Burberry Ltd Vs Megastar Shipping Pte Ltd

Trade Mark Infringement and Goods in Transit

Facts:The case involved Burberry Ltd and Louis Vuitton Malletier, two luxury brand owners who brought trade mark infringement actions against Megastar Shipping Pte Ltd, a freight forwarder company in Singapore. The dispute arose because Megastar Shipping handled the transhipment of counterfeit goods infringing the appellants’ registered trade marks. These counterfeit goods were shipped from China to Singapore in sealed containers with the final destination being Batam, Indonesia. The goods were never intended for the Singapore market, never placed on sale in Singapore, and were never physically handled or inspected by the freight forwarder except when customs intervened.

The respondent, Megastar Shipping, received documents showing the goods as household items but did not have knowledge of the counterfeit nature of the cargo. The freight forwarder's role was limited to arranging transhipment through the Port of Singapore, a common practice given the geographic constraints of smaller ports. The counterfeit goods were seized by Singapore Customs upon arrival, and the appellants commenced infringement proceedings against Megastar Shipping.

Procedural Details:The case initially came before the High Court, which dismissed the appellants’ claims against Megastar Shipping on the ground that the freight forwarder was not the importer or exporter of the goods for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act (Cap 332, 2005 Rev Ed) ("the TMA"). The issue at hand was whether Megastar Shipping’s role amounted to "use" of the trade marks under section 27 of the TMA, specifically whether receiving and forwarding the goods for transhipment amounted to importing or exporting goods "under the sign," thereby constituting trade mark infringement.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal challenging the High Court's interpretation of import, export, and liability under section 27(4)(c) of the TMA.

Dispute: The key legal issues concerned whether goods in transit through Singapore were to be treated as imported or exported under the TMA and whether the freight forwarder, which handled the sealed containers without knowledge of counterfeit marks, was liable for infringement. The debate revolved around the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing trade mark infringement, particularly what constitutes "use" of a trade mark, the scope of "import" and "export" under the TMA, and the mental element required for liability.

The appellants argued that Megastar Shipping was liable as the importer and potential exporter, given its control over the goods in Singapore and would have completed forwarding the goods but for customs intervention. They contended that liability should extend to local consignees and freight forwarders to effectively combat trade mark infringement by counterfeiters.

Megastar Shipping asserted that mere transhipment without knowledge of the infringing signs does not amount to trade mark use or infringement. They maintained they acted as an agent for the actual shipper, had no ownership or beneficial interest in the goods, and no involvement in decisions about the cargo. Liability for trade mark infringement, they argued, required knowledge or at least reason to believe that infringing signs were present on the goods.

Detailed Reasoning and Legal Discussion: The Court of Appeal began by affirming the requirement of "use" for trade mark infringement under section 27(1) of the TMA. The court confirmed that "use" does not merely mean physical handling but involves use of a sign that identifies the trade origin of goods and happens "in the course of trade." The presence of a sign identical to a registered trade mark on the goods, combined with trade use, constitutes infringement.

The Court agreed with the High Court that the definitions of "import" and "export" in the TMA are aligned with the ordinary meanings in the Interpretation Act, which extends to goods brought into or taken out of Singapore by any means, including transit or transhipment. This was distinguished from EU cases where goods in transit are not considered imported for infringement purposes, reflecting different policy considerations including free movement of goods within the European Union. The Singapore Court emphasized Singapore’s role as an entrepot and indicated that goods brought physically into the country, even for transhipment, may be considered imported under the TMA.

The Court also examined international jurisprudence, such as *Beautimatic International Ltd v Mitchell International Pharmaceuticals Ltd* and *Waterford Wedgwood Plc v David Nagli Ltd*, which supported infringement findings in cases of transhipment.

Importantly, the Court highlighted that the mere physical import or export is insufficient to impose liability. Instead, knowledge or reason to believe that infringing signs are present on the goods is a necessary condition for liability. This mental element is consistent with principles of fairness and commercial reality, especially considering the many persons involved in international shipping.

The Court held that strict liability in trade mark infringement means fault or knowledge of infringement is not required once presence of infringing signs and use in trade are established. However, this strict liability does not extend to persons genuinely unaware of the signs' presence on the goods, especially in the context of freight forwarders who have no access or knowledge of the cargo’s contents. Cases like *Gillette UK Limited v Edenwest Limited* and Singapore decisions including *Creative Technology Ltd v Cosmos Trade-Nology Pte Ltd* reiterated that knowledge of presence of signs is vital for liability, even if knowledge of infringement specifically is absent.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that Megastar Shipping did not know or have reason to suspect counterfeit goods were in the containers, as documents described the goods generically and no suspicious circumstances existed. The freight forwarder’s role was administrative and facilitative without actual possession or proprietary interest in the goods. Physical handling was minimal, and no evidence indicated complicity in infringement.

On the question of export liability, the Court agreed that a mere intention to export is insufficient to constitute infringement. There must be clear actions or evidence that goods would definitely be exported under the sign. Here, although Megastar Shipping would have forwarded the goods to Batam if not stopped, this point was rendered moot as the goods were seized and destroyed before export.

The Court also affirmed the limits of liability for freight forwarders, emphasizing their duty to disclose information if they become aware of counterfeit goods under recent legislative amendments providing border enforcement measures.

The Court ultimately dismissed the appeals, holding that while the goods were imported into Singapore, Megastar Shipping did not "use" the infringing signs for purposes of the TMA because it lacked knowledge or reason to believe the goods bore the infringing marks.

Decision: The Court of Appeal dismissed the trade mark proprietors’ appeals with costs, holding that Megastar Shipping was not liable for trade mark infringement under section 27 of the TMA as it did not knowingly import or export goods under the infringing signs. The Court emphasized the importance of the knowledge requirement for imposing liability, balancing trade mark enforcement with the practicalities of international shipping and fairness to freight forwarders.

Case Title:Burberry Ltd Vs Megastar Shipping Pte Ltd  

Order Date: 5 September 2018  

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos 237 and 238 of 2017  

Neutral Citation:  [2019] SGCA 1

Court: Court of Appeal of the Republic of Singapore  

Hon’ble Judges: Justice Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, Justice Judith Prakash JA, Justice Tay Yong Kwang JA  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Exotic Mile Vs. Imagine Marketing Pvt Ltd

Role of Pleading and Prayers in Trademark Injunctions

Facts: The present legal dispute revolves around Imagine Marketing Pvt Ltd (IMPL) and Exotic Mile (EM). IMPL is a well-established company known primarily for its electronic gadgets such as earphones, headphones, speakers, soundbars, and travel chargers marketed under its flagship brand "boAt," launched in 2014. IMPL has registration of several trademarks and claims exclusive ownership of original logos and taglines including the trademark "boAt" and the tagline "PLUG INTO NIRVANA."

Exotic Mile, on the other hand, is engaged in selling audio gadgets and coined the mark "BOULT" and "BOULT AUDIO" starting in 2017. EM registered its device mark in 2017 and has been advertising and selling products under this brand. IMPL alleged that EM's mark "BOULT," along with its logos and the tagline "UNPLUG YOURSELF," was deceptively similar to IMPL’s marks, causing confusion among consumers and amounting to trademark infringement and passing off.

IMPL contended that EM’s use of the mark "BOULT," logo, and tagline was an intentional attempt to ride on IMPL's goodwill, thereby misleading customers. IMPL received complaints alleging customers bought EM’s products mistaking them for IMPL's because of the similarity in the marks and trade dress.

EM denied these claims, arguing that "BOULT" is an arbitrary word derived from "BOLT," and their logos and taglines are independently created without any intention to deceive. EM contended that their products cater to a different educated consumer segment unlikely to be confused by the similar-sounding mark. EM also stated that "BOULT" products have been used since 2017, advertising expenditure was significant, and the marks were registered, hence no infringement occurred.

Procedural Details: IMPL filed a civil suit  in the High Court of Delhi seeking a permanent injunction against Exotic Mile preventing them from using "BOULT" and related logos and taglines. IMPL also filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code for an interim injunction during the pendency of the suit.

The learned Single Judge initially granted an ex parte interim injunction, restraining EM from using the alleged infringing marks pending the suit. EM then filed an application to vacate this injunction, which was dismissed. EM appealed this order through FAO(OS) (COMM) 20/2020 seeking to set aside the injunction.

Dispute:The core dispute in the case centered upon whether the use of the mark "BOULT" by EM amounts to infringement or passing off the registered "boAt" mark of IMPL. Issues included determination of deceptive similarity of the marks and logos, the likelihood of confusion amongst consumers, the legitimacy of injunctive relief against EM, and whether injunction could be extended to EM’s tagline "UNPLUG YOURSELF" and the newly proposed mark "GOBOULT."

EM challenged the injunction granted against the use of the tagline "UNPLUG YOURSELF," which IMPL had not specifically prayed for. EM also sought to use "GOBOULT," contending the impugned order did not restrain that use.

Detailed Reasoning and Legal Discussion:The court first addressed the injunction concerning the tagline "UNPLUG YOURSELF." It was noted that the plaintiff IMPL never sought an injunction against this tagline. The Court held, based on established legal principles, that relief can only be granted on the basis of the prayers made in the plaint or application. Granting the injunction against a tagline not formally challenged was held to be legally unsustainable as per the Supreme Court rulings such as in *State of Uttarakhand v Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj*, (2017) 9 SCC 579, *Mahabir Prasad Jain v Ganga Singh*, (1999) 8 SCC 274, and other authorities emphasizing that courts cannot grant reliefs beyond pleadings.

Regarding the disputed mark "BOULT," the Court applied principles of passing off rather than infringement since EM’s mark was registered. Passing off requires establishment of (i) goodwill in the plaintiff’s mark, (ii) misrepresentation by the defendant, and (iii) resultant damage to the plaintiff. The Court recognized IMPL as the prior user with established goodwill in "boAt" and related logos and taglines and extensive promotion and advertising investments. 

The Court found that EM was aware of IMPL’s mark and market presence, including the involvement of Varun Gupta, EM’s promoter, who had previously been associated with IMPL as a distributor or consultant. The phonetic similarity—boAt and BOULT—was held significant because they share the same beginning and ending consonants “B” and “T,” a factor supported by precedents such as *K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v Shri Ambal & Co and *Encore Electricals Ltd v Anchor Electronics. The Court emphasized the perception of a consumer with "imperfect recollection" who might be misled.

Visually, the logos of both parties were triangular in shape and bore resemblance, reinforcing the likelihood of confusion. The similarity extended to trade dress, including packaging and colour schemes. The Court ruled that such similarities cumulatively increased the risk of consumers mistaking EM’s products for IMPL’s.

The use of the tagline "UNPLUG YOURSELF," incorporating the word "PLUG," was found prima facie inspired by IMPL’s "PLUG INTO NIRVANA," further contributing to potential confusion. The Court also considered confusion between product names “Boult Bass Buds” and “boAt Bass Heads,” finding them deceptively similar.

EM’s argument that the primarily online nature of sales reduces confusion was rejected, as the Court pointed out that the goods are also sold in physical stores and the average consumer does not have perfect recall when purchasing.

The Court clarified that though EM’s mark was registered, no statutory infringement claim lay, but the common law tort of passing off was satisfied due to goodwill, misrepresentation and likelihood of damage to IMPL. The Court followed the principles as stated in *Wander Ltd v Antox India Pvt Ltd*,  and *Satyam Infoway Ltd v Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd*  explaining the elements and tests for passing off.

Regarding the mark "GOBOULT," the Court noted that this was not under challenge before the learned Single Judge and no injunction was passed against its use. The Court observed that any challenge to "GOBOULT" by IMPL would have to be pursued separately. Therefore, as of the date of the order, EM was free to use the mark "GOBOULT."

Decision:The Court partially upheld the interim injunction. The injunction restraining Exotic Mile from using the marks "BOULT" and related logos was affirmed, as was the injunction against the use of taglines confusingly similar in combination with those marks. The injunction against the tagline "UNPLUG YOURSELF" alone was set aside since it was not specifically prayed for.

The Court clarified that EM could use the mark "GOBOULT" as this was not covered by the injunction and IMPL was free to initiate separate proceedings if it believed this mark is deceptively similar.

Case Title:Exotic Mile Vs. Imagine Marketing Pvt Ltd  

Order Date: 15 September 2025  

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 20/2020  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8075

Court: High Court of Delhi  

Hon’ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Aishwarya Rai Bachchan Vs Aishwaryaworld.com

Case Title: Aishwarya Rai Bachchan Vs Aishwaryaworld.com & Ors.

Order Date: 09 September 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 956/2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Aishwarya Rai Bachchan, one of India’s most celebrated actresses and a global cultural icon, approached the Delhi High Court claiming violation of her personality rights. She alleged that various websites, e-commerce platforms, apps, YouTube channels, and even AI-based tools were using her name, image, and persona without permission. 

Some platforms falsely portrayed themselves as her official site, others sold merchandise like T-shirts and mugs with her image, while certain AI chatbots and YouTube channels created fake and even sexually explicit content using her likeness. She argued that these activities misled the public into believing she endorsed them, harmed her reputation, and commercially exploited her persona without authorization.

The dispute centered on whether defendants could exploit Aishwarya Rai Bachchan’s identity for commercial or other purposes without her consent. The plaintiff maintained that such unauthorized use amounted to infringement of her publicity and personality rights, copyright, performer’s rights, and also constituted passing off and unfair competition.

The Court explained that personality rights include the right to control and protect one’s name, image, likeness, and other unique attributes. Their unauthorized use can not only cause financial loss but also harm an individual’s dignity and privacy, thus undermining their right to live with respect. The Court relied on earlier cases such as Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India (2023), Amitabh Bachchan v. Rajat Nagi (2022), and Jaikishan Kakubhai Saraf v. Peppy Store (2024), where protection was given against similar misuse. 

It clarified that while free speech permits information, news, satire, or parody, it cannot extend to unauthorized commercial gain or obscene content that tarnishes reputation. The Court observed that the plaintiff had built immense goodwill and that misuse of her identity in merchandise or AI-generated explicit content caused confusion, diluted her reputation, and violated her contractual brand endorsements. Thus, the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience was in her favour, and denial of protection would cause irreparable harm.

The Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction. Defendants were restrained from using Aishwarya Rai Bachchan’s name, image, likeness, or any element of her persona, including through AI, deepfakes, or morphing, without her consent. They were also directed to remove and block infringing URLs and products within 72 hours. Google (YouTube) was ordered to disable deepfake and misleading videos and provide subscriber details of offending channels. Government authorities were directed to block and disable listed infringing URLs. 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Del

Abhishek Bachchan Vs The Bollywood Tee Shop

Case Title: Abhishek Bachchan Vs The Bollywood Tee Shop & Ors.

Order Date: 10 September 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 960/2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Abhishek Bachchan, a well-known actor, producer, and entrepreneur, claimed that his personality rights—his name, image, likeness, signature, voice, and other aspects of his identity—were being misused without permission. Several online sellers and platforms were offering merchandise such as T-shirts, mugs, posters, wallpapers, and stickers using his photographs and name. 

In addition, multiple YouTube channels created AI-generated content using his image and likeness, including inappropriate and explicit videos. Bachchan argued that such misuse damaged his reputation, caused confusion in the public mind, and amounted to infringement of his personality rights and passing off.

The central dispute was whether the defendants could commercially exploit Abhishek Bachchan’s persona without his consent. This included selling merchandise, running e-commerce listings, and generating AI-based or deepfake content using his name and image. The plaintiff argued that such unauthorized exploitation not only violated his rights but also caused irreparable harm to his goodwill and reputation.

The Court noted that personality rights are legally recognized and linked with an individual’s dignity, livelihood, and privacy. Unauthorized commercial exploitation of a celebrity’s persona directly impacts their economic interests and reputation. The Court referred to precedents such as Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India (2023), Amitabh Bachchan v. Rajat Nagi (2022), Jaikishan Saraf v. Peppy Store (2024), and Aishwarya Rai Bachchan v. Aishwaryaworld.com (2025), which affirmed protection of personality rights against misuse, particularly in the age of technology and artificial intelligence.

The Court emphasized that while free speech allows information, satire, parody, and fair criticism, it does not extend to unauthorized commercial gain or creation of explicit/derogatory AI content that tarnishes an individual’s reputation. Misuse of Bachchan’s persona risked misleading the public into believing endorsement or association, thereby diluting his goodwill and breaching his contractual obligations with brands.

It was held that the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case, the balance of convenience lay in his favour, and denial of relief would cause irreparable harm not only financially but also to his dignity.

The Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction. Defendants 1–14 and unknown “John Doe” parties were restrained from using Bachchan’s name, voice, image, likeness, or any other attribute of his persona without authorization, including through AI, deepfakes, and morphing. 

Specific directions were given to take down infringing URLs, disable listings of merchandise, and remove explicit or misleading AI content from YouTube and e-commerce platforms. Google (YouTube) and government authorities (MeitY and DoT) were also directed to assist in compliance. 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd. Vs. Standard Corporation India Ltd

Copyright Protection for Functional Drawings

Fact:​The plaintiff, Tractors and Farm Equipment Limited, was established in 1961 to manufacture and sell tractors and other farm equipment in India. They were authorized by AGCO Corporation, USA, to use the trademarks and designs of Massey Ferguson. The plaintiff has been producing popular tractor models like MF 245 DI and MF 1035 DI since the early 1980s. The plaintiff claims to own the copyright to the drawings for the parts of these tractors. 

They state that their employees created these drawings with precise specifications and dimensions during their employment. The plaintiff asserts that they have the right to prevent others from reproducing these drawings in two or three dimensions, as the three-dimensional tractor parts are made from these two-dimensional drawings. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Standard Corporation India Limited, manufactured their tractor model Standard 348 by copying the plaintiff's drawings or by using a method called reverse engineering to create three-dimensional parts. Based on these claims, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement and passing off.

​Procedural Detail:​The plaintiff filed an amended complaint under Order IV Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules and Order VII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, along with Sections 51, 55, and 62 of the Copyrights Act, 1957. The lawsuit sought a permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from infringing the plaintiff's copyright in the drawings by manufacturing and selling the Standard 348 tractor. It also sought a permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from "passing off" their tractors as those of the plaintiff.

The defendant argued that the suit should be dismissed based on Section 15(1) and (2) of the Copyright Act, claiming that the copyright in a design, which is capable of being registered but is not, ceases to exist after the article to which the design is applied has been reproduced more than fifty times by an industrial process.

​Based on the pleadings, the court framed 15 issues for consideration on October 24, 2016, covering aspects like passing off, copyright infringement, and the applicability of Section 15 of the Copyright Act. The plaintiff later abandoned their claims related to "passing off". 

​The core of the dispute revolves around two main points:

First, the plaintiff's claim of copyright infringement. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's Standard 348 tractor is a copy of their MF 245 DI tractor and that the defendant reproduced the plaintiff's copyrighted two-dimensional drawings to create their three-dimensional tractor parts.

​Second, the defendant's counter-argument, which states that the plaintiff's case is barred by Section 15 of the Copyright Act. This legal provision says that if a design is capable of being registered under the Designs Act but is not, the copyright for it ceases once the article to which the design is applied is reproduced more than 50 times through an industrial process. 

The defendant argued that the plaintiff's tractor parts fall under this category and therefore no copyright exists to be infringed. The defendant also challenged the originality of the plaintiff's drawings, stating they were based on drawings from Massey Ferguson, and argued that the plaintiff had no cause of action in this court as their tractors were sold outside India.

​Reasoning of court:​The court began by addressing the issue of its own jurisdiction. It concluded that since the plaintiff carried on business within the court's jurisdiction at the time of filing the suit and continues to do so, and the remedies pursued related to copyright infringement, the court did have jurisdiction.

​The central part of the court's reasoning focused on the application of Section 15 of the Copyright Act. The court cited a previous judgment in A. Rudramurthy and another v. Mr. Moorthy and another, 2025 MHC 1338, which explained the meaning of Section 15. The court's analysis highlighted the difference between an "artistic work" under the Copyright Act and a "design" under the Designs Act, 2000.

​According to the court's analysis, a "design" is defined in Section 2(d) of the Designs Act as something applied to an article which "appeal[s] to and are judged solely by the eye". This definition specifically excludes an "artistic work" as defined in the Copyright Act. The court noted that the definition of an "artistic work" in Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act includes a "drawing," and it does not explicitly exclude a "design" from its scope.

​The court reasoned that the plaintiff's industrial drawings, exhibited as Exs. P59 to P79, fall under the category of an "artistic work" as per Section 2(c) of the Copyright Act. Crucially, the court found that these drawings would not be considered a "design" under the Designs Act because the copyright claim was for the drawings themselves, not for features that appeal "solely by the eye". The drawings were for the creation of functional components, and no claim was made regarding non-functional, visually appealing features.

​The court referred to judgments from other high courts to support the plaintiff's case:

​Mody Pumps Inc. & others v. Sovereign Pumping Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & others, 2022 (91) PTC 142 (Bom): This case was cited by the plaintiff's counsel to argue that industrial drawings are not capable of being registered as designs under the Designs Act.

​Microfibres Inc. v. Girdhar & Co. and another, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1647: The plaintiff's counsel also relied on this Delhi High Court judgment.

​Indiana Gratings Private Limited and Others v. Anand Udyog Fabricators Private Limited and others, 2009 (39) PTC 609 (Bom): This judgment was cited to support the contention that the plaintiff is entitled to protect the industrial drawings of the tractor parts under the Copyright Act.

​In the context of indirect copying, the court also cited the following international judgments referred to by the plaintiff's counsel to show that copying an artistic work can be done by copying an object made from it:

​Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Green Cartridge Co. (Hong Kong Ltd.), 3 WLR 13

​British Leyland Motor Corp & others v. Armstrong Patents Company Ltd. & others, MANU/UKHL/0017/1986

​The court found that the defendant's defense based on Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act was not applicable because the plaintiff's drawings were artistic works, not designs.

​Decision

​The court concluded that its jurisdiction was valid. It rejected the defendant's defense under Section 15(2) of the Copyright Act, reasoning that the plaintiff’s industrial drawings are "artistic works" and not "designs" under the relevant statutes. 

The court stated that the plaintiff’s drawings for functional components are not meant to appeal solely to the eye, a key requirement for a "design" under the Designs Act. Therefore, the bar on copyright protection under Section 15 of the Copyright Act did not apply. The court found that the plaintiff's lawsuit, which centered on copyright infringement of these drawings, was legally valid.

Case Title: Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd. Vs. Standard Corporation India Ltd.

Case Number: C.S No. 602 of 2007

Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:2145

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Order Date: September 3, 2025

Name of Honourable Judge: The Honourable Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

​Disclaimer:​The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

​Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

New Bharat Overseas Vs Bhagwati Lacto Vegetarian Exports Pvt. Ltd

Rule 70(9) of Copyright Rules and the Duty of prior Notice to party interested

Facts:The petitioner, New Bharat Overseas, has been engaged in the business of processing, selling, and exporting rice since 1978. It holds long-standing trademark registrations for the mark “TAJ MAHAL,” including one registered in 1981 under No. 338004 and another in 1989 under No. 387177, both in Class 30. Alongside trademark rights, the petitioner also secured copyright registration of its artistic label featuring the “TAJ MAHAL” device, registered under No. A-50558/1990.

The grievance of the petitioner arose when it discovered that the respondent, Bhagwati Lacto Vegetarian Exports Pvt. Ltd., obtained copyright registration No. A-130837/2019 dated 06.09.2019 for an artistic work titled “GARIMAA GOLD,” which also prominently depicted the Taj Mahal and was used on packaging of rice. The petitioner alleged that this registration was obtained surreptitiously and directly conflicted with its own earlier registered rights. It further argued that the respondent had been earlier accused of infringing activities, leading to FIRs in 2017 and 2019, in which seizure of goods had already taken place.

Procedural Detail:The petitioner filed a rectification petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, challenging the copyright registration granted to respondent no. 1. The petitioner contended that respondent no. 1 obtained registration without complying with Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013, which mandates that notice of the application must be given to any person who claims an interest or disputes rights in the subject matter of the copyright. According to the petitioner, since FIRs and criminal proceedings were pending at the time of the application, there was clear knowledge of dispute. However, no notice was served to it.

Dispute:The core legal dispute was whether the registration of copyright granted in favour of respondent no. 1 for the artistic work “GARIMAA GOLD” was valid when the statutory requirement of notice under Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013, had not been complied with. A secondary question raised by the respondent was whether the petitioner could claim exclusivity over the depiction of the Taj Mahal, which is a public monument and generally free for all to use under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Detailed Reasoning:The petitioner argued that the registration of the impugned artistic work was procedurally unsustainable, as Rule 70(9) requires the applicant for registration to give notice of its application to every person who claims or has any interest in the subject matter of the copyright. Since disputes were pending between the parties, and FIRs and charge sheets existed against the respondent, the petitioner clearly qualified as an “interested person.” It was also highlighted that in Form XIV, where the applicant must disclose whether there is any dispute over ownership, respondent no. 1 had suppressed material facts by failing to mention the ongoing disputes.

The respondent countered by arguing that no exclusivity could be claimed over the Taj Mahal, a national monument, which is free for use under Section 52(s) and (t) of the Copyright Act. They also contended that FIRs against a party do not automatically make the petitioner an “interested person” entitled to notice.

The Court noted that this case was not about deciding who owns the depiction of the Taj Mahal or whether it is common to trade. Instead, it focused on whether there was compliance with Rule 70(9). It was undisputed that no notice had been given to the petitioner despite the existence of ongoing criminal and civil disputes over the same artistic work. The Court emphasized that the statutory mandate under Rule 70(9) is clear: any person claiming or disputing rights in the subject matter must be notified. Since the petitioner had active disputes against the respondent, evidenced by FIRs and chargesheets, the respondent could not have ignored this requirement.

The Court found that non-compliance with Rule 70(9) rendered the registration procedurally flawed. The act of obtaining registration without serving notice undermined the integrity of the process and deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to oppose the registration. The Court rejected the contention that FIRs did not make the petitioner an “interested person.” On the contrary, the disputes and legal proceedings established that the petitioner had a genuine and active interest in the subject matter.

At the same time, the Court clarified that it was not making any finding on the merits of whether the Taj Mahal could be exclusively appropriated as part of an artistic work. Those issues were left open for the Registrar of Copyrights to decide afresh when reconsidering the application.

Decision:The High Court of Delhi held that the registration granted in favour of respondent no. 1 under Copyright No. A-130837/2019 was procedurally invalid due to non-compliance with Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013. The Court revoked and cancelled the impugned registration. It directed that the application of respondent no. 1 would be treated as revived, and the petitioner was permitted to file objections within four weeks. The Registrar of Copyrights was instructed to adjudicate the application afresh in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations in the Court’s order. 

Case Title: New Bharat Overseas Vs Bhagwati Lacto Vegetarian Exports Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Case Number: C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 843/2022

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Date of Order: 08 September 2025

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

WOW Momo Foods Pvt. Ltd. VS. WOW Burger

Trademark Law and the Limits of Exclusivity over Laudatory Words

Facts:WOW Momo Foods Private Limited began operations in 2008 in Kolkata and gradually grew into a well-known food business with more than 600 outlets across India. Its core brand identity revolved around the mark “WOW! MOMO,” which it used along with other related marks such as “WOW! CHINA,” “WOW! CHICKEN,” and “WOW! DIMSUM.” The plaintiff claimed that “WOW!” itself was the essential and distinctive feature of all its trademarks. It relied on its continuous commercial use, significant turnover, high promotional expenses, and strong social media presence to argue that consumers identified the word “WOW!” exclusively with its brand.

In December 2024, the plaintiff came across a LinkedIn post about the launch of a new food venture in India under the brand “WOW BURGER.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had slavishly copied the essential feature of its mark and was attempting to ride upon its goodwill. Claiming infringement of its trademarks and passing off, the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from using “WOW BURGER” in the food business.

Procedural Detail:The plaintiff filed a commercial suit in 2024 accompanied by an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, asking for an interim injunction. The matter was listed, notice was issued, but the defendants failed to appear despite service. Consequently, the right of the defendants to file a written statement was closed.

Dispute:The controversy centered around whether the plaintiff could claim exclusive rights over the word “WOW” or “WOW BURGER.” The plaintiff asserted that the defendant’s mark was deceptively similar to its own and amounted to trademark infringement and passing off. The question before the Court was whether the plaintiff had any legal basis to monopolize “WOW” as a trademark in the food industry, and whether the defendant’s use of “WOW BURGER” could be stopped.

Detailed Reasoning:The Court first considered the plaintiff’s trademark portfolio. It observed that the plaintiff did not hold any standalone registration for “WOW” or for “WOW BURGER.” The registrations available were only for composite marks like “WOW! MOMO,” “WOW! CHINA,” and others. Importantly, the Registrar of Trademarks had issued these registrations with disclaimers, clarifying that individual words within the composite marks, such as “WOW,” could not be monopolized. Thus, on record, there was no statutory right available to the plaintiff in the standalone word “WOW.”

The Court then considered whether the word “WOW” could be monopolized in law. Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 prohibits registration of marks which are descriptive, laudatory, or commonly used. Such terms can only acquire protection if they gain distinctiveness or “secondary meaning.” Section 30(2)(a) of the Act also makes it clear that even if such words are registered, third parties can use them honestly to describe the nature or quality of goods or services.

To reinforce this reasoning, the Court referred to multiple judicial precedents. In Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701, the Supreme Court held that generic or laudatory terms used in a trade cannot be monopolized even if they form part of a registered trademark. The Court emphasized that composite marks must be compared as a whole and that cherry-picking common elements like “PRIDE” in “BLENDERS PRIDE” and “LONDON PRIDE” cannot form a basis for infringement. This principle applied equally to the use of “WOW.”

The Court also cited Institute of Directors v. Worlddevcorp Technology and Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd., CS (COMM) 611/2023, decided on 11.12.2023, where it was held that ordinary English words like “Institute” and “Directors” cannot be monopolized as trademarks, as doing so would improperly privatize the English language.

Similarly, in Yatra Online Limited v. Mach Conferences and Events Limited, CS (COMM) 1099/2024, decided on 22.08.2025, the Delhi High Court refused exclusivity over the word “Yatra” in relation to travel services. It reiterated that generic or commonly descriptive words cannot acquire protection unless they unmistakably acquire secondary meaning over many decades of exclusive use.

The Court further relied on Marico Limited v. Agro Tech Foods Limited, FAO(OS) 352/2010, decided on 01.11.2010, where it was held that even slightly altered descriptive words like “LOSORB” (derived from “LOW ABSORB”) cannot be monopolized, because otherwise even dictionary words would get blocked by minor tweaks.

The Privy Council decision in Standard Ideal Co. v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company, (1910) 27 RPC 789 was also invoked to stress that words like “Standard,” being descriptive of quality, cannot be monopolized as trademarks.

Applying these authorities, the Court concluded that “WOW” is merely a laudatory exclamation, widely used in the food industry to express delight at taste or quality. As such, it lacks distinctiveness and cannot be reserved for the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had also argued that “WOW” had acquired secondary meaning due to its long use since 2008. However, the Court found this unconvincing. It referred to PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. v. EZY Services & Anr., IA 8084/2019 in CS(COMM) 292/2019, decided on 15.04.2021, which held that secondary meaning cannot be assumed and requires many decades of uninterrupted use, such as the 60-year use of “Glucon-D” noted in Heinz Italia v. Dabur India Ltd., (2007) 6 SCC 1. Since “WOW” had only been in use for about 16 years and was already used by many other businesses, the Court held that it had not acquired secondary meaning.

Another important finding was on the plaintiff’s claim of using “WOW BURGER” since 2009. The Court examined the documents and found that “WOW BURGER” had never been registered and had only been used as a menu item until 2018. Thereafter, the plaintiff replaced it with “Moburg” and “Louder Chicken Burger.” The plaintiff’s own website confirmed that its current brands were “WOW MOMO,” “WOW CHINA,” and “WOW CHICKEN,” with no mention of “WOW BURGER.” Thus, the Court held that the plaintiff had tried to mislead by presenting “WOW BURGER” as its brand when it was not.

Finally, the Court compared the competing marks “WOW! MOMO” and “WOW BURGER.” It reiterated the anti-dissection rule laid down in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980, which requires marks to be compared as a whole from the perspective of an average consumer. The Court found that apart from the shared use of “WOW,” the marks were entirely different in appearance, color scheme, and trade dress. The plaintiff’s branding was yellow, while the defendant’s was red and white. Their menus and products were also marketed differently. Hence, there was no deceptive similarity.

Decision:The High Court of Delhi dismissed the application for interim injunction. It held that the plaintiff had no registration or exclusive right over “WOW” or “WOW BURGER,” that “WOW” was a common laudatory word in the food industry, that “WOW BURGER” was never the plaintiff’s brand, and that the marks were not deceptively similar. The Court also observed that the plaintiff attempted to monopolize a dictionary word, which is not permissible. The findings were limited to the interim stage, and the suit was directed to proceed to trial.

Case Title: WOW Momo Foods Pvt. Ltd. VS. WOW Burger & Anr.

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1161/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8044

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Date of Order: 12 September 2025

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Cyril Bath Company Vs. Controller of Patents

Cyril Bath Company Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs: IPDPTA/8/2025:High Court at Calcutta: 01.09.2025:Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Facts:The Cyril Bath Company had filed a divisional patent application in India (Application No. 1376/KOLNP/2013). The Patent Office rejected this divisional application. The Controller’s order held that such modification of claims in a PCT national phase application was not possible. The Controller also stated that as per Section 10(4A) of the Patents Act and Rule 20(1) of the Patents Rules, only deletion of claims is allowed, and therefore filing a divisional application with modifications was impermissible.

Procedural Detail:The Patent Office passed its rejection order on 22 September 2023. The Cyril Bath Company filed this appeal before the Calcutta High Court under Section 16 of the Patents Act, 1970, challenging the Controller’s decision. The High Court examined whether the Controller had properly exercised his power while rejecting the divisional application.

Dispute:The core dispute was whether the applicant had the right to file a divisional patent application under Section 16 of the Patents Act, 1970, and whether the Controller was justified in rejecting the divisional application without giving reasons.

Reasoning:The Court noted that Section 16 of the Patents Act clearly permits the filing of a divisional application whenever the claims in the main application disclose more than one invention. The section expressly allows an applicant to file such an application before the grant of the parent patent. The Court criticized the Controller’s order because it simply quoted provisions of the law but gave no explanation or reasoning.

The Court relied on earlier rulings, including Toyo Engineering Corporation v. Controller General of Patents, where it was emphasized that orders must satisfy the “why” and “what” test. The “why” explains the reasoning, while the “what” shows the conclusion. An order without reasons amounts to arbitrary exercise of power. The Court also referred to Union Public Service Commission v. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi (2021) 4 SCC 516, reiterating that absence of reasons makes an order unsustainable.

The Court observed that the Controller wrongly relied only on the Boehringer Ingelheim decision (2022), without considering the later Delhi High Court decision in Syngenta Limited v. Controller of Patents (2023), which clarified the law on divisional applications. Such selective reliance showed lack of proper legal analysis.

Decision:The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned rejection order, and remanded the matter back to the Controller of Patents. The Court directed the Controller to decide the divisional application afresh in accordance with law within three months. The Court clarified that it had not decided the merits of the patent claims and that all issues remained open for the Controller’s independent decision.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Saint Gobain Glass France Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents

Workshop Tweaks Aren't Inventions

Facts of the Case:This case involves a challenge to the refusal of a patent application by the Indian Patent Office. The appellant, Saint Gobain Glass France, is a French company that makes and researches various glass products used in buildings, cars, airplanes, solar panels, and interior designs. They filed a patent application in India as part of an international process under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The application, numbered 201717045317 and titled "Material comprising a stack of thin layers," claimed priority from a French filing dated 9 July 2015. It was filed in India on 18 December 2017, examined on the same day, and published on 19 January 2018.

The invention describes a special coating for glass that uses layers of materials, including a silver-based metal layer, to create a shiny silver look on the outside while keeping good light transmission and solar energy control. The goal is neutral colors when light passes through and a reflective silver appearance without harming energy efficiency.

During the process, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) on 25 April 2019, raising issues like lack of newness (novelty), lack of inventive step, non-patentability under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 (which bars mere discoveries or new forms of known substances without enhanced efficacy), and unclear claims under Sections 10(4)(c) and 10(5). The appellant responded on 11 October 2019 by amending the claims, making a lower blocking layer optional.

On 20 August 2019, Respondent No. 2 (an opponent) filed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) of the Act. Hearings happened multiple times in 2023, with more prior art documents shared. The appellant filed replies, affidavits from experts, and further amendments. On 5 January 2024, the Assistant Controller refused the application, mainly because it lacked inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Act and Section 25(1)(e) (obviousness ground for opposition).

The appellant appealed this refusal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, to the High Court. An interim order on 11 April 2024 kept the application status as "pending" during the appeal. Oral arguments were heard over several dates in late 2024 and 2025, and judgment was reserved on 11 July 2025.

The Dispute:The core dispute is whether the invention meets the requirements for patentability under the Patents Act, 1970, especially Section 2(1)(ja), which defines "inventive step" as a feature that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art (a skilled worker in the field). The Controller said no, because the idea was obvious from existing knowledge (prior art)—just tweaking layer thicknesses in known glass coatings to get the desired silver look and reflection over 30%, without real innovation.

The appellant argued the Controller wrongly mixed bits from different old documents (cherry-picking) using hindsight (judging based on the invention itself, not what was known before). They said their invention provides real technical improvements like better neutral colors and solar performance, supported by data and expert evidence. They also claimed a similar patent was granted in France, so it should be in India.

The respondents (Patent Office and opponent) defended the refusal, saying the prior arts already taught similar layer stacks, and the changes were routine adjustments anyone skilled could make.

Detailed Reasoning: The Court applied a structured approach to check for inventive step, drawing from Supreme Court and High Court precedents. It relied on Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries (1979) 2 SCC 511, which says an invention must go beyond simple tweaks or combinations of known things—it needs to create something new or better through real creativity, not just obvious steps. The Court also used the five-step test from the Division Bench in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd. (2015 SCC OnLine Del 13619) to test obviousness objectively, without hindsight bias.

Step 1: Who is the 'person skilled in the art'? The Court agreed with the Controller: This is someone familiar with glass building and manufacturing basics, like how to layer coatings for light and energy control.

Step 2: What common knowledge existed before the priority date (9 July 2015)? The Court listed key prior arts (old documents):

Document A (WO 2014/164674): Teaches multi-metal layers for glass coatings.

Document B (WO 2014/177798): Shows silver layers between dielectric and blocking layers for better looks and reflection, but with triple silver (not single) and max 23.7% external reflection.

Document D2 (WO 2011/062574 A1): Describes bronze-colored glass with reflection under 28%, blue transmission, and tips on thickness tweaks for colors and solar performance.

Documents 3022/KOLNP/2010 and 3417/KOLNP/2010: The appellant's own earlier filings, showing single silver layers with 30-50% reflection and thin dielectric layers (5-25 nm), but different setups.

These show that stacking silver between protective layers for reflection and color was already known.

Step 3: What is the inventive concept? The Court saw it as: (i) Using one silver layer with specific surrounding layers for neutral transmission colors; (ii) Getting a glossy silver external reflection over 30% without worsening solar factor (energy gain).

Step 4: Differences from prior art?

Vs. A: A has three metals; invention uses one.

Vs. B: Similar stack, but B requires three silvers and lower reflection (23.7%).

Vs. D2: D2 aims for bronze/blue with lower reflection (<28%); invention wants silver over 30%.

Vs. 3022/KOLNP/2010: Similar reflection goal (30-50%), but different features.

Vs. 3417/KOLNP/2010: Single silver between anti-reflective layers, thin dielectrics.

The main difference: Specific thicknesses for silver look and high reflection without a lower blocking layer.

Step 5: Are these differences obvious (no inventive step)? Here, the Court sided with the Controller. The appellant's data (Tables 2-3) and expert affidavit didn't prove big improvements over prior art—no clear gains in solar factor, transmission, or colors without the optional layer. The expert missed key metrics like energy transmission (ET%) and external reflection (ERext%).

Prior arts (A, B, D2) already sandwich silver between dielectric/blocking layers and teach thickness tweaks for reflection, colors, and solar tweaks. D2 specifically says adjust layers for bronze from blue glass—obvious to try for silver. The appellant's own old filings show they knew single-silver stacks could hit 30-50% reflection and <60% transmission.

The Court rejected "cherry-picking": Combining related teachings from the same field isn't hindsight—it's what a skilled person does to solve similar problems. Citing Bishwanath Prasad, tweaks like thickness optimization are "workshop improvements," not inventions, unless they yield unpredictable new results. Here, outcomes were predictable.

On France grant: Patents are territorial (Communication Components Antenna Inc. v. ACE Technologies Corpn., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9123). India's standards (e.g., who counts as "skilled") differ; foreign grants don't bind.

The Court said the invention fails Section 2(1)(ja)—obvious routine work. Dependent claims (2-13) add nothing new. No need to revisit other objections like Section 3(d) or clarity, as inventive step alone bars grant.

Decision:The High Court dismissed the appeal on 11 September 2025, upholding the Controller's refusal under Section 2(1)(ja). The pending application (I.A. 8216/2024) was disposed of. The interim order (status as "pending") was vacated. The Registry must send a copy to the Patent Office. No costs awarded. This means no patent for the invention in India, emphasizing that obvious tweaks to known tech don't qualify as inventions.

This ruling reinforces strict scrutiny for inventive step in coatings/glass patents, stressing evidence of non-obvious advances and warning against hindsight in prior art combos. It guides applicants to show real, unpredictable benefits over old knowledge.

Case Title: Saint Gobain Glass France Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Anr.

Order Date: 11 September 2025

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 13/2024 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7941

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nehru Memorial Museum & Library Society Vs Dr. N. Balakrishnan

When Does Media Reporting Become Contempt

Facts: The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Society (petitioner) filed a contempt petition against Dr. N. Balakrishnan (respondent) under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The petition alleged that the respondent had committed contempt of court by creating an atmosphere of "trial by press." This allegation arose after a news report appeared in "The Hindu" newspaper during the hearing of a writ petition that the respondent was involved in. The news article reportedly gave an impression that the court hearing on a particular date was a standalone event and did not clarify that the hearings were ongoing daily. The petitioner claimed this misrepresentation influenced public opinion and undermined the court’s authority.

Dispute:The main issue was whether the newspaper report that publicized the ongoing case and the respondent’s complaints amounted to contempt of court by creating trial by media. The petitioner argued that the report wrongly suggested the court was delaying justice and unfairly influenced public perception against the petitioner. The respondent countered that the report merely reflected facts that were already presented openly in court and that the media report was based on judicial proceedings and thus protected from contempt under Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The respondent also argued that there was no attempt to influence the court's decision as the report did not comment on the legitimacy of the charges or the merits of the case.

Legal Discussion & Reasoning:

Trial by Media and Contempt: The court explained that trial by media occurs when the media tries to influence the court by asserting what the court’s decision should be. However, a mere report, which is fair and accurate and based on judicial proceedings, is not contempt.

Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: This section excludes fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings from contempt. Since the report was based on information already in court records and was a part of the judicial proceeding, it did not constitute contempt.

Freedom of Speech and Media Role: The court recognized that freedom of speech includes the right to express opinions through the media. The law and its recent amendments, especially Section 13 of the Contempt Act (with the defense of truth and limitation on imposing sentences for technical contempt), reflect a balance between protecting court authority and upholding freedom of expression.

Precedents: Several earlier cases were cited. Notably, the Bombay High Court in Vijay S. Mallya vs Bennett Coleman held that media reporting based on court pleadings is not contempt. Similar views were echoed in cases where the media reported facts from police charge sheets or judicial proceedings without unfair criticism.

Public Domain and Right to Know: The court observed the public’s right to know about judicial proceedings and that criticism or unfavorable portrayal in the media does not automatically amount to contempt unless it poses a clear and present danger to justice administration.

No Substantial Interference: The court emphasized that contempt requires deliberate or willful interference with the court's authority. A newspaper article expressing grievances or opinions without such interference is insufficient for contempt jurisdiction.

Decision: The Court dismissed the contempt petition, holding that the newspaper report in question did not amount to contempt of court. The reportage was a fair and accurate reflection of judicial proceedings and did not create trial by media. The petitioner failed to prove that the report interfered substantially with the due course of justice. The court reinforced that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised carefully and only if there is clear contempt, not merely on a party’s insistence. No costs were ordered.

Case Title: Nehru Memorial Museum & Library Society Vs  Dr. N. Balakrishnan

Order Date: 25.10.2010

Case Number: CCP No.380/2010 in WP (C) No.13733/2009

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manmohan Singh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Velji Karamshi Vaid And Anr Vs V3 Fashion

No Clean Hands, No Relief

Facts of the Case: The main parties are two garment businesses: the plaintiffs, Velji Karamshi Vaid & Anr., and the defendants, V3 Fashion and others. Plaintiffs own and run a business selling garments under the brand and trademark “V3” and “Volume 3”. They have trademark registrations for these and related marks (like “VOLUME...3 THE PERFECT FASHION”, “CASUAL”, etc.). The plaintiffs allege that they have been in this business for a long time, using their brand all over India and even exporting abroad.Defendants are also running a similar business and have used brand names like “V3”, “V3 STYLE”, and “V3.S” with or without other words.Plaintiffs state that defendants are using or attempting to register similar trademarks for garments, which are identical goods, and that this is causing confusion. Plaintiffs became aware that Defendant No. 7 (later separated from others) had applied for the “V3” trademark, which was later refused by the registrar.Plaintiffs sought an order (interim relief) stopping defendants from using those marks until a full trial is held.

The Dispute: Plaintiffs accuse the defendants of infringing their registered trademarks by using confusingly similar marks and also of passing off (attempting to make it seem that their goods are from the plaintiffs).Defendants argue that they are the earlier users of the “V3” mark (since 2017), that their marks look and sound different, and that no one can have an exclusive right to the letters “V3” alone because plaintiffs’ registration is for a device mark (a special design, not just letters).Plaintiffs reply that their reputation is attached to “V3” and that defendants’ actions are dishonest and misleading.

Detailed Reasoning by the Court:

Necessity of Clean Hands – Honesty of Both Sides: The Judge notes that both sides have not told the whole truth and have hidden important information or taken changing positions in court. This makes it hard to trust either side completely.

Plaintiffs’ Weaknesses:The plaintiffs did not submit all the relevant trademark registration documents up front, and their own statements about when they started using the mark “V3” varied at different times (2010, 2016, 2018, etc.).Plaintiffs did not back up their claims of business sales with concrete evidence like certified invoices or records.Earlier, when trying to register trademarks, plaintiffs themselves told the authorities that their mark was different from other “V3” marks and not conflicting, which weakens their current claim for exclusivity.

Defendants’ Weaknesses:The main defense from defendants was that they used “V3” first (since 2017), but the invoices they showed as proof used the details (like GST and address) of Defendant No. 7, who had actually left the business. There was no proper explanation for this. The court found that sales invoices produced by the defendants for 2017 and 2018 could not be trusted as they seemed doctored or fabricated. Defendants also made different claims in different forums—sometimes saying “V3” was unique and should not be used by others, and other times saying it was not confusingly similar—making their credibility questionable.

Both Sides Lack Reliable Evidence:The Court found that both sides either withheld or manipulated key facts. Neither side could credibly prove exactly when and how they started using their marks, or that customers specifically identified their goods with the marks in question. The usual straightforward way of proving use—by showing actual sales invoices—was not honestly or consistently presented by either side.

Trademark Law Points:Plaintiffs’ trademarks are device marks (a graphical/design element, not just the word “V3” alone). Law says that registration of a device mark does not give complete monopoly over each individual word or letter in it. For a claim of passing off, a business must show that people recognize its goods due to its reputation and that others’ imitation causes confusion. This too was not clearly shown here.

Final Decision: The Judge ruled that neither side deserves an order stopping the other from using the marks, at least at this interim (temporary) stage. The Court refused to give any interim order (injunction) in favor of the plaintiffs.

Case Title: Velji Karamshi Vaid & Anr. Vs V3 Fashion & Ors.

Order Date: 9 September 2025

Case Number: Commercial IP Suit No. 348 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:14740

Court: Bombay High Court

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Hi Tech Arai Private Limited Vs. Paul Components Private Limited

Legal Insights on Trademark Dishonesty and Document Fabrication

Facts: The plaintiff, Hi Tech Arai Private Limited, is a well-established company engaged in manufacturing and supplying rubber products like oil seals and aluminium die casting products, primarily for the automobile industry. They have used the trademark "HTA" since 1985 and other related marks ("Ars-HTA," logos with concentric circles) since the 1990s. Their products enjoy substantial sales and goodwill among major Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in India.

The defendant, Paul Components Private Limited, claims to have been using the "HTA" mark since 1977 and is the registered proprietor of that mark based on registrations starting from 2007, though claiming back use to 1977. They are also in the same business of manufacturing oil seals and rubber parts. The defendant had previously sued the plaintiff for trademark infringement and obtained an interim injunction, which was stayed by the Division Bench.

Dispute: The plaintiff filed the current suit to restrain the defendants from using the plaintiff’s trademarks, trade dresses, packaging, and passing off their goods as those of the plaintiff. The main points of dispute were:  Who was the prior user of the "HTA" mark? Whether the defendants' use of the mark and packaging was honest or intended to deceive consumers by copying the plaintiff’s identity. Validity and authenticity of documents and photographs presented by the defendants to show prior use since 1977. Whether the defendants acted in bad faith by adopting marks similar to the plaintiff’s and other third-party well-known trademarks.

Reasoning: The Court carefully examined the documentary evidence provided by both parties. The plaintiff submitted extensive evidence including sales figures, technical drawings, purchase orders, invoices, and packaging samples showing consistent use of "HTA" and related marks since 1985. The defendants' evidence was weaker and included trade mark registrations with claims of prior use starting in 1977. 

However, upon closer scrutiny: The defendants had filed manipulated photographs in a related proceeding, where marks "HTA" were digitally inserted into images that originally bore their "Paul Components" mark. Brochures filed by defendants contained errors in dates (e.g., wrong years for notable industry expos) indicating fabrication. Defendants had changed their user claim in trademark applications only after learning of plaintiff’s use history, suggesting backdating to claim priority. Defendants had also filed trademark applications for well-known third-party marks such as "JCB," "CUMMINS," and others without authorization, showing a pattern of bad faith. Defendants changed their product packaging color schemes to closely resemble the plaintiff’s packaging, indicating intent to confuse consumers. 

The plaintiff’s prior use of "HTA" as a trademark in trade and business papers, packaging, and sales was established under Section 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which recognizes use on business papers as valid trademark use. The Court referred to established legal principles on passing off, highlighting that even if a mark is registered by one party, an unregistered prior user with goodwill can seek relief. The Court discredited defendants’ evidence, especially in light of documented manipulations and lack of plausible explanations for adopting similar marks and third-party trademarks.Prima facie, the plaintiff had demonstrated significant goodwill and reputation in these marks, while defendants exhibited mala fide intent and dishonesty in adopting marks and packaging similar to the plaintiff’s.

Decision: The Court found a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff for passing off. The defendants were restrained from using the mark "HTA" and any deceptively similar marks, the logos, and the trade dress of the plaintiff’s packaging until the final decision in the suit. The interim injunction was granted to protect the plaintiff’s reputation and prevent harm to consumers and the plaintiff’s business.

Case Title: Hi Tech Arai Private Limited Vs. Paul Components Private Limited & Ors.

Order Date: September 9, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 891/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7819

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Stromag Gmbh Vs. The Controller General Of Patents

Stromag Gmbh Vs. The Controller General Of Patents

Stromag Gmbh vs. The Controller General Of Patents,  September 4, 2025  IPDPTA/12/2025  High Court at Calcutta, Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Stromag Gmbh, the appellant, filed an application for a patent titled"HYDRAULICALLY ACTUATABLE DISK BRAKE AND AZIMUTH DRIVE" on February 18, 2013. The Controller of Patents, the respondent, issued a First Examination Report (FER) raising objections to the patent application. The objections were that the invention lacked aninventive step under Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act, 1970; lacked patentability under Section 3(f) of the Act; and lacked sufficiency of disclosure under Section 10 of the Act.

The primary dispute arose because the Controller rejected the patent application, stating that the invention was not "inventive" because it was merely a combination of seven previously known technologies, or "prior arts". The appellant argued that the order rejecting their patent was passed in violation of theprinciples of natural justice. They pointed out that the Controller's order simply reproduced summaries of the seven prior arts but did not provide any specific analysis of how combining these prior arts would make the appellant's invention obvious. The appellant's argument was that the order had no valid reasons and was just a "rubber-stamp reason".The court noted that a judicial or quasi-judicial order must have reasons to support it. This is a fundamental part of natural justice. The court cited several Supreme Court cases, includingKranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, which emphasized that orders "must speak" for themselves and not be vague or inscrutable. The court also highlighted the principle fromGurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368] that "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions".

The High Court of Calcutta found the impugned order (the order from the Controller) to be sustainable because it did not provide an analysis of how the prior arts made the invention obvious. It ruled that merely stating that the invention is a combination of prior arts is not a sufficient reason for rejection. The court set aside the Controller's order and sent the matter back to a different Hearing Officer to review the patent application from the beginning, within a period of four months. The court made it clear that it was not deciding on the merits of the patent itself, and all questions regarding the patent were left open for the new Hearing Officer to decide.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ultrahuman Healthcare Pvt Ltd Vs. Oura Health Oy

Ultrahuman Healthcare Pvt Ltd Vs. Oura Health Oy & Anr. Order Date: September 1, 2025 Case Number: CS(COMM) 923/2025 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Hon'ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Plaintiff,Ultrahuman Healthcare Pvt Ltd, filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, Oura Health Oy, seeking a permanent injunction to prevent them from infringing on their Indian Patent No. IN 549915. The patent, titled 'Electronic Ring Including Sensors For Monitoring Health and Fitness Parameters' , was granted to the Plaintiff on September 10, 2024, for a period of 20 years. The Plaintiff claimed they discovered that the Defendants were selling their product, the 'OURA Ring 4', in India through e-commerce channels. The parties were already involved in legal disputes in US Courts.

The main dispute centered on the Plaintiff's allegedsuppression of material facts and documents from the High Court of Delhi. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff failed to disclose two crucial orders from theUnited States International Trade Commission (ITC) dated April 18, 2025, and August 21, 2025. These orders had granted an injunction against the Plaintiff's products in the US market, finding that they infringed on the Defendants' patent.

The Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the US court orders wereirrelevant because patent law is territorial, meaning a patent in one country does not automatically apply in another. They also claimed that the August 21, 2025 order could not be included because the suit was filed on the same day.

The court, however, was not persuaded. It stated that the Plaintiff had a strict obligation to disclose all relevant documents in a commercial suit under

Order XI Rule 1(1) and Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC. The court found that the US orders were highly relevant because they involved the same parties and the same technology. The court also noted that the Plaintiff had sufficient time between filing the suit and the first hearing to bring the orders to the court's attention, which it willfully failed to do.

The court concluded that the Plaintiff's failure to disclose the US court orders was willful and deliberate. This suppression of material information was in disregard of legal obligations and merited the dismissal of the suit at the very beginning.

The High Court of Delhi, therefore,dismissed the suit. However, it granted the Plaintiff the liberty to file a fresh suit after making a full disclosure of the suppressed orders and providing an explanation for why the findings in those orders are not relevant to the Indian proceedings.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

VGP IPCO LLC Vs. Mr. Suresh Kumar

VGP IPCO LLC & Anr. Vs. Mr. Suresh Kumar Trading :August 22, 2025: CS(COMM) 821/2024  Hon'ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Plaintiffs, VGP IPCO LLC and an Indian company, a 50:50 joint venture with Cummins India Ltd. , filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, who are a manufacturer, a wholesaler, and two retailers. The Plaintiffs, known for their

Valvoline lubricant brand, which was established in 1866 and operates in over 150 countries, have a strong brand identity and registered trademarks in India dating back to 1942. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants were selling engine oils under the names

Vivoline / V Vivoline / VIVOLINE / VIVOLINE, which they claimed were deceptively similar to their own trademarks. The Defendants' products also allegedly used similar packaging and trade dress, which could confuse consumers.

The court found merit in the Plaintiffs' claims. It noted that the Defendants had not contested the suit, and their failure to file a written statement meant the allegations in the plaint could be taken as admitted. The court concluded that the Defendants' marks were deceptively, visually, and phonetically similar to the Plaintiffs' trademarks, and their use of similar trade dress was likely to cause confusion.

Given the Plaintiffs' high sales volume in India, the court reasoned that the Defendants must have been aware of the Valvoline brand and that their adoption of the similar mark was not an honest one. The court granted a decree of permanent injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, preventing the Defendants from using the infringing marks or any similar packaging. The interim injunction that had been in place since October 22, 2024, was made permanent. Additionally, the court directed the trademark registry to process the withdrawal application filed by Defendant No. 1 for the VIVOLINE trademark.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Dabur India Limited Vs Real Hindustan Beverages

Dabur India Limited Vs Real Hindustan Beverages & Ors

Order Date: 19 August 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 274/2022

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Dabur India, a leading FMCG company, owns the popular trademark “REAL FRUIT POWER” for fruit juices. In 2022, Dabur discovered that Real Hindustan Beverages was selling fruit drinks using the mark “ULTRA REAL FRUIT ENERGY,” which closely resembled Dabur’s brand name, logo, and packaging.

Dabur argued that the use of “ULTRA REAL FRUIT ENERGY” by Real Hindustan Beverages was a clear case of copying, causing confusion to buyers by making it seem related to Dabur. Dabur sought a permanent injunction to stop this use, claiming infringement and passing off of its trademark.

The Court saw that Real Hindustan Beverages did not defend the case and found the marks and packaging to be very similar. Using Order XIII-A of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court passed a summary judgment—giving Dabur permanent injunction relief as requested, and ordering Real Hindustan Beverages to stop using the disputed marks and logos on its products.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Alkem Laboratories Ltd Vs Lordcent and Torcent Healthcare

Alkem Laboratories Ltd Vs Lordcent and Torcent Healthcare

Order Date: 28 August 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 905/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Alkem Laboratories claimed exclusive rights over its ‘A TO Z’ trademark, logo, and product design for medicines, used since 1997 and registered under Indian law. They discovered in 2023 that Lordcent and Torcent were selling similar medicines with nearly identical branding, which could confuse customers.

Alkem argued that Lordcent and Torcent had copied their branding, leading to trademark, copyright infringement, and passing off. The records showed Lordcent and Torcent gave written assurances to stop using the disputed branding, but Alkem later found similar products still on sale in 2025, prompting this lawsuit for a permanent injunction against further use.

The Court recognized Alkem’s prior rights and found the competing products’ branding was deceptively similar. It ordered Lordcent and Torcent to immediately stop selling, marketing, or advertising any products using the disputed marks or packaging. The Court also ordered the removal of such products from third-party websites and set deadlines for replies and further proceedings. The injunction will remain in effect until the next hearing.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi