Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Actual Service of Notice in Trademark Oppositions

Facts of the Case: The dispute arose when the appellant, Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., popularly known for its brand association with dairy products, filed an opposition against the trademark application of Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 had applied for registration of the mark "DOODH" under Class 30. The appellant filed Opposition No. 1298974 challenging this application on various grounds, asserting that the registration of such a mark would adversely affect its business interests and was liable to be refused under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The Registrar of Trade Marks, however, by order dated 24 April 2025, dismissed the opposition on the ground that the appellant had failed to file its evidence affidavit in support of the opposition within the stipulated period of time. This dismissal prompted the appellant to file the present appeal before the High Court of Delhi challenging the Registrar’s decision.

The central factual controversy revolved around whether the appellant had indeed filed the affidavit of evidence within the statutory period prescribed under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, which allows a period of two months from the date of service of notice to submit evidence.

Procedural Background: The opposition was filed on 10 April 2024. Subsequently, a notice dated 11 September 2024 was prepared by the Registrar’s office requiring the appellant to file its evidence. This notice was served upon the appellant only via email on 15 September 2024. As per Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, the limitation period for filing evidence commenced from the date of service, i.e., 15 September 2024. Thus, the two-month period would expire on 15 November 2024.

The appellant filed its affidavit of evidence before the Registrar on 14 November 2024 and also supplied a copy to Respondent No. 2 on 13 November 2024. In addition, the evidence was dispatched through speed post on 11 November 2024. Despite this timely filing, the Registrar dismissed the opposition by treating the filing as delayed, apparently computing the limitation from the date of the letter (11 September 2024) instead of the actual date of service (15 September 2024).

This error formed the basis of the appeal before the Delhi High Court.

The Core Dispute: The principal dispute was whether the appellant had complied with the statutory requirement of filing evidence within two months from the date of service of notice under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

The appellant argued that the limitation must run from the date of actual service of notice, not from the date printed on the Registrar’s letter. Therefore, since the service was effected on 15 September 2024 and the affidavit of evidence was filed on 14 November 2024, it was clearly within the statutory time.

On the other hand, the Registrar had mistakenly concluded that the evidence affidavit was filed beyond time, while Respondent No. 2 contended that though technically served within time, this situation caused prejudice since Respondent No. 2 had already been granted registration.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis: The High Court examined the submissions of all parties, particularly the written statement of the Registrar of Trade Marks. It was fairly conceded by the Registrar that the notice was indeed served only on 15 September 2024 via email and not earlier.

This concession was critical, as Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, explicitly states that the period of two months for filing evidence begins from the date of receipt of notice. The Court observed that service of notice is a foundational step in limitation law. Citing the general legal principle that limitation runs from the date of actual service and not the date of the letter, the Court held that the appellant had acted within the prescribed period.

The Court emphasized that the Registrar’s finding that the evidence was filed belatedly was contrary to the record and violative of Rule 45(1). The Court also stressed that any contrary interpretation would amount to depriving a party of its statutory right to oppose a trademark merely on account of a procedural misunderstanding.

Furthermore, the Court carefully balanced equities. While setting aside the Registrar’s order, the Court recognized the concern of Respondent No. 2, who had been granted registration in the meantime. To address this, the Court directed the Registrar to decide the opposition afresh within a period of two months, strictly without adjournments, thereby protecting the rights of both parties.

The Court also directed that the relief sought in prayer clause (d) for cancellation of Respondent No. 2’s registration be allowed and the trademark registry be updated accordingly within two weeks. However, the Court clarified that nothing in its order should be read as an opinion on the merits of the opposition itself, which would have to be independently adjudicated by the Registrar.

Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. and set aside the impugned order dated 24 April 2025 passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks. The Court held that the appellant had filed its evidence affidavit within the prescribed period under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

The Court remanded the matter to the Registrar of Trade Marks with directions to conduct a time-bound hearing and adjudicate the opposition on its merits within two months. The registration already granted to Respondent No. 2 was ordered to be updated in the records to reflect the correct legal position. Importantly, the Court clarified that its order should not prejudice the Registrar’s independent decision on the merits of the opposition.

Case Title: Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

Case Number: C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 46/2025 

Date of Decision: 19 September 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Woltop India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India

Territorial Jurisdiction in Trademark Rectification

Introduction: The petition sought a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to transfer rectification petitions pending before the Registrar of Trade Marks, Ahmedabad, to the Intellectual Property Division of the Madras High Court for consolidation and expeditious disposal alongside an existing civil suit.

Facts: The facts reveal that the petitioner had instituted civil suit C.S.(Comm.Div.) No. 199 of 2023 for alleged trademark infringement and passing off. Pending before the Ahmedabad Registrar were rectification petitions numbered 272370 and 272372 concerning trade mark registrations in classes 27 and 35. The petitioner requested transfer of these rectification petitions to the IPD of the Madras High Court for consolidation with the civil suit, contending that this was necessary to avoid multiplicity, delays, and conflicting judgments. Despite the petitioner’s letter dated 30.05.2024 invoking Section 125(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, requesting transfer, no action was taken. Subsequently, these writ petitions were filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Procedure: Procedurally, the maintainability of the writ petitions was questioned. The petitioner argued that consolidation was fair and necessary under Rule 14(1) of the Madras High Court Intellectual Property Division Rules, 2023, and that neither Article 139A of the Constitution nor Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied to prevent this remedy. Counsel emphasized that the High Court’s power under Article 226 to issue writs extends where a cause of action arises within jurisdiction, regardless of the physical location of the authority to be directed.

In opposition, the respondents, particularly the fifth party, contended that jurisdiction rested with the High Court having appellate jurisdiction over the relevant Registrar’s office per Rule 4 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. They submitted that the writ petitions could have been filed in the Gujarat High Court where the Registrar of Trade Marks, Ahmedabad exercises authority. They denied any stay application in the civil suit and stated no impediment existed to its continued prosecution. The respondents invoked statutory provisions and procedural rules, emphasizing that only the High Court geographically competent over the Registry office can entertain rectification matters. They cautioned against judicial overreach under Article 226 when a statutory tribunal with specified jurisdiction exists.

