Monday, November 3, 2025

Ankit Batra Vs Ravinder Kumar

Stay of Registered Trademark during pendency of Rectification Proceeding

Factual Background:  This case centers around a trademark dispute in the Indian spices industry, where the petitioner, Mr. Ankit Batra, proprietor of M/s KD Industries, sought rectification and cancellation of the registered trademark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ owned by respondent Mr. Ravinder Kumar. The conflict arose over the use of the letters “KD”, which the petitioner claimed as the core part of his brand identity.

The petitioner’s case was founded on long-standing use, reputation, and prior adoption of the trademark ‘KD’ and its label ‘KD Masale’. The petitioner asserted that his firm, M/s KD Industries, had been using the mark ‘KD’ since 2003 in connection with manufacturing and selling spices and blended condiments. The mark had become widely recognized in both domestic and international markets, with sales and exports extending to countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

The petitioner claimed that the rights in the trademark ‘KD’ were originally held by his predecessor in business, who had assigned those rights to him through a valid Assignment Deed dated 16 February 2022. Thus, by operation of both statutory and common law principles, he was the lawful proprietor and user of the trademark.

According to the petitioner, the respondent dishonestly and with mala fide intent adopted a deceptively similar mark, ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’, under Application No. 4923053 in Class 30, which covers spices and similar goods. The petitioner argued that this imitation was deliberate and intended to exploit his established goodwill and reputation, thereby deceiving consumers and diluting the distinctiveness of his mark.

The petitioner supported his claim with evidence including invoices dating back to 2013, packaging, promotional materials, and online listings showing consistent and extensive use of the ‘KD’ mark and label for over two decades.

Procedural Background: The petitioner approached the High Court under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation and rectification of the respondent’s registered trademark on grounds of dishonest adoption and likelihood of confusion. Alongside the main petition, he filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking a stay on the operation of the respondent’s registration during the pendency of the rectification proceedings.

The petition also included an application requesting the Court to summon the complete record of the impugned registration from the office of the Registrar of Trade Marks to facilitate fair adjudication.

Upon hearing the matter, Hon’ble Justice Tejas Karia issued notice to both respondents — Mr. Ravinder Kumar (the private respondent) and the Registrar of Trade Marks (as the statutory respondent). The Central Government Standing Counsel accepted notice on behalf of the Registrar.

The respondent was directed to file a reply within four weeks, and the petitioner was allowed to file a rejoinder thereafter. Meanwhile, the Court proceeded to examine the petitioner’s interim application for a stay on the respondent’s mark.

Core Legal Dispute: The principal issue before the Court was whether the registration of the respondent’s trademark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ was valid and bona fide or whether it constituted an infringement upon the petitioner’s prior rights in the mark ‘KD’.

The case also raised critical questions of trademark law such as:Whether the respondent’s adoption of the impugned mark was honest or tainted by mala fide intent;Whether the impugned mark was deceptively similar to the petitioner’s registered and prior-used mark;Whether continued operation of the respondent’s registration would cause confusion and prejudice to the petitioner’s business;Whether the Registrar’s decision to register the mark contravened Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:  Counsel for the petitioner argued that his client was the lawful proprietor of the trademark ‘KD’, being the assignee of the original registration (No. 1446270 in Class 30). The mark, they submitted, had been continuously and extensively used since 2003 and had acquired a strong reputation and distinctiveness in the market.

The petitioner’s mark ‘KD’ formed the dominant and essential feature of his packaging, labeling, and brand presentation under ‘KD Masale’. Because the respondent’s mark, ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’, prominently reproduced the same element ‘KD’ in identical font and structure, it was bound to create confusion among consumers.

It was also pointed out that the respondent’s application was filed in 2021, almost two decades after the petitioner’s adoption of the mark, and that it was made on a “proposed to be used” basis, demonstrating the absence of prior use. The petitioner alleged that the respondent’s adoption was not innocent but intentionally designed to mislead consumers and unfairly benefit from the goodwill of the ‘KD’ brand.

Citing Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, counsel argued that registration of the impugned mark was in direct violation of statutory provisions, as it was both deceptive and confusingly similar to an existing registered mark. They further contended that balance of convenience and equity lay in favor of the petitioner since continued use of the impugned mark would irreparably harm his reputation and mislead the public.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents:  The respondent’s counsel was yet to file a formal written reply, but during oral submissions, the government counsel representing the Registrar accepted notice and agreed to furnish the complete record of the registration in question. The respondent’s position, as recorded, was that the petition would be contested, though no concrete rebuttal on merits was placed on record at this interim stage.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:  The Court nocied that the petitioner had produced ample evidence of use of the mark ‘KD’ since 2003, supported by documentary proof such as invoices, packaging labels, and promotional materials. The petitioner’s business, it was observed, was not limited to domestic operations but had extended internationally, thereby adding weight to his claim of distinctiveness and goodwill.

The Court further observed that the impugned mark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ reproduced the essential and dominant part of the petitioner’s mark — the letters ‘KD’. This similarity, both visually and phonetically, was likely to cause confusion among consumers in the same line of trade, especially because both parties operated in the same market segment (spices under Class 30).

The Court also considered the statutory framework under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 9(2)(a) prohibits registration of marks that are likely to deceive or cause confusion, while Section 11 mandates refusal of registration if the mark is identical or deceptively similar to an earlier registered mark in respect of similar goods or services.

On this basis, the Court found that the respondent’s registration appeared prima facie to violate these provisions. The respondent’s mark was a subsequent adoption made in bad faith and lacked originality. The Court held that the balance of convenience was clearly in favor of the petitioner, as the potential for confusion in the marketplace was undeniable.

Court also observed that the petitioner had established both statutory rights (through registration and assignment) and common law rights (through long and continuous use), entitling him to protection even independent of registration. Allowing the respondent’s registration to remain in effect during pendency of the rectification petition would, therefore, cause irreparable harm to the petitioner and mislead the public.

In light of these findings, the Court exercised its equitable powers under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to grant interim relief.

Decision:  The Court held that the petitioner had made out a strong prima facie case for protection of his mark and for suspension of the respondent’s registration. It observed that the impugned mark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ incorporated the petitioner’s dominant feature ‘KD’ and was likely to deceive the public and trade.

Consequently, the High Court of Delhi ordered that the operation and effect of the registration of the impugned mark (Application No. 4923053 in Class 30) be stayed until the next date of hearing. The Court concluded that the respondent’s registration was prima facie in violation of Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Conclusion:  This case highlights how courts protect prior and bona fide trademark owners from deceptive and opportunistic registrations that attempt to capitalize on existing goodwill. The judgment also reinforces the dual protection afforded under Indian trademark law — both statutory and common law — and emphasizes the importance of continuous, consistent use in establishing proprietorship.

The Court’s reasoning affirms the principle that in matters of trademark disputes, the dominant feature test, likelihood of confusion, and intent of adoption are crucial determinants of judicial protection. The stay granted here safeguards both commercial integrity and consumer interest until a final determination is made.

Case Title: Sh. Ankit Batra, Proprietor of KD Industries Vs. Ravinder Kumar & Anr.
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 253/2025
Date of Order: 16 October 2025
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of Karnataka

Private complaint in non-compliance of Section 155(3) of Cr.P.C. is not maintainable

Factual Background: This case arose from a conflict between M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioners) and Mr. Ashish Koruth Philip (the complainant), concerning ownership and control over an online domain name — routesrezworld.com — and allegations of cyber fraud and data misuse.

