Dabur India Limited Vs. Marico Limited

Introduction

The case of Dabur India Limited v. Marico Limited and Anr. before the High Court of Delhi concerns an application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner, Dabur India Limited, sought permission to amend certain averments in its cancellation petitions filed against the trademark registrations of Marico Limited. The dispute primarily arose because of alleged inconsistencies in the pleadings of Dabur, where certain paragraphs in the cancellation petition admitted deceptive similarity of trademarks, contrary to its established stand in earlier proceedings that the marks were in fact dissimilar. The central legal question revolved around whether such inadvertent admissions could be corrected through amendment or whether they constituted binding admissions, thereby conferring vested rights on the respondent.

Factual Background

The dispute finds its origins in the commercial rivalry between Dabur India Limited and Marico Limited concerning their respective trademarks "COOL KING" and "REDKING." Marico alleged that Dabur’s mark was deceptively similar to its mark and initiated a commercial suit, CS(COMM) 303/2023, before the Delhi High Court. In that suit, Dabur unequivocally took the stand that the two marks were dissimilar, both in its oral submissions on 11 May 2023 and later through its written statement and reply to the injunction application filed on 10 July 2023.

Subsequently, Dabur filed cancellation petitions in August 2024 seeking cancellation of Marico’s trademark registration no. 5879763 under Class 03. However, due to inadvertent drafting errors, Dabur’s pleadings in paragraphs 15, 17, and 18 of the cancellation petitions wrongly recorded that Dabur’s mark was “deceptively similar” to Marico’s mark, a position contrary to its earlier stance in the commercial suit. Upon realizing this inconsistency, Dabur promptly filed amendment applications in October 2024 to bring its pleadings in line with its earlier categorical position that the marks were not deceptively similar.

Procedural Background

In the cancellation petitions filed in August 2024, Dabur sought cancellation of Marico’s trademark on grounds under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. However, before Marico filed its reply, Dabur discovered the drafting inconsistencies. Consequently, applications under Order VI Rule 17 CPC were moved in October 2024 for amendment.

Marico opposed the amendment, contending that the statements in the original petition constituted binding admissions, which Dabur could not now retract. It argued that the admissions created vested rights in its favour under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Simultaneously, Marico sought condonation of delay in filing its reply to the cancellation petition. Both sets of applications came up before the Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the Delhi High Court.

Core Dispute

The primary dispute in this case centered on whether Dabur could be allowed to amend its cancellation petitions to delete and replace inconsistent averments that had inadvertently admitted deceptive similarity of marks. The secondary but related issue was whether such admissions, even if erroneous, could be withdrawn by amendment, or whether they constituted binding admissions preventing Dabur from altering its stand.

Discussion on Judgments

The petitioner, Dabur, relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166, wherein the Court had held that errors committed by a lawyer in drafting pleadings ought to be permitted to be corrected if they do not prejudice the other side. Dabur argued that its amendment merely sought to bring consistency with its earlier written statement and reply in CS(COMM) 303/2023, where it had always maintained that the marks were dissimilar.

On the other hand, Marico relied on Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 278, where the Supreme Court emphasized that admissions made in pleadings could not ordinarily be withdrawn through amendment. It also cited Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, (2022) 16 SCC 1, para 71, to reinforce the principle that admissions in pleadings cannot be lightly disregarded or retracted, as they confer corresponding rights upon the opposing party.

Marico argued that since Dabur’s cancellation petitions had admitted deceptive similarity, those statements created a vested right in its favour, and any attempt to retract them should not be permitted.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Court carefully considered the chronology of pleadings and submissions made by Dabur in earlier proceedings. It noted that in CS(COMM) 303/2023, Dabur had categorically asserted that its mark was dissimilar to Marico’s mark, both orally and in its written statement and reply to the injunction application filed in July 2023. This position was reiterated in the amended written statement filed in October 2024.

The Court observed that the impugned averments in the cancellation petitions, filed later in August 2024, were inconsistent with Dabur’s established stand and were incongruous. The Court accepted Dabur’s explanation that the inconsistency was a result of a drafting error by its counsel. Importantly, the Court reasoned that findings on deceptive similarity are judicial determinations based on evidence and not solely on admissions or pleadings of parties. Therefore, Marico could not claim vested rights merely because of inadvertent statements in Dabur’s petition.

The Court emphasized that since the amendment application was filed promptly in October 2024, even before Marico filed its reply, there was no prejudice caused to Marico. Applying the principle laid down in Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi, the Court held that it was appropriate to allow the amendment to correct the error.

Final Decision

The Court allowed Dabur’s amendment applications in all three cancellation petitions, subject to payment of consolidated costs of Rs. 25,000 to the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee. It directed that the amended petitions be taken on record. The Court also condoned Marico’s delay of 52 days in filing its reply and granted it liberty to file replies to the amended petitions within six weeks, with rejoinders to be filed within four weeks thereafter.

Law Settled in This Case

This case settles the principle that inadvertent and inconsistent admissions in pleadings, particularly when contrary to an earlier established stand, may be permitted to be amended if such amendments are sought promptly and without causing prejudice to the opposing party. Admissions in pleadings are important but cannot be construed as irrevocable when they are demonstrably inconsistent with prior categorical assertions made on oath in related proceedings. Courts will allow amendments to bring consistency in pleadings, especially when issues like deceptive similarity are judicially determined on evidence rather than solely on admissions.

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Case Details

Case Title: Dabur India Limited Vs. Marico Limited & Anr.
Date of Order: 20 August 2025
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 172/2024, 173/2024, 174/2024
Neutral Citation: Not provided in order
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for Publication in Law Journal

1. Amendment of Inadvertent Admissions in Trademark Pleadings: Dabur v. Marico

2. Delhi High Court on Pleading Inconsistencies and Trademark Disputes

3. Admissions in Pleadings and Their Withdrawal: A Study of Dabur India Limited v. Marico Limited

4. Drafting Errors and Rectification under Order VI Rule 17 CPC: Judicial Approach in Trademark Cases

5. Balancing Admissions and Fairness in Trademark Litigation: Lessons from Dabur v. Marico

6. Consistency in Trademark Pleadings: Delhi High Court’s Perspective in Dabur v. Marico

7. Deceptive Similarity, Admissions, and Amendments: Legal Insights from Dabur v. Marico

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Would you like me to also prepare a comparative table of the judgments cited by both parties (with citation, context, and application in this case) for easy reference in your publication draft?

Cipla Limited vs Union of India

Kindly provide a detailed analytical legal case study with the following structure and specifications:

Include the following major headings in the exact order:

Introduction,Factual Background,Procedural Background,Core Dispute ,Discussion on Judgments – This must include complete citations of all judgments cited by the parties, along with the context in which they were referred to within this case.,Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge,Final Decision,Law Settled in This Case

Case Details – At the end of the case study, mention the following details: Case Title, Date of Order, Case Number, Neutral Citation, Name of Court, and Name of Judge.

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Do not use sub-paragraph numbering or bullet points in any section. Present the content in a coherent narrative format under each heading.

Mandatory Closing Statement:

At the bottom of the article, include the following lines exactly as written:

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

At the end suggest me various Suitable titles for this article for publication in  Law Journal

I have reviewed the attached court order document titled Cipla Limited vs Union of India, dated August 21, 2025, from the Delhi High Court. I will now proceed to prepare a detailed analytical legal case study based on this document as per the requested structure and specifications.Introduction

This case study examines the legal proceedings in the matter of Cipla Limited versus the Union of India through the Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, decided by the Delhi High Court. The case concerns the renewal of Cipla Limited's registered trademark "TRIEXER" which had allegedly expired without the petitioner receiving the mandatory statutory notice required to apply for renewal. The Court was called upon to interpret the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and corresponding Rules, particularly focusing on the requirement of issuing the Form RG-3 or ‘O-3 notice’ prior to the removal of a trademark from the register.