Examination by Court: The Court examined applicable provisions from the Trade Marks Act, particularly Sections 47 and 57 relating to rectification powers, which had been amended by the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, replacing the erstwhile Appellate Board with the High Court. The Court noted the deliberate use of the definite article ‘the’ before ‘High Court’ in these Sections, signaling Parliament’s intent to confer jurisdiction on a specific High Court exercising appellate jurisdiction over a defined Registrar’s office. The Court contrasted this with the use of the indefinite article ‘a’ in other contexts.

The Court underscored Rule 4 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, designating the territorial jurisdiction of trademark registry offices, and confirmed that since the registered proprietor’s principal place of business was in Surat, Gujarat, the appropriate Registry was Ahmedabad. Hence, statutory jurisdiction over rectification petitions necessarily lay with the Gujarat High Court and itsTrademark Registry.

The Court reviewed jurisprudence including Adiuvo Diagnostics Private Limited v University Health Network (2024 SCC OnLine Mad 185), which held the appropriate Patent Office does not restrict writ jurisdiction, but distinguished this from statutory jurisdiction conferred in the TM Act for rectification matters. The Court clarified that jurisdiction under Sections 47 and 57 cannot be assumed by any High Court besides the one with territorial appellate jurisdiction, to avoid jurisdictional chaos and conflicting decisions, as multiple petitions for the same rectification could arise everywhere.

Further, the Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Rule 14(1) of the Madras High Court IPD Rules as conferring power to consolidate these proceedings beyond supervisory jurisdiction. It noted that commercial courts including district courts have jurisdiction for suits concerning trademarks, and consolidation across district and high court proceedings is not envisaged. The Court pointed out Section 124 of the TM Act prescribes stays of suits pending resolution of rectification petitions, thereby preventing conflict without needing transfer or consolidation in different fora.

The Court cited a contrary view held by a single judge in Nippon Paint Holdings Co. Ltd. v Suraj Sharma (MANU/TN/1388/2024) and the Delhi High Court in Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd v Fast Cure Pharma, but as this order was stayed by the Supreme Court, the Court declined to endorse it, reaffirming the territorial nexus principle for High Court jurisdiction.

Decision: The Court held that the Madras High Court did not have jurisdiction under Sections 47 and 57 of the TM Act to entertain the rectification petitions pending before the Ahmedabad Registrar. It stated that the writ petitions were discretionary remedies not suited to override statutory jurisdiction and procedural availability of remedies before the Gujarat High Court. The Court declined to grant the requested transfer or consolidation but left open the option to approach the Gujarat High Court for expeditious disposal of the rectification petitions. The writ petitions were thus dismissed without costs.

This judgment clarifies territorial jurisdiction and separation of powers under the TM Act and underscores the delicate balance between constitutional writ powers and statutory administrative adjudication. It emphasizes the need to respect jurisdictional boundaries based on territorial connections of trademark registrations to reduce litigation confusion, preserve orderly administration of justice, and avoid conflicting rulings.

Case Title: Woltop India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others  

Order Date: 20th February 2025  

Case Number: W.P.(IPD) Nos. 30 & 32 of 2024  

Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:485  

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: The Honourable Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Fox and Mandal and Another Vs. Somabrata Mandal and Others

The Role of Court Discretion in Consolidating IP Proceedings

Facts:The case primarily deals with an application for consolidation and analogous hearing of three related proceedings pending before the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the Court. The petitioner sought to consolidate these proceedings for effective and consistent determination of disputes concerning ownership and use of the mark.

Procedural Background: The petitioner moved for consolidation of the suit (IP-COM 6 of 2025) with a writ petition (WPO-IPD 1 of 2025) and another commercial suit (IP-COM 31 of 2025), all concerning rival claims to rights in the trademark "Fox & Mandal." The claimed reliefs included quashing of impugned communications by the Registrar of Trade Marks, removal of registrations, stay on implementation of certain registrations, injunctions preventing unauthorized use of the mark, and monetary damages.

Petitioner's contention: The facts reveal that the petitioner claimed ownership of the trademark "Fox & Mandal," arguing that all three proceedings raise common issues such as goodwill associated with the mark, possibility of confusion among consumers due to concurrent use, exclusive ownership disputes, and questions of whether one party can restrain another from using the mark. The petitioner cited judicial precedents including Prem Lala Nahata & Ors. vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria (2007) 2 SCC 551 and Chittivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004) 3 SCC 85 to support the request for consolidation based on common questions of law and facts.

Respondent's contention: The respondents, who are the plaintiffs in the suit opposing consolidation, contended that the application was an abuse of process filed to delay proceedings. They argued that the suit before the Court was for passing off and that the defendants had failed to file their Written Statement within the mandatory 120-day period, indicating their intention to stall the case. They further noted that the request for consolidation had been rejected repeatedly at different stages. They submitted that the different proceedings were at incomparable stages procedurally and that consolidation would thus be improper. They relied on case law including Monohar Lal vs. Ugrasen (2010) 11 SCC 557, Ananda Swarup Agarwal & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal AIR 2000 Cal 222, and Jai Singh vs. Union of India (1977) 1 SCC 1 in support of their stance.

Relevant Provision: The Court examined the provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which permit consolidation of proceedings as part of Case Management Hearing (Order IV A), and the court’s inherent power under Section 151 CPC. It also referred to Rule 18(b) of the Intellectual Property Rights Rules, 2023 applicable in the Calcutta High Court.

The Observation: The Court observed that while the power to consolidate is discretionary and may be applied to avoid conflicting decisions or duplication of effort when there are common issues of fact or law, the stage of the proceedings is a critical factor. The suit in IP-COM 6 of 2025 was well advanced with the plaintiff having completed opening arguments in a summary judgment application, while the other suits were at much earlier or dormant stages — the writ petition had been pending without trial, and the suit IP-COM 31 of 2025 had not seen service of the summons even after two years.