The complainant, Mr. Philip, claimed that he personally purchased and registered the domain routesrezworld.com through GoDaddy.com on 28th October 2019, using his own HDFC Bank account, for a payment of ₹400.85. He alleged that the domain was never part of any intellectual property transfer agreement with the petitioners, as the agreements between the parties dated 7th February 2019 were executed before this domain even existed.

He further claimed that the petitioners later attempted to forcibly take control of his domain by changing passwords and credentials, misusing customer credit card data without authorization, and fraudulently operating the website for profit. The complainant alleged that this conduct violated PCI (Payment Card Industry) regulations and amounted to cybercrime.

On the other hand, the petitioners — a company engaged in technological and software services — contended that routesrezworld.com was, in fact, their lawful business asset, transferred to them under an Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement (IPR Agreement) and Service Bond Agreement executed between Mr. Philip’s former firm, StraightDrive Softlab LLP, and the petitioners. They asserted that the complainant’s claim was false and had already been settled through arbitration proceedings, where his rights over the disputed domain were conclusively determined.

Procedural Background:Following the complainant’s allegations, a First Information Report (FIR) dated 3rd May 2025 was registered by Surya Nagar Police Station, Bangalore, bearing Crime No. 0185/2025. The offences invoked included Sections 66, 66C, 66D, 84C, and 85 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with several provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, including Sections 3(5), 308, 314, 316, 318, 319, 323, 351, 353, 45, and 61(2).

The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, approached the High Court of Karnataka under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), seeking to quash the FIR on grounds that the dispute was purely civil and commercial, not criminal in nature. They argued that the matter had already been adjudicated in arbitration, where the complainant’s claim was rejected, and thus, the continuation of criminal proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law.

Core Dispute:The central question before the Court was whether the FIR and criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners amounted to misuse of criminal law to re-litigate a commercial dispute that had already been conclusively decided in arbitration.

Closely tied to this was the question of ownership over the domain routesrezworld.com: whether it belonged personally to Mr. Philip or was part of the intellectual property assets acquired by M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. under the IPR Agreement.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners: The petitioners argued that the complaint was baseless, malicious, and filed to harass them after losing in arbitration. They produced documents such as the Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement and Service Bond Agreement dated 7th February 2019, which explicitly transferred all technological assets, software programs, and related intellectual property from the complainant’s former firm to the petitioners.

They relied heavily on the arbitration award, which had already restrained the complainant from using or interfering with the domain name routesrezworld.com and the associated trademark Caledonrez. This award had attained finality, and thus, the issue was no longer open to criminal proceedings.

The petitioners also presented email communications from November 2019 and January 2020, showing that the complainant himself had acknowledged the domain as belonging to the company and had sought permission from the company’s directors regarding its use. They further contended that although the initial domain payment was made by the complainant, the company had later reimbursed him, and therefore the domain was purchased for business, not personal use.

They also raised a procedural challenge under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, arguing that the private complaint was invalid because the complainant failed to comply with Section 173(1) and (4) of the BNSS, which require prior intimation to the Superintendent of Police before filing a private complaint. Lodging a report on the cybercrime online portal, they argued, did not satisfy this legal requirement, since the portal was not recognized as a “police officer” or “police station” under the law.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent (Complainant): The complainant, argued that the domain was personally purchased by Mr. Philip in October 2019 and therefore was not part of the earlier IPR transfer. She emphasized that the payment for the domain and its four-year renewal was made entirely from his personal HDFC account, and documentary evidence of such transactions was submitted.

She contended that the company later hacked into his GoDaddy account, altered credentials, and gained unauthorized control over the domain, thereby committing offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Regarding the procedural objections, she submitted that the filing of a complaint through the cybercrime portal constituted substantial compliance with the requirement of reporting to police under Section 155(3) CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS). Reliance was placed on Supreme Court rulings in S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka (2025 INSC 917) and Siddartha v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1044-46/2022), where the Court recognized flexibility in procedural compliance when substantial justice required it.

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning: The court examined the Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement (IPR Agreement) between the parties. Clause 8(a) of the Agreement made it clear that all intellectual property, including software programs, web interfaces, and related technological developments, vested solely in the purchaser — M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. The clause explicitly prohibited the creator (Mr. Philip) from holding or using any copies of source codes or related data, and Clause 8(b) obligated him to execute further documents to give full effect to this transfer.

The Court concluded that, by this clause alone, the ownership of all intellectual property — including domains developed for the company’s business — rested with the petitioner company.

Next, the Court turned to the arbitral award, which had directly addressed the issue of domain ownership. Paragraph 66 of the arbitral award categorically stated that the complainant (Mr. Philip) was restrained from interfering with the domain routesrezworld.com and the trademark Caledonrez, both of which were declared to be the exclusive property of the petitioner company. The arbitrator had also prohibited the complainant from engaging in competing business activities or operating similar websites.

Based on this finding, the Court held that the issue of ownership had already been conclusively determined in arbitration and could not be reopened through a criminal complaint. Allowing the complaint to proceed, the judge observed, would amount to “re-litigation of a settled civil dispute through criminal law machinery,” which is impermissible.

The Court then analyzed the complainant’s argument about personal payment for the domain. Documentary evidence, including emails from 2019 and 2020, revealed that the complainant had acknowledged the company’s ownership of the platform and discussed rebranding the site under the name Caledonrezworld. Furthermore, the company had reimbursed him for the domain registration expenses, reinforcing the conclusion that the domain was acquired for business use, not personal use.

On the procedural aspect, the Court emphasized that merely filing a complaint on the cybercrime portal does not constitute compliance with Section 155(3) CrPC or Section 173 BNSS. The online portal is not equivalent to a “police officer” or a “police station” under statutory definitions. Therefore, the private complaint filed without following this legal procedure was not maintainable.

Citing the principle that criminal law should not be used as a tool to settle business or contractual disputes, the Court reiterated the settled law from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) that where allegations predominantly involve a civil nature, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the judicial process.

Final Decision:  The Court concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil and commercial in nature, having already been settled through arbitration. The FIR, therefore, was an abuse of process. The complaint did not disclose the essential ingredients of any offence under the Information Technology Act or the BNS, 2023.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR dated 3rd May 2025 (Crime No. 0185/2025) registered at Surya Nagar Police Station for alleged offences under Sections 66, 66C, 66D, 84C, and 85 of the IT Act, and multiple sections of the BNS, 2023, as against the petitioners. The court concluded by reaffirming that criminal law cannot be invoked to settle contractual or proprietary disputes that have already been adjudicated by a competent arbitral forum.

Case Title: Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.
Neutral Citation: 2025:KHC:43558
Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 7222 of 2025
Order Date: 30th October 2025
Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Friday, October 31, 2025

Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal

Public Prosecutor’s Role in Political Defamation

Facts:The case arose from a controversy surrounding a book published in 2015 which contained certain passages and allegations about the personal life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of West Bengal. The author of the book had claimed that the Chief Minister had been secretly married prior to assuming office and had attempted to conceal this fact from the public. The book described the alleged relationship and questioned the integrity and honesty of the Chief Minister, suggesting that her public persona did not match her private conduct.

In the same book, the author published a letter dated 30 April 2012 addressed to the Chief Minister in her capacity as Chairperson of the All India Trinamool Congress. The letter contained two specific questions — whether a particular individual (allegedly her spouse) had attended her oath-taking ceremony at Raj Bhavan on 20 May 2011, and whether that individual was present in her official chamber at the Writers’ Buildings on the same day when she assumed charge as Chief Minister. These questions, according to the author, were meant to expose what he described as “undisclosed facts of her personal life.”

The book was never banned or restricted by any government order and continued to be sold publicly.

The petitioner, Koustav Bagchi, an advocate and political figure, uploaded certain pages from the book—particularly the page containing the 2012 letter—on social media platforms. He also made comments on television channels referring to the same content. This act led to allegations that he had defamed the Hon’ble Chief Minister. Consequently, the Public Prosecutor of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta filed a complaint under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), corresponding to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, invoking Section 222(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which allows the Public Prosecutor to file a defamation complaint on behalf of certain public functionaries such as the President, Governors, or Ministers for defamatory acts committed against them in the discharge of their official duties.

Procedural Background:Upon receiving the complaint, the Chief Judge of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta, after hearing the petitioner as required under Section 223 of the BNSS, took cognizance of the offence under Section 356(2) BNS and issued summons to the petitioner.

Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a criminal revision application before the Calcutta High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 of the CrPC), seeking to quash the proceedings. He raised three principal arguments.

First, that the book had been published nearly a decade earlier and was freely available in the market, and therefore, merely reproducing its content on social media did not constitute a new offence.

Second, that since the original author had not been prosecuted and the book had not been banned, his act of reproduction could not be treated as defamation.

Third, that even if the statements were defamatory, they did not relate to the Chief Minister’s conduct in discharge of her public duties, and therefore, the Public Prosecutor had no authority to initiate proceedings under Section 222(2) BNSS; only the Chief Minister herself could have done so as an aggrieved person.

The State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor, opposed the revision, arguing that at the stage of cognizance, the Court should not conduct a detailed inquiry or “mini-trial” but only see whether a prima facie case existed. He relied on Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338 and Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221), to emphasize that the trial court had correctly taken cognizance on the basis of the material on record.

The Core Dispute:The key legal questions before the Court were:

1. Whether the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 222(2) of the BNSS was maintainable when the allegedly defamatory statements concerned the personal life of the Chief Minister and not her conduct in discharge of official duties.

2. Whether mere reproduction or sharing of a previously published book on social media amounted to fresh defamation, attracting criminal liability.

3. Whether the learned Chief Judge erred in issuing summons to the petitioner without sufficient grounds.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis: Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 222 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The section provides that ordinarily, only an aggrieved person can file a complaint for defamation. However, under sub-section (2), the Public Prosecutor may file a complaint if the defamation concerns the conduct of certain high constitutional functionaries—including the President, Governors, or Ministers—in the discharge of their public functions, provided that the appropriate government grants prior sanction.

The Court first acknowledged that the Public Prosecutor indeed has authority to file such complaints, but this authority is limited strictly to instances where the alleged defamation concerns the official or public conduct of the functionary. Personal or private matters of life fall outside the ambit of this provision. Relying on K.K. Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2018) 6 SCC 676] and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [(2016) 7 SCC 221]*, the Court emphasized that the Public Prosecutor must independently examine whether the material truly relates to the conduct of the public official in discharge of public duties and must act with independence, not as a mere agent of the State.

In the present case, while the initial allegations in the book related to the personal and private life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, certain references—such as whether a particular person was present during the oath-taking ceremony or inside her office chamber at the Writers’ Buildings—could arguably relate to her official capacity. The Court noted that the definition of “conduct” includes not only action but also demeanor and behavior. Therefore, if the statements linked her personal relationship to the functioning of her office, they could potentially relate to her conduct in discharge of public duties.

Court observed that determining whether the defamatory content was purely personal or had a nexus with the Chief Minister’s public conduct required a full trial and examination of evidence. Hence, the complaint could not be dismissed at the preliminary stage.

On the second issue, regarding republication, the Court held that re-sharing or reproducing defamatory material amounts to a fresh act of defamation. The Court referred to Kaikhusuru Naroji Kabraji v. Jehangir Byramji Murzban (1890 ILR 14 Bom 532), where the reprinting of a defamatory article made the re-publisher equally liable as the original author. It also relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Arvind Kejriwal v. State [2024 SCC OnLine Del 719], where retweeting defamatory content without disclaimer was held to constitute republication.

The Court further cited Ruchi Kalra v. Slowform Media [2025 SCC OnLine Del 1894], which held that hyperlinking or referencing defamatory content could amount to republication if it expands the defamatory reach. Similarly, in Amber Quiry v. Yohan Tangra [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1093], the Bombay High Court reiterated that every repetition of defamatory material gives rise to a new cause of action.

Court emphasized that even though the book was not banned, it carried a clear copyright notice prohibiting reproduction without permission from the author. The petitioner had failed to show that he had obtained such permission. Therefore, his act of sharing the pages online amounted to unauthorized reproduction, both in defamation law and copyright terms.

The Court also discussed K.K. Mishra (supra) in depth, where the Supreme Court quashed a similar complaint because the alleged defamatory remarks did not concern the Chief Minister’s official duties but personal matters. However, in the present case, the defamatory imputations included references to the Chief Minister’s office and oath ceremony, thereby partially overlapping with her public functions. This, according to the Court, justified the continuation of proceedings.

Lastly, the Court reiterated that the role of the Public Prosecutor, as laid down in Subramanian Swamy and Bairam Muralidhar v. State of A.P. [(2014) 10 SCC 380], is not mechanical. He must independently assess the materials before filing the complaint. However, in the absence of evidence showing mala fides or lack of independent scrutiny at this stage, the Court found no basis to interfere with the complaint.

Decision:The Calcutta High Court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the order dated 18 June 2025 of the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. Justice Apurba Sinha Ray held that the cognizance taken by the trial court was legally valid and that the proceedings could not be quashed at the preliminary stage.

The Court observed that whether the alleged statements were truly connected to the Chief Minister’s official duties or were purely personal was a matter of evidence and trial. Hence, the complaint was not barred in law. The Court clarified that its observations were only for the purpose of the revisional application and not on the merits of the trial.

Consequently, the revision application (CRR 2817 of 2025) was dismissed, along with the connected application (CRAN 1 of 2025). The interim stay, if any, stood vacated, and the Court directed that the book produced during proceedings be returned to the petitioner’s counsel.

Conclusion:This judgment in Koustav Bagchi v. The State of West Bengal sheds light on the delicate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation, particularly concerning public functionaries. It clarifies the limited scope of Section 222(2) of the BNSS, emphasizing that the Public Prosecutor can intervene only when the defamatory act is connected to a Minister’s official duties, not private life. However, where private life allegations spill into official conduct—such as office presence or public events—the matter may warrant judicial scrutiny through trial.

The Court’s observations on republication underline that digital repetition, retweeting, or reposting of defamatory material is legally equivalent to fresh defamation. The decision also underscores the principle that the Public Prosecutor must act independently and cautiously when filing defamation complaints under statutory authority.

Case Title: Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr.
Order Date: 31 October 2025
Case Number: CRR 2817 of 2025 with CRAN 1 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:2011
Court: High Court at Calcutta, Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Apurba Sinha Ray

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ramesh Chandra Sahoo Vs State of Orissa

Case Title: Ramesh Chandra Sahoo Vs State of Orissa
Order Date: 16 October 2025
Case Number: BLAPL No. 10425 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:ORI:HC:10425
Court: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Hon’ble Judge: Justice G. Satapathy


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Facts

The petitioner, Ramesh Chandra Sahoo, was the Principal of Swami Arupananda Higher Secondary School of Education and Technology, Kurtanga, in Jagatsinghpur district. The case arose from an incident of sexual harassment of a minor girl student by a Mathematics lecturer named Saswat Kumar Mohanty, who was employed at the same school. On 15 January 2025, the victim girl complained to the petitioner about the lecturer’s misbehavior and harassment. The petitioner conducted an internal inquiry, and the accused lecturer reportedly admitted to his misconduct. However, despite such admission, the petitioner neither reported the matter to the Governing Body of the school nor to the local police, as required under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

The victim, dissatisfied with the inaction of the Principal, submitted a written complaint to the Sub-Collector, Jagatsinghpur, during a Jana Sunani (public grievance hearing). Upon receiving the complaint, the Sub-Collector called for a report from the petitioner. After evaluating the situation, the Sub-Collector himself lodged an FIR on 22 July 2025 before the Inspector-in-Charge, Jagatsinghpur Police Station. A “Zero FIR” was registered as Jagatsinghpur P.S. Case No. 07/2025, later transferred to Raghunathpur Police Station as Case No. 155/2025, which was then taken up as Special G.R. Case No. 74/2025 before the Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the POCSO Act, Jagatsinghpur.

The petitioner was accused not of directly committing sexual assault but of failing to report the offence, which amounted to a contravention of Section 19(1) read with Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. The maximum punishment prescribed for such an omission is imprisonment for up to one year along with fine.


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Procedural Background

After the FIR was registered, the petitioner first sought anticipatory bail by filing ABLAPL No. 9129 of 2025 before the Orissa High Court. The Court, however, declined to grant anticipatory bail and instead directed the petitioner to surrender before the trial court and move an application for regular bail, which was to be considered on the same day. The co-accused lecturer also filed a separate anticipatory bail application in ABLAPL No. 9395 of 2025. The petitioner accordingly surrendered before the Special Court at Jagatsinghpur and applied for bail. The Special Court, however, rejected his bail plea and remanded him to judicial custody.

Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner filed the present bail application (BLAPL No. 10425 of 2025) under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking post-arrest bail before the Orissa High Court.


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The Core Dispute

The central question before the High Court was whether the offence alleged against the petitioner under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act was bailable or non-bailable in nature. The petitioner’s counsel argued that since the maximum punishment under Section 21(2) is only one year, the offence should be classified as bailable under the First Schedule of the BNSS (formerly the CrPC). The prosecution, however, resisted this argument and supported the trial court’s decision to deny bail.

The question thus involved an interpretative issue: how should courts classify offences under “special laws” like the POCSO Act when those laws themselves do not explicitly categorize offences as bailable or non-bailable?


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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice G. Satapathy began by examining the statutory scheme of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The POCSO Act defines and penalizes a range of offences relating to child sexual abuse but does not specify whether those offences are bailable or non-bailable. Instead, Section 31 of the POCSO Act makes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (and now, the BNSS, 2023) applicable to proceedings under the Act, unless inconsistent with its provisions. Therefore, to determine whether an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act is bailable, the Court referred to Table II of the First Schedule of the BNSS, which classifies offences under “other laws.”

According to Table II of the First Schedule of the BNSS:

1. If the punishment prescribed is death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding seven years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Sessions Court.


2. If the punishment is imprisonment between three and seven years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the First Class.


3. If the punishment is imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only, the offence is non-cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate.



The Court then analyzed Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, which states that any person in charge of an institution who fails to report an offence under Section 19(1) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine. Based on the punishment structure, the Court concluded that this offence clearly falls within the third category—that is, it is bailable and non-cognizable.

In support of this interpretation, the Court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi [(2022) 10 SCC 221; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 668]*, where the Apex Court examined Section 63 of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court had clarified that where the maximum punishment is up to three years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, and where it is less than three years, it becomes non-cognizable and bailable. Applying this reasoning, the Orissa High Court held that an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act—punishable with imprisonment up to one year—is clearly bailable.

The Court then turned to the constitutional perspective under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Justice Satapathy emphasized that denying bail to a person accused of a bailable offence amounts to unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and constitutes a violation of Article 21. He observed that when an offence is bailable, the accused has a right to be released on bail upon furnishing surety or even on a personal bond if indigent. The trial court’s refusal to grant bail, therefore, amounted to a constitutional infraction.

The High Court criticized the Special Court for failing to notice that the alleged offence was bailable in nature and for mechanically remanding the petitioner to custody. Justice Satapathy observed that the learned trial court had undertaken an extensive analysis of the allegations but still reached an erroneous conclusion by denying bail. The Court described this as a gross violation of the petitioner’s personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.


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Decision

The Orissa High Court allowed the bail application and directed the immediate release of the petitioner on bail in accordance with law. It also quashed the impugned order of the Special Court that had refused bail and ordered the Registrar General of the High Court to circulate the judgment to all POCSO Courts in the state. The purpose was to ensure that trial courts handling offences under the POCSO Act do not mistakenly deny bail in cases where the alleged offence is bailable.

The Court further directed that the copy of the judgment be sent electronically to the concerned court and observed that even if courts are closed for holidays, the bail order must be implemented immediately since the accused was in custody for a bailable offence. The judgment thus affirmed the principle that in bailable offences, bail is not a matter of judicial discretion but a matter of right.


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Conclusion

The judgment in Ramesh Chandra Sahoo v. State of Orissa is a landmark ruling on the classification of offences under the POCSO Act and their intersection with the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. It clarifies that where a special statute does not specify whether an offence is bailable or not, the classification provided in the First Schedule of the BNSS will apply. The decision also reinforces the constitutional dimension of bail as an extension of personal liberty under Article 21.

By holding that failure to report an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act is a bailable offence, the Orissa High Court has ensured that procedural fairness and personal liberty remain central to criminal jurisprudence. The ruling also serves as guidance for all Special Courts dealing with POCSO matters to distinguish between serious offences and procedural omissions, preventing unnecessary incarceration for minor lapses.


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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Bail as a Right, Not a Favour: Orissa High Court’s Guidance under the BNSS and POCSO Act


2. Failure to Report under POCSO: A Bailable Offence Clarified by the Orissa High Court


3. Liberty, BNSS, and Bailable Offences: Understanding the Case of Ramesh Chandra Sahoo v. State of Orissa


4. When Silence Isn’t a Crime: Judicial Interpretation of Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act


5. Protecting Liberty in Procedural Justice: A Simple Reading of Orissa High Court’s 2025 Bail Judgment

Everest Entertainment LLP Vs Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar

When Delay Defeats Copyright Claims

Facts:Everest Entertainment LLP, the plaintiff, claimed to be the sole and exclusive owner of the copyright and intellectual property in the Marathi film “Mee Shivajiraje Bhosale Boltoy!” produced under an assignment agreement dated June 26, 2008, and its addendum dated August 28, 2013, executed with the first defendant, Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar. Under this agreement, Manjrekar, the director and original rights holder, assigned all intellectual property rights in the film—including the script, dialogues, cinematograph film, and promotional materials—to Everest Entertainment.

In 2025, the defendants, led by Manjrekar and others associated with Krizolh Filmz LLP, Satyasai Productions Pvt. Ltd., and Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., began production and promotion of a new Marathi film titled “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale.” The plaintiff alleged that the new film was a direct copy or unauthorized sequel to its earlier film. The plaintiff contended that the defendants had not only copied the storyline, theme, and characters but also used the same title format, font style, and promotional materials that were confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s work.

Everest Entertainment further asserted that the original film had gained immense popularity and goodwill among audiences and that the impugned film’s title and marketing strategy misrepresented an association or continuity, leading to public confusion and deception. The plaintiff, therefore, sought to restrain the release of the defendants’ film, scheduled for theatrical release on October 31, 2025.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff filed the commercial intellectual property suit on October 10, 2025, along with an interim application seeking ad-interim injunctions to restrain the defendants from releasing the impugned film. The initial bench recused itself from hearing the matter, after which the case was reassigned. On October 17, 2025, another bench directed the defendants to arrange a private screening of the impugned film for the plaintiff without background music. The screening took place on October 20, 2025.

After viewing the film, the plaintiff claimed to have identified over 30 points of substantial similarity between the two works and sought to amend the plaint accordingly. The vacation court heard the matter on October 24, 2025, when the plaintiff pressed for ad-interim injunctions restraining the release of “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale.”

The defendants strongly opposed the grant of any injunction, contending that the plaintiff had delayed unreasonably in filing the suit despite being aware of the impugned project since April 2025.

The Core Dispute:The core question before the Court was whether the defendants’ film “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale” amounted to an infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright and whether the plaintiff was entitled to an ad-interim injunction stopping its release.

The plaintiff’s claim was twofold: first, that there was substantial copying of its film, including the story, theme, and dialogues, constituting copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957; and second, that the defendants’ use of a similar title and presentation amounted to passing off, misleading the public into believing that the impugned film was a sequel or derivative of the plaintiff’s original film.

The defendants, on the other hand, denied all allegations. They argued that there can be no copyright in an idea, historical concept, or the name “Shivaji Raje Bhosale”, which refers to a historical and cultural figure. They contended that their film had a completely different storyline—focused on farmer distress and corruption—while the plaintiff’s earlier film was centered on a modern man rediscovering his Marathi identity with the spiritual guidance of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. The defendants further claimed that they had invested crores in production and promotion and that any injunction at this stage would cause irreparable loss.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:The Court noted that the plaintiff had admitted knowledge of the impugned film’s production as early as April 2025 and had even issued a legal notice on April 30, 2025. Replies from the defendants were received in July 2025, yet the plaintiff waited until October 10, 2025, to file the suit. The Court found no plausible explanation for this delay. Citing earlier Bombay High Court precedents, including Anil Kapoor Film Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Make My Day Entertainment (2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8119) and Dashrath B. Rathod v. Fox Star Studios India Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (1) Mh. L.J. 474], the Court reiterated that litigants who approach the Court at the eleventh hour to stop film releases after months of inaction cannot claim equitable reliefs.

The Court held that ad-interim injunctions are discretionary and equitable remedies, which require the applicant to show bona fides and promptness. Since the plaintiff delayed nearly five months despite knowing of the alleged infringement, its request was deemed to be a tactical move to pressure the defendants close to the release date. Hence, on this ground alone, the Court held that no urgent injunction could be granted.

On the merits, the Court examined the plaintiff’s claims of copyright infringement. Justice Jamsandekar clarified that under Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, a copyright in a cinematograph film is limited to protection against making a facsimile copy of the film. Referring to Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Leo Burnett (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2 Bom LR 655, the Court noted that producing a new film with similar themes or ideas does not constitute infringement unless it reproduces the original recording itself. Thus, since the defendants had independently produced their film, it could not be termed a “copy” of the plaintiff’s work.

Regarding the script and dialogues, the Court observed that the plaintiff had not produced the full script to substantiate its claim. Even from the alleged similarities, the Court found no substantial reproduction of the plaintiff’s literary work. The dialogues claimed—such as “Yaj Sathi Kela Hota Attahas” or “Marathi Mansala Kana Nahi”—were considered common Marathi expressions and therefore not eligible for copyright protection. The Court reasoned that accepting such a claim would mean granting monopoly over common cultural phrases, which would be against the spirit of copyright law.

On the title and promotional material, the Court held that the plaintiff could not claim exclusivity over the name “Shivaji Raje Bhosale”, a historical and revered public figure. The use of this name in a film title could not amount to infringement or passing off. Both posters depicted Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, a common cultural motif, and the use of similar imagery could not be monopolized.

Thus, the Court concluded that neither the title, dialogues, storyline, nor the visuals of the impugned film amounted to any actionable infringement or passing off. Moreover, the plaintiff’s conduct lacked diligence, making it ineligible for equitable relief.

Final Decision:Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for ad-interim injunctions, holding that there was both gross delay and no prima facie case of infringement. The Court emphasized that film production involves massive investment, and last-minute attempts to stall releases without timely action must be strongly discouraged.

Accordingly, the Court refused to restrain the release of “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale”, which was scheduled for October 31, 2025, and observed that the plaintiff’s remedy, if any, lies in pursuing the suit on merits after the defendants file their written statements.

Conclusion:This judgment underscores the importance of promptness in seeking equitable remedies in intellectual property disputes involving films. It also reiterates settled principles of copyright law that protect the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The Court made it clear that generic titles, historical names, and culturally rooted dialogues cannot be monopolized under copyright law. The case thus reinforces the balance between protecting creative works and preserving public domain expressions within cultural heritage.

Case Title: Everest Entertainment LLP Vs Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar & Ors.
Date of Order: October 24, 2025
Case Number:Commercial IP 32984 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:19882
Court: High Court of Bombay
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Amit S. Jamsandekar 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


Swapan Dey Vs. Competition Commission of India

Patents Act Versus Competition Act

Fact:The appellant, Mr. Swapan Dey, is a hospital CEO providing free dialysis services under the Pradhan Mantri National Dialysis Programme, who approached the Competition Commission of India alleging anti-competitive conduct by Vifor International AG concerning Ferric Carboxymaltose (FCM) injection used to treat iron deficiency anaemia common in dialysis patients and vulnerable populations, asserting that Vifor’s licensing and market practices made FCM inaccessible and unaffordable in India. 

Vifor, a Swiss company, held an Indian patent on the FCM molecule granted on 25.06.2008, which expired on 21.10.2023, and the company had entered into licensing arrangements with Indian pharmaceutical companies including Emcure Pharmaceuticals (manufacturing) and Lupin Ltd. (import and distribution), with the appellant alleging limited production, control, and discriminatory pricing. The appellant claimed contraventions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 on the basis that Vifor’s arrangements and conduct restricted supply, involved abuse of dominance, and discriminated on pricing between public procurement and private markets, thereby harming patients’ access to essential therapy. 

Procedural Detail:The appellant filed information before the Competition Commission of India on 12.01.2022 in Case No. 05 of 2022 alleging violations under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act by Vifor, which the CCI closed at the prima facie stage by order dated 25.10.2022 under Section 26(2) of the Act, concluding that there was no requirement to define a precise relevant market or assess dominance, and finding no prima facie contravention. 

The CCI’s order reasoned that Vifor’s limited-term licences with Emcure and Lupin contained reasonable IP-protective conditions, did not foreclose competition, did not restrict inter se competition between licensees, and did not indicate long-term exclusionary effects; it also observed patent expiry in 2023 would open the market, and that price differentiation between public bulk procurement and private retail could be benign. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal under Section 53B of the Competition Act before the NCLAT, where CCI supported its jurisdiction and merits closure with reference to Delhi High Court’s Monsanto 2020 single judge decision, while Vifor challenged maintainability, asserted lack of CCI jurisdiction due to the Patents Act being a special code, and pointed out patent expiry and alleged forum shopping by the appellant. 

Dispute:The core dispute was whether the Competition Commission of India had the power to inquire into and decide allegations of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance relating to licensing and supply of a patented drug, when the conduct arose in the exercise of statutory rights under the Patents Act. The connected issue was whether, even if the CCI had jurisdiction, the impugned order closing the case at the prima facie stage for want of contravention required interference in appeal, in light of the licensing terms, market structure, alleged price discrimination, and patent expiry changing market dynamics. Finally, the tribunal had to consider the effect of the Delhi High Court Division Bench decision in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson PUBL v. CCI, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4078, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent disposal of CCI’s SLP on 02.09.2025, on the jurisdictional relationship between the Competition Act and the Patents Act. 

Detailed Reasoning:The tribunal began by recording that the CCI had examined the matter within its statutory confines and closed it at the threshold under Section 26(2), having found no prima facie contravention of Sections 3 and 4, particularly in view of licensing agreements’ nature, absence of long-term foreclosure, inter se competition, and impending patent expiry in 2023, as reflected in the CCI’s reasons at paragraphs 65 to 79 of its order. The CCI’s analysis highlighted that Vifor’s licences with Emcure and Lupin were time-bound, did not include unilateral anti-competitive restraints on pricing or competition between licensees, and did not block entry by other potential producers of soluble iron injectables, with the Commission observing that not all price differentiation is discriminatory, especially when justified by bulk procurement or public purpose considerations. 

The tribunal noted the appellant’s criticism that the CCI failed to define a precise relevant market or assess dominance, and that it adopted an ex-ante lens instead of ex-post assessment under Section 3 and 4; however, the tribunal emphasized that the decisive issue in this appeal was jurisdictional primacy when alleged conduct arises from exercise of patent rights under the Patents Act. In this regard, the tribunal recorded CCI’s reference to the Delhi High Court’s decision in Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. CCI (W.P.(C) 1776/2016, decision dated 20.05.2020) to contend that Section 3(5) of the Competition Act does not oust CCI’s jurisdiction merely because IP is involved, but also noted that the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson PUBL v. CCI, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4078 (in LPA 247/2016 and connected matters) later reversed the Monsanto single judge view and held that, for issues concerning exercise of patent rights, the Patents Act is a special and subsequent code that prevails over the Competition Act. 

Relying on Ericsson, the tribunal reproduced and adopted the Division Bench’s reasoning that the inquiry proposed by CCI in respect of licensing terms and alleged abuse by a patentee is nearly identical to the inquiry contemplated under Chapter XVI of the Patents Act concerning compulsory licences and related reliefs, and that unreasonable licensing conditions, abuse of patentee status, and the remedial framework are a complete code under the Patents Act. The Division Bench reasoned that, applying generalia specialibus non derogant and lex posterior derogat priori, the Patents Act as the special and later legislation must prevail over the general competition law where the subject matter is anti-competitive agreements or abuse by a patentee in the exercise of patent rights, with Section 3(5) of the Competition Act further indicating legislative intendment to preserve reasonable conditions for IP protection outside competition scrutiny. 

The tribunal then recorded the subsequent development that the CCI had filed SLP No. 25026 of 2023 against the Delhi High Court’s Ericsson decision, which the Supreme Court disposed of on 02.09.2025, declining to interfere in the peculiar facts, noting that the original informants had nothing further to say, and expressly keeping questions of law open for appropriate cases. Although the Supreme Court’s order kept questions of law open, the tribunal treated the Delhi High Court’s operative conclusions as binding guidance for present purposes, reading Ericsson to mean that CCI lacks power to proceed where the alleged conduct is integrally bound to the exercise of patent rights and the Patents Act provides the special mechanism for regulating unreasonable licensing conditions and market abuses by patentees.

Within that framework, the tribunal emphasized that Section 3(5) of the Competition Act preserves the right of a patentee to restrain infringement and to impose reasonable conditions necessary to protect patent rights, while Sections 83, 84, 88, 89, and 90 of the Patents Act collectively embody a policy balance between innovation incentives, access, affordability, and public interest, including compulsory licensing to address unmet reasonable requirements of the public, non-working, or unaffordable pricing. Vifor’s submissions invoking Section 83 and the compulsory licensing regime were noted to support the view that patent-related market questions, including supply sufficiency and reasonable pricing, are primarily addressed by the Patents Act’s dedicated apparatus. 

On facts, the tribunal recorded that Vifor’s patent expired on 21.10.2023, thus placing FCM into the public domain and making it available for free exploitation by interested parties across India, which materially diminished any continuing competition law concern premised on exclusive rights; it also noted that the CCI had already considered the limited-term nature of licences, absence of licensee foreclosure, and freedom to enter more licences. Further, the CCI had observed that pricing differences in public procurement versus private retail may be justified and that cross-country comparisons, such as Bangladesh prices, are an unreliable benchmark due to distinct tax, duty, and regulatory environments. 

In this statutory and factual setting, the tribunal concluded that, guided by the Delhi High Court’s Division Bench in Ericsson and the Supreme Court’s disposal of CCI’s challenge, the CCI lacks power to examine the present allegations against Vifor because the controversy stemmed from the exercise of patent rights over FCM at the relevant time, for which the Patents Act is a complete and special code. The tribunal therefore found no merit to interfere with the CCI’s closure of the matter and held that the Patents Act prevails over the Competition Act in the facts of this case, while also noting Section 3(5) of the Competition Act protects reasonable IP-related conditions. 

Judgment:The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal held that the Competition Commission of India lacks power to examine the allegations against Vifor International AG in this case because the subject matter concerns conduct by a patentee in the exercise of patent rights, an area governed by the Patents Act as a special and complete code, as clarified by the Delhi High Court Division Bench in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson PUBL v. CCI, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4078. The tribunal noted the Supreme Court’s 02.09.2025 order disposing of the CCI’s SLP in Ericsson without interference and keeping questions of law open, but in the present facts applied the Delhi High Court’s guidance to hold that the Patents Act prevails and that CCI’s prima facie closure did not warrant interference, also taking into account the expiry of Vifor’s patent on 21.10.2023 and the CCI’s reasons that licensing terms did not show foreclosure or anti-competitive restraints and that price differentials in public procurement may be justified. 

Case Title: Mr. Swapan Dey Vs Competition Commission of India
Order Date: 30.10.2025  
Case Number: Competition Appeal (AT) No. 5 of 2023  
Name of Court: National Company Law Appellate Tribunal 
Name of Hon’ble Bench: Justice Yogesh Khanna and Mr. Ajai Das Mehrotra 

Decision:The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, and pending applications were closed, thereby affirming the CCI’s order dated 25.10.2022 closing the information under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act. 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. 

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi 

R.C. Plasto Tanks and Pipes Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Gouri Industries

Case Title: R.C. Plasto Tanks and Pipes Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Gouri Industries & Anr.
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-CR) 868/2022 & I.As. 16726-16728/2022
Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:—
Date of Decision: 20th February, 2023
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Sanjeev Narula


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Factual Background

The petitioner, R.C. Plasto Tanks and Pipes Pvt. Ltd., is a well-known manufacturer and supplier of water storage tanks, PVC pipes, and fittings under its registered trademark “PLASTO.” The company also holds artistic copyright registrations for its labels and designs. The respondent, Ganesh Gouri Industries, is engaged in a similar line of business involving water storage tanks and allied goods.

The dispute traces back to the year 2018 when the petitioner discovered that the respondent was selling water tanks under the mark “AQUA PLAST” accompanied by the tagline “NAAM HI GUARANTEE HAI.” The petitioner alleged that this mark and slogan were deceptively similar to its own registered mark “PLASTO” and its slogan “PLASTO HAI TO GUARANTEE HAI.” According to the petitioner, this amounted to infringement of trademark and copyright, as well as passing off.

This dispute initially led to a civil suit being filed by R.C. Plasto before the District and Sessions Judge, Nagpur, registered as Suit No. 3 of 2018. The parties subsequently reached an amicable settlement, which was recorded in the judgment dated 21st February 2019. The settlement was based on express undertakings and terms that became central to the present rectification petition.

Under the settlement, the respondent agreed not to use the mark “PLASTO” or any identical or deceptively similar mark, tagline, or trade dress. Specifically, the respondent undertook not to use the slogans “PLASTO HAI TO GUARANTEE HAI” or “NAAM HI GUARANTEE HAI,” and agreed to remove all infringing material from its products and marketing items. In return, the petitioner agreed not to object to any mark or logo of the respondent that included the word “PLAST,” provided it was not deceptively similar to the petitioner’s marks. Both parties thus agreed to maintain distinct trade identities.

However, in 2022, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had obtained copyright registration No. A-142047/2022 for an artistic label titled “Gauri Aqua Plast”. The petitioner alleged that this label used a blue background and white lettering similar to its own “PLASTO” logo and colour scheme. Viewing this as a breach of the earlier settlement and an act of copying, the petitioner filed the present petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 seeking removal of the impugned copyright from the Register of Copyrights.


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Procedural History

The rectification petition was filed before the Delhi High Court’s Intellectual Property Division (IPD) under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The respondent’s reply to the petition was delayed by 33 days, which was condoned by the Court upon sufficient cause being shown.

The petitioner’s argument primarily rested on three pillars: that the impugned registration was (i) in violation of the 2019 settlement terms, (ii) deceptively similar to the petitioner’s copyrighted artistic label, and (iii) dishonest and mala fide in nature. The respondent opposed the petition, arguing that its artwork was original, distinct, and in compliance with the settlement terms, and that the petitioner’s claim amounted to monopolizing generic elements such as colours and shapes.


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Core Dispute

The legal question before the Court was whether the respondent’s copyright registration for the label “Gauri Aqua Plast” was liable to be cancelled under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, on the grounds that it was not original and constituted a substantial reproduction or colourable imitation of the petitioner’s artistic work.

The case also tested the limits of contractual undertakings in prior settlements and whether the use of common design elements like colour combinations and word stems (like “PLAST”) could amount to infringement or breach of settlement.


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Arguments of the Petitioner

Counsel for the petitioner, Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, contended that the respondent’s impugned copyright was a clear violation of the 2019 settlement terms. It was argued that the respondent had expressly undertaken not to use any mark or slogan similar to “PLASTO HAI TO GUARANTEE HAI” or to imitate the petitioner’s blue-and-white colour scheme.

The petitioner argued that the impugned artwork “Gauri Aqua Plast” was substantially similar to its own “PLASTO” label, both in visual presentation and conceptual impression. The label used a blue background and white lettering identical to that of the petitioner, thereby creating confusion among consumers.

It was also submitted that the petitioner’s goodwill and reputation, developed over decades, were being unfairly exploited by the respondent. According to the petitioner, the adoption of the impugned label was not independent or bona fide but an act of bad faith aimed at riding on the petitioner’s established reputation.

The petitioner relied on Section 13(1)(a) and Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, arguing that since originality is a prerequisite for copyright registration, any registration obtained through imitation or copying is liable to be cancelled. The petitioner further pointed out that the Delhi District Commercial Court, in CS (COMM) 545/2021, had already granted an injunction restraining the respondent from using similar trade dress and label, indicating prima facie infringement.


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Arguments of the Respondent

The respondent, represented by Advocate Salim A. Inamdar, opposed the petition by asserting that its artwork was independently created and bore no resemblance to the petitioner’s label. It was argued that the petitioner was attempting to monopolize generic and functional elements such as the colour blue or the shape of the label, which are common in the plastic products industry.

The respondent emphasized that under the 2019 settlement, the petitioner had agreed not to object to the respondent’s use or registration of any mark that included the word “PLAST,” provided it was not deceptively similar. The respondent’s new label, it was argued, fully complied with this term as it used “Aqua Plast” with distinctive design features.

The impugned label contained a stylized “G” representing the company’s name “Gouri,” designed in the form of an “OK” hand gesture enclosing three waves, symbolizing water — a feature completely absent from the petitioner’s label. The respondent further pointed out that it used the tagline “NAAM HI KAAFI HAI” instead of “NAAM HI GUARANTEE HAI,” which indicated creativity rather than imitation.

Lastly, the respondent argued that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, colours, or common expressions but only to the original artistic arrangement. Hence, similarity in broad elements such as colour or shape could not justify cancellation of registration.


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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Sanjeev Narula commenced the analysis by examining the scope of Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which allows the High Court to order rectification of the Register of Copyrights if a registration has been “wrongly made” or if any entry has been made or remains on the Register “without sufficient cause.” The Court noted that to justify removal, the petitioner must establish either lack of originality in the respondent’s work or substantial reproduction of the petitioner’s existing copyrighted work.

The Court compared both the labels in question and observed that while both used the word “PLAST” and had blue and white colours, the overall artistic impression was different. The respondent’s label had distinct visual elements such as the stylized letter “G,” additional taglines, and differentiated fonts. The composition, artistic layout, and design collectively rendered it an original work capable of copyright protection.

The Court emphasized that copyright law protects expression and not mere ideas or functional aspects. A blue-and-white colour scheme or a rectangular label are common features in packaging and cannot form the exclusive property of one entity. Referring to the settled principle laid down in R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films (AIR 1978 SC 1613), the Court reiterated that where the expression of ideas is substantially different, no case of infringement or copying arises.

Justice Narula also relied on the petitioner’s own settlement terms to underscore that the petitioner had explicitly agreed not to object to the respondent’s use of “Aqua Plast” so long as it was not deceptively similar. Since the impugned label bore clear differences in artistic features, font styles, and slogans, it did not violate the settlement agreement. The use of the word “PLAST” was held to be generic, derived from the word “plastic,” and not exclusively associated with the petitioner.

The Court concluded that the petitioner’s claim was primarily based on broad similarities that could not satisfy the legal test of substantial reproduction under copyright law. The mere use of the same colour background and general layout was insufficient to prove copying or breach of settlement.


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Final Decision

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition, holding that no ground was made out for removal of the impugned copyright under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The Court observed that the respondent’s label was original and did not constitute a reproduction of the petitioner’s copyrighted work.

Justice Sanjeev Narula further held that the terms of the prior settlement had not been violated and that the petitioner was attempting to overextend its exclusive rights beyond reasonable limits. The Court imposed costs of ₹10,000 on the petitioner, payable to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority, and dismissed all pending applications.


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Significance and Legal Insight

This case is significant as it clarifies the distinction between artistic similarity and copyright infringement in label design disputes. It reinforces the principle that copyright does not protect common design elements or colour combinations used widely across an industry. Moreover, it highlights the importance of honouring settlement terms and restricting legal action to clear cases of deception or bad faith.

The judgment also serves as a practical lesson for intellectual property owners: once a settlement allows limited use of certain terms or design elements, they cannot later object to such use merely on the basis of stylistic similarities.


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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Colour, Shape, and Settlement: Delhi High Court on the Limits of Copyright Protection


2. When Blue is Just a Colour: RC Plasto v. Ganesh Gouri and the Meaning of Originality


3. Copyright, Contract, and Commonality: A Study in Industrial Label Disputes


4. The Fine Line Between Inspiration and Infringement: Lessons from RC Plasto Case


5. Generic Words and Common Colours: Delhi High Court Redefines Copyright Boundaries in Label Art




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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pradeep Bailey Vs Gilma Daniel

Additional documents at the stage of trial

Factual Background:The dispute between the petitioner, Mr. Pradeep Bailey, and the respondent, Ms. Gilma Daniel, arose from a long-standing family property conflict concerning ownership and possession of a shop measuring 8’x10’ located at property No. WZ-5A/31, Vishnu Garden, New Delhi. The petitioner, Mr. Bailey, claimed to be the rightful owner of the property by virtue of documents executed by his late mother in 2003, while the respondent, his sister, asserted ownership on the basis of a prior Will dated 17th November, 1994.

In 2021, Mr. Bailey filed a civil suit for recovery of possession, eviction, mesne profits, and injunction against the respondent, alleging that she had been permitted to reside in the property as a licensee but had later refused to vacate. The respondent, on the other hand, claimed that she was the true owner of the property under her mother’s 1994 Will, under which the mother had disinherited the petitioner due to his alleged misconduct and lack of filial care.

The dispute soon extended beyond mere ownership claims. Mr. Bailey, during the pendency of the trial, sought to introduce additional documents which, according to him, were vital to prove his ownership, occupation, and contribution to the family, including two subsequent Wills of 2000, house tax receipts, bills, professional certificates, and membership records.

Procedural Background:The civil suit was registered as Civil DJ No. 934/2021 before the District Judge, where the respondent filed her written statement in March 2022. Subsequently, Mr. Bailey filed a replication along with an application under Order VII Rule 14 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking permission to place additional documents on record.

The trial court, however, dismissed this application on 17th May, 2023. The trial judge held that the petitioner had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for not filing the documents with the plaint or at least mentioning them earlier in the replication. The judge also observed that the receipts and property tax documents appeared to have interpolations, such as the petitioner’s name being added in a different handwriting, and that some of the documents, like electricity and water bills, had no direct relevance to the main issues.

Aggrieved by this order, Mr. Bailey approached the Delhi High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, contending that the trial court’s refusal was arbitrary and unjust, particularly when the case was still at the evidence stage and no prejudice would be caused to the respondent by admitting the documents.

Core Legal Dispute:The essential legal question before the High Court was whether the trial court had erred in refusing to permit the petitioner to file additional documents under Order VII Rule 14 CPC, despite his claim that those documents were necessary for just adjudication and were not in his possession when the plaint was filed.

This dispute brought into focus the balance between procedural compliance and substantive justice — whether technical delay in filing documents should defeat a party’s right to produce crucial evidence for determining the truth.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:Counsel for the petitioner argued that the documents sought to be placed on record were highly relevant for proving his ownership and rebutting the respondent’s claims. These documents included Wills dated 19.09.2000 and 24.08.2000, house tax receipts, tent house business vouchers, electricity and water bills, membership of a traders’ association, and payment slips of burial expenses of the mother.

The petitioner contended that the documents could not be filed earlier because his previous counsel had failed to include them and some were later discovered when handed over by his sister-in-law in 2022. He maintained that since the case had not yet proceeded to evidence, allowing such documents would not prejudice the respondent. Reliance was placed on Kapil Kumar Sharma v. Lalit Kumar Sharma (Civil Appeal No. 2330/2009) and Nishant Hannan & Ors. v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation (CM(M) 262/2014), where courts permitted additional documents at later stages in the interest of justice.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent:The respondent’s counsel opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner was attempting to fill lacunae in his case. He argued that the petitioner had already filed replication with new documents and was now attempting to introduce even more without justification. The delay of over two years was deliberate and not supported by a credible explanation.

According to the respondent, their late mother had, by a Will dated 17th November 1994, bequeathed the suit property solely to her daughter (the respondent) and had expressly disinherited the petitioner for his neglectful and abusive behavior. The respondent further contended that the petitioner’s conduct had forced their parents to publicly debar him through an affidavit and newspaper publication.

The respondent relied on several precedents including Asia Pacific Breweries v. Superior Industries (2009) 158 DLT 670, Gold Rock World Trade Ltd. v. Veejay Lakshmi Engineering Works Ltd. (2007) 143 DLT 113, and Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Haldiram Bhujiawala (2009) 5 ILR (Del) 503, all of which emphasize that courts must exercise discretion in allowing late filing of documents strictly and sparingly, to prevent misuse and delay.

Legal Analysis and Judicial Reasoning:  Court analyzed the intent and scope of Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC, which mandates that all documents relied upon by the plaintiff should ordinarily be filed with the plaint. However, sub-rule (3) provides that a document not produced at that stage may later be received in evidence with the leave of the court. The judge observed that the 2002 amendment to this rule was enacted precisely to soften the earlier rigid embargo on filing documents belatedly, thereby allowing genuine parties an opportunity to present relevant materials if justice so requires.

The Court referred to the Delhi High Court’s own ruling in Haldiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Haldiram Bhujiawala (2009 5 ILR (Del) 503), which clarified that this is a discretionary power to be used sparingly, only in genuine cases and not as a matter of routine.

The Court also cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs v. P. Rajkumar (2020) 10 SCC 706, where it was held that procedural rules should not act as stumbling blocks in the path of substantive justice. The Apex Court had emphasized that the objective of such provisions is to aid in discovering the truth rather than penalizing inadvertent procedural lapses. Similarly, reference was made to Mohanraj v. Kewalchand Hastimal Jain (AIR 2007 Bom 69), which held that courts should take a liberal approach in allowing relevant documents necessary for a fair decision.

The petitioner’s additional documents, the Court noted, were directly relevant to his claim that he was employed, financially independent, and had been taking care of his mother, contrary to the respondent’s allegations of negligence. Moreover, some of the documents, such as property tax receipts and municipal payment slips, were public records whose authenticity could be verified at a later stage through evidence.

The judge found that the trial court had taken an overly rigid and mechanical approach in rejecting the documents solely on procedural grounds. He reasoned that since the trial was still at the initial stage and evidence had not commenced, allowing the petitioner to file these documents would not cause any serious prejudice to the respondent. Rather, it would enable the court to effectively adjudicate the real issues between the parties.

The High Court also observed that even if the petitioner’s explanation about his previous counsel’s negligence appeared weak, courts should adopt a pragmatic and compassionate view. Minor mistakes or lapses by litigants or their counsel should not deprive them of a fair chance to present their case, especially when no substantial delay or prejudice is caused to the opposite side.

Final Decision:The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the trial court’s order dated 17th May 2023. It permitted Mr. Bailey to place the additional documents on record and prove them in accordance with law. Justice Dudeja emphasized that “procedural rules are meant to advance the cause of justice, not to obstruct it.” Excluding potentially relevant documents at this stage, he said, would elevate technical formalities over the pursuit of truth.

The Court concluded that the trial court’s order suffered from “gross illegality and perversity,” as it failed to consider the importance of the documents for the fair adjudication of the matter. The petition was therefore allowed, with both parties directed to bear their own costs.

Legal Principle and Impact:This judgment reaffirms the settled principle that procedural law is a means to achieve justice, not an end in itself. The decision underscores the judiciary’s discretion under Order VII Rule 14 CPC to allow late filing of documents if it serves the interests of justice and does not prejudice the other party. It also serves as a guiding precedent for lower courts to adopt a balanced approach, avoiding undue rigidity in procedural compliance.

Case Title: Pradeep Bailey Vs Gilma Daniel
Case Number: CM(M) 1506/2023
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4992
Date of Decision: 18th June, 2025
Court: High Court of Delhi 
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Ravinder Dudeja

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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