Factual Background

Cipla Limited, the petitioner, held a registered trademark "TRIEXER" (Application no. 1371553) originally registered on August 31, 2007. The trademark had expired in 2017. However, the petitioner alleged that it had not received the mandatory ‘O-3 notice’ under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Rule 58(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, which is a prerequisite notice issued by the Trademark Registry before trademark removal or renewal expiration. The petitioner sought permission to file an application for the renewal of the trademark and requested directions as to the issuance of renewal certificates and correction of records.

Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Notice was issued by the Court directing the Respondents—the Union of India and the Trademark Registry—to take instructions on the petitioner’s claim of non-receipt of the ‘O-3 notice’. The Respondents stated that the ‘O-3 notice’ could not be traced and that the petitioner's trademark had expired in 2017 due to non-renewal. They submitted a supporting order from a Coordinate Bench in Ashok Bhutani v. The Registrar of Trademarks and Another, W.P.(C)-IPD 22/2024, which dealt with similar facts.

Core Dispute

The central issue was whether the Trademark Registry was obligated to issue the ‘O-3 notice’ to Cipla Limited before the expiration of the trademark renewal period and if the absence of such notice entitled the petitioner to relief in the form of renewal despite the lapse. Cipla contended that failure to issue the ‘O-3 notice’ deprived them of the opportunity to renew, thereby entitling them to directions for renewal and correction of records. The respondents maintained that the trademark had expired in 2017 and the petitioner had failed to apply for renewal in time, with no traceable proof that the notice was issued.

Discussion on Judgments

The petitioner relied heavily on the judgment by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Motwane Private Limited vs. Registrar of Trade Marks and Another (2024 SCC OnLine Bom 661), which emphasized the mandatory nature of issuing the ‘O-3 notice’. The respondents referred the Court to the order dated September 27, 2024, by the Coordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Bhutani v. The Registrar of Trademarks and Another (W.P.(C)-IPD 22/2024), where similar issues were resolved by directing the issuance of renewal certificates and accepting renewal applications despite delays when procedural lapses like non-issuance of the ‘O-3 notice’ were found. Both judgments underscored the legal requirement of the statutory ‘O-3 notice’ prior to termination or removal of trademarks and the consequent right to renewal where such notice was not furnished.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The learned Judge accepted the uncontroverted fact that no ‘O-3 notice’ had been issued to Cipla Limited, as confirmed by both parties. The Court noted the mandatory nature of issuing the ‘O-3 notice’ under the Trade Marks Act and Rules as a safeguard to notify trademark owners about renewal deadlines. The Court observed that the omission of the petitioner to apply for renewal would not absolve the Registry from its obligation to serve this mandatory notice. It held that absence of this notice amounted to denial of a procedural right, justifying directions to allow the petitioner to file the renewal application belatedly. The Court further directed the Registrar to process the renewal application expeditiously and to correct the database with respect to the trademark's renewal status and dates. The Court also took note of the petitioner’s disclosure about assigning the trademark to Linux Laboratories Private Limited during pendency of the petition, which was recorded.

Final Decision

The Court disposed of the petition with directions allowing Cipla Limited to file its renewal application within two weeks. Upon receipt, the Trademark Registry was directed to process and renew the trademark within four weeks in accordance with law, effective retroactively from August 31, 2017, for a period of ten additional years. The Registry was also instructed to update its database records to reflect the correct renewal status. These directions mirrored similar relief granted in the cited Ashok Bhutani case, setting a clear precedent for cases involving mandatory notices.

Law Settled in This Case

The judgment firmly establishes that the issuance of the statutory ‘O-3 notice’ under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Rule 58(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, prior to trademark removal or expiration, is a mandatory procedural requirement. Failure to issue such notice deprives the trademark owner of due process and entitlement to renewal, even if the application is delayed. The Trademark Registry must issue renewal certificates reflecting the correct period and update its database accordingly. This safeguards trademark owners' rights against administrative lapses and ensures compliance with the procedural safeguards envisaged by the statute.

Case Details

Case Title: Cipla Limited vs Union of India 

Date of Order: August 21, 2025

Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 42/2025 & CM 190/2025, CM 191/2025

Neutral Citation: Not provided in the document

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suitable Titles for Publication in Law Journal:

1. "Mandatory Issuance of O-3 Notice and Trademark Renewal: Analysis of Cipla Limited v. Union of India"

2. "Procedural Safeguards in Trademark Renewal: The Delhi High Court’s Approach"

3. "O-3 Notice as a Procedural Mandate: Lessons from Cipla Limited’s Trademark Renewal Case"

4. "Judicial Enforcement of Statutory Notices in Trademark Law: A Case Study"

5. "Trademark Registry Obligations and Owner Rights: Insights from Cipla Limited v. Union of India"

Dabur India Limited Vs Marico Limited

Introduction

This case study examines the legal proceedings between Dabur India Limited and Marico Limited before the Delhi High Court concerning multiple cancellation petitions filed by Dabur challenging the trademark registrations of Marico. The controversy primarily revolves around allegations of trademark similarity and deception, and subsequent amendments sought by Dabur to align its claims consistently across concurrent litigation. The Court was required to decide on the permissibility and impact of amendment of pleadings in light of existing contradictory assertions made by the parties in related commercial suit proceedings, weighing principles of procedural fairness and judicial consistency.

Factual Background

The dispute involves Dabur India Limited as the petitioner and Marico Limited as the respondent, relating to alleged trademark conflicts. Marico had filed a commercial suit (CS(COMM) 303/2023) against Dabur alleging infringement and passing-off for its ‘REDKING’ hair oil product brand, contending that Dabur’s ‘COOL KING’ mark was deceptively similar. Dabur appeared in the commercial suit and took a categorical stand denying any similarity between the marks. In addition to the commercial suit, Dabur independently filed multiple cancellation petitions under trademark law in August 2024 seeking to cancel Marico's trademark registrations. However, the pleadings in Dabur's cancellation petitions contained inconsistent averments accusing the marks of deceptive similarity, contradicting its earlier stand.

Procedural Background

The Court was seized with interlocutory applications filed by Dabur under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking to amend the cancellation petitions to rectify errors in the pleadings that created inconsistency with the stands already taken before the Court in CS(COMM) 303/2023. The amendments proposed deletion of claims of deceptive similarity in favor of asserting non-similarity consistent with earlier pleadings in the commercial suit. Respondent Marico opposed the amendment claiming that the inconsistent pleas amounted to admissions now barred from withdrawal, relying on Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Court heard detailed arguments on whether the amendments should be permitted given that the contradictory averments may have created vested rights in favor of Marico.

Core Dispute

The primary issue was whether Dabur could amend its cancellation petitions to withdraw admissions of deceptive similarity made inadvertently, and align its pleadings with its original defense in the commercial suit denying similarity. Marico contended that allowing such amendments would prejudice its vested rights and undermine judicial consistency, asserting that admissions once made cannot be retracted. The petitioner argued that the amendment was necessary to correct lawyer errors, avoid contradictory pleadings across cases, and pose no prejudice to the respondents.

Discussion on Judgments

Dabur relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166 which permits rectification of pleadings where errors have occurred without prejudice to the other party. Marico referred to authoritative decisions including Heeralal v. Kalyan Mal and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 278 and Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, (2022) 16 SCC 1 to argue that admissions made in pleadings, particularly factual and legal admissions, cannot be withdrawn by amendments as these create binding effects and rights in favor of the opposing party. The Court was required to balance these competing jurisprudential lines relating to procedural amendments and doctrinal binding nature of admissions.

The Court observed that the inconsistent averments in the cancellation petitions were clearly incongruous with the stands taken in the commercial suit pleadings affirmed earlier. However, it noted that the amendment application was filed promptly upon realization of the error and prior to the filing of any reply by the respondents in the cancellation petitions, mitigating any prejudice. The Court emphasized that the issue of deceptive similarity at the injunction or trial stage is ultimately to be decided on merit and evidence, not merely on averments or admissions in pleadings. Applying the principles from Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi, the Court held that since the amendment does not introduce new causes of action or change substantive claims but only corrects internal inconsistency, the alteration should be allowed. The Court found no vested right accruing to Marico simply from the erroneous averments that justified denial of amendment. It underscored the petitioner’s duty to avoid contradictory pleadings and the lawyer’s error causing the inconsistency, permitting correction in the interests of justice.

The Court allowed the applications by Dabur India Limited to amend the cancellation petitions, striking the inconsistent averments asserting deceptive similarity and aligning the pleadings with earlier consistent stand denying similarity. The amended petitions were directed to be taken on record. The Court also condoned the delay by Marico Limited in filing replies and granted them time to respond to the amended petitions. Costs were imposed on Dabur towards the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee as a measure of accountability. The matter was listed for further proceedings before the Court to address the substantive trademark issues.

This case reaffirms the principle that procedural amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed to correct errors or remove inconsistencies to ensure fair adjudication of substantive rights. It establishes that accidental admissions or contradictory pleadings made without intent do not create irrevocable vested rights that bar correction, especially when amendments are sought promptly and do not prejudice the opposing party. The Court further clarifies that findings on issues like deceptive similarity require evidence-based trial adjudication and cannot be bootstrapped merely on pleadings or admissions alone. This judgment upholds consistency, procedural fairness, and avoidance of contradictory positions in connected proceedings.

Dabur India Limited Vs Marico Limited:August 20, 2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 172/2024, High Court of Delhi : Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Mahesh Gupta Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Introduction

This case study explores the appeal filed by Mahesh Gupta against an order passed by the Registrar of Trademarks. The dispute concerns the cancellation of the registration of a trademark "SMART CHEF APPLIANCES" under Class 21. Registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the appeal challenges the Registrar’s decision to rectify the Trade Marks Register by cancelling the said mark while the identical mark under Class 11 continues to subsist. The case navigates key principles in trademark law, specifically dealing with registration, objections under Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b), and the application of rectification proceedings under Section 57(4).

Factual Background

The appellant, Mahesh Gupta, filed applications for the registration of the mark “SMART CHEF APPLIANCES” under two classes—Class 11 and Class 21—on October 29, 2021. Following the examination process, the applications faced objections under Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act. The appellant responded with submissions and appeared for hearings before the trademark examiner. Upon acceptance of the replies, the Registrar accepted the applications, and the marks were advertised in the Trade Marks Journal on January 29, 2024, with the registration certificates issued on June 17, 2024. Subsequently, the Registrar issued notices under Section 57(4) proposing rectification of the register, targeting the registration under Class 21 on grounds mirroring the earlier examination objections.

Procedural Background

Following the issuance of rectification notices, the appellant filed replies and participated in a virtual hearing. The Registrar, dissatisfied with the appellant’s submissions, passed an order on June 3, 2025, cancelling the registration for the mark under Class 21 and rectifying the register accordingly. Aggrieved by this cancellation, the appellant filed the present appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The appellant concurrently moved for a stay of the Registrar’s cancellation order, arguing that the mark under Class 11 remained on the register, highlighting inconsistent treatment. The Delhi High Court accepted the notice of appeal and granted interim relief by staying the operation of the impugned order pending the final hearing.

Core Dispute

The core dispute revolves around the legality and reasonableness of the Registrar’s order cancelling the trademark registration under Class 21 while allowing the identical mark under Class 11 to subsist on the register. The appellant challenges this differential treatment as arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice. Significant emphasis is placed on the application of Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b), which relate to absolute grounds for refusal of trademark registration such as lack of distinctiveness or deceptive similarity. The appellant also contests the Registrar’s apparent disregard of the anti-dissection rule, which prohibits dissecting a composite trademark to invalidate a part while protecting the whole.

Discussion on Judgments

The parties cited several relevant judgments to support their positions. The appellant relied on established case law affirming the principle that identical marks registered under different classes related to allied and cognate goods should be treated uniformly to prevent arbitrariness. The principle of anti-dissection cited by the appellant reflects judgments which hold that trademarks should be considered as a whole, rather than dissected into components for the purpose of refusal or cancellation. The respondent referenced precedents empowering the Registrar’s discretion under Section 57(4) for rectification and under Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) for refusal on grounds of distinctiveness and resemblance. However, the detailed citations of these judgments and their factual contexts were not explicitly recorded in the order, implying that nuanced legal argumentation on judicial precedents was part of the submissions considered by the Court.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tejas Karia observed that the appellant had made a prima facie case warranting interim protection of the trademark under Class 21 pending final adjudication. The Court noted that the mark registered under Class 11 continued to legally subsist, which underscored the appellant’s argument about inconsistent treatment. It was reasoned that immediate cancellation of the Class 21 mark without uniform application of law could cause irreparable harm to the appellant, including exposure to third-party adoption and market confusion. The judge found no immediate prejudice to the Registrar if the operation of the cancellation order was stayed. Based on these considerations, the Court temporarily stayed the operation of the impugned order, balancing the interests of both parties pending resolution. This interim relief reflected a commitment to fairness and procedural justice without prejudging the merits.

The Court granted a stay on the operation of the Registrar’s order dated June 3, 2025, which cancelled the registration of the trademark “SMART CHEF APPLIANCES” under Class 21. The stay was granted on the grounds of the prima facie case made by the appellant, the subsistence of the identical mark under Class 11, and the potential harm that could arise from premature cancellation. The matter was posted for further hearing on September 26, 2025, to decide the substantive issues raised in the appeal.

This case reinforces the principle that trademark registrations under allied classes for identical marks should be subject to consistent and fair treatment by the Registrar of Trademarks. It highlights that cancellation orders must be reasoned with cogent justification, respecting natural justice and the anti-dissection rule. Further, the case affirms the scope of interim relief in trademark disputes to prevent undue harm pending final adjudication, balancing parties’ rights while the legal questions remain unresolved. The decision underscores the importance of procedural fairness in rectification proceedings under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Mahesh Gupta Vs The Registrar of Trademarks: August 19, 2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 50/2025: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Rajat Gupta Vs. Rupali Gupta

Rajat Gupta vs. Rupali Gupta 

Introduction

This case revolves around a reference made by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court to a Division Bench concerning the applicability of contempt proceedings in matters involving mutual consent divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The reference arises from a batch of contempt petitions where one spouse alleged willful disobedience by the other in failing to adhere to undertakings to proceed with divorce by mutual consent. The court examined whether such failures attract contempt liability, considering the statutory framework that allows parties to reconsider their decision during the divorce process. The judgment clarifies the boundaries between enforcing settlements and respecting the legislative intent behind mutual consent provisions, emphasizing the protection of marital institutions while addressing breaches of court-accepted undertakings.

Factual Background

The reference stems from multiple contempt petitions filed before the Delhi High Court, where petitioners claimed that respondents had breached undertakings to file or appear in petitions for divorce by mutual consent. In most cases, the parties had entered into settlements, either in court through mediation or outside, agreeing to dissolve their marriage under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. These settlements often included considerations such as monetary payments, property transfers, or child custody arrangements. The undertakings were recorded in consent orders or joint statements accepted by the court. However, in several instances, one spouse refused to proceed with the first motion under Section 13B(1) or the second motion under Section 13B(2), leading to allegations of willful disobedience. The table provided in the judgment details 17 such cases, highlighting whether settlements were reached in or outside court, the stage of proceedings, and the petitioner's gender. Except for two cases without consideration, all involved undertakings against monetary or other benefits.

Procedural Background

The contempt petitions were initially heard by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, who noted conflicting views in prior judgments regarding contempt for failing to honor undertakings in mutual consent divorce proceedings. Doubting the correctness of certain Single Judge decisions in light of a Division Bench ruling, the judge framed four questions of law on January 9, 2017, and referred the matter to a larger bench. The Division Bench, comprising Justices Hima Kohli and Deepa Sharma, appointed an Amicus Curiae and heard arguments from counsels representing the parties. The bench analyzed statutory provisions, judicial precedents on contempt and waiver, and the public policy implications of marriage. After extensive deliberation, the reference was answered on May 15, 2018, providing clarity on the issues and guidelines for family courts.

Core Dispute

The central issue is whether a spouse can be held liable for contempt of court for failing to file or appear in mutual consent divorce proceedings despite an undertaking to do so, given the statutory right under Section 13B(2) to withdraw consent during the cooling-off period. The dispute balances the enforcement of court-accepted settlements against the legislative intent to allow reconsideration in divorce matters, which are rooted in public policy favoring the preservation of marriage. It also examines if such undertakings waive the right to rethink, the need for judicial guidelines in recording settlements, and the validity of prior judgments on similar issues.

Discussion on Judgments

The parties cited several judgments to support their positions on contempt, waiver, and mutual consent divorce. Sureshta Devi vs. Om Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC 25, was referred to emphasize that mutual consent must continue until the decree is passed, allowing unilateral withdrawal at any stage before the final order, as it underscores the ongoing nature of consent in Section 13B proceedings. Smruti Pahariya vs. Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338, was discussed in the context of mutual consent being a jurisdictional fact, requiring the court to verify its genuineness at the second motion stage, reinforcing that consent cannot be presumed from initial filings. Anil Kumar Jain vs. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415, was cited to highlight that irretrievable breakdown is not available to lower courts, and consent must subsist throughout, supporting the argument against compelling divorce. Hitesh Bhatnagar vs. Deepa Bhatnagar, AIR 2011 SC 1637, was used to argue that decree requires complete satisfaction of free consent, allowing withdrawal unless proven otherwise. Rajesh R. Nair vs. Meera Babu, AIR 2014 Kerala 44, was referenced to contend that courts cannot probe the bona fides of consent withdrawal, as it is an unqualified right under Section 13B(2). Prakash Alumal Kalandari vs. Jahnavi Prakash Kalandari, AIR 2011 BOM 119, was invoked to suggest that unilateral withdrawal after acting on consent terms may not be permitted if detrimental to the other party. Ishita Kunal Sangani vs. Kunal Sudhir Sangani, 2014 (6) ABR 767, was mentioned but noted as quashed by the Supreme Court. Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and Anr., 2006(11) SCC 114, was cited to argue that breach of a consent decree amounts to contempt, as it combines contract and judicial command. Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Dharam Godha and Ors., 2003(11) SCC 1, was referred to define willful disobedience in civil contempt, emphasizing intent and feasibility. Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, was used to distinguish contempt from execution in post-decree breaches. Krishna Bahadur vs. Purna Theatre and Ors., (2004) 8 SCC 229, was discussed for the principle that statutory rights can be waived if no public interest is involved. Hirabai Bharucha vs. Pirojshah Bharucha, AIR (32) 1945 Bombay 537, was cited to illustrate maintenance as a public policy matter that cannot be waived. Jyoti vs. Darshan Nirmal Jain, AIR 2013 Gujarat 2018, was referenced to stress marriage's public policy dimension, requiring efforts to sustain it. Nagendrappa Natikar vs. Neelamma, 2014(14) SCC 452, was used to argue that maintenance rights cannot be waived due to social welfare considerations. Angle Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Ashok Manchanda & Ors., 2016(156) DRJ 290(DB), was invoked to explain enforcement of mediated settlements under Section 89 CPC. Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Cherian Varkey Construction Company Private Limited, (2010) 8 SCC 24, was cited for ADR mechanisms and their execution. Dr. Keshaorao Krishnaji Londhe vs. Mrs. Nisha Londhe, AIR 1984 BOMBAY 413, was referred to trace the evolution from fault theory in divorce laws. Shri Lachoo Mal vs. Radhey Shyam, 1971(1) SCC 619, was used to validate waivers without statutory prohibition. Rajiv Chhikara vs. Sandhya Mathur, 2017 (161) DRJ 80 (DB), was cited to treat resiling from settlements as cruelty. Amardeep Singh vs. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746, was discussed for waiving the cooling-off period in irretrievable breakdowns. Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India & Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 409, was referred to affirm inherent contempt powers. T. Sudhakar Prasad vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 516, was cited to confirm contempt powers' constitutional basis. S. Balasubramaniyam v. P. Janakaraju & Anr., 2004 (5) Kar. LJ 338, was invoked for breach of undertaking as contempt. Inderjit Kaur vs. Rajinder Singh, 18 (1980) DLT 197, was used to consider changed circumstances in dropping contempt. Ashish Ranjan vs. Anupma Tandon, (2010) 14 SCC 274, was cited for agreements defeating statutes not attracting contempt. Rajesh vs. Mrs. Bhavna, 2008(6) Mh.L.J. 853, was referred to prevent mala fide withdrawals. D.N. Taneja vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26, was discussed to limit the petitioner's role in contempt to informer. Shailesh Dhairyawan vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619, was cited to affirm consent orders' enforceability. Pramod Gupta vs. State of U.P., (1990) Supp SCC 60, was used for waiving interest rights.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench meticulously analyzed the statutory framework of Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, emphasizing that mutual consent must persist from the first motion to the decree's passage, allowing unilateral withdrawal during the cooling-off period to reflect the provision's intent of enabling reconsideration. The judges distinguished contempt jurisdiction, noting it operates independently and can address breaches of undertakings in settlements, but cannot compel consent for divorce, as that would contravene the statute's public policy favoring marriage preservation. They clarified that while undertakings to file motions cannot waive the right to rethink under Section 13B(2), breaches of other settlement terms, like financial obligations, may attract contempt if willful and detrimental. The bench reconciled prior judgments, affirming that contempt powers are inherent but must align with statutory limits, and provided guidelines for recording settlements to ensure clarity and enforceability, balancing judicial authority with legislative intent.

Final Decision

The Division Bench answered the referred questions, holding that while a party cannot be compelled to consent to mutual divorce despite undertakings, breaches of settlements may constitute civil contempt if willful. The judgments in Avneesh Sood and Shikha Bhatia were upheld as good law, not conflicting with Dinesh Gulati, which was case-specific. Guidelines were issued for courts to follow in recording settlements.

Law Settled in This Case

This judgment settles that mutual consent under Section 13B must continue until the decree, allowing withdrawal without contempt for non-consent, but permitting contempt for other settlement breaches if willful. It affirms no waiver of the reconsideration right under Section 13B(2), as it involves public policy. Courts must record settlements with clear terms, undertakings, and consequences, enforceable via contempt sparingly. Prior Single Judge decisions align with this, and guidelines ensure equitable handling of mutual consent divorces.

 Rajat Gupta Vs. Rupali Gupta :15.05.2018: Cont.Cas(C) 772/2013,  High Court of Delhi: Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Deepa Sharma

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

YMI Ghar Soaps Private Limited Vs. Ashok Kumar Trading as Bendist Export Hamare Ghar Ka Soaps

Case Title: YMI Ghar Soaps Private Limited Vs. Ashok Kumar 

Date of Order: 19 August 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 849/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The plaintiff, YMI Ghar Soaps Private Limited, approached the court seeking protection against infringement and passing off of its trademark ‘GHAR SOAPS’ and related packaging by unknown, unscrupulous entities listing counterfeit products on various e-commerce platforms. The plaintiff started its business in 2019, incorporated the company in 2024, and claimed substantial sales and brand goodwill. It alleged that defendants were selling counterfeit soaps with similar packaging and trademarks, and were unfairly benefiting from ‘latching on’ to the plaintiff’s listings, resulting in consumer confusion and bad reviews negatively impacting the real brand.

The suit involved applications for leave to file documents, exemption from pre-litigation mediation, and exemption from advance service upon certain defendants, all of which were granted. The court directed several e-commerce platforms to provide information about sellers and to block infringing listings after the plaintiff amended the memo of parties.

The dispute centered on trademark and copyright infringement by John Doe defendants and the failure of e-commerce platforms to provide effective and lasting remedies against such listings. The plaintiff also pointed out that certain defendants misused commercial platform schemes to gain visibility and cause unfair competition and deception.

The court found that the plaintiff’s mark ‘GHAR SOAPS’ had acquired reputation and goodwill, and observed significant confusion for consumers due to counterfeit products with deceptively similar packaging on various platforms. It granted ex-parte interim injunction restraining defendants from using the plaintiff’s trademark, trade dress, or copyright works in any manner, and directed e-commerce platforms to block and remove fraudulent listings and take swift remedial action on plaintiffs’ requests. For one defendant, the court issued a limited direction to disconnect listings that misleadingly appeared alongside the plaintiff’s products.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

PI Investment Advisory LLP & Anr. Vs. Registrant of Premjiex.com

Case Title: PI Investment Advisory LLP & Anr. Vs. Registrant of Premjiex.com & Ors.

Date of Order: 18 August 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 846/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The plaintiffs, PI Investment Advisory LLP and its group entity, filed this suit seeking protection of their registered trademarks and copyrighted content from misuse and fraudulent impersonation. They alleged that defendants, including the registrant of "Premjiex.com" and unknown persons, were running fake websites, mobile apps, and social media campaigns using the plaintiffs’ marks, name, and management photos to solicit investments and defraud the public. The plaintiffs maintained an official website and highlighted their strict policy of not soliciting public investments via social media or apps. The suit identified specific fake domains and applications, details of deceptive WhatsApp groups, and listed bank accounts used for fraudulent activities.

The suit came before the court with applications for court fee exemption, leave to file additional documents, exemption from pre-litigation mediation, and exemption from advance notice to certain defendants. The court disposed of these applications, granted registrations, and issued summons to various defendants by permissible modes while making directions for service and pleadings.

The dispute centers on the plaintiffs’ allegation of unauthorized use of their trademarks "PREMJI INVEST" and related branding for fraudulent financial activities online, as well as passing off and copyright infringement.

The court found a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiffs and granted ex-parte ad-interim injunction, restraining the defendants and unknown entities from any form of infringement or passing off of the plaintiffs’ IP. The court directed the domain registrar to suspend the infringing domains and reveal registrant details, ordered government departments and Google LLC to block access to the fake website and apps, instructed Meta and WhatsApp to remove fraudulent posts and groups, and directed banks to freeze related accounts. The dynamic injunction allows swift blocking of any new infringing websites or applications discovered subsequently.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Maschio Gaspardo S.P.A Vs Maschio Crop Protection Llp

Case Title: Maschio Gaspardo S.P.A Vs Maschio Crop Protection LLP

Date of Order: 14.08.2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 842/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Plaintiff, an internationally recognized agricultural equipment manufacturer with longstanding use and registration of the “MASCHIO” trademark (including stylized variants), found in October 2024 that the Defendant, Maschio Crop Protection LLP, was using the mark “MASCHIO” and its variants for similar agricultural goods in India. The Plaintiff’s mark, originating from the founder’s family name, has been used since 1964 globally, and since 1998 in India through its subsidiary, with significant sales and social media presence (para 23–23.5). Upon investigation, the Plaintiff discovered the Defendant’s use of the “MASCHIO” mark (along with “ITALIAN”) on products and e-commerce platforms, which the Plaintiff contended was an act of deliberate imitation likely to confuse consumers and dilute the brand’s goodwill (para 23.6–23.19).

Procedurally, the Plaintiff sought exemption from pre-institution mediation and original document filing, which the Court granted. Applications for leave to file additional documents were also allowed. The plaint was ordered to be registered, and summons issued for service (para 2–21).

The core dispute concerned the allegation of infringement of the Plaintiff's registered “MASCHIO” trademark, passing off, and unfair trade practices by the Defendant using identical or deceptively similar marks in the same industry sector, potentially misleading the public about association with the Plaintiff (para 12, 23.11–23.17, 28).

The Court, finding a prima facie case, balance of convenience in Plaintiff's favour, and irreparable harm to Plaintiff if not protected, granted an ad-interim ex-parte injunction restraining the Defendant and affiliates from using “MASCHIO,” “MASCHIO ITALIAN,” or any deceptively similar marks or names in relation to goods/services identical or similar to the Plaintiff’s, until the next hearing (para 29–30).

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

ITC Limited Vs Interstellar Testing Centre Pvt. Ltd.

 ITC Limited Vs Interstellar Testing Centre Pvt. Ltd.:21.08.2025:IP-COM/42/2024 :High Court at Calcutta :Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

The suit concerns ITC Limited’s claim for infringement and passing off against Interstellar Testing Centre Pvt. Ltd., objecting to the latter’s use of the “ITC LABS” mark and the domain www.itclabs.com. ITC Limited alleged urgent interim relief was necessary and obtained exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Upon challenge, it emerged that Interstellar Testing Centre Pvt. Ltd. had used “ITC LABS” for over thirty years, well before 2022, and ITC Limited had prior dealings with it, contradicting claims of recent discovery and urgency in the plaint. The court found that material facts were suppressed and the urgency was artificially created. Based on binding precedents, especially Dhanbad Fuels v. Union of India, as the suit was instituted before 20.08.2022, the court ordered a stay of proceedings, directing both parties to undergo compulsory mediation as per Section 12A within three months from the date of order.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd. Vs Chacha Cloth House

Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs Chacha Cloth House:19 August 2025: FAO (COMM) 217/2025: Hon'ble Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

The appellants, Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd., are registered proprietors of several trademarks containing the word "CHACHA" and are engaged in trading sarees, textiles, clothing, and related goods. The respondents, operating as Chacha Cloth House, do not have trademark registration. The appellants claimed that the respondents’ use of “CHACHA,” “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE,” and related marks constituted infringement of their registered trademarks. The appellants initially succeeded in obtaining an ex parte ad interim injunction in their favour from the Commercial Court. However, the Commercial Court later vacated the injunction and dismissed the appellant's application for interim relief, reasoning that "CHACHA" is a generic word over which no monopoly could be claimed unless it had acquired a secondary meaning exclusively linked to the appellants in the minds of consumers (Paras 17, 18). On appeal, the High Court noted the substance of the appellant’s argument that the genericness of a mark must be assessed in the context of the relevant goods, and found the submission merited consideration. Consequently, the High Court stayed the operation of the Commercial Court’s order and restored the earlier ad interim injunction in favour of the appellants, pending the next hearing.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Bikaner Sweets Corner Vs. Balaji Corner

Bikaner Sweets Corner Vs. Balaji Corner & Ors.: 19.08.2025: CS(COMM) 835/2025:Hon'ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The plaintiff, Bikaner Sweets Corner, claimed long-standing use and goodwill of the trademark/tradename ‘BIKANER SWEET CORNER’ at Paharganj since 2006, building upon their predecessor's business from 1982, and alleged that the defendants opened an adjoining outlet with identical name, external appearance, layout, signage, and packaging, thereby seeking to pass off their goods and services as those of the plaintiff and exploit plaintiff's reputation. The defendants justified their use based on a trademark assignment deed from Defendant No. 3, who claimed to be the prior user with applications dating to 2004 and some invoices, but failed to show uninterrupted commercial use of the mark in the relevant locality.

The court, considering statutory records, photographs, and evidence of goodwill and continuous use since 2006, held that the plaintiff was the prior and honest user of the mark ‘BIKANER SWEET CORNER’ in Paharganj, and found the defendants’ adoption and use to be non-bona fide, amounting to passing off and misrepresentation likely to cause confusion among consumers. An interim injunction was granted restraining the defendants from using the impugned mark and requiring the removal of infringing signboards and packaging, with directions for further pleadings and compliance.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Glaxo Group Limited Vs. Aubade Healthcare Private Limited

Glaxo Group Limited Vs. Aubade Healthcare Private Limited and Anr.: 14.08.2025: CS(COMM) 841/2025: Hon'ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The plaintiff, Glaxo Group Limited, filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing its registered trademark ZENTEL and from passing off, along with claims for rendition of accounts and other reliefs. The matter relates to the plaintiff’s long-standing use and registration of the invented coined trademark ZENTEL for an antiparasitic pharmaceutical product launched globally in 1982 and in India since 1986, and alleges that the defendants adopted the visually and phonetically similar mark RENTEL for a medicinal product for hypertension, leading to potential consumer confusion and public health risks. The plaintiff discovered the defendants’ trademark application for RENTEL, issued a cease-and-desist notice, and indicated readiness for an amicable solution, but the defendants claimed bona fide adoption and denied similarity.

Procedurally, the court granted various procedural exemptions and directions for the plaint and documents, recognised the need for urgent interim relief waiving pre-litigation mediation, and registered the plaint. Observing the similarity between the marks and the non-prescription status of both products, the court found a prima facie case for the plaintiff and, considering balance of convenience and potential for irreparable harm, granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the mark RENTEL or any deceptively similar mark for pharmaceutical products till the next date of hearing.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Elsevier Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Alexandra Elbakyan

Elsevier Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Alexandra Elbakyan and Ors. is a copyright infringement case filed in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. The case, numbered CS(COMM) 572/2020, involves multiple interim applications including I.A. 12668/2020, I.A. 197/2021, I.A. 590/2021, and others, with the order dated 19.08.2025 delivered by Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora. 

Facts include Elsevier Ltd. and other plaintiffs alleging that defendant Alexandra Elbakyan, a Russian national, operates the website Sci-Hub, which infringes their copyrights by storing and distributing scientific articles. Elbakyan gave an undertaking on 24.12.2020 to not upload new plaintiff articles, later breached by adding post-2022 articles on Sci-Hub and a new sister site, Sci-Net, funded by cryptocurrency donations.

Procedurally, the case saw multiple hearings and applications, with the defendant’s counsel seeking discharge and intervenors in I.A. 590/2021 requesting to be heard without impleadment. The court noted the defendant’s lack of instructions and her email acknowledging the breach.

The core dispute centers on whether Sci-Hub and Sci-Net’s actions violate the defendant’s undertaking and court orders, constituting copyright infringement and contempt, with plaintiffs seeking to block these websites.

The decision found Elbakyan prima facie guilty of contempt for breaching the 24.12.2020 undertaking by uploading copyrighted material on Sci-Hub and Sci-Net. The court directed the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and Ministry of Electronics and IT (MeitY) to issue blocking orders within 72 hours for Sci-Hub (www.sci-hub.ru and mirrors) and Sci-Net (www.sci-net.xyz), to be implemented by ISPs within 24 hours, continuing until further orders, with the next hearing set for 01.12.2025.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Sanjit Singh Salwan & Ors. Vs. Sardar Inderjeet Singh Salwan

Introduction

This case involves a dispute between parties claiming to be trustees of the Guru Tegh Bahadur Charitable Trust, focusing primarily on the question of whether a plea of estoppel can prevent a party from raising a challenge to a settlement or award when the party’s previous conduct induced the other to act to its detriment. The case navigates the complex interplay of arbitration law, injunction suits, estoppel doctrines, and court jurisdiction, particularly concerning the arbitrability of disputes involving charitable trusts.

Factual Background

The appellants and respondents were both involved in managing the Guru Tegh Bahadur Charitable Trust and had disputes concerning its administration, including allegations of interference in the management of a school run by the Trust. The respondents filed a suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the appellants from entering the school premises and interfering with its functioning. The appellants challenged the suit’s maintainability under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), contending that the suit was barred. During the appeals process, parties decided to resolve their disputes through arbitration by appointing a sole arbitrator who, after hearings, passed an award with directions for managing the Trust’s affairs.

Procedural Background

Following the sole arbitrator’s award on December 30, 2022, both parties filed a joint application seeking disposal of the pending appeal in view of the award, which was accepted, and a consent decree incorporating the award was passed by the District Court on January 27, 2023. This decree was unchallenged and remained operative. Subsequently, the appellants sought to enforce the award and consent decree by filing execution proceedings in November 2023 but withdrew these to file an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim measures. The Commercial Court rejected this application, holding the dispute non-arbitrable under Section 92 of the CPC and declaring the arbitral award null and void. The High Court affirmed this decision, leading the appellants to approach the Supreme Court.

Core Dispute

The core legal issue centers on whether the respondents, who initially accepted the arbitration award and consent decree, could later challenge the award’s validity on the basis of non-arbitrability under Section 92 of the CPC. Relatedly, the question arose whether the appellants were entitled to enforcement of the consent decree and protection under the doctrine of estoppel, given that the respondents’ conduct induced the appellants to act to their detriment.

Discussion on Judgments

The appellants relied heavily on precedent establishing that a party cannot approbate and reprobate—that is, cannot accept the benefits of a judgment, decree, or contract and later repudiate it to the detriment of the other party. Important case law cited by the appellants included Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt. Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of Mahendra Petrochemicals Ltd., (2018) 10 SCC 707; Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots’ Association of India v. Director General of Civil Aviation, (2011) 5 SCC 435; Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport, (2010) 10 SCC 422; and Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, (2010) 4 SCC 753. These decisions underscored that a litigant’s conduct in accepting an award or decree can estop them from later asserting its invalidity.

Conversely, the respondents argued that under Section 92 CPC, disputes concerning the management of a trust are non-arbitrable; thus, the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction, rendering the award a nullity. This position, supported by rulings such as Vimal Kishor Shah v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah, (2016) 8 SCC 788 and Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 532, was upheld by both the Commercial Court and the High Court.

The Supreme Court also relied on older foundational principles such as those enshrined in Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145, to articulate how estoppel by conduct applies even if an award may be invalid in law when parties accept and act upon that award, changing their position to their detriment. The Court additionally cited Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport to emphasize that a party cannot adopt inconsistent legal positions to prolong litigation or gain unfair advantage.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Supreme Court recognized that the respondents had expressly contended in earlier pleadings that their suit was maintainable and not barred by Section 92 of the CPC. They joined the arbitration process and accepted the arbitral award, prompting the disposal of the respondents' appeal by the District Court via a consent decree incorporating the award terms. The Court ruled that the respondents' later contention of non-arbitrability and invalidity of the award amounted to approbation and reprobation, which is impermissible.

The Court emphasized that the appellants acted on the consent decree to their detriment, such as by withdrawing FIRs and remitting substantial amounts per the award terms. Consequently, the principle of estoppel operated to preclude the respondents from challenging the decree's validity. The Court deemed it unjust to allow a party to accept benefits under a decree or award and later repudiate the same to thwart enforcement.

Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that the question of arbitrability was deemed by the lower courts without due regard to the principle of estoppel by conduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court restored the appellants' right to revive execution proceedings on the consent decree and ordered that the matter be dealt with on merit in accordance with law.

The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeal filed by the appellants and set aside the orders of the Commercial Court and the High Court that had held the arbitration award null and void and denied interim measures. The appellants were permitted to revive the execution proceedings filed earlier and to enforce the consent decree. The Court held that the respondents were estopped by their own conduct from denying the award’s enforceability, and justice required that the appellants not be left remediless. The parties were left to bear their own costs.

This case firmly establishes the application of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct and election in arbitration and civil litigation contexts, particularly when one party accepts a consent decree or arbitral award and induces the other party to act to its detriment. It confirms that a party who approbates a legal instrument cannot later reprobate the same to undermine its enforcement. Importantly, the Court clarified that objections concerning arbitrability under Section 92 CPC, though serious, cannot be invoked to defeat an award once consented to and acted upon by the parties. The judgment underscores that the finality and enforceability of arbitration awards and consent decrees are to be respected in the interest of justice and fairness, preventing litigious gamesmanship.

 Sanjit Singh Salwan & Ors. Vs. Sardar Inderjeet Singh Salwan & Ors.:: August 14, 2025:SLP (Civil) No. 29398 of 2024: 2025 INSC 988: Supreme Court of India: Augustine George Masih and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Metpalli Lasum Bai (since dead) and Others Vs. Metapalli Muthaiah

Introduction

This legal dispute centers on rival claims over a chunk of land measuring 4 acres and 16 guntas, located in village Dasnapur. The parties involved are the legal representatives of the late Metpalli Rajanna and others, with plaintiff Lasum Bai (the second wife of Rajanna) on one side and defendant Muthaiah (Rajanna’s son from his first marriage) on the other. The case raises intricate issues concerning the rights to joint family property, the validity of a will, and the effect of oral family arrangements in partition disputes.

Factual Background

The original landowner, Metpalli Ramanna, died intestate before 1949. His legal heir, Metpalli Rajanna, who died in 1983, had two marriages. Rajanna’s first marriage to Narsamma produced two children — Muthaiah and Rajamma. After Narsamma’s death, Rajanna married Lasum Bai, who bore no children. Thereafter, Rajanna made registered will dated 24th July 1974 that distributed his properties among Lasum Bai, Muthaiah, and Rajamma. Specifically, Lasum Bai was granted certain lands including part of Sy. No. 28 of Dasnapur village (6 acres 16 guntas out of 12 acres 32 guntas), one third portions of Sy. Nos. 6 & 9 in Mavala village, and other properties. Muthaiah and Rajamma also received defined shares.

Plaintiff Lasum Bai sold two acres from her share in a registered sale deed dated 27th August 1987 and later entered into an agreement to sell the remaining 4 acres 16 guntas to Janardhan Reddy. Defendant Muthaiah filed an injunction suit against her preventing sale, aiming to challenge her right over the land. The District Munsif granted injunction in favor of Muthaiah but did not examine title, prompting Lasum Bai to file a declaratory suit.

Procedural Background

Lasum Bai instituted Original Suit No. 2 of 1991 for declaration of title and possession over her share of properties under the will. Muthaiah contested the claim, asserting the properties were joint ancestral properties and that he inherited full rights as sole coparcener after Rajanna’s death. The trial court decreed the suit favoring Lasum Bai declaring her owner and granting permanent injunction against Muthaiah and Rajamma dated 15th November 1994.

Muthaiah and Rajamma appealed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which in a judgment dated 23rd January 2014 partly allowed the appeal, holding Muthaiah entitled to 3/4 share and Lasum Bai to 1/4 share only, stripping her of injunction rights over the entire property. Lasum Bai and legal representatives of Janardhan Reddy appealed to the Supreme Court.

Core Dispute

The dispute pivots on whether Lasum Bai’s claim by virtue of the registered will and the oral family settlement resulting in partition of joint family properties is valid and enforceable against Muthaiah’s claim to the whole ancestral property as coparcener. It also concerns the effect of sales made by Lasum Bai and the validity of the injunction suit initially granted in favor of Muthaiah.

Discussion on Judgments

The trial court upheld the validity of the 1974 registered will and oral family arrangement, noting Muthaiah’s admission of the will and possession of properties by Lasum Bai. The court held that Rajanna, foreseeing family disputes, made an amicable division whereby Lasum Bai received a definite share. The judgment granted her title and injunction protecting her possession.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court overturned this to an extent, holding the properties were ancestral and joint family properties inherited by Muthaiah as sole coparcener, limiting Lasum Bai’s share to one-fourth and denying a full injunction. The High Court discredited the oral family settlement for being unregistered and considered the will lacking sanctity as Rajanna was not the sole owner.

The Supreme Court, upon review, restored the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the will is a registered document with a presumption of validity and was admitted by Muthaiah. The family arrangement and possession further confirmed the distribution. The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s view that the will lacked sanctity and noted that the will afforded Muthaiah a major share, negating manipulation claims. The Supreme Court also recognized that Muthaiah had not challenged the registered sale deed of two acres earlier, hence estopped from questioning Lasum Bai’s rights.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Supreme Court critically analyzed the evidence, including Muthaiah's own testimony admitting the signatures on the will and the possession status aligning with the family settlement. The court held that a registered will carries legal sanctity and presumption of authenticity. The judge emphasized that absence of challenge to the will’s validity and admissions weakened Muthaiah’s case against it.

The judge also noted that the oral family settlement was corroborated by possession and conduct of parties, fulfilling criteria for acceptance. The division under the will was seen as a fair and intended partition to avoid disputes. The fact that the major share was left to Muthaiah further weakened allegations of forgery or manipulation.

The plaintiff’s prior sale deed of part of her share, unchallenged by Muthaiah, was treated as acquiescence. This estoppel factored in the court’s refusal to unsettle plaintiff’s title.

Final Decision

The Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 5921 of 2015 filed by plaintiff Lasum Bai and legal representatives of Janardhan Reddy, reinstating the trial court’s decree declaring Lasum Bai’s title and the validity of her possession and sales. The court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 5922 of 2015 filed by defendant Muthaiah’s representatives. The High Court’s judgment partially setting aside the trial court’s decree was reversed, and the registered will and family arrangement were upheld as valid effective instruments of partition.

Law Settled in This Case

This case reiterates that a duly registered will partitioning joint family property and creating definite shares among coparceners enjoys presumption of validity and legal sanctity. Oral family arrangements supported by possession and conduct may be admitted to prove partition if not contradicted by valid documents. A party admitting signatures on a will and not challenging earlier sales is estopped from disputing ownership later. The case affirms the importance of registered wills in overriding the presumptions of joint family ownership and confirms that actual partition recognized by all parties can displace presumed ancestral coparcenary rights.

Case Details

Case Title: Metpalli Lasum Bai (since dead) and Others Vs. Metapalli Muthaiah (D) by LRs

Date of Order: July 21, 2025

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 5921 and 5922 of 2015

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 879

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for Publication in Law Journal:

1. "Sanctity of Registered Wills and Partition in Hindu Undivided Family Property: Insights from Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaiah"

2. "Oral Family Settlements and Property Rights: A Supreme Court Analysis on Joint Family Property Partition"

3. "The Interplay of Will, Possession, and Estoppel in Family Property Disputes: A Case Study"

4. "Registered Will as Evidence of Partition: Revisiting Property Rights in Hindu Joint Families"

5. "Partition Disputes in Hindu Joint Families: Legal Lessons from Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaiah"

Lenskart Solutions Limited v. Mr. Chetan Govind Vhand

Lenskart Solutions Limited filed a commercial suit against Mr. Chetan Govind Vhand alleging trademark infringement through the defendant's use of a deceptively similar mark in business operations, seeking injunction and other reliefs. The procedural background involves the plaintiff filing multiple interim applications for exemptions and permissions at the outset of the suit, including for filing additional documents, waiving pre-institution mediation due to urgency, exempting advance service to the defendant to prevent concealment of infringing activities, and extending time for court fees payment. The core dispute centers on the alleged infringement of the plaintiff's trademark rights, with concerns over the defendant potentially disposing of or hiding evidence of such infringement. The court granted all requested exemptions and permissions, allowing the suit to proceed with urgent ex-parte considerations, exemption from mediation citing the need for immediate interim relief as per Supreme Court precedent, permission to file additional documents, waiver of advance notice to the defendant, and a two-week extension for court fees. 

Case Title Lenskart Solutions Limited v. Mr. Chetan Govind Vhand Date of Order August 8, 2025 Case Number CS(COMM) 814/2025 Name of Court High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge Honble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Rajkumar Sabu Vs. Sabu Trade Private Ltd.

### Introduction

This case delves into the procedural intricacies of trademark registration under Indian law, examining the scope for third-party intervention prior to the advertisement of a trademark application. It highlights the boundaries of the Registrar of Trade Marks' discretion in handling interlocutory petitions alleging fabrication of user claims and underscores the statutory framework that prioritizes post-advertisement oppositions over pre-emptive challenges. The judgment clarifies the absence of a mandatory hearing for objectors at the examination stage, reinforcing the structured process outlined in the Trade Marks Act, 1999, to ensure efficiency while protecting applicants' rights. By dismissing the writ petition, the court emphasizes balancing procedural fairness with statutory compliance, offering guidance on when and how third parties can effectively contest trademark applications without disrupting the registration pipeline.

### Factual Background

The first respondent, Sabu Trade Private Ltd., submitted a trademark application for the word mark "SACHAMOTI" on January 22, 2020, claiming usage by itself or its predecessor-in-title since April 1, 1984, in classes 30, 35, and 39. An examination report was issued by the Registrar on February 18, 2020, to which the applicant responded the following day. The petitioner, Rajkumar Sabu, lodged an interlocutory petition on July 20, 2021, asserting that the claimed user date was based on fabricated documents, urging the Registrar not to proceed with the application or advertise it in the Trade Marks Journal, and requesting a hearing. Despite paying the requisite fee of Rs. 2,700, no response was received to this petition. The application was accepted on February 25, 2025, and advertised in Trade Marks Journal Number 2199 on March 10, 2025. Seeking clarity, the petitioner filed a request under the Right to Information Act, 2005, on April 21, 2025, specifically asking for the document supporting the user date of April 1, 1984, but the reply on June 4, 2025, merely stated that all available documents were uploaded on the IP India portal, providing no substantive details.

### Procedural Background

The petitioner invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing a writ petition for certiorari to quash the acceptance report dated February 25, 2025, and the advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal dated March 10, 2025. The petition contended that the Registrar failed to consider the interlocutory petition and provide a hearing, violating principles of natural justice and the powers under Section 19 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The matter was heard before a single judge, with arguments from the petitioner's counsel emphasizing the need for pre-advertisement scrutiny, the first respondent's counsel defending the statutory procedure and the availability of opposition post-advertisement, and the second respondent represented by a Deputy Solicitor General. No interim relief was sought or granted in the connected miscellaneous petition, and the court proceeded to decide the writ on merits after considering the statutory provisions and rules.

### Core Dispute

The central issue revolved around whether the Registrar of Trade Marks was obligated to consider the petitioner's interlocutory petition alleging fabrication of the user claim and to afford a hearing before accepting and advertising the trademark application. The petitioner argued that the Registrar's failure to act on the petition and exercise powers under Section 19 to withdraw acceptance amounted to a miscarriage of justice, especially given the payment of fees and the RTI response's inadequacy. In contrast, the first respondent maintained that no provision under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, or Rules, 2017, permitted pre-advertisement oppositions or hearings for third parties, asserting that the statutory scheme confined challenges to post-advertisement oppositions under Section 21, and that the interlocutory petition lacked a legal basis.

### Discussion on Judgments

No judgments were cited by the parties or referenced by the court in the course of this case. The analysis was confined to a direct interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, including Sections 18, 19, and 21, and the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, particularly Rules 10, 11, 33, and Entry 15 of Schedule I, without reliance on prior judicial precedents to contextualize or support the arguments or decision.

The judge meticulously dissected Chapter III of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, focusing on the procedure for registration. He noted that Section 18(4) and (5) require reasons only for refusal or conditional acceptance, implying no such obligation for unconditional acceptance, as evidenced by the brief order waiving objections based on submitted documents. Regarding the interlocutory petition, the judge held it lacked statutory foundation, as Entry 15 of Schedule I pertains to fees for specific applications like reviews or uncontemplated matters, but any petition must invoke a substantive provision from the Act or Rules. He clarified that while Rule 33 allows examination and re-examination by the Registrar, it does not envision third-party oppositions at that stage, which are expressly reserved for post-advertisement under Section 21 and Rules 42-51. Although acknowledging the Registrar's power under Section 19 to withdraw acceptance pre-registration, the judge reasoned this does not confer a right on third parties to be heard, as the provision is silent on such entitlements. He suggested procedural improvements, like mandating citation of provisions in interlocutory applications and enabling rejections for non-maintainability, to enhance transparency. Balancing equities, the judge found no prejudice to the petitioner, who had already lodged an opposition under Section 21, while quashing the acceptance would cause irreparable harm to the applicant, thus justifying non-interference.

The writ petition was dismissed without any order as to costs, upholding the acceptance report and advertisement. The connected miscellaneous petition was closed accordingly, with the court observing that the petitioner's remedy lies in the ongoing opposition proceedings before the Registrar.

This case establishes that third parties have no inherent right to intervene or be heard at the pre-advertisement stage of trademark registration unless explicitly provided under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, or Rules, 2017. It clarifies that interlocutory petitions challenging applications must be grounded in specific statutory provisions to be maintainable, and the Registrar's power to withdraw acceptance under Section 19 does not mandate hearings for objectors. The judgment reinforces that oppositions are confined to the post-advertisement phase under Section 21, promoting procedural efficiency while suggesting enhancements for handling miscellaneous applications to ensure fairness and accountability.

Rajkumar Sabu Vs. Sabu Trade Private Ltd.: August 19, 2025 : W.P.(IPD)No.34 of 2025  : 2025:MHC:2069  : Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, J.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.