The Court emphasized that a diligent party should not be delayed or prejudiced because of the indolence of the opposing party. The issues in the writ petition and other suits had no material bearing on the main disputes in the suit before the Court, which was a suit for passing off. The need for speedy disposal of commercial disputes as mandated by the Commercial Courts Act was explicitly noted, cautioning against delaying tactics through consolidation applications.

The Court further noted that the principal purpose of consolidation is to address strong common links in cause of action, injury, or relief claims, and to save time and costs. However, it may be refused where it could cause delay or embarrassment to the trial process. The Court found no strong common link warranting consolidation and held that the stage of the various proceedings was incompatible for consolidation.

Issues in Suit and Issues in Writ: Relying on precedents such as Dyna Chem vs. Jaipal Das Punjabi (2021) 4 MPLJ 406 and Supriya Roy & Anr. vs. Bijaya Bose 2018 (2) CHN 372, the Court confirmed that the issues in the writ petition were unrelated to the present suit. The Court also distinguished the petitioner’s reliance on Prem Lala Nahata and Chittivalasa Jute Mills cases as factually inapposite.

Decision: Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application for consolidation as ill-motivated and misconceived but made no order as to costs. The judgment reinforces principles that while courts have wide discretion to consolidate cases with similar facts or issues, procedural stages and the interest of justice, including the avoidance of undue delay, are paramount considerations in exercising that discretion.

The decision crystalizes how courts balance procedural efficiency, litigants’ rights to expeditious trial, and the avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings in intellectual property disputes. It also highlights judicial vigilance against abuse of court process under pretexts such as consolidation for delaying the progress of substantive issues like passing off.

Case Title: Fox and Mandal and Another Vs. Somabrata Mandal and Others  

Order Date: 22nd September 2025  

Case Number:  IP-COM/6/2025  

Name of Court: High Court of Calcutta

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Oxular Limited Vs. The Assistant Controller of Patents

The Test of Inventive Step in Patent and Procedural Fairness

The Fact:This case center around a patent application for an ophthalmic delivery device. Oxular Limited filed Patent Application No. 201817034819 titled "Ophthalmic Delivery Device and Ophthalmic Drug Compositions" at the Patent Office, New Delhi, on 14 September 2018, through its authorized Patent Agent. A request for examination was timely filed on 13 March 2020, within the permissible window starting from the date of priority. The Patent Office took up the application for detailed examination and, on 27 August 2020, issued the First Examination Report (FER) raising a range of objections regarding novelty, inventive step, patentability under Section 3(d), and sufficiency of disclosure under Section 10(5) of the Patents Act, 1970.

Response by Appellant:Oxular Limited responded through its authorized agent, submitting a reply and amending the claims to reduce and clarify the claims under challenge. However, the Patent Office persisted with its objections and issued a hearing notice on 2 August 2023, which was followed by actual hearing only after several adjournments on 31 October 2023. Further written submissions along with amended claims were filed by Oxular Limited on 15 December 2023, aiming to address the outstanding objections. Despite these submissions, the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs refused the application under Section 15 of the Patents Act by an order dated 9 January 2024. The primary ground was lack of inventive step as prescribed under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Act, referencing several prior arts.

The Core Issue:The dispute before the High Court of Delhi involved the appellant, Oxular Limited, challenging the order of the Assistant Controller. The appellant argued that the refusal order failed to properly consider the written submissions made in response to the hearing notice and did not apply the well-known judicial criteria for determining "inventive step."

The Reasoning:The Court’s analysis starts with recapping the reasons provided in the impugned order, which found that the claims did not involve an inventive step in light of documents cited as prior art (particularly D1 to D6). 

The Controller reasoned that using a flexible cannula deployed from a needle to the suprachoroidal or supraciliary space was obvious, and that other choices such as the shape or semi-solid state of compositions were routine and did not show any inventive step. The Court noted that the applicant’s main argument was that the device's self-actuated deployment mechanism was a significant advancement over the cited prior art and that the written submissions with clarifications had not been duly considered.

Assessment of inventive step:The appellant also invoked two key judicial precedents regarding assessment of inventive step:  

 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2016 (65) PTC 1 (Del) (DB)  

 Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents & Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4786

The Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. test involves five steps:  

1. Identify who is an ordinary person skilled in the art  

2. Identify the inventive concept in the patent  

3. Impute what was commonly known in the field at the date of invention  

4. Identify distinctions between prior art and the claimed invention  

5. Determine whether those distinctions would have been obvious.

Similarly, the Agriboard International LLC case emphasizes that, in order to refuse a patent for lack of inventive step, the Controller must consider:  

- The prior art  

- The invention as claimed  

- Whether, in light of the prior art, the invention would have been obvious to a skilled person

The Finding:The Court found that the refusal order did not reflect a reasoned application of these legal tests. It observed that the impugned order focused solely on the obviousness issue using a broad-based and generic approach, without examining whether the features unique to the applicant’s device were in fact obvious when read in the context of the technical field and the full set of prior art documents. The Court strongly reiterated, by relying on Supreme Court precedents like Assistant Commissioner v. Shukla and Brothers and Manohar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2013 SC 681), that a reasoned and speaking order is central to procedural fairness, a fundamental principle of natural justice.

The Conclusion:Thus, the Court concluded that the Assistant Controller had failed not only to consider the applicant’s submissions but also to pass a reasoned order as required by law. The decision was held to be non-compliant with both statutory requirements and judicial precedent laid down for patent assessments.

The Decision:Accordingly, the High Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Patent Office for a fresh decision. The Patent Office was directed to grant a hearing to Oxular Limited and provide a reasoned order after applying the tests prescribed in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. and Agriboard International LLC. The matter was to be decided as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months from the date of the order. The Court made it clear that no observations in this judgment should be read as an opinion on the patentability of the invention itself.

Case Title: Oxular Limited Vs. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs  

Order Date: 11 September, 2025  

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 142024  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8337

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi  

Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Shikanji Private Limited Vs. Satish Kumar Jain

Contempt of Court in Trademark Law

Facts:The core dispute revolved around the use of several trademarks involving "Jain Shikanji." Satish Kumar Jain, the respondent, claimed exclusive rights over the trademark "Jain Shikanji." Meanwhile, the appellant company, Jain Shikanji Private Limited, and its Directors were accused of violating earlier ad-interim injunction orders by continuing to use, advertise, and promote goods under deceptively similar trademarks like "Jain Shikanji Restaurant," "Jain Asli," and related variants. This dispute even extended to online references and third-party platforms where the marks appeared.

Trial Court Order:Originally, the learned District Judge, Commercial Court-01, East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, passed an order on 03.06.2023 in Suit CS COMM No. 171/2021, allowing Satish Kumar Jain’s application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. This rule deals with consequences for willful disobedience or breach of court injunctions. The Trial Court found Jain Shikanji Private Limited and its Director, Mr. Anubhav Jain, guilty of disobeying the Court’s interim injunction dated 05.11.2022 and sentenced Mr. Anubhav Jain to civil imprisonment for eight weeks. 

The Appeal:Subsequently, the appellant challenged the order in appeal before the High Court, which partially stayed only the imprisonment direction on 12.06.2023, keeping other directions active.

The Contention:The prime contention was whether the appellant and its Director had complied with the court’s injunction and multiple undertakings to stop using the disputed trademarks. Despite assurances and filing affidavits, evidence and complaints showed that the appellant continued GST filings and operated bank and UPI accounts under the name "Jain Shikanji Private Limited" even after the undertakings. Bottled beverages with the allegedly infringing trademarks continued production and sale, both under the older and newly created company names. Additionally, further products using the disputed marks were produced by associated entities such as Hawa Hawai Restaurant Private Limited and Sangria Beverages, all linked to the same family group, despite claims of retirement and non-involvement from certain directors.

The Reasoning:The High Court exhaustively analyzed the undertakings filed and the steps claimed by the appellant to comply with the orders. It found persistent violations, such as the continued use of the "Jain Shikanji Private Limited" name for banking and payment services long after affidavits claimed the name was changed. The Court noted that only after repeated complaints from the respondent did the appellant take rushed steps to change UPI details, and even then, only post-court directions in August 2025. The packaging produced in Court still featured infringing marks as per the complaints, and there was no credible denial from the appellant. Even new products launched by interrelated or formerly associated group entities bore the contentious trademarks and continued manufacturing claims.

The Finding:The bench found this conduct amounted to not just violation but to repeated contempt, as affidavits and statements before the Court proved misleading or incomplete. The Judges highlighted that instead of "purging the contempt," the appellant "compounded the same by committing further contempt during the pendency of the present appeal." Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC was squarely invoked, which legally empowers the court to penalize for disobedience of injunction by civil imprisonment or attachment of property.

Decision:The High Court vacated the interim stay protecting Mr. Anubhav Jain from surrender and ordered compliance with the Trial Court’s punishment by 19.09.2025. All directions from the order dated 03.06.2023 remained operative. The appeal was dismissed, and pending applications were rendered infructuous. Directions for urgent compliance and transmission of orders to the Trial Court were issued to ensure execution.

Case Title: Jain Shikanji Private Limited Vs. Satish Kumar Jain

Order Date: 17.09.2025

Case Number: FAO COMM 130/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8248-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Madhu Jain

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nilesh Girkar Vs Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Interplay of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction

Facts:The appellant, Mr. Nilesh Girkar, an author and lyricist, was engaged by Respondents 2 to 5, including Tutri Ventures Private Limited and its directors, to write dialogues and lyrics for songs in a film initially titled "SHOOTER." It was agreed that if the appellant's work was used in the film, he would be compensated. However, in 2016, the appellant was informed that the film project was shelved, leading him to cease pursuing his claims.

Years later, the appellant discovered a film titled "OPERATION FRYDAY" streaming on ZEE5, the OTT platform owned by Respondent 1, Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited. "OPERATION FRYDAY" was essentially the earlier shelved "SHOOTER," having been renamed but containing the appellant’s dialogues and songs. Though the film credited the appellant for the songs, it did not acknowledge his contribution to the dialogues, nor did the respondents seek his permission or pay any royalty for using his literary work.

Issuance of notices:The appellant issued multiple notices starting in February 2023, demanding recognition and compensation for his copyright, but the respondents failed to adequately respond or settle the matter amicably. Consequently, the appellant filed a suit in the Commercial Court alleging copyright infringement, seeking permanent injunctions, credits, damages, and costs.

Procedural History:The Commercial Court initially rejected the suit against Respondent 1 (Zee Entertainment) under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for lack of cause of action and returned the plaint against Respondents 2 to 5 under Order VII Rule 10 for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed against this order, challenging the dismissal and return of plaint parts. On a prior occasion, a Division Bench of the High Court had ruled that dismissal under Order VII Rule 11(a) was improper when it should have been a return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 and remanded the matter for correct consideration.

Dispute:The core dispute concerned two interlinked issues was whether the Commercial Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit given that the appellant's cause of action partly arose in Delhi, where ZEE5 operates and where the film was accessible.

The Commercial Court held that no cause of action existed against Respondent 1 since there was no direct contractual privity and that the suit was not maintainable there. It also found lack of territorial jurisdiction over Respondents 2 to 5, returning the plaint against them.

Detailed Reasoning:The High Court undertook an extensive analysis of procedural law and copyright provisions to evaluate the correctness of the Commercial Court's order.

Partial Rejection of Plaint, not permissible:The Court recognized that under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, a plaint is returned when a suit is filed in a court lacking jurisdiction, while under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, a plaint is rejected if it does not disclose a cause of action. The Court emphasized that a plaint cannot be rejected partially; it must either be wholly rejected or upheld, citing authoritative precedents, including the Supreme Court decision in *Geetha v. Nanjundaswamy* (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1407), which clarifies this principle.

The Court noted that the Commercial Court erred in rejecting the plaint against Respondent 1 and returning it against others simultaneously, which is not permissible.

Part of cause of action and Jurisdiction:Regarding jurisdiction, the Court relied on Section 20(c) of the CPC, which allows suits to be instituted where a cause of action, wholly or partly, arises. Since the film was streamed on the OTT platform ZEE5 accessible in Delhi, the Court held that at least part of the cause of action did arise within the Court’s territorial limits.

Significantly, the Court detailed the copyright provisions under the Copyright Act, 1957, particularly Sections 14, 17, and 51. The author of literary works—here, the dialogues and songs—holds exclusive rights including reproduction, public communication, and adaptation.

Section 51 of the Copyright Act deems infringement to occur when any person, without a license, exercises these exclusive rights or permits a place (such as an OTT platform) to communicate the infringing work to the public for profit.

The Court held that mere lack of contractual privity with Respondent 1 does not extinguish the cause of action for copyright infringement. The OTT platform owner, as the entity streaming the film containing the author’s copyrighted dialogues without authorization, is liable as an infringer under Section 51(a)(ii).

Accessibility of Platform and Jurisdiction:The Court also rejected attempts by Respondent 1 to differentiate their platform from "interactive websites" used in commerce by highlighting technical differences with subscription models and transaction types. It held that such distinctions do not negate the fact that the streaming constituted communication to the public within the meaning of copyright infringement and thus created jurisdiction in the Court where the platform is accessible.

Further, the Court observed that the appellant's grievances against all respondents formed an interconnected "bouquet of grievances" related to copyright infringement. This interconnection precluded splitting the suit by defendant. Hence, the suit was maintainable against all respondents in the Commercial Court sitting at Saket, Delhi.

Judgements Referred:The Court relied on these important precedents and legal principles: Geetha v. Nanjundaswamy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1407 — Partial rejection of plaint not permitted; entire plaint must be accepted or rejected.Maqsud Ahmad v. Mathra Datt & Co, AIR 1936 Lah 1021 — Early precedent on rejection of plaint. Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 780 and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 158 — Affirming that plaint cannot be rejected segment-wise. Banyan Tree judgment: Regarding territorial jurisdiction and "purposeful availment" in online contracts. Sections 14, 17, and 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957 — On copyright ownership, exclusive rights, and definition of infringement. The Court also carefully noted the procedural impropriety in the rejection/return order and set aside the impugned order.

Decision:The appeal was allowed to the extent that the impugned order of the learned Commercial Court dated March 20, 2025, was quashed and set aside.The matter was remitted to the learned Commercial Court at Saket for fresh adjudication, with instructions to issue summons to all respondents and consider all pending applications, including granting territorial jurisdiction over the suit as maintainable against all defendants.The rejection of the suit against Respondent 1 and return of plaint against Respondents 2 to 5 was held to be unsustainable in law.

Case Title: Nilesh Girkar Vs Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited and Others

Order Date: September 16, 2025

Case Number: RFA(COMM) 251/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8281-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written by:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

BASE SE Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs

Partial Grant of Patent

Fact:The matter concerns the rejection of a patent application by the Deputy Controller and its subsequent appeal under the Patents Act, 1970.The case begin with a patent application filed on 26 February 2009 titled "Pesticidal Mixtures Comprising an Anthranilamide Compound." It contained originally 24 claims related to a chemical mixture used to protect plants from harmful fungi and pests. 

The application was subjected to the examination process under the provisions of the Patents Act, and a First Examination Report (FER) dated 13 October 2014 objected to the claims under sections 2(ij), 3(e), 3(h), and 3(i). The applicant then amended the claims, reducing them to 18 and modifying the invention's title.

Partial allowance of Claims:After successive hearings and further amendments, claims 1 to 9 and 17 were accepted and others (claims 10 to 16) were rejected under section 3(h) of the Act. The Deputy Controller directed the applicant to amend the rejected claims. 

The Appeal:The appellant challenged this decision on several grounds: that section 3(h) was wrongly applied, there was a violation of natural justice due to inadequate hearing opportunities, and partial grant of patent was warranted. The appellant supported their case by referencing several judgments, including Siemens Engineering Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 981 and unreported decisions relevant to patent law.

On the other side, the respondent argued that the impugned order was passed under section 21 of the Patents Act and hence not appealable. They also held that no partial patent grant was permissible under the law, and the appellant's contentions had no merit.

Discussion:The Court meticulously examined the legal provisions relevant to the issues. Sections 3(h), 3(i), 3(j), 15, and 21 of the Patents Act, 1970, formed the backbone of the legal analysis. Section 3(h) excludes methods of agriculture or horticulture from patentability. Section 3(i) excludes plants and animals except micro-organisms and biological processes related to their propagation. Sections 15 and 21 govern the Controller's power to refuse and the time frames for compliance and abandonment.

Importantly, the Court emphasized that the exclusion under section 3(h) is policy-driven, aimed at preserving traditional agricultural practices from monopolization. The Court relied on recommendations of the Ayyangar Committee and judicial pronouncements such as Monsanto Technology LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd., 2019 3 SCC 381 and the recent unreported decisions from the Delhi and Calcutta High Courts. It clarified that section 3(h) excludes pure agricultural methods but does not bar technical, scientific innovations at the interface of agriculture and chemistry.

The impugned order was criticized for failing to distinguish between a pure method of agriculture and human scientific inventions embodied in chemical mixtures. The Court found no reasoning in the order to support the application of section 3(h), holding that this represents a narrow exception to patentability that does not include inventions like the present one.

Partial Grant of Patent:Regarding the issue of partial patent grant, the Court categorically held that the legislative scheme does not allow splitting claims within a single application into granted and rejected parts. The applicant must put the entire application in order for grant. Partial grants would disrupt the unity of invention principle and encourage legal uncertainty. Instead, rejected claims could be pursued via separate divisional applications under section 16 of the Act.

Finally, the Court dealt with procedural challenges about appealability and natural justice. It distinguished the impugned order as a decision under section 15 rather than a deemed abandonment under section 21, allowing the appeal to proceed. It further held that the appellant had not abandoned the application and had responded to objections within prescribed timelines, negating any claim of procedural unfairness.

Decision:The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order. It directed the Controller of Patents and Designs to reconsider the application afresh, complying with statutory procedures and principles within three months. The Court emphasized proper hearing rights for the applicant and clarified that the Controller was not bound by this order's observations, maintaining judicial neutrality on merits pending re-examination.

This judgment significantly clarifies the interpretation of sections 3(h) and 3(i) of the Patents Act, reinforcing the limited scope of exclusions and safeguarding the patent rights of innovations that intersect with agriculture but involve human technical intervention. It also reaffirms procedural safeguards in patent prosecution and rejects any notion of partial patent grants, emphasizing statutory coherence and legal certainty.

Case Title: BASE SE Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs  

Order Date: 16 September 2025  

Case Number: IPDPTA 3 of 2023  

Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

UPL Limited Vs. Union of India

The Intersection of Patent Procedure and Natural Justice

Facts: This case revolves around a patent application made by UPL Limited seeking rights over a specific fungicidal combination, which, according to the company, shows unexpected benefits such as a reduction in fungal diseases, delayed ageing in crops, and improved yield. The invention proposed the combination of various categories of fungicides—specifically a succinate dehydrogenase inhibitor (SDHI), a dithiocarbamate fungicide, and another fungicide from either the ergosterol biosynthesis inhibitor or quinone outside inhibitor family. UPL filed a provisional specification on 4 November 2016 and followed up with a complete specification and request for examination on 1 November 2017 under Patent Application No. 201631037704. The First Examination Report (FER) was issued by the authorities, after which UPL responded to the objections. However, a pre-grant opposition was filed by another party, and UPL had to submit replies and evidence.The core benefit claimed for the patent was the synergy created by combining different classes of fungicides, which, according to the applicant, resulted in superior technical performance on crops.

Procedural Details: The patent application went through several procedural stages. After UPL filed its original application and the subsequent complete specification, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report in April 2019. UPL responded, clarifying and defending its claims. In July 2020, a pre-grant opposition was filed under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, alleging lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and that the invention was merely a non-patentable admixture. Both oral and written submissions were made by UPL and the opposing party. The hearing on the opposition was held in May 2023, and both sides subsequently filed written submissions.

On 3 November 2023, the Controller of Patents issued an order rejecting UPL’s patent application. UPL challenged this order in the High Court, arguing that the decision violated the principles of natural justice—primarily because the Controller neither considered expert evidence submitted by UPL nor afforded separate hearings for the application and the opposition as mandated by law. The challenge was filed as a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution rather than by way of statutory appeal.

Dispute

The main dispute in the case centers around the following issues:Whether the patent application was rejected validly on the ground that it lacked novelty and inventive step and constituted a mere admixture.Whether the procedure adopted during the hearing of the pre-grant opposition, including the consideration of evidence and the conduct of hearings, adhered to the principles of natural justice.Whether the writ petition before the High Court was maintainable, considering the existence of an alternative statutory remedy.

UPL argued that the Controller ignored material evidence, especially expert affidavits demonstrating technical advancement and synergy of the combination. UPL further contended that the Controller, in the final order, relied on his own technical analysis and data that were not shared with the parties, violating the right to a fair hearing. Additionally, UPL claimed that the legal requirement of holding separate hearings for the application (under Sections 14 and 15) and the opposition (under Section 25(1)) was disregarded, further infringing procedural rights.

The respondents (Union of India and opposing party) maintained that mere non-acceptance of expert evidence did not vitiate the order and argued that the High Court should not intervene since a statutory appeal remedy was available. They also defended the Controller’s findings regarding the lack of novelty and inventive step, asserting the invention did not demonstrate any real synergy beyond what was expected from the mixture of known fungicides.

Detailed Reasoning and Legal Discussion: The High Court, presided by Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur, began by addressing the maintainability issue. The respondents argued that the writ petition should be dismissed since UPL had an alternative statutory remedy—namely, an appeal under the Patents Act. However, the Court noted established principles from key judgments—Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1, Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107, and Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of H.P (2021) 6 SCC 771—that although alternative remedies exist, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can still be invoked in cases where there is a violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or where fundamental rights are affected.

Referring to these precedents, the Court explained that the principle of “alternative remedy” is not absolute and serves more as a rule of prudence and convenience. The Court is empowered to intervene where procedural or substantive natural justice is denied, or when statutory procedures are ignored.

The Court then proceeded to examine the substantive legality of the proceedings before the Controller. A key legal issue was the proper application of Section 25(1) of the Patents Act (pre-grant opposition), Sections 14 and 15 (examination of applications), and Rule 55(5) of the Patent Rules. The Court highlighted that under law, pre-grant opposition and the application review are two separate processes. Legal precedent requires them to be conducted distinctly so that the applicant receives fair opportunity to respond to objections regarding their patent application as well as specific oppositions raised by opponents.

Justice Kapur observed that, in the present case, the expert affidavit and technical evidence submitted by UPL were not addressed or even recognized in the impugned order. Instead, the Controller conducted an independent technical analysis and drew conclusions without disclosing the basis to UPL or inviting submissions in response. This, in the Court’s view, violated the core principles of natural justice, especially the right to a fair hearing and to respond to the evidence against one’s case. The authorities also failed to grant UPL separate hearings as required under the Act and Rules.

The Court further pointed out that, as elaborated in the Supreme Court’s judgment in Oyster Point Pharma Inc v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2023 SCC Online Cal 1214 and AstraZeneca v. Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd., 2020 SCC Online Del 2765, the law recognizes the possibility to submit additional evidence to demonstrate technical advancement, even after the initial application. Therefore, the argument that expert evidence could not be considered was found unsustainable.

On the merits, the Court declined to express any views on the substantive patentability or validity of UPL’s invention. Instead, it restricted its analysis to procedural fairness. The Court noted that since technical material evidence had been disregarded and the required procedural safeguards not followed, the order under challenge was unsustainable.

Decision: The High Court set aside the order of the Controller dated 3 November 2023. The matter was remanded for fresh consideration by a different Hearing Officer who must hold separate hearings under Sections 14 and 25, consider all evidence (including the expert affidavit), and pass reasoned orders on both the application and pre-grant opposition as required by law. The Court expressly clarified that there had been no adjudication on the merits—every issue was left open for fresh consideration and decision.

Case Title: UPL Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors.

Order Date: 16 September 2025

Case Number: WPA-IPD No.3 of 2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:1812

Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Novartis AG Vs. Controller of Patents -Manmeet Pritam Singh

Timing and Waiver of Cross-Examination Rights in Patent Opposition

Fact: Novartis AG is the holder of Indian Patent No. 414518, which was granted after dismissal of several pre-grant oppositions. Post-grant, various pharmaceutical parties filed oppositions challenging the validity of the patent on the grounds of lack of inventive step and violation of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970. The patent grant was followed by procedural battles—opponents submitted further expert evidence through affidavits and Novartis responded with requests to file rebuttal evidence. This procedural exchange continued until a timeline was set by a prior High Court order to ensure expeditious proceedings in the post-grant opposition process.

Procedural Detail: Novartis filed its patent application in 2007 and received grant in December 2022. Following this, opponents filed post-grant oppositions under Section 25(2) of the Patents Act. Opponents submitted expert affidavits under Rule 60 of the Patent Rules, and Novartis objected, but the Controller admitted the evidence. Novartis sought an opportunity to file rebuttal evidence, which was initially rejected by the Controller. Novartis challenged this by filing writ petitions contesting the denial and the procedure followed. The High Court set aside earlier orders and allowed Novartis to file rebuttal evidence, ordered a new Controller for the matter and demanded that the process move forward under strict timelines. The parties complied with the directions—Novartis filed rebuttal evidence, the Opposition Board issued a fresh recommendation, and hearings were scheduled by the Controller. However, Novartis sought cross-examination of the opponents’ expert witnesses after having already filed rebuttal evidence and after the timeline for such applications had passed, leading to the present dispute over whether this belated request was maintainable.

Dispute: At the heart of the case is whether Novartis retained a right to seek cross-examination of expert witnesses after initially omitting to request it and electing instead to file rebuttal evidence. Novartis argued that the right to cross-examine arises as a matter of natural justice and does not get extinguished by not seeking it at the earliest stage. Respondents, including various pharmaceutical companies, opposed this position stating Novartis had multiple opportunities to make such a request and by not doing so had waived the right or was barred on grounds of delay and procedural abuse. They asserted that permitting the request at this stage would undermine the Court’s order for expeditious conclusion and render the previous proceedings futile.

Detailed Reasoning Including Judgements: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora systematically examined the sequence of events and arguments by both sides. The judgment discussed key procedural stages, including evidentiary filings, objections, hearings, and previous High Court interventions that set guidelines for timely and fair conduct. The Court considered if principles of natural justice demanded allowance of cross-examination at any stage, referencing several judgements such as Onyx Therapeutics v. Union of India (2019 SCC OnLine Del 7259, 11881) and Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Union of India (2019 SCC OnLine Cal 1609), which asserted cross-examination as a substantive right under Section 79 of the Patents Act. The Court, however, clarified that such a right must be exercised promptly, preferably at the time the expert evidence is admitted, to avoid unwarranted delay and disruption of proceedings.

The Court differentiated the facts of Onyx Therapeutics, where the patentee made immediate requests for cross-examination, from Novartis’s situation, where the request came much later after the right of rebuttal was specifically claimed and allowed, thereby satisfying natural justice. It is reasoned that failure to timely exercise the right, especially after a conscious election to file rebuttal evidence, not only constituted waiver but also operated as estoppel. The Court declared that the stage for seeking cross-examination ended when the Controller decided on the admissibility of evidence. Delay or tactical withholding of request cannot be used to reset the process or frustrate the timeline set by earlier judicial orders.

The Court addressed whether denial of cross-examination at a late stage constituted breach of natural justice and held it did not, as adequate opportunity for rebuttal was allowed and utilized. Judicial directions for expeditious disposal, and the procedural structure of patent oppositions—where evidence is first submitted and reviewed by an Opposition Board—were emphasized as safeguards for fairness and efficiency. The Court found that Novartis’s conduct in abstaining from hearings further reinforced procedural abandonment, and disallowed late assertions of rights which had already been considered and exhausted through the judicial process.

Decision: Justice Arora dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the Controller’s refusal to entertain the belated cross-examination request. The Court found that Novartis had waived its procedural right to cross-examination by electing to file rebuttal evidence and not seeking cross-examination at the time evidence was admitted. No procedural or substantive violation of natural justice had taken place. The efforts and timelines set by the Opposition Board and the earlier orders of the Court were protected against disruption through dilatory tactics. All pending applications were disposed of, confirming that parties must exercise their procedural rights in a timely and diligent manner, respecting guidelines laid down by judicial proceedings and statutory rules.

Case Title: Novartis AG Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.

Order Date: 16th September 2025

Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 50/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8211

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nupur Mehta Vs Bennett Coleman

Court Fee and Jurisdiction

Facts: The plaintiff, Nupur Mehta, filed a suit seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions as well as compensation for violation of her image rights and defamation caused by the defendants, which included Bennett Coleman and Company Ltd. The suit was filed in the High Court of Delhi and valued at a total of Rs. 10 crores for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. The suit included various prayer clauses, such as injunctions restraining the defendants from disseminating defamatory content, removal of the defamatory video from social media, compensation for slander and defamation, and a prayer for rendition of accounts for illegal use of the plaintiff’s image rights.

The plaintiff’s original pleadings valued the suit at Rs. 10 crores but sought to pay only a fixed court fee of Rs. 200 on certain reliefs, notably on the prayer for rendition of accounts, contending that it was a nominal sum for court fee purposes but maintaining a high valuation for jurisdictional purposes. This led to a legal question on whether the plaintiff was liable to pay court fees ad valorem on the full valuation of Rs. 10 crores or the nominal amount of Rs. 200 stated for certain reliefs.

Procedural Details: The suit was initially listed before the High Court on 29 May 2025, where the court directed the plaintiff to pay court fees on the full valuation of Rs. 10 crores within four weeks, warning that the suit would be rejected otherwise. The plaintiff sought to amend the plaint to clarify the valuation and to pay court fees as per the re-assessed value. Subsequently, an application for amendment was allowed on 8 August 2025, allowing the plaintiff to introduce a prayer for rendition of accounts.

The amended plaint maintained a valuation of Rs. 10 crores for jurisdiction but insisted on paying nominal court fees of Rs. 200 for rendition of accounts while pleading to pay ad valorem fees on ascertainment of damages. This dichotomy invited judicial scrutiny into the compatibility of such valuation with court fee statutes and the appropriate fee liability on rendition of accounts as relief.

Dispute: The central dispute before the court was whether a plaintiff seeking rendition of accounts and valuing the same for jurisdiction at Rs. 10 crores could be legally entitled to pay only a nominal court fee (Rs. 200) under Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, or whether such relief warranted payment of court fee ad valorem based on the high valuation assigned for pecuniary jurisdiction.

The plaintiff relied on precedents including the Supreme Court judgment in *Commercial Aviation and Travel Co. v. Vimla Pannalal* (1988) 3 SCC 423 and a Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in *Sheila Devi and Others v. Kishan Lal Kalra and Others* to argue that the court could not interfere with their valuation for the purpose of court fees. The plaintiff submitted that the valuation for rendition of accounts should follow the nominal fee pattern given the nature of the relief which is inherently unascertainable at the outset.

The court was tasked with reconciling the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, and relevant judicial precedents while addressing the potential tentativeness or alleged arbitrary nature of the plaintiff’s valuation and related court fee payment.

Detailed Reasoning and Legal Discussion:  The court examined the interplay between two key statutory acts: the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the Suit Valuation Act, 1887. The Court Fees Act, in particular Section 7(iv), provides for a fixed court fee for suits where the valuation of relief sought cannot be easily ascertained—such as in suits for rendition of accounts. This fixed fee was historically introduced to recognize the uncertainty in assessing exact damages at suit filing.

However, the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, governs pecuniary jurisdiction and requires the plaintiff to affix the value of the suit for determining appropriate jurisdiction of courts. The court emphasized that the value for court fees and for jurisdiction should align as per Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act to ensure legislative coherence and practical administration of justice.

The court referred extensively to the Division Bench judgment in *M/s Maiden Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. M/s Wockhardt Ltd.* (2008 SCC OnLine Del 804) which held that in suits for rendition of accounts, the valuation for jurisdiction dictates the court fee liability, and such valuation cannot be arbitrarily dissociated from court fees. This decision drew on the Supreme Court ruling in *Commercial Aviation and Travel Co.* which warned against whimsical and arbitrary valuation to evade payment of appropriate court fees, citing that a plaintiff must not “whimsically choose a ridiculous figure” for suit valuation when objective standards and positive materials exist in the plaint.

The court highlighted the rationale that while fixed court fees are a relief mechanism where suit valuation is uncertain, a plaintiff cannot exercise absolute discretion to assign a high jurisdictional value solely to secure filing in a higher court and then pay meagre court fees, defeating statutory intent under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure which mandates filing in the lowest competent court.

This dual valuation approach was found to be a misuse of jurisdictional criteria and court fees regulations. The court underscored the legislative mandate that court fees must correspond to the valuation affixed by the plaintiff for exercising pecuniary jurisdiction, thereby ensuring fairness and deterrence against vexatious litigation strategies.

The court also engaged prior judicial opinions specifying that the court may interfere in wrongful valuations not supported by positive records or objective standards and that plaintiffs having fixed arbitrary valuations must face consequences including potential dismissal or cost penalties.

The court pointed out that the plaintiff here afforded no coherent basis for valuing rendition of accounts relief at Rs. 10 crores but paying nominal fee, especially since such value was aimed at invoking jurisdictional threshold of the High Court.

The judgment further explained that rendition of accounts is a relief where exact damages are ascertainable only at a later stage, allowing the plaintiff some flexibility in nominal fee payment; yet this does not justify gross underpayment or decoupling from valuation set for jurisdiction. It affirmed consistency with procedural rules laid down by the High Court under its rule-making powers.

Based on these principles, the court ruled that the plaintiff was liable to pay substantive ad valorem court fees on the valuation of Rs. 10 crores affixed for rendition of accounts relief and ruled against the appropriateness of merely nominal fee payment.

Decision: The court concluded that the plaintiff’s approach of valuing rendition of accounts for jurisdiction at Rs. 10 crores while paying fixed nominal court fees of Rs. 200 was legally impermissible. The plaintiff was held liable to pay ad valorem court fees consistent with the valuation for jurisdiction as per the Court Fees Act, 1870 and the Suit Valuation Act, 1887.

The court granted the plaintiff four weeks' time to pay the requisite ad valorem court fees; failing which the suit would stand rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court also reserved the right for deterrent costs against litigants engaging in arbitrary valuation tactics.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s submissions affirming binding precedents but clarified that valuations must not be whimsical or designed to circumvent statutory requirements on court fees.

Case Title:Nupur Mehta Vs Bennett Coleman and Company Ltd. and Others  

Order Date: 11 September 2025  

Case Number: CS(OS) 376/2025   

Court: High Court of Delhi  

Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi