Irish Distillers International Limited Vs. Stardford Spirits Pvt Ltd

Brief Introductory Note:

The Court in this matter considered whether a registered trademark can continue to stay on the official Register when the owner of that mark has never genuinely used it in the real market. The Petitioner, a well-known international whiskey maker, said that the Respondent got the registration of the mark “BLUE SPOT” in India, but after registration, there has been no real use of this mark on any goods, anywhere, for years. When the Respondent did not come to Court to deny or defend their registration, the Court accepted the evidence of non-use and ordered that the registration be removed under the law.

Factual Background

The Petitioner company, Irish Distillers International Limited, belongs to the worldwide liquor group Pernod Ricard. Its business is to make and sell premium Irish single pot-still whiskey. Its brand family includes GREEN SPOT, YELLOW SPOT, RED SPOT, and also BLUE SPOT. The history of this “SPOT” family goes back to the year 1900 in Ireland, when color-spots were used to show how long barrels of whiskey were aged. The BLUE SPOT whiskey was first launched in the 1900s, later paused, and was relaunched to consumers again in 2020. The Petitioner said that its whiskeys are available in India through a third-party seller and that it holds trademark registrations for this family of marks in several countries, including its earliest GREEN SPOT registration in 1948 in Ireland and BLUE SPOT registration since 2020 in Ireland.

The Petitioner also wanted to register BLUE SPOT in India and filed Application No. 5866619 (Class 33) on 27.03.2023. However, the Trade Marks Registry objected, saying there was a conflicting earlier Indian mark, Registration No. 3999818, which already existed on the Register. This conflicting registration was owned by Respondent No.1, i.e., Stardford Spirits Pvt Ltd. This Respondent had filed their application in November 2018, claimed use since 14.11.2018, and got registration on 14.05.2019.

After learning this, the Petitioner hired an independent investigator in October 2024. The investigation showed that the Respondent did not exist at their public addresses, no BLUE SPOT product of the Respondent was found in the market, and when the investigator called the official mobile number on record, a person named Mr. Satpal Tanwar informed that Respondent No.1 never used the mark BLUE SPOT. Because the Petitioner’s application was stalled and not advertised, it filed this Rectification Petition on 28.01.2025 before the Court.

Procedural Details

The Petition was filed in the High Court of Delhi under Section 47 and Section 57 of the law, which is the statute Trademarks Act 1999, asking that the Respondent’s registration for “BLUE SPOT” be removed. The Petition was numbered C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 77/2025. The Court tried to serve notice to the Respondent by speed post, email, and WhatsApp, with proof filed in an affidavit. Speed post could not be delivered, but service succeeded on email and WhatsApp. When Respondent No.1 still did not appear, the Court passed an ex-parte order on 17.07.2025 and proceeded to decide the case based on the petitioner’s verified pleadings and documents.

Core Dispute

The main question was simple yet important: Whether a trademark that has never been genuinely used in the real market, anywhere, for more than five years after it is entered in the Register, should continue to remain registered, blocking the legitimate user from protecting their brand.

Court’s Reasoning, Discussion and Citation Analysis

The Court relied on the integrity-protecting purpose of Section 47 of the Trademarks Act 1999. This provision exists to stop “hoarding” (keeping trademarks without using them), because a trademark law is meant for marks used in real trade, not stored like trophies. The Court took guidance from the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Rong Thai International Group Co. Ltd. v. Ena Footwear Pvt. Ltd., reported as 2024 SCC OnLine Del 66

Irish Distillers International …

, where it was held that removal is allowed when a registered mark is not genuinely and honestly used in trade for a continuous period of five years, and the burden to prove non-use lies on the person asking for removal. In the same judgment, the Court analysed how the non-use period must start from the date the mark is actually entered in the official Register, not the date of application, and the end point is three months before filing the removal case. The law also gives a “grace period” of five years from entry in Register when non-use challenges cannot succeed, but after five years, any mark must show real use to survive.

The Court also considered the decision in DORCO Co. Ltd. v. Durga Enterprises, reported as 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1484

Irish Distillers International …

, which in turn discussed the earlier principle from the now-defunct tribunal, the IPAB, in Shell Transource Limited v. Shell International Petroleum Company Ltd., 2012 SCC OnLine IPAB 29. That case clarified a very important but easy-to-understand rule: When non-use is pleaded, the owner must specifically deny it; if they do not, the allegation is treated as admitted.

Applying these legal principles, the Court found that the Respondent’s registration was entered in the Register in May 2019, and the Rectification Petition was filed in January 2025, crossing a period of more than five years and three months, with no evidence that the mark was ever used in the market on real products. The investigator’s unrebutted report stating no market presence, non-existence at addresses, and admission of non-use over phone, satisfied the initial scrutiny of the Court. Since Respondent No.1 chose silence and absence, the non-use facts were accepted as admitted, and continued non-use stood legally established. The Court also noted that when a company applies for a mark claiming “use”, but in fact never puts any real goods in market, it shows lack of honest intention (bona fide intent) to use the mark. This violates both Section 47(1)(a) and Section 47(1)(b), which allow removal when there was no real intention to use at filing, and/or when there was real continuous non-use for 5 years after entry in Register.

The Court also directed the Respondent No.2, represented through counsel, to inform the Registrar for corrections, and said that the digitally signed order uploaded on the official website of the Court will be treated as a certified copy.

Decision of the Court

The Petition was allowed. The registration for the mark “BLUE SPOT” under No. 3999818 in Class 33 owned by Stardford Spirits Pvt Ltd was cancelled and ordered to be removed from the Register. Bona fide intention

Concluding Note

This decision reinforces that trademark law is rooted in common-sense fairness. A person or company may register a mark, but they must genuinely use it in the market within a reasonable time, and definitely defend it when its non-use is proved in Court. Silence, non-existence, and absence of goods in the market, speak loudly against the validity of a registration.

Concluding Remarks

The judgment protects rightful market players and strengthens the reliability of the trademark Register. It teaches that trademark law exists for the marketplace, not for paper ownership.

Bottom Case Details

Case Title: Irish Distillers International Limited Vs. Stardford Spirits Pvt Ltd & Anr.

Order Date: 19.11.2025

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 77/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Concluding Section Text

At the end, add this text:

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for Legal Journal Publication

The following five titles may suitably reflect the subject-matter depth and legal analysis for publication: "Trademark Register and the Reality Test: A Study on Judicial Approach to Non-Use Cancellation", "Bona Fide Use as the Heartbeat of Trademark Protection: Lessons from Delhi High Court’s Rectification Jurisprudence", "When Silence Becomes Admission: The Law of Unrebutted Non-Use Claims in Trademark Cancellation Proceedings", "Marketplace Presence or Register Removal: Understanding Section 47 through Recent Delhi High Court Interpretation", "Brand Protection v. Paper Ownership: A Common Man’s Guide to Trademark Cancellation for Non-Use"

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The High Court of Delhi in the trademark rectification case of Irish Distillers International Limited v. Stardford Spirits Pvt Ltd & Anr., decided on 19.11.2025 in C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 77/2025, presided over by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, examined whether a trademark registration can be continued when the registered proprietor has never genuinely used the mark in real commercial trade. The Court forms part of Delhi’s Intellectual Property Division, which handles specialised intellectual property matters, including trademark and patent disputes.

The Petitioner, Irish Distillers International Limited, the maker of premium single pot-still Irish whiskey, said that the Respondent, Stardford Spirits Pvt Ltd, obtained Indian trademark registration No. 3999818 for the mark “BLUE SPOT” in Class 33 and claimed “use” from November 2018, but had in fact never placed any product in the market under this mark. The Petitioner learned of this conflicting registration only when its own pending Indian application for BLUE SPOT (filed in March 2023) was objected to by the Trade Marks Registry citing the Respondent’s earlier mark.

The Petitioner placed evidence through an investigator’s report showing that the Respondent company could not be found at its official addresses, no product under the impugned mark existed in the market, and a representative contacted on the Registry-recorded mobile number confirmed that the mark had never been used. The Court made repeated attempts to serve Respondent No.1 by email, WhatsApp, and speed post. While digital service was successful, postal service failed, and the Respondent did not appear at any stage. Owing to this, the Court proceeded ex-parte (without the company present), and the unrebutted claims of non-use were treated as admitted in law.

In its reasoning, the Court relied on the purpose of Section 47 and Section 57 of the Trademarks Act 1999, which exist to maintain the honesty and reliability of the Trademark Register by preventing misuse, stockpiling, or hoarding of trademarks without real intention of use, and permitting cancellation if a mark has not been genuinely used in trade for a continuous period of five years after it is entered in the Register. The Court found that the registration granted in May 2019 had enjoyed the initial five-year protection window, but after crossing that period, there was still no real use of the mark in commerce. The Petitioner’s evidence satisfied the legal test, and Respondent’s silence sealed the result, as trademark rights must stand on real market use, not paper ownership alone.

Accordingly, the Court ordered removal of the impugned mark BLUE SPOT from the Register, directing correction by the Registrar, and disposed of the petition in favour of the Petitioner, giving it the legal path to pursue its own brand protection unhindered.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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Haveli Restaurant And Resorts Limited Vs Registrar Of Trademarks

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of case

The Delhi High Court recently dismissed two appeals that challenged the registration of the trade‑mark “HAVELI” in Class 43 (food services). The appellant claimed exclusive rights over the word “HAVELI”, arguing that it had acquired a secondary meaning through long use. The respondents, who had applied to register “HAVELI” for their own food‑service businesses, contended that the word is generic and therefore cannot be monopolised. The Court examined the evidence, the law on generic marks, and the requirement of secondary meaning, and concluded that “HAVELI” remains a common descriptive term and that the appellant had not shown sufficient distinctiveness to justify exclusivity. The judgment also touched upon the use of the word “shaadi” in a similar context, reinforcing the principle that widely used common words cannot be owned by a single trader.

Factual Background

The dispute centres on the trade‑mark “HAVELI”. The appellant, a food‑service provider, asserted that it had been using the mark since 2001 and that the mark had become distinctive of its business. The respondents filed applications to register “HAVELI” for their own food‑service ventures. The appellant opposed these applications, claiming that the respondents’ use would cause confusion and dilute its reputation. The Trade Marks Registry allowed the respondents’ applications, leading the appellant to file appeals before the High Court.

Procedural Detail

The appellant filed two separate appeals, numbered C.A.(COMM.IPD‑TM) 57/2024 and 58/2024, challenging the orders of the Registrar of Trade Marks that permitted the registration of “HAVELI” in favour of the respondents. The High Court heard the appeals together, considered the pleadings, the evidence submitted by both sides, and the arguments advanced by senior counsel. The Court also examined the earlier order of the Registrar, which had rejected the appellant’s opposition on the ground that “HAVELI” is a generic term.

Core Dispute

The central issue before the Court was whether the word “HAVELI” is a generic or descriptive term that cannot be appropriated as a trade‑mark, and whether the appellant had succeeded in proving that the mark had acquired a secondary meaning that would give it exclusive rights. A subsidiary question related to the use of the word “shaadi” in other trademark disputes, which the Court referenced to illustrate the broader principle that common words remain free for all to use.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court

The Court began by noting that a word that is commonly used in trade cannot be monopolised, even if a trader has used it for a long time. The judgment cited the decision of Simons J in the “shaadi” case, where it was held that a trader who adopts a common word must accept the risk of others using similar words, provided the differences are small enough to avoid confusion. The Court observed that the appellant had produced a long list of rival marks that incorporate the word “shaadi”, showing that the term is widely used in the market. This, the Court said, demonstrated that the appellant could not claim exclusivity over such a common expression.

Turning to “HAVELI”, the Court examined the evidence presented by the appellant. The appellant relied on sales figures, promotional expenses, newspaper cuttings, and invoices to prove long and continuous use. However, the Court found that these documents were either on plain paper, lacked certification by a chartered accountant, or did not clearly indicate that the mark “HAVELI” was used in connection with food services. The Court referred to the decision in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. (2008) where the Delhi High Court explained that mere sales data or promotional activities are insufficient to establish secondary meaning. The Court also cited Jain Shikanji Private Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Jain (2023) to illustrate that while a combination of common words can become distinctive, a single common word like “HAVELI” remains generic.

The Court further discussed the concept of secondary meaning, quoting from People Interactive (India) Private Ltd. v. Vivek Pahwa (2016). It explained that for a term to acquire secondary meaning, the primary meaning must be lost and the public must associate the term exclusively with the claimant’s goods or services. In the present case, the Court found no evidence that the public identified “HAVELI” solely with the appellant’s food services. On the contrary, the presence of numerous other businesses using “HAVELI” in their names indicated that the term retained its ordinary meaning.

The judgment also addressed the appellant’s argument that the respondents were acting dishonestly by using “HAVELI” prominently. The Court rejected this contention, stating that the respondents’ use of the word in a descriptive manner did not amount to passing off, especially when the word is generic. The Court referenced Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture (2008) and other authorities to underscore that a generic term cannot be protected merely because a party has used it extensively.

Finally, the Court concluded that the Registrar had correctly applied the law. The impugned orders were well‑reasoned, and there was no infirmity that required interference. The appeals were therefore dismissed.

Decision

The High Court dismissed both appeals, upheld the registration of “HAVELI” in favour of the respondents, and affirmed that the appellant does not hold exclusive rights over the word “HAVELI” as it is generic and has not acquired secondary meaning.

Concluding Note

This judgment reinforces the well‑settled principle that common descriptive words cannot be monopolised through trademark registration, even if a trader has used them for many years. The Court’s emphasis on the need for clear evidence of secondary meaning highlights the high threshold that claimants must meet when seeking protection for generic terms. The decision also serves as a reminder that extensive use alone does not transform a generic word into a distinctive brand.

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Case Title: Haveli Restaurant And Resorts Limited Vs Registrar Of Trademarks

Order Date: 24 November 2025

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD‑TM) 57/2024 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10363

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Tejas Karia, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for Publication

“Generic Words and the Limits of Trademark Protection: An Analysis of the HAVELI Case”
“From Shaadi to Haveli – How Common Terms Defy Exclusive Rights in Indian Trademark Law”
“Secondary Meaning in the Age of Generic Marks: Lessons from the Delhi High Court’s HAVELI Judgment”
“Balancing Fair Competition and Brand Claims: The Court’s Rationale in the HAVELI Trademark Appeals”
“When Long Use Is Not Enough: The Delhi High Court’s Stance on Generic Terms and Trade Mark Registration”      
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In a landmark decision dated 24 November 2025, the High Court of Delhi, presided over by Hon’ble Justice Tejas Karia, dismissed the appeals filed in C.A.(COMM.IPD‑TM) 57/2024 & 58/2024 (the “Haveli” trademark case). The appellants, who claimed exclusive rights over the word “HAVELI” for food‑service businesses, argued that the term had acquired a secondary meaning through long use. The respondents, seeking to register “HAVELI” for their own eateries, contended that the word is generic and therefore not protectable. After examining the evidence, the Court held that “HAVELI” remains a common descriptive term and that the appellants had not shown sufficient distinctiveness to justify exclusivity, thereby upholding the Registrar’s orders and allowing the respondents’ registrations to stand.
The judgment reiterated that generic words cannot be monopolised merely because a trader has used them for many years, and that proof of secondary meaning requires clear public association with the claimant’s goods or services—something the appellants failed to demonstrate. The decision is expected to influence future trademark disputes involving everyday words and the high bar for establishing distinctiveness.
Disclaimer:This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi]

Envitech Consultants India Pvt Ltd Vs Rudrabhishek Enterprises Limited

Copyright, Authorship, and Moral Rights in Public Infrastructure Projects

Brief Introductory Note:  This case, "Envitech Consultants India Pvt Ltd vs Rudrabhishek Enterprises Limited & Ors.", decided by the Delhi High Court, centers on a dispute involving allegations of copyright infringement linked to consultancy works, more specifically Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for water supply schemes in Uttar Pradesh. The core legal question is whether the Plaintiff, a consultancy firm, retains copyright and authorship over those DPRs or if, as claimed by the Defendants, the works constitute "Government Work" under Indian copyright law, making the State the copyright owner. The matter came before the court as an application by the Defendants under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, seeking summary rejection of the Plaintiff’s suit.

Factual Background: Envitech Consultants India Pvt Ltd (Plaintiff) is a registered consultancy start-up that undertakes projects in sanitation and public health engineering. Rudrabhishek Enterprises Limited (Defendant No. 1) is another consultancy, awarded contracts by the State Water Sanitation Mission (SWSM), Uttar Pradesh, to prepare DPRs for various districts, including Chitrakoot. Defendant No. 1 subcontracted work for the Chitrakoot DPRs to the Plaintiff after one of Plaintiff’s directors, previously employed as a general manager at Defendant No. 1, helped facilitate this appointment.

Plaintiff’s main allegation is that despite successfully preparing and submitting the required DPRs, Defendant No. 1 terminated their contract and used the Plaintiff’s work without appropriate attribution or consideration. Defendant No. 1 claims the Plaintiff breached its obligations by not following terms of contract (such as actual topographical surveys), forcing Defendant No. 1 to redo the work via separate contractors. The Plaintiff, however, maintains full compliance and asserts removal of authorship, resulting in reputational and financial loss.

Procedural Detail: The Plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking a permanent injunction, damages, and other legal relief under the Copyright Act, 1957. Defendant No. 1 filed an application for summary rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) on the grounds that the suit was legally barred and the Plaintiff lacked the locus standi under copyright law. Defendant No. 1 also challenged the Plaintiff’s valuation of damages and payment of court fees. Both parties submitted comprehensive pleadings, referencing contracts, communications, and legal notice.

Core Dispute:  The pivotal question before the Court is whether the Plaintiff – as a subcontracted consultancy – owns the copyright over the DPRs, or whether, in the absence of an explicit contrary agreement, the DPRs are “Government Work” under Section 17(d) of the Copyright Act, 1957, with the Government as first owner. Additional issues include claims of moral rights (removal of authorship, loss of reputation, and credentials), breach of contract, misappropriation of confidential material, and valuation/prayer for damages.

Detailed Reasoning:  The Court analyzed the law relating to Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, emphasizing that at this stage, the factual assertions in the plaint must be taken at face value and only the plaint and annexed documents can be considered, not the defense's reply. The court referenced landmark judgments such as Church of Christ Charitable Trust Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (2012) and Jadavbhai Jerambhai Chavda v. Koli Savsi Amra (2023), reiterating that the test is whether, assuming the Plaintiff’s claims to be true, the suit discloses a legitimate cause of action.

On the copyright dispute, the defense primarily relied on Section 17(d) and Section 2(k) of the Copyright Act, arguing that the Plaintiff could not claim ownership since the DPRs were commissioned for the government, which, absent any agreement to the contrary, is deemed the first owner. The Plaintiff countered by highlighting the absence of any direct agreement assigning copyright to the Government and invoked Section 57 of the Act to stress the protection of moral rights of the author irrespective of economic rights or assignment.

Citing Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India (2002, 2005), the Court underscored the distinction between copyright ownership and an author's “moral rights”—including the right to claim authorship and the right to restrain distortion of the work. Even if government ultimately owned the economic rights, the moral rights of attribution and integrity persist with the Plaintiff. The Court also considered the Supreme Court guidance in Cryogas Equipment Pvt. Ltd. v. Inox India Ltd. (2025) and Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain (2025), which clarify that complex questions of fact and law, including copyright ownership under nuanced contractual and statutory frameworks, cannot be decided at the summary stage.

Regarding the valuation issue, the Court noted established precedent (such as Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, 1987) that the Plaintiff’s bona fide estimation of relief, in absence of any demonstrable arbitrariness or undervaluation, should be accepted unless proven otherwise. As no such case was made out by the Defendant, this objection was also dismissed.

Decision

The Court held that the Plaintiff’s suit discloses a genuine cause of action, particularly concerning claims for violation of moral rights under Section 57, even though its primary claim of copyright ownership may ultimately be a question for trial. As such, summary rejection under Order VII Rule 11 was deemed unwarranted. The application for rejection of the plaint was dismissed, and the main suit was listed for further proceedings.​

Concluding Note:  This case is a significant illustration of the intersection between copyright law, government contracts, and moral rights of authors. The decision highlights that even if a work is prepared for and potentially owned by government under statutory presumptions, the author’s moral rights can survive and provide a cause of action for judicial determination. Legal nuances concerning statutory presumptions, authorship, and the differentiation between economic and moral rights are affirmed as deserving of full trial and not for summary disposal.

Case Title: Envitech Consultants India Pvt Ltd Vs Rudrabhishek Enterprises Limited & Ors.

Order Date: 24.11.2025

Case Number: CS COMM 892/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10351

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Delhi High Court Rejects Plea to Dismiss Copyright Suit in Envitech Consultants vs Rudrabhishek Enterprises

In the case of Envitech Consultants India Pvt Ltd vs Rudrabhishek Enterprises Limited & Ors (CSCOMM 892/2023), the Delhi High Court on November 24, 2025, dismissed an application by Defendant No. 1 seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The order was delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.​

Envitech Consultants, a consultancy firm specializing in water supply and environmental projects, sued Rudrabhishek Enterprises and others for alleged copyright infringement over Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for water supply schemes in Chitrakoot district, Uttar Pradesh. The plaintiff claimed authorship and ownership of the DPRs prepared under a subcontract with Defendant No. 1, accusing it of unauthorized reproduction, distribution, removal of authorship credits, and commercial exploitation, causing financial and reputational losses.​

Defendant No. 1 argued the plaint deserved rejection, contending the works qualified as "Government work" under Sections 2(k) and 17(d) of the Copyright Act, 1957, vesting ownership with the State Water & Sanitation Mission, Uttar Pradesh; it also alleged undervaluation of damages relief. Justice Karia held the plaint disclosed triable causes of action, including infringement of moral rights under Section 57 (paternity and integrity), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, even assuming government ownership arguendo. Complex ownership issues require full trial, not threshold dismissal, and the damages valuation was reasonable absent objective standards.​

The court rejected both grounds, emphasizing plaint averments must be taken as true at this stage, preserving the suit for adjudication. The matter is listed for January 16, 2026.​

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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Rajani Products Vs Madhukar Varandani

Originality Threshold in Artistic Works

Brief Introductory Note: This case involves a dispute over copyright protection for artistic labels used in the edible oil business. Rajani Products, a partnership firm, filed a petition in the Delhi High Court to cancel a copyright registration held by Madhukar Varandani, who runs Naturalindia Oils and Proteins. The main issue was whether Varandani's label, which included a Swastik device, copied Rajani Products' earlier labels too closely, making it unoriginal and unworthy of copyright protection. The court examined if the challenged label was a substantial imitation of the original works, leading to its removal from the copyright register. This decision highlights how courts protect original creative works in business branding while preventing unfair copying that could harm established reputations.

Factual Background:  Rajani Products is a partnership firm that makes and sells edible oils and similar products. They claim to have started using the Swastik mark, including labels like "Swastik No. 1" and a Swastik logo, back in 1975 through their earlier owners. The word "Swastik" is a key part of their branding. They have registered several trademarks for these, such as one for "Swastik No. 1" under application number 411334 for mustard and til oil, valid until 2034, and another under 1055218 for various edible oils, valid until 2031. Two more applications are pending. Rajani Products also holds copyright registrations for their artistic labels: one is A-45417/1984 for a Swastik label, and another is A-46097/1984 for a similar Swastik label. These copyrights protect the unique designs they created for their products.

On the other side, Madhukar Varandani runs a business called Naturalindia Oils and Proteins, which also deals in edible oils. He started using labels like "Shubharambh" with a Swastik device and "Niwai" with a Swastik device for his products. Rajani Products did not mind the words "Shubharambh" or "Niwai" but objected strongly to the use of the Swastik device, saying it looked too much like theirs. Varandani got a copyright registration in 2019 for his artistic work titled "NIOP Niwai in English and Hindi with Device of Swastik," numbered A-128046/2019. In this design, the Swastik device is a central feature.

Rajani Products learned about this copyright when Varandani mentioned it in a defense document during a separate lawsuit. Before that, Rajani Products had already sued Varandani in a lower court for using those labels, and on February 19, 2021, the District Judge in South Saket Court, New Delhi, granted a temporary order stopping Varandani from using the "Shubharambh" and "Niwai" labels with the Swastik device. Feeling harmed by the copyright registration, Rajani Products asked the high court to cancel it, arguing it was not original and copied their designs.

Procedural Detail:  The case started when Rajani Products filed a petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, in the Delhi High Court, numbered C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 16/2024. This section allows someone affected by a wrong copyright entry to ask for its removal. The court issued a notice on August 30, 2024, which Varandani's lawyer accepted, and gave him four weeks to reply. On December 13, 2024, the court noted no reply was filed and gave another six weeks. Then, on April 29, 2025, the court gave a final chance of four weeks to file a reply, but with a condition to pay 10,000 rupees as costs, and asked both sides to submit short written summaries. Despite this, Varandani did not file a reply, so on September 8, 2025, the court closed his chance to respond. The government's lawyer for the copyright office opposed canceling the registration but did not provide detailed arguments. The case was heard without Varandani's full defense, and the judgment was delivered on November 24, 2025.

Core Dispute:  The main question was whether Varandani's copyrighted label was original enough to stay on the copyright register or if it was too similar to Rajani Products' earlier labels, making it a copy that should be removed. Rajani Products argued they were the first to use the Swastik design in edible oil labels since 1975, and Varandani's version imitated it closely, including the shape, placement, and colors. They said this copying harmed their business reputation. Varandani did not defend himself properly since he missed filing a reply, but the copyright office opposed the cancellation. The court had to decide if Rajani Products was truly affected and if the challenged label met the legal test for originality under copyright law.

Detailed Reasoning : The court began by noting that since Varandani did not file a reply despite many chances, the facts presented by Rajani Products stood unchallenged. Under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the court explained that this provision allows the removal of a copyright entry if it was wrongly made or harms someone. It can be requested by any "person aggrieved," meaning someone directly affected by the registration. The court found Rajani Products qualified as aggrieved because they own registered copyrights for similar Swastik labels, and both parties sell the same type of products like edible oils. Allowing Varandani's registration to stay could weaken Rajani Products' brand and goodwill, as customers might confuse the products.

To decide if the label should be removed, the court discussed what makes an artistic work original under copyright law. It stressed that copyright protects only original creations, not copies. The court referred to a previous case to explain how to compare labels: Marico Ltd. v. Jagit Kaur, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8488. In that case, the Delhi High Court said that when checking if one label copies another, you look at the overall look and main features, not tiny details side by side. You consider things like color schemes, object arrangements, and if the copy could fool an average person. The court quoted a part from that judgment where it compared two coconut oil labels. One had a similar color scheme, coconut tree, and broken coconuts, leading the court to call it a "colorful imitation or substantive reproduction." The Marico case also borrowed from an older Supreme Court decision: Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618. There, the Supreme Court said you judge similarity by broad features that might mislead a normal buyer, not by nitpicking differences. For example, in Parle, two biscuit wrappers had similar sizes, colors, a girl with raised arm, animals, and a farm background, so one was seen as deceptively similar. The court explained that even if not identical, if the overall effect confuses people, it's a problem. It emphasized that ordinary buyers aren't detectives like Sherlock Holmes; they can easily mix up similar designs seen days apart.

Applying this to the current case, the court compared the designs visually. Rajani Products' labels from 1984 showed a Swastik symbol in a circle with specific colors and placement. Varandani's 2019 label had a very similar Swastik device, also in a circle, with matching background colors. The court said the Swastik was the key part in both, and the similarities in color and layout made Varandani's a "substantial imitation or reproduction." Since it copied essential elements without originality, it didn't deserve copyright protection. The court concluded that keeping such a non-original work on the register was wrong under the Copyright Act, 1957.

Decision:  The court allowed the petition and ordered the cancellation of Varandani's copyright registration A-128046/2019. It directed the copyright office to remove it from the register and update their website within four weeks. The petition and any related application were closed.

Concluding Note

This case shows the importance of originality in copyright for business labels. It reminds companies to create unique designs rather than borrow from others, as courts will step in to protect earlier creators and prevent confusion in the market. By canceling the registration, the court upheld fair competition in the edible oil industry, ensuring that goodwill built over years isn't unfairly diluted.

Case Title: Rajani Products Vs Madhukar Varandani

Order Date: November 24, 2025

Case Number: C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 16/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10368

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for This Legal Analytical Article

Protecting Originality in Branding: Analyzing the Delhi High Court's Decision in Rajani Products v. Madhukar Varandani on Copyright Rectification

Swastik Symbol Dispute: A Deep Dive into Copyright Cancellation for Imitative Artistic Works in Edible Oil Labels

Judicial Safeguards Against Copycat Labels: Lessons from the 2025 Delhi High Court Ruling on Section 50 of the Copyright Act

Originality Threshold in Artistic Works: Unpacking the Reasoning in Rajani Products' Successful Petition Against Infringing Copyright

Balancing Trademark and Copyright in Business: An Examination of Substantial Similarity in the Varandani Label Cancellation Case

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High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, through Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia, delivered judgment on November 24, 2025, in the case titled Rajani Products vs Madhukar Varandani, Proprietor of M/s Naturalindia Oils and Proteins & Anr., bearing case number C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 16/2024. The court ordered the cancellation of a copyright registration for an artistic label featuring the Swastik device, deeming it a substantial imitation lacking originality.

The dispute centered on Rajani Products, a firm in the edible oil business, challenging the 2019 copyright registration (No. A-128046/2019) held by Madhukar Varandani for his "NIOP Niwai" label with a Swastik symbol. Rajani Products claimed prior use of similar Swastik-based labels since 1975, backed by their own 1984 copyright registrations and trademarks. The court noted that Varandani failed to file a reply despite multiple opportunities, leaving the petitioner's claims unchallenged. Applying Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which allows rectification of erroneous entries, the judge ruled that Rajani Products was an aggrieved party due to potential dilution of their goodwill in the same market.

Justice Karia compared the labels, highlighting similarities in the Swastik device, color schemes, and placement, and cited precedents like Marico Ltd. v. Jagit Kaur (2018 SCC OnLine Del 8488) and Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore ((1972) 1 SCC 618) to emphasize that broad features must be examined for deceptive similarity, not minute differences. Finding the impugned work unoriginal, the court expunged it from the Copyright Register and directed the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks to update records accordingly.

This decision underscores the judiciary's role in protecting original artistic works in branding, particularly in competitive sectors like edible oils, where visual imitation can mislead consumers.

Disclaimer:This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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In a significant ruling on intellectual property rights, the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, through Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia, delivered judgment on November 24, 2025, in the case titled Rajani Products vs Madhukar Varandani, Proprietor of M/s Naturalindia Oils and Proteins & Anr., bearing case number C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 16/2024. The court ordered the cancellation of a copyright registration for an artistic label featuring the Swastik device, deeming it a substantial imitation lacking originality.

The dispute centered on Rajani Products, a firm in the edible oil business, challenging the 2019 copyright registration (No. A-128046/2019) held by Madhukar Varandani for his "NIOP Niwai" label with a Swastik symbol. Rajani Products claimed prior use of similar Swastik-based labels since 1975, backed by their own 1984 copyright registrations and trademarks. The court noted that Varandani failed to file a reply despite multiple opportunities, leaving the petitioner's claims unchallenged. Applying Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which allows rectification of erroneous entries, the judge ruled that Rajani Products was an aggrieved party due to potential dilution of their goodwill in the same market.

Justice Karia compared the labels, highlighting similarities in the Swastik device, color schemes, and placement, and cited precedents like Marico Ltd. v. Jagit Kaur (2018 SCC OnLine Del 8488) and Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore ((1972) 1 SCC 618) to emphasize that broad features must be examined for deceptive similarity, not minute differences. Finding the impugned work unoriginal, the court expunged it from the Copyright Register and directed the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks to update records accordingly.

This decision underscores the judiciary's role in protecting original artistic works in branding, particularly in competitive sectors like edible oils, where visual imitation can mislead consumers.

Disclaimer:This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane

Continuous Online Harm versus Res Judicata

Brief Introductory Note:  The Delhi High Court recently dealt with a dispute where a company (the plaintiff) sued several defendants for spreading false news, making threatening WhatsApp messages and using the plaintiff’s trademark in a way that allegedly harmed its reputation. The plaintiff had already filed an earlier suit (the “First Suit”) concerning the same trademark issue and a police raid. In the present case the plaintiff asked the court to stop the defendants from further disparagement and to remove the online material. The court had to decide whether this new suit was permissible under the law that prevents filing two suits for the same cause of action.

Factual Background: The plaintiff manufactures products bearing the mark “3X”. The defendants, especially defendant 1, filed a criminal complaint that led police to raid the plaintiff’s distributor in Nashik. After the raid, several news articles and a YouTube video appeared, and defendant 1 also shared a threatening WhatsApp message that mentioned the plaintiff’s mark. The plaintiff claimed that these actions damaged its reputation and infringed its trademark. In the First Suit, the plaintiff had asked for an injunction to stop the defendants from threatening legal action over the 3X mark and for a declaration that such threats were unjustified. The court in that suit gave a preliminary finding that the plaintiff’s use of the 3X mark did not infringe the defendants’ 3P mark and restrained the defendants from issuing further threats.

Procedural Detail: While the First Suit was still pending, the plaintiff filed a second suit (the present plaint) seeking a permanent injunction to stop the defendants from publishing the news articles, the YouTube video and the WhatsApp messages, and to have the material taken down. The defendants argued that the second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which says a plaintiff cannot bring a second suit for the same cause of action if the same relief could have been claimed in the first suit. The plaintiff argued that new events – such as the sharing of the YouTube video on 19 August 2025 and the continued circulation of the material on the internet – gave rise to a fresh cause of action.

Core Dispute: The central question before the court was whether the second suit was a fresh case based on new facts, or whether it was simply an attempt to re‑litigate matters already decided in the First Suit. The court also considered whether the plaintiff could have asked for the removal of the online material in the first suit and whether the continued presence of the articles and video created a continuous cause of action.

Detailed Reasoning :  The court examined the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC, which is meant to stop multiple lawsuits over the same set of facts. It recalled the Supreme Court decision in Gurbux Singh v. Bhura Lal (AIR 1964 SC 1810), which laid down three conditions for applying the rule: the second suit must be for the same cause of action, the plaintiff must have been entitled to more than one relief in the first suit, and the plaintiff must have omitted to claim that relief without the court’s permission. The court noted that the plaintiff was aware of the news articles and the YouTube video when the First Suit was filed, as shown by the documents attached to that suit (DOCUMENT‑20 and DOCUMENT‑21). The plaintiff had not asked for the removal of those materials in the first suit, even though the cause of action (the alleged defamation and trademark harm) was already present.

The court also referred to Mohamad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian (1949 51 BomLR 9), which explains that a new suit is allowed only if the claim is substantially different. In this case, the only new fact was the forwarding of the video on 19 August 2025, which the court said could have been added to the First Suit by amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The court cited Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Pvt. Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1128) to stress that an amendment should not change the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action.

The plaintiff relied on the judgment in Ruchi Kalra (supra) and Bengal Waterproof (supra) to argue that a continuous breach gives a fresh cause of action each time the offending material is viewed or shared. The court accepted that the internet can create a continuing wrong, but held that the principle does not override the bar under Order II Rule 2 when the plaintiff already had the opportunity to seek relief in the earlier suit.

Decision: The court concluded that the second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC because the plaintiff could have, and should have, sought the relief of taking down the media coverage and the YouTube video in the First Suit. The court dismissed the present plaint but gave the plaintiff liberty to amend the First Suit to include the later developments and the new defendants, in accordance with the law.

Concluding Note: The judgment reinforces the importance of bringing all related claims in one suit and using the amendment procedure when new facts emerge after the first filing. It also clarifies that while the internet can give rise to a continuous cause of action, that does not automatically allow a fresh suit when the same relief was available earlier.

Case Title: Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane

Order Date: 24 November 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 946/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10370

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Delhi High Court Dismisses Second Trademark‑Defamation Suit as Barred by Order II Rule 2

 In a judgment delivered on 24 November 2025 in Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane(CS(COMM) 946/2025), Justice Tejas Karia of the High Court of Delhi ruled that a plaintiff cannot bring a fresh suit seeking the removal of online articles and a YouTube video when the same relief could have been claimed in an earlier proceeding. The court held that the plaintiff’s second suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prevents multiplicity of actions on the same cause of action. The judge noted that the plaintiff was aware of the offending material when the first suit was filed and could have amended that suit to include the later developments, rather than initiating a new case. Consequently, the court dismissed the present plaint but granted the plaintiff liberty to amend the original suit to incorporate the new facts and parties.

The decision underscores the principle that while the internet can give rise to a continuing cause of action, parties must still consolidate all related claims in a single proceeding to avoid the procedural bar imposed by Order II Rule 2. The ruling also highlights the importance of timely amendments under Order VI Rule 17 when fresh evidence emerges after a suit is instituted.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Bikanervala & Anr. Vs. Sh. Satya Narayan

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case, Factual Background

This case involves a petition filed before the High Court of Delhi challenging an order passed by the Trial Court. The core issue revolves around the Trial Court's refusal to allow the Petitioners, Bikanervala & Anr., to submit electronic evidence (videos contained in a pen drive) in a contempt petition they filed against the Respondents, Sh. Satya Narayan & Ors. The videos allegedly show the Respondents violating an interim injunction by using a distinctive artistic label or "JHALAR device" similar to that of the Petitioners' 'BIKANERVALA' trademark. The High Court ultimately upheld the Trial Court's discretionary decision, finding no reason to interfere with the rejection of the application to take the videos on record, especially since the videos were not relied upon for the main trademark infringement suit but only for the separate contempt proceedings.

Procedural Detail

The Petitioners had filed a main suit, CS (COMM) No. 2232/2019, seeking a permanent injunction to prevent the Respondents from using the trademark and artwork 'BIKANER CORNERWALA,' which they claimed was identical or deceptively similar to their 'BIKANERVALA' mark. An interim injunction was initially granted on February 11, 2020, but a subsequent order on February 13, 2020, permitted the Respondents to use the words "Bikaner Cornerwala" or "Bikaner Corner Wala" while the injunction continued to operate specifically on the Petitioners' distinctive artistic label, the "JHALAR device". The injunction was later given full effect on May 9, 2023, restraining the use of 'BIKANER CORNERWALA' or 'BIKANER CORNER WALA' entirely.

Following this, the Petitioners conducted investigations in March and April 2023, where they shot videos allegedly revealing the Respondents' use of the "JHALAR device" in violation of the 2020 injunctions. The Petitioners then filed Contempt Petition No. 8/2023 against the Respondents, mentioning a Google Drive link to these videos.

The Petitioners filed an application on March 4, 2025, under Order XI Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, to place a pen drive containing the video recordings on record. This first application was dismissed by the Trial Court on July 24, 2025, because the supporting affidavit was given by the Petitioners' counsel, not a party to the proceeding, as required by Order XI Rule 6(3) of the Commercial Courts Act.

The Petitioners filed a fresh application on August 25, 2025, for the same purpose, this time supported by an affidavit from their authorised representative. This second application was also dismissed by the Trial Court on October 31, 2025 (the Impugned Order).

The present petition, CM(M)-IPD 45/2025, was filed by the Petitioners, Bikanervala & Anr., to challenge the Trial Court's dismissal order dated October 31, 2025. The Petitioners argued that the Trial Court had dismissed the application based on the erroneous fact that the videos were downloaded from the Google Drive on August 20, 2025, when the correct fact was that they were downloaded to a local drive on April 13, 2023, and only copied to the pen drive on August 20, 2025. They asserted that the videos were highly relevant for proving the Respondents' "contumacious conduct" in the contempt matter, even if they weren't relevant for the merits of the trademark infringement suit.

Core Dispute

The central dispute in the High Court was whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the Petitioners' application, filed under Order XI Rule 6 CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, to submit a pen drive containing video evidence in the contempt petition.

The Trial Court's reasoning in the Impugned Order, which the Petitioners challenged, rested on several observations:

The original video recordings were always in the possession or control of the Petitioners, yet they claimed they were downloaded from a Google Drive link.

The investigator, Anil Kumar, who shot the videos, was not examined as a witness.

The Google Drive link (URL) provided by the Petitioners in their previous application was non-functional and nothing was stored on the cloud as of the date of an earlier order (July 24, 2025) and even at the time of the hearing on the fresh application (October 10, 2025).

The Petitioners' stands in the affidavit and application were contradictory regarding the date of downloading the videos, stating they were downloaded on August 20, 2025, in the pen drive, but also asserting they were downloaded on April 13, 2023.

Given the link was empty earlier, it was "highly improbable" to download the videos to the pen drive on August 20, 2025, as claimed.

The Trial Court could not believe the videos were downloaded in the pen drive by the Petitioners' authorised representative as asserted.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The High Court of Delhi, presided over by Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, heard the arguments and reviewed the Impugned Order dated October 31, 2025.

The Court's primary focus was on the scope of its extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with a decision of the Trial Court. The High Court ruled that the Trial Court's order, which rejected the application under Order XI Rule 6 CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, was a matter within the Trial Court's jurisdiction. The Court found no reason to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to overturn the Trial Court's discretion.

The High Court specifically addressed the relevance of the evidence. It noted that the videos were not relevant to the merits of the main trademark infringement suit. The Petitioners had already concluded their evidence in the suit and had chosen not to rely upon these videos for the issues concerning the merits of the main claim. The Petitioners were relying on these videos solely for the adjudication of the contempt petition.

The High Court provided a crucial legal distinction regarding contempt proceedings. The Court stated that the issue of whether the Respondents committed contempt is a matter "between the Court and the defendant". This principle suggests that contempt proceedings are primarily for the vindication of the court's dignity and authority, not merely an adversarial proceeding between the parties. Therefore, the issue of contempt will be decided by the Trial Court based on the evidence already filed with the contempt petition.

Given these facts—that the evidence was not critical to the main suit, that the Petitioners had already concluded their evidence, and that the Trial Court had appreciated the facts and exercised its discretion based on the contradictory stands and non-functional evidence link—the High Court found no ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court in dismissing the application.

(The order does not include citations of any external legal judgments referred to or discussed for reasoning beyond the facts and procedural history of the case itself ).

Decision

The High Court of Delhi dismissed the present petition, CM(M)-IPD 45/2025. Consequently, all pending applications were also disposed of. The Trial Court's decision to not permit the electronic evidence (pen drive with videos) to be taken on record in the contempt petition stands affirmed.

Concluding Note

The decision of the High Court of Delhi underscores the principle of judicial non-interference with the discretionary orders of a subordinate court, particularly when the subordinate court has considered the facts presented to it. The key takeaway for any litigant is the importance of timely and consistent presentation of evidence, especially in the context of commercial litigation governed by specific procedural rules like Order XI Rule 6 of the Commercial Courts Act. The Trial Court's refusal, upheld by the High Court, was heavily influenced by the Petitioners' conflicting statements regarding the download date of the electronic evidence and the non-functional status of the original evidence link. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the distinct nature of contempt proceedings, which are fundamentally matters between the court and the alleged contemnor, allowing the Trial Court to decide the issue based on the evidence already before it, without the High Court needing to exercise its extraordinary power to compel the acceptance of belated or questionable evidence. This highlights the strict standards applied to the introduction of electronic evidence, requiring clear chain of custody and verifiable authenticity.

Case Title: Bikanervala & Anr. Vs. Sh. Satya Narayan & Ors. Order Date: November 20, 2025 Case Number: CM(M)-IPD 45/2025 Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:Citation No [This would be reflected at top of any page of Order in this format Year:DHC:Citation No] Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Legal Analytical Article:

The Discreet Hand of Justice: High Court Refuses to Interfere with Trial Court's Discretion on Electronic Evidence in Contempt Proceedings

Contempt, Commercial Courts, and CPC: An Analysis of Timeliness and Authenticity in Filing Electronic Evidence

Order XI Rule 6, CPC, and the Burden of Proof: Why Bikanervala's Pen Drive Was Dismissed by the Trial Court

The Contradictory Evidence Conundrum: A Study in Admissibility of Electronic Records for Contempt in Trademark Disputes

Beyond the Main Suit: Examining the High Court's Stance on Introducing Evidence Solely for Contempt Adjudication

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Delhi High Court Upholds Trial Court's Discretion to Reject Late Electronic Evidence in Trademark Contempt Plea

New Delhi: In a recent order dated November 20, 2025, the High Court of Delhi, presided over by Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, dismissed a petition filed by Bikanervala & Anr. in the case of Bikanervala & Anr. Vs. Sh. Satya Narayan & Ors. (Case No. CM(M)-IPD 45/2025). The Court refused to interfere with a Trial Court's decision that declined to take on record a pen drive containing video evidence regarding an alleged trademark violation.

The dispute arose from a suit filed by the petitioners seeking to restrain the respondents from using the mark 'BIKANER CORNERWALA', claiming it infringed their well-known 'BIKANERVALA' trademark. While an interim injunction was in place restraining the use of the petitioners' distinctive "JHALAR device," the petitioners alleged that the respondents continued to violate this order. To prove this "contumacious conduct," the petitioners sought to introduce video recordings shot by investigators in 2023 into the ongoing contempt proceedings via a pen drive application under Order XI Rule 6 of the Commercial Courts Act.

The Trial Court dismissed the application, noting significant discrepancies in the petitioners' claims regarding the electronic evidence. Specifically, the Trial Court observed that the Google Drive link originally cited by the petitioners was found to be empty on multiple occasions, making the claim that videos were downloaded from it on a specific later date "highly improbable".

Upholding the lower court's decision, Justice Arora observed that the videos were not relevant to the merits of the main suit, where evidence had already concluded. Regarding the contempt petition, the High Court ruled that the issue of contempt is primarily a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor. Finding no error in how the Trial Court exercised its jurisdiction to reject the contradictory evidence, the High Court dismissed the petition.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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