Ifra Sheikh, Trading As Rocket Bidi Vs Mobile Bidi Traders

Visual Similarity, Marketplace Confusion, and Trademark Rights

Fact:The dispute is between Ifra Sheikh, acting through a power of attorney and trading as Rocket Bidi Works, and Ms Mobile Bidi Traders, a partnership firm. The plaintiff, Ms Mobile Bidi Traders, has been making, marketing, and selling handmade bidis and matchboxes since 2005 and claims to have a registered trademark "Online BIDI" (registered on 04.01.2020, application dated 31.08.2017) and copyright over its label design (registered 13.06.2024). 

The plaintiff asserts that the design and blue color scheme of its packaging—known as "Asmani Puda" in the market—sets its product apart, especially as consumers are mainly workers and laborers from less educated backgrounds, making them prone to confusion. The defendant, Ifra Sheikh, sells bidis under the brand “ATM BIDI No.07.” The plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s color scheme and packaging design are deceptively similar to their own, causing a likelihood of confusion among ordinary purchasers who recognize products by appearance rather than name. 

Procedural Detail:Ms Mobile Bidi Traders filed Trademark Suit No.05 of 2024 in the District Court, seeking a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from using confusingly similar marks or packaging. On 12.08.2025, the District Judge-12, Nagpur, granted this temporary injunction, leading the defendant to file the present appeal before the High Court. The appellant (Ifra Sheikh) argued that the two products are not similar, especially after the defendant altered its design on 01.07.2024 to avoid further disputes. The defendant also alleged that the packaging used by the plaintiff did not include the statutory health warning required by the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Packaging and Labelling) Rules, 2008, and therefore, the plaintiff should not be granted the equitable relief of injunction. Earlier, an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by the defendant for rejection of the plaint on this ground was dismissed by the trial court. 

Dispute:The central dispute was whether the defendant’s packaging was deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff, potentially misleading consumers and infringing the plaintiff’s registered trademark and copyright. The defendant argued that its new packaging was not similar, that distinguishing features set the products apart, and that statutory non-compliance with health warnings on plaintiff’s outer packaging should disentitle the plaintiff from relief. The plaintiff countered that broad similarities in the products’ appearance—especially the blue color scheme—were likely to confuse consumers, who are not generally literate or brand-aware, and that the existing health warnings on bundles met statutory requirements. 

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion:The court identified that the end consumer of bidis—often workers or laborers—is likely to differentiate brands based on packaging and appearance rather than names or minor design differences. Both parties’ bidi bundles bore a blue conical design, and both included health warnings on the bundles (even if not on the wholesale outer packet). The trial court had rightly observed that similarities in the color scheme and visual presentation could be deceptive for such consumers.

In response to the defendant’s argument that the failure to provide a statutory health warning on outer packaging should disentitle the plaintiff from relief, the court looked to the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003, and its implementing rules. These provisions require statutory warnings on every “retail package.” The court found that although the external wholesale package lacked the warning, the retail bundle carried it, and that, even in case of procedural violation, relief for trademark infringement could not be denied in this context unless statutory authorities took action against the plaintiff. The policy behind the rules is consumer protection—not to be manipulated as a defence in trademark disputes (citing Sections 7, 14, 15, and 20 of the 2003 Act and Rule 3e of 2008 Rules).

The court also cited Ms Hiralal Industries Ltd. v. S.M. Associates and others (AIR 1984 Bom 218) for the principle that even where distinguishing features are identified, overall similarities—especially from an “arm-chair” or practical consumer perspective—prevail in the confusion analysis. The sales figures argument was dismissed as the plaintiff’s registered rights pertained specifically to the blue-labeled packages, which were at issue.

The appellate court reiterated the “arm-chair rule” (how a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection would perceive the products), reinforcing protection for consumers who may be influenced by broad visual similarities in the marketplace.

On the question of discretion, the court reiterated that, in appeals against discretionary orders like temporary injunctions, interference is justified only if a clear error or legal mistake has occurred—neither of which was present in this case[1].

Judgement:The High Court found no error in the trial court’s approach and held:The plaintiff’s mark "Online BIDI" and associated blue-colored trade dress enjoys protection under Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957.

 Where packaging breaches are alleged under the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Packaging and Labelling) Rules, 2008, and the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003—such breaches only lead to specified statutory consequences and not automatic disentitlement to trademark relief unless authorities take action. Section 15 of the 2003 Act allows for conditional release of confiscated goods if labeling requirements are corrected.

The principle established in Ms Hiralal Industries Ltd. v. S.M. Associates and others (AIR 1984 Bom 218), namely, that broad similarities in trade dress must prevail in such disputes, was upheld.Therefore, the order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant from using the deceptively similar trade dress was justified. 

Decision:The appeal was dismissed. The trial court’s order for temporary injunction against the defendant’s use of packaging and branding similar to the plaintiff’s was upheld. The court made no order as to costs.

Case Title: Ifra Sheikh Trading as Rocket Bidi Works Vs. Ms Mobile Bidi Traders  

Order Date: 04.11.2025  

Case Number: Appeal Against Order No.19 of 2025  

Neutral Citation: 2025BHC-NAG11393  

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Rohit W. Joshi  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Quantum Hi-Tech Merchandising Pvt. Ltd. Vs. LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd

Passing Off, Infringement, and Concealment

FACTS:Quantum Hi-Tech Merchandising Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, instituted a suit before the District Judge Commercial Court-II, Shahdara, alleging that LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd., LG Korea, and their Brand Store in Delhi infringed its registered trademarks and attempted to pass off their products as those of the appellant. The appellant sought a permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from using the marks QUANTUM, QUANTUM PLUS, QUANTUM DISPLAY, IPS QUANTUM, RGB QUANTUM, SMART QUANTUM, and G QUANTUM for their goods, arguing that these marks were deceptively similar to the appellant’s registered trademarks QUANTUM and related device marks.

The appellant clarified during proceedings that its request was limited only to restraining the respondents from using the marks QUANTUM and QUANTUM DISPLAY, and was no longer seeking an injunction against the respondents' use of their other registered trademarks containing “QUANTUM” as a part. Quantum Hi-Tech Merchandising Pvt. Ltd. asserted its adoption of the trademark QUANTUM since 1992, with formal registration under Class 9 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, following a transfer from its predecessor in 2006. The respondents were manufacturing televisions and related goods under similar marks, some of which were separately registered.

PROCEDURAL DETAILS:The appellant sought an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code to restrain the respondents' use of the allegedly infringing marks. An ad interim order was initially passed, restraining the respondents. Subsequently, the respondents applied under Order XXXIX Rule 4 for vacation of this interim order.

On 15 December 2021, the Commercial Court dismissed the appellant’s application for interim injunction and allowed the respondents' application to vacate the order. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Delhi.

DISPUTES:The main issues before the court were: Whether the appellant had a valid trademark registration for the mark QUANTUM for goods in question.Whether the respondents’ use of marks such as QUANTUM and QUANTUM DISPLAY constituted infringement or passing off.

DETAILED REASONING :The High Court noticed that the appellant had engaged in wilful and deliberate concealment of facts, noting the lack of bona fide in suppressing details regarding the nature of its trademark registration and use of the relevant affidavit. Equity dictates that interim relief can only be granted to parties who approach the court with clean hands, as per Seema Arshad Zaheer v Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and S.K. Sachdeva v Shri Educare Ltd.

Regarding infringement, the High Court clarified that had the concealment not happened, the appellant might otherwise have had a good case for injunction based on a valid device mark registration, especially since “QUANTUM” is the dominant part of its device mark (see K. R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v Shri Ambal Co, South India Beverages Pvt Ltd v General Mills Marketing Inc, Pernod Ricard India P Ltd v Karanveer Singh Chhabra). If a dominant part of a composite mark is replicated in another’s mark, confusion is likely under Section 29(2)(b) of the Act.

For passing off, the court cited Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v Prius Auto Industries Ltd. Passing off requires evidence of sale in the market and accumulation of goodwill before the defendant began using the impugned mark. As there was no proof of sale or sufficient material regarding goodwill, the passing off claim failed.

DECISION:The High Court upheld the Commercial Court’s order, finding that the appellant was guilty of concealment of facts and therefore not entitled to interim injunction. The appeal was dismissed, with no orders as to costs.

Case Title: Quantum Hi-Tech Merchandising Pvt. Ltd. Vs. LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Order Date: 4 November 2025

Case Number: FAO COMM 22/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9630-DB

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon'ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Arun R and Others Vs. Integray Health Care Private Limited

Consolidation of design cancellation with civil IP suits

Facts:The applicants, namely Arun R, Dinesh M, and M/s Espoirs Solution represented by its partner G. Lakshmi Prabha, instituted a commercial intellectual property suit in the Madras High Court against Ms Integray Health Care Private Limited and its promoters, alleging passing off in relation to the design and shape of a product described as a Carbon Fiber Cervical Extension device used in medical applications, and sought damages, accounts, delivery-up, recovery of dues, and return of a demonstration unit besides injunctive reliefs, in addition to addressing design-related issues linked to the respondent’s registered design bearing No. 400027-001 in the Designs Registry at Kolkata. 

The core product is a cervical extension device and the grievance is that the respondents’ design or shape closely imitates the applicants’ design and causes confusion in the marketplace, amounting to misrepresentation and damage to goodwill; alongside the civil suit, cancellation of the impugned design registration was already sought by the applicants before the Controller of Patents and Designs, Kolkata, under reference D-9107/2024-KOL. 

Since all private parties are based in Chennai, the applicants approached the High Court with an application to direct the Controller to transfer the pending design cancellation petition from the Designs Office at Kolkata to the Madras High Court to enable consolidated adjudication with the pending commercial suit concerning the same design subject matter. 

Procedural detail:The suit was filed under Order VII Rule 1 CPC read with Order IV Rule 1 of the Original Side Rules and Sections 27 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to seek injunctive and monetary reliefs typical of a passing off action in trade dress and product configuration disputes, while acknowledging that the respondents hold a registered design and that cancellation is separately pursued under the Designs Act mechanisms before the Controller in Kolkata. 

In the suit, the applicants moved Application No. 726 of 2025 specifically praying for a direction to the Controller of Patents and Designs, Kolkata, to transfer their pending design cancellation petition concerning Design No. 400027-001 (Ref. D-9107/2024-KOL) to the Madras High Court to be heard along with the commercial suit; notice was given of a prior representation dated 27 March 2025 to the Controller invoking the Supreme Court’s guidance on transfer of cancellation proceedings to the High Court when suits involving the same design issues are seized by the High Court.. 

The respondents opposed the application relying on a previous Madras High Court order in OP (PT) No. 2 of 2024 between the same parties, and on the Supreme Court’s decision in S.D. Containers, Indore v. Mold Tek Packaging Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 3695 of 2020, to argue that cancellation petitions lie only before the Controller and the High Court lacks concurrent original cancellation jurisdiction save in appellate capacity or via statutory transfer when defences under Section 22(3) are raised in a suit.

Dispute:The immediate dispute before the Court is jurisdictional and procedural: whether, in the presence of a pending commercial suit concerning passing off and related reliefs over the same product shape or design, the Madras High Court can direct transfer of the applicants’ design cancellation petition from the Controller at Kolkata to the High Court at Madras for consolidated adjudication, by drawing upon Section 19(2) of the Designs Act, 2000, Section 22(4) of the Designs Act in appropriate circumstances, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements harmonizing these provisions, and the Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 permitting consolidation of related IP proceedings. 

The applicants rely on the Supreme Court’s order in Maya Appliances Pvt. Ltd. v. Preethi Kitchen Appliances Pvt. Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1563, where both parties’ cancellation petitions pending before the Controller were directed to be referred to the Madras High Court under Section 19(2), given the pendency of a suit on infringement/passing off between the same parties concerning the same subject matter, to avoid multiplicity and conflicting outcomes. 

The respondents contend that S.D. Containers clarifies that a cancellation petition under Section 19 must be filed before the Controller and that High Court jurisdiction is appellate save when Section 22(3)-(4) is triggered by a defence to a piracy action, and they also rely on an earlier Madras High Court order declining original cancellation jurisdiction under the Designs Act and requiring resort to the Controller’s forum.

Detailed reasoning including on judgment:The Court began with the statutory framework. Section 19 of the Designs Act, 2000 provides that any person interested may present a petition for cancellation of registration to the Controller on grounds such as prior registration, prior publication, lack of novelty or originality, non-registrability, or that the subject is not a “design” under Section 2(d); critically, Section 19(2) permits an appeal from any order of the Controller to the High Court and also permits the Controller to refer any such petition to the High Court, with the High Court to decide any petition so referred, thereby establishing a statutory pathway for the High Court to decide cancellation petitions referred by the Controller. 

The Madras High Court engaged with its earlier decision in OP (PT) No. 2 of 2024 that held cancellation applications must be presented to the Controller and that the High Court’s role is appellate or upon statutory transfer, but distinguished that ruling by emphasizing that in the present scenario the applicants sought not to file an original cancellation directly in the High Court but to direct a transfer or referral of a pending Controller petition to the High Court seised of the related commercial dispute, which is contemplated under Section 19(2) and reinforced by Supreme Court practice in Maya Appliances.

The Court then examined the Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022. Rule 6 and Rule 14 expressly empower the Court to consolidate suits for infringement or passing off with other proceedings involving the same IPR, to direct consolidated recording of evidence and adjudication, and to use powers of transfer under Section 24 CPC to bring matters pending before commercial courts to the IP Division when consolidation is in the interests of justice, thus evidencing an institutional framework for unified IP adjudication where parallel proceedings exist. 

The Court reasoned that consolidation of the Controller’s cancellation petition with the pending suit would best serve judicial economy and consistency, especially as all parties are located in Chennai and the High Court is already seized of the connected civil dispute, and it noted that the Supreme Court has recognized such transfers to an appropriate High Court when cause of action and parties are centred there, as seen in S.D. Containers where the Supreme Court, while preserving the statutory scheme, adjusted forum on cause of action grounds in line with Godrej Sara Lee principles on jurisdiction .

On this foundation, the Court concluded that there is no legal impediment to ordering the Controller to transfer the pending cancellation petition to the Madras High Court for decision, either by the Controller referring the petition under Section 19(2) or by virtue of the Court’s authority to consolidate and secure a single-forum decision when Section 22 issues are live or likely to arise, and that this approach aligns with the Supreme Court’s guidance and the IPD Rules’ consolidation mandate.

Decision:Allowing Application No. 726 of 2025, the Court directed the Controller of Patents and Designs, Kolkata, to transfer the applicants’ petition for cancellation of Design No. 400027-001 in favour of Respondent No. 1, bearing Ref. D-9107/2024-KOL, to the Madras High Court for adjudication along with the pending commercial suit. 

Case Title: Arun R & Ors. Vs Ms Integray Health Care Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.  

Order Date: 25 October 2025

Case Number: A No. 726 of 2025 in C.S. (Comm. Div.) No. 152 of 2024  

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suparshva Swabs India Vs. AGN International

Floral Words and Trademark Boundaries

Factual Background: This case arose out of a conflict between two entities engaged in manufacturing and marketing consumer goods, primarily involving the use of the word “TULIP” as a trademark. The appellant, Suparshva Swabs India, is a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing cotton buds, cotton balls, and allied products since 1999. The firm claimed that it had coined, adopted, and used the trademark “TULIPS” (word and device) continuously since that year and had obtained registrations under various classes of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. According to the appellant, the mark “TULIPS” had, over time, acquired substantial goodwill and reputation, not just in India but also abroad, and had attained a distinctive association with its hygiene products.

On the other hand, the respondent, AGN International, is a firm engaged in the business of perfumes and cosmetic products. It had registered the trademark “AGN TULIP” in 2010 in Class 3 under a “proposed to be used” application, claiming that its goods, namely perfumes and sprays, were unrelated to the appellant’s products. The appellant alleged that the respondents had dishonestly and fraudulently adopted a deceptively similar mark to trade upon its reputation and confuse consumers.

In 2021, Suparshva Swabs discovered that AGN International was marketing perfumes under the name “AGN TULIP”. Believing that the impugned mark infringed its “TULIPS” trademark and amounted to passing off, the appellant filed a suit before the Commercial Court, South, Saket, New Delhi, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain AGN International from using the word “TULIP” in any form for perfumes, cosmetics, or related goods.

The plaintiff also filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking a temporary injunction pending trial. The trial court dismissed this application on 03.10.2023, holding that no prima facie case was made out. The appellant challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Procedural Background: Before the District Judge, Suparshva Swabs claimed that its trademark “TULIPS” was arbitrary, coined, and distinctive. It argued that the mark was registered in several classes, including Class 3 (cosmetics), and that it had long-standing use since 1999, with significant advertising and international recognition. The plaintiff asserted that AGN International’s use of “AGN TULIP” for perfumes was deceptively similar, given that the dominant portion of the respondent’s mark was the word “TULIP,” used prominently while “AGN” appeared merely as a prefix.

The defendants opposed the injunction, contending that “TULIP” is a generic term associated with fragrances and floral products. They asserted that their mark “AGN TULIP” was duly registered and that their goods — perfumes and sprays — were entirely different in nature and market segment from the plaintiff’s cotton buds and swabs. They further argued that the plaintiff had no exclusive right over a common word like “TULIP,” which naturally described the floral fragrance of their goods.

The District Judge, after hearing both sides, held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or show irreparable harm. The court found that “TULIP” is a generic term for perfumes and that the goods were dissimilar. The judge observed that perfumes, being fragrant floral products, naturally associate with flowers such as tulips and roses. Hence, “TULIP” could not be monopolized by one trader for all categories of goods. The plaintiff’s plea for interim injunction was thus rejected.

Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the present appeal before the Delhi High Court.

The Dispute:  The principal question before the High Court was whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The core issue revolved around whether the appellant’s mark “TULIPS” enjoyed such reputation and goodwill that it extended to the respondents’ category of perfumes, making their use of “AGN TULIP” likely to cause confusion or deception in the minds of consumers.

The dispute also required the Court to determine whether “TULIP” was a generic or descriptive term in relation to perfumes and fragrances, and whether the appellant’s prior use since 1999 conferred upon it rights superior to the respondents’ later registration from 2010.

Reasoning:  The High Court began by reaffirming that when both parties hold trademark registrations, no action for infringement can lie between them. The only available remedy is passing off, as explained by the Supreme Court in S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683. Therefore, the question before the Court was confined to whether the appellant had established goodwill and reputation in “TULIPS” sufficient to sustain a passing off action against “AGN TULIP.”

The Court then examined the three essential elements of passing off laid down in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65 — goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The judges emphasized that goodwill must be established in the specific market or line of trade in which the alleged misrepresentation occurs. They further referred to Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 73 PTC 1 (SC), where it was held that goodwill cannot be presumed merely from global reputation; it must exist in India and within the relevant segment of trade.

Applying these principles, the Court found that while Suparshva Swabs had substantial goodwill in relation to cotton buds, cotton balls, and hygiene products, it had not demonstrated that this goodwill extended to perfumes or fragrances before the respondents’ adoption in 2010. The evidence produced, including invoices, advertisements, and awards, showed recognition in hygiene products, but not in cosmetics or perfumery. Thus, the element of goodwill within the relevant trade segment was not satisfied.

The Court also evaluated whether “TULIP” was capable of exclusive protection. It noted that while “TULIP” might be arbitrary in connection with cotton products, it is descriptive or generic when used for perfumes, as tulips are flowers naturally associated with fragrance. Citing Nestle’s Products (India) Ltd. v. P. Thankaraja, 1977 SCC OnLine Mad 72, and Jain Riceland (P) Ltd. v. Sagar Overseas, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11305, the Court reiterated that generic words cannot be monopolized by traders for ordinary use. Hence, the plaintiff could not prevent others from using a floral name for perfumes.

The Court further discussed the claim that “TULIPS” was a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg) and Section 11(6) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It observed that for a mark to achieve “well-known” status, it must be widely recognized by the general public beyond its product class. Relying on Mahindra & Mahindra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 147, the judges noted that while “Mahindra” immediately evokes the automobile company, “TULIP” does not trigger an immediate association with Suparshva Swabs in the minds of consumers. The recognition of “TULIPS” was confined to a specific market segment of hygiene products, not perfumes or cosmetics.

On the issue of prior use, the Court reaffirmed that though prior use prevails over registration, it must be shown within the relevant trade context. The plaintiff’s use since 1999 in hygiene products did not automatically extend to perfumes. The Court found no evidence of consumer confusion or overlap in product identity sufficient to warrant protection across categories.

The High Court also referred to Wipro Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. Himalaya Wellness Co., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6859, which reiterated that the test of “allied and cognate goods” depends on consumer perception, not mere retail proximity. The Court concluded that even though hygiene products and perfumes might appear in similar retail spaces, they cater to different consumer needs and associations.

Finally, the Court upheld the trial court’s view that “TULIP” was generic in the context of perfumes and that no irreparable injury or confusion was demonstrated. The balance of convenience lay with the respondents, who were using a registered mark within their trade domain.

Decision: The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the District Judge’s order dated 03.10.2023. It held that the appellant failed to establish the essential elements of passing off — particularly, goodwill in the relevant trade and likelihood of deception. The Court clarified that procedural fairness and trademark protection cannot extend to monopolizing common or descriptive words, especially those naturally connected to the goods in question. The Court concluded that both parties, being registered proprietors in their respective domains, must coexist without encroaching upon each other’s legitimate business rights.

The Court’s closing observation emphasized that the word “TULIP,” while distinctive in connection with hygiene products, cannot be treated as a proprietary or well-known mark across unrelated product categories such as perfumes. Hence, the injunction sought by the appellant was rightly denied, and the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Case Title: Suparshva Swabs India Vs. AGN International & Ors.

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 253/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9625-DB

Order Date: 03.11.2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ankit Batra Vs Ravinder Kumar

Stay of Registered Trademark during pendency of Rectification Proceeding

Factual Background:  This case centers around a trademark dispute in the Indian spices industry, where the petitioner, Mr. Ankit Batra, proprietor of M/s KD Industries, sought rectification and cancellation of the registered trademark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ owned by respondent Mr. Ravinder Kumar. The conflict arose over the use of the letters “KD”, which the petitioner claimed as the core part of his brand identity.

The petitioner’s case was founded on long-standing use, reputation, and prior adoption of the trademark ‘KD’ and its label ‘KD Masale’. The petitioner asserted that his firm, M/s KD Industries, had been using the mark ‘KD’ since 2003 in connection with manufacturing and selling spices and blended condiments. The mark had become widely recognized in both domestic and international markets, with sales and exports extending to countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

The petitioner claimed that the rights in the trademark ‘KD’ were originally held by his predecessor in business, who had assigned those rights to him through a valid Assignment Deed dated 16 February 2022. Thus, by operation of both statutory and common law principles, he was the lawful proprietor and user of the trademark.

According to the petitioner, the respondent dishonestly and with mala fide intent adopted a deceptively similar mark, ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’, under Application No. 4923053 in Class 30, which covers spices and similar goods. The petitioner argued that this imitation was deliberate and intended to exploit his established goodwill and reputation, thereby deceiving consumers and diluting the distinctiveness of his mark.

The petitioner supported his claim with evidence including invoices dating back to 2013, packaging, promotional materials, and online listings showing consistent and extensive use of the ‘KD’ mark and label for over two decades.

Procedural Background: The petitioner approached the High Court under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation and rectification of the respondent’s registered trademark on grounds of dishonest adoption and likelihood of confusion. Alongside the main petition, he filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking a stay on the operation of the respondent’s registration during the pendency of the rectification proceedings.

The petition also included an application requesting the Court to summon the complete record of the impugned registration from the office of the Registrar of Trade Marks to facilitate fair adjudication.

Upon hearing the matter, Hon’ble Justice Tejas Karia issued notice to both respondents — Mr. Ravinder Kumar (the private respondent) and the Registrar of Trade Marks (as the statutory respondent). The Central Government Standing Counsel accepted notice on behalf of the Registrar.

The respondent was directed to file a reply within four weeks, and the petitioner was allowed to file a rejoinder thereafter. Meanwhile, the Court proceeded to examine the petitioner’s interim application for a stay on the respondent’s mark.

Core Legal Dispute: The principal issue before the Court was whether the registration of the respondent’s trademark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ was valid and bona fide or whether it constituted an infringement upon the petitioner’s prior rights in the mark ‘KD’.

The case also raised critical questions of trademark law such as:Whether the respondent’s adoption of the impugned mark was honest or tainted by mala fide intent;Whether the impugned mark was deceptively similar to the petitioner’s registered and prior-used mark;Whether continued operation of the respondent’s registration would cause confusion and prejudice to the petitioner’s business;Whether the Registrar’s decision to register the mark contravened Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:  Counsel for the petitioner argued that his client was the lawful proprietor of the trademark ‘KD’, being the assignee of the original registration (No. 1446270 in Class 30). The mark, they submitted, had been continuously and extensively used since 2003 and had acquired a strong reputation and distinctiveness in the market.

The petitioner’s mark ‘KD’ formed the dominant and essential feature of his packaging, labeling, and brand presentation under ‘KD Masale’. Because the respondent’s mark, ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’, prominently reproduced the same element ‘KD’ in identical font and structure, it was bound to create confusion among consumers.

It was also pointed out that the respondent’s application was filed in 2021, almost two decades after the petitioner’s adoption of the mark, and that it was made on a “proposed to be used” basis, demonstrating the absence of prior use. The petitioner alleged that the respondent’s adoption was not innocent but intentionally designed to mislead consumers and unfairly benefit from the goodwill of the ‘KD’ brand.

Citing Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, counsel argued that registration of the impugned mark was in direct violation of statutory provisions, as it was both deceptive and confusingly similar to an existing registered mark. They further contended that balance of convenience and equity lay in favor of the petitioner since continued use of the impugned mark would irreparably harm his reputation and mislead the public.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents:  The respondent’s counsel was yet to file a formal written reply, but during oral submissions, the government counsel representing the Registrar accepted notice and agreed to furnish the complete record of the registration in question. The respondent’s position, as recorded, was that the petition would be contested, though no concrete rebuttal on merits was placed on record at this interim stage.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:  The Court nocied that the petitioner had produced ample evidence of use of the mark ‘KD’ since 2003, supported by documentary proof such as invoices, packaging labels, and promotional materials. The petitioner’s business, it was observed, was not limited to domestic operations but had extended internationally, thereby adding weight to his claim of distinctiveness and goodwill.

The Court further observed that the impugned mark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ reproduced the essential and dominant part of the petitioner’s mark — the letters ‘KD’. This similarity, both visually and phonetically, was likely to cause confusion among consumers in the same line of trade, especially because both parties operated in the same market segment (spices under Class 30).

The Court also considered the statutory framework under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Section 9(2)(a) prohibits registration of marks that are likely to deceive or cause confusion, while Section 11 mandates refusal of registration if the mark is identical or deceptively similar to an earlier registered mark in respect of similar goods or services.

On this basis, the Court found that the respondent’s registration appeared prima facie to violate these provisions. The respondent’s mark was a subsequent adoption made in bad faith and lacked originality. The Court held that the balance of convenience was clearly in favor of the petitioner, as the potential for confusion in the marketplace was undeniable.

Court also observed that the petitioner had established both statutory rights (through registration and assignment) and common law rights (through long and continuous use), entitling him to protection even independent of registration. Allowing the respondent’s registration to remain in effect during pendency of the rectification petition would, therefore, cause irreparable harm to the petitioner and mislead the public.

In light of these findings, the Court exercised its equitable powers under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to grant interim relief.

Decision:  The Court held that the petitioner had made out a strong prima facie case for protection of his mark and for suspension of the respondent’s registration. It observed that the impugned mark ‘KEEP DEEP - KD MASALE’ incorporated the petitioner’s dominant feature ‘KD’ and was likely to deceive the public and trade.

Consequently, the High Court of Delhi ordered that the operation and effect of the registration of the impugned mark (Application No. 4923053 in Class 30) be stayed until the next date of hearing. The Court concluded that the respondent’s registration was prima facie in violation of Sections 9(2)(a) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Conclusion:  This case highlights how courts protect prior and bona fide trademark owners from deceptive and opportunistic registrations that attempt to capitalize on existing goodwill. The judgment also reinforces the dual protection afforded under Indian trademark law — both statutory and common law — and emphasizes the importance of continuous, consistent use in establishing proprietorship.

The Court’s reasoning affirms the principle that in matters of trademark disputes, the dominant feature test, likelihood of confusion, and intent of adoption are crucial determinants of judicial protection. The stay granted here safeguards both commercial integrity and consumer interest until a final determination is made.

Case Title: Sh. Ankit Batra, Proprietor of KD Industries Vs. Ravinder Kumar & Anr.

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 253/2025

Date of Order: 16 October 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. Vs State of Karnataka

Private complaint in non-compliance of Section 155(3) of Cr.P.C. is not maintainable

Factual Background: This case arose from a conflict between M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioners) and Mr. Ashish Koruth Philip (the complainant), concerning ownership and control over an online domain name — routesrezworld.com — and allegations of cyber fraud and data misuse.

The complainant, Mr. Philip, claimed that he personally purchased and registered the domain routesrezworld.com through GoDaddy.com on 28th October 2019, using his own HDFC Bank account, for a payment of ₹400.85. He alleged that the domain was never part of any intellectual property transfer agreement with the petitioners, as the agreements between the parties dated 7th February 2019 were executed before this domain even existed.

He further claimed that the petitioners later attempted to forcibly take control of his domain by changing passwords and credentials, misusing customer credit card data without authorization, and fraudulently operating the website for profit. The complainant alleged that this conduct violated PCI (Payment Card Industry) regulations and amounted to cybercrime.

On the other hand, the petitioners — a company engaged in technological and software services — contended that routesrezworld.com was, in fact, their lawful business asset, transferred to them under an Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement (IPR Agreement) and Service Bond Agreement executed between Mr. Philip’s former firm, StraightDrive Softlab LLP, and the petitioners. They asserted that the complainant’s claim was false and had already been settled through arbitration proceedings, where his rights over the disputed domain were conclusively determined.

Procedural Background:Following the complainant’s allegations, a First Information Report (FIR) dated 3rd May 2025 was registered by Surya Nagar Police Station, Bangalore, bearing Crime No. 0185/2025. The offences invoked included Sections 66, 66C, 66D, 84C, and 85 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with several provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, including Sections 3(5), 308, 314, 316, 318, 319, 323, 351, 353, 45, and 61(2).

The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, approached the High Court of Karnataka under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), seeking to quash the FIR on grounds that the dispute was purely civil and commercial, not criminal in nature. They argued that the matter had already been adjudicated in arbitration, where the complainant’s claim was rejected, and thus, the continuation of criminal proceedings amounted to abuse of process of law.

Core Dispute:The central question before the Court was whether the FIR and criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners amounted to misuse of criminal law to re-litigate a commercial dispute that had already been conclusively decided in arbitration.

Closely tied to this was the question of ownership over the domain routesrezworld.com: whether it belonged personally to Mr. Philip or was part of the intellectual property assets acquired by M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. under the IPR Agreement.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners: The petitioners argued that the complaint was baseless, malicious, and filed to harass them after losing in arbitration. They produced documents such as the Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement and Service Bond Agreement dated 7th February 2019, which explicitly transferred all technological assets, software programs, and related intellectual property from the complainant’s former firm to the petitioners.

They relied heavily on the arbitration award, which had already restrained the complainant from using or interfering with the domain name routesrezworld.com and the associated trademark Caledonrez. This award had attained finality, and thus, the issue was no longer open to criminal proceedings.

The petitioners also presented email communications from November 2019 and January 2020, showing that the complainant himself had acknowledged the domain as belonging to the company and had sought permission from the company’s directors regarding its use. They further contended that although the initial domain payment was made by the complainant, the company had later reimbursed him, and therefore the domain was purchased for business, not personal use.

They also raised a procedural challenge under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, arguing that the private complaint was invalid because the complainant failed to comply with Section 173(1) and (4) of the BNSS, which require prior intimation to the Superintendent of Police before filing a private complaint. Lodging a report on the cybercrime online portal, they argued, did not satisfy this legal requirement, since the portal was not recognized as a “police officer” or “police station” under the law.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent (Complainant): The complainant, argued that the domain was personally purchased by Mr. Philip in October 2019 and therefore was not part of the earlier IPR transfer. She emphasized that the payment for the domain and its four-year renewal was made entirely from his personal HDFC account, and documentary evidence of such transactions was submitted.

She contended that the company later hacked into his GoDaddy account, altered credentials, and gained unauthorized control over the domain, thereby committing offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Regarding the procedural objections, she submitted that the filing of a complaint through the cybercrime portal constituted substantial compliance with the requirement of reporting to police under Section 155(3) CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS). Reliance was placed on Supreme Court rulings in S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka (2025 INSC 917) and Siddartha v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1044-46/2022), where the Court recognized flexibility in procedural compliance when substantial justice required it.

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning: The court examined the Intellectual Property Purchase Agreement (IPR Agreement) between the parties. Clause 8(a) of the Agreement made it clear that all intellectual property, including software programs, web interfaces, and related technological developments, vested solely in the purchaser — M/s Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. The clause explicitly prohibited the creator (Mr. Philip) from holding or using any copies of source codes or related data, and Clause 8(b) obligated him to execute further documents to give full effect to this transfer.

The Court concluded that, by this clause alone, the ownership of all intellectual property — including domains developed for the company’s business — rested with the petitioner company.

Next, the Court turned to the arbitral award, which had directly addressed the issue of domain ownership. Paragraph 66 of the arbitral award categorically stated that the complainant (Mr. Philip) was restrained from interfering with the domain routesrezworld.com and the trademark Caledonrez, both of which were declared to be the exclusive property of the petitioner company. The arbitrator had also prohibited the complainant from engaging in competing business activities or operating similar websites.

Based on this finding, the Court held that the issue of ownership had already been conclusively determined in arbitration and could not be reopened through a criminal complaint. Allowing the complaint to proceed, the judge observed, would amount to “re-litigation of a settled civil dispute through criminal law machinery,” which is impermissible.

The Court then analyzed the complainant’s argument about personal payment for the domain. Documentary evidence, including emails from 2019 and 2020, revealed that the complainant had acknowledged the company’s ownership of the platform and discussed rebranding the site under the name Caledonrezworld. Furthermore, the company had reimbursed him for the domain registration expenses, reinforcing the conclusion that the domain was acquired for business use, not personal use.

On the procedural aspect, the Court emphasized that merely filing a complaint on the cybercrime portal does not constitute compliance with Section 155(3) CrPC or Section 173 BNSS. The online portal is not equivalent to a “police officer” or a “police station” under statutory definitions. Therefore, the private complaint filed without following this legal procedure was not maintainable.

Citing the principle that criminal law should not be used as a tool to settle business or contractual disputes, the Court reiterated the settled law from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) that where allegations predominantly involve a civil nature, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the judicial process.

Final Decision:  The Court concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil and commercial in nature, having already been settled through arbitration. The FIR, therefore, was an abuse of process. The complaint did not disclose the essential ingredients of any offence under the Information Technology Act or the BNS, 2023.

Accordingly, the High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR dated 3rd May 2025 (Crime No. 0185/2025) registered at Surya Nagar Police Station for alleged offences under Sections 66, 66C, 66D, 84C, and 85 of the IT Act, and multiple sections of the BNS, 2023, as against the petitioners. The court concluded by reaffirming that criminal law cannot be invoked to settle contractual or proprietary disputes that have already been adjudicated by a competent arbitral forum.

Case Title: Caledon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Neutral Citation: 2025:KHC:43558

Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 7222 of 2025

Order Date: 30th October 2025

Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal

Public Prosecutor’s Role in Political Defamation

Facts:The case arose from a controversy surrounding a book published in 2015 which contained certain passages and allegations about the personal life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister of West Bengal. The author of the book had claimed that the Chief Minister had been secretly married prior to assuming office and had attempted to conceal this fact from the public. The book described the alleged relationship and questioned the integrity and honesty of the Chief Minister, suggesting that her public persona did not match her private conduct.

In the same book, the author published a letter dated 30 April 2012 addressed to the Chief Minister in her capacity as Chairperson of the All India Trinamool Congress. The letter contained two specific questions — whether a particular individual (allegedly her spouse) had attended her oath-taking ceremony at Raj Bhavan on 20 May 2011, and whether that individual was present in her official chamber at the Writers’ Buildings on the same day when she assumed charge as Chief Minister. These questions, according to the author, were meant to expose what he described as “undisclosed facts of her personal life.”

The book was never banned or restricted by any government order and continued to be sold publicly.

The petitioner, Koustav Bagchi, an advocate and political figure, uploaded certain pages from the book—particularly the page containing the 2012 letter—on social media platforms. He also made comments on television channels referring to the same content. This act led to allegations that he had defamed the Hon’ble Chief Minister. Consequently, the Public Prosecutor of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta filed a complaint under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), corresponding to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, invoking Section 222(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which allows the Public Prosecutor to file a defamation complaint on behalf of certain public functionaries such as the President, Governors, or Ministers for defamatory acts committed against them in the discharge of their official duties.

Procedural Background:Upon receiving the complaint, the Chief Judge of the City Sessions Court, Calcutta, after hearing the petitioner as required under Section 223 of the BNSS, took cognizance of the offence under Section 356(2) BNS and issued summons to the petitioner.

Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a criminal revision application before the Calcutta High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 of the CrPC), seeking to quash the proceedings. He raised three principal arguments.

First, that the book had been published nearly a decade earlier and was freely available in the market, and therefore, merely reproducing its content on social media did not constitute a new offence.

Second, that since the original author had not been prosecuted and the book had not been banned, his act of reproduction could not be treated as defamation.

Third, that even if the statements were defamatory, they did not relate to the Chief Minister’s conduct in discharge of her public duties, and therefore, the Public Prosecutor had no authority to initiate proceedings under Section 222(2) BNSS; only the Chief Minister herself could have done so as an aggrieved person.

The State, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor, opposed the revision, arguing that at the stage of cognizance, the Court should not conduct a detailed inquiry or “mini-trial” but only see whether a prima facie case existed. He relied on Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338 and Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221), to emphasize that the trial court had correctly taken cognizance on the basis of the material on record.

The Core Dispute:The key legal questions before the Court were:

1. Whether the complaint filed by the Public Prosecutor under Section 222(2) of the BNSS was maintainable when the allegedly defamatory statements concerned the personal life of the Chief Minister and not her conduct in discharge of official duties.

2. Whether mere reproduction or sharing of a previously published book on social media amounted to fresh defamation, attracting criminal liability.

3. Whether the learned Chief Judge erred in issuing summons to the petitioner without sufficient grounds.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis: Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 222 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The section provides that ordinarily, only an aggrieved person can file a complaint for defamation. However, under sub-section (2), the Public Prosecutor may file a complaint if the defamation concerns the conduct of certain high constitutional functionaries—including the President, Governors, or Ministers—in the discharge of their public functions, provided that the appropriate government grants prior sanction.

The Court first acknowledged that the Public Prosecutor indeed has authority to file such complaints, but this authority is limited strictly to instances where the alleged defamation concerns the official or public conduct of the functionary. Personal or private matters of life fall outside the ambit of this provision. Relying on K.K. Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2018) 6 SCC 676] and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [(2016) 7 SCC 221]*, the Court emphasized that the Public Prosecutor must independently examine whether the material truly relates to the conduct of the public official in discharge of public duties and must act with independence, not as a mere agent of the State.

In the present case, while the initial allegations in the book related to the personal and private life of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, certain references—such as whether a particular person was present during the oath-taking ceremony or inside her office chamber at the Writers’ Buildings—could arguably relate to her official capacity. The Court noted that the definition of “conduct” includes not only action but also demeanor and behavior. Therefore, if the statements linked her personal relationship to the functioning of her office, they could potentially relate to her conduct in discharge of public duties.

Court observed that determining whether the defamatory content was purely personal or had a nexus with the Chief Minister’s public conduct required a full trial and examination of evidence. Hence, the complaint could not be dismissed at the preliminary stage.

On the second issue, regarding republication, the Court held that re-sharing or reproducing defamatory material amounts to a fresh act of defamation. The Court referred to Kaikhusuru Naroji Kabraji v. Jehangir Byramji Murzban (1890 ILR 14 Bom 532), where the reprinting of a defamatory article made the re-publisher equally liable as the original author. It also relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Arvind Kejriwal v. State [2024 SCC OnLine Del 719], where retweeting defamatory content without disclaimer was held to constitute republication.

The Court further cited Ruchi Kalra v. Slowform Media [2025 SCC OnLine Del 1894], which held that hyperlinking or referencing defamatory content could amount to republication if it expands the defamatory reach. Similarly, in Amber Quiry v. Yohan Tangra [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1093], the Bombay High Court reiterated that every repetition of defamatory material gives rise to a new cause of action.

Court emphasized that even though the book was not banned, it carried a clear copyright notice prohibiting reproduction without permission from the author. The petitioner had failed to show that he had obtained such permission. Therefore, his act of sharing the pages online amounted to unauthorized reproduction, both in defamation law and copyright terms.

The Court also discussed K.K. Mishra (supra) in depth, where the Supreme Court quashed a similar complaint because the alleged defamatory remarks did not concern the Chief Minister’s official duties but personal matters. However, in the present case, the defamatory imputations included references to the Chief Minister’s office and oath ceremony, thereby partially overlapping with her public functions. This, according to the Court, justified the continuation of proceedings.

Lastly, the Court reiterated that the role of the Public Prosecutor, as laid down in Subramanian Swamy and Bairam Muralidhar v. State of A.P. [(2014) 10 SCC 380], is not mechanical. He must independently assess the materials before filing the complaint. However, in the absence of evidence showing mala fides or lack of independent scrutiny at this stage, the Court found no basis to interfere with the complaint.

Decision:The Calcutta High Court dismissed the revision petition and upheld the order dated 18 June 2025 of the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta. Justice Apurba Sinha Ray held that the cognizance taken by the trial court was legally valid and that the proceedings could not be quashed at the preliminary stage.

The Court observed that whether the alleged statements were truly connected to the Chief Minister’s official duties or were purely personal was a matter of evidence and trial. Hence, the complaint was not barred in law. The Court clarified that its observations were only for the purpose of the revisional application and not on the merits of the trial.

Consequently, the revision application (CRR 2817 of 2025) was dismissed, along with the connected application (CRAN 1 of 2025). The interim stay, if any, stood vacated, and the Court directed that the book produced during proceedings be returned to the petitioner’s counsel.

Conclusion:This judgment in Koustav Bagchi v. The State of West Bengal sheds light on the delicate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation, particularly concerning public functionaries. It clarifies the limited scope of Section 222(2) of the BNSS, emphasizing that the Public Prosecutor can intervene only when the defamatory act is connected to a Minister’s official duties, not private life. However, where private life allegations spill into official conduct—such as office presence or public events—the matter may warrant judicial scrutiny through trial.

The Court’s observations on republication underline that digital repetition, retweeting, or reposting of defamatory material is legally equivalent to fresh defamation. The decision also underscores the principle that the Public Prosecutor must act independently and cautiously when filing defamation complaints under statutory authority.

Case Title: Koustav Bagchi Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr.

Order Date: 31 October 2025

Case Number: CRR 2817 of 2025 with CRAN 1 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:2011

Court: High Court at Calcutta, Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, Appellate Side

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Apurba Sinha Ray

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ramesh Chandra Sahoo Vs State of Orissa

Case Title: Ramesh Chandra Sahoo Vs State of Orissa

Order Date: 16 October 2025

Case Number: BLAPL No. 10425 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:ORI:HC:10425

Court: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

Hon’ble Judge: Justice G. Satapathy

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Facts

The petitioner, Ramesh Chandra Sahoo, was the Principal of Swami Arupananda Higher Secondary School of Education and Technology, Kurtanga, in Jagatsinghpur district. The case arose from an incident of sexual harassment of a minor girl student by a Mathematics lecturer named Saswat Kumar Mohanty, who was employed at the same school. On 15 January 2025, the victim girl complained to the petitioner about the lecturer’s misbehavior and harassment. The petitioner conducted an internal inquiry, and the accused lecturer reportedly admitted to his misconduct. However, despite such admission, the petitioner neither reported the matter to the Governing Body of the school nor to the local police, as required under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

The victim, dissatisfied with the inaction of the Principal, submitted a written complaint to the Sub-Collector, Jagatsinghpur, during a Jana Sunani (public grievance hearing). Upon receiving the complaint, the Sub-Collector called for a report from the petitioner. After evaluating the situation, the Sub-Collector himself lodged an FIR on 22 July 2025 before the Inspector-in-Charge, Jagatsinghpur Police Station. A “Zero FIR” was registered as Jagatsinghpur P.S. Case No. 07/2025, later transferred to Raghunathpur Police Station as Case No. 155/2025, which was then taken up as Special G.R. Case No. 74/2025 before the Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the POCSO Act, Jagatsinghpur.

The petitioner was accused not of directly committing sexual assault but of failing to report the offence, which amounted to a contravention of Section 19(1) read with Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act. The maximum punishment prescribed for such an omission is imprisonment for up to one year along with fine.

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Procedural Background

After the FIR was registered, the petitioner first sought anticipatory bail by filing ABLAPL No. 9129 of 2025 before the Orissa High Court. The Court, however, declined to grant anticipatory bail and instead directed the petitioner to surrender before the trial court and move an application for regular bail, which was to be considered on the same day. The co-accused lecturer also filed a separate anticipatory bail application in ABLAPL No. 9395 of 2025. The petitioner accordingly surrendered before the Special Court at Jagatsinghpur and applied for bail. The Special Court, however, rejected his bail plea and remanded him to judicial custody.

Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner filed the present bail application (BLAPL No. 10425 of 2025) under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking post-arrest bail before the Orissa High Court.

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The Core Dispute

The central question before the High Court was whether the offence alleged against the petitioner under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act was bailable or non-bailable in nature. The petitioner’s counsel argued that since the maximum punishment under Section 21(2) is only one year, the offence should be classified as bailable under the First Schedule of the BNSS (formerly the CrPC). The prosecution, however, resisted this argument and supported the trial court’s decision to deny bail.

The question thus involved an interpretative issue: how should courts classify offences under “special laws” like the POCSO Act when those laws themselves do not explicitly categorize offences as bailable or non-bailable?

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Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice G. Satapathy began by examining the statutory scheme of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The POCSO Act defines and penalizes a range of offences relating to child sexual abuse but does not specify whether those offences are bailable or non-bailable. Instead, Section 31 of the POCSO Act makes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (and now, the BNSS, 2023) applicable to proceedings under the Act, unless inconsistent with its provisions. Therefore, to determine whether an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act is bailable, the Court referred to Table II of the First Schedule of the BNSS, which classifies offences under “other laws.”

According to Table II of the First Schedule of the BNSS:

1. If the punishment prescribed is death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment exceeding seven years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Sessions Court.

2. If the punishment is imprisonment between three and seven years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, triable by a Magistrate of the First Class.

3. If the punishment is imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only, the offence is non-cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate.

The Court then analyzed Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act, which states that any person in charge of an institution who fails to report an offence under Section 19(1) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with fine. Based on the punishment structure, the Court concluded that this offence clearly falls within the third category—that is, it is bailable and non-cognizable.

In support of this interpretation, the Court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi [(2022) 10 SCC 221; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 668]*, where the Apex Court examined Section 63 of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court had clarified that where the maximum punishment is up to three years, the offence is cognizable and non-bailable, and where it is less than three years, it becomes non-cognizable and bailable. Applying this reasoning, the Orissa High Court held that an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act—punishable with imprisonment up to one year—is clearly bailable.

The Court then turned to the constitutional perspective under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Justice Satapathy emphasized that denying bail to a person accused of a bailable offence amounts to unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and constitutes a violation of Article 21. He observed that when an offence is bailable, the accused has a right to be released on bail upon furnishing surety or even on a personal bond if indigent. The trial court’s refusal to grant bail, therefore, amounted to a constitutional infraction.

The High Court criticized the Special Court for failing to notice that the alleged offence was bailable in nature and for mechanically remanding the petitioner to custody. Justice Satapathy observed that the learned trial court had undertaken an extensive analysis of the allegations but still reached an erroneous conclusion by denying bail. The Court described this as a gross violation of the petitioner’s personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.

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Decision

The Orissa High Court allowed the bail application and directed the immediate release of the petitioner on bail in accordance with law. It also quashed the impugned order of the Special Court that had refused bail and ordered the Registrar General of the High Court to circulate the judgment to all POCSO Courts in the state. The purpose was to ensure that trial courts handling offences under the POCSO Act do not mistakenly deny bail in cases where the alleged offence is bailable.

The Court further directed that the copy of the judgment be sent electronically to the concerned court and observed that even if courts are closed for holidays, the bail order must be implemented immediately since the accused was in custody for a bailable offence. The judgment thus affirmed the principle that in bailable offences, bail is not a matter of judicial discretion but a matter of right.

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Conclusion

The judgment in Ramesh Chandra Sahoo v. State of Orissa is a landmark ruling on the classification of offences under the POCSO Act and their intersection with the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. It clarifies that where a special statute does not specify whether an offence is bailable or not, the classification provided in the First Schedule of the BNSS will apply. The decision also reinforces the constitutional dimension of bail as an extension of personal liberty under Article 21.

By holding that failure to report an offence under Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act is a bailable offence, the Orissa High Court has ensured that procedural fairness and personal liberty remain central to criminal jurisprudence. The ruling also serves as guidance for all Special Courts dealing with POCSO matters to distinguish between serious offences and procedural omissions, preventing unnecessary incarceration for minor lapses.

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Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Bail as a Right, Not a Favour: Orissa High Court’s Guidance under the BNSS and POCSO Act

2. Failure to Report under POCSO: A Bailable Offence Clarified by the Orissa High Court

3. Liberty, BNSS, and Bailable Offences: Understanding the Case of Ramesh Chandra Sahoo v. State of Orissa

4. When Silence Isn’t a Crime: Judicial Interpretation of Section 21(2) of the POCSO Act

5. Protecting Liberty in Procedural Justice: A Simple Reading of Orissa High Court’s 2025 Bail Judgment

Everest Entertainment LLP Vs Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar

When Delay Defeats Copyright Claims

Facts:Everest Entertainment LLP, the plaintiff, claimed to be the sole and exclusive owner of the copyright and intellectual property in the Marathi film “Mee Shivajiraje Bhosale Boltoy!” produced under an assignment agreement dated June 26, 2008, and its addendum dated August 28, 2013, executed with the first defendant, Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar. Under this agreement, Manjrekar, the director and original rights holder, assigned all intellectual property rights in the film—including the script, dialogues, cinematograph film, and promotional materials—to Everest Entertainment.

In 2025, the defendants, led by Manjrekar and others associated with Krizolh Filmz LLP, Satyasai Productions Pvt. Ltd., and Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., began production and promotion of a new Marathi film titled “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale.” The plaintiff alleged that the new film was a direct copy or unauthorized sequel to its earlier film. The plaintiff contended that the defendants had not only copied the storyline, theme, and characters but also used the same title format, font style, and promotional materials that were confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s work.

Everest Entertainment further asserted that the original film had gained immense popularity and goodwill among audiences and that the impugned film’s title and marketing strategy misrepresented an association or continuity, leading to public confusion and deception. The plaintiff, therefore, sought to restrain the release of the defendants’ film, scheduled for theatrical release on October 31, 2025.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff filed the commercial intellectual property suit on October 10, 2025, along with an interim application seeking ad-interim injunctions to restrain the defendants from releasing the impugned film. The initial bench recused itself from hearing the matter, after which the case was reassigned. On October 17, 2025, another bench directed the defendants to arrange a private screening of the impugned film for the plaintiff without background music. The screening took place on October 20, 2025.

After viewing the film, the plaintiff claimed to have identified over 30 points of substantial similarity between the two works and sought to amend the plaint accordingly. The vacation court heard the matter on October 24, 2025, when the plaintiff pressed for ad-interim injunctions restraining the release of “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale.”

The defendants strongly opposed the grant of any injunction, contending that the plaintiff had delayed unreasonably in filing the suit despite being aware of the impugned project since April 2025.

The Core Dispute:The core question before the Court was whether the defendants’ film “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale” amounted to an infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright and whether the plaintiff was entitled to an ad-interim injunction stopping its release.

The plaintiff’s claim was twofold: first, that there was substantial copying of its film, including the story, theme, and dialogues, constituting copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957; and second, that the defendants’ use of a similar title and presentation amounted to passing off, misleading the public into believing that the impugned film was a sequel or derivative of the plaintiff’s original film.

The defendants, on the other hand, denied all allegations. They argued that there can be no copyright in an idea, historical concept, or the name “Shivaji Raje Bhosale”, which refers to a historical and cultural figure. They contended that their film had a completely different storyline—focused on farmer distress and corruption—while the plaintiff’s earlier film was centered on a modern man rediscovering his Marathi identity with the spiritual guidance of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. The defendants further claimed that they had invested crores in production and promotion and that any injunction at this stage would cause irreparable loss.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:The Court noted that the plaintiff had admitted knowledge of the impugned film’s production as early as April 2025 and had even issued a legal notice on April 30, 2025. Replies from the defendants were received in July 2025, yet the plaintiff waited until October 10, 2025, to file the suit. The Court found no plausible explanation for this delay. Citing earlier Bombay High Court precedents, including Anil Kapoor Film Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Make My Day Entertainment (2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8119) and Dashrath B. Rathod v. Fox Star Studios India Pvt. Ltd. [2018 (1) Mh. L.J. 474], the Court reiterated that litigants who approach the Court at the eleventh hour to stop film releases after months of inaction cannot claim equitable reliefs.

The Court held that ad-interim injunctions are discretionary and equitable remedies, which require the applicant to show bona fides and promptness. Since the plaintiff delayed nearly five months despite knowing of the alleged infringement, its request was deemed to be a tactical move to pressure the defendants close to the release date. Hence, on this ground alone, the Court held that no urgent injunction could be granted.

On the merits, the Court examined the plaintiff’s claims of copyright infringement. Justice Jamsandekar clarified that under Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, a copyright in a cinematograph film is limited to protection against making a facsimile copy of the film. Referring to Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Leo Burnett (India) Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2 Bom LR 655, the Court noted that producing a new film with similar themes or ideas does not constitute infringement unless it reproduces the original recording itself. Thus, since the defendants had independently produced their film, it could not be termed a “copy” of the plaintiff’s work.

Regarding the script and dialogues, the Court observed that the plaintiff had not produced the full script to substantiate its claim. Even from the alleged similarities, the Court found no substantial reproduction of the plaintiff’s literary work. The dialogues claimed—such as “Yaj Sathi Kela Hota Attahas” or “Marathi Mansala Kana Nahi”—were considered common Marathi expressions and therefore not eligible for copyright protection. The Court reasoned that accepting such a claim would mean granting monopoly over common cultural phrases, which would be against the spirit of copyright law.

On the title and promotional material, the Court held that the plaintiff could not claim exclusivity over the name “Shivaji Raje Bhosale”, a historical and revered public figure. The use of this name in a film title could not amount to infringement or passing off. Both posters depicted Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, a common cultural motif, and the use of similar imagery could not be monopolized.

Thus, the Court concluded that neither the title, dialogues, storyline, nor the visuals of the impugned film amounted to any actionable infringement or passing off. Moreover, the plaintiff’s conduct lacked diligence, making it ineligible for equitable relief.

Final Decision:Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for ad-interim injunctions, holding that there was both gross delay and no prima facie case of infringement. The Court emphasized that film production involves massive investment, and last-minute attempts to stall releases without timely action must be strongly discouraged.

Accordingly, the Court refused to restrain the release of “Punha Shivajiraje Bhosale”, which was scheduled for October 31, 2025, and observed that the plaintiff’s remedy, if any, lies in pursuing the suit on merits after the defendants file their written statements.

Conclusion:This judgment underscores the importance of promptness in seeking equitable remedies in intellectual property disputes involving films. It also reiterates settled principles of copyright law that protect the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. The Court made it clear that generic titles, historical names, and culturally rooted dialogues cannot be monopolized under copyright law. The case thus reinforces the balance between protecting creative works and preserving public domain expressions within cultural heritage.

Case Title: Everest Entertainment LLP Vs Mahesh Vaman Manjrekar & Ors.

Date of Order: October 24, 2025

Case Number:Commercial IP 32984 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:19882

Court: High Court of Bombay

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Amit S. Jamsandekar 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi