Bignet Solutions LLP Vs. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd.

### Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case

This case involves a dispute over the use of old sound recordings for a private event. The plaintiff, a company organizing the event, sought a court declaration that playing certain pre-1965 songs, which they believed were no longer protected by copyright, did not infringe on the defendant's rights. The defendant is a company that manages music copyrights and licenses. The plaintiff feared interference from the defendant unless they paid a license fee, leading them to file the suit. The court ultimately disposed of the case after the event occurred without issues, noting the defendant's assurance that they do not claim rights over such old recordings. This highlights how copyright terms expire after a certain period, placing works in the public domain where anyone can use them freely.

### Factual Background

The plaintiff, Bignet Solutions LLP, was planning a private event on October 12, 2025. They wanted to play 15 specific sound recordings, all from before 1965, during the event. The venue hosting the event required the plaintiff to get a no-objection certificate or license from the defendant, Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd., which handles music licensing. On October 1, 2025, the plaintiff emailed the defendant asking for a license quote and included the list of song names. The defendant responded with a fee quotation. However, the plaintiff later checked and realized that under the law, copyrights in these pre-1965 sound recordings had expired, meaning they were now free for public use without needing permission or payment. The plaintiff only planned to play these old versions, not any newer recreations. Worried that not getting the license might lead to disruption of their event, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking confirmation from the court that no infringement would occur and an order stopping the defendant from demanding fees for these songs.

### Procedural Detail

The suit was filed in the Delhi High Court as a commercial civil suit under the label CS(COMM) 1094/2025, along with three interim applications for urgent relief. It came up for the first hearing on October 10, 2025. At that time, the court heard arguments from both sides. The defendant stated they do not enforce rights over public domain works, while the plaintiff promised to play only the 15 listed pre-1965 songs and to provide a certified recording of the event afterward, signed by the venue. Based on this, the court issued interim orders allowing the event to proceed without interference. After the event on October 12, 2025, the plaintiff submitted documents, including a recording, to show compliance. The matter was heard again on November 21, 2025, where both parties made further submissions. The plaintiff argued the defendant should have clarified no fee was needed, while the defendant pointed out the email lacked release dates and complained about the short recording submitted. Ultimately, the court disposed of the suit and all applications on that date, without proceeding to a full trial.

### Core Dispute

The main issue was whether the plaintiff needed to pay a license fee to the defendant for playing 15 specific pre-1965 sound recordings at a private event. The plaintiff claimed these recordings were in the public domain because their copyright had expired under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which sets a time limit on copyright protection. They argued that demanding fees for such works was wrongful. The defendant countered that they never claimed rights over these particular old recordings and that the suit was unnecessary, as they only license works they own or manage. A side issue was whether the plaintiff's email clearly specified the pre-1965 nature of the songs, and whether newer versions of some songs (like recreations in recent movies) could confuse matters. The plaintiff also sought damages, but the court found no basis for that. Overall, the dispute centered on clarifying rights over expired copyrights and preventing potential event disruption.

### Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The court began by outlining the plaintiff's suit, which sought a declaration that using the listed pre-1965 sound recordings did not infringe copyrights and an injunction against the defendant demanding fees. It noted the plaintiff's fear of interference at the event. Referring to Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the court accepted that copyrights in these recordings had expired, making them public domain and free for use without licenses. The court discussed the initial hearing on October 10, 2025, where it recorded statements: the defendant assured they do not enforce rights over non-owned or public domain works, and the plaintiff undertook to limit playback to the 15 songs and provide post-event proof. This led to interim orders allowing the event.

In the final hearing on November 21, 2025, the court examined the plaintiff's compliance evidence, including the event recording. Though the defendant criticized it as too short (about 25 minutes for a three-hour event) and unsigned by the venue, the court accepted it as sufficient, finding no contrary evidence that other songs were played. The court highlighted the plaintiff's email of October 1, 2025, which listed song names but not release dates, noting the defendant's point that some songs have modern recreations where they hold copyrights. However, the court emphasized the defendant's repeated statements—on October 10, 2025, and November 21, 2025—that they claim no rights over pre-1965 recordings and expect no licenses for them.

The court then analyzed the cause of action from paragraph 26 of the plaint: it arose on October 1, 2025, from seeking a no-objection certificate, and intensified on October 3, 2025, with the fee demand. Since the event occurred without interference and the defendant disclaimed rights, the court reasoned the core grievance was resolved. It found no merit in damages, as the plaint lacked supporting pleadings. The court clarified it expressed no opinion on allegations of misrepresentation, interference, or unjust enrichment by the defendant.

Notably, the judgement did not refer to or discuss any other case citations or precedents, relying instead on the facts, parties' statements, and direct application of Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957. This section provides that copyright in sound recordings lasts for 60 years from publication, after which it enters the public domain. The court used this to affirm that pre-1965 works are free for use. It declined the plaintiff's request for court fee refund, noting they skipped pre-institution mediation—a statutory step under the Commercial Courts Act to encourage settlements before suits—and instead used court processes for urgent relief.

### Decision

The court disposed of the suit and all pending applications, finding the cause of action satisfied. It accepted the plaintiff's compliance with the October 10, 2025, order and recorded the defendant's statement disclaiming rights over pre-1965 sound recordings. No damages were awarded, and the refund of court fees was denied. The court clarified it made no findings on broader allegations against the defendant.

### Concluding Note

This case underscores the importance of copyright expiration under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, ensuring old works become freely available to the public. It shows how courts can resolve disputes quickly when parties clarify positions, avoiding full trials. For event organizers, it highlights checking copyright status before licensing and communicating details clearly. For rights holders, it reminds them to avoid demanding fees for public domain works. Overall, it promotes fair use of cultural materials while encouraging amicable resolutions over litigation.

Case Title: Bignet Solutions LLP Vs. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd.  

Order Date: November 21, 2025  

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1094/2025  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1094  

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Here are 5 suitable titles for this legal analytical article to be published as a legal research paper in a legal journal:  

1. Expiry of Copyright in Sound Recordings: Analyzing Public Domain Usage in Bignet Solutions LLP v. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd.  

2. Navigating License Demands for Pre-1965 Works: Lessons from the Delhi High Court's Disposal in a Music Copyright Dispute  

3. Public Domain and Event Licensing: A Case Study on Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957  

4. Resolving Apprehended Infringement: Judicial Approach to Expired Copyrights in Private Events  

5. Clarifying Rights Over Vintage Sound Recordings: Insights from a Swiftly Disposed Commercial Suit

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**Delhi High Court: No License Needed for Pre-1965 Sound Recordings in Public Domain – Suit Disposed of**  

In a significant ruling clarifying the scope of copyright protection for vintage music, the Delhi High Court in the case of **Bignet Solutions LLP v. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd., CS(COMM) 1094/2025**, decided on **21st November 2025** by **Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora**, has held that sound recordings published before 1965 fall in the public domain under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and no license or permission is required from any entity, including music licensing companies, to play such recordings.

The plaintiff had approached the court apprehending interference in a private event scheduled for 12th October 2025 after the venue insisted on a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) from Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd., a well-known music licensing company. When the plaintiff sought a license quotation for 15 specific pre-1965 songs, Novex quoted a fee, which prompted the plaintiff to file the suit claiming that the copyright in those recordings had long expired and the demand was unlawful.

On the very first hearing on 10th October 2025, the court recorded the statement of Novex that it does not claim or enforce any rights over sound recordings published before 1965 and does not require any license for such works. Based on mutual undertakings, the court permitted the event to proceed peacefully. After the event concluded without any disruption, the plaintiff submitted proof that only the 15 listed pre-1965 songs were played.

During the final hearing on 21st November 2025, senior counsel for Novex reiterated that these particular recordings never formed part of their repertoire and that they never intended to demand any fee for public-domain works. The court accepted the defendant’s categorical stand, noted that the event had been held smoothly, and held that the cause of action stood fully satisfied. Accordingly, the suit and all pending applications were disposed of. The court, however, declined the plaintiff’s prayer for damages and refund of court fees, observing that the plaintiff had bypassed the mandatory pre-institution mediation mechanism and directly invoked urgent court process.

The order serves as an important reminder that once 60 years have passed from the year of publication of a sound recording, it enters the public domain and can be freely used by anyone without payment or permission.

**Disclaimer:** This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts

Brief Introductory Head Note

The case of Ganraj Enterprises v. Landmark Crafts Ltd. & Anr., decided by the Delhi High Court on 02 December 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, concerns a trademark rectification appeal filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The central issue revolves around the word mark “HP” registered by Landmark Crafts Ltd. (earlier Landmark Fasteners Pvt. Ltd.) and the competing claim of use and adoption of the mark “HP+” by Ganraj Enterprises.

The dispute required the Court to examine whether the appellant had the legal right to seek rectification of the respondent’s trademark, whether the respondent’s registration was obtained through misrepresentation, whether territorial limitations in one registration automatically extend to another associated registration, and whether the appellant was genuinely a “person aggrieved” under trademark law.

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Factual Background

The story of the trademark “HP” begins in 1995 when Mr. Pankaj Lidoo, the director of Landmark Crafts Ltd., adopted the word mark HP for self-drilling screws and blind rivets. He initially carried on business through his proprietorship “Landmark Engineers”. In 2002, this business was converted into “Landmark Fasteners Pvt. Ltd.”

The company filed a trademark application for the word mark “HP” in 2007 under TM No. 1566805 in Class 6, claiming user since 15 December 1995. Registration was granted in 2011, but with a territorial restriction limiting the sale of goods to Uttar Pradesh only.

Another application for the same word mark “HP” was filed in 2014 under TM No. 2848372, which was later registered in 2018. Unlike the earlier mark, this second registration had no territorial limitation, giving the proprietor pan-India protection.

Both trademarks were later assigned to Landmark Crafts Ltd. by assignment deeds dated 05 August 2013 and 29 April 2019. The change was recorded by the Registrar of Trade Marks in 2017 and 2019 respectively.

During this period, Ganraj Enterprises adopted the logo mark “HP+” for similar goods in Class 6 and filed four trademark applications between December 2014 and December 2015. The Registrar of Trade Marks cited the respondent’s earlier registrations as conflicting marks. Landmark Crafts opposed all four of the appellant’s applications. As three of these applications were abandoned and one refused, the appellant initiated rectification proceedings to cancel the respondent’s trademark TM No. 1566805.

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Procedural Detail

Ganraj Enterprises filed a rectification petition seeking cancellation of the respondent’s trademark “HP” registered under TM No. 1566805, claiming that it was deceptively similar to their own “HP+” logo mark and that the respondent's claim of user since 1995 was false.

On 10 November 2022, the Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the rectification application, holding that Landmark Crafts Ltd. was the prior adopter and user of the mark “HP”, that the appellant was not a “person aggrieved”, and that no valid grounds for rectification had been established.

The appellant challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.

During the pendency of the appeal, three of the appellant’s own trademark applications had already been abandoned and the fourth had been refused.

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Core Dispute

The core dispute before the Court was whether the registration of the word mark “HP” under TM No. 1566805 should be cancelled.

Several related questions arose:

Whether the appellant, claiming to use the mark “HP+” since 2014, had the locus standi of a “person aggrieved” to seek rectification.

Whether the respondent’s claim of user since 1995 was false, constituting misrepresentation.

Whether the territorial restriction placed on TM No. 1566805 should automatically apply to TM No. 2848372 by virtue of Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act (association of trademarks).

Whether the respondent could legally prevent the appellant from using “HP+” in the State of Maharashtra given that TM No. 1566805 was territorially limited to Uttar Pradesh.

Whether the Registrar’s findings regarding the appellant’s proof of use were correct.

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Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court began by examining the foundation of the trademark rights claimed by Landmark Crafts. TM No. 1566805, though limited to Uttar Pradesh, was legally valid. TM No. 2848372 enjoyed nationwide protection without territorial restriction. The appellant’s challenge to the first registration could not automatically affect the second.

The Court addressed the appellant’s allegation that the respondent’s user claim since 1995 was fraudulent. However, the appellant itself had stated in written arguments that the issue of user since 1995 was being contested in a parallel commercial suit and should not be adjudicated in this rectification appeal. The Court accepted this concession and declined to rule on the factual claim relating to user from 1995.

Thereafter, the Court examined whether the territorial restriction of one registration could be applied to another registration under Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act dealing with association of trademarks. Relying on Foodlink F&B Holdings India (P) Ltd v. Wow Momo Foods (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4719, the Court held that the association of trademarks does not mean that the limitations or disclaimers applicable to one registration automatically apply to another. Each registration stands independently unless the Registrar explicitly records a limitation in the certificate. The Court also cited judgments such as Skol Breweries Ltd. v. Som Distilleries & Breweries Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1750 and Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Poma-Ex Products, MANU/MH/1661/2017, reiterating that conditions in one registration cannot be imported into another.

Turning to locus standi, the Court clarified that a person is “aggrieved” if their legitimate use of a trademark is obstructed by an existing registration. Since the respondent had opposed all four of the appellant’s applications and had filed a commercial suit seeking to restrain their use of “HP+”, the appellant indeed had the locus to maintain a rectification petition.

However, having locus standi does not automatically justify rectification. The burden to prove grounds for cancellation is separate.

The Court then examined the appellant’s evidence of prior use. The appellant claimed user since 2014, but many invoices produced showed the term “HP+” inserted later by handwriting. The Registrar was justified in doubting such material, and the Court found no error in this finding. Even if the appellant’s use from 2014 was accepted, the respondent had already placed on record invoices showing use of “HP” since 2006, and even in Maharashtra since 2010. Moreover, TM No. 2848372 granted pan-India protection from 2014 onwards, predating the appellant’s adoption of the mark “HP+”.

The appellant argued that due to the territorial restriction in TM No. 1566805, the respondent could not market products under “HP” in Maharashtra. The Court rejected this by explaining an important legal distinction: a territorial restriction in a trademark registration does not prevent the proprietor from conducting business outside the restricted zone; it only affects their ability to sue for infringement in other territories. The proprietor may still rely on the common-law remedy of passing off in other regions.

Thus, the Court held that the respondent was not barred from using the mark “HP” in Maharashtra, and the appellant’s argument had no legal basis.

The Court concluded that none of the grounds raised for rectification were valid. The concurrent findings of the Registrar were correct, and the registration deserved protection.

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Decision

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Registrar’s order dated 10 November 2022. TM No. 1566805 for the word mark “HP” remains valid. The Court also clarified that the rectification relating to TM No. 2848372 would be decided independently in separate pending proceedings.

All pending applications in the appeal were disposed of.

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Concluding Note

This judgment offers valuable clarity on the functioning of trademark law, especially on issues related to territorial limitations, association of trademarks under Section 16, determination of prior user, and the standard for being considered a “person aggrieved”. The Court emphasized that limitations imposed on one trademark cannot be mechanically extended to another trademark unless explicitly stated. It clarified the difference between territorial restriction for infringement purposes and the right to sell goods across India. It also reaffirmed that mere assertion of user without reliable documentary proof is insufficient in trademark disputes.

The decision reinforces the principle that rectification of a registered trademark is a serious remedy that cannot be granted lightly. It requires clear, credible, and well-substantiated grounds. Where a party fails to disprove the established user of the registered proprietor and cannot show genuine injury or deceptive similarity, the registered mark deserves protection. The judgment is therefore a significant contribution to trademark jurisprudence, especially in cases involving competing adoption of short alphabetical marks.

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Case Details

Case Title: Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd. & Anr.

Order Date: 02 December 2025

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____ (As reflected on the order header)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Understanding Territorial Limits and Trademark Association: A Study of Ganraj Enterprises v. Landmark Crafts Ltd.

2. Rectification of Trademarks and the Standard of Proof: A Detailed Analysis of the HP–HP+ Dispute

3. Prior User vs. Subsequent Adoption: Legal Lessons from the Delhi High Court’s HP Trademark Judgment

4. The Concept of “Person Aggrieved” Under Indian Trademark Law: An Examination Through Recent Case Law

5. Trademark Limitations, Registration Rights, and Passing Off: Insights from a 2025 Delhi High Court Decision

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Delhi High Court Upholds Validity of “HP” Trademark in Rectification Appeal Filed by Ganraj Enterprises

In Ganraj Enterprises v. Landmark Crafts Ltd. & Anr., C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022, decided on 02 December 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi, the Court dismissed a rectification appeal seeking cancellation of the respondent’s trademark “HP” registered under TM No. 1566805. The appellant, Ganraj Enterprises, argued that the respondent’s claim of prior user was false and that the territorial limitation in the respondent’s registration restricted use of the mark outside Uttar Pradesh.

The Court noted that the respondent had placed credible material showing long-standing use of the mark “HP” since the mid-1990s and certainly from 2006 onwards. The appellant, on the other hand, failed to produce reliable evidence of its own claimed use of the mark “HP+” since 2014, with many invoices appearing handwritten or modified later. The Court held that the Registrar was justified in dismissing the rectification petition on the ground that the appellant had not established any valid basis for cancellation.

The Court also clarified that the territorial restriction attached to one trademark registration cannot automatically apply to another, even if both registrations are associated under Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act. Each registration stands independently. The presence of the respondent’s second registration, TM No. 2848372, which has nationwide protection, further weighed against the appellant’s claim.

Finding no infirmity in the Registrar’s reasoning, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the respondent’s trademark rights.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs Office of the Regional Director

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of the Case

The case titled Orient Cables (India) Limited v. Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors., W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025, was decided by the Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi on 1 December 2025. The petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the Regional Director (Northern Region) from proceeding with a name-rectification application filed by Respondent No. 3 under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013. The core issue centered on whether the application filed by Respondent No. 3 was barred by limitation and whether the Regional Director could simultaneously exercise suo motu power under Section 16(1)(a) without notice to the petitioner.

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Factual Background

Orient Cables (India) Limited was originally incorporated on 15 September 2005 under the Companies Act, 1956. At the time of incorporation, a typographical error existed in the company’s name. This error was corrected, and the Registrar of Companies issued a fresh Certificate of Incorporation on 24 April 2007.

Many years later, on 13 December 2024, the company was converted into a public limited company under Section 18 of the Companies Act, 2013. During this conversion, its name was changed to Orient Cables (India) Limited.

On 8 August 2025, Respondent No. 3 filed an application before the Regional Director under Section 16(1)(b) of the 2013 Act, seeking rectification of the petitioner’s name. The petitioner opposed the application on the ground that it was hopelessly time-barred, since the limitation period of three years prescribed under Section 16 had expired long ago. According to the petitioner, the limitation expired on 24 April 2010, which was three years after the corrected Certificate of Incorporation was issued in 2007.

The petitioner also stated that it had already filed its reply raising the issue of limitation before the Regional Director, and a hearing was conducted on 29 September 2025. During that hearing, the Regional Director allegedly indicated the possibility of exercising suo motu power under Section 16(1)(a). This alarmed the petitioner, particularly because the company was in the process of applying for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) and any adverse order on its name could cause disruption to the IPO process.

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Procedural Detail

The petitioner approached the High Court through a writ petition. It prayed for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Regional Director from proceeding with the application filed under Section 16(1)(b). The petitioner argued that the application was time-barred and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, representing the Union of India, opposed the petition and stated that no suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) had been exercised or was intended to be exercised. They also clarified that the procedure under Section 16(1)(a) is completely different and requires issuance of an independent notice before any action can be taken.

Respondent No. 3, the applicant before the Regional Director, argued that the limitation issue could only be decided by the Regional Director during adjudication of the application and that the writ petition was premature.

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Core Dispute

The central questions before the Court were clearly defined. First, whether the High Court should interfere at this stage to prevent the Regional Director from hearing the application under Section 16(1)(b). Second, whether the Regional Director could concurrently or accidentally invoke its suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a) even though no independent notice was issued. Third, whether the petitioner’s concern regarding limitation should be decided by the High Court or by the Regional Director in the first instance.

The primary dispute revolved around the bar of limitation and the fear that the authority might unexpectedly exercise suo motu power without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

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Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court carefully considered the submissions of all parties. It observed that the application filed by Respondent No. 3 was expressly under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013. Therefore, the Regional Director’s examination must necessarily remain within the framework of that provision. The Court stated that the question whether the application was filed within the limitation period is itself a point which the Regional Director is fully competent to decide.

The Court found merit in the arguments advanced by Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 that the issue of limitation should be adjudicated by the authority in the first instance. Since the Regional Director must decide the matter under Section 16(1)(b), it is appropriate that the authority first records a specific finding on limitation. Only thereafter can the matter proceed on merits.

The Court clarified that the Regional Director may decide both limitation and merits through a single consolidated order, but the authority must specifically record its findings on the limitation objection raised by the petitioner.

The Court then addressed the petitioner’s apprehension that the Regional Director might simultaneously exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a). The Court held that such apprehension must be addressed because principles of natural justice demand that no such power can be exercised without issuing prior notice to the affected company. The Court accepted the submission of the Regional Director’s counsel that no such notice had been issued and that there was no intention to exercise that jurisdiction.

The Court reiterated that Section 16(1)(a) is distinct from Section 16(1)(b) and cannot be invoked without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. The Court made it clear that the Regional Director, while deciding Respondent No. 3’s application, must restrict itself only to Section 16(1)(b) and cannot invoke suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a).

The Court also granted protection to the petitioner by directing that if the Regional Director decides the limitation issue against the petitioner and allows the application of Respondent No. 3, the order must be kept in suspension for one week to enable the petitioner to avail legal remedies.

The Court also noted the urgency raised by the petitioner regarding its IPO process and ensured procedural fairness by directing that the next hearing, initially fixed for 3 December 2025, be postponed by one week.

The Court relied on the principles laid down in T.T. Ltd. v. Union of India (MANU/TN/6461/2022) while discussing limitation under Section 16.

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Decision

The High Court did not prohibit the Regional Director from proceeding with the application. Instead, it directed the Regional Director to first decide the issue of limitation raised by the petitioner. The Regional Director was instructed to record specific findings on the limitation objection. The authority was also barred from invoking suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a) while deciding the pending application.

The Court protected the petitioner by ordering a one-week suspension of any adverse order, ensuring that the petitioner would have adequate time to seek legal remedies. With these directions, the petition was disposed of.

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Concluding Note

This decision reflects a balanced judicial approach. The Court did not prematurely interfere with statutory proceedings but ensured that the adjudicating authority respects procedural fairness and natural justice. The ruling underscores that limitations under Section 16(1)(b) must be determined by the Regional Director, who must record a clear finding before proceeding to merits. At the same time, the Court firmly protected the petitioner against surprise invocation of suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a), reinforcing that authorities cannot bypass mandatory procedural safeguards.

The judgment becomes an important reference point for companies facing name-rectification proceedings, especially where questions of limitation and the scope of Sections 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b) are involved. It clarifies that the Regional Director must act strictly within statutory limits and that courts will intervene only to ensure fairness, not to prematurely decide matters meant for the authority.

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Case Details

Case Title: Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors.

Order Date: 01 December 2025

Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Delhi High Court Directs Regional Director to First Decide Limitation in Company Name-Rectification Proceedings

In Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs. Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors., W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025, decided on 01 December 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi, the Court addressed a challenge raised by Orient Cables (India) Limited against proceedings initiated under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 for rectification of its corporate name.

The petitioner argued that the application filed by Respondent No. 3 before the Regional Director was hopelessly barred by limitation, since the three-year period prescribed under Section 16 had expired in 2010, three years after the corrected Certificate of Incorporation was issued in 2007. The petitioner further expressed apprehension that the Regional Director might exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) without notice, despite the pending application being under Section 16(1)(b).

The Court held that the issue of limitation lies squarely within the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and must be decided by the authority before dealing with the merits of the rectification request. The Court directed the Regional Director to first record clear findings on the limitation objection raised by the petitioner. It also clarified that while deciding the pending application, the Regional Director shall exercise only its jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(b) and shall not invoke suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a) without issuing a separate notice, as such action would violate principles of natural justice.

The Court further ordered that if the Regional Director decides the limitation issue against the petitioner and allows the application, the resulting order shall remain suspended for one week to enable the petitioner to pursue legal remedies. The next hearing before the Regional Director was also directed to be postponed by one week.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan Vs The Artists Planet

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of the Case

This matter arises from a suit filed by renowned Bollywood actor Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan seeking protection of his personality rights, publicity rights, trademark rights and reputation against various parties involved in impersonation, unauthorized commercial use of his name and image, sale of merchandise, creation and circulation of AI-generated deepfake videos, face-morphed photographs and obscene pornographic content falsely depicting him. The Delhi High Court, vide order dated 27 November 2025 passed by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora in CS(COMM) 1269/2025, granted a detailed ex-parte interim injunction, issued wide-ranging takedown and blocking directions, and clarified the obligations of social media intermediaries, government authorities and online sellers while dealing with misuse of celebrity identity and harmful AI-generated content. The Court also emphasized the importance of the statutory grievance redressal mechanism under the IT Rules for swift action.

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Factual Background

Ajay Devgn is one of India’s most celebrated actors with a career spanning over four decades. His performances, awards such as the Padma Shri, and presence as director and producer have created an extraordinary goodwill attached to his name, appearance and voice. His stage name and its variations are registered trademarks in multiple classes. He also commands a very strong digital presence through millions of followers on Instagram, Facebook and other platforms. This popularity and distinct identity make him a commercially valuable personality whose attributes cannot be used without authorization.

The plaintiff discovered that several entities were misusing his identity in different ways. Some were selling posters, hoodies, stickers, caps and other merchandise carrying his name and image without permission. Others were impersonating him or falsely advertising that he could be booked through their websites. More seriously, multiple social media accounts were posting AI-generated deepfake photographs and videos showing him in disrespectful, obscene or pornographic situations with female celebrities. Several unknown persons and pornographic websites carried explicit morphed content falsely depicting him. He argued that these acts not only violated his legal rights but also damaged his dignity, reputation and public image.

Due to these widespread infringements across different platforms, the plaintiff approached the Delhi High Court seeking immediate injunctive protection and orders directing removal and blocking of the infringing content.

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Procedural Details

Multiple interlocutory applications accompanied the main suit. The Court allowed exemption from notice to government defendants under Section 80(2) CPC as they were proforma parties. It also granted additional time for furnishing certain statutory certificates under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. Further, the Court exempted the plaintiff from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act as the matter required urgent interim relief, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815.

The Court directed issuance of summons to all infringing defendants (Defendants 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11) and to YouTube/Google (Defendant 7), while treating several entities like Meta, X Corp., MeitY, DoT and others as proforma defendants for ensuring compliance with blocking and takedown directions.

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to hear the application for ex-parte interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

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Core Dispute

The central dispute concerns whether the defendants, through unauthorized commercial activities, AI-generated deepfake content, obscene morphed images, impersonation and sale of merchandise, violated the plaintiff’s personality rights, publicity rights, trademark rights and reputation.

Another major issue is the responsibility of social media platforms and government authorities in controlling and removing harmful AI-generated content, and whether immediate court intervention was warranted when statutory grievance mechanisms under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 already exist.

The dispute therefore touches upon multiple overlapping areas of law, including:

Personality and publicity rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution

Statutory trademark protection under the Trade Marks Act, 1999

Performers’ and moral rights under Sections 38, 38A and 38B of the Copyright Act, 1957

Common law doctrines of passing off, unfair competition and misappropriation

Obligations of intermediaries under the IT Act and IT Rules

Regulation of deepfakes and non-consensual explicit content through emerging technological frameworks

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Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court began by observing that Ajay Devgn is unquestionably a celebrity with enormous recognition and goodwill. It noted that his persona, including his name, image, likeness and voice, had acquired distinctiveness and commercial value due to a long and illustrious career. These attributes therefore deserved legal protection.

Recognition of Personality Rights

The Court relied upon three earlier decisions:

1. D.M. Entertainment v. Baby Gift House, MANU/DE/2043/2010

2. Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India (2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914)

3. Jaikishan Kaku Bhai Sarf alias Jackie Shroff v. The Peppy Store (2024 SCC OnLine Del 3664)

These cases firmly establish that a celebrity’s personality traits—name, image, likeness and voice—are protectable under Indian law. Unauthorized use for commercial gain amounts to violation of personality rights.

Based on these precedents, the Court held that the plaintiff’s personality rights were prima facie infringed by Defendants who were selling merchandise or impersonating him.

Protection Against Deepfakes and Harmful AI Content

The Court expressed strong concern about AI-generated deepfakes that portray a celebrity in compromising, obscene or humiliating scenarios. Such content can seriously harm reputation and dignity. It held that the plaintiff was entitled to prevent the making, circulation and monetisation of such content, whether posted by identified or anonymous users.

The Court classified infringing content into categories:

Unauthorized merchandise

Impersonation and false association

AI-generated deepfakes

Face-morphed images

Explicit and pornographic morphed content

It held that all these harmed the plaintiff’s rights and required immediate intervention.

Role of Intermediaries and Statutory Mechanisms

The Court examined the duties of intermediaries like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and X Corp. under the IT Rules. It noted that Rule 3(2) requires removal of non-consensual intimate content within 24 hours of complaint. It criticized the trend of directly approaching courts without first using the statutory grievance mechanism, emphasizing that such mechanisms were designed to provide faster relief and reduce judicial burden.

The Court clarified that if complainants bypass the statutory mechanism in future, they may not receive urgent ex-parte relief unless they first approach the intermediary’s grievance officer.

Directions for Take Down and Blocking

Despite cautioning against bypassing the IT Rules, the Court granted protection in this case due to the serious nature of the content and the urgency of preventing further harm. It issued sweeping injunctions restraining the defendants from:

Using the plaintiff’s name, image, voice, likeness

Creating or circulating deepfake or face-morphed content

Monetizing content generated using AI models trained on plaintiff’s images

Selling merchandise bearing his persona

The Court directed:

Immediate removal of infringing URLs within 72 hours

Delisting of infringing merchandise

Blocking of pornographic websites through MeitY and DoT

Provision of Basic Subscriber Information (BSI) of unknown infringers

Suspension of domain names hosting impersonation pages

Takedown of infringing content by YouTube, Meta, X Corp. and others

The Court imposed a coordinated compliance mechanism, requiring intermediaries and government departments to work together and respond to plaintiff’s future takedown requests within strict timelines.

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Decision

The Delhi High Court granted a detailed and far-reaching ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of Ajay Devgn. It restrained all infringing defendants and unknown persons from misusing the plaintiff’s personality attributes in any manner, including through AI-generated deepfake videos and morphed images. The Court directed takedown, delisting and blocking of infringing content and websites. It also laid down important future guidelines, emphasizing the mandatory use of the IT Rules grievance mechanism before seeking judicial intervention, and required intermediaries like X Corp. to establish proper representation and communication channels for advance service in such cases.

This order reinforces judicial intolerance towards misuse of celebrity identity, defamation through new technologies like AI, and exploitation of personality rights without authorization.

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Concluding Note

This case represents one of the most comprehensive judicial interventions in India on misuse of celebrity identity in the context of emerging technologies such as generative AI and deepfakes. It demonstrates the Court’s recognition of the increasing threat posed by manipulated digital content and its ability to cause irreversible harm to individual dignity and reputation. The judgment strikes a balance between strong protection of personality rights and encouraging responsible use of statutory grievance redressal mechanisms under the IT Rules.

The Court has sent a clear message that identity misappropriation, unauthorized commercial exploitation and circulation of AI-generated explicit content are serious violations that will invite strong judicial response. At the same time, it has clarified that intermediaries must maintain transparent communication channels and comply swiftly with takedown directions. This order therefore contributes to the evolving body of Indian jurisprudence on digital rights, celebrity protection, online safety, and regulation of AI-generated content.

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Case Details

Case Title: Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan v. The Artists Planet & Ors.

Order Date: 27 November 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1269/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer and Author Note

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for the Research Paper

1. Protecting Celebrity Identity in the Age of AI: A Study of Ajay Devgan v. The Artists Planet

2. Deepfakes, Personality Rights and Judicial Protection: An Analysis of the Delhi High Court’s 2025 Order

3. Digital Misuse of Celebrity Persona: Comprehensive Legal Insight from Ajay Devgan’s Case

4. AI-Generated Harm and Personality Rights Enforcement: Emerging Principles from Indian Courts

5. From Deepfakes to Domain Blocking: A New Framework for Protecting Celebrity Rights in India

======

In Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan v. The Artists Planet & Ors., CS(COMM) 1269/2025, decided on 27 November 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi, the Court granted an extensive ex-parte interim injunction protecting the personality and publicity rights of actor Ajay Devgan. The order was passed in response to widespread misuse of the actor’s name, image, likeness, and persona across multiple online platforms.

The Court noted that the plaintiff is a veteran and widely recognized film personality whose name, appearance, and voice possess significant goodwill and commercial value. The suit highlighted various infringing acts by several defendants, including impersonation, unauthorized sale of merchandise bearing his name and photographs, creation and circulation of AI-generated deepfake videos, morphed images depicting him with other celebrities, and pornographic content falsely showing him in obscene situations. Many online platforms and unknown entities hosted or facilitated dissemination of the infringing material.

After examining the evidence, the Court held that the plaintiff has a prima facie case for protection under personality rights, trademark law, performers’ rights, and common law doctrines such as passing off and misappropriation. Citing earlier decisions, including D.M. Entertainment v. Baby Gift House, Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India, and Jackie Shroff v. The Peppy Store, the Court confirmed that a celebrity’s identity traits are protectable, and unauthorized commercial or reputational misuse warrants judicial restraint.

The Court issued directions restraining defendants from using the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or image in any form, including deepfake technology, face-morphing, AI tools, or commercial merchandise. It ordered immediate takedown of infringing links across YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, X Corp., and various e-commerce platforms. It also directed government authorities such as MeitY and DoT to block pornographic websites hosting morphed content and required intermediaries to provide Basic Subscriber Information of unknown infringers. The Court further observed that plaintiffs must ordinarily use the statutory grievance redressal mechanism under the IT Rules before seeking ex-parte judicial relief but granted protection in this case due to the seriousness of the harm.

This order is a significant step in strengthening legal safeguards against deepfakes, online impersonation, and misuse of celebrity identity in the digital age.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

====

Aristo Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Healing Pharma India Pvt. Ltd.

Brief Introductory Head Note — Summary of Case

This case decides an important issue in pharmaceutical trademark law: Can a company claim exclusive rights over a trademark that is created by shortening (clipping) a generic medicine name that is internationally recognised by the World Health Organisation? The High Court held that it cannot. Even when a trademark is formally registered, if it is substantially taken from a globally recognised International Non-Proprietary Name (INN)—which by nature belongs to the public—it cannot be monopolised. The Court also clarified that the mere fact that the rival trademark contains the full clipped portion of the Plaintiff’s trademark is not automatically infringement if the common part is generic or descriptive. The ruling heavily relied on earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court on descriptive marks and public domain names.
Factual Background

The Plaintiff, Aristo Pharmaceutical Private Limited, is a pharmaceutical company engaged in manufacturing pain-relief medicines. In 2003, the Plaintiff invented the brand name “ACECLO” by trimming the last five letters from the generic name Aceclofenac, an anti-inflammatory pain medicine recognised as a global INN by the World Health Organisation. Initially, the Plaintiff applied for registration with the prefix “ARISTO ACECLO”, which was granted in 2005. However, instead of using the full mark as registered, the Plaintiff marketed its products using only “ACECLO” prominently, making the prefix ARISTO insignificant on medicine packaging. Later in 2011, the Plaintiff also secured registration of the word mark “ACECLO” and its variant “ACECLO-MR.”

In 2024, the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant Healing Pharma India Private Limited launched tablets under the name “ACECLOHEAL-MR,” “ACECLOHEAL-SP,” and “ACECLOHEAL-PLUS.” The Plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice in October 2024, claiming infringement and alleging that the Defendant’s mark unfairly used its registered trademark. The Defendant denied this claim, stating that “ACECLOHEAL” was an honest adoption combining first six letters of INN “Aceclofenac” + its own business name suffix “Heal”, and that no company can claim exclusive rights over an INN or any shortened (clipped) part of it under Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Procedural History and Procedural Details

The Plaintiff filed Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025 along with Interim Application (L) No. 26226 of 2025 before the Commercial Division of the High Court at Bombay seeking a temporary injunction to stop the Defendant from using ACECLOHEAL or ACECLO in any form. The matter was heard by Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh, reserved on 14 November 2025, and finally pronounced on 25 November 2025. The Court analysed evidence including photographs, invoices, registrations, and the list of INNs produced by the Defendant.

Aristo Pharmaceutical Vs Healin…
Core Dispute (Issue for Determination)

The central legal question was:

“Does formal registration of a trademark guarantee exclusive rights if the trademark is heavily derived from a globally accepted generic INN medicinal name?”
Detailed Reasoning and Judicial Discussion by the Court (With Case Law and Citations Examined for Reasoning)

The Court began by observing that the Plaintiff’s original 2005 registration was “ARISTO ACECLO.” However, the Plaintiff itself admitted that it did not use the mark in the manner it was registered, but instead used only the clipped term ACECLO prominently, reducing the ARISTO prefix to insignificance. The Court held that this inconsistent usage undermines any claim of acquired distinctiveness from 2003 onward, because a company cannot claim reputation for a mark it never actually commercially used.

The core legal defence was based on Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibits registration of:


commonly used or accepted names of a chemical compound, and


names declared by the World Health Organisation as international non-proprietary names (INN), or any name deceptively similar to such INN.

Section 13 also creates a legal assumption (deeming fiction) that any such mark registered in violation of this rule shall be considered wrongly entered or wrongly remaining on the register under Section 57, even if there is no direct challenge to its validity filed by a party.

The Defendant produced official WHO INN lists showing that “Aceclofenac” is an INN, meaning it is a public domain generic medicine name that no company can own exclusively. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s interpretation that “deceptively similar” means only similar sounding words like “Aceclodenac” and not shortened words like “Aceclo.” The Court reasoned that:

A shortened or clipped mark that still carries the same meaning, association, or connotation of the original INN is also non-proprietary, descriptive, and falls within Section 13 prohibition.

To support this reasoning, the Court cited the Supreme Court decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. vs. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 2062 (Neutral Citation not provided), holding that when part of a rival trademark is descriptive, the court must compare only the “distinct portions,” not the common descriptive part.

The Court also relied on a landmark principle from McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, which states that abbreviated versions of a generic medicine name are still generic if they continue to carry the original meaning or association.

Further, the Court strongly applied the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Sun Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd. vs. Hetero Healthcare Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2580 (marked before Supreme Court for principle reference), which held that when both parties adopt parts of INN name “Letrozole,” no exclusivity can be claimed for clipped portions.

Another crucial citation examined was Panacea Biotec Ltd. vs. Recon Ltd., 1996 PTC 16, where the Delhi High Court ruled that a mark derived from a generic medicine name is descriptive, cannot claim monopoly, and exclusive rights must be denied, because allowing ownership over generic pharmaceutical name is dangerous for public interest, competition, and free trade.

The Court then compared rival marks ACECLO vs. ACECLOHEAL, holding:

Both are clipped from “Aceclofenac” by deleting last five letters. The Defendant only added its own company identity word “Heal” to it. This is prima facie honest adoption. Because the shared part is INN-derived and descriptive, the Defendant cannot be restrained from using it.

On passing-off, the Court held that passing-off requires intentional misrepresentation, i.e., Defendant must attempt to sell its goods by pretending they are Plaintiff’s goods. The Court saw no such misrepresentation in packaging, font, style, or pricing. Both medicine packs visibly looked different. The Defendant also produced evidence showing several other companies also use clipped term “Aceclo,” proving it is widely used in the market. Pricing difference between rival products was also admitted.

Thus, the likelihood of public confusion is very low, because:

Medicine is Schedule-H drug (only on prescription),
Packaging is visually distinguishable,
Price is different,
And the common part of mark is descriptive and public domain.

Finally, the Court held:

When a trademark is taken substantially from an INN or its shortened part, registration does not grant exclusive monopoly, Section 13 overrides exclusivity claims, and infringement and passing-off relief must fail.
Decision (Operative Order)

The Interim Application seeking injunction was dismissed, holding that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement or passing-off, because the trademark is derived from a global INN which is non-proprietary and public property.

Aristo Pharmaceutical Vs Healin…
Concluding Note

This ruling reinforces a balanced, fair, and public-interest-aligned approach in pharmaceutical trademark disputes. It highlights that trademark law, even when deployed in a commercial suit, must serve competition, consumer welfare, and prevent unfair monopolies—especially in medicines which directly impact the common man. It makes clear that while innovators can brand their medicines, they cannot own or block generic or internationally recognised medicine names, even in clipped form, if the shortened mark continues to reflect the same global INN association. The judgement is helpful not only for law students but also for manufacturers of generic medicines, chemists, and consumers fighting inflated monopoly claims.
Case Details (As Asked to be Reflected at Bottom)

Case Title: Aristo Pharmaceutical Private Limited Vs. Healing Pharma India Private Limited & Others
Order Date: 25 November 2025
Case Number: Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:22177
Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Commercial Division
Judge: Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

At the end, add this text:

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
Suggested Journal Article Titles

Here are five suitable research paper titles for legal journal publication:

“Public Domain vs Private Monopoly: The ACECLO Trademark Battle and Section 13 Interpretation.”
“Clipped INN-Derived Pharmaceutical Trademarks: The Thin Line Between Branding and Descriptive Public Property.”
“Trademark Exclusivity in Medicines: Why Global INN Names Cannot Be Owned Even After Registration.”
“Pharmaceutical Trademark Infringement and Passing-Off Claims in INN-Derived Marks: A Consumer Welfare Perspective.”
“Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 as a Shield Against Monopolization of Generic Drug Names: The ACECLOHEAL Dispute.”

======


The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Commercial Division, in the case Aristo Pharmaceutical Private Limited vs. Healing Pharma India Private Limited & Others, by order dated 25 November 2025, in Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025, decided by Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh, has refused to grant interim injunction to the Plaintiff in a pharmaceutical trademark infringement and passing-off suit.

The dispute arose when the Plaintiff, holder of the registered trademark ACECLO, claimed that the Defendant’s adoption of ACECLOHEAL-MR, ACECLOHEAL-SP, and ACECLOHEAL-PLUS amounted to infringement and dishonest imitation. The Plaintiff argued that Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 gave it exclusive rights over the mark and that no similarity challenge had been raised against its registration.

The Defendant countered that ACECLO is merely a clipped version of the WHO-recognised International Non-Proprietary Name “Aceclofenac,” and therefore falls under Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibits monopoly or proprietary claims over INNs or any part thereof if the clipped form still carries the same meaning. The Defendant also argued that it had honestly added the suffix “Heal”—taken from its own company identity—to create a distinct composite mark.

The Court agreed with the Defendant, holding that a clipped or shortened version of an INN, which still points to the generic medicine, remains descriptive and public property (publici juris), and cannot be monopolized or protected exclusively, even if registered. The Court also noted that both marks were visually, phonetically and conceptually different in font, packaging and trade dress, and that the medicines were Schedule-H prescription drugs, further reducing the possibility of confusion. No evidence of intentional misrepresentation for unlawful gain (a core element of the tort of passing-off) was found.

Accordingly, the Interim Application seeking injunction was dismissed.=======

Capital Meters Ltd. Vs B.P. Electric

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of case

This case revolves around a dispute over the use of the trade mark CAPITAL in the electrical goods market. Capital Meters Ltd., a company making electrical products like meters and switches since 1986, took legal action against B.P. Electric for using the same trade mark on fans. The court found that the defendant's use of the mark caused confusion among buyers, leading them to think the fans came from the plaintiff, and this hurt the plaintiff's business reputation built over years of sales worth crores of rupees.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Factual Background

The plaintiff company has been in the business of manufacturing and selling various electrical items such as electrical meters, transformers, switches, relays, alarms, and both industrial and domestic electric appliances under the trade mark CAPITAL starting from 1986. This trade mark CAPITAL is already registered for measuring apparatus and instruments, including energy meters, under Clause 9 of the Fourth Schedule of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. To expand protection, the plaintiff applied for registration in Classes 7, 9, and 11 at the Trade Mark Registry in New Delhi, with these applications advertised in the Trade Mark Journal and certificates expected soon. Through long, widespread, and exclusive use on electrical goods, the trade mark gained strong reputation and goodwill, with annual sales in crores, and it even forms a key part of the plaintiff's company name.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

In January 1998, the plaintiff learned that the defendant started using the exact same trade mark CAPITAL for fans they made and sold across Delhi and other areas. The defendant sold these fans secretly without proper invoices, making the mark identical and confusingly similar in look and sound to the plaintiff's. Buyers ended up mistaking the defendant's fans for the plaintiff's products, allowing the defendant to profit from the plaintiff's hard-earned goodwill. The plaintiff's products faced damage to reputation due to the defendant's lower quality items sold under the same name.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Procedural Detail

The plaintiff sent a legal notice to the defendant asking them to stop using the trade mark, but the defendant refused in a written reply. This led the plaintiff to file a suit in court seeking a permanent injunction to stop the use, action for passing off and trade mark infringement, damages, and rendition of accounts. Summons were properly served on the defendant, but they did not appear or respond, so the court proceeded ex parte, meaning without the defendant's side. Evidence came through an affidavit by Dinesh Chand Gupta, the plaintiff's Director, who proved key documents like the company's Memorandum and Articles of Association, board resolutions authorizing the suit, the registration certificate for CAPITAL, pending applications, invoices and ads from Exhibits P-2 to P-21 showing long use, labels of both parties' marks, and the notice with reply.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Core Dispute

The main fight was whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff's registered trade mark CAPITAL and passed off their fans as the plaintiff's goods by using an identical mark on similar electrical products. The plaintiff argued this violated their statutory rights under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and common law rights from reputation and goodwill. The defendant's secretive sales without invoices worsened the chance of buyer confusion, leading to loss for the plaintiff and unjust gains for the defendant.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The court looked closely at the unrebutted evidence from the plaintiff, which clearly showed the defendant using CAPITAL on fans and passing them off as the plaintiff's. The labels were placed on record, proving the defendant's mark deceptively similar, sure to confuse ordinary buyers into thinking the fans came from the plaintiff. This use on similar goods like fans, which relate to electrical appliances, rode on the plaintiff's reputation from years of sales, causing real business loss while the defendant profited unfairly. The court noted the defendant copied the mark on purpose to trick buyers and cash in on the goodwill, as no defense was offered.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

In its reasoning, the court relied on the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, especially Clause 9 for registered measuring instruments, and principles of passing off from long exclusive use. No other cases were cited in the judgment, but the decision rested on proved facts: prior use since 1986, registration, pending wider applications, sales proof via Exhibits P-2 to P-21, and identical labels. The court held the plaintiff proved infringement and passing off fully, entitling them to relief. Thus, it granted permanent injunction per prayers (i) and (ii) of para 15 of the plaint, ordered delivery of all finished/unfinished goods, blocks, labels, boards, and literature with the offending mark for destruction per prayer (iii), and for accounts per prayer (iv), appointed Local Commissioner Mr. Yogesh Chaudhary (243, Lawyers Chambers, Delhi High Court) with Rs. 15,000 fee paid by plaintiff, for a preliminary decree on profits, allowing final decree later.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Decision

The suit succeeded fully with costs against the defendant. Permanent injunction issued restraining use of CAPITAL or any similar mark; delivery-up for destruction ordered; preliminary decree for profit accounts passed with commissioner appointed; decree sheet to be drawn up.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Concluding Note

This judgment strongly protects trade mark owners from copycats in related goods, stressing how identical marks on electrical items confuse buyers and damage goodwill. It shows courts act decisively ex parte when evidence is clear and unchallenged, upholding registration and reputation under the 1958 Act. A key lesson for businesses: long use builds rights even before full registration expands.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Case Title: Capital Meters Ltd. Vs B.P. Electric
Order date: October 12, 2001
Case Number: Suit No. 1413 of 1998
Neutral Citation: 2001:DHC:1155
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Sharda Aggarwal, J.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested 5 Suitable Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

1. Guarding Goodwill: Trade Mark Protection in Electrical Goods Domain

2. From Meters to Fans: Decoding Infringement and Passing Off under 1958 Act

3. Ex Parte Triumph: Enforcing CAPITAL Mark against Deceptive Imitation

4. Reputation at Stake: Judicial Stand against Identical Marks in Allied Products

5. Injunction and Accounts: Lessons from CAPITAL Trade Mark Clash

============

Delhi High Court Grants Injunction to Capital Meters Ltd. in Trade Mark Clash with B.P. Electric

New Delhi, October 12, 2001: In Suit No. 1413 of 1998, the Delhi High Court, presided over by Hon'ble Justice Sharda Aggarwal, ruled in favor of Capital Meters Ltd. against B.P. Electric, issuing a permanent injunction for trade mark infringement and passing off of the mark CAPITAL.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Capital Meters Ltd., manufacturing electrical meters, switches, and appliances under CAPITAL since 1986, proved prior registration under Clause 9 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and substantial goodwill from crore-level sales. The court found B.P. Electric's use of the identical mark on fans deceptively similar, causing buyer confusion and business loss due to inferior quality products sold clandestinely without invoices.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Proceeding ex parte after the defendant's non-appearance, evidence via Director Dinesh Chand Gupta's affidavit confirmed long use through invoices, labels, and legal notice ignored by defendants. Justice Aggarwal decreed injunctions per plaint prayers (i)-(iii), ordered destruction of offending materials, and a preliminary decree for profit accounts via Local Commissioner Yogesh Chaudhary, with costs on defendant.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Rallis India Limited Vs Controller of Patent

Brief Introductory Head Note

The present case arises from an appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the order of rejection passed by the patent office. The main issue was whether a previously filed patent application could be treated as ‘prior art’ for judging the obviousness and novelty of the appellant’s formulation. The court examined the procedural fairness of the order, the correctness of relying on a provisional specification to set priority date, and whether the claimed emulsifiable concentrate (EC) formulation was actually disclosed in the provisional specification of the earlier patent. The judgment ultimately remanded the case for fresh decision by another officer.

Factual Background

The appellant, Rallis India Limited, filed Patent Application No. 4135/CHEN/2014 on 25 August 2014 for a “stable herbicidal composition containing pendimethalin and metribuzin in emulsifiable concentrate (EC) form” at the Indian Patent Office, Chennai. A request for examination was made on 27 September 2017. The patent office issued the First Examination Report on 22 July 2019, raising objections on lack of novelty and lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) and Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, by citing prior documents AU760278B2, AU2012203353B2, and Proceedings of the Ninth Australian Weeds Conference, 1990.

Alongside, two opponents—Haryana Pesticide Manufacturers Association (HPMA) and Chimanbhai Chauhan—filed pre-grant oppositions under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act. HPMA’s opposition was filed on 10 September 2019, and pleadings were completed by 27 August 2021, with hearing concluded on 24 November 2021. The third respondent filed a separate pre-grant opposition a day before submissions were filed by HPMA; that second opposition concluded with hearing on 17 July 2023.

A key document used by all opponents was Patent No. IN 2243/MUM/2014, which also described pendimethalin and metribuzin compositions, and included dependent claim 17 referring to EC, ZC, OD, etc. This patent was initially filed provisionally on 9 July 2014 and later completed on 30 December 2014.

The appellant submitted amended specifications and two affidavits from experts, including by Vairamani Ramanathan, clarifying that the earlier provisional specification taught only SE formulation, not EC and even claimed that SE was superior to EC.

The controller rejected the claims on 5 March 2024.

Procedural Details

The appeal was filed under Section 117A(2) of the Patents Act, 1970. The appeal did not examine merits fully, but focused on legality of the rejection order. The court checked whether a ‘speaking order’ (reasoned order) was passed, and whether contentions, affidavits, and prior art reliance were examined in a fair and complete manner.

Core Dispute

The core dispute was whether the provisional specification of IN 2243/MUM/2014 actually disclosed an EC formulation so that its priority date could defeat the appellant's priority date of 25 August 2014. The appellant argued it does not, and hence cannot be treated as prior art for EC claims, because Section 11(2) mandates that the priority date of a claim can be taken from the provisional specification only if the claim is “fairly based on the disclosures” in it.

The opponents argued that the ranges overlap and compositions were already known, hence obvious. However, the impugned order never examined the appellant’s preliminary legal objection under Section 11(2) at all nor analysed all prior arts relied by opponents.

Reasoning and Detailed Discussion by Court

The court referred to Section 11(1), Section 11(2), Section 11(6), and Section 11A of the Patents Act, 1970 in full. It emphasised that priority date can flow from the provisional specification only if the claim is fairly based on it. When it examined the extracts from provisional specification, it found that the provisional specification of D3 related only to Suspo-Emulsion formulation and contained statements that SE formulations are better than EC, do not require solvents, contain no organic solvent and are water based. There was no disclosure of EC formulation at all. The later complete specification alone included claim 17 describing EC, OD, etc., but this came on 30 December 2014, which is after the appellant’s filing on 25 August 2014.

The court observed that though the appellant specifically raised this objection in the reply statement (Volume VI – pages 1026-1028) and written submissions (Volume VII – page 1186), the impugned order noticed that D3 is not a prior art under Section 25(1)(e) but failed to record any reasoning or finding on whether EC claim could derive priority from provisional specification. Hence, the order stood legally defective. The court also held that several other prior art documents used by opponents were not examined at all in the controller’s order. It was also noted that affidavits by experts were neither accepted nor rejected with reasons. This failure to deal with significant materials and issues rendered the order invalid in law.

Decision

The court set aside the rejection order dated 5 March 2024 and remanded the matter for fresh decision by another patent officer with direction to pass a speaking order within four months and without being influenced by the court’s prima facie remarks.

Concluding Note

This judgment stresses the importance of fairness, full reasoning, and proper legal foundation when rejecting a patent. It explains that if the earlier provisional specification does not disclose the exact subject matter claimed later (here, the EC formulation), then such later-added dependent claims cannot get priority back-dated to the provisional date. This protects the integrity of Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, which ensures that priority cannot be claimed for subject matter that was never disclosed at first filing.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Case Title: Rallis India Limited Vs Controller of Patent

Case Number: C.M.A.(PT) 21 of 2024
Order Date: 20 November 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:2659
Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras, Chennai – Tamil Nadu
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamurthy

Written By: Advocate Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Five Suitable Suggested Titles for Publication

Simultaneous Priority Claims and the Test of ‘Fair Basis’ under Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, 1970
Rallis India Limited v. Controller of Patents: A Case Study on Procedural Fairness and Prior Art Reliance
The Doctrine of Fair Basis for Priority: Lessons from the Rallis India Patent Appeal
When Provisional Specification Falls Short: Understanding Section 11(2) through Rallis India Ltd.
Prior Art, Fair Basis, and the Imperative of a Reasoned Order: Insights from Rallis India Limited v. Controller of Patents

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The case titled Rallis India Limited v. Controller of Patents, decided on 20 November 2025 in Case No. 4135/CHEN/2014, was delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The appeal by Rallis India Limited challenged the patent controller’s rejection of its invention concerning a stable herbicidal composition of pendimethalin and metribuzin in Emulsifiable Concentrate (EC) form. The rejection order, originally issued on 5 March 2024, was examined by the High Court of Madras for legal correctness and procedural fairness.

The dispute largely centred on the controller’s reliance on an earlier filed patent (IN 2243/MUM/2014) as prior art with a priority date of 9 July 2014 (provisional specification). The appellant argued that the provisional filing of that earlier application only disclosed a Suspo-Emulsion (SE) formulation and never disclosed an EC formulation, and hence its priority could not be used against the appellant's EC claims as per Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, 1970. Although the controller acknowledged D3 was not prior art under Section 25(1)(e), the rejection order contained no clear reasoning or finding on the “fair basis” test for backdating priority for EC formulation. The appellant also pointed out that affidavits filed by technical experts, including by Vairamani Ramanathan and G.N. Kendapa, were not discussed or evaluated at all.

The High Court found that the rejection order failed to deal with important legal objections, did not evaluate expert affidavits, and did not consider several prior art documents submitted by opponents. The court held that such omissions rendered the order invalid in law as it was not a “speaking order” (reasoned order). Consequently, the court set aside the rejection and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by a different patent officer, directing that a detailed reasoned order be issued within four months without being influenced by the court's remarks.

This decision reinforces the importance of complete reasoning, fairness, and the requirement that priority dates for specific formulations must be fairly based on the provisional disclosures, failing which they cannot defeat later-filed inventions.

Disclaimer:This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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