Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., a well-known company with registered trademarks PEPFIZ and REVITAL, filed a suit against Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. in the Delhi High Court alleging trademark infringement and passing off due to the defendant's use of similar marks PEPFIX and NEOVITAL on nutritional supplements. The defendant challenged the court's territorial jurisdiction, claiming no business or sales in Delhi, only export operations from Chennai and Andhra Pradesh, and sought return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The court dismissed the application, holding that the plaint's averments about the defendant's interactive websites accessible in Delhi raised sufficient part of cause of action here, to be tried as a preliminary issue later.​

Factual Background

The plaintiff, having its registered office in Delhi, owns trademarks PEPFIZ and REVITAL for pharmaceutical and nutritional products. It discovered the defendant using PEPFIX and NEOVITAL on similar goods, leading to an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on 21.11.2024 restraining the defendant from using these marks or any deceptively similar variants anywhere, including through dealers, e-commerce platforms, or agents. The defendant's website (www.arturapharma.com) features a "Contact Us" section inviting users to enquire for services, downloadable product brochures mentioning the impugned marks, and a third-party site (www.pharmahopers.com) lists NEOVITAL with an enquiry form for potential buyers. The plaintiff pleaded these platforms are accessible in Delhi, causing confusion and injury to its business among local consumers.​

Procedural Detail

The suit, filed as CSCOMM 103/2024 with I.A. 4574/2024 and I.A. 16842/2025, invoked Section 20 CPC for jurisdiction, asserting part of cause of action arose in Delhi due to online accessibility and potential sales. The defendant filed I.A. 17275/2025 under Order VII Rule 10 CPC to return the plaint, denying any Delhi operations, sales invoices, or interactive e-commerce features. Arguments were heard via video conference by counsels for both sides, with the court examining pleadings, documents like website screenshots and brochures, and prior interim order. No trial evidence was led; the matter was decided on demurrer basis.​

Core Dispute

The main question was whether the Delhi High Court has territorial jurisdiction over this trademark suit, given the defendant's claim of no physical presence, sales, or commercial transactions in Delhi, and that its websites are merely informational, not interactive for orders. The plaintiff countered that website accessibility in Delhi, "Contact Us" invitations for services, product listings on third-party platforms, and potential consumer confusion constitute purposeful targeting and part of cause of action under Section 20 CPC. The dispute centered on applying internet jurisdiction tests—sliding scale of interactivity and effects doctrine—to determine if online activities confer jurisdiction without proven local sales.​

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The court applied the demurrer principle from Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Limited, (2004) 3 SCC 688, where the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction objections under Order VII Rule 10 CPC must assume plaint averments as true, succeeding only if no jurisdiction exists as a matter of law even on those facts. It affirmed Section 20 CPC governs trademark suits, with cause of action arising where wrong (confusion/deception) or injury occurs, as in Millennium Copthorne International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services Private Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8268, noting codified law allows suits where part of cause accrues, especially via online confusion. For internet disputes, Banyan Tree Holding P. Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, mandated "sliding scale test" (website passivity vs. interactivity) plus "effects test" (purposeful targeting causing forum injury), requiring prima facie proof of commercial transactions targeting forum users, not mere accessibility.

The court rejected defendant's reliance on Federal Express Corporation v. Fedex Securities Ltd. & Ors., 2018 (74) PTC 205 (Del) (DB), distinguishing it as lacking any commercial transaction examples, unlike here with pleaded "Contact Us" enquiries and brochures. It noted Ms. Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Ms. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2404, returned a plaint for no Delhi orders via IndiaMart, but observed the appeal judgment was reserved (order 31.07.2025), and facts differ with purposeful service invitations. Contrarily, RSPL Limited v. Mukesh Sharma & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4285, supported demurrer-based jurisdiction from plaint facts. Tata Sons P. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968, clarified targeting need not be aggressive; mere accessible online presence suffices if inviting transactions. Marico Limited v. Mr. Mukesh Kumar & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10823, reinforced interactivity via enquiry forms.

Accepting plaint facts, the court found "Contact Us" (inviting "write to us for services"), downloadable brochures with impugned marks, and pharmahopers.com listing with enquiry forms indicate interactivity and targeting, creating Delhi confusion potential despite no sales invoices—issues needing trial evidence on functionality, enquiries from Delhi, and export-only claims. Jurisdiction, a mixed fact-law question, cannot be summarily rejected pre-trial; suit to proceed with jurisdiction as preliminary issue post-pleadings.​

Decision

The defendant's I.A. 17275/2025 was dismissed, reserving its right to re-agitate territorial jurisdiction as a preliminary issue at trial after evidence. The suit (CSCOMM 103/2024 and I.A. 16842/2025) listed for 17.12.2025 before Joint Registrar (Judicial).​

Concluding Note

This ruling balances plaintiff convenience in forum non-conveniens via online trademark threats with defendant protections against baseless jurisdiction claims, emphasizing evidence-led resolution over summary returns. It underscores evolving internet commerce challenges under CPC, prioritizing plaint averments at threshold while deferring factual probes, ensuring fair trials without premature ousters.​

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.
Order Date: 24.11.2025
Case Number: CSCOMM 103/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1038
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia​

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested 5 Suitable Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

1. Website Interactivity and Territorial Jurisdiction: Delhi High Court's Demurrer Approach in Sun Pharma v. Artura Pharma

2. From Contact Us to Courtroom: Evolving Tests for Online Trademark Jurisdiction under CPC Section 20

3. Demurrer, Deception, and Digital Reach: Jurisdiction Analysis in Pharmaceutical Trademark Dispute

4. Banyan Tree Revisited: Preliminary Issues in Internet-Based Passing Off Suits

5. Purposeful Availment Online: Why Delhi High Retained Jurisdiction Despite No Local Sales

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Delhi High Court Retains Jurisdiction in Sun Pharma's Trademark Suit Against Artura Pharma Despite No Local Sales

In a significant ruling on trademark jurisdiction in the digital age, the High Court of Delhi on November 24, 2025, in Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. (CSCOMM 103/2024), presided over by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia, dismissed the defendant's application seeking return of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Sun Pharma, holding registered trademarks PEPFIZ and REVITAL for nutritional supplements, sued Artura Pharma for infringement and passing off over similar marks PEPFIX and NEOVITAL. An ex-parte interim injunction was already granted on November 21, 2024, restraining the defendant from using these marks. Artura, based in Chennai with manufacturing in Andhra Pradesh and claiming export-only operations, argued no sales, offices, or interactive e-commerce in Delhi, relying on its informational website (www.arturapharma.com) and a third-party directory listing (www.pharmahopers.com).

Applying the demurrer principle under Order VII Rule 10 CPC—assuming plaint facts as true—the court held that the website's "Contact Us" section inviting service enquiries, downloadable product brochures featuring the marks, and the third-party enquiry form constituted sufficient interactivity and purposeful targeting of Delhi consumers under Section 20 CPC. Citing Banyan Tree Holding (2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780) for sliding scale and effects tests, Exphar SA (2004) 3 SCC 688 for demurrer, and Tata Sons (2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968) for online presence sufficing jurisdiction, Justice Karia ruled these raised part of cause of action in Delhi via potential confusion, warranting trial evidence on actual transactions and effects.

The application (I.A. 17275/2025) was dismissed, with jurisdiction to be decided as a preliminary issue post-pleadings. The suit proceeds to December 17, 2025.​

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs Pfizer Inc.

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case

This case involves a dispute between an Indian pharmaceutical manufacturer, Softgel Healthcare Private Limited, and the US-based company Pfizer Inc., along with its affiliates. It centers on whether Indian courts should help enforce a request from a US court for evidence in a patent infringement lawsuit. Pfizer holds a US patent for a drug called Tafamidis, sold as Vyndamax, and sued Indian companies Cipla and Hikma (formerly Zenara) in the US for trying to sell generic versions before the patent expires. To gather proof, the US court issued "Letters Rogatory," asking Indian courts to collect documents and statements from Softgel, which makes the drug for Cipla and Hikma. Softgel challenged this, arguing it violates Indian laws and international agreements. The Madras High Court initially allowed the request but was appealed. The appeal court overturned it, protecting Softgel's confidentiality and India's sovereignty in patent matters.

Factual Background

Pfizer Inc., a large pharmaceutical company based in New York, USA, owns a patent (number 9,770,441, often called the '441 patent) for the crystalline form of a drug called Tafamidis meglumine, which is 61 mg and sold under the brand name Vyndamax in the US. This drug treats a rare heart condition. In the US, companies must get approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to sell generic versions of patented drugs. Cipla Limited, an Indian company, and Hikma (which bought Zenara Pharma Private Limited, another Indian firm), filed applications called Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to sell generic versions of Vyndamax. Pfizer claimed these applications were filed before their patent expired, which under US law counts as infringement.

Pfizer sued Cipla and Hikma in the US District Court for the District of Delaware. During the lawsuit, Pfizer asked Cipla and Hikma for documents about how the generic drug was made. Cipla and Hikma said they didn't have all the details because Softgel Healthcare Private Limited, an Indian company based in Tamil Nadu, was the actual manufacturer under contract. Softgel produces the drug at its facility in Pudupakkam Village, Chengalpattu District.

To get information from Softgel, who isn't part of the US lawsuit, the US court issued Letters Rogatory on May 13, 2024. These are formal requests from one country's court to another's for help in gathering evidence, based on an international agreement called the Hague Convention of 1970. The request asked for documents and witness statements from Softgel about the drug's manufacturing process, testing, and polymorphic forms (different crystal structures of the drug).

Pfizer then filed petitions in the Madras High Court (O.P.(PT).Nos.5 and 6 of 2024) to execute this request. They wanted a commissioner appointed to collect the evidence, with safeguards like a confidentiality club to protect sensitive information. Softgel opposed this, saying they weren't involved in the US case, the request was too broad, and it violated Indian patent laws since Pfizer's similar patent application in India (number 20171005783) had been rejected by the Indian Patent Office. Softgel argued this was like fishing for information and could harm their business secrets.

Procedural Detail

The process started in the US when Pfizer filed infringement suits against Cipla (Civil Action No.23-879) and others. After Cipla and Hikma disclosed Softgel as their manufacturer, the US District Court issued Letters Rogatory under the Hague Convention.

In India, Pfizer filed two petitions in the Madras High Court in 2024 to enforce these letters. A single judge heard the case and, on January 28, 2025, allowed the petitions. The judge appointed a commissioner, set up a confidentiality club with representatives from both sides and experts, and ordered the process to happen in private to protect secrets. The judge relied on Indian civil procedure rules (Order XXVI, Rules 19-22, and Section 78 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) that allow courts to help foreign courts.

Softgel appealed this decision to a division bench (two judges) of the Madras High Court in Letters Patent Appeals (LPA Nos.17 and 18 of 2025). The appeals were reserved for judgment on November 11, 2025, and decided on November 25, 2025. Senior lawyers argued for both sides: Mr. V. Raghavachari for Softgel, emphasizing violations of confidentiality and Indian laws, and Mr. P.S. Raman for Pfizer, arguing that such requests are standard and protected by safeguards.

Core Dispute

The main issue was whether the Madras High Court should enforce the US court's Letters Rogatory against Softgel, a third party not involved in the US lawsuit. Softgel argued the request was vague, sought pre-trial discovery (which India has opted out of under the Hague Convention), violated their confidentiality rights, and undermined Indian patent laws since Pfizer's patent was rejected in India. They said it was like a broad search for evidence without specifics, harming their business.

Pfizer countered that the documents were specific and needed for their US case, Indian laws allow such cooperation, and safeguards like the confidentiality club would prevent misuse. They said Softgel wasn't a stranger since it manufactures for the sued companies, and international judicial help is recognized in India.

The court had to balance international cooperation with protecting national sovereignty, privacy, and domestic patent rules.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The division bench, consisting of Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran and Justice Mummineni Sudheer Kumar, carefully examined the arguments. They started by noting the point for consideration: whether the single judge's order violated Indian laws and the Hague Convention.

The court explained that India is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1970, but with reservations. Under Article 3, Letters Rogatory must specify details like parties, nature of proceedings, witnesses, questions, and documents. Article 11 allows a person to refuse evidence if it violates privileges under the law of the executing country (India) or the requesting country (US). Article 12 lets refusal if it doesn't fall under judicial functions or prejudices sovereignty. Crucially, Article 23 allows countries to refuse pre-trial discovery requests, and India has declared it won't execute such letters for broad document hunts not specifying exact items.

The bench found the US request vague and omnibus, listing broad categories like "all documents relating to testing and development" without naming specific witnesses or exact documents. They extracted the list from Appendix-I of the US application, noting it included "any further document deemed necessary," which seemed like fishing for evidence.

Discussing Indian law, the court referred to Order XXVI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which allows issuing commissions for foreign court requests, but must be liberally construed while protecting sovereignty. They emphasized that domestic laws prevail, and no international convention overrides them.

The judges discussed several cited cases. First, Wooster Products Inc. v. Magna Tek Inc. (1983 SCC OnLine Del 29), where the Delhi High Court said Indian courts shouldn't question the foreign court's relevance but witnesses can claim privilege. The bench agreed but noted it supports refusal by witnesses like Softgel.

They distinguished Upaid Systems Limited v. Satyam Computer Services (2009 SCC OnLine Del 2006), where the Delhi High Court enforced a request, saying it didn't fully consider India's Article 23 reservation. In Upaid, the court held that as long as Order XXVI, Rule 19 conditions are met (civil proceeding, witness in jurisdiction), enforcement is possible, but the Madras bench disagreed, stressing sovereignty under Articles 11, 12, and 23.

The court also noted a Telangana High Court judgment (not named but similar to this case) where enforcement against a third party was upheld, but rejected it because it ignored India's opt-out from pre-trial discovery.

Reasoning further, the bench said Pfizer's Indian patent rejection means they can't enforce US rights in India indirectly. The litigation links (US suit and Indian appeal) make this pre-trial evidence collection, banned under India's Hague declaration. Softgel, not a US party, has rights under Article 11 to refuse if it prejudices sovereignty or confidentiality, protected under TRIPS Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).

Pfizer offered undertakings for safeguards, but the court said confidentiality clubs aren't enough against broad requests. They held the single judge erred by not scrutinizing the Hague limits and India's notification, making the order routine without protecting national interests.

Decision

The appeals were allowed. The single judge's order dated January 28, 2025, in O.P.(PT).Nos.5 and 6 of 2024 was set aside. The petitions to execute the Letters Rogatory were dismissed, with no costs. This means Softgel doesn't have to provide documents or testimony, protecting their confidentiality and India's patent sovereignty.

Concluding Note

This judgment highlights the careful balance courts must strike between helping international justice and safeguarding national laws and business secrets. It reinforces that India won't assist in broad pre-trial evidence hunts from foreign courts, especially in patent disputes where local patents differ. For companies like Softgel, it offers protection against foreign overreach, while reminding multinationals like Pfizer to respect territorial limits. This case could guide future cross-border evidence requests, emphasizing specificity and sovereignty.

Case Title: Softgel Healthcare Private Limited Vs Pfizer Inc. and Others Order Date: 25.11.2025 Case Number: L.P.A.Nos.17 & 18 of 2025 and C.M.P.Nos.11011 of 2025 & 11017 of 2025 Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:1471 Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras Name of Hon'ble Judge: Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran and Justice Mummineni Sudheer Kumar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Legal Analytical Article:

1. Balancing International Judicial Cooperation and National Sovereignty: Lessons from the Softgel v. Pfizer Letters Rogatory Dispute
2. Refusal of Pre-Trial Discovery in Cross-Border Patent Litigation: Analyzing the Madras High Court's Stance on Hague Convention Article 23
3. Protecting Confidentiality in Pharmaceutical Patents: The Impact of India's Hague Reservation on Foreign Evidence Requests
4. Letters Rogatory and Third-Party Rights: A Critical Examination of Enforcement Limits under Indian Law
5. Sovereignty Over Secrets: How the Madras High Court Shielded an Indian Manufacturer from US Patent Infringement Probes

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Madras High Court Overturns Order to Enforce US Letters Rogatory in Pfizer Patent Dispute

In a significant ruling on cross-border patent enforcement, the High Court of Judicature at Madras, in the case titled Softgel Healthcare Private Limited v. Pfizer Inc. and Others (L.P.A. Nos. 17 & 18 of 2025 and C.M.P. Nos. 11011 & 11017 of 2025), delivered on November 25, 2025, by the bench comprising Hon'ble Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mummineni Sudheer Kumar, set aside a single judge's decision to assist a US court in gathering evidence from an Indian manufacturer.

The case stemmed from a US patent infringement lawsuit filed by Pfizer Inc., holder of US Patent No. 9,770,441 for the drug Tafamidis (branded as Vyndamax), against Indian firms Cipla and Hikma (formerly Zenara) for submitting abbreviated new drug applications before the patent's expiry. The US District Court for Delaware issued Letters Rogatory under the 1970 Hague Convention, seeking documents and testimony from Softgel Healthcare Private Limited, a Tamil Nadu-based contract manufacturer for Cipla and Hikma.

Pfizer petitioned the Madras High Court to execute the request by appointing a commissioner and forming a confidentiality club. A single judge allowed this on January 28, 2025, citing provisions under Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, Softgel appealed, arguing the request was vague, violated confidentiality, and amounted to pre-trial discovery, which India has reserved against under Article 23 of the Hague Convention. They also noted Pfizer's similar patent application was rejected in India, undermining any enforcement here.

The division bench agreed, holding that the Letters Rogatory lacked specificity as required by Article 3 of the Hague Convention and prejudiced India's sovereignty under Articles 11 and 12. Emphasizing India's declaration against pre-trial document discovery, the court ruled that such requests cannot override domestic patent laws. The appeals were allowed, dismissing Pfizer's petitions without costs and protecting Softgel's business interests.

This decision underscores the limits of international judicial cooperation in patent matters, particularly when local laws diverge from foreign claims.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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SKA Insurance Surveyors Vs. Regional Director Northern Region

Brief Introductory Head-Note Summary and Factual Background

The case is about a company challenging a direction given by a government official (Regional Director of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs) ordering it to change its name because its name looks almost the same as an older company’s name. The company filing the case (the Petitioner) was incorporated in 2022. Another company with a similar name (Respondent No. 2) was first incorporated in 2008, and later changed its name in 2013 to include the word "SKAAD".

The person who became a director in the newcomer company had earlier worked as a director of the older company for more than 13 years until late 2021, and soon after leaving that company, he helped create the new one. Both companies operate in the same business field — insurance surveying and loss assessment — meaning they target the same industry, customers, and market.

After the newcomer company was registered, Respondent No. 2 approached the Regional Director and said: this new company’s name is almost the same as ours and can mislead people. The Regional Director agreed and issued an order under Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 directing the Petitioner to change its name within three months by passing an ordinary resolution.

The Petitioner did not want to change its name and therefore filed a writ petition before the High Court, arguing that because Respondent No. 2’s trademark application on the word “SKAAD” had reportedly been abandoned or failed formalities, the Regional Director wrongly protected Respondent No.2’s “trademark rights” and went into trademark infringement issues, which he should not have done.

Procedural Details

The Petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the name-change direction given by the Regional Director. The petition was heard and decided orally on 19 November 2025. The Court also dealt with an interim relief application where the Petitioner asked for a stay on the impugned order. The Court refused to interfere in the merits and dismissed the case but extended the compliance period by one more month.

Core Dispute

The main dispute is whether the Regional Director acted beyond his legal power by touching trademark disputes, or whether he acted correctly within Section 16(1)(a) which allows the government to ask a company to correct its name if it is the same or confusingly similar to an already-existing company name.

Detailed Court Reasoning with Citations and Legal Discussion

The Court held that Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 gives the Central Government (and its delegate such as the Regional Director) a very wide power to direct a company to change its name if the name is:

identical to an older company name, or

too similar to make the public think both belong to the same source.

The Court explained that Section 16(1)(a) does not require proving trademark infringement. The only requirement is similarity with an older company name. It does not even need a detailed finding that confusion or deception is proven. Rather, even a mere resemblance is enough for the government to step in, because the law wants companies to have distinct identities to avoid administrative, public, financial, and legal confusion.

The Court referred in detail to the earlier judgment in cGMP Pharmaplan P. Ltd. v. Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Anr., decided by the same Court in 2010 under Section 22 of Companies Act, 1956 (which is legally the same as Section 16(1)(a) of the 2013 Act). That judgment said very clearly that the power of the RD is independent of trademark and passing-off disputes. The Court in that case had said:

There is no need for a trademark test,

There is no need to check actual deception, and

It is enough to look at whether two company names are “too alike when compared as a whole”.

The Petitioner had relied heavily on the Panchhi Petha Store judgment given in 2024. The Court clarified the difference. In Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India, the RD’s order was set aside because the RD had wrongly examined trademark ownership and based his order on trademark rights. But in the present case, the RD’s order was not about trademark rights, it was only about similarity in company names. Therefore this case follows the reasoning of cGMP Pharmaplan and not Panchhi Petha Store.

The Court also saw that a real-world problem had already happened: an insurance company mistakenly deposited money into Respondent No.2's bank account, thinking it belonged to the Petitioner, because the names were almost the same. This, though not legally required to prove, showed how similar names can lead to real confusion, justifying the RD’s action.

The Court held that the names "SKA" and "SKAAD", followed by identical wording “Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Private Limited”, are substantially the same names when viewed together. Therefore the impugned order was correct and not unreasonable.

The Court finally held that under Article 226, it can interfere in government orders only if they are (a) illegal, or (b) totally unreasonable, or (c) make no legal sense. Since Section 16(1)(a) clearly covers this situation, the RD did not act illegally and therefore the High Court refused to interfere.

Decision

The Writ Petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the name-change direction but extended compliance by one more month.

Concluding Note

This ruling reinforces a very practical message: disputes over company names are decided under the Companies Act, not trademark law. Even if a trademark application fails or is abandoned, that does not stop the government from correcting confusingly similar names between companies if an older company already exists. The purpose of the law is not a battle over logos or brand ownership, but public clarity, market honesty, and corporate separateness.

Concluding Note

This ruling reinforces a very practical message: disputes over company names are decided under the Companies Act, not trademark law. Even if a trademark application fails or is abandoned, that does not stop the government from correcting confusingly similar names between companies if an older company already exists. The purpose of the law is not a battle over logos or brand ownership, but public clarity, market honesty, and corporate separateness.

Concluding Note

This ruling reinforces a very practical message: disputes over company names are governed by the Companies Act, not trademark law. Even if a trademark application fails or is abandoned, the Regional Director can still direct a name change when a new company’s name closely resembles the name of an older, existing company. The intent of Section 16(1)(a) is to maintain corporate distinctiveness for public clarity, administrative accuracy, and market honesty — not to determine trademark ownership or infringement.

The Court’s refusal to interfere under Article 226 emphasizes that writ jurisdiction is meant to correct clear illegality or extreme unreasonableness, not to substitute administrative judgement when statutory conditions are satisfied. The real-world financial mix-up between similarly named companies strengthened the practical logic behind the Regional Director’s decision, even though legally, mere similarity suffices for action under Section 16(1)(a).

This decision serves as useful reading for law students, junior lawyers, and the general public to understand that company identity enjoys independent statutory protection and does not depend on separate trademark rights being formally registered or successfully pursued. The law prioritizes uniqueness in names to prevent public and commercial confusion at its source itself.

Concluding Note

Recently, the High Court of Delhi delivered an important ruling explaining how the law handles disputes related to company names that are very similar to each other. The order emphasizes a very simple principle — when the government asks a company to change its name because it looks almost the same as an older existing company, the test comes from the Companies Act, 2013, not trademark law.

In this case, the Regional Director used Section 16(1)(a) to direct the Petitioner company (incorporated in 2022) to change its name because it is almost identical to an older company’s name (registered in 2008 and renamed in 2013). The Petitioner argued that the trademark application of the older company had failed, so the Regional Director should not have protected trademark rights. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that Section 16(1)(a) does not require trademark registration or infringement tests — only similarity between company names is enough for the government to act.

The Court relied heavily on the earlier decision in cGMP Pharmaplan P. Ltd. v. Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (2010), which held that the Regional Director’s power is wider and independent, requiring no proving of actual confusion. It also distinguished the 2024 ruling in Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India, where interference was allowed because the Regional Director wrongly decided trademark ownership — something not done in the present case.

Most importantly, the Court refused to interfere under Article 226 because the Regional Director acted clearly within statutory limits, noting further that a real incident had already occurred where payments were wrongly forwarded to the similarly named company’s bank account, showing how harmful near-identical names can be.

This order is a reminder for everyone, especially young lawyers and students, that every law protects something different — trademark law protects brands, while the Companies Act protects the identity of companies so that the public always knows who is who.

Case Title: SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Regional Director (Northern Region)
Order Date: 19.11.2025
Case Number: W.P.(C) 17574/2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:???? (to be updated after official upload)
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Prateek Jalan

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles

“Distinct by Name, Distinct by Law — Understanding Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013”

“Where Similarity Alone Suffices — Judicial Review of Company Name Rectification Orders”

“Company Identity v. Trademark Confusion — A Practical Reading of SKA Insurance Surveyors Case”

“Why Company Names Must Never Overlap — Lessons from Delhi High Court’s Section 16 Interpretation”

“Corporate Name Rectification and Writ Jurisdiction — Keeping Legal Tests Simple for Public Use”

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On 19 November 2025, the High Court of Delhi, presided over by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Justice Prateek Jalan, delivered an oral order in the case of SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd. v. Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Anr. The petition, registered as W.P.(C) 17574/2025, was filed to challenge a name-change direction issued by the Regional Director under Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013. The Court upheld the government’s decision, observing that the law allows intervention when a newly registered company name is identical or too similar to an existing company name, irrespective of trademark claims. The ruling emphasized that the Regional Director does not need to determine trademark rights or prove actual deception—mere similarity of company names is sufficient. The writ petition was dismissed, though the time to comply with the name-change order was extended by one month.

The dispute stemmed from the Petitioner’s incorporation in 2022 under a name that was almost the same as an older company, “SKAAD Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd.”, which was originally registered in 2008 and renamed in 2013. Notably, a director of the Petitioner had served as director in the older entity for over 13 years until December 2021, and soon after resigning, helped incorporate the new company. Both companies operate in the same line of business as insurance surveyors and loss assessors. A real financial mix-up had already occurred when payments due to the Petitioner were mistakenly deposited into Respondent No.2’s bank account because of the equally similar names—although the Court clarified that such actual confusion was not legally required to empower action under Section 16(1)(a). 

Referring to the 2010 judgment in cGMP Pharmaplan P. Ltd. v. Regional Director, which interprets the earlier but legally similar 1956 provision, the Court held that the name comparison must be made as a whole and that the government’s power is wider than a Civil Court’s power in trademark or passing-off actions. The Court also distinguished the 2024 decision in Panchhi Petha Store v. Union of India, where interference was made because the RD had wrongly decided trademark ownership—something not done in the present matter. Here, the RD order was purely on company-name similarity, and therefore within jurisdiction.

The decision reiterates that protection of a company’s name-identity is governed independently by the Companies Act and does not depend on the success or failure of trademark registration. The law aims to keep corporate identities separate and easily distinguishable in public and official records.

Disclaimer:This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi