providing commercial vehicles and related services globally and in India, and have invested heavily in promoting their "VOLVO" brand. The defendants, engaged in the travel and bus services industry, used the "VOLVO" mark without authorization, creating confusion and infringing on the plaintiffs' rights.

Procedural Details:

• The original suit was filed seeking an injunction to restrain infringement and passing off.
• The court initially granted ex-parte ad interim injunctions restraining certain defendants from using the "VOLVO" mark.
• Multiple defendants were served, and some were deleted or made ex parte during the proceedings.
• The court referred parties for mediation, and some defendants settled.
• Several defendants, including defendant no.7, did not appear, and the court proceeded ex parte against them.
• The court ultimately decided the case on merits, addressing damages, infringement, and the defendants' conduct.

Issue:

Whether the defendants' use of the "VOLVO" trademark amounts to infringement and passing off, considering the well-known and registered status of the "VOLVO" mark, and whether the defendants' conduct was deliberate and mala fide, warranting damages and injunctions.

Decision:

• The court found that the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs' "VOLVO" trademark and had deliberately evaded court proceedings.
• Defendants no.5, 6, 7, and 8 were noted for continued profit-making despite service and orders.
• Damages and injunctions were granted against infringing defendants.
• The court disposed of pending applications and directed the decree sheet to be drawn up, closing all remaining claims and proceedings.