Friday, August 22, 2025

Mankind Pharma Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks


Introduction

This case study examines the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Mankind Pharma Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia on August 22, 2025. The appeal was filed by Mankind Pharma Limited challenging an order of the Trade Marks Examiner that refused registration of the trademark "PETKIND" in Class 5. The central issue revolved around whether the refusal under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 was justified in light of Mankind Pharma's extensive use and ownership of the KIND Family of Marks and the existence of a prior filed application for the mark "PETKIND PHARMA."

Factual Background

Mankind Pharma Limited is a major pharmaceutical company in India, marketing an extensive range of medicinal, pharmaceutical, and veterinary preparations under various well-known trademarks. On October 1, 2021, the Appellant applied for registration of the mark "PETKIND" under Application No. 5157441 for medicinal, pharmaceutical, veterinary preparations, including dietary supplements. The Trade Marks Registry raised objections under Section 11(1), noting a prior application for a similar mark: "PETKIND PHARMA" (Application No. 4794368) by Wellford Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. for similar goods in the same class. It was contended that registration of "PETKIND" would result in public confusion given the phonetic and visual similarity of the marks.
Procedural Background

The Examining report dated November 5, 2021, set forth objections to registration of "PETKIND" under Section 11 of the Act due to the existence of the similar "PETKIND PHARMA" application by Wellford Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. The Appellant was afforded an opportunity to respond and a hearing was scheduled for March 11, 2024. The case was reviewed by the Examiner of Trade Marks, who refused the registration on March 15, 2024, holding that "PETKIND" was not registrable in light of the existing similar mark in the same class, applying Section 11(1). Aggrieved, Mankind Pharma Limited appealed to the Delhi High Court, challenging the refusal as arbitrary and contrary to trademark registration principles.

Core Dispute

The main dispute centered on whether the refusal to register "PETKIND" by the Trade Mark Examiner was legally sustainable under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The parties debated whether the similarity between "PETKIND" and "PETKIND PHARMA" for similar goods in Class 5 was likely to cause confusion, and whether Mankind Pharma’s extensive use and ownership of KIND Family of Marks should grant it prior proprietorship and distinctive association in the relevant market.

Discussion on Judgments

The Appellant invoked several judgments to support its assertion of prior use and proprietary rights:

Mankind Pharma v. Lemford Biotech Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks, Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1232, Mankind Pharma Ltd v. Arvind Kumar Trading and Anr., Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:2700, Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar M/s Novakind Biosciences, Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:7590, Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Gurinder Singh, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 257/2022, and Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Dr. Kind Formulation Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 282/2022.

All judgments above were cited to demonstrate that Mankind Pharma is the prior, recognised, and exclusive user of the KIND Family of Marks in the pharmaceutical field, that the public associates the suffix "KIND" with Mankind Pharma’s products, and that the doctrine of family of marks extends heightened protection against confusingly similar subsequent marks within the same sector.

Further, the Court referenced Manu Garg & Ratan Behari Agrawal v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 581, which clarifies the proper construction of Section 11(1): mere existence of similar marks within the same class is not sufficient for refusal; there must be actual likelihood of confusion among the public resulting from the similarity of the marks and the goods/services to which they pertain.

The main judgment providing doctrinal context was Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6914, in which it was held that the word "KIND" bears no direct relation to pharmaceutical products, but through extensive and uninterrupted usage by Mankind Pharma, it has earned distinctiveness and heightened protection in law.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tejas Karia began by analyzing Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which serves as grounds for refusing registration based on relative similarity to existing or pending trademarks. The Court clarified that Section 11(1) does not categorically bar registration upon mere similarity between marks; rather, it requires that such similarity create a likelihood of public confusion or association with the prior mark.

The Judge observed that Mankind Pharma had demonstrated extensive use of KIND-based marks since 1986, boasting over 210 registered KIND marks in Class 5 alone. It was found that the KIND Family of Marks has acquired distinctiveness, and through consistent judicial recognition, the public at large, particularly in the trade of pharmaceuticals and veterinary products, associates the KIND suffix exclusively with Mankind Pharma.

While the Cited Mark, “PETKIND PHARMA,” was flagged as a proposed-to-be-used mark without evidence of actual market presence, the Appellant had documented substantial turnover and market usage under various KIND marks, thereby asserting prior right and goodwill.

The Judge distinguished the requirement for public confusion, emphasizing that the likelihood of confusion must be established through the facts and circumstances, not presumed based on mere existence of similar marks in the same class. The Judgment found no active use of the Cited Mark and acknowledged Mankind Pharma’s market dominance and associative strength in KIND-marked products.

Accordingly, the Court held that the refusal of registration was unwarranted and arbitrary, given Mankind Pharma’s established brand equity and rights. The Judge directed that the matter proceed to advertisement, subject to resolution of any subsequent filed opposition under due legal process.
Final Decision

The Delhi High Court, on August 22, 2025, set aside the Impugned Order that refused registration of "PETKIND." The Court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to proceed with the advertisement of "PETKIND" within two months, in accordance with the Act. The Judgment further clarified that any opposition proceedings lodged against "PETKIND" would be considered independently and uninfluenced by the present order.

Law Settled in This Case

The Judgment reinforces interpretation of Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that refusal of registration on grounds of similarity is not automatic and must be supported by evidence of likely confusion among the public. The doctrine of “Family of Marks” receives further reinforcement; where a party has established distinctiveness and broad market association with a shared word or suffix, such as "KIND," prior user rights are paramount. Also, proposed-to-be-used marks must demonstrate actual use or intent for use before serving as a valid ground for refusal against established marks with overwhelming market presence.

Case Title: Mankind Pharma Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 54/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7141
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mankind Pharma Ltd. Vs. Ram Kumar


Protection of the "Family of Marks

Introduction: This case study analyses the judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court in the matter of Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Ram Kumar M/S Dr. Kumars Pharmaceuticals. The petition was instituted under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 seeking rectification by way of cancellation of the trademark "UNKIND" registered in Class 35. The judgment, delivered on August 22, 2025, by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia, provides significant insight into the proprietary rights associated with the KIND Family of Marks in the pharmaceutical sector and sets considerable precedent in the interpretation of prior use, family of marks doctrine, non-use, and the concept of confusion in trademark law.

Factual Background: Mankind Pharma Ltd., incorporated in 1991 and backed by its predecessor-in-interest’s adoption of "MANKIND" since 1986, is a prominent entity engaged in manufacturing and marketing medicinal, pharmaceutical, and veterinary preparations. The Petitioner claims a robust portfolio of over 300 trademarks, with "MANKIND" and the word "KIND" being integral elements—the so-called KIND Family of Marks. Notably, Petitioner holds registrations in all 45 classes and has established goodwill and reputation through its extensive usage of these marks, including "MANKIND".

Respondent No. 1, Ram Kumar M/S Dr. Kumars Pharmaceuticals, purportedly adopted the impugned trademark "UNKIND" on July 17, 2008, claiming usage since June 30, 2006. The Petitioner, upon learning of this registration, issued a Cease and Desist Notice which remained unanswered. The Petitioner further asserts that there are no goods evidenced to have been sold under the "UNKIND" mark by Respondent No. 1, raising grounds for rectification on the basis of non-use.

Procedural Background:The Rectification Petition was initially filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). After the abolition of IPAB and transfer of such matters to the High Courts pursuant to the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalization and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021, the present petition was listed before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia. Despite several attempts, Respondent No. 1 remained unserved; ultimately, service was effected through WhatsApp on November 19, 2024, as per the directions of the Court. However, Respondent No. 1 failed to appear and was proceeded ex parte. Respondent No. 2—Registrar of Trade Marks—was represented as a formal party, submitting that they would abide by the Court’s directions.

Core Dispute:The core question before the Court was whether the registration of the trademark "UNKIND" (Application No. 1711563, Class 35) in favour of Respondent No. 1 should be cancelled on grounds of prior use, confusing similarity, dishonesty, and non-use, considering the Petitioner’s claim of proprietary rights over its KIND Family of Marks. The dispute examined whether "UNKIND" is deceptively or confusingly similar to "MANKIND" and other marks in the KIND Family, whether the registration was bona fide, and whether Respondent No. 1 had ever used the mark in commerce.

Discussion on Judgments:Numerous judicial precedents were cited by the Petitioner, each providing different context:

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2015 SCC OnLine Del 6914): Cited to substantiate the claim that "KIND" has no direct relation to pharmaceutical products and that Mankind Pharma, having established the first use of "KIND" in the pharmaceutical sector, is entitled to heightened protection. The judgment also contextualizes the distinctiveness of the mark and the associated goodwill.

Mankind Pharma v. Lemford Biotech Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1232): This precedent affirms Petitioner’s status as the prior and recognized user of the KIND Family of Marks.

Mankind Pharma Ltd v. Arvind Kumar Trading and Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:2700): Referred in context of prior use and the legal standing conferred to Mankind Pharma’s family of marks.

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar M/s Novakind Biosciences (Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:7590): Contextually relevant to show judicial consistency in recognizing the Petitioner’s rights over KIND Family of Marks.

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Gurinder Singh (C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 257/2022): Referred to establish repeat judicial recognition of rights over marks bearing the KIND suffix.

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Dr. Kind Formulation Pvt. Ltd. and the Registrar of Trade Marks (C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 282/2022): Cited regarding the confusion likely to arise in the market from use of similar marks and extended protection to the KIND Family of Marks.

In all these references, the context was to establish the Petitioner as the prior adopter, significant proprietor, and exclusive user of ‘KIND’ marks, thus entitling it to heightened legal protection under trademark law.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Tejas Karia's analysis is noteworthy for its legal clarity and focus on established principles. The judgment begins by observing that in the absence of any defence or reply by Respondent No. 1, the pleadings made by the Petitioner remain uncontroverted, and for all practical purposes, stand admitted.

The Court notes the Petitioner’s substantial number of registrations for marks using "KIND" as a suffix and acknowledges the development of a Family of Marks, a concept protecting marks with common essential features. Relying on Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., the Judge observed that "KIND" has no generic or descriptive connection to pharmaceutical products, but through long-standing, exclusive use, the mark enjoys unique status and recognition in the public mind associated with the Petitioner.

Justice Karia finds clear evidence of prior use and registration, distinguishing the Petitioner’s mark as earlier in time and established in goodwill. On non-use, the Court finds that Respondent No. 1 did not offer evidence of use of the "UNKIND" mark since its registration—a precondition for maintaining registration under Section 47(1)(a) and (b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Furthermore, it is reasoned that “UNKIND” is confusingly similar and deceptively akin to "MANKIND" and other marks in the KIND Family—likely to cause confusion or deception in trade and among consumers. The adoption of the "UNKIND" mark by Respondent No. 1 is found to be without bonafides and was likely intended to capitalize on the Petitioner’s goodwill, reputation, and business presence.

The Judge notes particularly that distinguishing only the prefix while retaining the essential family characteristic "KIND" is insufficient to avoid confusion, and constitutes violation of the rights of the Petitioner under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act.

Final Decision:The Court allowed the petition for rectification, directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove "UNKIND" (Application No. 1711563, Class 35) from the Register of Trade Marks. Instructions were issued for compliance, with a copy to be sent to the Trade Marks Registry by the Registrar.

Law Settled in This Case: This case clarifies and reinforces several legal principles:

The doctrine of "Family of Marks" receives judicial reinforcement, particularly where an essential word or feature is accorded distinctiveness by the proprietor through substantial usage and market reputation, even if such word is not inherently distinctive vis-à-vis the product category.

Prior user and goodwill associated with a series of marks can be pivotal in claiming exclusive rights and opposing later registrations.

Registration without bona fide use coupled with a lack of evidence of commercial use is a ground for rectification under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The adoption of deceptively or confusingly similar marks, particularly where the essential character of a prior registered mark is retained by a subsequent entrant, merits cancellation in the interest of preventing confusion and preserving the integrity of the Register.

Case Title: Mankind Pharma Ltd. Vs. Ram Kumar
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 566/2022
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7142
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Condor Footwear (India) Limited & Anr. Vs. Nexgen Footwear Private Limited


Filing of additional documents along with Replication in response to written statement in a commercial dispute

Introduction: This case study explores the judicial determination of Condor Footwear (India) Limited & Anr. v. Nexgen Footwear Private Limited & Ors., adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi. The dispute centers on the permissibility of plaintiffs filing additional documents alongside their replication in a commercial suit, and the procedural requirements under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) as amended for such production. The case uniquely probes the intersection between specific Delhi High Court Rules and national procedural laws, especially when responsive pleadings produce new documentary evidence relevant to the controversy.

Factual Background: The plaintiffs, Condor Footwear (India) Limited and another, instituted a commercial suit against Nexgen Footwear Private Limited and others for alleged trademark infringement, specifically relating to use of the mark 'ENBLUE'. The plaintiffs initially filed the suit accompanied by an affidavit and several documents. In response, the defendants maintained in their written statement that at no point had they manufactured, marketed, or sold goods using the impugned trademark. They categorically disclaimed any present or future intent to use the mark, asserting that the lawsuit lacked any real cause of action.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a replication to the written statement and, importantly, annexed additional documents, including invoices and export documents purportedly evidencing the defendants’ use of the trademark ‘ENBLUE’ through exports from India to Somalia. These documents were central to refuting the defendants’ categorical denials regarding use of the impugned trademark.

Procedural Background: The defendants objected to the plaintiffs’ filing of additional documents with the replication, asserting violations of procedural requirements under the Commercial Courts Act and the amended CPC. They contended that such documents could only be introduced with express leave of the Court and upon showing reasonable cause for late disclosure. The defendants argued that the documents, undisputedly in existence prior to filing the suit, should have been annexed to the original plaint under Order XI of CPC as amended for commercial suits and that Rule 1(4) and (5) imposed strict timelines and leave requirements. They characterized the plaintiffs’ actions as an abuse of process intended to plug gaps in the case and remedy insufficient evidence initially presented.

The impugned order of the Joint Registrar overruled the defendants’ objections, holding that since the documents were responsive and did not cause prejudice at that stage, they could be taken on record. The defendants then filed an appeal, challenging the order for contravention of procedural safeguards and seeking to strike the additional documents from the record.

Core Dispute: The principal dispute is whether the plaintiffs were entitled to file additional documents alongside their replication in response to averments made by the defendants in their written statement. The inquiry revolves around interpretation and application of Order XI of CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, and Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The defendants maintain that all documents in the plaintiffs’ power, possession, or control, which existed at the time of filing, should have been disclosed with the plaint, and further disclosure at the replication stage is permissible only upon satisfying statutory cause and obtaining leave. The plaintiffs contend that the documents were responsive, served alongside replication as required by DHC Rules, and were in direct rebuttal to new contentions made by defendants.

Discussion on Judgments: The defendants relied on two principal decisions of the Delhi High Court:

CEC-CICI JV & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2797. Here, the Court emphasized that in commercial suits, parties must strictly adhere to Order XI CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, which necessitates filing all documents with the plaint, and additional documents after the prescribed thirty-day period can only be filed on establishing reasonable cause with leave of Court.

Saregama India Ltd. v. ZEE Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2437. This decision reaffirmed strict construction of Order XI Rule 1(5), holding that the plaintiff cannot rely on original documents not disclosed in the plaint except upon showing reasonable cause and securing leave. Even in response to issues raised by the defendant, late filing is not permitted unless procedural requirements are met. The Court specifically cautioned against leniency in procedural compliance, noting that such practices risk undermining the objectives of the Commercial Courts Act.

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied upon Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, highlighting that replication must be served along with any documents in the plaintiff’s possession that they seek to file with replication. The Rule provides for endorsement of service and does not bar filing responsive documents at that stage when serving replication.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Tejas Karia carefully reviewed both the national procedural law and the specialized Delhi High Court Rules governing pleadings and document production in commercial suits. The Court noted that the defendants’ written statement expressly denied any use of the impugned trademark and asserted that the suit lacked cause of action—a factual assertion central to the controversy. In direct response, the plaintiffs’ replication not only contested these denials but furnished Bills of Lading and Commercial Invoices showing that the defendants did indeed export ENBLUE-branded goods overseas.

Justice Karia found that the documents annexed to replication were not belated filings or attempts at remedying prior deficiency in pleadings, but rather responsive documents relevant to refuting new averments in the defendants’ statement. The Judge highlighted Rule 5 of the DHC Rules, which specifically authorizes plaintiffs to serve documents with the replication when responding to contentions. Unlike documents which remained undisclosed despite being in possession, responsive documents plausibly accrue out of pleadings and are allowed at the stage of replication.

The Court acknowledged the principles outlined in CEC-CICI JV and Saregama India Ltd. but distinguished the facts, noting that the present case involved documents directly responsive to a categorical assertion introduced by the defendants. Permitting such documents ensures a full accounting of the dispute and does not prejudice the defendants, who are also given the opportunity to respond with further evidence. The Court thus found no infirmity with the Registrar’s order admitting the documents.

Final Decision: The High Court of Delhi dismissed the appeal, upholding the impugned order of the Joint Registrar. The plaintiffs’ additional documents annexed to the replication were lawfully taken on record, as they were responsive to contentions first introduced in the written statement. The defendants were given liberty to file any further responding documents within four weeks. The matter was directed to proceed before the Joint Registrar on the scheduled date.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment reaffirms that in commercial suits before the Delhi High Court, the procedural regime governing filing of additional documents must be interpreted in context with specialized court rules. Responsive documents annexed to replication are permissible when they directly rebut new factual assertions raised in the written statement, provided they are served as required. However, the regime of strict timelines and leave of Court for belated filings under Order XI CPC, as amended, continues to apply for all other documents not directly responsive in nature. The judgment balances robust compliance with procedural discipline and the need for thorough adjudication on merits, ensuring neither party is prejudiced.

Case Title: Condor Footwear (India) Limited & Anr. Vs. Nexgen Footwear Private Limited & Ors.
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 605/2024 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7140
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Cargill Incorporated Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks


Non-Speaking Orders in Trademark Law

Introduction: This legal case study analyses the appeal filed by Cargill Incorporated against the Registrar of Trade Marks before the High Court of Delhi. The dispute centers around Cargill’s application to register the trademark “TOPCITHIN” in Class 1, its prior international use and adoption, and the objections raised owing to the existence of a similar mark registered by another entity. The litigation probes into the procedural fairness, consideration of prior use, sufficiency of reasoning in administrative orders, and the interplay between rectification proceedings and trademark registration.

Factual Background: The trademark “TOPCITHIN” was originally conceptualized and adopted by Cargill’s predecessor, Lucas Meyer GmbH & Co., from as early as 1969. The mark was first registered in Germany in 1973 and maintained until 2009. Through a series of corporate acquisitions and mergers, all rights in the trademark passed from Lucas Meyer GmbH & Co. to SWK Trostberg AG in 1999, later absorbed by Degussa AG in 2001, and eventually acquired by Cargill’s German operations in 2006. The mark was assigned and adopted globally throughout this period.

In India, Cargill began using the mark “TOPCITHIN” since 2011 for lecithin used in food, cosmetics, animal feed, and related emulsifier products. On 17th October 2020, Cargill filed for registration of “TOPCITHIN” in India, claiming prior use from February 2011. Importantly, an Affidavit of Prior Use and supporting evidence was submitted promptly. The subject application was examined by the Registrar of Trade Marks on 19th November 2020, but the Appellant claims never to have received the examination report directly.

The objection raised by the Registrar centered on Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, noting the existence of a similar mark “TOPCITHIN” under Registration No. 896028 for “Lucas Meyer Industries Private Limited” as of January 2000. Despite the apparent similarity and potential for confusion, Cargill contested the grounds for refusal, maintaining its rights as the earlier adopter with a globally recognized trademark.

Procedural Background: Upon discovering the objection in the online records, Cargill promptly responded with a detailed reply on 7th December 2021, asserting its prior rights and referencing international registrations. It also filed a rectification petition No. 273414 seeking removal of the cited mark from the registry, arguing that the mark remained registered without sufficient cause.

In December 2023, the Registrar scheduled a pre-publication hearing, where Cargill’s counsel made oral submissions aligned with its written reply and highlighted the pending rectification petition. Despite these representations, the Registrar issued an order on 31st January 2024 refusing the application for trademark registration, holding that the mark was deceptively similar to the cited mark. Cargill filed the present appeal against this administrative order, claiming misrepresentation of submissions and an erroneous understanding by the Registrar.

Core Dispute:  At the heart of the case is whether the Registrar’s order rejecting Cargill’s application for registration of the mark “TOPCITHIN” is legally sustainable. The essential questions are whether the Registrar erred in recording submissions, failed to consider material evidence of prior use, and disregarded the pending rectification petition, thus violating principles of natural justice and administrative fairness.

A secondary but significant point revolves around whether prior international adoption and registration, along with actual use in India, confer stronger trademark rights for Cargill compared to the cited mark, which was registered on a “proposed to be used” basis and allegedly lay unused.

Discussion on Judgments: During the proceedings, Cargill relied upon specific legal authorities to demonstrate that orders passed contrary to the record must be set aside. The primary precedents cited include:

Order dated 10.01.2024 of the Delhi High Court in Hyclone Laboratorie, Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Mark, C.A (COMM.IPD-TM) 73/2021. In this case, it was held that findings contrary to the underlying record invalidate orders which refuse trademark registration.

Delhi High Court judgment in Mikko Vault LLC v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Neutral Citation: 2002 DHC 004440. Here, the Court quashed an order where the respondent failed to consider essential points urged by the appellant in response to the examination report.

These citations were invoked to emphasize the necessity for reasoned and speaking orders by administrative authorities, especially when submissions or critical documentary evidence have been placed on record but not expressly addressed.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Tejas Karia’s analysis centered upon whether the Registrar had properly recorded and considered Cargill's submissions and evidence of prior use. A careful examination of the reply to the examination report and the Registrar’s order revealed incongruence; the impugned order not only misrepresented Cargill’s arguments but failed to mention or analyze the substance of the documentary evidence submitted.

Despite assertions by the Registrar that “all documents on record” had been reviewed, no reference was made to the key issue of prior international adoption and the effective use of the mark in India prior to the cited mark. The Court found that the Registry overlooked Cargill’s argument that the cited mark remained on the register without sufficient cause and did not account for the pending rectification petition, which could impact the fate of the subject application.

Cargill’s counsel categorically denied making submissions attributed to them in the impugned order regarding the lack of similarity between the marks. Documentary records confirmed that Cargill’s written reply recognized the similarity but placed faith in its prior adoption and use. In line with statutory and judicial precedent, the Court held that a non-speaking and unreasoned administrative order is contrary to law.

Final Decision:  The High Court of Delhi allowed the appeal, quashing the impugned order dated 31st January 2024 passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks. The Court remanded the matter, directing the Registrar to reconsider the application afresh after granting the Appellant an opportunity to file additional evidence and documents, and to be heard in accordance with law. Pending determination of Cargill’s rectification petition was also directed to be expedited and resolved prior to the subject application’s decision. The matter was disposed of in terms of these directions.

Law Settled in This Case:  The judgment reaffirms a cardinal principle of trademark law and administrative justice: refusal of registration must be supported by proper reasoning, due consideration of evidence, and accurate recording of submissions made by applicants. Where prior use and international adoption are substantiated, authorities must do more than mechanically cite similarity. When rectification and cancellation proceedings are pending against a cited mark, these must be considered before finalizing the fate of the subsequent applicant’s trademark rights. The decision places a premium on procedural fairness, thorough analysis, and the necessity for administrative orders to be speaking, transparent, and reflective of the actual submissions and documents presented.

Case Title: Cargill Incorporated Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks
Date of Order: August 7, 2025
Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 43/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7113
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Champion Project Enterprises Vs Union of India

Copyright Claims in Governmental Technology Projects

Introduction: This case study concerns the writ petition filed by Champion Project Enterprises and others versus the Union of India and others before the High Court of Delhi. The petitioners allege unauthorized use and infringement of their original work, the “Student Permanent Account Number” (SPAN) Project, by the Government of India through the APAAR ID Project—Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry. The matter fundamentally revolves around allegations of copyright infringement vis-à-vis a digital academic identity project launched nationally and the subsequent claim for compensation running into hundreds of crores by the petitioners.

Factual Background: The genesis of the SPAN Project dates back to the tragic earthquake of 1993 in Latur, Maharashtra. Petitioner No. 2, then a student, was motivated by the loss of personal and educational documents during that disaster to develop a centralized digital record management system intended to safeguard every student’s educational journey from kindergarten to post-graduation. After years of conceptualization and development, this solution was christened “SPAN.”

According to the petitioners, SPAN was designed to assign a permanent digital academic number to every student in India, ensuring secure preservation and accessibility of educational records across the country. In February and May 2017, the petitioners claimed to have reached out to the Education Minister, Government of India, sharing the details and potential benefits of the SPAN Project, including its projected financial benefits for the government. They further asserted that APAAR ID, introduced by the Government of India in 2024, mirrors the functionality and structure of their SPAN Project. The petitioners averred that their copyright application for the SPAN Project was submitted in May 2023 and remains pending. Objections raised by the Registrar of Copyright regarding authorship were addressed by October 2023.

The APAAR ID Project, as noted, was claimed by the Ministry of Education to be based on the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, but the petitioners disputed this claim, asserting the absence of documentation regarding APAAR ID in relevant government notifications or NEP documents. The first official mention of APAAR was reportedly during a panel discussion in July 2023.

Procedural Background: The petitioners brought this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of mandamus and other appropriate orders for compensation amounting to ₹4,28,53,58,300 for the alleged unauthorized use and copyright infringement of their SPAN Project. Subsequent communications under the Right to Information Act (RTI) between December 2024 and March 2025 sought explanations about the development and adoption of APAAR ID, project tendering, and the status of the SPAN Project’s copyright registration. The Ministry of Education’s response in January 2025 denied direct relevance and clarified the launch dates and procedural aspects of APAAR ID development.

The petitioners, dissatisfied with these explanations, proceeded with appellate mechanisms under the RTI Act and further representation before the Copyright Office and governmental ministries.

Core Dispute:  The primary dispute in this matter is whether the APAAR ID Project, as launched and implemented by the Union of India, constitutes an unauthorized copy and infringement of the petitioners’ SPAN Project under the Copyright Act, 1957. The petitioners allege that their intellectual property was communicated to the authorities in 2017 and that the structure, objective, and essence of APAAR ID are substantially derived from SPAN. It is contended that such appropriation occurred without consent, attribution, or acknowledgment, culminating in significant alleged financial loss and violation of statutory rights.

On the contrary, the respondents, represented by government counsel, maintained the originality and policy-driven development of APAAR ID, denying all allegations of copying, unauthorized use, and infringement.

Discussion on Relevant provisions of law:  Throughout the proceedings, both parties referred to statutory provisions and earlier judgments to substantiate their positions.

However, it is noteworthy that the petition document and the judgment, as delivered, do not specifically enumerate or cite any earlier precedents or judgments by name or citation number. The petitioners mainly leaned on the statutory framework—specifically Section 2(o) and Section 13(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957—to claim subsistence of copyright and the enforceability of original works even during the pendency of registration. Section 63 of the Act was invoked regarding wilful infringement.

The respondents relied on the lack of substantive evidence of copying, absence of documented government communications regarding APAAR ID before 2023, and procedural discrepancies in the petitioners’ copyright application.

In the judgment, the Court itself did not refer to or rely upon any previous High Court or Supreme Court decisions, focusing predominantly on the facts and statutory interpretation as pleaded and evidenced before it.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Tejas Karia meticulously analyzed the material placed before the Court. The judgment notes the petitioners’ reliance on letters allegedly sent to the Ministry in 2017 sharing the SPAN concept. Upon examination, however, the Court found no proof of dispatch or receipt. Even assuming the letter had been sent, it did not annex the full SPAN project details as submitted during the litigation. The similarities provided in the petition did not form part of the letter allegedly sent to the Ministry.

A central finding was that there was no basis for the allegation that APAAR ID was a copy of SPAN simply on the grounds of the letter sent in 2017. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Registrar of Copyrights had shared the SPAN Project details with the Ministry of Education, precluding any claim of unlawful reproduction based on information obtained from the copyright application.

The timing of APAAR ID’s launch and clearance of copyright objection was also considered. The APAAR ID Project was launched while the petitioners’ copyright application was still under objection, which undermined any argument that the project was copied from SPAN. Throughout, the petitioners failed to establish any traceable infringement under the Copyright Act.

Given the absence of substantive evidence and lack of material showing sharing or adoption of the SPAN concept by government authorities, as well as the lack of correlation between the alleged dissemination of SPAN details and the implementation of APAAR ID, the Court concluded that the petitioners had not made out a case for copyright infringement.
Final Decision

The High Court of Delhi dismissed the writ petition, holding it devoid of merit. The Court found that the petitioners did not establish any infringement of copyright by the respondents in developing or implementing APAAR ID, nor did the evidence support the claim of unlawful copying or utilization of the SPAN Project. Accordingly, all pending applications were disposed of alongside the main petition.

Law Settled in This Case:  This judgment clarifies the evidentiary standards requisite for establishing copyright infringement claims, particularly in relation to governmental projects and alleged appropriation of original works. Mere transmission of proposals or conceptual communications to authorities does not constitute actionable dissemination unless supported by documented proof of acceptance, use, or sharing of the substantive details of the original work. The pendency or existence of copyright registration, in itself, does not prove unauthorized use or infringement unless clear, corroborated evidence is presented. The Court reinforces that claims of copying must move beyond parallels in objectives or structure and must be substantiated with concrete evidence of transmission, adoption, and reproduction.

Case Title: Champion Project Enterprises Vs Union of India & Ors
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 47/2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7165
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs Kulbir Singh

Non-Use and Rectification of Trade Marks

Introduction:The case of Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited versus Kulbir Singh and Another revolves around a trademark dispute under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the petitioner sought the cancellation and rectification of a registered trademark held by the respondent. This petition highlights key principles of trademark law, particularly concerning non-use of a mark and the criteria for removing it from the register. The High Court of Delhi examined whether the impugned mark "ROGER" registered in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages had been genuinely used by the respondent, and if the petitioner qualified as a "person aggrieved" to challenge its registration. The judgment underscores the importance of active commercial use in maintaining trademark rights and addresses the burden of proof in rectification proceedings. It draws on established precedents to clarify when a mark can be expunged due to prolonged non-use, emphasizing that mere registration without utilization does not suffice to retain monopoly over the mark.

Factual Background:The petitioner, Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited, operates a well-established business in manufacturing and marketing Indian Made Foreign Liquor and related goods, with its merchandise sold globally under various distinctive trade marks catering to different consumer segments. Over several decades, the petitioner has introduced multiple well-known brands, including "OFFICER'S CHOICE," "OFFICER'S CHOICE BLUE," "CLASS 21," "CALYPSO," "SUMO," "100 GUNEAS," "LORD & MASTER," "KYRON," "STERLING RESERVE," among others. The trade mark relevant to the present controversy is "JOLLY ROGER," which the petitioner's predecessors adopted in 1991. The petitioner's group entity, BDA Private Limited, applied for registration of the composite mark "JOLLY ROGER" in 2006, granted under Registration No. 1487257 in Class 33. Following a merger of the alcohol beverages business with the petitioner, the mark stands registered in the petitioner's name. The petitioner has extensively used the mark "JOLLY ROGER" since 2010, with products bearing this mark sold across the country. The petitioner claims that the mark "JOLLY ROGER" has acquired significant goodwill and reputation in the alcoholic beverages market in India, as evidenced by its website providing information on all products bearing the mark, leading to enhanced awareness and recognition. The petitioner further claims substantial financial investment to promote sales of its products bearing the mark "JOLLY ROGER," supported by sales figures from 2010-11 to 2023-24, showing consistent growth and totaling significant units sold. The impugned mark "ROGER" was registered under Registration No. 1799370 in Class 33 in the name of Respondent No.1, having address at C/o Roger Industries Limited, Agra-Mathura Road, Artoni, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, with the application filed on 24.03.2009 and valid till 24.03.2029. On 15.07.2024, the petitioner received a cease-and-desist notice issued by Roger Industries Limited through its director, Respondent No.1, calling upon the petitioner to cease and desist from its business operations using the mark "JOLLY ROGER." The petitioner sent a detailed reply dated 25.07.2024 to the petitioner and subsequently filed the present petition before this court. Respondent No.1 submitted that it is not the first adopter of the mark "ROGER" in India and that the said mark is a common name, further claiming several third-parties have registered trade marks containing the word "ROGER" with no monopoly over its usage for all goods and classes. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Respondent No.1 completely failed to put the impugned mark in use in relation to goods covered in Class 33. It is further submitted that a bare perusal of the memorandum of association of Roger Industries Limited shows that there is no intention to use the impugned mark for Class 33 goods. A perusal of the said memorandum of association was handed over to this court by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the same is taken on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is clear from Respondent No.1's affidavit dated 30.04.2009 filed before the registrar of trade marks during the prosecution of the impugned mark that there was no intention to use the impugned mark for goods in Class 33, and that the impugned mark is used in relation to Respondent No.1's footwear trade. It was submitted that the petitioner has filed and registered several "JOLLY ROGER" marks in Class 33 during the period from November 2020 to August 2024, which were not objected to or opposed by Respondent No.1, who establishes that Respondent No.1 never intended to use the impugned mark in relation to Class 33 goods. It was submitted that the petitioner is undergoing immense hardship on account of the registration of the impugned mark by Respondent No.1 and therefore, the petitioner is a "person aggrieved" as contemplated under Section 47 of the Act. It was further submitted that as the impugned mark has not been used in relation to goods in Class 33 for a period of 5 years 3 months before the present petition was filed, it is liable to be removed from the register of trade marks. In view of the foregoing submissions, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and consequently, the impugned mark be expunged from the register of trade marks.

Procedural Background: The present petition was filed by the petitioner under Sections 9, 18, 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the trade mark No. 1799370 registered in Class 33 for the mark "ROGER" in the name of Respondent No.1, and for rectification of the trade marks register under Rule 7 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022. Vide order dated 01.10.2024, this court directed that notice be issued to Respondent No.1 through all modes and granted four weeks' time to file the reply. Thereafter, this petition was taken up by this court on 15.01.2025, however, none appeared for Respondent No.1 despite issuance of notice vide order dated 01.10.2024 and the respondents were further granted a duration of two weeks to file the reply. This matter was called again for hearing on 28.04.2025 and this court in the order of even date noted that despite Respondent No.1 being served on 11.11.2024 via speed post, no one had entered appearance on his behalf and no reply was filed by Respondent No.1 despite repeated liberty being granted to do so. Accordingly, Respondent No.1's right to file a reply was closed and Respondent No.1 was proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 28.04.2025. Respondent No.1, despite repeated opportunities granted by this court, has failed to enter appearance and file a reply. Therefore, in accordance with the order dated 28.04.2025, Respondent No.1 was proceeded ex-parte. The learned counsel for Respondent No.2 submitted that Respondent No.2 will comply with the directions passed by this court in this matter. At the outset, it is to be noted that in the absence of any appearance and reply by Respondent No.1, the pleadings made in the present petitions remain uncontroverted. It is clear that Respondent No.1 is not interested in contesting the matter. Accordingly, the pleadings herein are deemed to have been admitted by Respondent No.1.

Core Dispute: The central issue in this case pertains to whether the impugned trade mark "ROGER" registered under No. 1799370 in Class 33 should be cancelled and removed from the register on the ground of non-use for a continuous period of at least five years from the date on which the mark was entered in the register of trade marks up to a date three months prior to the date of filing the present petition. The petitioner argued that it is the prior adopter and user of the mark "JOLLY ROGER" since 1991 in respect of goods falling in Class 33 and has been using the said mark since the year 2010, and is the registered proprietor of the said mark. It is further submitted that the petitioner is a "person aggrieved" as contemplated under Section 47 of the Act. It was further submitted that the impugned mark has not been used in relation to goods in Class 33 for a period of 5 years 3 months before the present petition was filed, it is liable to be removed from the register of trade marks. Respondent No.1 entered repeated opportunities granted by this court, has failed to enter appearance and file a reply, and therefore the petitioner's claims stand uncontroverted. The dispute thus focuses on establishing the petitioner's status as a person aggrieved due to the existence of the unused mark blocking its operations, and proving the factum of non-use by the respondent in relation to Class 33 goods, despite the mark being registered for alcoholic beverages.

Discussion on Judgments:The parties and the court referred to several key judgments to support their positions on non-use, the concept of a "person aggrieved," and the removal of unused trade marks from the register. In Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 92, the Supreme Court held that before the High Court or the registrar directs the removal of the registered trade marks they must be satisfied in respect of the following: that the application is by a "person aggrieved," that the trade mark has not been used by the proprietor for a continuous period of at least five years and one month prior to the date of the application, of the trade mark during this period by the proprietor, and that there were no special circumstances which affected the use of the trade mark during the said period. This judgment was cited by the petitioner to emphasize the burden on the respondent to prove genuine use or special circumstances justifying non-use, and the court relied on it to assess whether the impugned mark met the test of locus standi and continuous non-use. In Infosys Technologies Ltd. v. Jupiter Infosys Ltd. (2011) 1 SCC 125, the Supreme Court described the phrase "person aggrieved" in the following terms: the position that emerges from the above provisions is this, whether the application is under Section 46 or under Section 56 or a composite application under both sections, it is a prerequisite that the applicant must be a person aggrieved, Section 46(1) of the 1958 Act enables any person aggrieved to apply for removal of registered trade mark. This judgment was invoked by the court to define who qualifies as a person aggrieved, noting that actions were commenced to maintain the purity of the register and that a person aggrieved would necessarily have a wider sweep, however, there was no element of public mischief in favour in rectification of a register under Section 46 of the 1958 Act (Section 47 of 1999 Act) and thus, the person aggrieved in the context of removal of trademark on account of non-use would necessarily mean a person who is interested in removal of the impugned mark. The Supreme Court referred to the following passage from the decision of Lords in Powell's Trade Mark (1894) 11 RPC 4, although they were no doubt inserted to prevent officious interference by those who had no interest at all in the register being correct, and to exclude a mere common informer, it is undoubtedly of public interest that they should not be unduly limited, inasmuch as it is a public mischief that there should remain upon the register a mark which ought not to be there, and by which many persons may be affected, who, nevertheless, would not be willing to enter upon the risk and expense of litigation, whenever it can be shown, as here, that the applicant is in the same trade as the person who has registered the trade mark, and wherever the trade mark, if remaining on the register, would, or might, limit the legal rights of the applicant, so that by reason of the existence of the entry on the register he could not lawfully do that which, but for the existence of the mark, he could lawfully do, it appears to me he has a locus standi to be heard as a person aggrieved. This precedent was cited in the context of explaining the broad interpretation of "person aggrieved" to include those whose business might be restricted by an unused mark on the register, and the court applied it to determine that the petitioner, being in the same industry, had standing to challenge the impugned mark. In Kellogg Company v. Pops Food Products (P) Ltd. (2018) SCC OnLine Del 6562, a coordinate bench of this court relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Hardie Trading, observing that the principal issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner is a person aggrieved, in Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint and Chemicals Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court explained the expression "person aggrieved" as used in Section 46 of the 1958 Act (pari materia to Section 47 of the 1999 Act) was materially different from the connotation of the said expression as used in Section 56 of the 1958 Act, the court had observed that registration should not have been granted or was incorrectly granted, these situations included: (a) contravention of failure to observe a condition for registration; (b) absence of an entry; (c) an entry made without sufficient cause; (d) a wrong entry; and (e) any error or defect in the entry. The Court further explained that any type of defect in the entry. This judgment was referred to by the court to underscore that in cases of non-use, the aggrieved party need not prove fanciful grievance but a likelihood of injury, and it supported the petitioner's claim by highlighting that no special circumstances were shown for the non-use. In A.K. Al Muhairid v. Chaman Lal Sachdeva (2024) SCC OnLine Del 1026, a coordinate bench of this court observed as under: therefore, in view of the decision of this court in Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Balraj Muttneja 2014 SCC OnLine Del 781, no further evidence required if position in this matter has been reiterated by the court on several occasions, including recently in Russell Corpn. Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Ashok Mahajan (2023) 4 HCC (Del) 301, wherein the following relevant observation was made: under such circumstances, in the absence of denial by the respondent, the court has no reason to disbelieve the pleadings as also the investigator's affidavit on record, the respondent has chosen not to appear in the matter despite being served, specific court notice was issued even to the lawyer/trade mark agent of the respondent, in the context of non-use, it is the settled legal position that use has to be genuine use in the relevant class of goods and services, unless the non-use is explained by way of special circumstances, the mark would be liable to be removed for non-use, in the present case, no special circumstances have been cited. This recent judgment was cited to affirm that in the absence of the respondent's appearance and any evidence of use, the court can proceed to remove the mark, and it was used in the context of the petitioner's uncontroverted evidence of non-use in Class 33, where the respondent failed to demonstrate any genuine commercial utilization.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The judge meticulously analyzed the provisions of Section 47(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which allows for the removal of a trade mark from the register if it has not been used for a continuous period of five years up to three months before the rectification petition is filed, unless special circumstances are shown. The court noted that the petitioner has successfully discharged the burden by providing evidence that it is the registered proprietor of multiple trade marks bearing the mark "JOLLY ROGER" in Class 33, under which it sells and markets its products. Secondly, it is uncontroverted that the petitioner has been using the mark "JOLLY ROGER" since the year 2010 and that its predecessors had adopted the said mark in 1991. Thirdly, the sales figures of the petitioner's products in Class 33 under the mark "JOLLY ROGER" reflect that it is a well-established brand in the alcoholic beverages market in India. Lastly, given the similarity between the impugned mark and the petitioner's mark, an unwary consumer of average intelligence is likely to get confused and deceived by the impugned mark. In view of the above discussion, this court has no qualms that there is a likelihood of injury or damage to the petitioner if the impugned mark is not removed from the register. Therefore, the petitioner satisfies the test of being a "person aggrieved" under Section 47 of the Act. Under Section 47 of the Act, after establishing its locus standi, the petitioner has to discharge the burden of proving the factum of non-use of the impugned mark for a continuous period of at least five years from the date on which the mark is entered in the register of trade marks, up to a date at least three months prior to the date of filing the present petition. It is the petitioner's case that Respondent No.1 never intended to use the impugned mark in relation to Class 33 goods. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew this court's attention to the affidavit of Mr. Ankur Sachdeva, Chief Revenue Officer of the petitioner, wherein it is clearly stated that the impugned mark is not in use in the market in relation to Class 33 goods and that being in the same industry, he has never come across any product of Respondent No.1 in Class 33. It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in Respondent No.1's affidavit dated 30.04.2009 filed before the registrar of trade marks during the prosecution of the impugned mark, it is admitted that the trade mark "ROGER" is used by Respondent No.1 in relation to its products in footwear trade. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the memorandum of association of Roger Industries Limited to contend that Respondent No.1 and Roger Industries Limited had no intention to use the impugned mark in relation to goods falling in Class 33. In view of the above, the court observed that the impugned mark is not in use in the market in relation to Class 33 goods.

Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and directed that the impugned trade mark "ROGER" bearing registration No. 1799370 in Class 33 be removed/expunged/rectified from the register of trade marks. The registry is directed to update the register accordingly and notify the same to the concerned trade marks registry within four weeks.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that a registered trade mark can be removed from the register if it remains unused for a continuous period of five years and three months prior to the filing of a rectification petition, without any special circumstances justifying the non-use. It clarifies that a "person aggrieved" under Section 47 includes entities in the same trade whose business may be hindered by the existence of an unused mark, even without proving actual damage, as long as there is a likelihood of restriction on their legal rights. The judgment emphasizes that the burden shifts to the registrant to prove genuine use once the petitioner establishes non-use through evidence like affidavits and market surveys, and in ex-parte proceedings, uncontroverted pleadings can lead to removal. It also settles that intent to use at the time of registration does not substitute for actual commercial use, and marks registered without bona fide intention for the specified class are vulnerable to cancellation.

Case Title: Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs Kulbir Singh & Anr.
Date of Order: 22.08.2025
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 191/2024 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7158
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Thursday, August 21, 2025

Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane and Anr.

Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane: August 19, 2025:CS(COMM) 855/2025:High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Castrol Limited, a global leader in engine oils and lubricants, filed a suit against Sanjay Sonavane and another defendant in the Delhi High Court, alleging groundless threats of legal proceedings over the use of its "3X" marks. 

The plaintiff, with a significant market presence in India using the Castrol brand, faced a seizure of its goods by Nashik police on August 9, 2025, following a complaint by the defendants claiming infringement of their "3P" marks and copyright. 

The defendants had also issued a public notice threatening action against the use of "3X" marks. Procedurally, the court granted exemptions from filing additional documents and pre-institution mediation, registered the suit, issued summons, and scheduled a hearing for pleadings completion. 

The core dispute involves the plaintiff seeking an injunction and declaration that its "3X" marks do not infringe the defendants' "3P" marks, arguing the marks are dissimilar and the threats unjustifiable. The court restrained the defendants from issuing further groundless threats until the next hearing on December 9, 2025, finding a prima facie case in the plaintiff's favor and balance of convenience with it.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Triveni Household Items Manufacturers Private Limited vs. M/s Mapples Interior LLP & Ors.

Triveni Household Items Manufacturers Private Limited Vs. Mapples Interior LLP:21/07/2025: CS(COMM) 689/2025 :High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Facts: The plaintiff, a private limited company incorporated in 1956, is the proprietor of the trademarks "TRIVENI" and "TRIVENI ALMIRAH" registered under Trade Marks Registration No. 1571155, alleging infringement by the defendants through unauthorized use of similar marks on furniture products sold across India.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed applications seeking exemption from filing original/certified/typed copies, exemption from pre-institution mediation, leave to file additional documents, extension of time for court fees, and exemption from advance service, supported by a Supreme Court judgment in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382.  

Core Dispute: The dispute involves the defendants' alleged infringement of the plaintiff's registered trademarks "TRIVENI" and "TRIVENI ALMIRAH" and passing off their products as those of the plaintiff, affecting the plaintiff's goodwill and reputation built over decades.  

Decision: The court granted ex parte injunction against the defendants from using the Trademark TRIVENI INTERIO which was deceptively similar to Plaintiff's registered Trademark TRIVENI" and "TRIVENI ALMIRAH.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Today Tea Limited vs. Darjeeling Enterprises Private Limited

Today Tea Limited Vs. Darjeeling Enterprises Private Limited : 25/07/2025: CS(COMM) 741/2025: High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Facts: The plaintiff, engaged in the sale of tea and coffee, alleges that the defendant is infringing its trademark "TODAY" and its formats "TODAY STAR" and "TODAY PREMIUM" through deceptive use of similar marks "GANGA SUPER STAR" and "GANGA PREMIUM" on packaging and trade-dress since April 2025.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed applications seeking leave to file additional documents, exemption from filing original/certified/typed copies, exemption from pre-institution mediation, exemption from advance service, and interim injunction, supported by a Supreme Court judgment in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382.  

Core Dispute: The dispute centers on the defendant's unauthorized use of marks and trade-dress deceptively similar to the plaintiff's registered trademarks and copyrighted artistic works, affecting the plaintiff's brand identity and market standing.  

Decision: The court allowed ad interim injunction from using identical Trade Dress.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Rahul Mishra & Anr. vs. Nishchay Sajdeh & Ors.

Rahul Mishra Vs Nishchay Sajdeh:04/08/2025:CS(COMM) 786/2025: High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Facts: The case involves Rahul Mishra and another plaintiff alleging that the defendants infringed their copyright in the "Tigress Artistic Work" by producing and selling garments with identical designs, including distinctive floral motifs, as part of the plaintiffs' renowned "Sunderbans" collection.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiffs filed an application under Order XI Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) as applicable to commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CC Act) for leave to place additional documents on record. They also sought exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the CC Act, citing urgency for interim relief, supported by a Supreme Court judgment. Summons were issued to the defendants, and the suit was instituted against them.  

Core Dispute: The central dispute is the unauthorized reproduction and sale of the plaintiffs' copyrighted Tigress Artistic Work by the defendants, who are accused of passing off inferior quality products as those of the plaintiffs, thereby affecting the plaintiffs' brand integrity, market standing, and creative legacy. The defendants allegedly source the infringing fabric from Defendant No. 2, forming a chain of infringement.  

Decision: The court granted ex parte injunction in fvaour of Plaintiff restraining the defendants from using Tigress Artistic Work" by producing and selling garments with identical designs, including distinctive floral motifs .  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Marriott Worldwide Corporation vs Sunjoy Hans

Case Title: Marriott Worldwide Corporation vs Sunjoy Hans and Ors.  
Date of Order: 12th August 2025  
Case Number: IPDTMA/6/2025  
Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta (Intellectual Property Rights Division)  
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Facts: The petitioner, Marriott Worldwide Corporation, a well-known hospitality brand under the Marriott Group, has used the trademark "MARRIOTT" worldwide since 1957 and in India since 1992, with registrations dating back to 1992. Respondent no. 1 claims proprietorship of the deceptively similar mark "The New Marrion" in class 43 for hotel and related services, with respondent no. 2 initially applying for its registration on 8 November 2022, later amended to respondent no. 1's name.  

Procedural Background: The petitioner appealed under Section 91 of the Trademarks Act 1999 against an order dated 18 February 2025 by the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, which dismissed the petitioner's opposition to the respondents' mark registration. The opposition was rejected due to non-apostilled evidence, leading to the current appeal heard on 12th August 2025.  

Core Dispute: The dispute centers on the rejection of the petitioner's opposition to the registration of "The New Marrion" mark, alleging it is deceptively similar to "MARRIOTT". The petitioner argues the dismissal violated natural justice and disregarded notarized evidence, while respondents claim the appeal is infructuous due to the implemented registration.  

Decision: The court set aside the impugned order, remanding the matter to the Deputy Registrar for a fresh hearing, including the petitioner's opposition with evidence, to be completed within four months. No adjudication on merits was made, and all interlocutory applications were disposed of as infructuous.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Pitambari Products Private Limited vs Sawariya Collection

Pitambari Products Private Limited Vs Sawariya Collection :14th August 2025:Commercial IPR Suit (L) No. 24983 of 2025  :High Court of Bombay:R.I. Chagla, J.  

Facts: The plaintiff, Pitambari Products Private Limited, adopted the trademark PITAMBARI in 1983 for homecare products including cleaning powders for metals, securing multiple registrations in English and vernacular languages, with sales exceeding hundreds of crores and significant promotional expenditure, establishing it as well-known. In July 2025, the plaintiff discovered a video uploaded by the defendant on Instagram and YouTube on 2nd July 2025, which garnered over 2,45,000 views, portraying the plaintiff's product as containing hazardous chemicals unfit for cleaning worship articles like idols.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed the suit and interim application seeking ex-parte ad-interim injunction against disparagement, with the matter heard without notice to the defendant on 14th August 2025 due to urgency.  

Core Dispute: The defendant allegedly disparaged the plaintiff's PITAMBARI product through the impugned video by falsely implying it is harmful for human consumption and unsuitable for religious articles, intending to slander and erode the plaintiff's goodwill while promoting its own product.  

Decision: The court found a strong prima facie case of disparagement, with balance of convenience favoring the plaintiff and irreparable harm if relief was denied, granting ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant from circulating the impugned video or any similar material and from disparaging the product.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Phonographic Performance Limited vs Urban Mayabazar

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs Urban Mayabazar:August 08, 2025:Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 11705 of 2025  :High Court of Bombay:Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.  

Facts: The plaintiff, Phonographic Performance Limited, owns copyright in sound recordings through assignments from various music companies, enabling it to license public communication of its repertoire under Section 30 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Defendant No.1, a partnership firm, operates three renowned restaurants and bars in Hyderabad and Telangana, where the plaintiff's sound recordings are played without license, including during a New Year event on 31st December 2024.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed an interim application seeking injunction against the defendants for copyright infringement, with notices issued on 30th December 2024 and 3rd February 2025 remaining unresponsive. The matter was heard on 8th August 2025, with no appearance from the defendants despite service.  

Core Dispute: The dispute centers on the defendants' unauthorized public performance of the plaintiff's sound recordings at their premises and events, including a confirmed instance on 31st December 2024, and an anticipated event on 8th August 2025, constituting copyright infringement.  

Decision: The court granted ad-interim relief, issuing an injunction restraining the defendants from publicly performing or communicating the plaintiff's sound recordings without a license, pending the suit's final disposal. The matter is listed for 17th September 2025, with the relief continuing until then.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Moondust Paper Pvt Ltd. vs Vinay Shaw and Others

Moondust Paper Pvt Ltd. Vs Vinay Shaw and Others : 8th August 2025: IP-COM/44/2024: High Court at Calcutta:Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Facts: The petitioner, Moondust Paper Pvt Ltd., is a company engaged in manufacturing, trading, importing, and exporting smoker's articles like cigarette paper booklets, matchboxes, and flavored rolling papers under the trademarks "CAPTAIN GOGO" and "GOGO" since 2015. The petitioner owns trademark and copyright registrations for these marks and claims substantial advertisement expenditure and impressive sales figures. Respondents are accused of selling deceptively similar products under marks like "GOGO" and "GOGA", infringing the petitioner's intellectual property.  

Procedural Background: The petitioner filed a rolled-up action for infringement of trademark, copyright, and passing off, with IA No. GA-COM/1/2024 heard on 8th August 2025. Despite service, none of the respondents appeared, even on the second call, leading to the court proceeding ex parte.  

Core Dispute: The dispute involves the respondents' alleged infringement of the petitioner's "CAPTAIN GOGO" and "GOGO" trademarks and copyright through the use of deceptively similar marks and passing off their products as the petitioner's, causing potential confusion among consumers.  

Decision: The court found a strong case for trademark and copyright infringement and passing off, granting protective reliefs as prayed in prayers (a), (b), and (c) of the Notice of Motion. IA No. GA-COM/1/2024 was disposed of accordingly.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

LARGAN Precision Co., Ltd vs Honor Device Co., Ltd

LARGAN Precision Co., Ltd Vs Honor Device Co., Ltd:05.08.2025:CS(COMM) 793/2025:High Court of Delhi: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Facts: The plaintiff, LARGAN Precision Co., Ltd, a company specializing in designing and manufacturing optical lenses, filed a suit against defendants Honor Device Co., Ltd and its subsidiary, alleging infringement of patented camera lens technologies (IN'754, IN'095, and IN'203) used in Honor 200 series products. The defendants, including Honor Device No. 1 (a Chinese company) and No. 2 (incorporated in India), were accused of using the plaintiff's patented technology without authorization.

Core Dispute: The central dispute revolves around the defendants' alleged infringement of the plaintiff's patented optical lens assemblies (Suit Patents) in the Honor 200 series products, including main camera, front camera, and ultrawide camera lens assemblies, without proper authorization or licensing. The plaintiff claims exclusive rights under the Patents Act, 1970, seeking permanent injunction, damages, and rendition of accounts.

Decision: After going through the claim mapping provided by the Plaintiff, the the court granted ex parte injunction in favour of plaintiff.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Wednesday, August 20, 2025

Shantanu Prakash vs. Doris Chug Gim Lian & Ors.

Navigating Procedural Rigidity: Delhi High Court's Stance on Delay Condonation in Written Statements

Introduction:This case study examines a significant judgment from the High Court of Delhi that addresses the rigid timelines for filing written statements in civil suits under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The appeals in question challenge the refusal to condone delays beyond the prescribed 120-day period, highlighting tensions between procedural strictness and equitable considerations in litigation. The decision reinforces the mandatory nature of court rules over general principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and underscores the evolving judicial interpretation of delay condonation in non-commercial suits. By dismissing the appeals, the court emphasizes the importance of timely compliance to ensure expeditious justice, while navigating arguments on legal uncertainty, the nature of the underlying suit, and historical precedents.

Factual Background:The underlying suit, CS (OS) No. 655/2017, was instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the respondents, Doris Chung Gim Lian and others, against the appellants, Shantanu Prakash and Pramod Thatoi, among others. The suit pertains to matters involving a trust or charitable institution, with allegations of malafide intentions and a chequered history between the parties. The appellants contended that the suit was a mere camouflage, lacking bonafides, and involved voluminous documents, including historical records and over a thousand emails exchanged between the parties. They also cited operational disruptions due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to office closures and limited functioning, as contributing factors to the delay in preparing their defense. The respondents, however, maintained that the appellants had been actively participating in related litigations and the present suit without any evident impediments, demonstrating continuous appearances through counsel.

Procedural Background:The suit was filed in 2017, and summons were served on the appellants. The appellants failed to file their written statements within the initial 30 days or the extended period up to 120 days as per Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The Joint Registrar, on 05.11.2024, passed a reasoned order closing the appellants' right to file the written statements due to the delay. Aggrieved, the appellants challenged this before a Single Judge in O.A. No. 226/2024 and O.A. No. 227/2024, which were dismissed by a common judgment on 23.01.2025. The appellants then filed the present appeals, FAO(OS) 39/2025 and FAO(OS) 40/2025, before a Division Bench, arguing primarily on legal grounds. The appeals were reserved on 29.07.2025 and decided on 14.08.2025, with the court hearing extensive arguments on the condonability of the delay.

Core Dispute:The central issue revolves around whether the court has the discretion to condone delays in filing written statements beyond the maximum 120-day period stipulated under Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, in non-commercial suits. The appellants argued that equity demands condonation given the suit's nature under Section 92, the historical disputes between parties, prevailing legal uncertainty during the relevant period, and exceptional circumstances like the Covid-19 pandemic and voluminous documentation. They sought to rely on past judgments allowing such delays upon payment of costs or due to interpretative ambiguities. In contrast, the respondents asserted that the rules are mandatory, with no room for condonation, and that the appellants' active participation in proceedings negated any claim of prejudice. The dispute thus pits procedural rigidity against claims of substantive justice, questioning if inherent powers or Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure can override court-specific rules.

Discussion on Judgments:The parties cited several judgments to support their positions, reflecting the evolving jurisprudence on delay condonation under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The appellants relied on Esha Gupta v. Rohit Vig, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2702, particularly paragraphs 7, 8, and 10, to argue that given the nature of the suit, it would be in the interest of justice to allow the written statement, as denying it could cause undue prejudice and prevent a fair adjudication; they emphasized the bonafides shown by having a ready defense. They invoked Amarendra Dhari Singh v. R.C. Nursery Private Limited, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 84, especially paragraphs 23 to 26, to contend that the rules preserve judicial discretion to condone delays beyond 120 days, interpreting the word "may" in Rule 4 as enabling rather than mandatory, and noting the High Court's choice not to adopt the stricter language of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In Jamaluddin v. Nawabuddin, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 974, paragraph 6 was highlighted, which references Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chabra, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 613, to submit that delays can be condoned with costs in non-commercial suits, as Order VIII Rule 1 is not mandatory; the appellants offered to pay costs but acknowledged this judgment overlooked the specific High Court Rules. Vikrant Khanna vs. Amita Lamba, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6661, paragraph 23, was cited to trace uncertainty in interpreting Rule 4, resolved only by Manhar Sabarwal vs. High Court of Delhi, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5945, arguing for leniency due to this ambiguity during the suit's dormancy. They distinguished Bharat Singh vs. Karan Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 691, as an instance where condonation was permitted, and sought to revive the distinction between Rules 4 and 5 rejected in Charu Agarwal v. Alok Kalia & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1238, paragraph 10 of which was extracted in the impugned judgment to affirm no such distinction exists, emphasizing the peremptory language "but not thereafter" in both rules. The respondents countered with Harjyot Singh vs. Manpreet Kaur, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2629, to assert that delays cannot be condoned, predating any claimed uncertainty. They distinguished Vikrant Khanna on its peculiar facts, as noted in paragraph 23, and relied on Manhar Sabarwal, along with implied references to Amit Tara and Delhi Gymkhana Club (full citations not specified but contextually supporting no condonation), to affirm the settled prohibition. Additionally, Modula India vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo, (1988) 4 SCC 619, was invoked to argue that rejecting a written statement does not leave a party defenceless, as cross-examination remains available and proceedings are not ex-parte.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Division Bench, comprising Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, meticulously analyzed the arguments, focusing on the pure question of law regarding condonation under the High Court Rules. They found no infirmity in the Single Judge's judgment, holding that the current legal position, as clarified in Manhar Sabarwal, Amit Tara, and Delhi Gymkhana Club, prohibits condonation beyond 120 days. The bench rejected the appellants' plea of legal uncertainty, noting that judgments apply retrospectively unless specified otherwise, and accepting prospective application would undermine settled principles. They deemed the suit's nature and chequered history irrelevant to this procedural issue, as no equitable considerations can override a pure legal question. The court observed that the appellants were actively represented by qualified counsel and participated in proceedings, negating claims of impediment. Explanations like Covid-19 disruptions and voluminous documents were unconvincing, given the appellants' resources. The bench agreed with the respondents that non-filing does not prejudice the defense entirely, as cross-examination persists. Ultimately, the analysis upheld the mandatory timelines to promote expeditious justice, aligning with the rules' intent over Code of Civil Procedure analogies.

Final Decision:The appeals were dismissed, with the court finding them devoid of merit. The impugned judgment of the Single Judge was upheld, confirming the closure of the appellants' right to file written statements. Pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:This case solidifies that under Rules 4 and 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, there is no discretion to condone delays in filing written statements beyond 120 days from service of summons in non-commercial suits. It clarifies that perceived distinctions between Rules 4 and 5 are untenable, and principles from Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure or inherent powers cannot be invoked to extend timelines. The decision emphasizes retrospective application of interpretative judgments, rejects equitable pleas based on suit nature or external factors like pandemics unless exceptionally compelling, and affirms that such procedural bars do not render parties defenceless, preserving rights like cross-examination.

Case Title: Shantanu Prakash Vs. Doris Chug Gim Lian 
Date of Order: 14.08.2025
Case Number: FAO(OS) 39/2025 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:6845-DB
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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